Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Claude Frassen

Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Claude Frassen (1620–1711)


Tractatus I: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Quaestio I: Quot, et quae fuerint haereticorum erronea dogmata circa incarnati Verbi mysterium

Disputatio I: De Existentia, Natura, et Causis Incarnationis

Articulus I: De Possibilitate, Convenientia, et Complemento seu Peractione Mysterii Incarnationis

§ I: De Possibilitate Incarnationis

Quaestio I: An unio divinae naturae cum humana in unitate personae sit possibilis

Quaestio II: An, et quo lumine cognosci possit et suaderi

§ II: De Convenientia Incarnationis

Quaestio I: An conveniens fuerit Deum incarnari

Quaestio II: An convenientius fuerit naturam humanam, quam Angelicam, aut aliquam aliam a Verbo assumi

Quaestio III: Utrum convenientius fuerit Filium, quam Patrem, aut Spiritum Sanctum incarnari

Quaestio IV: An convenienti tempore facta fuerit incarnatio

§ III: De Necessitate Incarnationis

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Quaestio I: An, et qualiter necessaria fuerit incarnatio

It is certain from the faith that all men whatsoever are held guilty by the sin of Adam our parent, and bound over to divine justice, and enslaved as debtors to punishment and vengeance: for so the Council of Trent, session 5, canon 2, decreed after the Apostle, in these words:

If anyone asserts that the prevarication of Adam harmed himself alone and not his progeny, and that the holiness and justice which he lost, received from God, he lost for himself alone and not also for us; or that he defiled by the sin of disobedience transferred death and bodily punishments only upon the human race, but not that stain and sin which is death of the soul; let him be anathema: since he contradicts the Apostle who says: By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned: from which it is plain that we are all constituted in a mass of perdition: from which we are drawn out by the merit of the one Mediator Jesus Christ, who reconciled us to God.

Whether, however, and in what manner it was necessary for the Divine Word to become incarnate for this reparation of the human kind, here shall be resolved.

Note 2. Omitting the various divisions of necessity, as regards the present undertaking, I posit two kinds: one indeed absolute, the other hypothetical. Absolute is that by which a thing cannot be otherwise, and that either simply, so that it is a contradiction and repugnance for it to be otherwise; thus it is necessary that God exist. Hypothetical necessity is that by which something is said to be necessary on the hypothesis that it so be. Thus, on the hypothesis that a man run, it is necessary that he be moved: but it is not necessary that he run. The first necessity is called of irritability by St. Anselm, book 2, Cur Deus homo, chapter 1. The second of immutability, because it is sought from the immutability of God, both in his entity and in his decrees. Or, as the Theologians customarily speak, the first is a necessity of the antecedent, the second truly a necessity of the consequent. Moreover, here there is no question of absolute necessity, and simply invincible: for no Theologian was ever one who asserted the Incarnation to have been so necessary that it would imply a contradiction for God not to become incarnate: but the question is moved concerning the necessity of immutability, and the hypothetical: seeing that there are some who judge it necessary for God to have become incarnate on the hypothesis that man had fallen. Thus St. Anselm seems to think throughout the whole first book of Cur Deus homo: to whom subscribe Richard of St. Victor, book De Incarnatione, chapter 1., Raymond Lull in his brief introductory Art to all sciences, eighth demonstration; who nevertheless seem to decline from the opinion of St. Anselm in this, that they do not pronounce absolutely that the Incarnation was necessary supposing the fall of man, but only on the hypothesis that God should will to advance fallen man to his former innocence, and to the beatific state, unto which he had formed him. St. Anselm, however, seems to teach both.

Note 3. This twofold necessity, both absolute, and respective and hypothetical, can be regarded in two ways with respect to the end, namely either absolutely, or secundum quid. That is said to be absolutely necessary without which a thing cannot be obtained: thus a ship is necessary for crossing the sea. Secundum quid truly, that which conduces only to an end to be attained in an easier and more perfect manner: thus a horse is said to be necessary for a man in good health to undertake a journey. It is certain, however, that the Incarnation is necessary secundum quid for the redemption of men, because by it satisfaction was made to God in a more excellent and efficacious manner, and provision and counsel were supplied for our miseries and calamities more abundantly and more salubriously. Whence the discourse here is to be only of the absolute necessity of the Incarnation for the salvation of men.

Two things therefore come here to be determined: First, whether supposing the fall of man, it was necessary for God to become incarnate, that he might restore him,

Second, whether on the hypothesis that God willed to ordain the restoration of man, he had need to effect it through the Incarnation.

First Conclusion. — The Incarnation, supposing the fall of man, was not simply necessary for God.

Proof first from sacred Scripture. Wisdom 2. Who will charge thee with injustice if the nations perish, which thou hast made? It would not therefore turn to the prejudice of justice for God, if he should leave fallen man forever in the state of his misery. And Jeremiah 12. Can the potter himself make vessels of the house of Israel? Therefore God can, short of injustice, by his supreme liberty repair fallen man, or cast off the lost one, as the potter can refuse to restore a broken vessel to wholeness.

Reason also favors this: for God works all things ad extra according to the counsel of his own will, and in modulating all his operations he is most free, and far removed from every coaction and necessity; seeing that nothing of perfection accrues to him or recedes from him on account of the salvation or perdition of a creature: therefore he is impelled by no necessity to receive and restore fallen man; and presently he is led by no necessity to undertake the Incarnation. This truth will be made plainer by the following consideration, but first must be resolved the arguments by which St. Anselm seems to assert the contrary.

He objects therefore: First, book 1. Cur Deus homo, chapters 2. 4. The purpose of God cannot be evacuated: but God, in creating man, had purposed to advance him to eternal beatitude, which he cannot attain so long as he lies in his fall: therefore it was necessary for God, lest his purpose prove frustraneous, and lest what he had purposed concerning man be utterly annihilated, and the human kind, so precious a work of his, perish altogether, that he repair him from his fall: but this could not be done except through the Incarnation of the Word: therefore it was simply necessary. —

I answer. From this argument nothing else follows than that it would have been fitting indeed for God to repair fallen man, but not that he was driven to it by any necessity. Or if there be any such necessity, certainly no other than one of consequence, drawn from the immutability of his purpose, which assuredly does not imply absolute necessity: for it does not follow, says the Seraphic Doctor in the same place, if God repairs by the necessity of his immutability, that therefore he does not repair by the liberty of his benignity: for these can stand together. Add that even if God had some decorum and necessity of repairing men, he was not therefore bound to accomplish it necessarily through the Incarnation; since there was supplied to him a varied and manifold mode of saving men, even if the Word had not become incarnate, as will appear below.

They object 2. chapter 21. It is not fitting that supreme wisdom permit the noblest creature universally to be defrauded of its end: but unless the reparation of fallen man intervene, all men created unto eternal beatitude would be defrauded of their end, and thus all the sons of men would have been constituted in vain, since everyone is unjust who does not render to God what he owes: and no unjust man, says St. Anselm, is admitted to beatitude, since as beatitude is a sufficiency in which there is no indigence, so it befits no one in whom justice is not pure, so that there be no injustice in him: therefore it was necessary for God by reason of his divine wisdom to restore fallen man, and to advance him to his due end.

I answer. The solution of the former argument serves also sufficiently for the present one: for from it is understood only that it was congruent indeed to the divine wisdom that God should raise man up from his fall, and advance and order him toward his end; but not that this was absolutely necessary: since God, as we said, is most free in his operations ad extra, and whatever benefit he bestows he lavishes especially upon sinners, not from constraining necessity, but from overflowing mercy and goodness.

You will object. Wisd. chapters 16 and 17. It would be unseemly, and therefore impossible, to leave forever diminished the number of Angels, as being the most excellent creatures: yet that number could not be restored from those who had fallen; since an Angel once fallen cannot be reconciled to God through penance. Nor could that number be repaired through other Angels newly created, because those who were to be substituted ought to be such as those who fell would have been had they not sinned: but they could not be such without the former Angels, who fell, being better if they had persevered than the later Angels would have been, who were to be created after their fall: since the former, had they persevered, would have done so with no punishment of sin seen, nor strict chastisement of God upon his enemies: whereas the latter, newly created, would persevere only after that punishment had been witnessed: but it is more excellent and more perfect to persevere in grace with no example seen of the divine justice vindicating sin, than to persevere on account of that example: because the former perseverance proceeds from the pure and sole motive of divine love, while the latter has fear mixed in; and the act elicited simply from the motive of love is more excellent than that elicited from the motive of fear: therefore the former manner of persevering would be more excellent than the latter. From these things St. Anselm infers that the ruin of the Angels must be repaired out of another nature than the Angelic: but no other nature was apt for this than the human: therefore it was necessary for human nature to be raised up to supply the number of the Angels. But where it had fallen, it could not be advanced to that elevation unless it were raised up and restored to its pristine innocence: therefore it was necessary for it to be saved, and consequently for God to have a Savior, which he obtained only through the Incarnation.

I answer. All those consequences are utterly void. First, for it was not absolutely necessary, but only congruent, to restore and supply the number of the Angels; for, as we said from Wisdom, What shall hinder him if the nations perish? since God owes the sinner nothing by justice except punishment. Secondly, it appears less true that the number of the Angels could not be restored from those who had fallen, or from others newly created; since we proved in Volume 2 that it involves no contradiction that Angels can be recalled to penance through the aid of divine grace; for the hardening of those in evil arises chiefly from the aid of grace being denied them. God could equally supply that number through Angels newly created: both because it was not necessary that it be restored from Angels equally good with those who fell, since it was free for God to constitute and order otherwise; and also because God by his grace could bring it about that Angels newly created would be even better than those who had fallen; for the grace of God is not less efficacious for preserving and increasing goodness and justice than the chastisement of God and his vindication for punishing. Finally, even if the number of the Angels were to be repaired through men, still it would not follow that those men were to be restored through the Incarnation of the Word; since by very many other modes, even setting aside the Incarnation, God was able to liberate man and make safe what had perished, as he will judge.

Second conclusion. — THE INCARNATION WAS NOT SIMPLY NECESSARY, EVEN ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT GOD DECREED TO RESTORE AND SAVE FALLEN MAN. This is common among Theologians.

It is proved first from Scripture, which commends the Incarnation as a most excellent work, and a benefit of the love, mercy, and liberality of God. Thus John 3: So God loved the world, as to give his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. To Titus 3: According to his mercy he saved us. And 1 John 4: In this hath the charity of God appeared towards us, because God hath sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we may live by him: but the work of the charity, mercy, and benignity of God is not a work of necessity, but of supreme liberty: therefore the Incarnation, through which God restored men, was not in any way from necessity.

St. Anselm responds, book 2, Cur Deus homo, chapter 5.

That a twofold necessity must be distinguished: the one which compels someone unwilling to confer a benefit, because he cannot do otherwise: and this necessity, he says, of benefiting takes away or diminishes grace; for when anyone benefits against his will by that necessity to which he is subject, either no gratitude, or less, is owed him: the other, indeed, through which rather the gratitude of the benefactor is increased, because he has freely subjected himself to this necessity: when he submits himself to the necessity of benefiting, and does not sustain it unwillingly, then surely he merits greater gratitude for the benefit; for this ought not to be called necessity, but grace, because he undertakes or keeps it under no compulsion, but freely. Such is the case when one vows a purpose of holy living; for although after the vow it must be kept of necessity, lest he incur the damnation of the apostate, and although he can be compelled to keep it if he should be unwilling, yet if he keeps not unwillingly what he has vowed, he is not less but more grateful to God than if he had not known it, since he denied himself not only the common life but also its license for the sake of God: nor is he to be said to live holily of necessity, but with the same liberty by which he vowed it. Wherefore much more if God does good to man, whom he has begun, although he ought not to fall away from the good begun, we must impute the whole to grace; because this he began on our account, not on his own, needing nothing; for it did not lie hidden from him what man was about to do when he made him, and yet by his goodness, creating him spontaneously, he bound himself to perfect the good begun.

Such are the words of St. Anselm; by which he signifies that because God created man, whom he foreknew would sin, and consequently that it would be necessary for one of the divine persons to become incarnate, who would redeem him, and nevertheless produced him freely and permitted him to sin, therefore he willed to undergo this necessity of his own accord; and consequently nothing was derogated from his liberality, grace, love, and benignity thereby. — But this response does not meet the authorities cited above, for

Scripture openly intimates the free and supremely merciful will of God after the fall in repairing man, and in that mode of reparation which he chose among all those which he was able to employ for that office, as we shall say presently.

Passing over the Arians, where he had said that God fittingly undid the malediction through the Incarnation of the Word, which He had threatened, saying: Earth thou art, and into earth shalt thou go, he subjoins this objection of the Arians: But it could have been so even if the Savior were a creature, or merely spoke, and thus undo the malediction: which he solves in this manner: God could without the advent of Christ merely speak, and undo the malediction: here it must be considered what is useful to men, not what lies within the power of God. — The same is said by very many holy Fathers. St. Leo, sermon 2. On the Nativity, chapter 3. A marvelous thing, he says, is the mercy of God, to whom ineffably many ways lay ready for repairing the human race, and who chose above all this way of consulting for us, whereby to destroy the work of the devil he would employ not the power of might but the reason of justice. St. Bernard subscribes, Epistle 190. Who denies, he says, that by the nod of the Omnipotent there could have been other and other modes of our redemption, justification, and liberation? — More openly, however, St. Augustine insinuates this truth, book On the Christian Struggle, chapter 11, where he says: They are fools who say: the wisdom of God could not otherwise deliver men unless he took upon himself a man, and was born of a woman, and suffered all those things from sinners. And lib. 13. De Trinitate, chapter 10, arguing against those who say that there failed God another mode by which he might deliver men from sin, he says: It is too little thus to refute, so as to assert that this mode, by which God deigns to liberate us through the Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, is good and fitting to divine honor: but we must also show that no other possible mode failed God, to whose power all things lie equally subject: but that there has not been, nor ought to have been, another mode more fitting for healing our misery.

Theological reason also gives its suffrage. For first, since God is most free in his operations ad extra, and since he himself was offended by the sins of men, he was able to pardon and remit that offense gratuitously by a simple and gratuitous condonation, exacting no punishment or satisfaction for the fault committed; for this would above all savor of his divine clemency, benignity, and mercy, and his superabounding sufficiency in himself would appear; since indeed thereby he would manifest himself in no wise to need our goods, nor would honor paid by us to him, or denied him, add anything to or detract anything from his perfection or felicity. Add that it seems laudable to every man who has been offended, when he gratuitously pardons an injury inflicted upon him: for this gratuitous remission of an offense is a manifest argument of a generous and magnanimous soul: therefore that equally gratuitous condonation would tend supremely to the honor and glory of God. It is confirmed, because although a Magistrate, or a particular Judge, sometimes cannot leave unpunished an offense even remitted by the man offended and gratuitously pardoned, but according to the prescriptions of the laws is held to prescribe due punishments to the guilty party; yet a prince, for just causes, by his authority over the community, can gratuitously relax the principal punishments from the guilty party according to the prescriptions of the laws, and dismiss him free without any satisfaction: therefore much more will God, by his supreme authority and clemency, be able to condone gratuitously to men the punishments due according to the prescriptions of his divine justice, and exact from them no satisfaction; therefore, even presupposing the fall of men, the Incarnation of the Word was not necessary. —

Then, even if God out of justice necessarily exacted some satisfaction from men for expiating their offense, he could have required it from each man individually guilty; so that each one of men would be bound to satisfy God in his own singular person for original sin contracted from himself: just as any sinner is held to render God satisfaction for all his actual sins: since original sin is contracted by each man for this reason, because his will interpretively was in the will of Adam, so that in him they sinned; why could God not also prescribe to each of men some satisfaction to be rendered voluntarily and freely, for expiating that guilt, which was only interpretively voluntary with respect to each man? — Finally, God was able (as we shall say in the following Question) to confer so great a grace upon some particular man, that his works would become wholly pleasing and acceptable to God for satisfaction on behalf of the whole human race: therefore satisfaction rendered by the God-Man was not absolutely necessary for that end.

You will object 1. The holy Fathers affirming that the Incarnation was absolutely necessary ex hypothesi, that God decreed to liberate man. Thus St. Chrysostom, Homily 10. on John. Our nature fell, he says, in such a manner that it could by no means be restored by anyone whatsoever, except by that most omnipotent hand: for neither otherwise could it be restored, unless he who fashioned it from the beginning stretched forth his hand. Cyril, book 6. of the Treasury, chapter 7. Since, he says, it befitted not the work of God to be imperfect, and it could not otherwise be repaired, God became of necessity man. Ambrose on Hebrews 9. So great was our sin, that we could not be saved otherwise than if the omnipotent Son of God died for us. Leo the Pope, Epistle 81. What reconciliation, he says, could there be, whereby God might be propitiated to the human race, unless the Mediator of God and men took upon himself the cause of all? To these add St. Anselm throughout the whole of book 1. Cur Deus homo, etc. —

I answer, that all those holy Fathers can be expounded by us in the manner in which our Alensis and the Seraphic Doctor expound St. Anselm, when he said it was impossible for God not to become incarnate; and thus it was necessary for man to be redeemed through the Incarnation, such that otherwise it neither could nor ought to have been done. For those Doctors say that St. Anselm spoke only of the necessity of immutability, which proceeds from the decree of the will of God, which God himself, once held, cannot change. Therefore, supposing the divine ordination concerning redeeming man through the Incarnation, we could not otherwise be saved, nor could God deny us this benefit: otherwise he would have been mutable. Secondly, the holy Fathers can be expounded as speaking of the necessity of being better: so that that may be called necessary which is most fitting, and which compensates on every side the loss inflicted by sin: for in this way neither does the disgrace of sin remain without the adornment of justice, and man pays the penalties which he owes, and worthily satisfies God, who can render worthy satisfaction. Finally, they can be expounded as speaking of the necessity conducing to the mode of redemption most perfect that can be conceived: it is certain, moreover, that the most excellent satisfaction for the sins of men that can be conceived is that which is exhibited by the Man-God.

You will object 2. with St. Anselm, book 1. Cur Deus homo, chapter 12: God can accomplish nothing to the prejudice of his divine equity and justice: but if he relaxed the offense of men without due satisfaction, which can be made only by the God-man, he would act against the requirement of his justice, which wills every sin to be punished and the honor taken away from God to be repaid: therefore, etc. —

I distinguish the minor; that it would tend to the prejudice of divine equity and justice according to the reason of the present disposition and ordination of things, I concede: since indeed God decreed that no sin should go unpunished, nor be remitted without satisfaction, either proper or another's: according to the ordination which God could have established, had he willed to succor us by another means, as it was in his liberty, I deny; since the whole justice and equity of God depends upon his divine ordination, and that is considered just and equitable only which accords with the divine will; thence it is clear that if God had disposed the matter otherwise, that decree would not have conflicted with divine equity.

You will object 3. with the same St. Anselm: If sin is not punished, it is left disordered: because as virtue is ordered unto glory, so sin unto punishment: but it beseems not God to leave anything disordered in his kingdom: therefore it beseems not God to leave sin thus unpunished. —

I distinguish the major: that it is disordered to leave sin without punishment, according to the present divine ordination, I concede; since God, as we said just now, wills every sin to pay due penalties: but since God could have disposed the matter otherwise, so equally could he have brought it about that sin should not be ordered absolutely to punishment infallibly to be inflicted.

Finally you will object with the same: If sin is not solved by due satisfaction, nor punished, the consequence is that it lies subject to no law: but this conflicts: both because it would follow that injustice would be freer than justice: because this lies subject to divine providence, while that would lie subject to no law; and equally that injustice would be like unto God; seeing that, like God, it would lie subject to no law: which consequences are altogether absurd: therefore also that whence they are inferred. —

I deny the sequel of the major: since in that case sin and injustice would lie subject to the divine will ordaining them, so that they be remitted gratuitously, just as the works of justice themselves lie subject to it, which by divine ordination ought to receive their due reward, for no other reason than that namely God so decreed and ordained.

Quaestio II: Utrum purus homo Deo satisfacere potuerit pro hominum offensa, eorumque ruinam restaurare

By the name of a mere man the Theologians here do not understand a man destitute of sanctifying grace and other supernatural gifts, as Cajetan understood it: but only is signified a man who is not God, nor hypostatically united with any one of the divine persons, such as is Christ the Lord; whence the sense of the question is, whether any man can offer to God a condign satisfaction for all the sins of men, and so merit before Him by his meritorious and satisfactory works that God remit the offence of men and grant them sufficient means for attaining eternal salvation.

Note 2. That satisfaction in general is the payment of a debt: which is defined by the Subtle Doctor in 1. distinc. 5. num. 4. The voluntary rendering of an equivalent, otherwise of what is not owed. The Doctor explains the parts of this definition in the same place. First it is called a rendering, both that it may be distinguished from simple donation, because a rendering is not a simple donation, but the payment of a debt: and also, that it may be signified that satisfaction is an act of justice, and directed toward another; because properly no one renders anything to himself. Secondly it is called voluntary: both because it is an act of the virtue of justice, but every act of moral virtue ought to be voluntary: and also because every rendering which is not voluntary is more a suffering of satisfaction than a satisfaction. Thirdly, of an equivalent: for what is rendered through satisfaction ought to have a certain equality with the debt; and this either according to the geometrical proportion, whereby by distributive justice a greater satisfaction is owed to the worthier injured person than to the less worthy: or according to the arithmetical proportion, whereby by commutative justice so much is given for so much, e.g. a hundred gold pieces are paid for as many debts. When however some satisfaction has all these conditions, it is called perfect: when equality is wanting, it is called de congruo, because the creditor is not bound to accept it from justice, but only from liberality, and congruity: when indeed it is made unto equality, but from goods granted by the creditor, it is said to be de condigno: because although what is rendered be from the grace of the creditor, yet truly the price rendered is equivalent to the debt.

Note 3. By reason of its matter, satisfaction is manifold; for it is made either in the goods of fortune, or of nature, or of honor, or of reverence; but with this distinction, that satisfaction in the goods of nature cannot be made to the injured person except by a certain commutative compensation; for he who has gravely struck another owes him satisfaction by paying from the goods of fortune some price for the penalty of injury and offence. In the goods of fortune however satisfaction ought to be made from the same goods, not indeed always according to the same entity, but according to price and estimation: for he who owes another a hundred coins will satisfy by restoring an equal or matching sum of money, or by donating something equivalent in price, according to common estimation, or at least according to the judgment of a prudent man. Satisfaction moreover in honor is especially attended to, either according to the excellence of the satisfactory work; or according to the dignity of the satisfying person: for as injury grows according to the dignity of the offended person, and the lowliness of the offender; so satisfaction grows according to the excellence of the satisfying person: for the worthier the person doing honor, the more illustrious is the honor.

These things thus premised, two things are here to be resolved. The first, whether any mere creature by ordinary law could condignly satisfy God for the sins of all men. The second, whether at least according to the absolute power of God, and extraordinary dispensation, He could accomplish it.

First Conclusion. — MAN COULD NOT, ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT DISPOSITION OF THINGS, OFFER SATISFACTION DE CONDIGNO, AND UNTO EQUALITY FOR THE SIN OF ALL MEN. This too is the common

For satisfaction to be perfect, it would have to be a rendering of an equivalent, as was said in Note 2: but a mere man could not render an equivalent, both for his own sin and for another's, with every divine pact set aside: therefore neither could he bestow perfect satisfaction.

Not indeed repay an equivalent, because there is no work of man, however endowed with grace, which could repay to God so much honor as was taken from Him by any sin of man: for as through whatsoever sin a peculiar injury is done to God, there would be need for perfect satisfaction, that a peculiar satisfaction also be made for each sin: or that an act so perfect be elicited, which could bestow on God so much honor as was taken from Him through each individual sin: but neither can a mere man accomplish, with the divine pact set aside. Not indeed the first, because no man can elicit so many meritorious acts as offensive acts against God were elicited by sinners. Nor can he accomplish the second, for as by any sin there is a certain and limited indignity and offence; so a meritorious work has a determined reason of merit and honor, nor can it have so much dignity that its merit is equivalent to all the injuries inflicted on God by individual sins. Add that the reason of merit is partly drawn from the acceptance of God; therefore where that does not intervene, as in fact it truly did not, since it appears nowhere, so neither could the satisfaction be equal.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Holy Fathers, who for this reason affirm the necessity of the Man-God for working our salvation, because no Angelic or human creature could accomplish it. Thus above all very many Greek Fathers teach. So St. Athanasius in the Gospel of the Passion and Cross of the Lord, says: When He saw the intolerable malice, neither was the mortal race fit to withstand death, nor could it pay the penalty of its evils, for the excess of malice exceeded every punishment: and seeing at once the goodness of the Father, and that He was fit and able (for Christ is the Power and Wisdom of God) He was moved by His humanity, and had pity on our weakness, and took upon Himself that very weakness... and seeing at once how we were not sufficient for the payment of the penalty, He transferred that very penalty upon Himself. And in the book On the Incarnation of the Word. For since, he says, the Word belongs to the Father and is above all, deservedly He alone could recover all things, and was fit, who should intercede for all. —

St. Basil expounding on Psalm 28 these words, Neither shall brother redeem, shall man redeem, says: Not man merely, but the Man-God Jesus Christ: because no other could offer a worthy price. — Cyril epist.

  1. or exegesis, In what manner, he says, could one dead for men, the just for all, pay the price, if we say that passion was that of some mere man? — Damascene lib. 15. and 19. says the action of Christ, and His Passion, were salutary for this reason, because they were divine: For, he says, it could not befit a human action. — Chrysostom Homil. 10. on John. Our nature fell, he says, in such a way that it could in no wise be restored by anyone, save by that most omnipotent hand: for neither could it otherwise be restored, unless He who fashioned it in the beginning had stretched forth His hand. — To these the Latin Fathers give assent, over whom presides St. Cyprian, or whoever is the author of the book On the cardinal works of Christ, where he says: Since for original death there could be no remedy except in the death of Christ, nor could any offering reconcile God to the exiled and condemned, except the singular sacrifice of this blood. —

St. Ambrose lib. 1. on Luke. What so great a leader would there be, who should profit all, unless He who is above all? Who would establish me above the world, unless He who is greater than the world? etc. —

St. Augustine in the Enchiridion c. 10. Nor would we be freed through him, the mediator man Christ Jesus, unless he were God. — Fulgentius On the Incarnation and grace, cap. 4. after the middle. The Word therefore God, he says, the only-begotten Son of God, who is in all things, as He Himself testifies, the beginning, and end: so did He begin initialiter according to His human nature, nourished not by flesh: so dying in the same flesh God paid the final debt of human nature: for so far would human nature bear away the sin of the world to be removed, and become fit, unless through union with the Word of God it passed, not by natural confusion, but only personally. — Finally St. Leo Serm. 1. On the Nativity says: Unless He were true God, He would not have brought the remedy. And Serm. 12. on the Passion of the Lord: Since therefore, he says, the miserable posterity of the first man had fallen together at once with the wound, nor could any merits of Saints overcome the condition of that death, there came from heaven a singular physician. — From which and similar oracles of the Holy Fathers it openly appears that satisfaction for the sins of the human race could not by the ordinary way be offered to God by any man whatsoever, however holy. Whether however it could be done by the extraordinary way, and through the absolute power of God, the Second Conclusion will disclose.

Second Conclusion. — A MERE MAN COULD HAVE SATISFIED GOD WITH EQUALITY FOR THE SINS OF THE HUMAN RACE, BY THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD, AND ACCORDING TO HIS EXTRAORDINARY DISPOSITION. This is the teaching of the Subtle Doctor in book 3, distinction 20, number 9, where, attacking the opinion of St. Anselm, who says that it was absolutely necessary for God to become man in order to make satisfaction for men, he says:

Against what he says in the third article, that none but a man ought to make satisfaction, this does not seem absolutely necessary: for one who is not a debtor can make satisfaction for another, just as he can pray for another. Wherefore as Christ, an innocent man and not a debtor, made satisfaction: so, had it pleased God, one good Angel could have made satisfaction by offering something pleasing to God on our behalf, which He would have accepted for all sins: for every created oblation is worth as much as God accepts it for, and no more. Moreover, one mere man could have made satisfaction for all, if he had been conceived without sin, as was possible by the operation of the Holy Spirit and of the Mother; even as Christ was; and God would have given him the fullness of grace, which he could have received, even as He gave it to Christ, without preceding merits, out of His liberality: for such a man could have merited the remission of sin even as he could have merited beatitude.

