Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

By the name of a mere man the Theologians here do not understand a man destitute of sanctifying grace and other supernatural gifts, as Cajetan understood it: but only is signified a man who is not God, nor hypostatically united with any one of the divine persons, such as is Christ the Lord; whence the sense of the question is, whether any man can offer to God a condign satisfaction for all the sins of men, and so merit before Him by his meritorious and satisfactory works that God remit the offence of men and grant them sufficient means for attaining eternal salvation.

Note 2. That satisfaction in general is the payment of a debt: which is defined by the Subtle Doctor in 1. distinc. 5. num. 4. The voluntary rendering of an equivalent, otherwise of what is not owed. The Doctor explains the parts of this definition in the same place. First it is called a rendering, both that it may be distinguished from simple donation, because a rendering is not a simple donation, but the payment of a debt: and also, that it may be signified that satisfaction is an act of justice, and directed toward another; because properly no one renders anything to himself. Secondly it is called voluntary: both because it is an act of the virtue of justice, but every act of moral virtue ought to be voluntary: and also because every rendering which is not voluntary is more a suffering of satisfaction than a satisfaction. Thirdly, of an equivalent: for what is rendered through satisfaction ought to have a certain equality with the debt; and this either according to the geometrical proportion, whereby by distributive justice a greater satisfaction is owed to the worthier injured person than to the less worthy: or according to the arithmetical proportion, whereby by commutative justice so much is given for so much, e.g. a hundred gold pieces are paid for as many debts. When however some satisfaction has all these conditions, it is called perfect: when equality is wanting, it is called de congruo, because the creditor is not bound to accept it from justice, but only from liberality, and congruity: when indeed it is made unto equality, but from goods granted by the creditor, it is said to be de condigno: because although what is rendered be from the grace of the creditor, yet truly the price rendered is equivalent to the debt.

Note 3. By reason of its matter, satisfaction is manifold; for it is made either in the goods of fortune, or of nature, or of honor, or of reverence; but with this distinction, that satisfaction in the goods of nature cannot be made to the injured person except by a certain commutative compensation; for he who has gravely struck another owes him satisfaction by paying from the goods of fortune some price for the penalty of injury and offence. In the goods of fortune however satisfaction ought to be made from the same goods, not indeed always according to the same entity, but according to price and estimation: for he who owes another a hundred coins will satisfy by restoring an equal or matching sum of money, or by donating something equivalent in price, according to common estimation, or at least according to the judgment of a prudent man. Satisfaction moreover in honor is especially attended to, either according to the excellence of the satisfactory work; or according to the dignity of the satisfying person: for as injury grows according to the dignity of the offended person, and the lowliness of the offender; so satisfaction grows according to the excellence of the satisfying person: for the worthier the person doing honor, the more illustrious is the honor.

These things thus premised, two things are here to be resolved. The first, whether any mere creature by ordinary law could condignly satisfy God for the sins of all men. The second, whether at least according to the absolute power of God, and extraordinary dispensation, He could accomplish it.

First Conclusion. — MAN COULD NOT, ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT DISPOSITION OF THINGS, OFFER SATISFACTION DE CONDIGNO, AND UNTO EQUALITY FOR THE SIN OF ALL MEN. This too is the common

For satisfaction to be perfect, it would have to be a rendering of an equivalent, as was said in Note 2: but a mere man could not render an equivalent, both for his own sin and for another's, with every divine pact set aside: therefore neither could he bestow perfect satisfaction.

