Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

All Catholics agree that Christ, God, insofar as he is the Word of the eternal Father, is also his true consubstantial Son; for thus it is declared not only by open texts of Scripture, but also defined by sacred Oecumenical Councils against the Arians, Sabellians, and other heretics. It holds equally that at least by reason of the divine supposit, by which the humanity of Christ subsisted, concretely Christ can be called Son of God natural, as is clear from the Symbol of the Apostles, in which we believe in Christ his only Son our Lord, who was conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary. And from the Symbol of Saint Athanasius: Est ergo fides recta, ut credamus, et confiteamur, quia Dominus noster Iesus Christus Dei Filius, Deus, et homo est. And everywhere this truth is inscribed in the sacred Scriptures: thus Ioannis 1: Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis, et vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti a Patre, etc. Whence the only difficulty is whether Christ, considered qua man, can be called and truly is an adoptive Son of God: for man is capable of the adoptive filiation of God, as the sacred Texts mostly indicate: thus ad Romanos 8: Accepistis spiritum adoptionis, in quo clamamus Abba Pater. And ad Galat. 4: in adoptionem filiorum reciperemus: quoniam autem estis filii, etc. Et ad Ephes. 1: In adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum in ipsum. That these things may appear more evidently,

Note 1. From the Doctor in 3 d. 10 nu. 2, that the name of adoption has been drawn from the jurists to the Theological schools, to declare that consignation whereby God through sanctifying grace and superinfused charity peculiarly elects and destines certain men to eternal inheritance, as proper and adoptive sons: for adoptive son is said to be he, says the Doctor, who is not naturally begotten of someone, nor has by natural generation the right of succeeding him in his inheritance and goods, but obtains that right from the favor and pure liberality of the adopter: by which reason the daughter of Pharaoh adopted Moses as her son, Genesis¹ 2, by reason of which adoption Moses had right to the throne and scepter of Egypt, as Saint Paul indicates ad Heb. chapter 11, saying: Fide Moyses grandis factus negavit se esse filium filiae Pharaonis, magis eligens affligi cum populo Dei, quam temporalis peccati habere iucunditatem, maiores divitias aestimans thesauro Aegyptiorum improperium Christi. By like reason God is said to adopt certain men when he receives them to the inheritance of eternal life, who by their nature do not demand that inheritance to be communicated to them. Whence divine adoption is an acceptation, whereby God accepts men grateful to himself unto possession of eternal life after the manner of inheritance: to which description of adoption corresponds that which the Council of Frankfort hands down near its end, where it says: Quid est adoptio nisi charitatis copulatio, qua pater adoptione sibi copulat filium, quem proprium non habet? Which description indeed the book Sacro-syllabus confirms, pronounced in the same Council, in which it is said: Adoptatus dici non potest, nisi ille, qui alienus est ab eo, qui dicitur adoptans. Et gratis ei adoptio tribuitur, quonium non ex debito, sed ex indulgentia tantummodo adoptio praestatur.

Note 2. That although divine adoption agrees with human in some things, yet in more things it differs from it: First indeed, because human adoption takes place only in supplement of sterility and unfruitfulness: seeing that therefore the adopter chooses and enrolls another as son to himself because he desires to have some heir in place of a son whom nature denies him: but God although he has a natural son in all things like himself, nevertheless on account of his eminent charity deigns to enroll us among his sons, and to destine us to the inheritance owed to his proper natural Son: for, says the Apostle ad Romanos 8: Si autem filii, et haeredes: haeredes quidem Dei: cohaeredes autem Christi. — according to the second difference between both adoptions, divine and human: that he who adopts is nowise the principle or cause of the nature of the adopted: nay among men adoption was introduced that there might be a solace of sterility, and the defect of nature might somehow be supplied: but truly God adopts us as sons in such wise that he is also the principle of our being according to nature, although we were aliens from him with respect to the gift of grace and justice; wherefore when God adopts anyone, he is said to adopt one who was otherwise his own through creation, though not through the grace of holiness: and communicating to him sanctifying grace, he is said in a certain peculiar manner to make him his own: which St. Augustine explains most beautifully book 1 De sermone Domini in monte, chapter 22, saying: Adoptamur in regnum Dei, non tamquam alieni, sed tamquam ab illo facti, et creati, hoc est conditi, ut unum beneficium sit, quo nos fecit esse per omnipotentiam suam: alterum, quo adoptavit, ut tamquam filii vitae aeterna pro nostra participatione frueremur. For since from the benefit of creation alone we should not have right to eternal life and beatitude, which is the inheritance of God, which he prepared for his sons, from that alone we were not adoptive sons: but we obtain it through justification, by which we are instituted sons of God and his heirs. — The third difference between divine and human adoption is that by reason of human adoption, the adopted does not succeed in the paternal inheritance while the father still lives, but after he dies: but in the divine it happens otherwise: for the adopted by right of filiation enjoys his inheritance and beatitude while God always lives. The reason of this difference is not only that God is immortal, man indeed subject to death: but chiefly this comes about because adopting man needs those goods himself together with his own, nor could he communicate them to the adopted without his own loss, therefore he did not hand over those things to the adopted while he lives among the living: but since God is himself the inheritance of the sons whom he adopts, living he communicates himself to them through vision and love, without any detriment to himself. — The Doctor assigns a fourth difference, that man adopts by mere willing, and without positing any real entity in the adopted; but God adopts without any really distinct willing, but through communication of some real entity, namely sanctifying grace, by which the adopted is formally constituted in the reason of adopted: whence the divine will is not called adoption properly speaking, but rather the grace itself communicated; but the human will is the very adoption.

