Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

This Question is commonly proposed by theologians in other words: namely whether in Christ there is one esse or manifold: for a threefold esse is commonly assigned by the Philosophers, namely of essence, of existence, and of subsistence. The esse of essence is that whereby things are constituted in some determinate species of being, namely that which coalesces from the essential and quidditative parts of each thing, from which is derived the abstract essence, which differs by reason alone from its concrete esse, as the Doctor teaches passim, especially in 1 dist. 8 last question but one. The esse of existence is that whereby a thing is in act, and is really placed outside causes and outside nothing; whence existence and actual essence do not differ really. The esse of subsistence of substance is that very real existence of any substance whatsoever whereby it is called a being subsisting per se: for subsistence is taken in various ways, chiefly two: first inasmuch as it is the mode of an existent being per se, and independently of any subject of inhesion sustaining it, whereby it differs from accident; or inasmuch as it signifies the mode of existing incommunicably, as this something and as whole, that is, after the manner of part and superior. Subsistence taken in the prior way is called difference of substance and mode of its existence: but in the latter it is called supposit in things devoid of reason, and person in things endowed with reason.

Note 2. That all Catholic Doctors agree that in Christ there is one unique esse of personal subsistence, because in Him there is one only person; since the human nature of Christ subsists by the very personal subsistence of the Word, as we proved above: but all those same Doctors do not agree whether there is also in Christ one unique esse of substantial subsistence; since most of the holy Fathers to be praised below admit in Christ a threefold subsistence, as likewise substance and essence, namely divine, corporeal, and spiritual. Whence a grave controversy on this matter arose at some time between the Spanish Prelates and Benedict II. For the writers of Spanish history, as Ambrosius Maurus book 12 chapter 38, and Mariana book 6 chapter 18, relate, when the Fathers of the Twelfth Council of Toledo had said in their confession of faith that there are three substances in Christ, when Benedict II received that confession transmitted to himself by those Prelates, that it might be approved by Pontifical authority, he noted three things in it which did not seem rightly enough said: especially truly, that they professed three substances in Christ. Which he certainly signified verbally through a Spanish man whom they had sent to Rome with Peter notary regionary Legate of the Apostolic See: when the Toledo Fathers had received this, Julian Toletan Antistes, in the name of the whole Council and of the prelates of Spain wrote an apologetic book, King Egica requiring it, in which with many testimonies he confirmed that three substances in Christ, according to the sentiment of the holy Fathers and OEcumenical Councils, must be admitted; and they transmitted that book to Benedict himself; but since he was already deceased, Sergius his successor received it, who, as Rodericus Archbishop relates in his History chapter 13, and likewise Garcias Loaysa Doctor Complutensis and Archbishop of Toledo in the annotations on Council 15, gratefully held and approved, Sergius the Pontiff. — But whether that Apologetic was written by the succeeding Thirteenth Council of Toledo or truly at that time between the Twelfth and Fifteenth is disputed among those same authors; and Baronius thinks that Apologetic was written and transmitted under the year 684 and 685 before the celebration of Council 13; and he notes that Benedict suspected more than three propositions in that confession of faith, and proves it from the same Council 13 where the Fathers speak thus: Considering truly the third and fourth chapter, we have shown that we tasted beforehand not only the sense but even the very words from the books of blessed Ambrose and Fulgentius. But they say monstravimus certainly nowhere else than in that prior Apologetic sent to Benedict for the defense of the same propositions; there therefore all four chapters noted by Benedict were confirmed, and transmitted to the same Benedict during that intervening time between the Councils of Toledo 12 and 13; although afterward it was enlarged, as seems to be gathered from those words of Council 13 read again more studiously, (etc. and approved by the unanimous consent of the Fathers of Council 17: which indeed stands, because in the acts of that Council, after the confession of faith, it is had: from which it appears that the controversy is not uselessly raised whether three subsistences are to be admitted in Christ.