Not indeed repay an equivalent, because there is no work of man, however endowed with grace, which could repay to God so much honor as was taken from Him by any sin of man: for as through whatsoever sin a peculiar injury is done to God, there would be need for perfect satisfaction, that a peculiar satisfaction also be made for each sin: or that an act so perfect be elicited, which could bestow on God so much honor as was taken from Him through each individual sin: but neither can a mere man accomplish, with the divine pact set aside. Not indeed the first, because no man can elicit so many meritorious acts as offensive acts against God were elicited by sinners. Nor can he accomplish the second, for as by any sin there is a certain and limited indignity and offence; so a meritorious work has a determined reason of merit and honor, nor can it have so much dignity that its merit is equivalent to all the injuries inflicted on God by individual sins. Add that the reason of merit is partly drawn from the acceptance of God; therefore where that does not intervene, as in fact it truly did not, since it appears nowhere, so neither could the satisfaction be equal.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Holy Fathers, who for this reason affirm the necessity of the Man-God for working our salvation, because no Angelic or human creature could accomplish it. Thus above all very many Greek Fathers teach. So St. Athanasius in the Gospel of the Passion and Cross of the Lord, says: When He saw the intolerable malice, neither was the mortal race fit to withstand death, nor could it pay the penalty of its evils, for the excess of malice exceeded every punishment: and seeing at once the goodness of the Father, and that He was fit and able (for Christ is the Power and Wisdom of God) He was moved by His humanity, and had pity on our weakness, and took upon Himself that very weakness... and seeing at once how we were not sufficient for the payment of the penalty, He transferred that very penalty upon Himself. And in the book On the Incarnation of the Word. For since, he says, the Word belongs to the Father and is above all, deservedly He alone could recover all things, and was fit, who should intercede for all. —

St. Basil expounding on Psalm 28 these words, Neither shall brother redeem, shall man redeem, says: Not man merely, but the Man-God Jesus Christ: because no other could offer a worthy price. — Cyril epist.

1. or exegesis, In what manner, he says, could one dead for men, the just for all, pay the price, if we say that passion was that of some mere man? — Damascene lib. 15. and 19. says the action of Christ, and His Passion, were salutary for this reason, because they were divine: For, he says, it could not befit a human action. — Chrysostom Homil. 10. on John. Our nature fell, he says, in such a way that it could in no wise be restored by anyone, save by that most omnipotent hand: for neither could it otherwise be restored, unless He who fashioned it in the beginning had stretched forth His hand. — To these the Latin Fathers give assent, over whom presides St. Cyprian, or whoever is the author of the book On the cardinal works of Christ, where he says: Since for original death there could be no remedy except in the death of Christ, nor could any offering reconcile God to the exiled and condemned, except the singular sacrifice of this blood. —

St. Ambrose lib. 1. on Luke. What so great a leader would there be, who should profit all, unless He who is above all? Who would establish me above the world, unless He who is greater than the world? etc. —

St. Augustine in the Enchiridion c. 10. Nor would we be freed through him, the mediator man Christ Jesus, unless he were God. — Fulgentius On the Incarnation and grace, cap. 4. after the middle. The Word therefore God, he says, the only-begotten Son of God, who is in all things, as He Himself testifies, the beginning, and end: so did He begin initialiter according to His human nature, nourished not by flesh: so dying in the same flesh God paid the final debt of human nature: for so far would human nature bear away the sin of the world to be removed, and become fit, unless through union with the Word of God it passed, not by natural confusion, but only personally. — Finally St. Leo Serm. 1. On the Nativity says: Unless He were true God, He would not have brought the remedy. And Serm. 12. on the Passion of the Lord: Since therefore, he says, the miserable posterity of the first man had fallen together at once with the wound, nor could any merits of Saints overcome the condition of that death, there came from heaven a singular physician. — From which and similar oracles of the Holy Fathers it openly appears that satisfaction for the sins of the human race could not by the ordinary way be offered to God by any man whatsoever, however holy. Whether however it could be done by the extraordinary way, and through the absolute power of God, the Second Conclusion will disclose.

Second Conclusion. — A MERE MAN COULD HAVE SATISFIED GOD WITH EQUALITY FOR THE SINS OF THE HUMAN RACE, BY THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD, AND ACCORDING TO HIS EXTRAORDINARY DISPOSITION. This is the teaching of the Subtle Doctor in book 3, distinction 20, number 9, where, attacking the opinion of St. Anselm, who says that it was absolutely necessary for God to become man in order to make satisfaction for men, he says:

Against what he says in the third article, that none but a man ought to make satisfaction, this does not seem absolutely necessary: for one who is not a debtor can make satisfaction for another, just as he can pray for another. Wherefore as Christ, an innocent man and not a debtor, made satisfaction: so, had it pleased God, one good Angel could have made satisfaction by offering something pleasing to God on our behalf, which He would have accepted for all sins: for every created oblation is worth as much as God accepts it for, and no more. Moreover, one mere man could have made satisfaction for all, if he had been conceived without sin, as was possible by the operation of the Holy Spirit and of the Mother; even as Christ was; and God would have given him the fullness of grace, which he could have received, even as He gave it to Christ, without preceding merits, out of His liberality: for such a man could have merited the remission of sin even as he could have merited beatitude.