Note 3. From the Doctor in the same place, three conditions are desired for adoption: The first is that such adoption be gratuitous: so that the adopter is neither necessitated nor bound by any law to adopt anyone as his son and heir. Second, that in adoption there intervene mutual consent of adopter and adopted, if he who is adopted as son be of his own right: but if he be under paternal tutelage, or under his guardian, it is necessary that there intervene the consent of the father himself, or guardian, as is provided by law in adoptions, etc. Finally third, that the person who is adopted be extraneous, that is, that he have not by his nature right to that inheritance to which he is adopted. These three conditions are also desired in divine adoption: First indeed, that is done gratuitously, seeing that from charity alone and pure mercy the eternal Father gives us sanctifying grace, whereby we are named and are Sons of God. Secondly, the justification of adults, who are of their own right, takes place with their own consent; but the justification of infants, who are under the care and tutelage of the Church, takes place mediated by the ministry of the Church itself. Finally third, the one adopted by God to eternal beatitude is extraneous. Nevertheless that extraneousness, as the Doctor observes number 3, must not be so understood as if sin ought to precede the grace of justification; otherwise the Virgin Mother of God could not have been held an adoptive Daughter of God, because she never contracted sin before grace; nor equally could Adam have been called an adoptive son during the time of his innocence; nor finally would the Angels have been adoptive Sons of God, because they were always innocent. There remains therefore that such extraneousness consist in the lack of natural right to the inheritance and goods of the adopter.

These things having been premised, there remains the difficulty to be determined, whether Christ qua man is and can be called Son of God adoptive. Concerning whose resolution there is a threefold opinion: The first indeed of those who judge that Christ, qua he is man, cannot be called adoptive son, whether his person be considered or his nature regarded. Thus Suarez, disputation 19, and Vasquez, disputation 89, who contends the opposite opinion was condemned as heretical in the Council of Frankfort against Felix and Elipandus; but as Cavellus our countryman notes most excellently in schol. 3 to the aforesaid question of the Doctor, Vasquez learned ill from St. Paul that word: Modestia vestra nota sit omnibus hominibus.

The second opinion is that, although absolutely and simply Christ is not to be called adoptive Son of God, nevertheless he can be so called with this reduplication, insofar as man; which opinion indeed Durandus taught in 3 dist. 1 qu. 1, with which the Doctor seems partly to subscribe in the above-praised place, where he says that he who should say filiation belongs precisely to the supposit, and not according to nature, could easily say Christ is not an adoptive Son, because that relation does not befit the supposit in itself: but by saying filiation is founded in a nature similar to the nature of the natural generator, adoptive filiation will be founded in the nature, which is similar to the Creator, as the image thereof by natural similitude, and also by similitude of grace, which he himself, as intellectual nature, can attain to the inheritance of the adopter. But since in the preceding Distinction, speaking of natural filiation number 10, he said it is not taken in creatures from the person, but from the nature, some gather from the same that he inclines more to the affirming opinion than the denying. Finally the third opinion is that of those who contend that Christ the Lord, as man, is to be called neither adoptive nor natural son. Thus Lugo disputation 31 and Faber disp. 23. We however judge the question is not to be determined absolutely, but only with distinction and modification. Whence let there be

Conclusion first. — CHRIST, IF MAN, IS NOT TO BE CALLED ABSOLUTELY SON OF GOD ADOPTIVE.