Note 3. That among Scholastic Doctors there is the greatest controversy concerning the resolution of the first difficulty. For most Thomists with Cajetan in 3 par q. 17 art. 2 and Capreolus in 3 dist. 6 q. 1 contend that the humanity of Christ does not exist by created existence, but that by hypostatic union it has been assumed unto existing by the very existence of the divine Word, and they strive to confirm this by the authority of St. Thomas from his sayings in 3 par in the same question. Truly, as Suarez observes disp. 36 sect. 2, St. Thomas is to be understood of the esse of personal subsistence, not indeed of the esse of existence and substantial subsistence. Other theologians however with Subtili Doctore in 3. dist. 6 q. 1 contend that there is in Christ a twofold existence, namely divine, by which the divine nature exists, and created, by which the human nature really exists.

First Conclusion. — THERE ARE IN CHRIST TWO ESSES OF EXISTENCE: ONE UNCREATED OF THE DIVINE NATURE; THE OTHER CREATED OF THE HUMAN NATURE. This is the opinion of the Doctor; and he proves it with eight arguments, whereof the first is: The term of generation, or that which receives esse through generation and passes from non-existing in the order of nature to existing esse, is either the very existence itself or something having existence: otherwise it would not receive esse of existence through generation: but the humanity of Christ, or Christ Himself qua man, is truly begotten of His Mother, and brought forth in time by her, the Holy Ghost cooperating: therefore that humanity receives esse of existence through generation, which it had not before: but the uncreated esse, or existence of the Word, is not produced through temporal generation: therefore the term of that generation had another esse of existence distinct from the existence of the Word. The major is Aristotle's Metaphysics 5 text 7. The minor truly is St. Damascene's book 4 De fide, chapter 13.

The Thomists reply: that the uncreated esse terminated generation not absolutely, but under humanity. — Against this: the uncreated esse, as it was in humanity, denoted nothing but a respect toward it: but such a respect cannot be the terminus of a real and actual generation.

Moreover, there are two natures in Christ having distinct actual entities: therefore also distinct existences, because existence is nothing else than actual entity; whence as personal or subsistent esse cannot be understood without subsistence, so neither can actual esse without existence; and this argument indeed is founded upon our general principle, by which we say essence and existence are not distinguished really.

Thirdly the Doctor proves the conclusion from that saying of Aristotle, To live to living things is the same as to be: but the humanity of Christ lived an actual life distinct from the life of the Word: otherwise as the Word truly did not die, so the humanity would truly not have died if it had lived no other life than the life of the Word: therefore it had an actual esse distinct from the esse of the Word: but actual esse is the esse of existence: therefore etc.

Fourthly, the humanity qua condistinct from the Word is either something or nothing. If nothing, then the Word assumed nothing; if something, either it is only in objective potency, as Antichrist, or in act. If only in objective potency, the Word assumed humanity no more than any possible being whatever. If in act; therefore the humanity qua condistinct from the Word has existence, for humanity in act and existing humanity are the same. It is confirmed: for the Word assumed humanity either outside causes and outside nothing, or still only existing in its causes. If the first, we have our intent; if the second, the Word assumed not so much the humanity itself as its causes, because a thing in its cause is nothing else than the cause itself, as productive of that thing.

Fifthly, if the assumed humanity were dismissed, it would not be necessary for it to be annihilated, but it would truly exist; which supposed, it would exist either by force of a certain new production, or by force of the ancient production through which it was first effected, so that it might be assumed by the Word. Not the first, because no necessity appears why it be produced anew: therefore it would exist by force of its own production: therefore that production is terminated to humanity actually existing.

Sixthly, he argues ad hominem, because the Word could assume an angelic nature: but according to the adversaries the angelic nature assumed would not lose its own existence: therefore neither ought the assumed human nature lose its own existence. The minor the adversaries admit, for they teach that existence in purely spiritual things is really indistinct from essence. The consequence the Doctor proves: first, because proper existence is no more connected with an angelic nature than it is connected with a human nature. Secondly, because for this reason it is said that human nature has not its own proper existence in the Word, because it would follow that the same supposit has in itself several existences: but the same follows from the assumption of the angelic nature with its proper existence: therefore if this proper existing existence can be assumed, that one also can be.

