Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1. It is one thing for a satisfaction to be equal and condign by its very nature; it is another for that satisfaction to be made to the strictest requirements of law, or to proceed from rigorous justice. For in order that a satisfaction be condign, it suffices that the compensation be made to equality, and that only so much be paid by the debtor as is owed to the creditor: but in order that a satisfaction be made according to the laws of strict and rigorous justice, other conditions are desired beyond equality, which we shall set forth and weigh presently. Wherefore although nearly all agree that the satisfaction of Christ was condign, and unto equality, especially if his value be considered in relation to the reward; nevertheless very many of the Recent writers inquire further whether it was also offered according to the strict requirements of law and the laws of rigorous justice. Recent writers, I say, for none of the ancients whom I have read proposes and discusses the question under these terms: for they inquire only into, and resolve, that the satisfaction of Christ was condign, and unto equality, from true justice.

Note 2. Besides the three conditions desired for every perfect satisfaction, which we weighed in the preceding third Question, five more are assigned by Theologians, in order that a satisfaction may be said to be made according to rigorous justice: First, that the satisfaction be made from the proper goods of the one satisfying, who is the debtor: for since by every rigorous satisfaction a perfect equality must be brought about, it is necessary that he to whom satisfaction is made acquire dominion over some thing which he did not possess before; at least in that manner in which he obtains it through the satisfaction. Second, that it not be founded upon the grace of the creditor; for if someone owes a hundred coins, and the creditor is content if only fifty are offered, that satisfaction will not be from the rigor of justice, because it supposes the grace of the creditor, who out of liberality and mercy remits part of the debt. Third, that it be toward another; for rigorous satisfaction is essentially ordered to establishing a perfect equality; but perfect equality cannot be of the same being toward himself; for equality is a real relation necessarily requiring extremes really distinct. But whether that distinction and otherness must be between persons, or between natures, we shall open up below. The fourth condition is, that the person offended be bound to accept such a satisfaction, nor can he reject it out of justice, since indeed he recognizes it to be equal to the debt. This condition they assign above all others, John Medina, Treatise 3. De Poenitentia, q. 1. Andreas de Vega lib. 1. super Concilium, cap. 9. and with them very many Recent writers. The fifth condition is, that the satisfaction be made from those things which under another title are not per se owed to the creditor: which condition Saint Anselm assigns in book 2. Cur Deus homo cap. 19. For if someone owes another a hundred coins on account of an annual rent, and as many more by reason of a loan, or a sale, he would not satisfy the creditor by paying him only a hundred coins; for the creditor could accept those hundred coins for the annual rent, and thus the debtor would be held to pay another hundred coins in satisfaction of the loan, or sale.

Note 3. That we said pointedly and deliberately, that rigorous satisfaction must be made from things per se not owed. For a title of debt can supervene upon another in two ways: First indeed per se, and separately, by inflicting a new debt: Second, however, per accidens, and conjoinedly, by inflicting only a new obligation of paying the same debt, or a confirmation of the prior obligation: which becomes clear from these examples: For if someone owes another a hundred coins by reason of an annual rent, and afterwards borrows as many more; because the title of annual rent, by which he owed the former sum, is obligatory per se, just as the title arising from a contract of loan, therefore there is a twofold distinct debt, which cannot be discharged by a single payment. Likewise the same point becomes clear from this example: If someone is bound by vow to fast on each Friday, when that day is the vigil of some feast, and during the time of Lent, at which time and on which day he is also bound to fast by the precept of the Church, he does not there have a threefold distinct debt of fasting, but only a new obligation superadded to the prior one. Here, however, the question is not raised whether rigorous satisfaction requires being made from things owed per accidens, but only from things not owed per se: for it is certain that if someone were to swear to another that he would journey to Rome, which he was already going to do by vow, as well as by reason of a stipend accepted on account of that journey, he would not be bound to journey to Rome three distinct times; although he is bound thereto by the title of religion, by reason of the vow and oath, and by the title of justice by reason of the stipend accepted, because the titles of religion and justice in such a case are not obligatory per se, but only confirmatory of the prior obligation.