This is the more common, and is proved by all those authorities of Scripture and the Holy Fathers by which Adrianus the Pontiff, and the Fathers of the Council of Frankfort impugned the most wretched assertion of Elipandus Archbishop of Toledo, and of Felix Bishop of Urgel. But the chief ones are those by which Christ the Lord, often speaking before men concerning the Father God, never addresses him with one name common with us; for he does not say Pater noster, but Pater meus; et ascendo (says Ioan. 20) ad Patrem meum, et Patrem vestrum. He did not say, says Adrianus, Patrem nostrum, but Patrem meum, namely by nature, and Patrem vestrum, by benefit and grace. Although however an argument from negation usually carries little force, here nevertheless it is of no small moment; since Christ is so often called Son of God, why would he not once and again be called adopted, if truly he were such? Whence rightly St. August., book Contra Se-

Contra Secundinum Manichaeum, chapter 3, says: Read, he says, the Scriptures, you will never find it said of Christ that he is by adoption a Son: wherefore the Council of Frankfort, in the Epistle to the Bishops of Spain, after a certain testimony of St. Hilary, says: But thou whosoever thou art, who preachest Christ adoptive, whence had this sense come to thee? Thou knowest not any Patriarch knew it. Tractators kept silence about this name, Doctors of our faith did not teach it. — Secondly Adrianus proves from that ad Romanos 8: Qui proprio Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum: for if he calls him proper, how will he be adoptive? But that this must be referred to Christ according as he is man, Adrianus gathers: Because, he says, he was not delivered according to his Divinity, but according to that which he is man: him namely who was delivered, the very Apostle protests to be the proper Son of God. — It is confirmed by the authority of St. Hilary 6 De Trinitate, where weighing those words of the Apostle he says: Numquid rursum nunc adoptionis erit nuncupatio, in quo proprietatis est nomen?

These things are confirmed most especially from the words of the Divine Father, when Christ was baptized by John, and again while transfigured between Moses and Elias, in the sight of three Apostles resounded from heaven: Hic est Filius meus dilectus (Matth. 3 and 17), he manifestly distinguishes him from those who were sons of God by grace and adoption. For nothing hinders that John, Moses, Elias, the Apostles be called sons of God by adoption: therefore since this voice of the Father was directed to Christ alone, and called him Son, and his own, and beloved: doubtless he separated him from those who are called sons of God solely by the grace of adoption. Therefore Christ is not adopted, thence because, as often as Christ speaks of the Father, so often he distinguishes between himself and the sons of adoption; and nowhere does the Gospel say with common signation of filiation with us: Pater noster; but perpetually either Pater meus, indicating that by property of nature he pertains to God: or Pater vester, or Pater suus, that he may signify the grace of adoption.

It is proved secondly by the authority of the Holy Fathers: most especially indeed of St. Augustine, tract. 2 on chapter 1 of Ioannis, at those words: Quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, where he says: Non enim nati sumus de Deo, sicut illo Unigenito, sed adoptati per gratiam ipsius; ille enim natus est Unigenitus, ut solveret peccatum: quibus solutis, implicamur, ne non adoptaret nos propter impedimenta eorum. But St. Augustine speaks of Christ qua he is man: for according to his humanity he alone had brothers adopted. Whence thus argues Adrianus: when through his grace we were adopted, if he himself was partaker with us in the grace of adoption? For just as he would not have taken away sin, if he himself had sin, so he would not bestow the grace of adoption, if he himself, on account of the man whom he assumed without stain of sin, had need to receive the grace of adoption. — Secondly he proves the testimony of St. Gregory the Great book 1 Moralium, chapter 6, where applying to Christ those words: Erat ille vir magnus inter omnes orientales, he says: All men are only men: but himself the east of God and man is rightly called: he surpasses all who are born of God in faith; because not as the others adoptive, but natural illuminator he existed. Nearly the same has St. Isidore book De doctrina christiana, and Ecclesiasticarum dogmatum, chapter 2, whose words are: The Son of God made man became son, born according to the truth of nature of man the son of man, that by the certainty of the Only-begotten, not by adoption nor appellation, but in both nativities he might have the name of son in being born, that he might be true God and true man one son.

The Doctor proves the same truth with this reason: That anyone be adopted it is necessary that he be extraneous to that to which he is adopted: so that nothing accompany his generation as a disposition conferring right to the inheritance: but Christ in the very moment of time in which he was conceived had habitual grace, which conferred right to the inheritance: therefore Christ, even according to his humanity, was not adopted. The major is clear from Notable 3. The minor is proved; for in the first moment of conception the humanity of Christ was united to the Word, and thus demanded sanctifying grace.