Seventhly, the foundation of a relation as such precedes the relation as such: therefore the foundation of an actual relation really existing precedes it according to real existence: but the union of the human nature to the Word is an actual relation really existing: therefore it precedes it according to real existence, and consequently ought to have real existence antecedently to that union with anteriority of nature; not truly of time, because from what was said above the human nature of Christ did not exist earlier in time before the union: but what it had for that prior condition, it had in the same instant of time: therefore for that instant of time it had the same existence. But that existence was not the existence of the Word: therefore in that instant it had another existence; which is our intent. The Doctor confirms it: because before the nature was assumed as nature, the soul perfected the body of Christ, since the nature was constituted of body and soul, and consequently that nature could not be before the soul perfected the body: but in that prior condition the soul could not perfect the body unless both existed: therefore both existed before the nature was perfected. But in that prior condition they had not the existence of the Word: therefore another: but that other was not lost on account of the assumption: therefore it remained with the assumption, and consequently remained with the existence of the Word, which had come through the assumption.

Eighthly, every mode, especially extrinsic, supposes the thing whose mode it is: but hypostatic union is a mode extrinsic: therefore it supposes humanity: accordingly as that union is actual, so it supposes humanity existing.

They object 1. Certain authorities of the Holy Fathers: the first indeed drawn from the synodal epistle of Sophronius approved in the 6 Synod action 11, where speaking of the humanity of Christ he says: In Him (namely in the Word) and not in itself it had one existence. Likewise St. Damascene book 3 De fide, chapter 22 saying that human nature exists by the existence of the Word. Thirdly, the testimony of St. Leo Pope epistle 11 saying that the humanity of Christ was created by the very assumption. And St. Fulgentius book De Incarnatione chapter 3, where he says thus: The very acceptance of flesh was virginal conception: therefore they judge those Holy Fathers held that human nature did not previously exist before it was assumed by the Word, and therefore exists by the existence of the Word. — I answer first to Sophronius: he wished to signify that humanity did not exist twice, once in itself, and afterward in the Word, but that as soon as possible it existed thus in the Word, so that it did not previously exist in time than it subsisted in Him. Which certainly is confirmed from the preceding and following words of his epistle; for it is said: At once flesh, and at once the flesh of the Word of God; at once flesh animated rational. And it is subjoined: therefore in Him, and not in itself it had one existence, namely it did not previously exist in time in itself than in the Word. Which we grant spontaneously; but it is one thing to have existence in the Word, and another to exist by the existence of the Word. For the former does not repugn created existence; but the latter does. To these add that it can be answered that Sophronius understood by existence personal subsistence. For Budaeus observes in the Commentary on the Greek language that sometimes existence and subsistence are expressed by the same name. — To St. Damascene I say that authority is fictitious; since he teaches the contrary, for in the same chapter 22 he says: That the flesh is united from the last articulation to God the Word; nay rather that it existed in Him, and had personal identity with Him; where observe he does not say the flesh existed by the Word, but in the Word, because the Word is not the very existence of humanity, but the terminus of that existence. — To Saints Leo and Fulgentius I answer that they wish nothing else than that in the same instant of time humanity was formed and assumed; for thus says Leo: Our nature was not so assumed that first it was created and afterward assumed, but that it itself, namely, in the very assumption was created; where that prior and posterior are manifestly referred to succession of time. Fulgentius however thus expounded the matter: He showed this flesh then from the nature of the Virgin conceiving when in her God came to be conceived: therefore some interval must not be judged between the beginning of flesh and the advent of Majesty.