One Conclusion only. — The satisfaction of Christ (the divine pact being supposed) had all the conditions for a satisfaction from the rigor of justice, and unto the strictest requirements of law. This is the more common view, and, as it seems to me, more conformable to the mind of the Doctor, affirming that Christ satisfied condignly, and unto equality, and superabundantly (the divine acceptance and covenant being supposed), as was said above.

The Conclusion can be proved by the authority of the holy Fathers, who teach that Christ satisfied for us most exactly. Thus Proclus of Cyzicus in the Oration De Nativitate Christi, cap. 1. where he says: For our sins a price of such kind was paid out, which justly held fast the debt exacted unto the equity of justice: most justly indeed would the devil not lose his captives through the death of Christ, unless they were released from their captivity by a rigorous satisfaction and justice. — Saint Basil of Seleucia in the first Homily De Incarnatione says, that through the marvelous firstfruits of our nature, namely through Christ the Lord, every reason of justice was fulfilled.

Salvian lib. 1. De Providentia: In that Christ himself, namely, the very magnitude of justice seems to bear the appearance of injustice; that is, so exact, and so strict was the divine justice in the chastisement inflicted upon Christ, that the satisfaction exacted from him, on account of its magnitude, bore as it were an injustice.

But the Conclusion is proved by reason: That satisfaction was exhibited unto the strictest requirements of law, because it had all the conditions belonging to rigorous justice: but such was the satisfaction of Christ, which is indeed proved by weighing and applying the individual conditions:

The satisfaction of Christ was from proper goods.

For first the satisfaction of Christ was exhibited from the proper goods of the man satisfying: since Christ satisfied by submitting and offering his actions, and himself, to God, to compensate the injury inflicted through the sin of the human race: but both the actions, and the very suppositum of Christ were the proper goods of him as lord, and in no way under the dominion of God, to whom the satisfaction was rendered: therefore it was made from proper goods. The major stands: the minor is proved first: The suppositum of Christ was not under the dominion of God, inasmuch as it is not something created, but divine, and thence dependent on no one, since Christ is equal to the Father according to the divinity. The same stands for the satisfactory actions, for Christ satisfied only through human actions inasmuch as they proceeded from a divine suppositum: but as such, they took on the character of that suppositum from which they proceeded, not only after the manner of an efficient principle, but also after the manner of a formal principle informing and dignifying morally works of this kind: whence under this character they involved morally the divine suppositum: therefore since the suppositum of the Word is under the dominion of no one, the satisfactory actions of Christ were so properly his, that they belonged to no other as lord.

You will object 1. Created actions are under the general dominion of God, since God by title of creation and conservation has supreme dominion over all created beings: but Christ the Lord satisfied through the actions of his humanity, which are created: therefore through actions which were under the dominion of God, and hence of the creditor, and consequently not from proper goods.

I answer, distinguishing the major: created actions, which are not from a divine person, are under the general dominion of God, I concede: those which are from a divine person, I deny. To the minor I say, that Christ the Lord satisfied through created actions, not simply, but as they were from the person of the Word, so that the whole reason of the value of those actions emanated from the very person of the divine Word.

You will urge: The value of the satisfaction of Christ, from what has been granted, proceeded from the person of the Word as from a formal principle dignifying the operations of the humanity: but the person of the divine Word has the character of creditor, and of the offended party: since both the person of the Word, and the other two divine persons were injured through sin: therefore even the value of the satisfaction of Christ is taken from the creditor, or from the very offended party. — I distinguish the major: the value of the satisfaction of Christ is taken from the person of the Word inasmuch as it is formally the divine suppositum, that is, inasmuch as it terminates the divine nature, I deny: inasmuch as it is the human suppositum, or inasmuch as it subsists in the human nature, I concede. And likewise with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence. For although the suppositum of the Word be most simple formally, yet it is virtually multiple, because it exercises its terminating power both toward the divine nature and toward the human