— And then, answering the claim of St. Anselm, namely that there is required on the part of the one satisfying that he offer to God more than the whole of creation is worth, he says at number 8:

I believe that, saving his reverence, this is not true: for satisfaction for the sin of the first man did not need to exceed the whole creation formally in magnitude and in perfection; for it would have sufficed to offer to God a greater good than the evil of that man sinning was. Wherefore if Adam, through grace given and charity, had had one act, or many acts, of loving God for His own sake, with a greater effort of free choice than was the effort in > sinning; such love would have sufficed for redeeming his sin, and satisfaction would have been made. And then that proposition is false, that he ought to have offered to God something greater than all that for which he ought not to have sinned: but just as for the love of a creature, as an object lovable, he ought not to have sinned: so in making satisfaction to God he ought to have offered something greater, attaining objectively through his act more than a creature is; namely, a love attaining Him for His own sake, and that love objectively, as terminated in God, exceeds the love of a creature, just as God exceeds the creature. Wherefore just as he sinned by love of a baser object infinitely: so he ought to have made satisfaction by love of a nobler object infinitely, and this would have sufficed, at least possibly.

Thus the Doctor; wherein he teaches First, that God could have formed some man who would not be from the stock of Adam, nor infected with his sin, and could have conferred upon him the same fullness of grace which He bestowed upon Christ the Lord: and could have agreed with him that his good works should avail unto the remission of sin, and unto the merit of beatitude for other men, just as He agreed with Christ. In which hypothesis that man, from perfect justice, could have satisfied God for the guilt of the whole human race. Secondly, God could also have agreed with Adam repenting, insofar as he was the head of the human race, that by acts of the love and charity of God, and other acts of piety and penance, he should make satisfaction both for his own sin and for the sin of his posterity, because by reason of that pact God would have accepted those meritorious acts, so that as much honor should be rendered to Him as had been taken away by the sins. For that these things could be done, no repugnance appears: therefore so it could have happened.

It is proved further: If a mere man could not make satisfaction with equality, chiefly because the works of such a just man could not have that condignity unto the expiation and payment of sin: but the consequence is false; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: hence those works would not have that condignity, because, as very many Thomists hold, sin has a certain infinity in the order of malice; but no creature can expiate and pay for infinite malice: yet this argument is worthless. I prove it: Either they speak of the extrinsic and objective infinity which sin has, inasmuch as it is committed against God, because He is an infinite object; or of the formal and intrinsic infinity. But the first does not prevent that malice from being paid for by a mere man; because the satisfactory works of a just man would tend also to God, as to an infinite object: therefore they likewise have that extrinsic infinity. But the second is false, because, as the Doctor proves in book 3, distinction 19, number 18, and in book 1, distinction 19, number 2, question 1, no sin is formally malice of infinite kind; for if sin were of infinite malice formally and intrinsically, no one could offend God more gravely by one sin than by another, and thus the offense would be no graver if anyone offered irreverence directly to God than if he killed a man or stole; which is absurd. The sequel is evident: because if the offense which is in theft be infinite, that offense which is in irreverence cannot be greater, since no offense can be conceived greater than infinite.

The Thomists reply, that offense and injury increase according to the dignity of the person against whom they are committed: for, other things being equal, the injury is graver if a prince is struck with blows by a commoner than if a commoner is struck by a prince: whence Aristotle, book 5 of the Ethics, chapter 5, says: If anyone holding office strikes someone, it is not fitting that he be struck back; and if anyone strikes him who holds office, he must not only be struck back, but also punished. Therefore since sin is committed against God, who is of infinite dignity, it is judged to have infinite malice. —