— And then, answering the claim of St. Anselm, namely that there is required on the part of the one satisfying that he offer to God more than the whole of creation is worth, he says at number 8:

I believe that, saving his reverence, this is not true: for satisfaction for the sin of the first man did not need to exceed the whole creation formally in magnitude and in perfection; for it would have sufficed to offer to God a greater good than the evil of that man sinning was. Wherefore if Adam, through grace given and charity, had had one act, or many acts, of loving God for His own sake, with a greater effort of free choice than was the effort in > sinning; such love would have sufficed for redeeming his sin, and satisfaction would have been made. And then that proposition is false, that he ought to have offered to God something greater than all that for which he ought not to have sinned: but just as for the love of a creature, as an object lovable, he ought not to have sinned: so in making satisfaction to God he ought to have offered something greater, attaining objectively through his act more than a creature is; namely, a love attaining Him for His own sake, and that love objectively, as terminated in God, exceeds the love of a creature, just as God exceeds the creature. Wherefore just as he sinned by love of a baser object infinitely: so he ought to have made satisfaction by love of a nobler object infinitely, and this would have sufficed, at least possibly.

Thus the Doctor; wherein he teaches First, that God could have formed some man who would not be from the stock of Adam, nor infected with his sin, and could have conferred upon him the same fullness of grace which He bestowed upon Christ the Lord: and could have agreed with him that his good works should avail unto the remission of sin, and unto the merit of beatitude for other men, just as He agreed with Christ. In which hypothesis that man, from perfect justice, could have satisfied God for the guilt of the whole human race. Secondly, God could also have agreed with Adam repenting, insofar as he was the head of the human race, that by acts of the love and charity of God, and other acts of piety and penance, he should make satisfaction both for his own sin and for the sin of his posterity, because by reason of that pact God would have accepted those meritorious acts, so that as much honor should be rendered to Him as had been taken away by the sins. For that these things could be done, no repugnance appears: therefore so it could have happened.

It is proved further: If a mere man could not make satisfaction with equality, chiefly because the works of such a just man could not have that condignity unto the expiation and payment of sin: but the consequence is false; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: hence those works would not have that condignity, because, as very many Thomists hold, sin has a certain infinity in the order of malice; but no creature can expiate and pay for infinite malice: yet this argument is worthless. I prove it: Either they speak of the extrinsic and objective infinity which sin has, inasmuch as it is committed against God, because He is an infinite object; or of the formal and intrinsic infinity. But the first does not prevent that malice from being paid for by a mere man; because the satisfactory works of a just man would tend also to God, as to an infinite object: therefore they likewise have that extrinsic infinity. But the second is false, because, as the Doctor proves in book 3, distinction 19, number 18, and in book 1, distinction 19, number 2, question 1, no sin is formally malice of infinite kind; for if sin were of infinite malice formally and intrinsically, no one could offend God more gravely by one sin than by another, and thus the offense would be no graver if anyone offered irreverence directly to God than if he killed a man or stole; which is absurd. The sequel is evident: because if the offense which is in theft be infinite, that offense which is in irreverence cannot be greater, since no offense can be conceived greater than infinite.

The Thomists reply, that offense and injury increase according to the dignity of the person against whom they are committed: for, other things being equal, the injury is graver if a prince is struck with blows by a commoner than if a commoner is struck by a prince: whence Aristotle, book 5 of the Ethics, chapter 5, says: If anyone holding office strikes someone, it is not fitting that he be struck back; and if anyone strikes him who holds office, he must not only be struck back, but also punished. Therefore since sin is committed against God, who is of infinite dignity, it is judged to have infinite malice. —

The consequence, however, I deny: for if it were a legitimate inference, it would follow equally that the beatific vision would be of intrinsic infinite dignity: for just as the more dignified the person offended, the graver the offense, so the more excellent the object, the more perfect also is the vision: therefore if the offense against a person of infinite dignity be of infinite malice, the vision of an object of infinite perfection will also be infinite: therefore just as this latter consequence is false — otherwise the acts of a pure creature would be intrinsically infinite — so too is the former false. — Therefore from it only this may be inferred, that the offense against a more dignified person, other things being equal, is graver than that which would be inflicted upon a less dignified person; wherefore just as the clear vision of God is more worthy than vision of an inferior object, yet is not an infinite act, because it tends in a finite manner toward its object: so the offense against God is graver than another offense: yet it is not infinite. Hence those acts indeed increase according to the greater perfection of the object according to a geometrical proportion; so that those acts which are concerned, whether by way of honor or of offense, with a more worthy object, have a greater dignity, or indignity, than those which tend in such wise to a less worthy object: but they ought not to increase according to an arithmetical proportion; so that an act tending toward some object should have as much perfection as the object toward which it tends has.

You insist. Although sin in the order of act is something finite, yet in the order of offense and aversion from God it is something infinite: for the malice of aversion is as great as the good which one spurns: therefore since sin, as offense, is something infinite, satisfaction of infinite dignity is required. —

I deny the antecedent: for that aversion from God either means only the privation of sanctifying grace, or the moral deformity and malice of sin. If the first, the offense cannot be infinite; for the gravity and deformity of a privation is not drawn from the object or end, but from the form which ought to inhere. Wherefore just as the pain of loss, which is the perpetual lack of the divine vision, is finite intensively, since it deprives only of the clear vision of God, which ought to inhere in the intellect as its perfective form; while it deprives of God only insofar as He is the object of that vision: so mortal sin, since it deprives either immediately of the due rectitude of the act, or of sanctifying grace as the physical form due to the subject, will be only a finite offense, although God, to whom grace converts, be infinite. If the second, since the malice of sin is something finite, the offense also will be finite: for sin is called an offense of God not because it injures God, or takes away anything intrinsic to Him — for on that account it would be judged infinite intrinsically — but because it is an evil which displeases God.

They urge. For every mortal sin, whether actual or original, infinite punishment is owed: therefore it is of infinite malice. —

I distinguish the antecedent: that infinite punishment is owed as regards intensity, I deny; as regards extension and duration, I concede. For this punishment is not inflicted because sin has infinite malice; but because, together with taking away grace, without which sin cannot be remitted, it also renders sinners unworthy of all future grace, therefore it is judged to be an incurable wound. But since punishment is owed to sin as long as it remains, therefore, since the sin of the damned remains forever, punishment is likewise owed to them forever: and hence it is eternal and infinite as to duration, although finite as to intensity. Or otherwise I answer by denying the consequence: for if the inference were valid, it would follow that our meritorious work would be likewise of infinite value, because through it we merit an eternal reward, and of infinite duration. Therefore there does not seem to be a more fitting reason why God willed final sin to be punished with eternal punishment, just as a good work is to be given an eternal reward, than because it so pleased Him; for although that punishment exceeds the malice of sin speaking extensively, nevertheless God could justly prescribe it, because the infliction of it is rather to be attributed to the sinner, who suffers it, than to God, who prescribes it, inasmuch as the sinner most freely performs those actions against the dictate of right reason on account of which that punishment of eternal duration would be inflicted.

You urge again. Although sin does not grow univocally, nor according to arithmetical proportion, according to the dignity of the person against whom it is committed; nevertheless satisfaction is to be measured from the dignity, or lowliness, of the one satisfying; wherefore, since man is far inferior to God, and appears most vile in the sight of that divine majesty, thence it comes about that nowhere can man of himself worthily satisfy God for sin. —

I deny the antecedent: for satisfaction is not always diminished on account of the lowliness of the person; otherwise an inferior, who had injured a superior, could never make satisfaction to him, unless at least he rendered him more than he had taken away; which is false; indeed, if the injury be in goods of fortune, some peasant will worthily satisfy a Prince for a hundred gold pieces taken away, if he render him the same number; similarly if the offense were against reputation, he can make restitution, either by denying that he said anything to the prejudice of so great a Prince, or by celebrating him with praises. Nor does it matter that those who thus injure a Prince are accustomed sometimes, besides this satisfaction, to be chastised with a graver penalty; for that is done for terror, lest others should have an easier occasion for thus detracting from so great a Prince. Finally, if the injury be done to honor, although satisfaction may appear more difficult, because nothing is esteemed so great that a vile person should humble himself and cast himself down before the Prince: nevertheless his humiliation can be so great, and his love toward the Prince so great, that he expose himself to grave peril for the safety and life of the Prince; whereby it will come to pass that the Prince judges him worthy to whom he may equally remit the offense. Thence it appears that man, although far inferior to God — as the peasant is to the Prince — nevertheless, elevated and upheld by His divine grace, will be able to bestow upon Him an equivalent satisfaction for sin, especially since the sins of men take away from God no intrinsic good, but are said to offend and injure Him only insofar as they displease Him. Add that the love of God above all things pleases God as much as sin displeases Him. —

The preceding argument is confirmed; for it does not conflict with its being done, nor ought it to be denied of God, because it involves no contradiction: but no contradiction appears in that a mere man should render to God as much as has been taken away by sin, both his own and that of others: therefore, etc. The major stands. The minor is proved; for for worthy and equal satisfaction only this is required, that the work of satisfaction be equivalent in value and dignity to the debt, and that God accept it as compensatory of the debt: for the merit of man, and the value of his good works, is sought chiefly from pact and divine acceptation, as we shall prove in the Treatise On Grace, the Disputation on Merit: but a just man can elicit an act of as great goodness as was the malice of Adam's sin, especially if he be free from original sin and endowed with the highest grace: therefore a mere man could satisfy with equality for the sins of others. —

This argument is confirmed again, and illustrated by this example: God could have stipulated a covenant with Adam, that if he did not sin, but merited an increase of his justice, He would transmit such justice, together with its increase, to posterity; for if the pact was sufficient to transmit justice, so was it sufficient to transmit its increase: but if Adam could do this by pact, and by reason of divine acceptation, by a similar reason another mere man could, through his meritorious works, transfer aids and justifying grace, so that others might be cleansed from sins: and consequently he could satisfy de condigno for them by the acceptation of God.

You will object 1. All the holy Fathers praised in the preceding Conclusion, affirming that no man had been fit to repair the fall of the human race, and therefore that it had been necessary for the Son of God to become incarnate, who might bestow a due and fitting satisfaction for the sins of the human race to the eternal Father. —

I answer, the authorities of the holy Fathers do not stand against us: for indeed we may reply with the Doctor in 1. distinc. 15. q. 1. that they are to be understood of conditional necessity, and ex suppositione, that God willed to employ a more excellent remedy than the worse disease required, and that the price of merit should far surpass the debt, so that where sin abounded, grace might superabound also. Or we may reply with the same Doctor in 3. dist. 20. num. 10 that God therefore decreed that satisfaction be bestowed through His proper Son, that we might be bound to Him by the bond of a greater benefit:

For, says the Doctor, therefore we are much bound to Him, since man could have been redeemed otherwise, and yet out of His free will He so redeems him, we are much bound to Him, and more than if it were so necessary, and we could not have been redeemed otherwise: therefore, to draw us to His love (as I believe) He did this especially: and because He willed man to be more bound to God: as if someone had first begotten a man, and afterwards instructed him in discipline and holiness, he would be more obliged to him, than if he had only begotten him, and another had instructed him: but this is congruity, not necessity.

— Or with the same Doctor in the same place, we may reply, that the holy Fathers intended nothing else than that de facto, ex suppositione of the divine ordination and law truly instituted, no one could worthily satisfy God except the God-Man, as was said in the preceding Conclusion: but this does not conflict with the present Conclusion, which does not treat of what was done, but of what could be done. — Or finally I say, the holy Fathers can be expounded thus, that they wish, that no mere man could have satisfied de condigno for the sins of the human race: such that, for example, the satisfaction of Adam exhibited by himself, insofar as it proceeded from him, could not have force morally to move God to remit sins; but the satisfaction of Christ obtained this, insofar as it proceeded from Him; for since it proceeded from a divine person, it could of itself sufficiently move God to forgive sin, although not so necessarily but that He could not forgive that sin, even though satisfaction had been exhibited by Christ, unless there intervened a pact to forgive sin on account of that satisfaction exhibited by a divine person. Yet it does not follow from this, that, a similar ordination and divine pact intervening, a mere man, especially one who would not be propagated from Adam, nor infected by his sin, and who would have the highest grace, could not render a satisfaction worthy of God for the sins of men.

You will object 2. That satisfaction cannot be worthy in which the favor of the creditor intervenes, and which is made from gifts freely accepted from the creditor: but such would be the satisfaction of a mere man, because it would have its value only from sanctifying grace gratuitously granted to him, and from the most free acceptation of God: therefore it could not be unto equality, nor from pure justice. —

I distinguish the major: if that grace granted, and gratuitous acceptation, be antecedent to the satisfaction, that satisfaction cannot be worthy, I concede: if only consequent, I deny. To the minor I say, that both the grace granted, and the gratuitous acceptation of God, whereby He would receive the satisfaction exhibited to Him by a mere man, would be consequent upon that satisfaction bestowed by Him, and thus they do not prevent it from being worthy: because although that ordination, or law, depended on the mere and gratuitous will of the creditor; nevertheless once granted, by means of it the debtor acquires a right of justice, both in that which has been gratuitously given to him, namely in grace liberally granted to him; which although it was given gratis, nevertheless when he possesses it, it is his own property, and he can use it, or not use it, at his pleasure for performing meritorious and satisfactory works: and likewise in the condition, which he fulfills, which stands in the manner of merit, so that recompense be rendered to him, or debt remitted, when he has fulfilled that condition: for he who fulfills the pact merits to receive that reward concerning which agreement had been made.

You will object 3. If a mere man could have made satisfaction for all the sins of men, it would follow that we are not greatly beholden to Christ our Lord: since we could have been redeemed by another: but the consequent openly militates against Sacred Scripture, and no less against Christian piety: therefore also against that from which it follows. —

I deny the sequel of the major; for, as we said just now with the Subtle Doctor, we are so much the more beholden to God because, although He could have saved us in another way, He yet spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all; for far more beholden would a peasant be to the King whom he had offended, if, to compensate the injury which the King could freely forgive, or discharge in another way, he were to substitute his own son in the place of that commoner, that he might exhibit to him a satisfaction worthy of the offense; but were to dismiss that commoner exempt from punishment and satisfaction.

You will object 4. A mere man could not make satisfaction except through the mediation of habitual grace: but habitual grace is not a principle of meriting condignly anything other than eternal life and the increase of grace for the man who uses that habitual grace worthily: therefore it cannot be a principle of meriting for others, by condignity, the forgiveness of sin. —

I distinguish the minor: according to the present ordination, I concede it; according to the possible, I deny it; for nothing hinders God from being able to accept an act of charity of a just man for another reward than for eternal life; for if a man had the fullness of grace, through the mediation of which he would have a right to eternal life corresponding equally to that grace itself, so that God would not in any way wish to accept his works as meritorious of an increase of grace, or of glory for the man himself operating them (just as in fact the meritorious works of Christ did not profit Himself, nor toward more abundant graces, whose plenitude He had from the beginning of His conception; nor toward a more ample beatitude of soul, whereby He enjoyed God), it would be most absurd that God could not accept those merits for other rewards to be conferred on those very persons for whom the lowly man would exhibit his merits to God.

You will object 5. No one could make satisfaction sufficiently to God for all the benefits received from Him: therefore much less will he be able to make satisfaction for the sins of all. The consequence is evident, because man is constituted debtor no less for a sin committed than for benefits received. —

I deny the consequence, because for making satisfaction for benefits another grace is required, for which no satisfaction could then be made, or the process would go on to infinity; which process would not arise if one were to make satisfaction for all sins. Add that the antecedent could be denied, for just as he who deserves for his sin the penalty of temporal death can make condign satisfaction for it, namely by exhibiting such service for the utility of the king, or of the commonwealth, as to be worthy to have life bestowed upon him by the supreme authority; in the same way one could make satisfaction for another, and compensate the penalty of death that was owed.

You will object 6. One man cannot make satisfaction for the sin of another, in expiation of which the latter deserved the penalty of death: therefore much less will he be able to make satisfaction to God for a sin which deserves eternal death. —

I deny the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is that a man making satisfaction for the sins of others: for just as sin merits eternal punishment, so a meritorious work merits eternal life; and hence it seems a condign satisfaction, when a meritorious work is exhibited in compensation for mortal sin and its eternal penalty: because it plainly renders an equivalent work, which merits eternal life.

Quaestio III: Utrum Christus Deo condignam satisfactionem exhibuerit

Three things above all come to be determined in the present Question: First, whether the satisfaction of Christ was offered from the virtue of justice properly so called. Second, whether it was of itself sufficient, and worthy, for expiating the sins of all men. Third, whether it had the conditions for a rigorous justice: which points, that they may appear more evidently,

Note 1. From Aristotle, book 3 of the Ethics, chapter 1, moral virtue is divided generically into that which is exercised about oneself, and that which is chiefly concerned with another: the former moderates the passions, the latter operations. To the first head belong Fortitude, which concerns the passions of the irascible appetite; Temperance, which concerns the passions of the concupiscible; and Prudence, which chiefly moderates the rational affections of the appetite. But Justice is wholly occupied with regulating the actions of man in order to another, so that man render to another what is owed. Now since debt is twofold, one moral, whose obligation arises from right reason, which dictates that it be right and equitable that this or that be rendered to another; the other legal, proceeding from some law, whether natural, or divine positive, or human, obliging one to render an equal for an equal: hence justice is established as twofold; one indeed common, which is found in all the virtues ordered to one's neighbor, or to God; thus it is just to obey the commands of superiors from obedience, to pay God due worship from religion, to come to the aid of parents from piety, etc. The other however is special, which consists in this, that it directly regards debt to be rendered to someone by the prescription and obligation of law. —

Now it is certain that Christ the Lord underwent his Passion, and offered satisfaction, from common justice, for he offered it from the motive of Charity: since he loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood. Apoc. 1. Likewise of Obedience, according to that saying: As the Father gave me commandment, so I do. John 14. Of Religion, as John 17 testifies: For them I sanctify myself, that is, I offer sacrifice, that by its power they may be sanctified, according to that saying to the Hebrews 10: By one oblation he has perfected forever them that are sanctified. But it is disputed among Theologians whether Christ also offered satisfaction from the motive of strict justice.

Note 2. That just as there is a twofold right in the thing, or operation, through which satisfaction can be made, or reward received, so there is in it a twofold value, and dignity: the first right is in order to the thing; the second in order to the person. The right in order to the thing is the title which the meritorious action of the worker acquires in order to the reward; hence he who labored more deserves to receive a greater wage; and this right takes its origin, and is founded, upon the equality of thing to thing. But the right in order to the person is the title which the worker acquires by reason of the meritorious work in order to the one rewarding, which right indeed, although it supposes an equality of the work with the reward received, yet does not arise from it, but depends precisely upon the will of the one rewarding, ordaining, or accepting this merit in order to that reward; for since the thing which is to be the reward is under the dominion and in the power of the one rewarding, until he shall have granted it, its donation and alienation depend upon his consent; whence the worker cannot have a right to it unless he also have a right and title to the person of the one rewarding, arising from that one's own will, namely from free promise and agreement. As is evident from the parable of the laborers who, sent into the vineyard, having made an agreement about the daily denarius, though hired at different hours, some labored longer than others: nevertheless all equally received the same wage: whence although those who had come at the first hour murmured against the householder, saying, Matt. 20: These last have worked one hour, and you have made them equal to us, that have borne the burden of the day and the heats; deservedly the Householder said to one of them: Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a denarius? Take what is yours, and go; but I will also give to this last even as to you. Or is it not lawful for me to do what I will? From which it appears that although the greater and longer labor of the workers in the vineyard had a right to ampler wages by reason of the work: nevertheless he ought not to have obtained it, because he did not have the same ground of right in order to the one rewarding, inasmuch as no prior agreement and promise had been made on the part of the one rewarding.

NOTE 3. It is certain that Christ the Lord was truly the redeemer and liberator of the human race, whatever Peter Abailard most wickedly asserted with heretical mind against this Catholic truth, saying that man after the sin of Adam is not held captive under the power of the devil as under the power of a Prince, but only as under a prison keeper: and consequently that the Incarnation of Christ profited us nothing toward redemption, but only toward doctrine and example, as is evident from St. Bernard, Epist. 190, where he thus assails the shamelessness of Abailard: What in these words is more intolerable, the judgment, the blasphemy, or the arrogance? What more damnable, the rashness, or the impiety? Would it not be more just that a mouth speaking such things be beaten with rods, when it is refuted by arguments? etc. For it is evident from Scripture that we were truly reduced through sin into captivity under the devil. Thus 1. to Timothy 2: That they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil, by whom they are held captive at his will. You hear "at his will," says St. Bernard, and do you deny the power? Hence Christ, John 14: The prince of this world came, and in me he has nothing: that is, he does not have power over me in that manner in which he has it over men; wherefore the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 1, teaches that men in the transgression of Adam not only lost innocence, but also were made slaves of sin and under the power of the devil and of death. But from this captivity Christ redeemed us, as sacred Scripture teaches in very many places. Thus to the Galatians 2: Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law: to Timothy 2: Who gave redemption for himself for all; 1. Peter 2: You were not redeemed with corruptible gold and silver, but with the precious blood of Christ. But the difficulty is, whether that redemption was made: first, from justice; second, unto equality; third, from the rigor of justice, which indeed must be determined in the following Conclusions.

First Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD SATISFIED TO GOD FOR THE SINS OF THE HUMAN RACE FROM A SPECIAL MOTIVE OF LEGAL JUSTICE.

It is proved first, from sacred Scripture affirming that the divine justice appeared in the satisfaction of Christ. Thus to the Romans 3: Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to show forth his justice for the remission of former sins: and to the Corinthians 1: He is made unto us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption: and to the Colossians 2: Blotting out the handwriting of the decree that was against us, etc.; by which similitude he signifies that Christ from justice paid our debt; for when a debt is paid, e.g., of money, from special justice, straightway the juridical handwriting whereby the debtor was previously bound toward the creditor is torn and broken. — And St. Peter, epistle 1, chapter 2, verse 24: who bore our sins in his own body upon the tree; in which words the Apostle, writing to the Jews, speaks in the Jewish manner, and alludes to the Jewish victims, by whose slaughter the Jews thought themselves delivered from their sins. And as the Jews immolated victims for their sins, and transferred those victims burdened with this weight of sins upon the altar and the wood of the altar; so our Lord

Jesus is represented by the Apostle as a victim laden with our sins, and that he transferred and laid down that detestable weight, near as it was and most heavy, upon the altar of the cross and that wood with most courageous spirit. The Apostle perhaps also alludes to the scapegoat which on the day of expiation was laden with the sins of the whole people, and was sent away far into the desert, as is evident from these words of Leviticus, chapter 16, verses 21 and 22: and laying both hands upon the head of the goat, let him confess all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their offenses and sins, as if cursing them upon its head, and he shall send him away by a man ready into the desert. Whichever way the goat shall have borne all their iniquities into an uninhabited land, and shall have been let go into the desert, etc. Therefore the high priest in public sacrifices and those of the whole people, when he represented the people, was accustomed to impose hands upon the victims for sin, with confession of his own sins and those of the whole people, in these words: I beseech thee, O Lord, I have sinned, I have offended, I have rebelled in thy sight, I and my house and the sons of Aaron, thy holy people; I beseech thee, O Lord, forgive now the sins, offenses, and rebellions in which I have sinned, offended, and rebelled in thy sight, I and my house and the sons of Aaron, thy holy people, as it is written in the law of Moses thy servant, where it is said, on this day there shall be expiation and cleansing for you from all your sins. See the codex Ioma in the Misna, and Maimonides in Iom Haecipurim. From these things it appears how truly St. John the Baptist spoke to the Jews, who flowed to him in most numerous throngs, when he saw Christ the Lord hastening to him with others about the time of expiation: Behold the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world. Which words were uttered by him precisely that he might recall the minds and eyes of the Jews from the goat of expiation, in which they wished to place the hope of their expiation, and turn them to Christ the lamb, even the most excellent. Inasmuch as he would take away sin not ceremonial but moral; bear punishment, not typical and temporal, but the whole punishment, congruous to the merits of sins, and upon which had been imposed not only the sins of one Jewish nation, but the sins of the whole world. The divine Apostle confirms this, epistle to the Colossians, chapter 2, verse 14, where he says that Christ granted us forgiveness of all sins, because, he says, he blotted out the handwriting of the decree that was against us, which was contrary to us, and took it out of the way, fastening it to the cross. For sin is like an obligation whereby we were liable by the judgment of God; whence since obligations secured by handwritings are rendered null when they are erased, settled, and cancelled; so Christ blotted out upon the cross and utterly removed the obligations contracted by us from our sins; so much so that before God they no longer stand and appear as accusers and witnesses demanding his vengeance and judgments against us; he transfixed them with the nail of the beam of the cross, he cancelled them, he exposed them torn, void, vain, he crucified them, exhibited them as dead and lifeless, and rendered them no less powerless than the crucified one who, with blood poured out through all his wounds, truly died and breathed forth his soul.

The same thing the holy Fathers teach, affirming that God did not wish to fight with the devil, nor assail him with power, but with justice in the redemption of men. Thus St. Augustine, book 13 De Trinitate, c. 13: If therefore, he says, the commission of sins, through the just anger of God, subjected man to the devil, certainly the remission of sins, through the benign reconciliation of God, drew man out of the devil's hands. But the devil was not to be overcome by the power of God, but by justice. What then is that justice by which the devil was conquered? What, if not the justice of Jesus Christ? And how was he conquered? Why, when he found in him nothing worthy of death, he nevertheless killed him. And assuredly it is just, that the debtors whom he held should be set free, believing in him whom he killed without any debt. To him subscribe the other holy Fathers praised by us above, Question 1, while we were proving that the Incarnation was fitting for manifesting the divine justice.

It is proved also by reason: Then does one satisfy from legal justice properly so called, when per se he intends to establish an equality, as owed by some law: but Christ offered his merits to God with the intention of rendering to him an equal for the debt contracted by men. Which indeed is proved, both because Christ was our surety, and constituted himself as pledge for us in his Incarnation: therefore he ought to offer his merits to God with the intention of satisfying him for us; and because his merits were sufficient, indeed even superabundant, for paying our debt, as the following Conclusion will make plain: therefore he ought to offer them to God from the motive of justice, and with the intention of satisfying unto equality; finally because he was moved to it by divine decree, whereby God had determined to grant us the pardon of all our offenses if he himself should lay down his life for us, according to that saying of Isaiah, chapter 53: If he shall lay down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed, and the will of God shall be directed in his hand: for his labor his soul shall be glad and be filled: therefore since Christ offered his merits for us to the Father, he did this with the intention of rendering to God the debt unto equality according to the agreement and divine law, and consequently performed an act of proper and special justice. — Further, servants and true slaves are bound to render observance and obedience to their lord from a proper debt of special justice: and where they offend against such a debt, they are bound to repair it not only by virtue of obedience, but also by virtue of justice: but we are true slaves with respect to God, who is King of Kings and Lord of Lords, whose is the earth and the fullness thereof, and all they that dwell therein: therefore by virtue of justice we are bound not only to render him obedience; but also to repair what has not been rendered from the motive of the same justice: now Christ the Lord satisfied for all the debts contracted through our sins; therefore he ought to satisfy not only for the debt of punishments which were to be retributed for our sins, but he also ought to render such obedience and an equal debt to God, to compensate for the defect of the exercise of the virtues which we were bound to exercise for the glory and worship of God. — Finally, when one is bound by special and proper justice to render the reward, then the merit of the worker is considered to exact that reward from justice: but God, supposing his promise and law, is bound to render to Christ as the reward of his merits the remission of our debt, seeing that he was heard for his reverence: therefore the satisfaction and merit of Christ was bestowed from the virtue of justice.