You will object 2. Since every dominion belongs to the supposit by reason of the will, dominion over the satisfactory actions belonged to Christ the Lord either by reason of the divine will, or of the human: if the former, therefore he satisfied from what was common, and not from what was his own, because he satisfied from those things which were under the dominion of the will common to the whole Trinity: if the latter, therefore he satisfied likewise from what was common, because the human will of Christ, being a created thing, depends upon the whole Trinity. — I answer, that these actions are under the dominion of Christ by reason of his human will, and yet it does not follow from this that they are under the general dominion of God: for the created will of Christ can be considered in two ways: either in itself, that is, insofar as it is a created intellectual appetitive faculty, and as such it is under the general dominion of God: or inasmuch as it is the created intellectual appetite of a divine person, and thus it is not under the general dominion of God, because such a will is under this formal aspect of such a kind as is the divine person whose property it is: but the human will of Christ is mistress of the same satisfactory actions as the will of a divine person, and accordingly those actions are proper to him.

You will insist: But even those actions, inasmuch as they proceed from a will looking to the divine person, depend upon God in becoming and in being conserved; indeed even the will from which they proceed is under the dominion of God: therefore they look to the general and common dominion of the whole Trinity. — I answer, that the antecedent can be denied, if in that particle as the formal sense is taken; because in this sense these three things — the action of a divine person, and the worship of a divine person, and being created — are related only concomitantly: just as, for example, this proposition understood according to the formal sense, a stone as rational is not an animal, is true; because animality is not included in the formal concept of rationality, but only in the real and identical concept: but if the particle as is taken according to the material sense, the antecedent is true: and with that concession the consequence must be denied, on account of the reason given before, namely because those actions take on the character of the supposit from which they emanate.

You will insist: The actions of the human will of Christ, whether considered formally or materially, are a created thing: but everything created looks to the common dominion of the whole Trinity: therefore however they may be considered they were not proper to Christ. — I answer 1. that the actions elicited by Christ can be considered in two ways: First physically and entitatively, inasmuch as they proceed from the human nature as from a formal principle by which: Second morally, and as it were reflexively, to the divine Word, from whom they proceed as from a principle which. In the former way they are truly formally a created thing, and thus look to the common dominion of the whole Trinity: In the latter way, however, they are the very supposit of the Word, or at least put on its character: because, as we have said, under this formal aspect they involve it, not only after the manner of an effective principle, but also after the manner of a formal principle morally informing and dignifying those very actions. I answer 2, with Suarez disp. 1. sect. 6. that although satisfaction from things given and accepted, which is properly called restitution, cannot be made from those things which are under the dominion of the creditor; yet well enough that satisfaction which is concerned with free actions, such as compensation for injury in matters of honor: for this is the difference between satisfaction and restitution, that restitution is concerned with things given and accepted; because by it damage inflicted upon another in his goods is repaired: but satisfaction is concerned with actions: because by it compensation for an injury is intended. Hence in restitution there ought to be made a perfect equality between the one satisfying, and him to whom satisfaction is made: but in things given and accepted equality cannot be made unless something passes into the actual dominion of him to whom satisfaction is made, otherwise he would not be any more possessed of his own goods than he was before the satisfaction exhibited; and so an inequality would always remain. It is otherwise, however, in satisfaction, which is made by a free work, of which work the agent is master, because the reason of satisfaction does not consist in the translation of the dominion of some thing; but in this only, that as much reverence and honor be rendered as the injury inflicted took away. And therefore although God had dominion over the actions of Christ, no less could Christ satisfy equitably by means of them, because he renders to God as much, indeed more honor, than was taken from him by sin. I answer 3, that although the actions of Christ, considered both materially and formally, were under the high and general dominion of God, inasmuch as he is the supreme Moderator and Lord of all, nevertheless by them Christ at the strict standard of justice was able to pay our debt: because high and common dominion over anything does not impede particular dominion; for although the King has high and common dominion over the goods of subjects, such that he can expend them for the utility and protection of the Republic, no less do particular individuals each have peculiar dominion over their own goods, by reason of which dominion they truly satisfy the King himself with the strictness of justice, when they pay the tribute prescribed to them: therefore similarly, although God had high and common dominion over the actions of Christ, no less did the adorable Savior himself have particular dominion over them: because he elicited them most freely, and consequently, through them, notwithstanding that common dominion, he was able to satisfy God equitably on our behalf.