We shall reply therefore with the same Doctor, that that grace which accompanied the generation of Christ was not granted in the prior instant or sign of nature, but in the posterior; and thus in that prior sign of nature human nature, regarded in itself, was extraneous, nor had right to the inheritance: therefore qua such it could be adopted. — But true, although the Doctor does not answer this objection, but only says why; nevertheless I say this does not suffice for Christ to be called simply, qua man, Son of God adoptive; because however much Christ had right to the inheritance only in the second instant of nature, nevertheless in the first instant he had a disposition necessitating, at least de congruo, to that right; which disposition indeed was none other than the exigency of the divine supposit, since he lacked his proper supposit. Add that that priority of nature whereby the existing human nature is conceived before being assumed by the Word does not suffice for that reason of extraneousness required on the part of adopting: for extraneousness is something extrinsic presupposing a nature complete according to all its intrinsic modes, and consequently the nature must first be conceived as complete according to subsistence before it can be called extraneous or not extraneous. Therefore since in that prior instant of nature the human nature of Christ is not conceived as affected with personality, nor consequently intrinsically perfect, it cannot be held extraneous to the inheritance, seeing that in that sign it is not yet conceived capable of the inheritance, but only in the second instant of nature, in which it is conceived to have the subsistence of the Word and to be intrinsically complete: but thus considered the nature was not extraneous, because the supposit of the Word, by which it was sustained, demanded from congruity sanctifying grace, which conferred right to the inheritance.

It is proved secondly: If Christ were an adoptive son qua man, he could even simply be called adoptive Son; for since things befit Christ qua he is man, they can be affirmed of him simply, and must nowise be denied: for it is said simply of him that he suffered hunger, thirst, and similar things, which did not befit him except qua he is man, or by reason of his humanity; therefore since it is false that Christ is simply an adoptive son, it cannot be true that he is an adoptive son also qua man. Finally that formula of speaking is above all to be shunned, and every attribution is to be eliminated from Christ, which savors of heresy, or at least imitates the manner of speaking of heretics: but to call Christ an adoptive son, even qua man, savors of Nestorian heresy, by which he pronounced absolutely that Christ is Son of God only adoptive: therefore such he is not simply to be called.

You will object 1. Various authorities of the Holy Fathers, whereby there seems to be signified that Christ is Son of God adoptive; for Irenaeus book 1 Adversus haereses, chapter 21, expressly pronounces thus: Propter hoc enim Verbum Dei homo, et qui Filius Dei, filius hominis factus est. Mixtus homo Verbo Dei, ut adoptionem percipiens, fiat Filius Dei. Et Marius Victorinus book 1 Contra Candidum Arianum has thus: Nos adoptione filii, ille natura, etiam et adoptione quadam filius, et Christus, sed secundum carnem. Et Hilarius 2 De Trinitate, past the middle says: Potestatis Divinitas non amittitur, dum carnis humilitas adoptatur, namely in Christ. From which at least it is gathered that the humanity of Christ was adopted. — I answer, the holy Fathers use adoption improperly, truly not according to its strict signification, seeing that Irenaeus and Victorinus call the substantial union itself of humanity with the Word the adoption of that humanity. But if Christ were an adoptive Son, his adoption would not have to be sought precisely from the hypostatic union: since that of itself does not confer the reason of divine filiation, both because, as has been proven, the Word could assume any non-rational nature; yet in this hypothesis an assumed irrational nature could not be called daughter of God: then because union with a person, who is a natural son, is judged rather to confer natural than adoptive filiation. To St. Hilary I say that reading seems corrupt: for although in some codices there is that word adoptatur, in others however is read adoratur, into which the carelessness of scribes could easily creep. To which response Hilary himself gives suffrage, for speaking words about the nativity of Christ according to the flesh, he says: Hinc intelligitur, aliud videtur, aliud oculis, aliud animo conspicitur: parit virgo, partus a Deo est: infans vagit, laudantes Angeli audiunt: panni sordent, Deus adoratur: ita potestatis dignitas non amittitur, dum carnis humilitas adoratur: where the particle dum has causal force, just as the particle quidem: he therefore renders most excellently the reason why the dignity of power is not lost through the humility of birth and crying, saying: dum carnis humilitas adoratur.