They object 2. From the opposite opinion three absurdities follow: The first, that the divine Word exists by created existence. The second, that created existence is a perfection of the Word. The third, that the Blessed Virgin is not the Mother of God. The first they prove a simili, because as the Word is said to will by created will and understand by created intellect, since He has created will and intellect, so He is said to exist by created existence if He be said to have created existence. They prove the second thus: existence is complement and perfection of subsistence: but in Christ there is one subsistence only, namely of the Word: therefore created existence will be complement and perfection of it. They prove the third, because from the opposite opinion it follows that the action of Virgin Mary was terminated to created existence, or to created being, and accordingly she will have from such created being that she is an action productive of a created being, not truly of God, and accordingly she will not be Mother of God. — The Subtle Doctor answers that it is not absurd that the Word be said to exist by created existence; not indeed qua He is God, but inasmuch as He is man; nor on that account ought the Word be said to exist by created existence secundum quid, but simpliciter, for that existence tends to make that which it affects existent simpliciter, not however secundum quid: for although Paul exists by the existence of white, because formally he is white, yet not simpliciter, but secundum quid does that existence exist, because that existence is secundum quid; and especially with respect to the existence which is in itself existence simpliciter; but in the supposit the existence of the human nature is in itself existence simpliciter, inasmuch as being is divided into simple being and being secundum quid, and ens simpliciter is subsistence, ens secundum quid is accident; but the existence of the human nature is the existence of substance: therefore since the divine Word is simpliciter man, that existence exists simpliciter, although he may say that this existence of the human nature is not the existence of this supposit, but supervening upon it, already having perfect esse, and therefore seems to be the existence of the supposit secundum quid, if it is not born to give secundum quid existence, such as every substantial nature is, however it stands toward that to which it gives esse. But if altogether the dispute be made, that the first supposit and not simpliciter be taken for the same, there is contention only about the word. — It will also be answered concerning the second absurdity that there is none, because so far is existence from being the complement of subsistence that rather subsistence farther actuates existence and supposes it. — To the third I say that the Virgin Deipara is not called Mother of God for this reason that she did not generate some created being; but that that created being generated by her was farther completed and terminated through the subsistence of the Word. Whence although the formal terminus of that generation be humanity with its existence; nevertheless the ultimate terminus which is generated is not humanity, but this man, because that humanity and its existence is not produced in itself, but in the Word, and therefore the Word is truly said to be generated and born of the Virgin: as the murderers of Christ, says Suarez disput. 36 sect. 1, truly deprived the humanity of Christ of its own existence, for the humanity did not exist during the three days of death; yet because the humanity did not suffer nor was deprived of existence per se, but as existing in this supposit, therefore this man is truly said to be slain, and God dead.

They object 3. If the humanity of Christ has its own created existence, Christ will not be ens per se. The consequent is proved: humanity having created existence is formally ens in actu; also the divine Word is ens in actu: but from two beings in actu there is not made ens per se: therefore etc. — I answer, that from two complete beings in actu there is not made ens per se, but well from two incomplete beings in actu, as in our hypothesis, since humanity destitute of proper subsistence is not accounted a being in actu altogether complete.

Second Conclusion. — WITH RIGHT REASON IT CAN BE SAID THERE ARE IN CHRIST THREE SUBSTANCES, AND CONSEQUENTLY THREE SUBSTANTIAL SUBSISTENCES.

It can be proved first by the authority of the Councils of Toledo 12 and 15, in which that proposition is asserted also through the apologetic book first published by Julian Archbishop of Toledo, and then approved by that Council 15 not only through Sergius successor of Benedict, but even through Benedict II himself, if those things are true which Rodericus relates lib. 3 Historiae Hispanicae cap. 13, where relating this controversy he says: Earlier in time the book concerning three substances, which long ago the most holy Primate Julian had sent to Rome, and treating less cautiously Benedict the Roman had declared to be reproved, for this reason that will grieved over will. It is added:

But St. Julian strengthened with truthful testimonies in this Council through their oracles, which he had transmitted to Rome, that it was true; and he made an apology, and sent it to Rome through his Legates Priest, Deacon, and Subdeacon men most learned servants of God in all things and imbued with divine Scriptures, together with acclamatory verses also, according as formerly he had transmitted concerning the praise of Roman Empire. Which Roman Pontiff Benedict receiving worthily and piously proclaimed to be read by all, and by acclamating, Thy praise, O God, unto the ends of the earth, made known it was often read; who also remitted the rescript to Lord Julian through the aforesaid Legates with thanksgiving and with honor, and brought forth that all things whatsoever he wrote were just and pious.