You will object 3. If the actions of Christ, inasmuch as they were sustained, were proper to the incarnate Word alone; then the actions of a mere man, as free and vital, would be proper to that man alone, since they proceed from him alone in a free and vital manner: therefore if for that reason Christ was able to satisfy from what was his own, rightly a mere man by his own actions, as free and vital, will be able to satisfy God from what is his own, by the ordinary way, whose contrary we taught above. — I deny the consequence of the antecedent: for although those actions proceed from man alone, as agent in a vital and free manner; yet they proceed from him in such a way that their power and efficacy for acting vitally and freely is from God by dependence: since those actions proceed from a created will, as existing under the common dominion of the whole most holy Trinity, which will, besides that received power and efficacy, requires further the concurrence of God, that it elicit its vital and free acts: but that very power of sustaining the human nature is so proper to the divine Word, that he has it from that precise concept whereby he is a divine person independent of any other. Nor does the divine Word need any special concurrence, that he sustain the human nature and its actions, since such sustentation is only a certain termination, whereby the personality of the incarnate Word alone so completes the humanity, that he alone makes it subsist. Therefore there is no parity between the vital and free acts of a mere man, and the sustentation itself of the human nature by the person of the Word. For two things are found in those acts, on account of which those acts look to the common dominion of the whole Trinity: The first is, that they cannot be elicited except dependently upon the concurrence of God, as first and universal cause: The second is, that this vitality and liberty are so under the dominion of the man eliciting those acts, that nevertheless they are also under the dominion of the whole Trinity, from which that whole man with all that is his depends no less than whatever is of a servant, inasmuch as servant, is under the dominion of him who is lord of such a servant. But these two have no place in the sustentation itself of the humanity and of its actions made by the incarnate Word.

You will insist: Therefore man depends upon God for eliciting free and vital actions, because from him he received the power of acting vitally and freely: but also the divine Word received from the Father this power of sustaining nature: for whoever gives being, gives also what follows upon being: but this power of sustaining follows necessarily upon the personality of the Word: therefore by the same reason that a mere man cannot satisfy from what is his own by his actions, as vital and free: neither could Christ satisfy by the actions of the human nature, as sustained by the Word, as from goods proper to himself. — I distinguish the major: that Christ received from the Father this power of sustaining, just as also his personal being, for this end, that he might satisfy for us before him, I deny: for first, the Father produces the Word, at least in some sign of reason, before he determines to create and redeem man: that he received that power and that being without any respect and order to satisfaction, without any dependence whatsoever, and as a good proper and particular to himself, I concede; for thus the Word received from God the Father his personality, and in consequence the infinite power of sustaining not only the divine nature, but also another's, provided nevertheless that his personality and sustaining power are proper to the Word alone, and in no way subject to the dominion of the Father, nor include any dependence upon him. Or otherwise I answer: that he received it from the Father with some dependence, such that the personality and sustaining power of the Word depend upon the Father and are subject to his dominion, I deny: that he received it as something proper to himself, dependent on none, nor subjected to anyone's dominion, I concede. Therefore there is no parity between that sustaining power of the Word, and the free and vital actions of a mere man.

You will object 1. That anyone may satisfy from strict justice, it is required that he make something come to be under the dominion of him to whom he satisfies, which before did not belong to him, nor would belong, if the one satisfying did not subject it to his dominion: but Christ could attribute nothing to God which did not look to his dominion, and which God would not have under his dominion from elsewhere, if it were not offered through Christ in satisfaction: therefore he could not satisfy from strict justice. — I deny the major: for it is not necessary for exact and strict satisfaction that the creditor receive something newly under his dominion, as is evident in human satisfaction for injured honor: for by that satisfaction the creditor receiving it receives nothing which is subject to his dominion: whence usually it suffices for perfect satisfaction that what is given conduce to honor, and be done according to the good pleasure of the creditor. Nor truly does there seem greater reason that the thing offered in satisfaction should conduce to the benefit and utility of the creditor, than what is offered through a meritorious action: but it is not required in merit that the meritorious work should conduce to the benefit and utility of the one rewarding, otherwise we could merit nothing at all before God; for he has no need of our goods: but it suffices that it conduce to his honor and glory, and be done according to his precept and good pleasure. The same must be said of satisfaction.