You will say 1. From Aristotle, book 5 of the Ethics, chapter 1: Justice must be toward another: but the satisfaction of Christ was toward himself, since he satisfied God, and he himself is God: therefore this justice was not properly so called. — I distinguish the major: justice must be toward another, either physically, or morally. I concede: physically only. I deny. And so, the minor being distinguished, the consequence must be denied. For in order that justice be toward another properly, it is not necessary that it be toward another supposit physically, or metaphysically speaking, but it suffices that it be toward another supposit morally: and it is toward another in this way when one person, metaphysically considered, stands morally as distinct, as twofold, namely by reason of dominion and right: for it can happen that one and the same man, taken physically and metaphysically, appears twofold morally: thus a tutor, by reason of administering the property of his pupil, can be debtor, and by reason of his own right can be creditor. This is also illustrated by the example of a merchant who is a member of two partnerships: for he is morally a twofold person, and to himself, as metaphysically considered, he is frequently both debtor and creditor. The same by the example of a man who, possessing an estate owing to another a certain sum of annual revenue, if he buy another estate which owes rent to the first, becomes morally a twofold person; and can under one respect be simultaneously debtor and creditor. Now Christ the Lord stood thus; for sustaining two natures through the hypostasis of the Word, he was morally a twofold person, and by reason of the two natures assumed had distinct rights and dominions: and he was simultaneously debtor by reason of the assumed human nature, through which he had constituted himself surety for men: and creditor by reason of the divine nature, which had been injured by the sins of men; whence he is also called Mediator of God and men, 1. to Timothy 2. For it no more conflicts that he be debtor by reason of one nature, and creditor by reason of the other, than it conflicts that by reason of one nature he be Mediator, and by reason of the other be him between whom and others he is mediator: now Christ the Lord, by reason of the human nature, is the Mediator of God and men: but by reason of the divine nature, he is the one between whom and men the Mediator stood: therefore also by reason of the two natures he could be simultaneously creditor and debtor.

You will say 2. From the same Aristotle, in the same place, chapter 6, there can be no true obligation of justice between father and son, or lord and servant: but Christ, inasmuch as He is man, is Son and servant of God: therefore from His operations as man there could not intervene an obligation of justice toward God. — I distinguish the major: between son and father, servant and lord, there cannot intervene an obligation of justice, if the son and the servant do not hold domains distinct from the domains of the father and the lord. This I concede: otherwise, I deny it. Christ, however, as man, has a right distinct, and a dominion different from the right and dominion of His Father and God: since He holds dominion over the works of His humanity, by which He made satisfaction to the Father and to God; and accordingly in His satisfaction true justice could intervene.

You will say 3. No one can make satisfaction from justice unless he be a debtor: yet not Christ Himself, but we ourselves were debtors for our sins: therefore Christ did not make satisfaction from justice. — I answer 1. The major can be denied: for someone can pay another's debt from mercy indeed with respect to the debtor, but from justice with respect to the creditor: for instance, if anyone moved by mercy toward some captive, or destitute man, pays for him a certain sum of money which he owed, he makes satisfaction from justice to the creditor, although he is moved by mercy toward the debtor. I answer 2. By denying the minor: for Christ, having constituted Himself surety and pledge for us, and voluntarily undertaken the office of Redeemer, constituted Himself likewise debtor for us toward God: therefore just as a surety is bound from justice to pay the debt when the debtor is unable to pay it; so also Christ the Lord on this account ought to make satisfaction for us from justice.

You will say finally: The same Christ would have to exercise an act in making satisfaction for us which we are bound to elicit while we make satisfaction for our sins: yet we do not make satisfaction by an act of justice, but of penance: therefore Christ also did not make satisfaction from justice. — I answer by denying the minor: for man existing in grace renders to God the satisfaction owed not only through the virtue of penance, but also through the virtue of justice, yet from different motives, because through penance he makes satisfaction from a motive of avenging sin; through justice truly from a motive of rendering to God an equivalent for sin, according to the prescription of divine ordination; and this was especially true in Christ, since He exhibited to God a satisfaction condign and proportioned to equality, as is manifest.

Second Conclusion. — The satisfaction of Christ was not only such as it was, but most sufficient also, and superabundant in order to the reward: it needed nevertheless the divine acceptance, that He might obtain that from the One rewarding it. This Conclusion consists of two parts, of which

The first is proved by that passage to the Romans 5. Not as the offense, so also the gift; for if by the offense of one many died, much more the grace of God, and the gift in the grace of one man Jesus Christ has abounded unto many.... For as by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so also by the obedience of one many shall be constituted just.... But where sin abounded, grace superabounded. To these agrees the prophecy of Isaiah chapter 10. The consumption of the word shall wash away iniquity. Which St. Paul interprets Romans 9. concerning Christ, to signify that the works of Christ, as it were consummated and abbreviated in the word, which the Lord hath made short upon the earth, poured forth as it were an overflowing fountain of justice, for the expiation of our sins. Hence Luke 9. Christ speaking with Elias and Moses about His passion, they spoke of the excess which He was about to accomplish in Jerusalem, by which it is declared that the passion of Christ exceeded, in the reason of satisfaction, all our offenses.

It is proved also from the Supreme Pontiffs; for Pope Gaius, Epistle 1., decretal, expounding the words of St. Paul cited above, says: More resplendent was made the gift of liberty than the debt of servitude. Agapetus, Epistle to Authimus, after saying that no mere man could have been made worthy to make satisfaction for us all, subjoins the cause for which Christ made satisfaction, in these words: The effusion of righteous blood was not vile, and precious, as if the multitude of captives believed in their redeemer, that it would loosen no bond of the devil: since, as the Apostle says, where sin abounded, grace superabounded. And since born under the injury of sin we received the power of ministering injustice, more resplendent was made the gift of liberty than the bond of servitude. These words he took from St. Leo, sermon 12. On the Passion. To these agrees Clement V. in the extravagante Unigenitus, where, to show the abundance of the merits of Christ, which are said to be in the treasury of the Church, that they cannot be exhausted, he says: Not a little drop of blood, which nevertheless on account of its union with the Word would have sufficed for the redemption of the whole human race, but copiously as a kind of outpouring He is known to have shed it.

The holy Fathers concur also: above all St. Chrysostom, sermon 11. on chapter 5. to the Romans, where he writes thus: Christ paid for us; and more things by how much an immense sea exceeds a tiny drop... do not despair therefore, O man, since you see such great riches of goods, etc.

The author On the cardinal works of Christ subscribes: speaking of the Circumcision he says: That one oblation of our Redeemer was of such dignity, that one alone sufficed for taking away the sins of the world: who entered into the holy places with so great authority in His own blood, that thereafter He had need of no alien blood for the petitions of suppliants.

Finally St. Bernard, explaining that passage Psalm 129. Plenteous with him is redemption, says sermon 22. on the Canticles: Truly plenteous, he says, because not a drop, but a wave of blood flowed forth generously through the five parts of the body. And Epistle 190. There was certainly blood, which being shed was so much for forgiving, that it blotted out even that greatest sin by which it came to pass that it should be shed.

To these favors the Council of Tribur chapter 19. where it says that in the consecration of the chalice more wine than water is mixed in, that it may be shown that greater is the power of the blood of Christ than the frailty of the people, which is designated by water.

The same truth Doctor Subtilis teaches and defends Doctor Subtilis in 3. dist. 19. n. 7. where he says the merit of Christ by reason of the divine person had an infinite circumstance, by reason of which it was fitting that it be accepted for infinite things. In that formal reason, he says, which itself had, it could not be accepted in the infinite, and for infinite things, but for finite things. Nevertheless from the circumstance of the supposit, and de congruo by reason of the supposit, it had a certain preeminent reason why God could accept it in the infinite, namely extensively for infinite things. But if that merit had been of another person, then neither by reason of the work nor by reason of the worker would its acceptance for infinite things have been congruous. In which the Doctor plainly teaches that the merits of Christ by reason of the divine person had congruence, that is, value and dignity, so that they might be accepted by God for paying the infinite sins of men: every congruity with the Doctor is the same as value and dignity with the Recentiores: although it is not thus called by him, because there is not integral value where there is not true right against the One rewarding, which the meritorious works of Christ did not have of themselves, but only from the divine acceptance. — The same he has in 1. dist. 15. q. 1. where he says: By the ordinary power God did not dispose to reconcile an enemy to Himself except through an homage more grateful than his offense, as displeasing to Himself, and such an homage of his is the passion of Christ, or his merit. Where it must be weighed that he speaks of the value of the merits which they have before acceptance: for as he said immediately, they can only have a value equal with the debt, since satisfaction for that alone is actually accepted: therefore when he says that the homage of Christ was more grateful, it is understood of the acceptability which that homage had before actual acceptance.

From these things it appears how shamefully the greater part of the More Recent Authors hallucinate, while they affirm that the Doctor holds that the merits of Christ were condign only in order to the reward, solely by reason of divine acceptation; for the abundance of merit is not to be sought from the acceptation of the one rewarding, but from the dignity of the one acting. Therefore, although the Doctor teaches that before acceptation merit does not possess complete condignity in order to the reward — for this cannot be complete unless it also gives a right in order to the one rewarding — nevertheless he contends that those merits were in themselves most sufficient, such as would be accepted by God for paying our debts; so that if God had placed all the sins of men in a balance, and the merits of Christ on the other side, there would be no doubt that the merits of Christ would far preponderate, as St. Bernard excellently teaches in the Homily on the two Disciples going to Emmaus, where he teaches that the punishment which Christ endured for the sins of the human race, weighed in the balance of the cross, was by reason of satisfaction far greater than our sins had merited. Now he says: The cross was made the balance of the body, which is the Church: for when he himself was being crucified, there were weighed with him the sins which we have committed, the calamity which we have incurred: he himself was innocent, unstained, separate from sinners, and his conversation higher than the heavens: for he did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth, and because he who was so great and of such a kind deigned to suffer so unworthy a thing on the cross, he weighed out the taking away of calamity, and the binding up of crimes: yet while he still stood erected on the cross, the balance seemed to waver, nor was it plainly known whither it ought to fall; when with head bowed he gave up the spirit, and the calamity fell by preponderating, and appeared heavier than the sand of the sea, the nations were reckoned as the weight of the balance: for into the balance they fell, because the opposing parts lost the handwriting of our damnation.

To these things also this argument lends its support: That satisfaction is held to be condign in order to the reward, namely the remission of offense, whereby it morally equals the gravity of the injury: but the satisfaction of Christ morally equaled the gravity of the offense inflicted upon God by the sins of men: therefore it was condign in order to the reward. The major is evident. The minor is proved: the gravity of the offense arising from the sins of men is chiefly drawn from this, that it is against God, who, since he is an infinite object, whence a certain supreme and extrinsically infinite indignity redounds upon that offense; but the satisfaction of Christ, since it was exhibited by a divine person, had also by reason of its principle a certain moral and extrinsically infinite dignity equaling the gravity of the offense; because the dignity of the person satisfying is no less powerful unto influencing moral value in the satisfactory act than is the dignity of the person offended unto influencing gravity and moral malice in the offense inflicted upon him: therefore since the satisfaction of Christ is the satisfaction of a divine person, its dignity no less equals the majesty of the injured person than does the offense of men. — It is confirmed: it was fitting, and congruous, that just as the mercy of God shone forth most of all in the reparation of the human race, so also the divine justice should shine forth therein: All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth: but the justice of God would not shine forth in the redemption of men if the satisfaction of Christ were not of itself condign in order to the reward, because all its value would hang upon the divine acceptation, and thereupon the whole payment would be from the liberality and clemency of God: therefore that both these divine perfections might shine forth equally in our redemption, it was necessary that the merits of Christ, besides the divine acceptation, be of themselves sufficient for paying all our debts.

The second part is also proved, namely that the satisfaction of Christ, that it might be complete on every side, both in order to the reward and in respect of the one rewarding, had need of being accepted by God. It is proved, I say, first both from sacred Scripture and from the holy Fathers signifying that the acceptation and covenant of God are desired for the condignity of the merits of Christ: for to this tends the pact, and covenant, and oath of God, whereby he promised the redemption of Christ to the most holy Patriarchs and Prophets. To this tends also that famous promise made to Christ to come, Isaiah 53. If he shall lay down his life for sin, etc. Hence St. Ambrose, expounding the words of Psalm 118. Uphold me according unto thy word, and so forth: after he had said: We ask that we be received by Christ: he adds: Moreover I should seem to carry presumption were I to say to the Lord: Uphold me; unless I joined his promise: that is, that thou thyself didst make this, that we might dare this: thou hast redeemed thyself by thy handwriting. By which he signifies that our works are meritorious completely insofar as they are accepted by God, nor can we hope to attain the divine reward unless it has been promised.

Reason persuades the same thing: for nothing created can induce an obligation in God to confer anything, unless he himself, from his liberty and clemency, shall have willed to bind himself by promises to grant it. Otherwise he would not be altogether independent: but the satisfactory works of Christ were truly in their entity something created: therefore they could in no way bind God, so that in their reward he would grant the remission of our sins, unless he himself had willed the same by his free ordination and acceptation.

You will say 1: The value of the satisfactory works of Christ did not equal the gravity of the offense of all sins: therefore his satisfaction was not condign in respect of the reward. The antecedent is proved: First, because offense is inflicted upon God as God is: but the satisfactory works of Christ proceed not from him inasmuch as he is God, but inasmuch as he is man: for he satisfies not as God, but as man: therefore the satisfactory value of those works did not equal the gravity of the offense of sins. Next, there cannot be a satisfaction bestowed so pleasing and honorable as the offense of men was displeasing and injurious. For sin displeases God as much as his own goodness pleases him, against which sin is opposed: because as much as any thing is loved, so much is its destructive contrary hated and displeasing: but the satisfactory works of Christ cannot please God as much as his own divine goodness pleases him: therefore they do not correspond equally to the offense. Finally, the gravity of the offense inflicted upon God by a creature is infinite, both on the part of the person against whom the sin is committed, and on the part of the offending person, who is infinitely distant from God: but the satisfaction of Christ can be held infinite only on the part of the person satisfying, not truly on the part of him to whom satisfaction is exhibited, because satisfaction does not grow by reason of the person to whom it is paid, nay rather its value is more depressed: for the worthier the person, the more excellent also a satisfaction he requires: and consequently what would suffice in respect of another of lesser dignity cannot be sufficient in respect of a more worthy person: therefore the gravity of sins was far greater than the value of the satisfaction of the works of Christ; and consequently so far are they from having been superabundant, that indeed they could not have possessed condignity.

I deny the antecedent, and to its first proof I say, that Christ did not satisfy only as man, nor only as God; but as God-man, inasmuch as the humanity elicited the satisfactory works, the personality of the Word urging them on, which influenced the satisfactory value into them, and consequently instilled into them a certain infinite dignity, at least extrinsically, namely by reason of the infinite person from which those works proceeded. To the second proof, I deny the antecedent and the argument of its proof; for it is not necessary that God hate sin as much as he loves his own goodness, since sin is not opposed physically to that goodness, but only morally; but the satisfactory works of Christ render as much honor to the divine goodness as injury is inflicted upon it through sin. To the third proof I say, that if sin possesses any infinitude, that infinitude is not intrinsic, but only extrinsic, namely by reason of the infinite person offended: but the satisfaction of Christ has extrinsic infinitude not only from this heading, but also on the part of the person satisfying: for since this is infinite, even its works are worthy to be accepted for infinite things on behalf of men, as we said above with the Doctor.

You will say 2: The personality of the Word does not confer upon the works of Christ an intrinsically infinite value, as the Doctor teaches in dist. 19 of book 3, but only extrinsically; therefore those satisfactory works are of finite value only: but the finite value of a satisfactory work not only does not exceed, nay not even equals, the gravity of the offense of all sins: therefore so far is it that the satisfaction of Christ was superabundant, rather it was not condign and equal. — I distinguish the minor: the finite value of a satisfactory work cannot suffice for the expiation of all sins according to some degrees of its value, I concede: where it involves all whatsoever degrees of value which can be found in any satisfactory work, I deny. And although the works of Christ did not possess an intrinsically infinite value, they nevertheless possessed a supreme value, which could befit created works. Hence it is that, since besides a divine person, on account of his most eminent excellence, illustrated those works in a wonderful manner, he exhibited them also worthy to become most acceptable to God for the paying of our sins.

You will say 3: If the satisfaction of Christ had been exuberant in order to the debts, God could not have refused it: therefore it had no need of divine acceptation for the completion of its perfection. The consequence is evident: for where more is rendered than is owed, the debt is most exactly paid: but the most exact payment of a debt cannot be refused by the creditor: therefore etc. — I distinguish the antecedent: he could not refuse it by reason of the value of the work itself, and of its condignity to the reward, I concede: by reason of the liberty of the one rewarding himself, who cannot be bound by anything external to grant something unless he has spontaneously bound himself thereto by his promises, I deny.

You will say 4: Everyone sins against equity who exacts satisfaction beyond what is owed: but God, by exacting the satisfaction of Christ, could not sin against equity: therefore it was not superabundant, and beyond what was owed. — I distinguish the major: when a satisfaction can be exhibited without that excess, I concede: when it cannot be repaid, I deny. So it is in the present case, for God could not be satisfied to equality according to the statute law except by a divine person; but satisfaction proceeding from a divine person necessarily exceeded human debts, on account of the dignity of the person who exhibited it; not therefore did God act against equity, while he exacted the satisfaction of Christ, although superabundant.

Quaestio IV: Utrum Christus pro nobis satisfecerit ad iuris apices, seu ex rigore iustitiae

Note 1. It is one thing for a satisfaction to be equal and condign by its very nature; it is another for that satisfaction to be made to the strictest requirements of law, or to proceed from rigorous justice. For in order that a satisfaction be condign, it suffices that the compensation be made to equality, and that only so much be paid by the debtor as is owed to the creditor: but in order that a satisfaction be made according to the laws of strict and rigorous justice, other conditions are desired beyond equality, which we shall set forth and weigh presently. Wherefore although nearly all agree that the satisfaction of Christ was condign, and unto equality, especially if his value be considered in relation to the reward; nevertheless very many of the Recent writers inquire further whether it was also offered according to the strict requirements of law and the laws of rigorous justice. Recent writers, I say, for none of the ancients whom I have read proposes and discusses the question under these terms: for they inquire only into, and resolve, that the satisfaction of Christ was condign, and unto equality, from true justice.

Note 2. Besides the three conditions desired for every perfect satisfaction, which we weighed in the preceding third Question, five more are assigned by Theologians, in order that a satisfaction may be said to be made according to rigorous justice: First, that the satisfaction be made from the proper goods of the one satisfying, who is the debtor: for since by every rigorous satisfaction a perfect equality must be brought about, it is necessary that he to whom satisfaction is made acquire dominion over some thing which he did not possess before; at least in that manner in which he obtains it through the satisfaction. Second, that it not be founded upon the grace of the creditor; for if someone owes a hundred coins, and the creditor is content if only fifty are offered, that satisfaction will not be from the rigor of justice, because it supposes the grace of the creditor, who out of liberality and mercy remits part of the debt. Third, that it be toward another; for rigorous satisfaction is essentially ordered to establishing a perfect equality; but perfect equality cannot be of the same being toward himself; for equality is a real relation necessarily requiring extremes really distinct. But whether that distinction and otherness must be between persons, or between natures, we shall open up below. The fourth condition is, that the person offended be bound to accept such a satisfaction, nor can he reject it out of justice, since indeed he recognizes it to be equal to the debt. This condition they assign above all others, John Medina, Treatise 3. De Poenitentia, q. 1. Andreas de Vega lib. 1. super Concilium, cap. 9. and with them very many Recent writers. The fifth condition is, that the satisfaction be made from those things which under another title are not per se owed to the creditor: which condition Saint Anselm assigns in book 2. Cur Deus homo cap. 19. For if someone owes another a hundred coins on account of an annual rent, and as many more by reason of a loan, or a sale, he would not satisfy the creditor by paying him only a hundred coins; for the creditor could accept those hundred coins for the annual rent, and thus the debtor would be held to pay another hundred coins in satisfaction of the loan, or sale.

Note 3. That we said pointedly and deliberately, that rigorous satisfaction must be made from things per se not owed. For a title of debt can supervene upon another in two ways: First indeed per se, and separately, by inflicting a new debt: Second, however, per accidens, and conjoinedly, by inflicting only a new obligation of paying the same debt, or a confirmation of the prior obligation: which becomes clear from these examples: For if someone owes another a hundred coins by reason of an annual rent, and afterwards borrows as many more; because the title of annual rent, by which he owed the former sum, is obligatory per se, just as the title arising from a contract of loan, therefore there is a twofold distinct debt, which cannot be discharged by a single payment. Likewise the same point becomes clear from this example: If someone is bound by vow to fast on each Friday, when that day is the vigil of some feast, and during the time of Lent, at which time and on which day he is also bound to fast by the precept of the Church, he does not there have a threefold distinct debt of fasting, but only a new obligation superadded to the prior one. Here, however, the question is not raised whether rigorous satisfaction requires being made from things owed per accidens, but only from things not owed per se: for it is certain that if someone were to swear to another that he would journey to Rome, which he was already going to do by vow, as well as by reason of a stipend accepted on account of that journey, he would not be bound to journey to Rome three distinct times; although he is bound thereto by the title of religion, by reason of the vow and oath, and by the title of justice by reason of the stipend accepted, because the titles of religion and justice in such a case are not obligatory per se, but only confirmatory of the prior obligation.

One Conclusion only. — The satisfaction of Christ (the divine pact being supposed) had all the conditions for a satisfaction from the rigor of justice, and unto the strictest requirements of law. This is the more common view, and, as it seems to me, more conformable to the mind of the Doctor, affirming that Christ satisfied condignly, and unto equality, and superabundantly (the divine acceptance and covenant being supposed), as was said above.

The Conclusion can be proved by the authority of the holy Fathers, who teach that Christ satisfied for us most exactly. Thus Proclus of Cyzicus in the Oration De Nativitate Christi, cap. 1. where he says: For our sins a price of such kind was paid out, which justly held fast the debt exacted unto the equity of justice: most justly indeed would the devil not lose his captives through the death of Christ, unless they were released from their captivity by a rigorous satisfaction and justice. — Saint Basil of Seleucia in the first Homily De Incarnatione says, that through the marvelous firstfruits of our nature, namely through Christ the Lord, every reason of justice was fulfilled.

Salvian lib. 1. De Providentia: In that Christ himself, namely, the very magnitude of justice seems to bear the appearance of injustice; that is, so exact, and so strict was the divine justice in the chastisement inflicted upon Christ, that the satisfaction exacted from him, on account of its magnitude, bore as it were an injustice.

But the Conclusion is proved by reason: That satisfaction was exhibited unto the strictest requirements of law, because it had all the conditions belonging to rigorous justice: but such was the satisfaction of Christ, which is indeed proved by weighing and applying the individual conditions:

The satisfaction of Christ was from proper goods.

For first the satisfaction of Christ was exhibited from the proper goods of the man satisfying: since Christ satisfied by submitting and offering his actions, and himself, to God, to compensate the injury inflicted through the sin of the human race: but both the actions, and the very suppositum of Christ were the proper goods of him as lord, and in no way under the dominion of God, to whom the satisfaction was rendered: therefore it was made from proper goods. The major stands: the minor is proved first: The suppositum of Christ was not under the dominion of God, inasmuch as it is not something created, but divine, and thence dependent on no one, since Christ is equal to the Father according to the divinity. The same stands for the satisfactory actions, for Christ satisfied only through human actions inasmuch as they proceeded from a divine suppositum: but as such, they took on the character of that suppositum from which they proceeded, not only after the manner of an efficient principle, but also after the manner of a formal principle informing and dignifying morally works of this kind: whence under this character they involved morally the divine suppositum: therefore since the suppositum of the Word is under the dominion of no one, the satisfactory actions of Christ were so properly his, that they belonged to no other as lord.

You will object 1. Created actions are under the general dominion of God, since God by title of creation and conservation has supreme dominion over all created beings: but Christ the Lord satisfied through the actions of his humanity, which are created: therefore through actions which were under the dominion of God, and hence of the creditor, and consequently not from proper goods.

I answer, distinguishing the major: created actions, which are not from a divine person, are under the general dominion of God, I concede: those which are from a divine person, I deny. To the minor I say, that Christ the Lord satisfied through created actions, not simply, but as they were from the person of the Word, so that the whole reason of the value of those actions emanated from the very person of the divine Word.

You will urge: The value of the satisfaction of Christ, from what has been granted, proceeded from the person of the Word as from a formal principle dignifying the operations of the humanity: but the person of the divine Word has the character of creditor, and of the offended party: since both the person of the Word, and the other two divine persons were injured through sin: therefore even the value of the satisfaction of Christ is taken from the creditor, or from the very offended party. — I distinguish the major: the value of the satisfaction of Christ is taken from the person of the Word inasmuch as it is formally the divine suppositum, that is, inasmuch as it terminates the divine nature, I deny: inasmuch as it is the human suppositum, or inasmuch as it subsists in the human nature, I concede. And likewise with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence. For although the suppositum of the Word be most simple formally, yet it is virtually multiple, because it exercises its terminating power both toward the divine nature and toward the human

You will object 2. Since every dominion belongs to the supposit by reason of the will, dominion over the satisfactory actions belonged to Christ the Lord either by reason of the divine will, or of the human: if the former, therefore he satisfied from what was common, and not from what was his own, because he satisfied from those things which were under the dominion of the will common to the whole Trinity: if the latter, therefore he satisfied likewise from what was common, because the human will of Christ, being a created thing, depends upon the whole Trinity. — I answer, that these actions are under the dominion of Christ by reason of his human will, and yet it does not follow from this that they are under the general dominion of God: for the created will of Christ can be considered in two ways: either in itself, that is, insofar as it is a created intellectual appetitive faculty, and as such it is under the general dominion of God: or inasmuch as it is the created intellectual appetite of a divine person, and thus it is not under the general dominion of God, because such a will is under this formal aspect of such a kind as is the divine person whose property it is: but the human will of Christ is mistress of the same satisfactory actions as the will of a divine person, and accordingly those actions are proper to him.

You will insist: But even those actions, inasmuch as they proceed from a will looking to the divine person, depend upon God in becoming and in being conserved; indeed even the will from which they proceed is under the dominion of God: therefore they look to the general and common dominion of the whole Trinity. — I answer, that the antecedent can be denied, if in that particle as the formal sense is taken; because in this sense these three things — the action of a divine person, and the worship of a divine person, and being created — are related only concomitantly: just as, for example, this proposition understood according to the formal sense, a stone as rational is not an animal, is true; because animality is not included in the formal concept of rationality, but only in the real and identical concept: but if the particle as is taken according to the material sense, the antecedent is true: and with that concession the consequence must be denied, on account of the reason given before, namely because those actions take on the character of the supposit from which they emanate.

You will insist: The actions of the human will of Christ, whether considered formally or materially, are a created thing: but everything created looks to the common dominion of the whole Trinity: therefore however they may be considered they were not proper to Christ. — I answer 1. that the actions elicited by Christ can be considered in two ways: First physically and entitatively, inasmuch as they proceed from the human nature as from a formal principle by which: Second morally, and as it were reflexively, to the divine Word, from whom they proceed as from a principle which. In the former way they are truly formally a created thing, and thus look to the common dominion of the whole Trinity: In the latter way, however, they are the very supposit of the Word, or at least put on its character: because, as we have said, under this formal aspect they involve it, not only after the manner of an effective principle, but also after the manner of a formal principle morally informing and dignifying those very actions. I answer 2, with Suarez disp. 1. sect. 6. that although satisfaction from things given and accepted, which is properly called restitution, cannot be made from those things which are under the dominion of the creditor; yet well enough that satisfaction which is concerned with free actions, such as compensation for injury in matters of honor: for this is the difference between satisfaction and restitution, that restitution is concerned with things given and accepted; because by it damage inflicted upon another in his goods is repaired: but satisfaction is concerned with actions: because by it compensation for an injury is intended. Hence in restitution there ought to be made a perfect equality between the one satisfying, and him to whom satisfaction is made: but in things given and accepted equality cannot be made unless something passes into the actual dominion of him to whom satisfaction is made, otherwise he would not be any more possessed of his own goods than he was before the satisfaction exhibited; and so an inequality would always remain. It is otherwise, however, in satisfaction, which is made by a free work, of which work the agent is master, because the reason of satisfaction does not consist in the translation of the dominion of some thing; but in this only, that as much reverence and honor be rendered as the injury inflicted took away. And therefore although God had dominion over the actions of Christ, no less could Christ satisfy equitably by means of them, because he renders to God as much, indeed more honor, than was taken from him by sin. I answer 3, that although the actions of Christ, considered both materially and formally, were under the high and general dominion of God, inasmuch as he is the supreme Moderator and Lord of all, nevertheless by them Christ at the strict standard of justice was able to pay our debt: because high and common dominion over anything does not impede particular dominion; for although the King has high and common dominion over the goods of subjects, such that he can expend them for the utility and protection of the Republic, no less do particular individuals each have peculiar dominion over their own goods, by reason of which dominion they truly satisfy the King himself with the strictness of justice, when they pay the tribute prescribed to them: therefore similarly, although God had high and common dominion over the actions of Christ, no less did the adorable Savior himself have particular dominion over them: because he elicited them most freely, and consequently, through them, notwithstanding that common dominion, he was able to satisfy God equitably on our behalf.