The consequence, however, I deny: for if it were a legitimate inference, it would follow equally that the beatific vision would be of intrinsic infinite dignity: for just as the more dignified the person offended, the graver the offense, so the more excellent the object, the more perfect also is the vision: therefore if the offense against a person of infinite dignity be of infinite malice, the vision of an object of infinite perfection will also be infinite: therefore just as this latter consequence is false — otherwise the acts of a pure creature would be intrinsically infinite — so too is the former false. — Therefore from it only this may be inferred, that the offense against a more dignified person, other things being equal, is graver than that which would be inflicted upon a less dignified person; wherefore just as the clear vision of God is more worthy than vision of an inferior object, yet is not an infinite act, because it tends in a finite manner toward its object: so the offense against God is graver than another offense: yet it is not infinite. Hence those acts indeed increase according to the greater perfection of the object according to a geometrical proportion; so that those acts which are concerned, whether by way of honor or of offense, with a more worthy object, have a greater dignity, or indignity, than those which tend in such wise to a less worthy object: but they ought not to increase according to an arithmetical proportion; so that an act tending toward some object should have as much perfection as the object toward which it tends has.

You insist. Although sin in the order of act is something finite, yet in the order of offense and aversion from God it is something infinite: for the malice of aversion is as great as the good which one spurns: therefore since sin, as offense, is something infinite, satisfaction of infinite dignity is required. —

I deny the antecedent: for that aversion from God either means only the privation of sanctifying grace, or the moral deformity and malice of sin. If the first, the offense cannot be infinite; for the gravity and deformity of a privation is not drawn from the object or end, but from the form which ought to inhere. Wherefore just as the pain of loss, which is the perpetual lack of the divine vision, is finite intensively, since it deprives only of the clear vision of God, which ought to inhere in the intellect as its perfective form; while it deprives of God only insofar as He is the object of that vision: so mortal sin, since it deprives either immediately of the due rectitude of the act, or of sanctifying grace as the physical form due to the subject, will be only a finite offense, although God, to whom grace converts, be infinite. If the second, since the malice of sin is something finite, the offense also will be finite: for sin is called an offense of God not because it injures God, or takes away anything intrinsic to Him — for on that account it would be judged infinite intrinsically — but because it is an evil which displeases God.

They urge. For every mortal sin, whether actual or original, infinite punishment is owed: therefore it is of infinite malice. —

I distinguish the antecedent: that infinite punishment is owed as regards intensity, I deny; as regards extension and duration, I concede. For this punishment is not inflicted because sin has infinite malice; but because, together with taking away grace, without which sin cannot be remitted, it also renders sinners unworthy of all future grace, therefore it is judged to be an incurable wound. But since punishment is owed to sin as long as it remains, therefore, since the sin of the damned remains forever, punishment is likewise owed to them forever: and hence it is eternal and infinite as to duration, although finite as to intensity. Or otherwise I answer by denying the consequence: for if the inference were valid, it would follow that our meritorious work would be likewise of infinite value, because through it we merit an eternal reward, and of infinite duration. Therefore there does not seem to be a more fitting reason why God willed final sin to be punished with eternal punishment, just as a good work is to be given an eternal reward, than because it so pleased Him; for although that punishment exceeds the malice of sin speaking extensively, nevertheless God could justly prescribe it, because the infliction of it is rather to be attributed to the sinner, who suffers it, than to God, who prescribes it, inasmuch as the sinner most freely performs those actions against the dictate of right reason on account of which that punishment of eternal duration would be inflicted.

You urge again. Although sin does not grow univocally, nor according to arithmetical proportion, according to the dignity of the person against whom it is committed; nevertheless satisfaction is to be measured from the dignity, or lowliness, of the one satisfying; wherefore, since man is far inferior to God, and appears most vile in the sight of that divine majesty, thence it comes about that nowhere can man of himself worthily satisfy God for sin. —

I deny the antecedent: for satisfaction is not always diminished on account of the lowliness of the person; otherwise an inferior, who had injured a superior, could never make satisfaction to him, unless at least he rendered him more than he had taken away; which is false; indeed, if the injury be in goods of fortune, some peasant will worthily satisfy a Prince for a hundred gold pieces taken away, if he render him the same number; similarly if the offense were against reputation, he can make restitution, either by denying that he said anything to the prejudice of so great a Prince, or by celebrating him with praises. Nor does it matter that those who thus injure a Prince are accustomed sometimes, besides this satisfaction, to be chastised with a graver penalty; for that is done for terror, lest others should have an easier occasion for thus detracting from so great a Prince. Finally, if the injury be done to honor, although satisfaction may appear more difficult, because nothing is esteemed so great that a vile person should humble himself and cast himself down before the Prince: nevertheless his humiliation can be so great, and his love toward the Prince so great, that he expose himself to grave peril for the safety and life of the Prince; whereby it will come to pass that the Prince judges him worthy to whom he may equally remit the offense. Thence it appears that man, although far inferior to God — as the peasant is to the Prince — nevertheless, elevated and upheld by His divine grace, will be able to bestow upon Him an equivalent satisfaction for sin, especially since the sins of men take away from God no intrinsic good, but are said to offend and injure Him only insofar as they displease Him. Add that the love of God above all things pleases God as much as sin displeases Him. —