From these things it follows that that proposition, that in Christ there are three substances, although not first proven by Benedict, and, together with the other noted propositions, seemed to have been imprudently posited, as if the Fathers of Toledo had willed something far different, nevertheless, upon a change of judgment, Benedict approved the exposition of Julian and his book.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Holy Fathers, who taught that there are three substances in Christ, or that Christ was composed of three substances. For thus St. Augustine, lib. 3. De Trinitate, cap. 17, says: Since

human nature could be joined to God, so that from two substances one person might be made, and thereby already from three, God, soul, and flesh: by which he clearly teaches that Christ consists of three just as of two substances. Similarly St. Isidore in lib. De differentiis, cap. 7: We, he says, subsist of two substances, namely of soul and body: that one (namely Christ) of three, of the Word, of soul, and of body: which manner of speaking the Eleventh Synod of Toledo also imitated in the profession of faith, where, having said that there are two natures in the Son, it adds: The same Christ in these two natures exists in three substances: of the Word, which is to be referred to the essence of God alone: of body, and of soul, which pertains to the true man. — To these subscribes Stephen, Bishop of Edua, in lib. De Sacramento altaris, cap. 17: We believe, he says, that in Christ there were two natures, divine and human, and three substances, the divine, flesh, and soul. To these we can add St. Bernard, sermon 3. De virginitate nativitatis after the middle, where he speaks thus: And attend, because as in that divine singularity there is a Trinity of persons, a unity of substance: so in this special conjunction there is a trinity of substances, a unity of person.

You will say: Very many of the Holy Fathers disapprove this way of speaking: therefore it is to be rejected. The antecedent is proved; since St. Damascene, lib. 3. De Fide, cap. 16, does not think it should be said that Christ is composed of three substances: For, he says, every composition is said to be made only from those things which proximately compose, for we do not finally say that a house is composed of water and earth, but of bricks and wood; otherwise it will be necessary to say that man consists at least of five natures, namely of four elements and a soul. Thus in Jesus Christ our Lord we consider not parts of parts, but those things which are proximately composed with one another, divinity and humanity. In a similar manner speak the Fathers of the Council of Frankfurt in the Synodal Epistle to the Bishops of Spain, as well as Paulinus of Aquileia in his sacrosyllabic little book: therefore, etc. — I answer, that the aforesaid Fathers do not disapprove such a way of speaking as truly erroneous, but because it could perhaps lead someone either to think that Christ consists of three distinct natures, or has three substances personal as well as substantial; or to signify that the opposite way of speaking is more proper and fitting, so that we may profess our faith simply: notwithstanding that against the Apollinarian heretics denying the soul in Christ, and against the Valentinians and Marcionites denying in Christ a true body, one would rightly say that there are three substances in Christ. For, as the Council of Frankfurt says in the place soon cited, it is one thing to contend against heretics, another faithfully to confess pure faith; there indeed the truth of soul and flesh in Christ must be shown, here perfect humanity in the same must be confessed. Add that, as St. Damascene says, in composition remote parts are not reckoned, but proximate ones: for it must not be said that man is composed of five substances, but of two; because the four of them, namely the elements, concur in one body. By this reason, therefore, the way of speaking of the Council of Frankfurt and of Damascene seems more sincere, that Christ be said to consist of two natures and substances, namely the divine and the human.

Peres: whether Christ can be called some two? — I answer with the Doctor in 3. dist. 6. qu. 2, that neither in the masculine nor in the neuter can Christ be called two simply. Not indeed in the masculine, because these names, one, whole, other, two, taken in the masculine gender, signify hypostasis and person, as we said in the treatise on the Trinity; but in Christ there are not two persons, nor two supposita: therefore Christ cannot be called two in the masculine gender. Nor even then could he be called two in the neuter, because if Christ could be called two in the neuter, especially on account of the two natures that he has: but for that reason he cannot be called two, for from Logic abstracts cannot be predicated of concretes simply, but only with addition and explication: for it is not said, white simply is whiteness, because white says more than whiteness: since whiteness signifies only the form; white, however, the form and subject. Whence this enunciation is not legitimate: Christ is nature divine, or nature human, because Christ says more than the divine nature separately and the human nature: since besides those natures he says also the suppositum of the Word. Hence Athanasius in the Symbol says: Perfect God, and perfect man; yet not two, but one is Christ. Nevertheless, just as by exposition it can be said that white is that which has whiteness, so in an expository sense it can be said that Christ is that which has two natures; or more rightly, in which there are two natures, namely divine and human.