You will object 3. If the actions of Christ, inasmuch as they were sustained, were proper to the incarnate Word alone; then the actions of a mere man, as free and vital, would be proper to that man alone, since they proceed from him alone in a free and vital manner: therefore if for that reason Christ was able to satisfy from what was his own, rightly a mere man by his own actions, as free and vital, will be able to satisfy God from what is his own, by the ordinary way, whose contrary we taught above. — I deny the consequence of the antecedent: for although those actions proceed from man alone, as agent in a vital and free manner; yet they proceed from him in such a way that their power and efficacy for acting vitally and freely is from God by dependence: since those actions proceed from a created will, as existing under the common dominion of the whole most holy Trinity, which will, besides that received power and efficacy, requires further the concurrence of God, that it elicit its vital and free acts: but that very power of sustaining the human nature is so proper to the divine Word, that he has it from that precise concept whereby he is a divine person independent of any other. Nor does the divine Word need any special concurrence, that he sustain the human nature and its actions, since such sustentation is only a certain termination, whereby the personality of the incarnate Word alone so completes the humanity, that he alone makes it subsist. Therefore there is no parity between the vital and free acts of a mere man, and the sustentation itself of the human nature by the person of the Word. For two things are found in those acts, on account of which those acts look to the common dominion of the whole Trinity: The first is, that they cannot be elicited except dependently upon the concurrence of God, as first and universal cause: The second is, that this vitality and liberty are so under the dominion of the man eliciting those acts, that nevertheless they are also under the dominion of the whole Trinity, from which that whole man with all that is his depends no less than whatever is of a servant, inasmuch as servant, is under the dominion of him who is lord of such a servant. But these two have no place in the sustentation itself of the humanity and of its actions made by the incarnate Word.

You will insist: Therefore man depends upon God for eliciting free and vital actions, because from him he received the power of acting vitally and freely: but also the divine Word received from the Father this power of sustaining nature: for whoever gives being, gives also what follows upon being: but this power of sustaining follows necessarily upon the personality of the Word: therefore by the same reason that a mere man cannot satisfy from what is his own by his actions, as vital and free: neither could Christ satisfy by the actions of the human nature, as sustained by the Word, as from goods proper to himself. — I distinguish the major: that Christ received from the Father this power of sustaining, just as also his personal being, for this end, that he might satisfy for us before him, I deny: for first, the Father produces the Word, at least in some sign of reason, before he determines to create and redeem man: that he received that power and that being without any respect and order to satisfaction, without any dependence whatsoever, and as a good proper and particular to himself, I concede; for thus the Word received from God the Father his personality, and in consequence the infinite power of sustaining not only the divine nature, but also another's, provided nevertheless that his personality and sustaining power are proper to the Word alone, and in no way subject to the dominion of the Father, nor include any dependence upon him. Or otherwise I answer: that he received it from the Father with some dependence, such that the personality and sustaining power of the Word depend upon the Father and are subject to his dominion, I deny: that he received it as something proper to himself, dependent on none, nor subjected to anyone's dominion, I concede. Therefore there is no parity between that sustaining power of the Word, and the free and vital actions of a mere man.

You will object 1. That anyone may satisfy from strict justice, it is required that he make something come to be under the dominion of him to whom he satisfies, which before did not belong to him, nor would belong, if the one satisfying did not subject it to his dominion: but Christ could attribute nothing to God which did not look to his dominion, and which God would not have under his dominion from elsewhere, if it were not offered through Christ in satisfaction: therefore he could not satisfy from strict justice. — I deny the major: for it is not necessary for exact and strict satisfaction that the creditor receive something newly under his dominion, as is evident in human satisfaction for injured honor: for by that satisfaction the creditor receiving it receives nothing which is subject to his dominion: whence usually it suffices for perfect satisfaction that what is given conduce to honor, and be done according to the good pleasure of the creditor. Nor truly does there seem greater reason that the thing offered in satisfaction should conduce to the benefit and utility of the creditor, than what is offered through a meritorious action: but it is not required in merit that the meritorious work should conduce to the benefit and utility of the one rewarding, otherwise we could merit nothing at all before God; for he has no need of our goods: but it suffices that it conduce to his honor and glory, and be done according to his precept and good pleasure. The same must be said of satisfaction.

You will object 5. Christ satisfied God the Father as man, and by actions truly human: but man, and his actions, are a thing inwardly of God, and depending upon God, and consequently subjected to his dominion; therefore he satisfied God from goods which were his: and not from those which were merely proper to Christ satisfying. The major stands: since Christ satisfied for us in that respect in which he suffered and died: but he suffered and died only as man, and he offered his death and passion in satisfaction, which are actions of Christ only as man: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major: that Christ satisfied as man, if the particle as is taken duplicatively, that is, according to those things only which belong to him by reason of the human nature, I deny: if it is taken specificatively, that is, he who satisfied for us was true man, although he was also true God, I concede: for thus the humanity was the principle by which of satisfaction; but the Word was the principle which, not only inasmuch as he sustained the human nature, and was the principle which of the satisfactory actions which the assumed humanity elicited from him as principle by which: but also inasmuch as the same Word concurred to those same actions by moral influence, conferring upon them the highest and extrinsically infinite value, namely by offering and subjecting both himself and his own actions in the service of God, at the same time influencing into those same actions that highest value by which they were truly worthy to be accepted by God in satisfaction for all our debts.

THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST WAS NOT FOUNDED UPON THE GRACE AND LIBERALITY OF THE CREDITOR.

Proof: If the satisfaction of Christ had been founded in the grace and liberality of the creditor, especially because it hung upon the grace of union: for this seems necessary, that the person of the Word influence the highest value into his satisfactory and meritorious actions: but this reason does not stand in the way of the satisfaction of Christ having been made to the strict standards of justice, and independently of the liberality and grace of the creditor: therefore, etc. Proof of the major: when a gratuitous gift precedes the obligation contracted of paying a debt, then that which has been obtained from the grace of the creditor does not stand in the way of a satisfactory and meritorious action being able to merit an equitable premium: because when the debtor is truly lord of that which has been given to him gratuitously, then he is held to satisfy the creditor whenever he restores that very thing into his dominion: for if Peter, for example, before James contracted a debt toward him, gave him one hundred coins, or even after the contraction of his debt, yet not on that condition, that from them he pay the contracted debt, but absolutely and without respect, Peter will be able to pay the debt from justice, restoring those hundred coins into the dominion and possession of the creditor: because since he was their lord, he transfers that dominion and possession into the creditor: therefore although God granted to Christ gratis the hypostatic union, since this grace conferred is wholly antecedent, truly Christ was lord of that divine state, and of all the operations which as God-man he was able to elicit; and consequently, by eliciting those operations, and submitting them to God, he truly paid our debt without any grace or remission of the creditor. — Further, for satisfaction with the rigor of justice there is required only that it not be founded in the grace of the creditor, insofar as that grace would supply the defect of the value of the satisfaction, and thus the value of the work be accepted beyond what it merited: but the satisfaction of Christ, although founded in the grace of union, nevertheless this grace does not supply the defect of that dignity, nor does God accept the works of Christ beyond their value: but rather he gives to the works of the humanity a dignity and value not only equaling, but even superexceeding the gravity of the injury: therefore such grace does not stand in the way of satisfaction at the strict standards of justice. — Finally, the grace of union was not simply made to Christ inasmuch as he was God-man, but only to the humanity, to which the divine Word communicated itself hypostatically: but satisfaction was not exhibited through that humanity separately, but precisely through Christ, inasmuch as he is God-man: therefore he did not satisfy under that aspect under which grace was granted to him.

You will say 1. When someone gives to another from which he may pay him a debt, then that payment cannot be reckoned as from the rigor of justice: but God conceded to Christ the humanity, and the person of the Word, through which he elicited satisfactory operations, and paid our debt: therefore that payment was not from the rigor of justice. — I distinguish the major: if in conferring that gift he did not confer also its dominion, I concede: if he bestowed both, I deny. But God, in conferring the humanity or the Word, or rather in giving him that state of the God-manhood, gave also the dominion of that state; for Christ was lord of his own operations, and could exercise them or not exercise them at his pleasure: and consequently he was able through those operations to render the satisfaction due for our sins. Add to these, that the satisfaction of Christ the Lord is so founded in the grace of union and Incarnation, and is so made by the power of that grace, that this grace of union was not given to the humanity for this end, that it might satisfy: since, as we said with probability within, God decreed the Mystery of the Incarnation before foreseen sin of Adam: whence, as when something is paid from things accepted by a creditor, not for that end that he satisfy, it does not prevent such payment from being from strict justice: so neither will this prevent the satisfaction of Christ from being so reckoned.

You will say 2. If Peter owes Paul twenty coins on this condition, that he pay an equal sum of money owed to him, that payment is founded in the grace of the creditor, and consequently will not be from the rigor of justice: but God conceded to Christ the state of God-manhood for this reason, that through it he might satisfy him for the sins of men: therefore the satisfaction exhibited by Christ is founded in the grace of God, and is not from the rigor of justice. — I deny the minor: and the reason of the disparity is, that that donation of twenty coins does not effect that that sum of money pass under the dominion of Peter: whence it is only a disguised and supposititious donation, and merely a relaxation of the debt. It is otherwise, however, concerning the works of Christ: because although they are elicited from the grace of God, truly nevertheless they exist under the dominion of Christ, by reason of the liberty of the creature; and therefore although they are gifts of God, and presuppose the grace of union, on that account they are not a gratuitous donation, but a just and equitable payment of the debt.

THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST WAS MADE FROM GOODS NOT OWED.

Proof: If the works of Christ had been owed to God on some other title than satisfaction, especially the title of gratitude, or obedience, or justice: but neither of these can be affirmed. Not indeed on the title of gratitude; because the debt of gratitude is founded upon a merely free and gratuitous bestowal of a benefit made by the giver: yet no gratuitous benefit was bestowed by God upon Christ the Lord as God-man; for if any had been, it would have been above all the grace of union: but this was freely conferred upon his humanity alone, not however upon the person of Christ: the same must be said of those things which followed upon the union, because they were owed by reason of the hypostatic union, and not purely gratuitous: whence there is a difference between the thanksgiving of Christ and that of a mere man, in that the purer the man who gives thanks to God, the more he is bound to him, because that very act of thanksgiving is a new benefit conferred upon the creature itself from divine largess: but when Christ the Lord gave thanks to his Father, whether for a benefit conferred upon his humanity, or for some other thing, he received no new gratuitous gift, but only what was owed to his dignity. — Nor indeed on the title of obedience: for one owes his works absolutely to another on the title of obedience when it is not within his liberty gladly to accept or not accept what is commanded: but the obedience of Christ was not of this kind: for he was most free to accept or not to accept the command of God, as is gathered from those words Ps. 39: In the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do thy will; O my God, I have desired it: and thy law in the midst of my heart, and also from that of Isaiah 32: He was offered because he willed it himself. — Finally not on the title of justice, because if there were any title, it would be above all potential justice, such as is religion: but on that title of Religion Christ precisely would not owe his works to God by a new and special debt, because that title of Religion, when it does not multiply matter, does not introduce a new debt, nor consequently require a peculiar payment, and therefore by one action both that title and the other could be satisfied...

You will object. God could have required of Christ the Lord that he elicit each of his good works from a motive of gratitude on account of the benefits divinely bestowed upon him: therefore by these works, already owed to God from another source, Christ could not have made satisfaction. — I answer: the difficulty here concerns only satisfaction as it was exhibited by Christ the Lord, not indeed as it could have been rendered in another way. But it is certain that in fact God did not require that Christ perform all his works on the title of gratitude; indeed such an obligation is read nowhere in the Scriptures. Nay, even if God had prescribed this law, nonetheless that adorable Savior could still have worthily made satisfaction for our debts: since all the divine benefits bestowed upon him are of far lower dignity and excellence than his actions and works, because as they proceed from the person of the Word as from a principle which, they elicit a certain divine and infinite excellence and dignity, at least extrinsically, such as is found in none of the gifts bestowed upon Christ: for all of these, namely grace, knowledge, etc., are entirely created and finite. Hence it follows that Christ by his meritorious works could have satisfied for any debt of gratitude whatsoever for all and singular the benefits received, so that even by those same works, as goods not owed, he could further have satisfied out of strict justice for the debts of all men.

You will insist. When a benefit has been bestowed that is supreme intensively, so that God by his absolute power cannot bestow a greater and more excellent one, however perfect an act of gratitude may be elicited by the recipient of the benefit, it cannot exceed the dignity of the benefit, nor consequently be offered and expended to God out of strict justice in satisfaction for the debt of another: but the hypostatic union is the most excellent of all benefits that God can bestow by his absolute power: therefore every act of gratitude which Christ can render to God on account of that benefit will not exceed the dignity of that benefit, nor consequently can it be expended in satisfaction for another's debt. — I distinguish the major: if that supreme benefit be conferred upon him who holds the principal part in the satisfaction, and must expend it by way of the principle by which, I concede: if it be conferred only upon him who obtains a less principal part in expending the satisfaction, and is related to it only by way of the principle whereby, I deny. But it is certain that the benefit and grace of union were conferred only upon the humanity of Christ, which in the satisfaction holds only the character of the principle whereby; not indeed the divine Word, to whom in the satisfaction belongs the character of the principle by which: both because he is the supposit of that very nature from which that satisfaction is offered: and because he imparts the supreme value to the satisfactory works: therefore although the humanity of itself could not duly satisfy by acts already owed to God on the title of gratitude on account of the supreme benefit of the grace of union granted to it, it does not follow from this that Christ considered in himself wholly, especially by reason of the person of the Word, cannot by acts already owed on the title of gratitude by reason of the grace of union granted to the humanity also satisfy God for the debts of others.

THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST WAS TOWARD ANOTHER.

Proof: That satisfaction is sufficiently toward another which takes place between distinct natures, of which one has the character of debtor, while the other truly has that of creditor: but the satisfaction of Christ intervenes between the human nature and the divine, of which the former had the character of debtor, the latter truly that of creditor: nor is it required, as when with the distinction of natures there is also a distinction of persons; for that distinction suffices for the notion of justice which is sufficient for the distinction of rights: but the distinction of rights is preserved when only the distinction of natures is posited; for where there are diverse natures, there are also diverse wills and liberties, by reason of which dominions are distinct: therefore that distinction of natures sufficed in Christ, that his satisfaction might be toward another. — It is confirmed.: no more is required for rigorous satisfaction, that it intervene between distinct persons, than is required for any satisfaction whatever: but Christ (as we said in the preceding Question) had alterity sufficient, that he might expend some satisfaction to God: therefore also that he might satisfy to the strictest requirements of right. — Then, no greater distinction is required between the extremes of justice than between servant and lord: but a real distinction of natures in the same supposit sufficed, that one and the same Christ might be at once servant and lord: therefore it also sufficed that he might satisfy. — Finally, if Christ had assumed two humanities, he could have exercised an act of commutative justice between those two humanities, because although there had been one supposit really, nevertheless it would have been twofold virtually, because it would have borne the roles of two human supposits; why then could not Christ likewise, existing in the human and divine nature, exercise an act of justice toward himself as existing in the other nature?

You will object 1. The one satisfying ought to be other than the one to whom satisfaction is made: but Christ is not other than God, to whom he expends satisfaction, since he himself is God, and satisfied as God-man: therefore his satisfaction was not toward another. — I distinguish the major: that he ought to be other, both according to every nature proper to himself and according to person, I deny: that he ought to be other, at least according to some nature proper to himself, I concede. And although Christ the Lord is not other than the divine nature, nor indeed than the personality of the Word; nevertheless he has that alterity, or the character of another, by right of the human nature proper to himself, which alterity suffices for a true and strict satisfaction: because strict justice demands only that the satisfaction be toward another, namely that it be made by goods which are of distinct rights and dominions from the right and dominion of the creditor. Whence since Christ by reason of his human nature has right and dominion over free actions, which are entirely distinct from God, to whom satisfaction is due, therefore by them he truly was able to satisfy God.

You will insist. For satisfaction out of strict justice not only does alterity on the side of the nature suffice, but furthermore it is required also on the side of the supposit, as is evident even from Aristotle and other Philosophers, who commonly explain this alterity in justice through the distinction of supposits: therefore since Christ had alterity only by reason of nature, he cannot be held to have satisfied God to the strictest requirements of right. — I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say that Aristotle and the other Philosophers explain that alterity necessary to strict justice through the distinction of supposits because they speak of the acts of that justice as they are commonly and ordinarily exercised by men having distinct natures and distinct supposits, because naturally it cannot happen that one and the same numerically single supposit sustains diverse natures. But because the Catholic faith teaches that the one and the same numerically single supposit of the divine Word sustains at once two free natures, in which we discover a sufficient distinction of dominions and rights, by reason of which they can enter into some mutual obligation sufficient for a perfect contract of justice; hence it comes about that that distinction of natures suffices equally for establishing the perfect relation of debt and payment.

You will urge. The principal reason and chiefest value of the satisfaction of Christ must be sought from his supposit, as we just now said: but as such, he has not sufficient alterity for the strict justice desired, seeing that the satisfaction of Christ the Lord had to be expended not only to the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, but also to the Son himself, which by a special title, as we said, was offended by the sins of men: therefore the satisfaction of Christ the Lord did not have sufficient alterity for strict justice: seeing that strict justice cannot exist of one toward himself. — I deny the minor, and of its proof I make a distinction: satisfaction out of strict justice cannot exist of one toward himself according to one and the same entirely identical free nature, and according to the same rights and dominions, I concede: according to distinct free natures, and diverse dominions of things, I deny. Whence since Christ in the same supposit had two free natures, in which were distinct rights and dominions, hence it is that he could satisfy himself. From this also it follows that the satisfaction exhibited by Christ was not made primarily and per se to the three divine persons, but to the Divinity: for, as St. Paul says, 2 Cor. 5: God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. Where the particle God, as St. Ambrose explains, lib. 3 De Fide, cap. 5, signifies the very Divinity itself, That is, he says, there the eternal Divinity: therefore since the satisfaction of Christ was made primarily to God himself, but secondarily to the three divine persons, hence it is that the divine Word by reason of his human nature had sufficient alterity for strict justice; seeing that the human nature was entirely distinct from the divine.

GOD BY THE PACT ENTERED INTO COULD NOT FITTINGLY REFUSE THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST.

Proof, because (as we said) the satisfaction of Christ was not only condign and equal to the debt, but even superabundant and exceeding it: therefore there was no reason for God to refuse it. The consequence is evident: for then ought a satisfaction to be refused when it not only equals the debt, but even exceeds it according to the convention made: but the satisfaction of Christ, which was expended to God by pact, far exceeded our debt: therefore there was no reason for God to refuse it.

You will say. Then a satisfaction can be refused when it is not exhibited by that person who ought to satisfy: but the satisfaction of Christ was not made by that person who ought to satisfy; for Christ was not a guilty person, who on account of his own sin could not obtain pardon unless he either satisfied, or God freely forgave him the offense: therefore God could justly refuse his satisfaction. — I distinguish the major: if the creditor has entered into no pact concerning the forgiveness of sin on account of the satisfaction of another, I concede: if he has entered into such a pact, I deny. Now God had promised that he would forgive us all our debts if Christ should expend satisfaction for us: therefore he could not refuse it, especially since that satisfaction not only equaled the debt, but also far exceeded it.

Quaestio V: Utrum revera peractum sit incarnationis mysterium, et Iudaeis promissus Messias advenerit

NOTE 1. The Jews call that man, destined by so many divine promises, so desired in prayers, so celebrated in oracles of the Old Testament, the Messiah, that is, he who was to be sent by God for the salvation and redemption of men: while the Greeks and Latins name him Christ, that is, anointed, because he ought to be not only King and Priest, but also God-man, anointed with the oil of Divinity. Tertullian accurately delineated this notion in his book against the Jews, ch. 6. And indeed, he says, first it must be asked whether there is expected a lawgiver of a new Law, and heir of a new Testament, and a Priest of new sacrifices, and a Purifier of a new Circumcision, and an Observer of an eternal sabbath: who should restrain the old law, establish a new Testament, offer new sacrifices, suppress the ancient ceremonies, restrain the ancient circumcision together with its bare sabbath, and announce a new kingdom which shall not be corrupted. It is agreed that all these things were foretold of the Messiah through the Prophets, as will be manifest from what follows.

NOTANDUM 2. It is most constantly held among all who glory in the Christian name that the Messiah has truly come. For this truth is the head and foundation of the Christian Religion and faith, and it is established not only in all the Symbols and definitions of the faith, but also confirmed by the open oracles of the New Testament: for John 4, when the Samaritan woman said, I know that the Messias cometh, who is called Christ: Jesus said to her, I am he, who speak with thee. Wherefore that adorable Savior not undeservedly pronounces blessed Peter the Apostle, because with public testimony he confessed, Thou art Christ the Son of the living God: for, as John 17 says, This is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. Therefore the present Question must be directed solely toward breaking the obstinacy of the Jews and illuminating their blindness, in which it must be demonstrated from the sacred letters and oracles of the Old Testament that the Messiah came long ago.

NOTANDUM 3. The promises by which the coming Messiah is announced in the Old Testament differ in two ways: for some are read as made simply without any designation of time, as when Moses said to the people in Deuteronomy 18, The Lord thy God will raise up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren. And God promised Abraham in Genesis 18, In thy seed shall all the nations be blessed. Of this kind also are all those prophecies which foreshadow the place and manner of the Messiah's birth, the doctrine of his converse, his virtue and power, the voluntary oblation of his dying and unconquered constancy, the majesty of his rising again and the triumph of his ascension into heaven, as is read both in the books of Moses and in the books of the Prophets; but especially in the Psalms, very many of which were written concerning Christ. But some promises were made with some certain designation of time, yet not so perspicuous as to remove every ground of doubt; nor yet so obscure and entangled as not to supply an efficacious argument for proving the advent of Christ. We shall employ and discuss both kinds of these twofold promises in the present Question, distinguishing them into three Conclusions.

First Conclusion. — THAT THE MESSIAH DIVINELY PROMISED HAS ALREADY COME IS GATHERED WITH SUFFICIENT CLARITY FROM THE PROPHECY OF THE DYING JACOB, Gen. 49.

Proof: For when that most holy Patriarch, being near death, was bestowing his paternal blessing upon his sons, and, inspired by the divine Spirit and with a mind foreseeing the future, was declaring what God would peculiarly bestow upon the posterity of each one; revealing how great the kindness and munificence of God was to be poured out upon the sons of Juda, among many things that he promises he says, The sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, and the leader from his thigh, until he come that is to be sent, and he shall be the expectation of nations: just as the Hebrew Edition has it (which I subjoin in the customary characters, for the reader's benefit) To iasour sebeth mi oula, ou mehokek mibben rayeliou ad ki iabo siloh relo ilchat iammim. That is, as Barradius and our Galatinus l. 1. c. 1. interpret it, The sceptre shall not depart from Juda, and the Scribe, or Lawgiver, from between his feet, until Siloh come (that is, peaceful, or the Messias), whose the nations shall serve. Or, as the Chaldaic paraphrase has it, There shall not be taken away he that exerciseth power from the house of Juda, and the Scribe from his sons' sons, unto eternity, until the Messias come, whose is the kingdom, and to whom the peoples shall be obedient. Or finally, as the Septuagint Interpreters have it, A prince shall not fail from Juda, until come those things that are laid up for him; that is, until arrive those supreme and excellent gifts and goods which through the Messias arising from the tribe of Juda are to be conferred upon humankind, as St. Augustine reads in lib. 12. Contra Faustum, cap. 42. Or, as other codices have it, until he come that is to come; that is, until he come to whom the kingdom of the whole world is laid up, as Origen explains in lib. 4. Periarchon, and St. Cyril Contra Iulianum, lib. 8. Not by force, he says, were the nations gathered, nor yet by Moses, or any other: but rather for Christ it was laid up, that he should rule not Judaea alone, but all nations, etc. All which readings conspire and tend to this one end: to signify that the authority of ruling and of bearing laws was not to be taken from the tribe of Juda before the promised Messias arrived. From which one may thus argue: the royal and legislative power ought not sooner to fail from the tribe of Juda (once it had flocked to it) than the foretold Messias had arrived: but now for 1675 years and more, both that power and authority have utterly failed; since long ago there exist no kings and no legislators, even of another Israelitic tribe, to rule over the Jews: nay, all of them without exception wander dispersed among foreign nations (Apologet. cap. 21.) straying, wandering, exiles from their heaven and their soil, without man, without God as king, to whom not even the right of strangers permits them to greet the land — at least with a footprint, their fatherland: therefore, that the truth of that prophecy may stand firm and most constant, it must be that the Messias has come. — It is confirmed by this example: If God, displaying a most brilliant torch from a tower, had said that it was not to be extinguished until the Messias should come; whoever saw it extinguished would he not straightway rightly conclude that the Messias had already come? But God exhibited to the eyes of the Jews the splendor of the Israelitic sceptre as it were a torch, foretelling that it was not to be extinguished until the Messias should come: since therefore that splendor of the Judaic sceptre was long ago extinguished, it is necessary that the Messias has come. To elude the force of this most efficacious reasoning, the Jews devise many evasions, which, for clarity and easier refutation, I reduce chiefly to three heads, and set forth under as many § together with all their windings to be impugned.

§ I. — The first evasion of the Jews is, that nothing whatsoever concerning the coming Messias is foretold in this profane prophecy, and that we twist all the parts and words of that oracle into a perverse sense.

For they reply 1. That the word Iasour signifies not recession but access; for Sur signifies to turn aside toward someone: hence Loth thus addresses the Angels: Suru na el beth gabdecem: that is, Turn aside, I beseech you, into the house of your servant. Hence Moses uses the word Iasour, when he says Exodus 3, I will go, and see this great vision: so that the sense of the aforesaid prophecy is that the sceptre shall not sooner accede to the tribe

of Juda than the Messias shall have come: which, they say, certainly happened; for that Messias so desired with prayers, who was to liberate the Israelitic people from the hard yoke of captivity, was Solomon, who on that account was called Siloh, that is, King of peace: indeed, at whose birth David obtained the whole Israelitic kingdom, and vanquished all the most intense enemies of the Jews: and while Solomon himself reigned, the Jews were endowed with the highest security and peace, as 3 Kings chap. 4 relates in these words, He had peace on every side round about: and Juda and Israel dwelt without any fear, every one under his vine, and under his fig-tree, from Dan to Bersabee, all the days of Solomon. — But that this exposition is altogether empty and coheres not at all with the aforesaid prophecy is evident on every side: First, the word Iasour does indeed sometimes signify to accede just as to recede: yet all Hebrews agree that that word denotes accession only when it has prefixed the preposition el corresponding to the preposition ad, which governs the accusative and indicates access; but when it is joined to the preposition mi or min, which is indicative or directive of the ablative case, and corresponds to de, ex, or e, then it signifies recession or elongation: just as among the Latins the verb declino governs the ablative with the preposition a and the accusative with ad: for we say declino a te, and declino ad te. Now the word Iasour has the preposition min prefixed in the aforesaid prophecy; and accordingly it signifies the recession of the Israelitic sceptre from the tribe of Juda. — Secondly, it is false that David obtained the Israelitic sceptre only upon the birth of Solomon: for, as is related lib. 2. Reg. chap. 5, in Hebron he reigned over Juda seven years and six months before he was saluted king over all Israel: similarly he reigned many years over all the Israelites and vanquished their various enemies before Solomon was born: and accordingly it is false that the sceptre acceded to the tribe of Juda only at that time when Solomon was born. — Add that the remaining particulars of the same prophecy in no wise befit Solomon, seeing that he was not the expectation of nations; since he bestowed upon them no good thing nor benefit; nor was his kingdom likewise endowed with perpetual tranquillity and felicity; for lib. 3. Reg. chap. 12 the Israelites complain before Roboam his son, Thy father imposed a most hard yoke upon us: do thou therefore now mitigate somewhat the hard empire of thy father, and the most heavy yoke which he imposed upon us, and we will serve thee: and in the same place it is related that when the Israelites did not obtain a favorable answer from Roboam, ten tribes withdrew from him and made Jeroboam their king; and so from that time the kingdom of the Israelites was divided; such that only two tribes, namely Juda and Beniamin, served Roboam and his posterity: while the other ten turned aside to Jeroboam and served his successors down to their extermination by the Assyrians.