The preceding argument is confirmed; for it does not conflict with its being done, nor ought it to be denied of God, because it involves no contradiction: but no contradiction appears in that a mere man should render to God as much as has been taken away by sin, both his own and that of others: therefore, etc. The major stands. The minor is proved; for for worthy and equal satisfaction only this is required, that the work of satisfaction be equivalent in value and dignity to the debt, and that God accept it as compensatory of the debt: for the merit of man, and the value of his good works, is sought chiefly from pact and divine acceptation, as we shall prove in the Treatise On Grace, the Disputation on Merit: but a just man can elicit an act of as great goodness as was the malice of Adam's sin, especially if he be free from original sin and endowed with the highest grace: therefore a mere man could satisfy with equality for the sins of others. —

This argument is confirmed again, and illustrated by this example: God could have stipulated a covenant with Adam, that if he did not sin, but merited an increase of his justice, He would transmit such justice, together with its increase, to posterity; for if the pact was sufficient to transmit justice, so was it sufficient to transmit its increase: but if Adam could do this by pact, and by reason of divine acceptation, by a similar reason another mere man could, through his meritorious works, transfer aids and justifying grace, so that others might be cleansed from sins: and consequently he could satisfy de condigno for them by the acceptation of God.

You will object 1. All the holy Fathers praised in the preceding Conclusion, affirming that no man had been fit to repair the fall of the human race, and therefore that it had been necessary for the Son of God to become incarnate, who might bestow a due and fitting satisfaction for the sins of the human race to the eternal Father. —

I answer, the authorities of the holy Fathers do not stand against us: for indeed we may reply with the Doctor in 1. distinc. 15. q. 1. that they are to be understood of conditional necessity, and ex suppositione, that God willed to employ a more excellent remedy than the worse disease required, and that the price of merit should far surpass the debt, so that where sin abounded, grace might superabound also. Or we may reply with the same Doctor in 3. dist. 20. num. 10 that God therefore decreed that satisfaction be bestowed through His proper Son, that we might be bound to Him by the bond of a greater benefit:

For, says the Doctor, therefore we are much bound to Him, since man could have been redeemed otherwise, and yet out of His free will He so redeems him, we are much bound to Him, and more than if it were so necessary, and we could not have been redeemed otherwise: therefore, to draw us to His love (as I believe) He did this especially: and because He willed man to be more bound to God: as if someone had first begotten a man, and afterwards instructed him in discipline and holiness, he would be more obliged to him, than if he had only begotten him, and another had instructed him: but this is congruity, not necessity.

— Or with the same Doctor in the same place, we may reply, that the holy Fathers intended nothing else than that de facto, ex suppositione of the divine ordination and law truly instituted, no one could worthily satisfy God except the God-Man, as was said in the preceding Conclusion: but this does not conflict with the present Conclusion, which does not treat of what was done, but of what could be done. — Or finally I say, the holy Fathers can be expounded thus, that they wish, that no mere man could have satisfied de condigno for the sins of the human race: such that, for example, the satisfaction of Adam exhibited by himself, insofar as it proceeded from him, could not have force morally to move God to remit sins; but the satisfaction of Christ obtained this, insofar as it proceeded from Him; for since it proceeded from a divine person, it could of itself sufficiently move God to forgive sin, although not so necessarily but that He could not forgive that sin, even though satisfaction had been exhibited by Christ, unless there intervened a pact to forgive sin on account of that satisfaction exhibited by a divine person. Yet it does not follow from this, that, a similar ordination and divine pact intervening, a mere man, especially one who would not be propagated from Adam, nor infected by his sin, and who would have the highest grace, could not render a satisfaction worthy of God for the sins of men.