You will object 2. Various texts of Scripture, in which Christ is preached inferior to the Father: thus Ioannis 14: Pater maior me est: but he is not inferior to the Father by reason of natural filiation, seeing that by it he is equal to him: therefore he must be held inferior to him by reason of adoptive filiation. Secondly ad Romanos 8 Christ is called our co-heir: Si filii, et haeredes: haeredes quidem Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi: but he is not our co-heir according to nature and divine filiation: therefore according to the human. Finally in the same chapter 8 v. 29 Christ is called firstborn among many brethren, that is, among all predestinated sons: therefore Christ is first among all adoptive sons by reason of grace and glory, and consequently truly is an adoptive son. — I answer, from these and similar texts of Scripture nothing against our assertion is inferred. Certainly not from the first, for when Elipandus had objected those words: Pater maior me est, the Fathers of the Council of Frankfort answered that these were not said by Christ on account of adoption, but on account of the form of servant, which Christ had as man. For, as they say: God and man he was, who according to his Godhead said: ego et Pater unum sumus, and according to his manhood: Pater maior me est: therefore that inferiority is not to be reduced to the reason of adoption, but to the assumption of humanity. To the other contexts I say Christ is not called our co-heir and brother because he is an adoptive son as we are, but because, as natural Son of God, he has the same Father whom we sons of God adoptive acknowledge: and has right to the same inheritance, though far more excellent than we; seeing that his right is founded in his natural filiation: ours truly in gratuitous adoption. Which response is clear by a like case: if any one of men, for instance having a son begotten of himself, nevertheless adopted others from the consent and will of the son himself: although that son were natural, nevertheless he could be called firstborn among adoptive brethren, because their adoption was made solely from his good pleasure and nod, and he earlier had right to the inheritance than they, of whose inheritance he is co-heir: but the same can be said of Christ the natural Son of God, by whose benefit we were enrolled as adoptive sons of God.

You will object 3. Christ was predestinated Son of God, ad Romanos 1; but predestination is adoption: therefore Christ is Son of God adoptive; for to predestinate is to adopt to the inheritance; therefore truly Christ is Son of God adoptive. — I deny the minor, for more things are required for adoption than for predestination, for to adoption is required that the adopted be extraneous; for predestination however only is desired that someone be elected to glory, whether meanwhile he be extraneous or not. To the proof I say that to predestinate is to adopt when the nature of the predestinate has sufficient extraneousness for adoption, I concede: when however it has not, I deny. But Christ has not sufficient extraneousness for adoption; seeing that right to the inheritance is founded in his natural filiation: therefore the consequence must be denied.

You will object 4. Every dignity of human nature is to be attributed to Christ: but dignity is in man that he be Son of God adoptive, because it befits no non-intellectual nature: therefore that is to be attributed to Christ. — I distinguish the major, similarly and the minor: it is a dignity to be an adoptive son, a dignity, I say, arguing some imperfection, I concede: it is a dignity without imperfection, I deny; for less worthy and glorious is it to be an adoptive son than natural. Therefore the consequence must be denied. For not every dignity arguing imperfection must be admitted in Christ; but only that by which it argues an imperfection necessarily consequent upon human nature: but the dignity of adoption presupposes extraneousness, which is an imperfection not necessarily consequent upon human nature: therefore that must not be admitted in Christ.

You will object 5. Insofar Christ is Son of God natural insofar as he is begotten of God the Father: but he is not begotten of God the Father qua man: therefore qua such he is Son of God adoptive, but not natural. — Some answer with Vasquez chapter 12 and 13 by denying the minor, because, they say, the human nature of Christ subsists in the Word, which is

Son of God natural, and begotten of God the Father; for to be Son of God natural happens in two ways: in the first way strictly and properly, insofar as it denotes begotten of an intellectual generator naturally; in the second way less properly, insofar as it signifies something personally united to him who is said to be begotten naturally. In the former way Christ as man is not Son of God natural: in the second way however he can be so called. I answer moreover that if that proposition, Christ, as man, is Son of God natural, be so taken as to signify that that man united to the Word has not only habitual grace, by which he is adopted to the inheritance, but also has the grace of hypostatic union, by which he is called God, certainly in this sense, Christ, as man, is Son of God natural, because he is united personally to the natural Son of God: but if this proposition be understood thus: Christ according as he is man, that is specificatively, the human nature of Christ is natural daughter of God, in this sense that proposition is false; for the humanity of Christ is not begotten of God, but of blessed Virgin. Whence speaking absolutely, the minor could be permitted and the consequence denied, because since between filiation simply natural and simply adoptive a middle is given, doubtless to be Son of God not absolutely naturally, but by participation of natural filiation, as Christ as man is Son of God on account of the union of humanity with the person of the natural Son of God, it follows that the inference is vicious, since the argument is not made from a just distribution.