They reply 2. That the word Scebeth, or Scereth, signifies not a sceptre but a rod, namely not of principality and dominion, but of sorrow and tribulation; so that the Prophet's meaning is: the rod of tribulation shall not recede from Juda, until the Messias come: but even now the Jews are pressed everywhere among the nations with hard servitude and groan under the rod of tribulation: therefore the Messias has not yet come. — Against this, first, all Hebrews who have published Dictionaries of their language confess that the word Scereth mostly signifies sceptre; for David uses it in Psalm 44 when he says, A sceptre of direction, the sceptre of thy kingdom, which certainly denotes nothing else than a sceptre. Second, the rod spoken of in this prophecy is relative to the Leader: for we have, the rod shall not be taken away, and the Leader: but the rod of a leader is the rod of principality and dominion: therefore our interpreter rightly said that by the rod the sceptre is signified. Third, the rod of tribulation expressed in that prophecy cannot be understood if all the other things uttered in that blessing foretell nothing ominous for Juda, but all things felicitous and fortunate for Juda and his posterity: but so it is; for in what precedes we read, Juda, thy brethren shall praise thee, thy hand upon the necks of thine enemies: the sons of thy father shall adore thee. And in what follows, Tying his foal to the vine, and, o my son, his ass to the vine-branch: he shall wash his robe in wine, and his mantle in the blood of the grape: fairer are his eyes than wine, and his teeth whiter than milk. By which words not only the surpassing beauty of the Messias to come is designated, but the felicity and fruitfulness of the people subject to him is also foretold. Fourth, if the Messias was to come when the rod of tribulation failed from the Israelitic people, he must be said to have come long ago; for indeed for the longest time, especially from David down to Sedecias, namely nearly 500 years, the Jews were free from captivity and had shaken off the rod of tribulation; so far were they from being held captive by others that they rather held foreign and neighboring peoples subject to themselves and paying tribute, above all the Idumaeans. — Nor does it matter that at that very time they were harassed and burdened by many wars; for they were not on that account forced into captivity, nor groaning perpetually under the rod of tribulation, especially during the many years under the reign of Solomon, as long as namely that faithful worshipper of God endured; for in 3 Kings c. 5 he himself testifies, God hath given me rest round about, and there is no satan, nor evil occurrence. Finally it is not only foretold that the rod shall not be taken away, but also that the Legislator shall not be removed from the Israelitic people until the Messias come: but the Jews must confess that they long ago had no Legislator who might prescribe to them most holy laws and keep them in peace and sanctity of morals: therefore it is necessary that the Messias came long ago.

They reply 3. That the words Mehokek, that is Legislator, and Mibben rageliou, that is from between his feet, are wrongly taken by us, while in the Vulgate we read, nor the leader from his thigh. For R. Beecha says that by the aforesaid words is signified that the Legislator, or pacificator, was to be formed from menstrual blood of woman; for he wishes the word Siloh to be derived from that other whereby menstrual blood is signified in Hebrew. — But besides that all editions and readings without exception, Hebrew, Samaritan, Arabic, and the Septuagint Interpreters, and likewise the Chaldaic and Hierosolymitan paraphrases, render the aforesaid words in the same way as our Vulgate edition, namely that the leader or Legislator shall not fail from the thigh, or from between his feet; it is certain that the interpretation of that Rabbi does not militate against us; nay, it signifies that the Messias was to be formed only from the blood of woman, without any commerce with man: which certainly suits in wondrous measure the adorable Savior, who was formed from a Virgin, not indeed from menstrual blood (which all physicians affirm contributes in no wise to generation), but from her most pure blood.

They reply 4. And they make the greatest effort and labor to twist the meaning of the word Siloh; for, as our Galatinus relates l. 1. c. 1., some wish that by this name is signified the town of Silo, in which the tabernacle and the ark of the covenant were deposited, and therefore that place was held among the Israelites in such veneration and glory, flocking thither from everywhere for devotion. Hence they interpret the prophecy of Saul, whom they wish to have been inaugurated as King in the town of Silo, and to have transferred the sceptre from the tribe of Juda to the tribe of Beniamin, from which he was descended. — But this interpretation is easily overturned: first because the words of that prophecy directly oppose it; for Jacob did not say, the sceptre shall not be taken away, until anyone anointed at Silo come, but until Siloh himself come. Add that the preceding and following words sufficiently plainly demonstrate that this oracle must by no means be understood of a place or town. Second, Saul was not created King in Silo, but in Maspha and in Gialgala, and was anointed by Samuel with the vial of oil at Ramatha. Third, in the time of Saul the sceptre had not been taken away from Juda; indeed before his inauguration Samuel of the tribe of Ephraim presided over the Jews, and before him Heli the high priest ruled, whom very many Judges preceded, of whom only two were sprung from the tribe of Juda: since Josue, who first judged and ruled after Moses, was of the tribe of Ephraim; while Aod, the second Judge, was of the tribe of Beniamin. Debbora and Barac alike were of a foreign tribe, she of the tribe of Ephraim, he of the tribe of Nephtali, as appears Judges 4, vv. 3 and 6. Gedeon was of the tribe of Manasse, as appears Judg. 6, 15, after whom reigned his son Abimelech, at whose death arose Thola his uncle, who was of the tribe of Issachar, as appears Judg. 10, after whom ruled Jephte of the tribe of Manasse. After him judged Samson of the stock of Dan: whence it must be inferred that only two judges were of the tribe of Juda, namely Othoniel son of Caleb, and Abesam.

Others urge: By Siloh is meant that which lay fallen and fell, when the sceptre acceded to the tribe of Juda; for the word Sabo placed in the prophecy signifies to fall, or perish: but when David was elected King, and through him the royal dignity was carried to the tribe of Juda, then all the glory of the town of Silo fell and was extinguished, since David ordered the ark of the covenant to be carried thence into Sion his city: whence that Psalm verse, He rejected the tabernacle of Joseph, and chose not the tribe of Ephraim: but he chose the tribe of Juda, mount Sion which he loved, and a little before he had said, He rejected the tabernacle of Silo. — But he must grope at noonday whoever devises this interpretation; for in 1 Paralip. chap. 13 we read, David went up, and all Israel, to the hill of Cariathiarim, which was in Juda, to bring thence the ark of the Lord God, etc.; therefore at that time that ark was not in Silo: nay, it had been carried thence more than 80 years before, as is related, 1 Reg. 4, namely when it was captured by the Philistines. Driven off from this evasion, they seek another in King Jeroboam, whom they say was crowned at Silo, and transferred the sceptre from the tribe of Juda to the tribe of Ephraim, from which he drew his lineage; for ten tribes defected from the kings of Juda to Jeroboam. — But this is the evasion of the groping blind, who do not see where they may flee. For Jeroboam was not created King in Silo, but in Sichem, as is gathered from 3 Reg. 12. Moreover Jeroboam did not take away the kingdom from the kings of Juda; for although ten tribes followed him, nevertheless the kings of the tribe of Juda held the helm even to the captivity of the Babylonian commonwealth. Furthermore, as we said above, it is not found in the prophecy, the sceptre shall not be taken away, until someone come at Silo, but: until Siloh come. — Some seek still another refuge, contending that by the name Siloh is signified Ahias the Shilonite, who in 3 Reg. chap. 11, meeting Jeroboam, rent his mantle into twelve parts, And he said to Jeroboam: Take to thyself ten pieces, for thus saith the Lord God of Israel: Behold I will rend the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and give thee ten tribes. Such that they contend the words of that prophecy mean that the Israelitic sceptre would remain in the tribe of Juda until that Prophet the Shilonite came. — But desiring to avoid Charybdis they fall upon Scylla: for the prophecy plainly signifies a man named expressly Siloh, and not one sprung from the town of Silo. Moreover, although through the prophecy of Ahias the empire was diminished and divided, namely the kingdom over which kings sprung from the tribe of Juda presided; nevertheless the sceptre was not wholly taken from it; nay it persevered therein very many years, nor did it cease to be until long after the Israelitic kingdom, which according to the prophecy of Ahias Jeroboam had inaugurated, was wholly extinct.

Since, therefore, all these escapes have been closed off, in order to raise up the truth and the force of that oracle they have recourse to Nabuchodonosor, the bitterest enemy and assailer of the Jewish name, who was sent and destined by God to destroy the Jews. — But they are so blinded and so rebellious against the divine name that they do not notice that the sceptre of Juda was not taken away by Nabuchodonosor; since after the Babylonian captivity Princes of the tribe of Juda, such as Zorobabel and others, held the helm of the Israelite commonwealth. Moreover, it was not about an enemy, the destroyer of the Jews, Nabuchodonosor, but about the Messias that Jacob prophesied, as the Chaldean Paraphrast teaches: nor can Nabuchodonosor be called Siloh, that is, sent or to be sent, by antonomasia; for in this place the name sent, or to be sent, must be understood as assumed by way of excellence, because it is placed without any addition, as if Jacob were saying, the sceptre shall not be taken away, until he come who is to be sent by antonomasia; that longed-for one, that one desired with a long desire, that expectation of the nations. To these add what follows, which suits not Nabuchodonosor but Christ: He shall wash his robe in wine, and his mantle in the blood of the grape, etc. By which words the Passion of the Messias is darkly shadowed forth. Besides, says Barradius: what has the most holy Patriarch to do with the impious Nabuchodonosor, that in his last breath he should utter prophecies concerning him, and should call the destroyer of his people and of Juda, whom he was praising, one sent by God, and the expectation of the nations? The thoughts of the most holy Jacob were other, his sighs were other, concerning that Redeemer of the world, not the destroyer; concerning one sent by the Father to save the Jews, not one driven by proud lust of domination to slaughter them; concerning the Redeemer most ardently desired, not a formidable and accurséd oppressor; concerning the King of heaven, not the King of Babylon; he was thinking of the Messias, not of Nabuchodonosor. For the Messias he sighed, of the Messias he spoke, for the Messias he waited; whence that utterance from the depth of his breast, I will wait for thy salvation, O Lord: which words the

Chaldean Paraphrast thus excellently expounds:

I wait for thy salvation, O Lord, said our father Jacob; I await not the salvation of Gedeon the son of Joas, which is a temporal salvation: nor the salvation of Samson the son of Manue, which is a transitory salvation: but I wait for the redemption of the Messias the son of David, who is to come to gather to himself the children of Israel, whose redemption my soul desires.

These are his words, from which it is evident both that the desires of the holy Patriarch were fixed on the Messias, and that the salvation of the Messias was not to be temporary, won by war, but eternal, purchased by blood shed.

Nor are they wanting who have recourse to frivolous versions of the aforesaid oracle, by which they strive to corrupt its meaning. Some indeed wish it read there shall not depart, nor be removed, a tribe from Juda, and a leader from his thigh, until the Messias come. And it is so rendered for this reason, that the Hebrew word Sebeth, or Scereth, which we interpret rod or sceptre, signifies not only sceptre but also Tribe. — But that version confirms too that the Messias has come. For already the tribe is taken away from Juda, and the leader from his thigh, out of the land of promise: therefore the Messias has already come.

There are besides some who have thought the prophecy concerning the sceptre of tyrants is to be understood, so that the sense here is, The sceptre of tyrants shall not be taken away from Juda until the Messias come. But it is clearly a fabrication, both because for the space of many years after the death of Jacob the tribe of Juda held the principality, and was free from every princely rule of tyrants; and because Jacob does not speak of a tyrannical sceptre but of a Judaic one, as the words plainly show, The sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, and a leader from his thigh, etc.

Finally the Jews add, that the sceptre was not to be taken away from the tribe of Juda so as to be given to another Israelite tribe until the Messias should come. — But, says Barradius, who does not see that this answer wanders far from the prophecy? What? The sceptre shall be taken away so as to be given to strangers, it shall not be taken away so as to be given to another tribe. It would take a new Prophet to bring a new prophecy against the old one: but nothing is less like Prophets than the Jews. Therefore the true sense is the one we have already set forth, the empire and principality shall not be taken away from Juda until the Messias come. The Jews cannot deny that the principality has been taken away; therefore they must confess that the Messias has already come. To these add that the most learned among the Jews expound this oracle openly of the coming Messias, as appears most clearly from the Targum, that is, from the Chaldaic translation of Rabbi Onkelos, and also from Ionathan, the other author of the Chaldaic paraphrase: the Jerusalem Paraphrast likewise plainly signifies the same. So too in the Talmud, treatise on the Sanhedrin, chapter 9, where the name of the Messias is treated of, it is related that the disciples of Rabbi Schela teach that his name will be Siloh, as was said Gen. 49. Likewise in the Bereschith Rabba, that is, the ancient commentary upon Genesis, expounding these words until Siloh come, it says, This is the Messias, and to him shall the nations gather themselves, because he shall judge the whole world: and this is what was said Micheas 1., And he shall judge among the nations, and rebuke many peoples, etc. The same also most constantly teach R. Salomon Iarchi, and R. Kimki in the book Serassim, and many other celebrated Doctors of the Jews. From all which it is established that this prophecy of Jacob is to be understood of the true Messias: and therefore the aforesaid words of the oracle are wrongly twisted into another meaning by the more recent Jews.

Hence other Jews, more skilled, agreeing with us that those words are to be understood of the Messias, seek for themselves another escape, so as to prove that the aforesaid Messias designated there is not Jesus of Nazareth.

§ II. — The second escape of the Jews, who contend either that the Messias has not yet come, or that he was never to come at all, or that his coming long preceded the Nativity of Jesus of Nazareth.

They answer 1. That with Rabbi Moses the Egyptian, as cited by Burgensis, part 1 of the Scrutiny, dist. 3, the Israelitic sceptre has not yet been detected, nor has the royal dignity been taken away from the tribe of Juda, since the heads of the transmigration, who remained in Babylon, still rule with an authority quasi-regal over the Jews subject to them. Rabbi Beniamin adds in his itinerary that he traversed various parts of the world, and found in very many kingdoms inhabitants keeping the Jewish religion, and publicly rendering to God in all things the worship prescribed in the law; nay, that he passed through one most powerful kingdom, whose King, sprung from the stock of David, abounds in such riches, and in such authority and power, that he can gather three hundred thousand men to arms. — But who, though but little versed in the histories of the nations and in cosmography, does not see that these narratives are pure figments of the Jews and puerile fables, which anyone can dissolve without difficulty? As to the first point, it is plainly established that after Judaea and Jerusalem had been stormed by Vespasian and Titus, the Jews obtained neither in Babylon nor anywhere else on earth any supreme authority over their fellow-countrymen. I confess indeed that when, after the Jews had been conquered and utterly cast down, many of them had betaken themselves to the Babylonian city and province, they were permitted to choose and have one from among themselves who should be head and rector of the others, especially in matters pertaining to commerce and religion: but that rector was neither always sprung from the tribe of Juda, nor did he hold the sceptre, nor obtain royal authority; nay, with the rest he groaned under the dominion of the Babylonian Caliph: whence he was called not King but only Patriarch, with that name namely with which Princes of nations are honoured, 1 Paralip. 8, where concerning the sons of Benjamin it is said, These were Patriarchs, and Princes of nations, who had dwelt in Jerusalem. To these add that about the tenth century this dignity and authority, whatever it was, which the Jews enjoyed under the Babylonian dominion, was altogether extinguished, and the Schools and Academies of the Jews utterly overturned by the Persians laying waste the domination and empire of the Babylonian Caliphs. Therefore the Jews must confess that at least at that time the sceptre was altogether taken away from the tribe of Juda, and consequently that they wait in vain for the coming of the Messias. — As however to the narrative of Rabbi Beniamin, I say it is no less fabulous than the many other things which he collects and reports in his Itinerary. In truth if such kingdoms existed, in which the Jews alone bore rule, how is it that no Christian, Turk, or Persian ever discovered them, especially in this very age in which the remotest American nations, before unknown to men, and the islanders have been found out and discovered? How is it that Beniamin alone penetrated to these, and had no companion of his journey who could relate the same things with him? How is it that all the Jews who wander through Asia, Africa, Europe groaning beneath the hard yoke of captivity do not withdraw themselves into those most excellent kingdoms, where they would be granted perfect peace, liberty, and abundance of honours? How finally did it come about that no Jew ever came to us from those most flourishing kingdoms to reveal what is done in them? Perhaps because, as Beniamin relates, access to those kingdoms lies open only on the Sabbath day, two trees of immense size offering passage across the strait which lies between those kingdoms and the mainland of other lands by their mutual embrace, lest anyone should detect even a fire kindled in them from afar, nor make his way into those kingdoms. All which certainly are fictitious and fabulous. Most fittingly then does that saying of Aschines the Orator suit the Jews, Vain men, when they tell a lie, speak certain things quite indefinite and obscure, lest they can be refuted. To which agrees that Hebrew proverb, He who wishes to lie, let him remove his witnesses afar off.

Others answer that the promises of the Messias to come are only conditional. Whence they reason thus: the fulfilment of a promise made under a condition to be posited cannot be inferred when that condition was not in fact posited: but the advent of Christ was promised under a condition to be posited, which was not posited: therefore that promise made concerning the Christ to come does not infer that he has come. The major is evident. The minor is proved: the promised Messias was not only to draw his origin from the tribe of Juda, but also from the seed of David, and to prolong his empire unto eternity, as David himself testifies Psalm 131., The Lord hath sworn to David in truth, and he will not make it void, etc. To which accords that of Luke 1., where concerning the same Messias it is said, He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High, and the Lord God shall give unto him the seat of David his father: but the origin of the Messias from the seed of David, and the prolongation of the Davidic empire down to the nativity of that Messias, depended upon some condition which was not posited, namely it was made on the hypothesis that the posterity of David would be keepers of the divine law, as David himself indicates in the same Psalm, God speaking, If thy children keep my covenant, and these my testimonies which I shall teach them, their children also shall sit upon thy seat for ever. It is evident also from the prayer of Solomon, whereby 3 Kings c. 8 he entreats God thus, Now therefore, O Lord God of Israel, preserve to thy servant David my father that which thou hast spoken to him. 3 Kings 8, speaking through Nathan, There shall not fail thee a man before me, sitting upon the throne of Israel; yet so, that if thy children keep my way, walking before me as thou hast walked in my sight, etc. But so far are the children of David from having kept the divine law exactly unto eternity, that Solomon himself scarcely remained faithful for thirty years: for, utterly forgetful of his former observance towards God, he declined into idolatry, whom thereafter all his posterity imitated, Holy Scripture saying Ecclus. 48., Besides David, Ezechias, and Josias, all committed sin, for they forsook the law of the Most High, the kings of Juda, and despised the fear of God: for they gave their kingdom to others, and their glory to a strange nation: therefore they not only sinned, but also fell from the kingdom in punishment of their crimes. — But from these only this much may be inferred, that the Judaic sceptre ought to fall away from the family of David on account of sins, but not that it failed altogether from the tribe of Juda: for the authority of ruling, under these conditions, had indeed been promised to the family of David, but not to the tribe of Juda, as is clear from the words of the prophecy.

Others answer that two Christs, or Messiases, were promised: one upon whom converge whatever abject and humble things are foretold of Christ in the sacred Books: the other upon whom they confer whatever splendid and magnificent things are announced concerning the same. The former they call the Messias son of Joseph: the latter the Messias son of David. Of both R. Selomoh makes mention in his Commentary upon Isaiah chapter 21 and 28: Whoever shall have escaped the sword of the Messias son of Joseph, shall fall into the sword of the Messias son of David. They say moreover that the Messias son of Joseph is to be slain in the war of Gog and Magog, but to be raised again through the power of the other Messias son of David, who shall redeem Israel and restore his kingdom: they grant indeed that the first has already come: but they expect that the second is still to come. — But this capital escape of the more recent Jews is easily forestalled; for Scripture nowhere mentions two Messiases, but the twofold advent of the same one, the first indeed in humility as Redeemer: the second truly in majesty as Judge. Which Isaias above all admirably foretells in chapters 35 and 62, where he predicts the contempt of the Messias, his slaughter, resurrection, and the conversion of all peoples to him. Likewise Zacharias chapter 9, where he says:

Exult greatly, O daughter of Sion, proclaim it aloud, O daughter of Jerusalem: behold thy King will come to thee, the Just One and Saviour: he is poor, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass. And I will destroy the chariot out of Ephraim, and the horse out of Jerusalem, and the bow of war shall be broken: and he shall speak peace to the Gentiles, and his power shall be from sea even to sea, and from the rivers even to the ends of the earth, etc.

In which words the Prophet plainly signifies that this same Messiah, who is preached as poor, abject, and humble, was to be the Redeemer, Saviour, King, and Ruler of the whole world. — Whence it is that the Talmudists acknowledged a twofold advent of this same Messiah: for as Galatinus relates, book 1. chapter in Hidras Coheleth, that is, in the exposition of Ecclesiasticus, upon that text, there is nothing new under the sun, R. Barachias is said to have declared: The last Redeemer has been revealed, and he who was hidden shall return again. The same is found also in the book Tamhuma, where the twofold advent of the Messiah is gathered from Psalm 126, especially from these words according to the Hebrew edition: When the Lord brought back the captivity of Sion, we became like men comforted. Then was our mouth filled with joy, and our tongue with gladness: which words are expounded thus in the same place:

When the Messiah withdraws himself, so as not to be for the help of the children of Israel, we shall all be as dreamers, neither sleeping nor waking. But when he returns and shows himself to them, then shall their mouth be filled with laughter, and they shall rejoice, and shall verify the first advent by reason of this second manifestation: and they shall say: God hath magnified himself in doing for us.

Vain therefore, and altogether fictitious, is the assertion of the modern Jews concerning a twofold Messiah.

Some will object. The sceptre was entirely taken away from the tribe of Juda at the time of the Babylonian captivity: therefore either the Messiah must be thought to have come long since, or from the foregoing reasoning his advent cannot be certainly concluded. The antecedent is proved from the last chapter of Paralipomenon and the last of Kings, where it is related how Nabuchodonosor, having laid waste Juda and burned Jerusalem together with the temple with fire, led all the Jews away captive into Babylon together with their King. Then from the prophecy of Jeremias, chapter 22, where he foretold to King Jechonias that, after the devastation of the Jews by Nabuchodonosor, there would be no man who should sit upon the throne of David and have power any longer in Juda. Then finally from Daniel 3. v. 38. In this time there is no Prince, and Leader, and Prophet, neither holocaust, nor sacrifice, nor oblation, nor incense, etc. — But truly I answer first, that at the time of the captivity the royal power and authority of the Jews was not entirely extinguished, although for a while it lay suppressed and oppressed: for we read in the last chapter of Kings

That Evilmerodach, king of Babylon, in the year in which he had begun to reign, lifted up the head of Joachim king of Juda out of prison: and spoke kindly to him, and set his throne above the throne of the kings that were with him in Babylon. And he changed his garments, which he had in prison, and he ate bread always in his sight all the days of his life. His allowance was given him daily by the king, every day a portion.

Likewise in that captivity judicial and legislative authority had not been extinguished among the Jews, nor entirely taken from them, the removal of which was nevertheless one of the certain signs of the advent of the Messias designated in the prophecy of Jacob: for at that time authority still flourished among the Judges and Legislators of the Jews to condemn the accused to death, as is evident from the History of Susanna, Daniel chapter 13; and consequently the Messias ought not then to have come, whose advent only was to be after both authorities had been removed, namely the royal and the legislative. — Whence it is that not long after the death of King Joachim, Zorobabel, sprung from the tribe of Juda and of royal blood, obtained the prefecture of the Jewish people, and was delegated by Cyrus, Emperor of the Persians, after Babylon had been taken, that he might restore the Temple of Jerusalem entire, as is read in 1. Esdras chapter 2. Therefore the sceptre was not entirely taken away from Juda, nor a leader from his thigh in the Babylonian captivity.

They urge. From the loosing of the Babylonian captivity to the Nativity of Jesus of Nazareth there intervened about 500 years: but in that intermediate time no one of the tribe of Juda presided over or governed the Jews; for shortly after Zorobabel, Esdras, who was a Priest and of the tribe of Levi, obtained supreme rule over the Jews, when they had been dismissed from captivity to their own homes, as we read in 1. Esdras chapter 7. But from him down to the Machabees indeed no prefects of the Jews are recorded in Scripture: yet it is likely that at that time the High Priests ruled down to the Hasmonaeans, or Machabees, who were of priestly order and Levitical stock: therefore then the sceptre was entirely taken away from the tribe of Juda: and thereupon it was necessary that the Messias should have come shortly after the loosing of the captivity, and that that promised Messias was either Esdras himself, or Nehemias, who, as is read in 2. Esdras, having obtained royal letters from Artaxerxes, restored the city of Jerusalem and its walls. — To this objection, which is the capital one of the modern Jews, Catholic Doctors answer variously: for some reply, with St. Cyril book 18. against Julian, that there always existed some of the tribe of Juda who exercised authority over the Jews, even in the time of the Machabees, although on account of the Persians they did not use the Royal Diadem, because at that time the greater authority resided in the Pontiffs: How, he says, is the kingdom of David said to have ceased in Sedecias, since Zorobabel after the time of the captivity sat upon the throne of the kingdom, and was of the tribe of Juda and of David, and the sceptre was transmitted through his posterity even to the kingdom of Herod, who was by his Father of another- stock? — Others answer with Genebrard book 2. Chronology, that the Machabees were descended from the tribe of Juda according to the paternal line. Whence in chapter 5. of the book of Machabees it is said of the Machabees: And the men of Juda were exceedingly magnified. But since the Machabees were Priests, it is certain that they could not trace their origin from the tribe of Juda: inasmuch as St. Paul to the Hebrews 7. denies that the Priesthood can pertain to those who were of the tribe of Juda, which must be understood simply and absolutely, that is, according to paternal origin, wherefore this answer seems less sufficient.

— Some answer, however, with SS. Epiphanius against heresies, heresy 22, Augustine lib. 13. De Civit. Dei, c. 15, and also with Josephus book 13. of the Jewish Antiquities from chapter 15., that it is a tradition of the Hebrews that the Machabees were sprung from the tribe of Juda according to the maternal line. Which opinion indeed Baronius follows and proves at the beginning of the first volume of his Annals, by a fourfold argument: First indeed, because, as Josephus and Philo relate, the tribes of Juda and Levi could contract marriages with one another, as also Exodus chapter 6. concerning Aaron, who had for his wife the daughter of Aminadab, named Elizabeth. Likewise Joiada the Supreme Pontiff, as we read in 2. Paralipomenon chapter 22, married the daughter of Joram king of Juda, named Josabeth. Some also add the marriage of Elizabeth and Zachary, the mother of John the Baptist. But this is said Luke 1. of the daughters of Aaron, and therefore of the tribe of Levi. Therefore, although the Machabees according to their paternal stock were sprung from the priestly and Levitical tribe, and that from the turn of Joiarib, as Josephus testifies book 12. of the Antiquities, chapter 8, nevertheless according to their maternal stock they were of the tribe of Juda. Secondly, because those who were of the tribe of Juda often used names proper to the Levitical tribe, and conversely those sprung from the Levitical tribe were sometimes called by some name proper to the tribe of Juda, as is seen in the Genealogy of Christ; for some of his progenitors are called Levi, Mathathias, etc., while it is equally established that one of the Hasmonaeans was called Juda. Thirdly, because of the Machabees it is said book 1. chapter 1.: The men of Juda were exceedingly magnified in the sight of Israel. Where they are significantly called men of Juda, not Jews, whereby it is signified that they are so named not from Juda their leader but from the tribe of Juda. Fourthly finally, because if the Machabees had not been of the tribe of Juda through the maternal line, they could not without the mark of tyranny and usurpation claim for themselves supreme authority over the Jews: therefore it must be granted that they were sprung from the tribe of Juda on the side of the women.