You will say: Wherever there is one thing and another, there are two: but in Christ there is one thing and another: therefore in him there are two. The minor is proved: Christ according as man, is something; and also according as God, is something: but according as man, he is not the same something as according as God: therefore he is another something. — The Doctor answers in the same place, that the particle according as, or inasmuch as, can be taken in two ways, namely reduplicatively or specificatively. In the former way it signifies that the term which is appended is the reason why the predicate is said of the subject: and thus the minor and its proof are to be denied. For just as it does not follow, milk inasmuch as white is something; and inasmuch as sweet is something: therefore milk inasmuch as white is the same something as it is insofar as sweet, or is another something: for it cannot be said that it is the same something, because it is certain that milk insofar as sweet, speaking reduplicatively, is not white: therefore it is another something: therefore it is true that milk is two, which is absurd: because if milk were called two, it would follow that there are two supposita. Therefore just as there is no first consequence of this argument, so neither does the minor of the argument about Christ stand in the reduplicative sense: whence just as of milk it cannot be said that inasmuch as sweet in the reduplicative sense it is white or not white; because sweetness is an impertinent reason for milk to be called white or not white, since it could be white even if it were not sweet; in the same way the suppositum of Christ, neither inasmuch as God, is the same as it is inasmuch as man, because it could be God without being man; nor yet is it thus diverse from it, because otherwise the suppositum of the Word, or Christ, could not truly be called man. But if the particle inasmuch as, or insofar as, is taken specificatively, so that the sense is that Christ insofar as man, that is, who is man, or notwithstanding that he is man, is also God, thus the minor can be denied, as well as the minor of its proof; for Christ, who is man, is entirely the same who is God, because the same suppositum of Christ is God and man. Nor does it thence follow that God is the formal reason on account of which he is man; or humanity the formal reason on account of which he is God, because that would only be true if the particle inasmuch as were taken in the reduplicative sense.

You will say 2. Christ is not only God: therefore he is God, and something else: and consequently he is two. The consequence is proved: because if it is true that a man runs, and does not run alone, it follows that something else besides the man runs: therefore similarly if the exclusive particle is posited on the part of the predicate, as happens in the aforesaid argument, saying that Christ is God, and is not only God, it follows that he is something else. — The Doctor answers by denying the consequence, together with the consequence of the proof; because one must not reason in the same way about the exclusive particle when it is added to the subject as when it is added to the predicate; for when it is added to the subject, it signifies that every subject not having the form to which the predicate is attributed also cannot have that predicate, although all things that have such a form can also have such a predicate; thus e.g. when it is said, only the white runs, it does not follow that the man and dog and white horse does not run, but only that the black does not run, nor anything else that is not white. But when the exclusive particle is posited only on the part of the predicate, then it could be said that no other predicate belongs to the subject: thus when it is said, milk is only white, the sense would be that of the qualities only whiteness would belong to milk. And in this sense it is denied that Christ is only God, because by that proposition it is signified that nothing belongs to him except Deity, which is false; equally by parity of reason it should be denied that he is only man. But it is conceded that he is not only God, nor only man; but thence it is not inferred that he is something else than God, or something else than man; for although of Christ no predicate is said that is other than God, and of which it could not be said that it is not God; nevertheless of him a predicate can be said of which God is not said essentially and formally. Therefore the parity of example does not hold; namely, that when it is said that not only the man runs, it is signified that some other suppositum runs: whereas when it is said that Christ is not only man, it is not signified that he is another suppositum: which signification, however, hangs on the institution of men, who by one exclusive particle signify another suppositum, but not by another.