You will object 6. The natures remain unmixed in Christ, nor mutually impeding their properties: but to be adopted is a property of a nature having grace: therefore it can be said of Christ that he is adopted by reason of his human nature, by which he has grace, no less than it can be said of him, by reason of the divine nature, that he is a natural Son. — I distinguish the major: the natures remain unmixed not impeding their properties necessarily and connaturally consequent upon themselves, I concede: their properties, that is, all those things which could befit those natures, I deny. Similarly I distinguish the minor: adoption is a property necessarily and connaturally consequent upon a nature having sanctifying grace when that nature is extraneous to the inheritance, I concede: otherwise, I deny. Whence the consequence must be denied, seeing that the human nature of Christ, as completed by the subsistence of the Word, does not have that extraneousness.

You will object then: The Subtle Doctor teaches that Christ as man can be called Son of God adoptive, as may be seen in the already-praised book, and moreover in 3 dist. 8 where he teaches filiation is not taken in creatures from the person, but from the nature: hence the favorers of that Disciple, namely Tartaretus, Maior, Luzsonius, etc., defend the same opinion: therefore our assertion militates against him. — I deny the antecedent: For the praised Doctor q. 10 resolves with the Master that Christ is not Son of God adoptive; Because, he says, then he would be the Son of the Trinity, whom the whole Trinity adopts, and would exercise every act outside: and in the same place he solves all the arguments which he himself had formed for the opposite side: whence Puteolanus disp. 10, Lucher disp. 23, Ried 3 part of Controversies 3 art. 2, and Pourius in the Commentary militate for our assertion, and confess the Doctor is problematical in this opinion: nevertheless I incline more to the denying side; for the Doctor himself in 3 dist. 2 qu. 1 n. 11, having said: Non necesse est, quod si filius Dei est filius hominis, quod ille idem filius hominis sit Filius Dei per gratiam: adds: Forte enim negaretur de eodem determinate: imo nec conceditur, quod Christus sit Filius Dei adoptivus: therefore false is it that our assertion opposes the mind and doctrine of the Doctor. Hence appears how gravely very many Recentiors of either school exorbitate, while they praise the Subtle Doctor absolutely for the opposite opinion.

Conclusion second. — IT IS NOT CERTAIN (WITH CERTITUDE OF FAITH) THAT CHRIST, QUA MAN, IS NOT TO BE CALLED SON OF GOD ADOPTIVE. This is against Vasquez and others his pertinacious followers.

It is proved first: If that proposition were of faith, chiefly because it would be held defined in the Council of Frankfort against Felix and Elipandus: but this reason is null: therefore it is not certain of faith that Christ qua man is not to be called Son of God adoptive.

Vasquez admits the major chapter 6 and 8 of disputation 81. But the minor is proved: Firstly very many Doctors even after that Council, as Alensis, Albertus, Richardus, and others judged it probable that Christ qua man can be called Son of God adoptive: nor did any of the Ancients condemn as heretical the opinion of Durandus, who assertively attributed such adoption to Christ. It can scarcely be replied that those Authors were ignorant of the definition of the Council of Frankfort, since they made no mention of it. For he will say it is not likely: for although it can be believed that perhaps they had not read the Acts of that Council, until at most in the year 1567 Surius took care to have transcriptions printed from a most ancient and true exemplar; nevertheless it can hardly be believed that they had not read the histories and writings of all those who impugned the Felician heresy, or made discourse concerning it; such as not only were Beatus and Heterius, who first rose up against Elipandus and nobly impugned him by words and writings: but also Charles the Great Emperor, by whose labor that heresy was condemned. And also Ionas Aurelianensis, and very many other Authors who wrote against Elipandus and Felix, all whom certainly could scarcely be believed unknown to those most expert Doctors.

Secondly, although in that Council Felix and Elipandus were condemned asserting Christ to be Son of God adoptive; nevertheless sufficient foundation would not seem to exist for asserting that proposition, as asserted by certain Theologians, to be rejected as heretical; because although Felix and Elipandus were condemned and proscribed by that Council as heretics because they asserted Christ to be Son of God adoptive: yet that condemnation does not prejudice our assertion; for Felix and Elipandus were therefore condemned in this Council because they renewed the heresy of Nestorius, and established two persons in Christ, or two supposits, according to the two natures, namely human and divine, which he had, as Suarez disp. 19 sect. 3, Valentia q. 20, Baronius ad annum Christi 783 n. 5 and 6 teach, likewise anno 791, Mariana book 7 De rebus Hispanicis, nay even Surius himself in the annotations upon this Council; which is also evinced from the acts of that Council, which consist in a certain epistle to the Bishops of Spain: likewise in the epistle of Adrian