— But how slight these arguments are, and how little efficacious, is easily demonstrated. The first indeed, because Priests and Levites were permitted not only to take wives from the tribe of Juda, but also from any other tribe whatsoever, as is clear from chapter 41. of Ezechiel v. 22, where it is prescribed concerning the Levites and Priests: They shall not take a widow, or one put away, for wives, but virgins of the seed of the house of Israel: but they shall take a widow who has been the widow of a Priest. Moreover it is gratuitously asserted that someone among the progenitors of the Machabees married a woman of royal blood, for no authority and no testimony persuades this. Besides, the maternal stock counts for nothing among the Hebrews, nor is anyone's genealogy read as woven through women: therefore although the Machabees were of the tribe of Juda according to the maternal line, this would not suffice for the right of the kingdom properly to belong to them: nor consequently for the Judaic sceptre to be propagated through them. Finally for this reason God ordained in book of Numbers 36. that Israelite women may marry whom they will, provided it be men of their own tribe, lest the possession of the children of Israel be mingled from tribe to tribe; for all the men shall take wives of their own tribe and kindred, and all the women shall take husbands of the same tribe; that the inheritance may remain in the families, and that the tribes be not mingled with one another, but so remain as they have been separated by the Lord: but if by reason of the maternal line, and from the marriage contracted with wives of the tribe of Juda, the Machabees had acquired supreme power over the Jews, the greatest inheritance of all would have passed with the wives, namely the supreme power of ruling and commanding: therefore by this argument the Machabees cannot be reckoned as of the tribe of Juda, nor can they have propagated the Judaic sceptre in that tribe.

— But it is objected that Christ belonged to the tribe of Juda by the maternal line alone. For this was peculiar to him, because he was formed from the Virgin alone without any work of man. Whence it was necessary that he belong to the tribe of Juda by reason of his mother, or else he could not be said to have been propagated from that tribe.

— The second argument also is less efficacious, for it does not appear that each tribe possessed certain names peculiar and proper to itself. Add that one of the Hasmonaeans is called Jonathan, by which name the firstborn son of Saul was called, who nevertheless was of the tribe of Benjamin.

— The third argument is refuted with equal ease: for it can be that these words, viri Iuda, signify some warriors sprung from the tribe of Juda, who were fighting vigorously and successfully under the Hasmonaean leaders; or, what is truer, they signify military men over whom this Judas himself and his brothers commanded. For there the Machabees are celebrated, and their soldiers above certain Priests and Levites, rivals of the glory and victories of the Machabees, who had rashly and without counsel entered into battle with foreigners and had fallen: for of them it is said: There was not any of their seed by whom salvation was wrought in Israel. Whereupon immediately concerning the Machabees it is added: The men of Juda were magnified exceedingly in the sight of Israel. Add that the Greek edition, which is the primary and original one of the books of the Machabees, expressly has: The men of Juda, and his brethren.

— To the fourth argument I say that the Hasmonaeans did not claim for themselves supreme authority over the Jews by reason of succession and hereditary right, but only by right of war, by title of victory, and likewise by zeal for defending religion. For since they had first resisted Antiochus Epiphanes and fought against him, and had slain those who, holding the Israelites under a secretly imposed yoke of captivity, were even driving them to idolatry; thence it came about that all the Israelites to whom liberty and religion were dear, stirred up by their example, rushed to arms against the enemies of their religion and their fatherland, and acknowledged the Machabees, whom they had had as promoters of the sacred war, also as Leaders of the army, and moreover as Protectors and Governors of their republic.

But that they did not arrogate to themselves this right of reigning, nor esteem it owed to them by any right of succession, is evident from this: that upon the death of Judas, Jonathan his brother did not assume the princedom before it had been conveyed to him by election of the Jewish people, who said to Jonathan, lib. 1. Machab. cap. 1: Since thy brother Judas is dead, there is not a man like him to go out against our enemies Bacchides, and those who are enemies of our nation. Now therefore we have chosen thee this day to be for us in his place Prince and Leader to wage our warSubditur: And Jonathan took upon himself the princedom at that time, and rose up in the place of Judas his brother. But it is especially to be noted that that election and promotion was made only long after the death of Judas, as may be gathered from the preceding events: for upon the death of Judas, and before Jonathan was confirmed in his place, very many deeds are related, both by certain notable men among the Jews, and by Bacchides, the most intense enemy of the Jews, the surviving Machabees keeping silent and not offering themselves, which is a sign that they did not esteem the Israelitic princedom owed to them by any right: for since there was in them the highest love of defending their fatherland and religion, undoubtedly as soon as Judas died Jonathan with armed soldiers subject to himself would have attacked Bacchides and overcome him, just as we read further on in the same place that he did as soon as he was elected and designated Prince. Therefore another reason must be sought and assigned, whereby it may be demonstrated that although after the Babylonian captivity however many temporal Princes arose in Judaea they were of the tribe of Levi, nevertheless in truth the sceptre of Juda was propagated in the sense in which Jacob had foretold it, up to the very Nativity of Christ our Lord. Wherefore

Other more modern theologians respond that by the word Juda is understood not only the tribe of Juda, but the whole people of the Hebrews, and all the progeny of Jacob: so that royal and legislative power would not have to be taken away from the sons of Jacob, or from all the tribes of the Israelites entirely, before the Messias had come.

— But this opinion (although it appears more probable) nevertheless does not seem to cohere with the genuine sense of the prophecy. First, for there Jacob pronounces to each of his sons those things which were to come specifically and peculiarly to their posterity: therefore while he announces to Juda that the sceptre is not before then to be taken from him, and the duke from his loins, or Lawgiver from between his feet, until the Messias come, he directs those words not to his whole progeny, but only to the posterity of Juda; otherwise he would have designated nothing peculiar to Juda. Second, a little before the aforesaid words of the prophecy, Jacob addressing Juda says: Juda, thee shall thy brethren praise: thy hand is on the necks of thine enemies: the sons of thy father shall adore thee; which words certainly cannot be directed to all the Israelites; otherwise the sense would be that the Israelites were going to praise and adore one another mutually and reciprocally, which certainly would be altogether ridiculous and absurd: and presently these words are judged directed to Juda alone and his kin: therefore those things which follow are to be understood of the posterity of Juda alone. Add that Jacob would not rather have said that the sceptre was not to be taken from Juda than from the Israelites, since he could equally well have pronounced the name Israelite as of Juda, unless he had judged that the sense and truth of this oracle pertained to Juda alone and his kin. Third, nowhere in Scripture will you find the whole progeny of Jacob designated by the name of Juda: indeed they are sometimes called Israelites, because all draw their origin from Jacob, who was called Israel: but no other tribe claims its name and appellation for itself; but each one of the Israelites attributes to himself the name of that Patriarch from whom he was descended. Hence one is called a son of Ruben, another a son of Levi, etc., as may be seen 1. Paral. where the genealogy of the Israelites is related, especially of those who were eldest, and heads of families, up to the Patriarchs from whom they were begotten.

Therefore another sense of the aforesaid oracle must be investigated, and another explanation of it must be set forth, whereby it may appear that truly the sceptre was not taken from Juda until Jesus Christ our Lord, the true Messias, was born: although the royal and ducal dignity flew almost through 500 years from the posterity of Juda to the posterity of Levi. Which we strive to accomplish according to our measure in the following §.

§ III. — By what reasoning it is established that the sceptre was not taken from Juda until Christ was born.

That the aforesaid prophecy uttered by Jacob may appear more clearly and distinctly, according to what seems to us its genuine interpretation: here at the outset it must be noted that Jacob foretold not one sign only, but two distinct and most famous indications of the coming Messias. First, that the sceptre was not to be taken from Juda: Second, that the duke, or Lawgiver was not to be removed before the Messias had come: therefore that the truth of that prophecy might appear, both of these authorities, namely royal and legislative, ought first to be taken from Juda before the Messias arrived: so that at the time of his advent no one of the Jews ruled, nor exercised any supreme judicial and legislative authority.

It must be observed secondly that judicial and legislative authority was most famous among the Jews, and chiefly lodged in their Senate, which they called the Sanhedrin, the institution of which Senate is read to have been made by divine authority, Numbers cap. 12, where it is related that when Moses, at the command of the Lord, had chosen Seventy Elders to be ministers to him in governing the Israelitic people, and had ordered them to stand about the tabernacle: The Lord descended in a cloud, and spoke to Moses, taking away of the spirit that was in Moses, and giving to the seventy men: and when the Spirit had rested in them, they prophesied, nor did they cease afterwards. Now these Seventy Elders, discharging the office of Judges and Lawgivers, were called the Sanhedrin, whom we, saith Galatinus, lib. 1. cap. 5, can call ordinary Judges: they were also called Mehokeliim, that is Scribes, or Bearers of laws, because whatever they handed down and wrote was held as law by others.

But of what sort those promoted to that dignity ought to be, is taught in the book Sanhedrin in the chapter Dine mamonoth, that is, judgments of riches, where it is thus read; Rabbi Johanam said, they were not to be constituted in the Sanhedrin unless masters of wisdom, stature, and appearance, and of old age, and masters of incantations, and likewise knowing 70 languages, lest it should be needful for them to hear interpreters. Where the gloss of R. Salomon says thus: stature and appearance were required in them, that they might be held in honor and veneration. But that they should be masters of incantations was required for this reason, that they might convince enchanters and sorcerers confident in their sorceries and incantations, and condemn them to death. Moreover it was permitted to them to condemn to four kinds of death, namely to stoning, burning, slaying, and strangling, as is had in the Babylonian book Sanhedrin. R. Akiba adds that on the day on which they condemned anyone to death they tasted nothing at all: but nowhere did they condemn anyone to death unless twenty-three were present, whose assembly is called Sanhedrioth. But while lesser matters were being judged, three of them sufficed for that. But matters of greater moment, as when it was to be decided whether war was licit, general laws were to be enacted, some

Pseudoprophet, or the high Priest was to be judged, etc., it was necessary that the business be transacted by the great Council of Sanhedrin of 71 Judges. I say 71, for although by Moses only 70 were elected and designated, nevertheless since Moses presided over them, it follows that the Council of Sanhedrin consisted of 71 Judges. It belonged to them also to institute ordinary and delegated Judges for each tribe and city, as R. Ismael says: but R. Iuda relates that for that institution and delegation, which was done by imposition of hands, five Judges of those 71 sufficed.

It must be observed thirdly that although Sacred Scripture does not relate from which tribes those 70 Elders were assumed who would constitute the Senate of the Jews, whether namely some from each tribe, or whether indiscriminately those were chosen who were celebrated among the Israelites for greater wisdom, gravity, and probity of morals, which appears probable from these words cap. 11. Numerorum, wherewith God addresses Moses thus: Gather unto me seventy men of the ancients of Israel, whom thou knowest to be ancients of the people, and Masters: and bring them to the door of the tabernacle of the covenant, and causing them to stand there with thee, that I may descend, and speak to thee, and take away of thy spirit, and give it to them, that they may bear with thee the burden of the people, and thou mayest not be burthened alone: nevertheless it is likely that very many of those were chosen especially from the tribe of Juda; the indication of which is, that Moses always held the tribe of Juda in greater estimation than the others, and preferred it to the rest: for that tribe marched first of all, and fixed its station to the east of the Ark of the covenant, and its Prince offered gifts first of all before the Lord, both in his own name and in the name of the tribe of Juda. Whence it becomes probable that from that tribe especially (in which Moses knew divinely that royal authority was to be lodged) he assumed men who would exercise judicial and legislative authority over the other Jews.

Whatever the case may be, at least after the division of the Israelitic kingdom from the kingdom of Judah, and especially after the Babylonian captivity, it appears certain that very many from the tribe of Judah were assumed to that dignity: since this tribe was far more numerous than the tribes of Levi and Benjamin, which together with it constituted the single kingdom of Judah. And accordingly it was more fitting that it itself should obtain more Senators from among its own.

It is to be observed, fourthly, that this Senate, the Sanhedrin, always stood among the Jews, even in the time of the Babylonian captivity, as the Jews themselves confess in the Chaldaic Paraphrase of the Song of Songs, where mention is made of that Sanhedrin which was in Babylon; nor certainly are those who are called in Daniel cap. 13. v. 5. the Elder Judges, who seemed to govern the people, to be thought other than those Senators from the Council of the Sanhedrin, in whose hands alone was deposited the authority of condemning to death. This Senate, moreover, persevered down to Herod the Ascalonite, who, as Josephus relates, received from the Romans the kingdom of the Jews, that he might press tributes upon them and obey the Roman Empire; and he took as wife the granddaughter of Hyrcanus the High Priest and Prince of the Jews, who was the son of Alexandra, Queen of the Jews, and traced his origin from the Machabees. And circumcising himself, out of love of the kingdom and of her, he became a proselyte, and at length treacherously killed the same Hyrcanus, because he said the Kingdom was owed to himself. For when, with Hyrcanus himself the Pontiff taken captive by the Parthians, he had received from Augustus and the Senate a Judaea that had nothing to do with him, afterwards, upon the return of the same Hyrcanus from Parthian captivity, together with Antigonus his son, who had succeeded his father in the Pontificate and Kingdom, he put them to death. All likewise who had gone forth from the royal stock he slew equally, on account of that written word of Deuteronomy 17., From the midst of thy brethren thou shalt set a king over thee: and he caused all the books inscribed concerning the Genealogy of the Kings to be burned, lest he himself, or his sons, be judged aliens from the kingdom. And among other things which he did cruelly, he killed also the husband of his sister Salome. And when he had given her in marriage to another man, he killed this one also as well. The Scribes too, and Doctors of the divine law, he put to death with similar wickedness, that he might take away from the Jews every means and hope of recovering the kingdom. So Josephus. Wherefore then properly and truly did the sceptre begin to be taken away from the tribe of Judah, when no one of the Royal race was believed to remain. Then also the judicial power was removed from them, when Herod himself ordered all the Sanhedrin to be slain. All which things the Talmudists relate. For that Herod himself destroyed the heads of the captivities of Babylonia, and the Sanhedrin themselves, is held in Barabuthra, in the chapter Hassutaphin, that is, Associates in negotiation; where thus it is said word for word: Herod arose, and slew all the Rabbanan, that is, the Masters, reserving to himself Baba the son of Bota alone, that he might consult him. And on a certain day he ordered him summoned to himself, and dug out an eye of his. And shortly after: This man extinguished the light of the world, that is, the Rabbanim, as it is written, Proverbs 6. c. Because the commandment is a lamp, and the law a light. All this is tradition. From these things, says Galatinus cap. 6., it clearly enough appears, that in the time of this Herod, who slew both the heads of Babylon, that is, the Machabees, and the ordinary judges, the sceptre began to be taken away from Judah: For although afterwards other Senators and Scribes were substituted into their lot and place, yet they were endowed with no judicial authority: whence when Pilate, upon their demanding the death of Christ the Lord, had said, Take him you, and judge him according to your law: they answered: It is not lawful for us to put any man to death, because plainly that supreme power of judging had been taken away from them. But that also the Royal authority had been detected as lost, they equally confess themselves, saying to Pilate: We have no king but Caesar. Therefore both these authorities began to be taken away from the Jews about the nativity of Christ, which befell two years before the death of Herod the Ascalonite.

It is to be observed, lastly, that in the schism, or partition and division of the Royal authority and dignity, which formerly existed among the Israelites — while ten tribes, detesting the most bitter yoke of King Roboam, chose for themselves Ieroboam as King, who instituted a new kingdom of Israel — there persevered under the empire and kingdom of Roboam, together with the whole tribe of Judah, also the entire tribes of Benjamin and Levi, as appears from 3 Kings 12. and 2 Paralipomenon 11. where we read that Roboam, hearing that ten tribes had revolted from him, gathered together all the house of Juda, and Benjamin, a hundred and eighty thousand chosen men and warriors, to fight against Israel, and bring back his kingdom to himself. And below v. 11. and 18. And he reigned over Juda, and Benjamin. But the Priests and Levites who were in all Israel came to him (Roboam) from all their abodes, leaving their suburbs and possessions, and passing over to Juda and Jerusalem. From which things it is established that King Roboam and his posterity had three tribes subject to them, namely Juda, Benjamin, and

Levi. — Herein, further, it is especially to be observed, that from the time of that schism the three just now mentioned tribes, even as they constituted the single kingdom of Judah, so also seemed to have coalesced into the one tribe of Judah: which indeed is evident quite openly from 3 Kings cap. 12. where it is said: And no man followed the house of David but the tribe of Juda only; which things certainly could not cohere otherwise with those we reported just now from 2 Paralipomenon than by our granting that the tribe of Benjamin and Levi had been so joined and federated to the tribe of Judah, that thereafter they were called and reckoned by no name other than Jews. Now this observation of ours can be confirmed from this, that although the successor Kings of Roboam ruled not only over the tribe of Judah, but also over Benjamin and Levi, nevertheless in all places of Scripture, whenever mention is made of them, they are called simply Kings of Judah, that it may be signified that those three tribes were designated by the sole name of Judah. Whence when Scripture speaks of the ten tribes deported far beyond the borders of Judaea by Salmanassar King of the Assyrians, it expressed the matter thus: And the Lord was exceeding angry with Israel, and removed them out of his sight, and there remained only the tribe of Juda: whereas in that tribe and kingdom of Ezechias the Priests and Levites had remained: and likewise the Benjamites, and then many others besides, adhered to the same: therefore all the tribes had so coalesced in Judah, that they must be judged to have constituted a single tribe called by the name of Judah. The reason of this appellation indeed was to be sought, as I judge, not only from the dignity, amplitude, and pre-eminence of the tribe of Judah above the tribe of Levi and Benjamin, but also from the fact that those three tribes dwelt promiscuously.

As regards the tribe of Levi, no one will call that into doubt: for these had no peculiar portion and lot of land assigned them, in which they might dwell apart from the others, according to that word of Numbers 18. In their land you shall possess nothing, neither shall you have a part among them. But since their ministry and service was to minister in the tabernacle of the Lord, which was deposited in the temple of Solomon; thence it came about that, as we related above from 2 Paralipomenon cap. 11, all the Priests and Levites, abandoning the possessions they held throughout each of the tribes of Israel, passed over to Judah and Jerusalem, and dwelt together with the posterity of Judah. — The same is established also of the sons of Benjamin, who were not only neighbours of the tribe of Judah, but even inhabited the same cities, above all Jerusalem, seeing that in Judges 1. v. 21. we read: But the Jebusite, the inhabitant of Jerusalem, the sons of Benjamin did not destroy, and the Jebusite dwelt with the sons of Benjamin in Jerusalem unto this present day. The same moreover is related of the sons of Judah, Josue 15. v. 63. where we read: But the Jebusite, the inhabitant of Jerusalem, the sons of Judah could not destroy: and the Jebusite dwelt with the sons of Judah in Jerusalem unto this present day: and presently the Judaeans and Benjamin were reckoned to dwell promiscuously, even before the division of the kingdom: which befell much more easily after that partition of the kingdom; and especially after the Babylonian captivity had been ended; for Josephus relates lib. 1. that after the ending of that captivity all the Israelites, as many as returned from Babylon into Palaestina with Zorobabel and Nehemias, were indiscriminately called Jews. The whole people, he says, obtained the name of Jews from that day on which they first set out from Babylon, from the Tribe of Judah: which, since it had come first into those places, both it itself and the whole Region passed over to that appellation. So also even now they are called, by those nations among whom they dwell, no longer any account being taken of those tribes whence they had been propagated. From all which it is established that all the Israelites, as many as survived after the ending of the captivity and inhabited Palaestina, were called and esteemed Jews, and were regarded as the one selfsame tribe of Judah. — Therefore from these things it may easily be gathered that the Royal authority was not taken away from Judah until the Messias should come. For although the Machabees held supreme authority for more than 100 years over the surviving Israelites, down to Herod the Ascalonite; nevertheless, since these latter were accounted by the common name Jews, and their tribes had as it were coalesced into the tribe of Judah, and were regarded as the one selfsame tribe, hence it is that, while they ruled, the sceptre is not judged to have been taken away from Judah, seeing that it remained with those who gloried in the name, dignity, and lot of the Jews.

You will perhaps reply: James therefore announced nothing peculiar to the posterity of Judah in his prophecy, if the tribe of Levi was to be illustriated with the same honour and title of dignity as the tribe of Judah. — But truly I answer, that this does not follow: since, as was said just now, the Machabees had attained this dignity and authority only because their lot and dwelling was the same as that of the Jews: and consequently the same duty of defending and governing their Republic. To these things add that James signally did not say: the sceptre shall not be taken away from the posterity of Judah, whereby he would signify that the sceptre was not to be taken away from the posterity of Judah before the Messias should come: but he said only: The Sceptre shall not depart from Judah, which indeed may be interpreted concerning the land, or the people of Judah, so that the sense is, that the sceptre would abide with those who inhabited the land designated to the tribe of Judah, and, as it were one people with one kingdom, constituted a single kingdom with the posterity of Judah, until the Messias should come. Nor does it matter what he subjoins, nor a Leader from his thigh: for as we admonished above, the word Mehokek signifies not only a Leader, as the common Edition has it, but chiefly a Legislator, as the other Editions bear: by which name of legislator, as we said, is signified the Senate of the Sanhedrin, in whose hands was the supreme authority of enacting laws. But the words Mibben rageliou signify not from his thigh, but from between his feet: which words indeed the Vulgate translator deemed to signify the same thing as from his thigh, on account of the position of the parts serving propagation and generation; which certainly fits the Hebrew diction quite openly. Although I should deem it also probable that the Patriarch Jacob, by those words, from between his feet, or as the other Editions bear, from between his thighs, alluded to the judicial custom by which the Scribe is accustomed to sit at the feet of the Judge and President, and to receive the sentence: which exposition also is handed down in the book Bereschith Rabba, sect. 98.

You will say perhaps that this opinion of ours is contrary to the common sense of the Holy Fathers and Theologians, who judge that the Machabees originated from the tribe of Judah according to the maternal line, and for this reason and on that account held the sceptre of the Jews. — But truly I answer that by the authority of the Holy Fathers no one is so bound in matters which pertain to History and to the minute and slight kinds of things, that he dare not bring forth his own judgment, provided something else shine forth. That indeed is a second kind, and to be received with veneration, the concordant sentiment of the Holy Fathers, in those things which pertain to the rule of faith or probity of morals: yet from it it is sometimes licit to depart, especially in those things which pertain to History: for, as Torniellus observes ad annum 4018. § 9., examples are innumerable in which Theologians and sacred Annalists are accustomed to depart from the common authority of the Fathers. Indeed, to bring forward one example from those examples, how many of the Ancients assert that Zachary, the father of John the Baptist, was High Pontiff of the Jews! Which however if anyone in our time asserted, he would be received by the learned with a whistle and laughter. It must be said therefore with Vincent of Lerins cap. 39. that the ancient consent of the Holy Fathers is not to be sought out and followed by us with great diligence in all little questions of law to be directed: but only in the certain rule of faith especially. — Yet I would not wish to prefer this opinion of ours to the sentiments of the Holy Fathers and erudite Theologians: nor even did I propose it with that mind or intention; but only that I might open to others those things which seem to me more probable; insofar as they also may be spurred on to investigate and set forth (if God grant) a more evident untying and explication of that difficulty. If you know anything better than these things, candid friend, impart it; if not, use these of ours.

The Jews finally object: Although these things were so, yet thence it is not licit to infer that Jesus the Nazarene is the Messias designated by that prophecy of Jacob: since at least twenty-eight years before his nativity the sceptre had been taken away from all the Israelites by Herod the Ascalonite son of Antipater, who transferred its preservation to his posterity, called by the same name of Herod, for several years. For it is to be observed that there were three Herods, of whom the first was that Ascalonite, who slew Hyrcanus together with his son Antigonus, who had succeeded his father in the Pontificate and kingdom: he it is also who cruelly ordered the infants of Bethlehem to be massacred upon the birth of Christ: the second Herod however was surnamed Antipater, son of the former Herod, who, Caesar adjudging it, succeeded his father in Galilee: but Archelaus his brother in Judaea: the third Herod was called Agrippa, son of this Herod, and grandson of the first: therefore etc.

I answer first, that the events of prophecies are not circumscribed by some single particle of time, but are unfolded gradually and fulfilled; thus the prophecy of Jacob concerning the taking away of the sceptre was fulfilled step by step, so that just as a man near to death, so long as he breathes and struggles with death, is said to be dying: so that taking away of the sceptre, and extinction of the royal and judicial power of Judah, was completed gradually: and begun somewhat before the rising of Christ, and thereafter falling into worse estate, at length had its completion in the overthrow of the temple and of the city under the Emperor Vespasian.

I answer second, that there seems to me probable the opinion of those who contend that Herod was a Jew not only by region, but by origin: first because, as Josephus writes lib. 18. cap. 17., long ago, before the kingdom begun by Herod, the Idumaeans had professed the rite and religion of the Jews, and had been made Jews: namely when, conquered by Hyrcanus, they were circumcised and imbued with the laws of Moses. Hence Strabo makes Idumaea a part of Judaea, and calls Herod an Idumaean, an indigenous or vernacular Jew: and Ammonius writes that the Idumaeans were called Jews; likewise Josephus lib. 11. cap. 11. has that Antipater, when Julius Caesar was in peril in Aegypt, appeased a tumult arisen among the Jews residing in Aegypt and those who had come to Caesar's aid from Judaea: because, Josephus says, he was of the same Race as they. Finally Nicolas of Damascus, an author of the greatest weight, a contemporary of Herod, who published not only the life of Caesar Augustus but also a universal history in 70 books, as Voletarenus reports from Suidas, expressly affirms that Herod was a Jew.

Second: reason itself also persuades this same thing. For if he had been an Idumaean, and alien from the stock of the Jews, since he was distinguished for audacity and ferocity, having without doubt attained the Judaic kingdom, he would have tried to transfer the Jews to the rites of the Idumaeans, and to repay the Jews; for, as we said just now, John Hyrcanus, in the fifth year of his Pontificate and prefecture, when he had subdued the Idumaeans by force of arms, compelled them to embrace the Judaic religion: for if Costabarus, one of the primates of the Idumaeans, made son-in-law of Herod, judged it unworthy that the Idumaeans serve the Jews, whose religion, Hyrcanus compelling, they had embraced, and on that account, as Josephus relates lib. 1. cap. 11., would resume even their former religion: what would not Herod the King have done, to whose nod the Jews obeyed, and the Romans fawned at his pleasure, especially since he could have persuaded himself that this would not be displeasing to the Romans, from whom he had received the kingdom, as aliens from the Judaic rite?

Third, that same thing is indicated by his most fervent zeal for the Judaic religion, as it is gathered both from the saying of Caesar, which Macrobius relates in the second book of the Saturnalia chapter four: for when he had heard that the son of Herod had been slain by command of the father, he is said to have said: it is better to be Herod's pig than his son; clearly intimating that Herod was such a zealous observer of the Mosaic law that he would not permit animals of that kind prohibited by the law to be slain: then from the fact that, when he captured Jerusalem by aid of the Romans, he strove with all his forces to bar the Gentiles, that is, the soldiers of the Romans, from the entrance of the inner temple, more bitterly, says Josephus, in the fourteenth book of the Antiquities, in the last chapter, and in the first book Of the Jewish War, chapter thirteen, than if he had been conquered, judging that then victory belonged to him, if anything of those things which it was not lawful to see seemed to be seen through his fault in the sight of the profane multitude. — Then from the fact that, when solicited by Caius Caesar, that he might ask for some favour doubtless to be obtained, despising all his own advantages, he asked only that the statue which Caius Caesar had ordered to be placed in the temple of Jerusalem be removed by him, as Josephus relates in book one. Then finally from the fact that, no one persuading or commanding, but moved by his own motion, he wished to build the temple of Jerusalem much more august than before, as the aforesaid Josephus relates. — Fourth, if Herod, who afterwards reigned over all Israel for so many years, had been an Idumaean, and of the posterity of Esau, there would follow the happening of the opposite of that which the Lord had foretold to Rebecca, carrying Jacob and Esau in her womb: Two nations are in thy womb, and two peoples shall be divided out of thy womb, and people shall overcome people, and the elder shall serve the younger. Genesis cap. 25. Nor does it matter what is subjoined in cap. 27. where Isaac had said to Jacob: Be lord of thy brethren, let thy mother's sons bow down before thee: and Esau had said: Thou shalt serve thy brother, he subjoins straightway: And the time will come when thou shalt shake off, and loose his yoke from thy neck: for it is one thing to shake off from oneself a yoke, as the Idumaeans did, in the times of Joram King of Judah, when, revolting from him, they constituted for themselves a proper King, as is read in the fourth book of Kings, chapter eight: another thing, that the Idumaeans or some one of them should be about to dominate the Israelites; for that would altogether be adverse to the aforementioned predictions. — Fifth, the Herodians, of whom Matthew cap. 22. affirms them asserting that Herod was the Messias, it is beyond doubt that they equally publicly confessed him to be a Jew by origin. Christ, whose Son is he? They say to him: David's. Sixth, Hyrcanus the High Pontiff would not have given his daughter Mariamne to him in marriage against the prescription of the law prohibiting marriages to be contracted with strangers, Deuteronomy chapter seventeen, and Exodus 34. etc.

