Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

It is certain that any one of the divine persons can assume human nature, whether propagated from Adam, or formed from elsewhere; since if another person than the Son were to assume human nature from the Virgin, it would not follow, in point of fact, that there would be a diminution of equality among the divine persons, nor a confusion of persons: for there is no confusion in the fact that one person bears several appellations mutually opposed; or that he who is Father should also be Son; since we now believe that one and the same person is temporal and eternal, immortal and dead, immense and circumscribed. Nor indeed is there any diminution of equality, seeing that the divine Word, when he took flesh, although he is less than the Father according to his humanity, is nevertheless equal to the Father according to his divinity, for in assuming what is human he did not lose what is divine. Hence the present question does not concern possibility, but only fittingness; namely, whether it would have been more congruent that the Son, rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit, become incarnate.

Note 2. That although the Incarnation, insofar as it is an effect ad extra, is the work of the whole Trinity: nevertheless it is certain that it is attributed peculiarly to one divine person alone. Because, as St. Bonaventure says in 3 dist. 1 q. 2:

a creature can be compared to the Creator in two ways; just as the Creator can be compared to the creature. For a creature can be compared to the Creator either according to its reception of some perfection, or according to the relation of a habit of dependence. The first comparison necessarily regards three persons indistinctly and indivisely; since in them there is one and indivisely the same essential perfection. But the second comparison can be made with respect to some determinate and distinct person, without regarding another, because the divine persons are distinguished among themselves by relations, and really. Similarly God can be compared to a creature in two ways: namely, in the character of a causative principle, and in the character of the supposit subsistifying it. According to the first comparison the three persons agree together and communicate with one another, because in them there is one nature, and one productive power of creatures: but according to the other comparison a creature can have a distinct relation to one divine person alone; because although one person agrees with another in nature and power, it is nevertheless distinguished from that other in supposit and personal property.

Since therefore in the union of natures, or incarnation, the divine person is the supposit, or hypostasis, of the human nature; so that union, or incarnation, signifies not merely a habitude of God to the creature by way of cause, but also by way of supposit; hence it comes about that, from the comparison of God to creatures, one person can be united to human nature without another being similarly united. On the part of the creature the same holds; since since the creature signifies a comparison to God, not only with respect to the reception of its complement, but also with respect to the habitude of relation; hence it follows that the Incarnation can belong to one person without belonging to another.

Note 3. That although the divine persons agree among themselves so indivisibly in the unity of essence as to be one God; nevertheless certain things are proper to them peculiarly, either according to their own properties, or according to appropriated attributes. According to their own properties, paternity is attributed to the first person, filiation to the second, and passive spiration to the third. But according to appropriated attributes, power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness and love to the Holy Spirit. For this reason a triple operation is likewise attributed peculiarly to these divine persons, namely creation to the Father, re-creation to the Son, glorification and justification to the Holy Spirit; because creation is the work of power; re-creation, or restoration, the work of wisdom; and justification and glorification the work of divine goodness. Now those three divine excellencies shone forth in a wondrous manner in the Incarnation of the Word. Power indeed, for, as St. Damascene says, book 3, chapter 1, God being made perfect man is perfected, which is the greatest of all modes: which alone knows itself through that alone by which the infinite power of God is shown forth: for what is greater than that God should become man? Goodness likewise shines forth in a wondrous manner in this, that God did not despise man, miserable and condemned by his own fault, but his divine bowels of Mercy were moved over his infirmities, that he might deliver him from them. Finally wisdom, on account of that manifold reason assigned in Question 1 of this Section. But it is asked whether it was more fitting that the Incarnation be reckoned the work of infinite wisdom rather than of goodness or of power: or, which amounts to the same thing, whether it was more expedient that the Incarnation be wrought by the Son rather than by the Father or the Holy Spirit.

Single Conclusion. — Truly it was more fitting that the Son become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Spirit.

The Seraphic Doctor praised above proves this conclusion in question 3, in almost the following way: the Incarnation can be considered either in itself, or inasmuch as it is ordered to the redemption of the human race: but under both considerations it was more congruent that the person of the Son become incarnate than the others.

First indeed, if the Incarnation be considered in itself, and with respect to the person who becomes incarnate, this is openly evident: because the second person can be considered either inasmuch as he is Son, or inasmuch as he is Image, or inasmuch as he is Word: and by this threefold reason it was more expedient that he himself become incarnate. — First indeed, inasmuch as he is Image; since the image of God, worn away by sin in man, had to be restored: therefore that natural image and likeness of God had to be applied, after whose likeness man, formed, could be restored, and emulate and reproduce the lineaments of the first divine perfection. — Secondly, inasmuch as he is Word, because as the Word of the Father he proceeds from the Father, that the Father may manifest himself through him; and therefore just as for the manifestation of thought our intellectual word is joined to sensible voice, so for the revelation of divinity it was congruent that the Word of the Father take flesh: wherefore St. Paul says to the Hebrews 1: God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days has spoken to us by his Son. — Lastly, because he is Son, it was fitting that he assume flesh, that he might be of the race of men, and thus the Son of man: for, as St. Anselm says, in book 2 of Cur Deus homo, chapter 9, if any other person were incarnate,

there would be two in the Sacred Trinity, namely the Son of God, who is Son even before the Incarnation, and he who through the Incarnation would be the Son of the Virgin, and thus there would be in persons, which must always remain equal, an inequality according to the dignity of natures: for he born of God would have a more noble nature than he born of the Virgin.