You will object 5. Christ satisfied God the Father as man, and by actions truly human: but man, and his actions, are a thing inwardly of God, and depending upon God, and consequently subjected to his dominion; therefore he satisfied God from goods which were his: and not from those which were merely proper to Christ satisfying. The major stands: since Christ satisfied for us in that respect in which he suffered and died: but he suffered and died only as man, and he offered his death and passion in satisfaction, which are actions of Christ only as man: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major: that Christ satisfied as man, if the particle as is taken duplicatively, that is, according to those things only which belong to him by reason of the human nature, I deny: if it is taken specificatively, that is, he who satisfied for us was true man, although he was also true God, I concede: for thus the humanity was the principle by which of satisfaction; but the Word was the principle which, not only inasmuch as he sustained the human nature, and was the principle which of the satisfactory actions which the assumed humanity elicited from him as principle by which: but also inasmuch as the same Word concurred to those same actions by moral influence, conferring upon them the highest and extrinsically infinite value, namely by offering and subjecting both himself and his own actions in the service of God, at the same time influencing into those same actions that highest value by which they were truly worthy to be accepted by God in satisfaction for all our debts.

THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST WAS NOT FOUNDED UPON THE GRACE AND LIBERALITY OF THE CREDITOR.

Proof: If the satisfaction of Christ had been founded in the grace and liberality of the creditor, especially because it hung upon the grace of union: for this seems necessary, that the person of the Word influence the highest value into his satisfactory and meritorious actions: but this reason does not stand in the way of the satisfaction of Christ having been made to the strict standards of justice, and independently of the liberality and grace of the creditor: therefore, etc. Proof of the major: when a gratuitous gift precedes the obligation contracted of paying a debt, then that which has been obtained from the grace of the creditor does not stand in the way of a satisfactory and meritorious action being able to merit an equitable premium: because when the debtor is truly lord of that which has been given to him gratuitously, then he is held to satisfy the creditor whenever he restores that very thing into his dominion: for if Peter, for example, before James contracted a debt toward him, gave him one hundred coins, or even after the contraction of his debt, yet not on that condition, that from them he pay the contracted debt, but absolutely and without respect, Peter will be able to pay the debt from justice, restoring those hundred coins into the dominion and possession of the creditor: because since he was their lord, he transfers that dominion and possession into the creditor: therefore although God granted to Christ gratis the hypostatic union, since this grace conferred is wholly antecedent, truly Christ was lord of that divine state, and of all the operations which as God-man he was able to elicit; and consequently, by eliciting those operations, and submitting them to God, he truly paid our debt without any grace or remission of the creditor. — Further, for satisfaction with the rigor of justice there is required only that it not be founded in the grace of the creditor, insofar as that grace would supply the defect of the value of the satisfaction, and thus the value of the work be accepted beyond what it merited: but the satisfaction of Christ, although founded in the grace of union, nevertheless this grace does not supply the defect of that dignity, nor does God accept the works of Christ beyond their value: but rather he gives to the works of the humanity a dignity and value not only equaling, but even superexceeding the gravity of the injury: therefore such grace does not stand in the way of satisfaction at the strict standards of justice. — Finally, the grace of union was not simply made to Christ inasmuch as he was God-man, but only to the humanity, to which the divine Word communicated itself hypostatically: but satisfaction was not exhibited through that humanity separately, but precisely through Christ, inasmuch as he is God-man: therefore he did not satisfy under that aspect under which grace was granted to him.