You will say, this opinion is opposed by nearly all the holy Fathers; for all the holy Fathers, Interpreters, or Doctors unanimously testify that Herod was an Idumaean or an Ascalonite.

I answer, as above according to the rule of Vincent of Lerins in his book against heresies c. 39, where he says concerning the consensus of the Fathers to be followed: Yet that ancient consensus of the holy Fathers is not to be sought out and followed with great diligence in all the little questions of divine law, but only in certain principal rules of faith. But who does not see that this question about the race of Herod does not pertain to matters of faith?

I answer secondly, that none of the holy Fathers undertook to discuss this difficulty deliberately, since they were intent upon weightier studies: but certain of them said in passing that Herod was an Idumaean and an alien by race; which, strictly speaking and by way of excluding Jewish stock, I do not think should be understood; but only in that sense in which Barnabas is said in the fourth chapter of Acts to be a Cyprian by race, not because he was not himself a Jew; but because his forebears, or certainly he himself, had dwelt in Cyprus. By like reasoning Paul is called a Tarsian, Acts ten, and in chapter twenty-two calls himself a Roman; not because he was sprung from that Province and lineage; seeing that in writing to the Romans eleven and to the Philippians three he professes himself an Israelite, and of the tribe of Benjamin: whence it becomes manifest that race is not always taken for the very origin of generation, but sometimes also for the place of birth, or upbringing, or long dwelling. Nor does it matter that Josephus names Herod an Ascalonite and an Idumaean by race, and therefore accuses the Damascene of falsehood and flattery, because he said, as it were flattering Herod, that he was a Jew. Rather must it be judged that the opposite account was committed to writing by Josephus the Jew and Priest in favor of the Jews, and especially of the Priests, whom Herod on account of his extreme cruelty and pride held in derision, and above all the Priests from whom he had not only removed the kingdom, but had also, after the death of Hyrcanus the younger, given the high priesthood to a certain Ananelus a Priest summoned from Babylonia, born of those Jews formerly carried beyond the Euphrates, lest so great a dignity should come to any of illustrious men who could withstand him. Now Herod is called an Idumaean either because his father Antipater, and some of his forebears

had dwelt in Idumaea, and as Josephus himself relates, Antipas the grandfather of Herod had formerly been appointed by Alexander King of the Jews, and afterwards by his wife Alexandra, who succeeded him in the kingdom, Commander of the Idumaeans: by which reason his parents may be called Idumaeans, and he himself an Ascalonite, because he was brought up in Ascalon, or perhaps even born there: for of Antipater Josephus writes in book fourteen of the Antiquities chapter two, that he cultivated the friendships of the Arabs, and the Gazites, and the Ascalonites: wherefore it could easily have come about that the parents of Herod, tarrying in Ascalon under some pressing occasion, begat him there. Nor ought he on that account to be said to be alien in origin from the Jews, for we read that many were called in Acts chapter two Parthians, Medes, Elamites, Cretans, and Arabs, yet that they were men by nation and origin Jews is indicated in the same place in these words: Now there were dwelling at Jerusalem Jews, religious men out of every nation under heaven. — I am not unaware that Tornielli's reasons can satisfy these sufficiently; and that Salianus has partly answered them at the year of the world 1017, page 381, saying to the first and to the second, that Herod was of the same mind as the other Politicians, who are lovers of kingdom rather than of religion, and under the pretext of religion inaugurate innovations and domination: for easily, with this cast of mind, Herod, when driven out, abandoned the religion of the Idumaeans and practiced the Jewish, that he might peacefully rule the Jewish Empire handed over to him by Caesar, knowing that the Jews would sooner undergo death than a change of religion; chiefly at that time, when they were being spurred thereto by the Priests, Scribes, and Pharisees. But that he was not so greatly zealous for the divine law and the Jewish rites is evident from the temples which he erected to Caesar as to a kind of god and divinity, as Josephus testifies, book 19 of the Antiquities, c. 7. He adorned the Temple of Jerusalem of his own accord, I confess: but the Kings of Asia illustrated it with their gifts, who therefore are not to be reckoned Jews.

Greater, you will say, shall therefore serve lesser? And why could this not have come about for a little while without prejudice to the prophecy, since generally, and for a long time, the Jews, driven into divers captivities, served an alien nation? Whence this opinion is not without difficulty. Nevertheless it is more apt for proving Christ to have been the true Messiah from the prophecy of Jacob; for when Herod died a little after the birth of Christ, the scepter began gradually to be withdrawn from Juda; for although after the death of Herod Archelaus his son is said to have reigned, constituted Ethnarch of Judaea by Augustus; yet he never prevailed with him to obtain royal dignity, as appears in Josephus, book 17 of the Antiquities, chapter 18; nay rather he was banished by the same Augustus into Gaul, and Judaea was wholly reduced under the empire and governance of the Romans throughout the whole time of the life of Christ, having no King but Caesar, as the Jews themselves Pi-⟦OCR dropped one or more lines here; see notes⟧ Caesar, as Josephus testifies, book 19 of the Antiquities, c. 7, gave the kingdom of Judaea to Herod Agrippa, who, as the same Josephus has it, book 18, ch. 7, was grandson of Herod the Ascalonite by Aristobulus his son; and who thereafter in Judaea killed James the brother of John with the sword: and sent Peter into prison, intending after Pascha to bring him forth to the people, as we read in Acts chapter 12. That, I say, is no obstacle, for a very brief space indeed was intercepted by divine dispensation, that the complement of the aforesaid Prophecy might be fulfilled: since that Herod, who four years before had been tetrarch of Philip, and in that part of Galilee prefect in place of his deceased uncle, at length died three years after he had obtained the kingdom of Judea, as Josephus relates, book 19, toward the end, and so his brief rule is counted as nothing.

Second conclusion. — ACCORDING TO THAT TESTIMONY AND PROPHECY IN WHICH THE OBSTINACY OF THE JEWS IS BROKEN, SOUGHT FROM THOSE WORDS OF THE ARCHANGEL GABRIEL SPEAKING TO DANIEL, AND PROMISING THE COMING OF THE MESSIAH AFTER SEVENTY WEEKS:

Mark the word, and understand the vision: seventy weeks are shortened upon thy people, and upon thy holy city: that transgression may be consummated, and sin may receive its end, and iniquity be blotted out, and everlasting justice be brought in, and vision be fulfilled, and prophecy, and the Saint of saints be anointed. Know thou therefore, and take notice: that from the going forth of the word to build up Jerusalem again unto Christ the Prince there shall be seven weeks, and sixty-two weeks; and the street shall be built again, and the walls in straitness of times. And after sixty-two weeks Christ shall be slain, and his people shall not be he that shall deny him. And the city and the sanctuary shall a people come with their leader destroy, and the end thereof shall be waste, and after the end of the war desolation shall be appointed. And he shall confirm the covenant with many for one week, and in the half of the week the victim and sacrifice shall fall, and there shall be in the temple the abomination of desolation, and until the consummation and the end the desolation shall last.

Thence I argue thus: That Christ whom the Angel promises shall come after seventy weeks is the Messiah promised to the Fathers: but the seventy weeks defined beforehand by the Angel have truly long ago passed away: therefore the Messiah has already come. The major stands, namely that that Christ is the Messiah; but not any Pontiff of the Jews, especially Hyrcanus of the Machabees, the last Pontiff by legitimate election, slain by Herod, as the Jews invent: because that Christ who is foretold to be anointed and slain is called the Saint of saints, and is said to be about to bring in everlasting justice; so that through him the iniquity of the earth is blotted out, and transgression receives its end: but these things cannot be verified of any of the Pontiffs of the Jews: therefore that prophecy is not to be understood of anyone other than the Messiah. The minor also is evident, namely that the seventy weeks defined by the Angel, however they be expounded, long ago passed away. For those weeks are either of days, or of years: but whichever way they be expounded, they have long ago passed away: therefore, etc. The minor stands: for if the prophecy be understood of weeks of days, it stands that the Messiah came after a year and a half from the time when that promise was made: if of weeks of years, whereas seventy weeks of years make only 490 years, it follows also that the Messiah came long ago, because from that time in which that angelic prophecy was uttered down to us, two thousand years and more have flowed away. The major also stands: since among the Jews a week is taken in only two ways, either for the number of seven days, as Leviticus 13, when the solemnity of Weeks, or of the Feast of Pentecost, is instituted, fifty days after Pascha, for 49 days make seven weeks: but the week of years, or that which consists of seven years, is gathered from Leviticus 25, where there is question of celebrating the holy year of Jubilee: Thou shalt number to thee seven weeks of years, that is seven times seven, which together make 49 years; and thou shalt sanctify the fiftieth year.

The Jews reply, that there the discourse is of longer weeks, namely either of Jubilees, or Olympiads, or Saecula, and consequently that the small number is not yet filled up, nor consequently has the Messiah come; for seventy weeks of saecula comprise forty-nine thousand years, but of Jubilees more than twenty-four thousand: but of Olympiads nearly two thousand: whereas scarcely two thousand years have flowed away since that promise made to Daniel of the coming Messiah: therefore the Messiah has not yet come.

Against this first: they invent this gratuitously and without foundation; but if it were permitted to institute weeks at pleasure, all certainty of prophecy would perish. Moreover, neither the prophets nor the Jews are accustomed to reckon by Olympiads, but the Greeks alone; for no trace of that reckoning appears in all Scripture. Finally, if that answer had any weight of truth, it would follow that temple and city were not to be laid waste except after forty-nine thousand years, or after twenty-four thousand, or at least after two thousand, from which the Jews restored both under the administration of Esdras and Zorobabel: but the contrary plainly stands; for scarcely two thousand years have flowed away since the time when that promise was made, and yet in the year 75 above sixteen hundred, the city together with the temple was destroyed and utterly desolated, and that general devastation of the Jews perseveres to the present day without any hope of recovering city or liberty; therefore the aforesaid answer of the Jews is altogether fictitious, nor would it present any appearance of truth; but that precisely those seventy weeks of years, that is 490 years, fall upon the nativity of Jesus of Nazareth, and that not all the particulars of that prophecy can be expounded of another than himself, I shall clearly demonstrate, if first I observe certain things.

To be observed 1. These seventy weeks began during the Kingdom of the Persians, continued throughout the whole time of the Monarchy of the Greeks, and ended finally almost at the beginning of the Empire of the Romans, from whose beginning to the baptism of Christ fifty-nine years are computed, namely forty-four of the Empire of Augustus, and fifteen of Tiberius, in which year Christ was baptized, as St Luke witnesses. As to the Monarchy of the Greeks, which began with Alexander, or especially after him, the more common opinion is that it lasted about three hundred and two years, computing under it six or nine years, during which Alexander is said to have lived after he had acquired the Monarchy. So Eusebius in the Chronicle, and Bede in the book De sex aetatibus; whatever be brought forward to the contrary out of Joannes Annius, whose history, as fabricated from false authorities, obtains no authority. Yet there is one thing, as Suarez notes, disputation 1, section 2, which renders this opinion difficult and suspect: for those who assign so many years to the Monarchy of the Greeks suppose that from its beginning down to John the son of Simon, surnamed Hyrcanus, Pontiff of the Jews, more than 191 years flowed away, as stands from Eusebius in the Chronicle, where he marks the death of Alexander the Great at the beginning of Olympiad 111; but the Pontificate of John Hyrcanus at the end of Olympiad 163. Whereas however it stands from the first book of Machabees, last chapter, v. 11, that from the first year of the Greek Empire down to John Hyrcanus only one hundred seventy-seven years flowed by, to which Scripture greater faith must be given than to all the Olympiads: therefore error crept into that computation; for twenty years, more than is fitting, are added to the Empire of the Greeks. Finally, as to the Monarchy of the Persians, it is uncertain how long it lasted: for nothing certain is gathered from Scripture; among authors however there is so great dissension, that some assign to it less than a hundred years, others fifty above two hundred, among whom the middle opinion computes the duration of that Monarchy at two hundred and thirty years, which is gathered from the reckoning of the Olympiads, for that Empire began in the time of Cyrus, whose beginning is assigned to the first year of the fifty-fifth Olympiad, and received its end under Darius at the end of Olympiad 112; yet this computation supposes that Cyrus reigned thirty years after Babylon was captured, which does not seem so established: for although Cyrus reigned thirty years, nevertheless it is likely that he did not reign so many after Babylon was captured; and accordingly the first year of his Monarchy of which mention is made in Esdras one was not the first year of his reign absolutely, but only the beginning of the Babylonian reign; for in 2 Paralipomenon chapter 36 it is said: Whosoever had escaped the sword, he led into Babylon, to serve the king and his sons until the King of the Persians should reign: and he is called King of the Persians before he obtained the Babylonian kingdom: and consequently he reigned before he held the Babylonian kingdom.

Likewise he distributed the time of the solution of the Babylonian captivity after seventy weeks, that is after 490 years, into three parts, that in each of them there should be an event of notable things: for he divides those weeks, first, into seven; secondly, into sixty-two; thirdly, into one. He divides them into seven, that is 49 years, because so many septennia, more or less (for Scripture often neglects drawn-out numbers and smaller divisions of time), were to be spent in perfecting the restoration of the whole city, temple, and land, on account of the hindrances of enemies. Which straitnesses of times the Angel names for two causes; that he may signify the immense affliction of the people on account of the frequent incursions of enemies, on account of which those who applied themselves to the work were compelled with one hand to build, and with the other to hold the sword, as we have in book 2 of Esdras, chapter 1. Then that he may denote the utmost brevity of the time; for, as we have in chapter 6, the walls were joined together with great haste and finished within an interval of fifty days; which signification fits better the letter and the Hebrew phrase: so that in straitness of times it signifies the same as in a short time: just as in the same place is said abomination of desolation, that is abominable desolation: or in a shorter time; for the Hebrews are accustomed to use the positive for the comparative; as Genesis 25, v. 23, they write: the greater shall serve the lesser: that is, the greater shall serve the lesser. Secondly, he divides them into sixty-two, that is, into 434 years, because thereafter the Republic of the Jews restored and ordered by the laws of the fathers would endure only so much time unto the slaying and death of the Messiah. Finally, he distributes those weeks into one, because the Messiah in it was to manifest himself through preaching and miracles: but this last week he divides into two parts, because not in the former, but in the latter half of it, he was to accomplish this, making a pact with men, that he might bestow eternal life upon those who should receive his doctrine.

Note 3. Those years 490., in which the seventy weeks are completed, are to be solar years, not lunar; between which, as is well known, this difference intervenes, that solar years consist of 365 days with at least six hours, if you deduct certain minutes: for 11 minutes are wanting, which in an interval of 131 years make one whole day, as is clear from the Alphonsine tables, which the Church approved in the last emendation of the Calendar: but lunar years are shorter than solar by about eleven days, and contain only 351 days, which indeed eleven days with three years make a whole month, whence every third year there occurs a lunar Embolismus, that is, an addition, or intercalation of one lunation, so that the embolimaeal year has not twelve lunations, as others, but thirteen, in order that the lunar year may be reduced to equality with the solar. But that in computing those weeks solar years, not lunar, are to be observed, is evident first from this, that the Hebrews had the common custom of computing by the solar motion, as may be seen in their Chronicle, which is called Seder olam, that is, the order of the world, which you will find inserted at the end of Genebrard's Chronology: Second from the first book of Maccabees chapter 1, where Alexander is said to have reigned twelve years, which number of years is also reckoned among the profane authors, who certainly defined years by the solar course: Third and finally because the Jews took the first month of the whole year from the vernal equinox, as may be seen in Exodus 12, and celebrated the Pasch on the 14th day of the Moon after the Sun had first touched the degree of Aries, and accordingly ordered their computation by the motion of the Sun, not of the Moon. To these add that this opinion is that of Eusebius book 8 of the Evangelical Demonstration, of Chrysostom in Oration 2 against the Jews, of Lyra on the aforesaid words of Daniel, and also of the more celebrated Moderns. Nor does it stand in the way that the Angel calls those weeks abbreviated and cut short: for by this he does not intend to signify that the weeks consist of lunar years, as being shorter, for those weeks are not called abbreviated on that account, but because they hastened toward the end of the time in which the Messias was awaited: for that time was brief when compared with the preceding: hence with so familiar a speech, when the time prescribed for some action is brought to an end, we are accustomed to say that now now the days are being shortened, not that they become fewer in length, but that few remain: even as in Mark 13 and Matthew 24 it is said: Unless those days had been shortened, no flesh should be saved.

Note 4. The opinion of the Authors varies in assigning the beginning of those weeks: for since the Angel had said that it must be reckoned from the going forth of the word, until Jerusalem be again rebuilt, thence various men judged variously: for some began that starting point from the time in which Jeremias prophesied in chapter 28 that there would someday be a time in which God would recall the dispersed Israelites into their land, in these words: The Lord saith: and I will gather together the remnant of my flock out of all lands into which I have cast them out: and I will return them to their own fields: and they shall increase and be multiplied. So judge Lyranus, Burgensis, etc. Some think that the beginning of those seventy weeks should be taken from the very time in which the Angel spoke these things to Daniel. So Origen, and Tertullian in the book against the Jews chapter 8. Some think that that computation must be begun from the first year of Cyrus, when he made it possible for the Jews to return into their fatherland and to erect the temple, as we read in book 1 of Esdras chapter 1. So Clement of Alexandria.

Others from the second year of Darius Hystaspes, when he made it possible for the Jews to continue the rebuilding of the temple begun under Cyrus, but afterward interrupted, as we read in Esdras 6. So Eusebius, and Cyril of Jerusalem in Catechesis 12; very many Moderns subscribe to whose opinion.

Almost all the more recent writers will have them to be ordered from the year 20 of Artaxerxes Longimanus: but I judge it truer to say that they must be computed only from the 2nd of that reign; namely, when that decree was put into execution.

It must be observed 5. As regards the series of the Kings of the Persians, different men think differently; for some number only three, as the Rabbins cited by Galatinus in book 1 chapter 15, namely Cyrus, who first held the empire of Persis: Assuerus, of whom mention is made in Esdras chapter 4, whom they will have to have been the husband of Esther, and Darius, who, conquered by Alexander the Great, lost the Empire, whom some of them will have to be that Artaxerxes of whom mention is made in 1 Esdras chapter 1.

Others number four, as rabbi Salomon and Lyranus, adding to the three aforesaid the son of Cyrus named Cambyses: but St. Jerome affirms this opinion to be most ancient, in chapter 7 of Daniel.

Tertullian in the book against the Jews names five, to wit Ochus, who by another name is called Cyrus by him: Darius Hystaspes, or Nothus, Artaxerxes, whom one may conjecture to be Mnemon, Jugus, and Darius, whom he calls Malus.

Others name Codomanus, conquered by Alexander.

Genebrardus in book 2 from page 210 establishes six. The first with him is Darius son of Assuerus surnamed Hystaspes. The second, Cyrus. The third Xerxes, of whom he wills mention to be made under the name of Assuerus in 1 Esdras chapter 4 verse 6, and under the name of Artaxerxes in the same place verse 7. The fourth, Darius Longimanus, concerning whom he contends that mention is made under the name of Darius in 2 Esdras chapter 1, and under the name of Artaxerxes chapter 7. The fifth, Artaxerxes, whom he contends to indicate none too obscurely that he is Mnemon. The sixth, Artaxerxes Codomanus, conquered by Alexander: but he names these alone, for the reason that he judges them truly to have reigned: but he excludes the others, as either illegitimate, or reigning together with others, as Cambyses with his father Cyrus.

St. Isidore in book 3 of the Etymologies, Metasthenes, and Philo recount eight: to wit Darius the Mede, Xerxes, Artaxerxes Longimanus, Darius Nothus, Artaxerxes Mnemon, Artaxerxes Ochus, Xerxes, and Darius Codomanus.

Calvisius establishes ten. Pererius however demonstrates so many from holy Scripture, to which adding eight from profane authors he numbers thence fourteen Kings of the Persians, which opinion St. Jerome confirms by his calculation in chapter 7 of Daniel, saying:

But we, since after Cyrus, who reigned 80 years, we know that among the Persians reigned Cambyses his son, and his brother the Magus: and next Darius, in whose 2nd year the Temple of Jerusalem began to be built: fifth Xerxes son of Darius: sixth Artabanus: seventh Artaxerxes, who was called μακρόχειρ: eighth Xerxes: ninth Sogdianus: tenth Darius: eleventh Artaxerxes, who was called μνήμων: twelfth Artaxerxes Ochus: thirteenth Arsaces son of Ochus: fourteenth Darius son of Arsames, who was overcome by Alexander King of the Macedonians.

Although, in settling this controversy, scarcely anything certain can be determined as to how many heads and how many senses there are, I judge it truer to say that there were only four Emperors of the Persians, from the auspicious beginning of their kingdom under Cyrus down to the complete and consummate restoration of the temple and of the city of Jerusalem — namely those who are related in the books of Esdras and Nehemias: first, Cyrus, who reigned seven years, reckoning from the first year of his general and universal empire; for before the Persian kingdom had begun, he reigned in Greece, as we have said. Second, Assuerus, whom Esdras calls Artaxerxes and Assuerus in chapter 4; but Josephus calls him, with all the Greeks, Cambyses, the son of Cyrus, who alone after his father's death reigned seven years and several months, although he had also reigned before with his father, especially at the time when Cyrus undertook the war against the Scythians. Third, Darius Hystaspis, who succeeded the Magi, whose empire and dominion neither Esdras nor Nehemias mention, since perhaps they had reigned only six months; but Darius reigned thirty-six years. And fourth there was Artaxerxes, called Longimanus, whom Josephus, the writer of the history of the Jews, calls only Xerxes, who held the Empire for at least thirty-two years; since the thirty-second year of that kingdom is recalled by Nehemias, chapter 5, verse 14, and chapter 13, verse 6.

A difficulty could be raised whether Assuerus, of whom Esdras makes mention in chapter 4, verse 6, is one and the same as him who is called Artaxerxes by the same author at verse 7; for he says:

But in the reign of Assuerus, in the beginning of his reign, they wrote an accusation against the inhabitants of Juda and Jerusalem; and in the days of Artaxerxes, Beselam, Mithridates, and Thabeel, and the rest who were in their council, wrote to Artaxerxes king of the Persians.

Yet it can easily be gathered that one and the same King was called by this twofold name, as Josephus relates, who names him Cambyses. For if the aforesaid words contained a twofold complaint and accusation against the Jews, of which one had been directed to Assuerus, the other to Artaxerxes, as to two distinct Kings, without doubt Esdras would have narrated the outcome and success of both complaints framed against the Jews; but since he relates the outcome of only one, namely that notwithstanding it, permission was granted to him and to the Jews his companions to set out for Jerusalem and to carry thither all the gifts and vessels which had been offered by the Jews dwelling in the province of Babylon for the ministry of the house of God, it is a sign that there was only one King, called by a twofold name. Add that, if there had been two complaints framed against the Jews, which would have been followed by two edicts from different Kings, it is likely that the last edict from the later of those Kings would have made mention of the former edict; and moreover, the adversaries of the Jewish people would not have kept silent about that edict of Assuerus, so that they might the more easily obtain from Artaxerxes what they demanded against the Jews; and since it is not read that this was done, it must be an indication that by the names Assuerus and Artaxerxes one sole King is designated. Nor ought it seem strange that one and the same King is called by a twofold name in the same chapter; for this was frequent among the Jews, as may be seen in the book of Judges, chapter 8, where one and the same man is called both Gedeon and Jerobaal in two immediately following verses; and in book 1 of Esdras, chapter 2, he who is called Nehemias is also there called Athersatha. Nor indeed can it be denied that King Xerxes, whom all authors, both Greek and Latin, affirm to have succeeded Darius the son of Hystaspes immediately, is another King distinct from Artaxerxes, of whom alone Esdras and Nehemias make mention; but we can assert that therefore Esdras and Nehemias made mention of Artaxerxes alone because Xerxes his father, having taken up arms against the Greeks, had designated Artaxerxes himself as the partner and administrator of the Empire; wherefore certain Authors relate that he himself reigned fifty-six years, although from elsewhere it is established that he alone reigned only forty years; whence it ought to seem wonderful to no one that the Jews, while Xerxes was reigning, had recourse to his son Artaxerxes, since he himself was then King and, in the absence of his father, the supreme moderator of the kingdom.

These things having been set forth beforehand, I judge it more probable that the beginning of those weeks is to be undertaken from the twenty-eighth year of Artaxerxes Longimanus, whom Josephus simply calls Xerxes in book 11, chapter 5, toward the end; but Esdras and Nehemias name Artaxerxes, and make no mention of any Xerxes, whom profane writers relate reigned only twenty years before that Artaxerxes. The truth of this opinion appears first, because the words of the aforesaid Prophecy cannot fit any other assertion. Indeed, the opinion of those cannot stand who will have these weeks to be computed from the first year of Sedecias, namely at that time when Jeremias, sixteen years before the Babylonian captivity, foretold that the whole people would be led away captive and would return into their homeland after seventy years and would repair the overthrown walls; otherwise there would be not only seventy weeks unto the overthrow of the city, but nearly ninety; and not only four hundred ninety-nine years would have to be numbered, but six hundred and more.

Nor do the opinions of others seem more probable, some of whom will have those weeks to be computed from the edict of Cyrus; others from the permission granted to the Jews by Darius Hystaspis to build the walls of Jerusalem; the rest from the twentieth year of Artaxerxes, namely at that time when Nehemias, as we read in chapter 2, obtained the authority to restore the city of Jerusalem, which at that time, as is asserted there, was still laid waste; for we read of three royal edicts in the books of Esdras in favor of and for the grace of the Jews: the first of Cyrus, the second of Darius Hystaspis, the third of Artaxerxes Longimanus. Yet Cyrus did not give the power of restoring the city, but only of rebuilding the Temple, as is gathered from the end of book 2 of Paralipomenon and chapters 1 and 6 of the book of Esdras. Nor does it stand in the way that in chapter 4 of Esdras there is mention made of the rebuilding of the city; for it is not said there that the Jews rebuilt it by the edict of Cyrus. Nor does it stand in the way that Isaiah, chapter 45, has it that Cyrus would build the city and release the captivity; for first it can be answered that this was not said of Cyrus, but of Christ; so Jerome. Second, that there the building of the city signifies not the material structure of the walls, but only the civil building, which comes about through the union and cohabitation of citizens, in such wise that the Jews, when they restored the temple, can be said also, the captivity being dissolved, to have restored and built Jerusalem. Third, supposing that it be understood of the material structure of the walls, the city is said to have been built by Cyrus because perhaps he commanded that it be built; yet nevertheless the beginning of the computation of the weeks cannot be taken from this time, but only from the time of Artaxerxes Longimanus, because then, the surrounding nations hindering it, as though the King had not commanded this, the work was not fulfilled but only attempted; and it was accomplished only by Nehemias. Finally, Scripture attributes the restoration of the city to that one man alone.

Ecclesiasticus 49: Nehemias in memoriam multi temporis, qui erexit nobis muras eversos, et stare fecit portas et seras, qui erexit domos nostras.