This same reason Saint Augustine also proves in book De Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, chapter 2, saying:

Not the Father assumed flesh, nor the Holy Spirit, but the Son alone, so that he who was in the divinity the Son of God might become in man the Son of man, lest the name of Son pass to another who would not be Son by eternal generation. The Son of God therefore was made the Son of man, born according to the divinity of nature from God the Son of God, and according to the truth of nature from man the Son of man; and the truth of the begotten one not by adoption, not by appellation, but in both births he should have the name of Son by being born, so that he might be true God and true man, one Son.

The second argument, suggesting this same truth, is drawn from the very comparison of the Incarnation with the Redemption of the human race. For on this account it was more fitting that the Son become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Spirit, whether we consider the fall of man, the manner of repairing him, or the fruit of that reparation.

First, I say, if we consider the fall of man, this appears: for man fell by desiring the likeness and equality of God, which in divine things is attributed especially to the Son: hence he himself was as it were the occasion of man's fall; and therefore man ought to take his reparation from that whence he had taken the occasion of his fall. This reason Saint Bernard weighs out no less elegantly than piously, Sermon 1 De Adventu, in these words, wherein he introduces the Son speaking thus:

Behold, on my occasion the Father loses his creatures. My height the first Angel coveted, and he had a people that believed him: but straightway the zeal of the Father avenged himself upon him, striking him together with all his followers with a plague past cure, with cruel chastisement. Knowledge also, which nevertheless is mine, man wished to steal: and neither did his eye pity him nor spare: he had made only two noble creatures partakers of reason, capable of beatitude: namely, the Angel and man: but behold, because of me he lost many Angels, and all men. Therefore, that they may know that I also love the Father, let him receive through me those whom he seems in a certain way to have lost: if because of me this tempest has arisen, take me, and cast me into the sea: all envy me, behold I come, and show myself to them of such a kind, that whoever strives to imitate me, there may be wrought in him a change into good.

To these things add, that since men sinned specially against the Son, it belonged to him to pardon and remit the sin against whom the offense had been committed. This reason Saint Anselm brings forward in the place just praised. Quasi specialius, he says, adversus personam Filii peccaverant, qui vera Patris similitudo creditur: illi itaque cui specialius fit iniuria, convenientius attribuitur culpae vindicta, cui indulgentia.

Second, if we consider the manner of reparation, that befitted the Son more than the other persons: for we are repaired through the obedience and supplication of the Mediator: now the role of Mediator befitted the Son rather than the other persons; for it was becoming that he who is middle among the divine persons should also set himself forth as a mediator between God and man, so that he might exist as the mediator of God and of men. Likewise it befitted the Son more to supplicate the Father and to obey: For, says Saint Anselm in the same place, Convenientius erat Filium supplicare Patri, quam aliam personam. — Lastly, if we consider the fruit or effect of reparation, it was more congruous that the Son become incarnate; because the Incarnation is ordered to this, that we be sons of God: but it was fitting that we attain the dignity of sons through him who is the natural Son. Hence Saint Augustine lib. 8. De Trinitate, chapter 9: Ut homo ex Deo nasceretur, primo ex ipsis natus est Deus: for it was necessary that through him we be made adopted sons, who is the natural Son.

You will say 1. To recreate and repair man belongs to him to whom it belongs to create and form him: but creation is attributed especially to and befits the power of the Father: therefore also to him should be attributed the restoration and reparation of man through the Incarnation. —

I answer. The Incarnation can be regarded either effectively or formally: in the first way it equally befits the three adorable persons; not so in the second way. —

I distinguish the major: to repair belongs to him to whom it belongs to form effectively; I concede; formally, I deny. Effectively, I say, the Incarnation is attributed especially to the Father, who so loved the world as to give his only-begotten Son; and he spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all: formally, however, it is attributed uniquely to the Son, since the personality of the Word alone terminates the dependence of human nature, and by formally affecting it makes it subsistent and personated.

You will say 2. To him belongs the adopting of sons into whom belongs the begetting of sons: but to the Father alone belongs to beget: therefore to him alone belongs to adopt men into sons through the Incarnation. —

I distinguish the major: authoritatively, and principally, I concede: sub-authoritatively and according to mission, I deny. Therefore there belongs to the Father the authority of adopting principally, because, as the Apostle says to the Galatians 1, God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, that he might redeem them who were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons.

You will say 3. It is more fitting for the Father to have something which the Son has not, than for the Son to have something which the Father has not, because what the Son has, he has from the Father: but through the Incarnation one person has something which the other has not: therefore it is more expedient that the Father, rather than the Son, become incarnate. —

I distinguish the major: it is more fitting for the Father to have something which the Son has not, according to eternal origin, I concede: according to hypostatic union, I deny. Indeed the Father ought to have, according to eternal origin, something which the Son has not, because the Father has the generative power of the Son, but in turn the Son has not the generative power of the Father. But it is otherwise concerning hypostatic union, for since through it one person is subjected to another, it is more fitting that the Son have that by which he can be subjected to the Father, than that by which the Father would be deemed inferior to the Son; and forthwith it is more expedient that the Son have the human nature by which he is less than the Father, than that the Father by reason of it would be subjected to the Son.

You will say 4. The Incarnation most accords with him to whom it belongs to confer upon man the highest grace, for that is the highest of all graces: but the bestowal of the highest grace belongs especially to the Holy Spirit: therefore the Incarnation must also be attributed to him more fittingly. —

I distinguish the major: to whom the bestowal of the highest grace is attributed, whether effectively, or formally, I concede: effectively only, I deny. Indeed the Incarnation is appropriated effectively to the Holy Spirit, because the supreme work of the love and goodness of God toward men, such as is the Incarnation, is appropriated especially to that person which is called the love and goodness of God: formally, however, it belongs to the Word alone, inasmuch as only the Word by his own personality made human nature subsistent.