You will object 2. That satisfaction cannot be worthy in which the favor of the creditor intervenes, and which is made from gifts freely accepted from the creditor: but such would be the satisfaction of a mere man, because it would have its value only from sanctifying grace gratuitously granted to him, and from the most free acceptation of God: therefore it could not be unto equality, nor from pure justice. —

I distinguish the major: if that grace granted, and gratuitous acceptation, be antecedent to the satisfaction, that satisfaction cannot be worthy, I concede: if only consequent, I deny. To the minor I say, that both the grace granted, and the gratuitous acceptation of God, whereby He would receive the satisfaction exhibited to Him by a mere man, would be consequent upon that satisfaction bestowed by Him, and thus they do not prevent it from being worthy: because although that ordination, or law, depended on the mere and gratuitous will of the creditor; nevertheless once granted, by means of it the debtor acquires a right of justice, both in that which has been gratuitously given to him, namely in grace liberally granted to him; which although it was given gratis, nevertheless when he possesses it, it is his own property, and he can use it, or not use it, at his pleasure for performing meritorious and satisfactory works: and likewise in the condition, which he fulfills, which stands in the manner of merit, so that recompense be rendered to him, or debt remitted, when he has fulfilled that condition: for he who fulfills the pact merits to receive that reward concerning which agreement had been made.

You will object 3. If a mere man could have made satisfaction for all the sins of men, it would follow that we are not greatly beholden to Christ our Lord: since we could have been redeemed by another: but the consequent openly militates against Sacred Scripture, and no less against Christian piety: therefore also against that from which it follows. —

I deny the sequel of the major; for, as we said just now with the Subtle Doctor, we are so much the more beholden to God because, although He could have saved us in another way, He yet spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all; for far more beholden would a peasant be to the King whom he had offended, if, to compensate the injury which the King could freely forgive, or discharge in another way, he were to substitute his own son in the place of that commoner, that he might exhibit to him a satisfaction worthy of the offense; but were to dismiss that commoner exempt from punishment and satisfaction.

You will object 4. A mere man could not make satisfaction except through the mediation of habitual grace: but habitual grace is not a principle of meriting condignly anything other than eternal life and the increase of grace for the man who uses that habitual grace worthily: therefore it cannot be a principle of meriting for others, by condignity, the forgiveness of sin. —

I distinguish the minor: according to the present ordination, I concede it; according to the possible, I deny it; for nothing hinders God from being able to accept an act of charity of a just man for another reward than for eternal life; for if a man had the fullness of grace, through the mediation of which he would have a right to eternal life corresponding equally to that grace itself, so that God would not in any way wish to accept his works as meritorious of an increase of grace, or of glory for the man himself operating them (just as in fact the meritorious works of Christ did not profit Himself, nor toward more abundant graces, whose plenitude He had from the beginning of His conception; nor toward a more ample beatitude of soul, whereby He enjoyed God), it would be most absurd that God could not accept those merits for other rewards to be conferred on those very persons for whom the lowly man would exhibit his merits to God.

You will object 5. No one could make satisfaction sufficiently to God for all the benefits received from Him: therefore much less will he be able to make satisfaction for the sins of all. The consequence is evident, because man is constituted debtor no less for a sin committed than for benefits received. —

I deny the consequence, because for making satisfaction for benefits another grace is required, for which no satisfaction could then be made, or the process would go on to infinity; which process would not arise if one were to make satisfaction for all sins. Add that the antecedent could be denied, for just as he who deserves for his sin the penalty of temporal death can make condign satisfaction for it, namely by exhibiting such service for the utility of the king, or of the commonwealth, as to be worthy to have life bestowed upon him by the supreme authority; in the same way one could make satisfaction for another, and compensate the penalty of death that was owed.

You will object 6. One man cannot make satisfaction for the sin of another, in expiation of which the latter deserved the penalty of death: therefore much less will he be able to make satisfaction to God for a sin which deserves eternal death. —

I deny the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is that a man making satisfaction for the sins of others: for just as sin merits eternal punishment, so a meritorious work merits eternal life; and hence it seems a condign satisfaction, when a meritorious work is exhibited in compensation for mortal sin and its eternal penalty: because it plainly renders an equivalent work, which merits eternal life.