You will say 1. When someone gives to another from which he may pay him a debt, then that payment cannot be reckoned as from the rigor of justice: but God conceded to Christ the humanity, and the person of the Word, through which he elicited satisfactory operations, and paid our debt: therefore that payment was not from the rigor of justice. — I distinguish the major: if in conferring that gift he did not confer also its dominion, I concede: if he bestowed both, I deny. But God, in conferring the humanity or the Word, or rather in giving him that state of the God-manhood, gave also the dominion of that state; for Christ was lord of his own operations, and could exercise them or not exercise them at his pleasure: and consequently he was able through those operations to render the satisfaction due for our sins. Add to these, that the satisfaction of Christ the Lord is so founded in the grace of union and Incarnation, and is so made by the power of that grace, that this grace of union was not given to the humanity for this end, that it might satisfy: since, as we said with probability within, God decreed the Mystery of the Incarnation before foreseen sin of Adam: whence, as when something is paid from things accepted by a creditor, not for that end that he satisfy, it does not prevent such payment from being from strict justice: so neither will this prevent the satisfaction of Christ from being so reckoned.

You will say 2. If Peter owes Paul twenty coins on this condition, that he pay an equal sum of money owed to him, that payment is founded in the grace of the creditor, and consequently will not be from the rigor of justice: but God conceded to Christ the state of God-manhood for this reason, that through it he might satisfy him for the sins of men: therefore the satisfaction exhibited by Christ is founded in the grace of God, and is not from the rigor of justice. — I deny the minor: and the reason of the disparity is, that that donation of twenty coins does not effect that that sum of money pass under the dominion of Peter: whence it is only a disguised and supposititious donation, and merely a relaxation of the debt. It is otherwise, however, concerning the works of Christ: because although they are elicited from the grace of God, truly nevertheless they exist under the dominion of Christ, by reason of the liberty of the creature; and therefore although they are gifts of God, and presuppose the grace of union, on that account they are not a gratuitous donation, but a just and equitable payment of the debt.

THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST WAS MADE FROM GOODS NOT OWED.

Proof: If the works of Christ had been owed to God on some other title than satisfaction, especially the title of gratitude, or obedience, or justice: but neither of these can be affirmed. Not indeed on the title of gratitude; because the debt of gratitude is founded upon a merely free and gratuitous bestowal of a benefit made by the giver: yet no gratuitous benefit was bestowed by God upon Christ the Lord as God-man; for if any had been, it would have been above all the grace of union: but this was freely conferred upon his humanity alone, not however upon the person of Christ: the same must be said of those things which followed upon the union, because they were owed by reason of the hypostatic union, and not purely gratuitous: whence there is a difference between the thanksgiving of Christ and that of a mere man, in that the purer the man who gives thanks to God, the more he is bound to him, because that very act of thanksgiving is a new benefit conferred upon the creature itself from divine largess: but when Christ the Lord gave thanks to his Father, whether for a benefit conferred upon his humanity, or for some other thing, he received no new gratuitous gift, but only what was owed to his dignity. — Nor indeed on the title of obedience: for one owes his works absolutely to another on the title of obedience when it is not within his liberty gladly to accept or not accept what is commanded: but the obedience of Christ was not of this kind: for he was most free to accept or not to accept the command of God, as is gathered from those words Ps. 39: In the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do thy will; O my God, I have desired it: and thy law in the midst of my heart, and also from that of Isaiah 32: He was offered because he willed it himself. — Finally not on the title of justice, because if there were any title, it would be above all potential justice, such as is religion: but on that title of Religion Christ precisely would not owe his works to God by a new and special debt, because that title of Religion, when it does not multiply matter, does not introduce a new debt, nor consequently require a peculiar payment, and therefore by one action both that title and the other could be satisfied...