the Pope, and also in the book sacro syllabo, whose author is Paulinus Aquileiensis, who together with CCC Bishops from Germany and Gaul in the Council condemned Felix and Elipandus therefore because they renewed the heresy of Nestorius; addressing first him and his adherents, column two has: Invenimus in libelli vestri principio scriptum, quod vos posuistis: Confitemur, et credimus Deum Dei Filium ante omnia tempora, sine initio ex Patre genitum, coaeternum, et consubstantialem, non adoptione, sed natura. Item post pauca in eodem legebatur: Confitemur, et credimus eum factum ex muliere, factum sub lege, non genere esse Filium Dei, sed adoptione, non natura, sed gratia. Et col. 1. Quia hominem Christum verum Dei Patris Filium esse negatis, nobis defensor esse noluisti. Et inferius col. 15. Nonne olim eadem haeresis vestra in Nestorio ab universali sancta Ecclesia refutata est etiam, et damnata? Et addit: Quapropter forte illum anathematizare noluistis, dum alios, Bonosum scilicet, Arianum, et Sabellium, Manichaeumque, qui prave de Filio Dei senserunt, Epistola vestra anathematizastis. In these things it is sufficiently intimated that Felix and Elipandus erred concerning the truth of the mystery of the Incarnation itself, and fell into Nestorian heresy either openly or under disguise. — The same is proved from the book sacro syllabo: for of Felix and Elipandus column three says: Haeresim veternosam illustrium virorum calcibus mirabiliter inculcatam, Catholicaque falce olim funditus detruncatam, spinoso redirivae radice suscitare de stirpe molliuntur. Et col. 8. Non duo Filii, alius Dei, alius hominis, ut sicut illi errando aestimant, adopticus sit hominis Filius, et sine adoptione Dei Filius. By which is signified that Felix and Elipandus openly distinguished the Word as natural Son from the son adoptive of man, like the ancient Nestorians. — The same is gathered from the epistle of Adrian, for at the beginning of the epistle the Pontiff speaking of the heretics whom he impugns says: Non sunt ex hominibus, quos Pater dedit illi, qui eum adoptivum, et non proprium Filium confitentur; quasi alienus aliquando a Patre fuerit — that is: They are not of men, whom the Father gave him, who confess him an adoptive and not a natural Son; as though he had been at any time alien from the Father. Therefore the opinion of those heretics was, that the person of Christ, who was man, was not the proper Son of God, but only adoptive. Which the Pontiff plainly signifies by the authorities of the holy Fathers, by which he upholds his own opinion, and attacks the opposing one as heretical. He proves St. Athanasius saying: If anyone against the divine Scriptures teaches another to be the Son of God, and another, who from Mary the Virgin was man, adopted by grace as we are, as if there were two Sons, him the holy Church anathematizes. He proves also the authority of St. Gregory Nazianzen, writing thus to Cledonius.

Then follows the decree of the Provincial Council, whose subscription not only the most illustrious men but also the bishops signed, and by authority of the Church condemned the same Felix: nay with the author of their error Nestorius, whom he imitated, they delivered them over to perpetual anathema. The same Sigebertus reports in his Chronicle ad annum 793 where he thus writes: Feliciana haeresis condemnata in praesentia domini Papae cum ipso Felice auctore abdicatur. This heresy asserted that the Son of God in divine nature was true God, but in human nuncupative. Likewise that in divine nature he was true Son of God, but in human truly adoptive, dividing the one person of God and man into two persons, namely of a true son and of an adopted. The same report Saint Antoninus 2 part of history tit. 14 cap. 1, Paulus Aemilius book 2, Nauclerus gen. 27, and others.