Nor can the opinion stand of those who will have those weeks to be begun from the edict of Darius Hystaspis, who, as is related in book 3 of Esdras, chapters 3 and 4, gave letters to Zorobabel for all the dispensers, prefects, and purple-clad nobles, that they should lend him aid, insofar as he himself together with the Israelitic people might be able to restore Jerusalem. First, because that third book of Esdras is not counted among the canonical Scriptures, and therefore full faith is not to be given to it. Second, scarcely can those things stand which are related there, namely that all these things were completed in the same year: to wit, the decree of Darius, by which he granted the power of building the city and the temple; the departure of Zorobabel and of those ascending with him to Jerusalem; the beginning of the building; its impediment by Tathanai and the other leaders who were beyond the river; the return of Zorobabel into Babylonia, that he might implore the protection of the King against those opposing Princes; the inquiry made in the royal library, which was in Babylonia, for the decree of Cyrus, by which he had granted the power of building the temple of Jerusalem; the new decree of the same Darius, which is read in book 1 of Esdras, chapter 6, and by which Darius commanded Tathanai and the other leaders not to impede the restoration of the city of Jerusalem, nay rather to supply from the royal treasury the expenses necessary for the building of the temple and the celebration of the sacrifices; the return of Zorobabel himself with that decree to Jerusalem; and the prophecy of Aggaeus and Zacharias, who, as we read in

  1. Esdras, chapter 5, prophesied against the Jews that, having the power of restoring the Temple of the Lord, they were laboring only at the building of their own private houses. For who would believe that all these things could have been fulfilled within the space of the second year of Darius? Especially since the city of Babylon stood far distant from Jerusalem, as is seen in book 1 of Esdras, chapter 7; for Esdras, returning to Jerusalem with the Israelitic people, set out from Babylon on the first day of the first month, and they arrived at Jerusalem only on the first day of the fifth month. Therefore that Darius from whom Zorobabel obtained the power in the
  2. year of his reign must have been either Cyrus or Cambyses, who perhaps were called not only Artaxerxes and Assuerus, but even Darius.

It is confirmed. Because Zorobabel at the time of that Darius from whom he obtained license to build the city and temple of Jerusalem was a youth and an adolescent, as is related in book 3 of Esdras, chapter 3, verse 4, and chapter 4, verse 51. But while Darius Hystaspis was reigning Zorobabel could not be accounted an adolescent; since already in the first year of Cyrus king of the Persians he was leader and prince among the Israelites, as is seen in book 1 of Esdras, chapter 2, and book 2, chapter 1, and likewise in Aggaeus 2, verse 22. Now Cyrus reigned at least thirty years; Cambyses his son also reigned just as many; after whom for some time the Magi held the empire, to whom Darius Hystaspis succeeded; therefore while he reigned Zorobabel must have been born at least forty-five years earlier, at which certain age he could not be esteemed either a youth or an adolescent. Add that that Darius, whoever he was, did not grant license for building Jerusalem, but only for restoring the temple; since he merely renewed the concession of Cyrus, by which he had granted license to the Jews to build the temple of Jerusalem and to offer sacrifices in it. Wherefore Darius commands Tathanai and the other leaders who were impeding that restoration of the temple: Let that temple be built by the duke of the Jews and by the ancients, that they may build that house of God in its place, as is seen not only in book 1 of Esdras, chapter 6, but book 3, chapter 6, where that edict of Darius is related; but also in chapter 2 of book 2, where we read that while Artaxerxes was reigning, who had succeeded Darius Hystaspis, the city of Jerusalem was still laid waste. For Nehemias, who had obtained from Artaxerxes the power of restoring the walls, addressing the Jews says: You know the affliction in which we are: because Jerusalem is desolate, and her gates are consumed with fire; come, let us build the walls of Jerusalem, etc. And presently, at that time the city of Jerusalem was not yet built up; now the words of the prophecy signify that those seventy weeks are to begin not from the going forth of the word or edict that the temple should be built, but that Jerusalem should be built; therefore those seventy weeks are not to be computed from that edict of Darius Hystaspis.

The same judgment must be passed upon that decree of the same Artaxerxes by which in the seventh year of his reign he granted license to Esdras to ascend to Jerusalem with chosen men from among the sons of Israel, to finish and consecrate the temple, whose restoration had long since been begun; since that decree looked only to the building of the temple, and not truly to the restoration of the city; as is evident from book 1 of Esdras, chapter 7.

From these things, therefore, it follows that those seventy weeks are to be ordered only from the edict of the same Artaxerxes by which in the twentieth year of his empire he granted power to Nehemias, insofar as with the Jews his companions he might ascend to Jerusalem and restore its walls and houses; for this is the first going forth of the word that Jerusalem should again be built, from which going forth the Angel signifies that there still remain seventy weeks even unto Christ the leader.

§ IV.

Nevertheless I do not judge that the beginning of the weeks is to be taken precisely from that twentieth year in which that edict was sanctioned, but only from the second year, in which that edict was committed to execution. For although Nehemiah received that edict in the twentieth year of Artaxerxes, yet, as Josephus narrates in book 11, chapter 5, Nehemiah could not set out for Judaea before the twenty-fifth year of the same King: since he had spent almost these five years from the acceptance of the edict in gathering together the Jews scattered throughout the Babylonian kingdom and dealing with them, and above all with the most familiar princes, so that, according to the King's grant, they might abandon the Babylonian lands and return to their fatherland alone. Which indeed was difficult to persuade of men already so beguiled by the companionship and familiarity of the Babylonians that they could scarcely be torn from their fellowship, and could abandon that most fruitful land in which most of them had been born, so as to inhabit another wholly devastated and uncultivated land, beset with very many adversaries. Hence it came about that Nehemiah, as Josephus relates, arrived at Jerusalem only about the twenty-fifth year of Artaxerxes; whence, since he spent two years in restoring the walls and houses of that city, it follows that he did not complete this immense and great work except about the ninth month of the twenty-eighth year of the same Artaxerxes; which Josephus would not have related so accurately unless he had had testimonies and documents certain and beyond all exception. Now this twenty-eighth year of the reign of Artaxerxes falls in the year of the world 3527., from which if you number 490. you will find 4017., which certainly is the year in which Christ was crucified, and thus immediately the event answers the prophecy most exactly.

But that those weeks are rather to be begun from the execution of that edict than from its grant and promulgation is to me no slight argument: especially since that edict was not granted by the King except by divine inspiration, and therefore ought rather to be judged an edict of God than of a King; and since the decrees of God obtain an infallible effect, according to that of the Psalm: The words that proceed out of my mouth I will not make void: it is manifest that the Angel in that prophecy signified not so much the promulgation of that edict as its execution, when he said, from the going forth of the word: whence also significantly he does not add, that license be given to build Jerusalem, but, that Jerusalem be again built up. By which he signifies that he is speaking of the real and effective restoration of Jerusalem, and from it weaving the whole series and order of his prophecy. But that all the parts of that prophecy accord in a marvelous manner with Jesus of Nazareth I prove thus: 1. That promised Messias is called the Saint of Saints, or in Hebrew the Holiness of Holinesses, or the Sanctified of Saints. Now these things most aptly befit Jesus of Nazareth, both according to his divinity and his humanity, which in hypostatic union is anointed with the oil of joy superabounding in graces and all celestial charisms beyond its fellows. And he is called the Saint of Saints just as being of beings, light of light, life of life: because all holiness flowed forth from him; for to each one of us grace is given according to the measure of the donation of Christ, who is full of grace and truth; of whose fullness we have all received.

You ask perhaps here, how Christ in his death is said to have received the unction of the Saint of Saints, since death seems rather the destruction than the preservation of unction. But this question is easily answered sufficiently: for although Christ before his death, and from the instant of his conception, had received the unction and delibation of the Divinity, as he himself testifies in Luke

  1. adapting to himself that prophecy of Isaiah: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me: nevertheless he had not yet received the fullness, majesty, and manifestation of this unction, as truly happened after he was raised from the dead. For in the resurrection the unction of the Divinity, and the ointment of immortality, descended from the head of that mystical Aaron, and Pontiff of men most high, not only into the beard, but even into the hem of his garment, that is, from the superior portion of his soul, not only into the interior portion of his soul, but also into his body. Whence deservedly the Apostle in Romans 1. commends the resurrection of Christ in these words: Predestinated the Son of God in power according to the spirit of sanctification by the resurrection from the dead. Therefore, since Christ died that our iniquity might be blotted out, as the Angel had foretold: so by the resurrection he was anointed the Saint of Saints; for, as the Apostle says in Romans
  2. He was delivered for our sins, and rose again for our justification.

Secondly, he is that in whom transgression was consummated: for the Jews, filling up the measure of their Fathers, not only sold the just Joseph, not only changed the glory of God into the likeness of the golden calf and other idols, not only finally killed the Prophets, but also killed the very Son of God himself: now this is their fourth sin, which is to be punished not for a time, but unto the end of the world. Thus the Prophet Amos is to be understood, saying in chapter 2.: For three crimes of Israel I will transfer, or convert them, and for four I will not convert them, because they sold the just one for silver. For although the Jews understand the just one sold for silver to be Joseph the son of Jacob, delivered for a price by his brothers to be carried into Egypt: nevertheless Rabbi Samuel in his Epistle to Rabbi Isaac, Master of the Synagogue, which is under Hulmoza in the Moroccan Kingdom, and which was found by Father Bonihomin of the Order of Preachers in the ancient library of Spain, and rendered into Latin from the Arabic idiom, and printed together with the Opuscula of St. Anthony — in which epistle he asks that most wise Rabbi why in that captivity with which they are now oppressed there is no Prophet present, no rite of sacrifice, no hope of recovering liberty, as in prior captivities promise was made through the Prophets: inquiring likewise what that most grievous sin might be on account of which they were oppressed by so hard and so long-lasting a captivity — has this in chapter 1. Christians also, to whom the study of the sacred books seems to have been handed down by God, respond to our aforesaid teaching, that first among the four crimes of Israel Joseph was sold by his brothers: and they assign as the second sin the adoration of the calf in Oreb: and the third was the killing of the Prophets: the fourth crime was the selling of the Just One, namely Jesus. In vengeance of the first our fathers were in the captivity of Egypt. In punishment of the second many perished in the desert, and they dwelt exiles therein for forty years. In vengeance of the third they suffered innumerable and diverse captivities, especially the Babylonian for seventy years. But since the Prophet Amos sets down expressly the selling of the Just One, and no Just One appeared sold except Jesus of Nazareth, it seems to me that we are in that fourth greatest sin, and therefore in that captivity of which God speaks, that he will bring back no more. For already there are a thousand years in which we profit nothing among the Gentiles, nor is there hope of profiting further.

Through him sin came to an end, and all iniquity was blotted out; for he washed us from our sins in his own blood, and offered himself to the Father on the altar of the cross as an immaculate victim, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and become a propitiation for our sins; not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world. Through him everlasting justice was brought in, true indeed and eternal, not legal and figurative, which was to endure not for a time, like the Mosarcae, but always in heaven and on earth; for whoever drinks of the water which Christ came to give shall not thirst again; but it shall become in him a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting. In him finally every vision and prophecy was fulfilled, for he did, said, and suffered all things which the Prophets prophesied concerning the Messias to come. Thence he has three principal effects and fruits to be bestowed through the advent of the Messias: 1. the purging away of sin: 2. the bestowal of true justice: 3. the fulfillment of the Prophecies.

Thirdly, he suffered in the midst of the last week, namely in the eighteenth year of Tiberius.

Fourthly, in the death of the Lord Christ the temple was violated and profaned, when namely the veil of the temple was rent from the top even to the bottom, at least the outer veil, by which the people were separated from the Priests, as if that temple now had nothing in its mysteries, nothing of reverence, nothing of religion. Thence the approach to the Sanctuary was permitted to the high Priest alone, and that only each single year on the day of Expiation, under threat of death should he enter more often, as Philo notes in the book On the Embassy to Caius; much less did it lie open to many Priests, to whom from that time it was permitted to enter into the Holy of Holies, as Josephus Gorionides writes in book 3., chapter 25., but also to the Jews themselves, when in the time of Florus, governor of Syria after Pilate, a sedition having arisen, all the Jews fled together to the temple of God; indeed even in the times of Vespasian himself, when not only his statue was placed in the temple, but also his soldiers entered the temple and despoiled and burned it. Therefore in the death of Christ the lintel of the temple collapsed in a great earthquake, and the voices of the Angels, guardians of the temple, were heard in it saying: Let us depart hence, as St. Jerome observes from the Gospel of the Nazarenes, chapter 9. Although Josephus refers this to the time of Pentecost, fifty days after the death of Christ: yet he may have erred either through uncertain report, or because he was ignorant of the Mysteries of our Religion, or perhaps hostile to the Christians. Therefore there was in the temple abomination, since soldiers stood in it worshipping idols: desolation, since they stripped it of all its vessels and ornaments, and afterwards, fire being applied, reduced it to ashes and cinders, and slew all the Jews either by bloody death, or, driven into exile into diverse provinces, enslaved them in perpetual and harsh captivity: as Christ had prophesied in Luke 21.:

When you shall see Jerusalem encompassed by an army, then know that the desolation thereof is at hand: then those who are in Judaea, let them flee to the mountains; and those who are in the midst thereof, let them depart; and those who are in the countries, let them not enter into it; for these are the days of vengeance, that all things may be fulfilled that are written: and they shall fall by the edge of the sword, and shall be led captive into all nations, and Jerusalem shall be trodden down by the Gentiles, until the times of the Nations be fulfilled.

Third Conclusion. — It can be proved that the Messias has come from many testimonies of Scripture, in which are designated the birth of the Messias, the state of his life, his ministry, the manner of his death, his resurrection, and his reception into heaven; all of which seem to be fulfilled in a marvelous manner in Jesus of Nazareth. Indeed it is foretold that the Messias was to be of the seed of David. Ps. 131.: The Lord hath sworn to David in truth, and he will not make it void: of the fruit of thy womb I will set upon thy throne: which indeed was fulfilled in that adorable Jesus of Nazareth, who, as the Angel foretold while speaking to his Mother, in Luke 1., was the son of David, and the Lord God gave him the throne of David his father, that he might reign in the house of Jacob forever.

Secondly, the Messias is declared to be born of a Virgin, Isai. 7.: Behold a Virgin shall conceive, and bear a Son, etc. But Jesus was born of Mary the Virgin before birth, in birth, and after birth: for in Luke 1.: The Angel Gabriel was sent from God into a city of Galilee, called Nazareth, to a Virgin espoused to a man, etc. Similarly the Messias was to be born in Bethlehem according to that of Micheas 5.: And thou Bethlehem Ephrata art a little one among the thousands of Juda: out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be ruler in Israel, and his going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity. But Jesus was born in Bethlehem, as is read in Luke 2.

Thirdly, the Messias to come was poor and abject, according to that of Zacharias 9.: Behold thy King shall come to thee just, and a savior: he is poor, and riding upon an ass. But Jesus was most poor; for, as he said in Luke 9.: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head: whence Bernard says excellently that he was poor in his nativity, poorer in his life, poorest in his death; likewise he mounted upon an ass in his triumphal entrance into Jerusalem, as is read in Matthew 21.

Fourthly, the Messias was to be delivered unto death for thirty pieces of silver. Zacharias 11.: They weighed my wages thirty pieces of silver. He was to die a most shameful death, Wisdom 2.: With a shameful death let us condemn him. He was to be fastened to a cross and torn with scourges: Psalm 21.: They have dug my hands and feet, and numbered all my bones. His garments were to be divided by lot: in the same place: Upon my vesture they cast lots. His bones and the members of his body were not to be broken, according to that of Exodus 12.: You shall not break a bone thereof.

Fifthly, his Resurrection is foretold. Psalm 56: Arise, O my glory, saith the heavenly Father; to whom the Son answereth: I shall rise at dawn. About to ascend into heaven, Psalm 67: Thou hast ascended on high; thou hast led captivity captive. About to send the Holy Ghost, Joel chapter two: I will pour forth of my Spirit upon all flesh. About to exterminate idols, Zechariah 13: It shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord, that I will destroy the names of them out of the land, and they shall be remembered no more. About to establish another law, Baruch chapter two: And I will establish for them another everlasting testament. About to be rejected by the people of the Jews, Jeremiah chapter five: They have denied the Lord, and said: It is not he. But all these things, as is evident from the Evangelical History, were fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth: therefore he was the true Messias.

To these add what the Angel had foretold while speaking to Daniel, namely that after the Messias should be slain the Jews were to be rejected, the city and the Sanctuary to be destroyed by a coming Prince, the whole Jewish nation to be laid waste, and its desolation to endure unto the end; yet the Jews cannot deny that after Jesus of Nazareth was slain, the City of Jerusalem was laid waste under the Princes Vespasian and Titus, the temple razed to the ground, all sacrifices extinguished, the Jews dispersed throughout the world, groaning under hard captivity: whence Saint Jerome elegantly says in his Epistle to Dardanus, addressing the Jewish nation: How is it that God, once most merciful, who was never before unmindful of thee, is now not moved, through so great spaces of time, to loose thy captivity, and — to speak more truly — to send thee the Anti-Christ whom thou expectest? For what deed, for so execrable a crime, hath He turned away His eyes from thee? Thy blind parents shall cry out: His blood be upon us, and upon our children! And: This is the heir, come, let us kill him, and the inheritance shall be ours: and: We have no king but Caesar. Thou hast him whom thou hast chosen; thou shalt serve Caesar even unto the end of the world; until the fulness of the Gentiles enter in, thou who once wast at the summit art cast down beneath the rest.

You will object that there are many prophecies of the Prophets concerning the future advent of the Messias which cannot possibly fit Jesus of Nazareth: therefore from those which we have brought forward it cannot clearly be gathered that he himself is the true Messias. To prove their antecedent, they bring forward many texts of Scripture. First indeed, that in the time of the Messias, as we read in Isaiah chapter 11: The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; the calf and the lion and the sheep shall abide together, and a little child shall lead them. Likewise Isaiah chapter two: In the last days the mountain of the Lord shall be prepared on the top of mountains: thence they gather that in the time of the Messias the Temple of Jerusalem, and the mountain on which it was founded, were to be raised above all mountains, etc.

But I answer, that the Jews, in bringing forward and expounding these texts, are shamefully deceived and labour under a twofold error: of which the first is that they would have very many things said of the advent of the Messias enigmatically, spiritually, or metaphorically understood literally, such being the texts just cited: their second error is that they distinguish two advents of the Messias: one as Saviour to deliver men, the other as judge to judge them; the former in humility, the latter in majesty and glory. Hence it has come about that in reconciling the oracles concerning the future Messias they labour greatly, yet find no issue: for certain prophecies set him forth overflowing with riches, crowned with glory and honour, holding and governing the sceptre and empire of all nations: but other oracles designate him as one to come poor, abject, lowest of men, despised by all: wherefore the Jews are compelled to distinguish two Messias, of whom one is poor and humble, the other rich and mighty.

Thirdly, how empty these things are, and without foundation, is sufficiently gathered from Holy Scripture, which makes mention of one Messias alone: yet distinguishes in him a twofold advent. This Saint Augustine pursues most elegantly in Tractate 1 upon John, weighing that verse of the Psalm: God shall come manifestly, our God, and shall not keep silence: where he says:

He kept silence, that He might be judged: He will not keep silence when He shall begin to judge. He would not be said to come manifestly, unless He had first come hidden: nor would it be said, He will not keep silence, unless because He first kept silence. But how did He keep silence? Ask Isaiah: He was led as a sheep to the slaughter, and as a lamb before his shearer was without voice: so He opened not His mouth. But He shall come manifest, and will not keep silence: how manifest? A fire shall go before Him, and round about Him a strong tempest.

Add that the obstinacy of the Jews, and their most grave error concerning a twofold Messias, can be most plainly refuted from chapter 53 of Isaiah, where is foretold of the Messias his birth, contempt, persecution, slaying, glorious resurrection, and the conversion of all peoples unto himself, so that it appears that the same Messias is both foretold poor and rich, abject and exalted, subject and Lord of all, as we said above.

We do not treat here of the arguments by which it is proved that the Messias must needs be God and man: for we shall discuss and resolve these in a more fitting order in Disputation the second, demonstrating the dignities and excellencies of the Word Incarnate.

Articulus II: De Unione Hypostatica

§ I: De Unione Hypostatica secundum se spectata

Quaestio I: Quid sit unio hypostatica

Quaestio II: An unio hypostatica facta fuerit in unitate naturae aut personae, idque per veram et proprie dictam compositionem, an per utriusque commixtionem

Quaestio III: Quis sit terminus unionis hypostaticae

Quaestio IV: Utrum unio hypostatica sit immediata, et omnium unionum maxima

§ II: De Persona Assumente

Quaestio I: Qualiter, et per quid Verbum divinum naturam humanam terminaverit et assumpserit

Quaestio II: Utrum subsistentia Dei absoluta et communis tribus personis possit naturam humanam assumere, illique immediate uniri

Quaestio III: Utrum plures personae divinae possent assumere eandem humanitatem, et eadem persona plures humanitates

Quaestio IV: An persona creata possit alienam naturam terminare et assumere

§ III: De Unione Hypostatica ex parte Naturae Assumptae

Quaestio I: An natura tam Angelica, quam irrationalis, sit assumptibilis a persona divina

Quaestio II: An natura accidentis possit assumi a persona divina

Quaestio III: Qualiter, et quo ordine Verbum divinum humanitatem et eius partes assumpserit

Articulus III: De Causis Incarnationis

§ I: De Causa Efficiente Incarnationis

Quaestio I: Quae fuerit vel esse potuerit causa efficiens et instrumentaria Incarnationis

Quaestio II: An aliqua fuerit causa media, seu praeparativa ad Incarnationem per modum effectionis et dispositionis

§ II: De Causa Morali et Meritoria Incarnationis

Quaestio I: An Christus per opera priora vel subsequentia unionem hypostaticam ipsam potuerit promereri

Quaestio II: An et qualiter Beata Virgo meruerit esse Mater Dei

Quaestio III: Utrum Sancti Patres meruerint, aut saltem mereri potuerint de congruo, Incarnationem eiusque circumstantias

§ III: De Causa Finali et Motiva Incarnationis

Quaestio I: Utrum si Adamus non peccasset, Filius Dei non minus esset incarnandus

Quaestio II: Propter quod peccatum expiandum Christus principaliter venerit

Disputatio II: De Christi Domini Entitate, Praecellentiis, et Operationibus

Articulus I: De Christi Domini Divinitate et Humanitate

§ I: De Christi Domini Divinitate

Quaestio I: An revera Christus sit idem unus Deus cum Patre, eandem indivisam cum eo naturam divinam habens

Quaestio II: Utrum Christus in quantum homo sit Filius Dei adoptivus aut naturalis

Quaestio III: Utrum in Christo sint duae filiationes, una aeterna ad Patrem, alia temporalis ad Matrem

Quaestio IV: Utrum Christus Dominus sit et dici possit Dei servus, et aeterno Patri subiectus

§ II: De Humanitate Christi

Quaestio I: An Christus vere integram humanitatem anima rationali et humano corpore constantem habeat

Quaestio II: An Verbum divinum assumpserit hypostatice omnes humani corporis partes, manente vero sanguine et aliis humoribus

Quaestio III: Utrum Verbum assumpserit animae rationalis facultates, nempe intellectum et voluntatem

Quaestio IV: Utrum natura humana in Christo propriam habuerit existentiam et subsistentiam creatam substantialem

§ III: De Modo Loquendi in hoc Mysterio

Quaestio I: Utrum per communicationem idiomatum omnia quae sunt Dei de homine, et vicissim quae sunt hominis de Deo praedicentur

Articulus II: De Praecellentiis Christi Domini

§ I: De Gratia Christi

Quaestio I: Utrum humanitas Christi sanctificetur formaliter per gratiam unionis, an vero requirat aliquod donum ab ipsa unione distinctum

Quaestio II: Utrum in anima Christi fuerit gratia habitualis, et ad quid necessaria

Quaestio III: Qualis fuerit gratia habitualis Christi

Quaestio IV: Utrum gratiae gratis datae fuerint in Christo

§ II: De Virtutibus Animae Christi et Donis Spiritus Sancti

Quaestio I: An Christus habuerit omnes virtutes Theologicas

Quaestio II: An et qualiter virtutes morales fuerint in Christo

Quaestio III: Utrum Christus habuerit omnia dona Spiritus Sancti

§ III: De Scientia ac Sapientia Christi Domini

Quaestio I: Utrum in Christo sit duplex scientia, creata simul et increata

Quaestio II: Utrum et qualiter scientia beatifica fuerit in Christo

Quaestio III: Utrum praeter scientiam beatificam Christus habuerit scientiam infusam, qua res ipsas in propria earum natura cognosceret

Quaestio IV: Utrum praeter scientiam beatam et infusam Christus habuerit etiam scientiam acquisitam

Articulus III: De Defectibus et Passionibus Corporis et Animi a Christo Domino Assumptis

Quaestio I: Utrum in Christo fuerint defectus et passiones humani corporis

Quaestio II: Utrum in Christo fuerit aliqua ignorantia aut aliquis error

Quaestio III: An Christus assumpserit defectus appetitus rationalis

Quaestio IV: An Christus Dominus assumpserit passiones animae seu appetitus rationalis tam secundum portionem superiorem quam inferiorem

Disputatio III: De Dignitate, Ministerio, et Cultu Christi Domini

Articulus I: De Dignitatibus Christi

§ I: De Dignitate Capitis

Quaestio I: An et per quid Christus ut homo constituatur caput omnis Ecclesiae

Quaestio II: An et quomodo Christus sit caput omnium prorsus hominum

Quaestio III: Utrum Christus dici possit caput Angelorum

§ II: De Regia Christi Dignitate et Potestate

Quaestio I: Utrum Christus fuerit Rex spiritualis an temporalis

§ III: De Iudiciaria Christi Dignitate et Potestate

Quaestio I: Utrum et quomodo iudiciaria dignitas Christo tribuatur

Articulus II: De Christi Functionibus et Ministeriis

§ I: De Christo Domino Mediatore

Quaestio I: Utrum et qua ratione Christus censeatur Dei et hominum Mediator

Quaestio II: Quam reconciliationem et pacem nobis conciliaverit et obtinuerit divinus ille Mediator

§ II: De Christo Domino Redemptore et Salvatore

Quaestio I: Utrum Christus Dominus vere fuerit hominum Redemptor

Quaestio II: Utrum necesse fuerit humanum genus per mortem Christi redimi

Quaestio III: An et quando Christus meruerit

Quaestio IV: Per quos actus Christus meruerit

Quaestio V: Quid Christus sibi, Angelis, et hominibus meruerit

Quaestio VI: Utrum et qualiter Christi meritum fuerit infinitum

§ III: De Pontificatu et Sacerdotio Christi

Quaestio I: Utrum et secundum quam naturam Christus Dominus vere et proprie fuerit Sacerdos

Quaestio II: Quale fuerit Christi Domini sacrificium, et qua ratione nunc Pontificis vices impleat

Articulus III: De Cultu et Veneratione Christi Domini, Eiusque Sanctissimae Genitricis ac Sanctorum, Eorumque Reliquiarum et Imaginum

§ I: De Cultu Latriae Christo Domino debito

Quaestio I: Utrum et qualiter una adoratione sit adoranda divinitas Christi et eius humanitas

Quaestio II: Utrum et quo cultu Crux Christi Domini sit colenda

§ II: De Cultu Sanctorum Eorumque Imaginum et Reliquiarum

Quaestio I: An et quis cultus sacris imaginibus sit debitus

Quaestio II: Utrum et quo cultu Sanctorum reliquiae sint adorandae

Quaestio III: Utrum Sancti sint invocandi

§ III: De Eximia Deiparae Virginis Dignitate ac Veneratione

Quaestio I: Utrum Virgo Deipara ab omni originalis peccati contagione et macula immunis fuerit, eiusque Conceptio dicenda sit omnino immaculata

Quaestio II: Utrum B. Virgo immunis fuerit ab omni peccato actuali

Quaestio III: Utrum beata Virgo vere et proprie dicenda sit Mater Christi

Quaestio IV: Utrum B. Maria Deipara semper Virgo steterit ante partum, in partu, et post partum

Quaestio V: Utrum B. Virgo non solum in anima sed in corpore evecta fuerit in caelum

Quaestio VI: De cultu et invocatione Deiparae Virginis

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