You will object. God could have required of Christ the Lord that he elicit each of his good works from a motive of gratitude on account of the benefits divinely bestowed upon him: therefore by these works, already owed to God from another source, Christ could not have made satisfaction. — I answer: the difficulty here concerns only satisfaction as it was exhibited by Christ the Lord, not indeed as it could have been rendered in another way. But it is certain that in fact God did not require that Christ perform all his works on the title of gratitude; indeed such an obligation is read nowhere in the Scriptures. Nay, even if God had prescribed this law, nonetheless that adorable Savior could still have worthily made satisfaction for our debts: since all the divine benefits bestowed upon him are of far lower dignity and excellence than his actions and works, because as they proceed from the person of the Word as from a principle which, they elicit a certain divine and infinite excellence and dignity, at least extrinsically, such as is found in none of the gifts bestowed upon Christ: for all of these, namely grace, knowledge, etc., are entirely created and finite. Hence it follows that Christ by his meritorious works could have satisfied for any debt of gratitude whatsoever for all and singular the benefits received, so that even by those same works, as goods not owed, he could further have satisfied out of strict justice for the debts of all men.

You will insist. When a benefit has been bestowed that is supreme intensively, so that God by his absolute power cannot bestow a greater and more excellent one, however perfect an act of gratitude may be elicited by the recipient of the benefit, it cannot exceed the dignity of the benefit, nor consequently be offered and expended to God out of strict justice in satisfaction for the debt of another: but the hypostatic union is the most excellent of all benefits that God can bestow by his absolute power: therefore every act of gratitude which Christ can render to God on account of that benefit will not exceed the dignity of that benefit, nor consequently can it be expended in satisfaction for another's debt. — I distinguish the major: if that supreme benefit be conferred upon him who holds the principal part in the satisfaction, and must expend it by way of the principle by which, I concede: if it be conferred only upon him who obtains a less principal part in expending the satisfaction, and is related to it only by way of the principle whereby, I deny. But it is certain that the benefit and grace of union were conferred only upon the humanity of Christ, which in the satisfaction holds only the character of the principle whereby; not indeed the divine Word, to whom in the satisfaction belongs the character of the principle by which: both because he is the supposit of that very nature from which that satisfaction is offered: and because he imparts the supreme value to the satisfactory works: therefore although the humanity of itself could not duly satisfy by acts already owed to God on the title of gratitude on account of the supreme benefit of the grace of union granted to it, it does not follow from this that Christ considered in himself wholly, especially by reason of the person of the Word, cannot by acts already owed on the title of gratitude by reason of the grace of union granted to the humanity also satisfy God for the debts of others.

THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST WAS TOWARD ANOTHER.

Proof: That satisfaction is sufficiently toward another which takes place between distinct natures, of which one has the character of debtor, while the other truly has that of creditor: but the satisfaction of Christ intervenes between the human nature and the divine, of which the former had the character of debtor, the latter truly that of creditor: nor is it required, as when with the distinction of natures there is also a distinction of persons; for that distinction suffices for the notion of justice which is sufficient for the distinction of rights: but the distinction of rights is preserved when only the distinction of natures is posited; for where there are diverse natures, there are also diverse wills and liberties, by reason of which dominions are distinct: therefore that distinction of natures sufficed in Christ, that his satisfaction might be toward another. — It is confirmed.: no more is required for rigorous satisfaction, that it intervene between distinct persons, than is required for any satisfaction whatever: but Christ (as we said in the preceding Question) had alterity sufficient, that he might expend some satisfaction to God: therefore also that he might satisfy to the strictest requirements of right. — Then, no greater distinction is required between the extremes of justice than between servant and lord: but a real distinction of natures in the same supposit sufficed, that one and the same Christ might be at once servant and lord: therefore it also sufficed that he might satisfy. — Finally, if Christ had assumed two humanities, he could have exercised an act of commutative justice between those two humanities, because although there had been one supposit really, nevertheless it would have been twofold virtually, because it would have borne the roles of two human supposits; why then could not Christ likewise, existing in the human and divine nature, exercise an act of justice toward himself as existing in the other nature?