They reply therefore with Vasquez, those who contend that those heretics did not admit two persons in Christ, but only asserted that Christ qua man is not Son of God natural but adoptive; they reply, I say, first, that those authors who fought against Felix and Elipandus attributed the Nestorian error to them, not because they taught it, but because they taught something from which that error seems to be inferred. — Against this: if those heretics had altogether conceded union of natures in Christ according to one subsistence, and only from a bad understanding of the name of attribution had attributed adoptive filiation to Christ, there would have been no reason why the Nestorian error should be fastened on them. Moreover, why did not someone, whether of the Fathers of the Council of Frankfort or of the Authors who fought against them, most especially indeed Alcuinus most learned, to whom the Felician heresy was clear-sighted, have laid open and plainly explained such heretical deception and assertion? But none so explains the forces of that heresy, but with unanimous reckoning, as has been said above, they teach the assertors of that heresy innovated Nestorianism, asserting that Christ the man was an adoptive Son in precisely the same way, though with more excellent grace, as other just men are. Add that Elipandus himself taught the very same thing in his Epistle to King Charles. His words are reported in the Epistle of the Council to the Bishops of Spain column 3: Ex Patre Unigenitum sine adoptione, primogenitum vero in fine temporis, rerum hominem assumendo de Virgine carnis adoptivum, Unigenitum in natura, primogenitum in adoptione et gratia. By which words he plainly teaches that that man was united to God and assumed by him solely by the grace of adoption. But that Elipandus judged that adoption similar to ours is gathered from column 2 of the same epistle, where it is related that Elipandus in his epistle expounded that word of 1 Ioannis 3: Similes ei erimus: that is, he said, similar in the adoption of flesh, not similar in Divinity. Therefore there is no reason why they should labor so greatly to free him from Nestorian error.

They reply secondly from the confession of faith of Elipandus himself, which is inserted in the book of Beatus and Etherius, which Vasquez reports entire chapter 2 of the above-praised disputation, that it appears Elipandus admitted one person in Christ; for he says: Homo interior in una eademque Dei, et hominis persona agglomeratus, atque carnis vestimento indutus. — I answer, cunningly and with heretical variety he said one person in Christ, in that manner in which Nestorius admitted unity of person in Christ. For St. Thomas testifies 3 part q. 2 art. 6: Si fiat sermo in nomine personae, etiam Nestorius utebatur unitate personae propter unitatem dignitatis et honoris. Whence also the sixth Synodus defines anathema against him who says one person secundum dignitatem, et honorem, et adorationem: as Theodorus and Nestorius foolishly wrote. Therefore similarly Elipandus could by this artifice posit unity of person, that he might more easily delude the orthodox Fathers and avoid sentence of condemnation. Hence add that those words in una eademque Dei persona agglomerata signify no more than accidental union. But also Elipandus himself declared that he intended something else; for he adds in the same confession: Quia non per eum, qui natus est de Virgine, visibilia et invisibilia condidit, sed per illum qui non est adoptione, sed genere, neque gratia, sed natura, et per istum Dei simul et hominis filium adoptivum humanitate, et non adoptivum Divinitate mundum redemit. Et infra: Si conformes sunt omnes sancti huic Filio Dei secundum gratiam, et cum adoptato adoptici, et cum advocato advocati, et cum Christo Christi, et cum parvulo parvuli, et cum servo servi: where he plainly seems to make us equal to Christ in adoption: nay in so unworthy a manner of speaking about Christ he seems to think nothing more than about a pure man; seeing that in the same place he writes that God willed Christ to be ignorant of certain mysteries of his action.

Finally they reply: If Elipandus and Felix had been infected with Nestorian error there would have been no need to convene so many Councils, nor write so many books to convict and eliminate their error; for it would have been easiest to mark and convict them as heretics both by the ancient definitions against Nestorius and by the testimonies of Scripture, whereby it is demonstrated that there is only one person in Christ. But truly the Council of Frankfort does not proceed thus, but rather from the unity of person of Christ, which Elipandus did not deny, and from the properties and true definition of adoption, which he seems to have been ignorant of, the Council gathers that adoption cannot befit Christ: and finally to this it reduces the inconveniences, that if Christ were held an adoptive Son, he also must be divided into two sons. They add that since already in the Church, especially the Latin, the Nestorian error had been utterly uprooted, how could Elipandus hope from the Council and Latin Bishops confirmation of his doctrine, if he had felt the same as Nestorius? With what face before Charles the Great, a Prince most Catholic and the greatest defender of the Church, would he have acted, ordering a Council to be convened, in which his doctrine would be approved? — I answer, indeed Elipandus and Felix had not professed the error of Nestorius in express words, nor asserted expressly two hypostases or two supposits in Christ, or accidental union: but only that one was such by the name adoptive, which however they declared so that plainly in reality they thought nothing else than Nestorius: because neither did they distinguish it from our adoption, as has been proven above, nor did they attribute it to the sole humanity, but to a certain man, whom they said was third and prior to such union or adoption. Hence it is no wonder if Elipandus dared demand the judgment and approval of a Council, because perhaps he did not understand what followed from his error, or blinded by his own heresy and vainglory he hoped it would come to pass that he might more easily deceive others with his wrappings of words. And for the same cause the Council not only used the testimonies and definitions made against Nestorius to confound those heretics, but also strove to declare how in reality they said nothing else than Nestorius.