You will object 1. The one satisfying ought to be other than the one to whom satisfaction is made: but Christ is not other than God, to whom he expends satisfaction, since he himself is God, and satisfied as God-man: therefore his satisfaction was not toward another. — I distinguish the major: that he ought to be other, both according to every nature proper to himself and according to person, I deny: that he ought to be other, at least according to some nature proper to himself, I concede. And although Christ the Lord is not other than the divine nature, nor indeed than the personality of the Word; nevertheless he has that alterity, or the character of another, by right of the human nature proper to himself, which alterity suffices for a true and strict satisfaction: because strict justice demands only that the satisfaction be toward another, namely that it be made by goods which are of distinct rights and dominions from the right and dominion of the creditor. Whence since Christ by reason of his human nature has right and dominion over free actions, which are entirely distinct from God, to whom satisfaction is due, therefore by them he truly was able to satisfy God.

You will insist. For satisfaction out of strict justice not only does alterity on the side of the nature suffice, but furthermore it is required also on the side of the supposit, as is evident even from Aristotle and other Philosophers, who commonly explain this alterity in justice through the distinction of supposits: therefore since Christ had alterity only by reason of nature, he cannot be held to have satisfied God to the strictest requirements of right. — I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say that Aristotle and the other Philosophers explain that alterity necessary to strict justice through the distinction of supposits because they speak of the acts of that justice as they are commonly and ordinarily exercised by men having distinct natures and distinct supposits, because naturally it cannot happen that one and the same numerically single supposit sustains diverse natures. But because the Catholic faith teaches that the one and the same numerically single supposit of the divine Word sustains at once two free natures, in which we discover a sufficient distinction of dominions and rights, by reason of which they can enter into some mutual obligation sufficient for a perfect contract of justice; hence it comes about that that distinction of natures suffices equally for establishing the perfect relation of debt and payment.

You will urge. The principal reason and chiefest value of the satisfaction of Christ must be sought from his supposit, as we just now said: but as such, he has not sufficient alterity for the strict justice desired, seeing that the satisfaction of Christ the Lord had to be expended not only to the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, but also to the Son himself, which by a special title, as we said, was offended by the sins of men: therefore the satisfaction of Christ the Lord did not have sufficient alterity for strict justice: seeing that strict justice cannot exist of one toward himself. — I deny the minor, and of its proof I make a distinction: satisfaction out of strict justice cannot exist of one toward himself according to one and the same entirely identical free nature, and according to the same rights and dominions, I concede: according to distinct free natures, and diverse dominions of things, I deny. Whence since Christ in the same supposit had two free natures, in which were distinct rights and dominions, hence it is that he could satisfy himself. From this also it follows that the satisfaction exhibited by Christ was not made primarily and per se to the three divine persons, but to the Divinity: for, as St. Paul says, 2 Cor. 5: God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. Where the particle God, as St. Ambrose explains, lib. 3 De Fide, cap. 5, signifies the very Divinity itself, That is, he says, there the eternal Divinity: therefore since the satisfaction of Christ was made primarily to God himself, but secondarily to the three divine persons, hence it is that the divine Word by reason of his human nature had sufficient alterity for strict justice; seeing that the human nature was entirely distinct from the divine.

GOD BY THE PACT ENTERED INTO COULD NOT FITTINGLY REFUSE THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST.

Proof, because (as we said) the satisfaction of Christ was not only condign and equal to the debt, but even superabundant and exceeding it: therefore there was no reason for God to refuse it. The consequence is evident: for then ought a satisfaction to be refused when it not only equals the debt, but even exceeds it according to the convention made: but the satisfaction of Christ, which was expended to God by pact, far exceeded our debt: therefore there was no reason for God to refuse it.

You will say. Then a satisfaction can be refused when it is not exhibited by that person who ought to satisfy: but the satisfaction of Christ was not made by that person who ought to satisfy; for Christ was not a guilty person, who on account of his own sin could not obtain pardon unless he either satisfied, or God freely forgave him the offense: therefore God could justly refuse his satisfaction. — I distinguish the major: if the creditor has entered into no pact concerning the forgiveness of sin on account of the satisfaction of another, I concede: if he has entered into such a pact, I deny. Now God had promised that he would forgive us all our debts if Christ should expend satisfaction for us: therefore he could not refuse it, especially since that satisfaction not only equaled the debt, but also far exceeded it.