Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

From our Alensis, part 3, question 1, member 6: that the similitude of man to God appears far greater and more manifold than that of the Angel. For in the soul of man there shines forth the image of God in nature, in person, and in power. In nature indeed, as St. Augustine says in sermon 21, which is on the Image, just as God is everywhere whole, vivifying, moving, and governing all things: so the soul is everywhere whole in its body, animating, moving, and governing it: which does not befit an Angel, because he is not a substance ordered to the vivifying of a body. Moreover, in man there is a similitude according to the reason of person, because man proceeds from man, as one Person in the divinity proceeds from another: but one Angel does not proceed from another. Finally, there is a similitude in power, because in man there is a power responding wholly to the exemplar: for since in the divine exemplar there exists eminently the reason both of corporeal and of spiritual being, the soul attains to both these reasons, inasmuch as it is ordered to spiritual and corporeal actions; which an Angel cannot have, for since he is simply spiritual, he is not ordered by his nature to corporeal actions: from which it appears that man has a greater affinity with God than the Angel.

Note 2. Truly the Angelic nature, and the human, would have seemed unworthy to be united to the divinity, especially had the fallen Angels been considered. For the Angels no less, indeed more gravely, provoked the divine attention and vengeance than men did: since the prevaricating Angel no less than man aspired to the divinity: the former indeed by emulating the supreme majesty and power of God, according to that of Isaiah 14, I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God, I will sit in the mountain of the testament, etc. The latter, however, pursued the divine wisdom promised him by the serpent, Genesis 3. Whence it was the supreme mercy of God, and that pure mercy, that He undertook to redeem men rather than Angels: yet since the divine wisdom undertakes nothing without reason, hence we inquire what those reasons may be, which stood forth as so many incentives of the divine love toward men, such that He relieved us rather than the Angels from eternal misery.

Note 3. That God could have become man in various ways: namely, either by creating for Himself body and soul, and assuming each independently from any commerce with any creature, nor deriving His origin and birth from a Mother: or if He had wished to have a Mother on earth, as He had a Father in the heavens, He could have formed her outside the line and propagation of Adam: so that she, formed by His alone extraordinary power, and not begotten of men, would not be reckoned among the posterity of Adam, nor would she in any way pertain to his progeny. Whether, however, either of these modes would have been more fitting than that by which in fact the Divine Word assumed flesh, must be determined in the present Question, to be resolved by two Conclusions: whereof the First will show that it was more fitting for God to assume and repair the human nature than the Angelic. Second, that it was more expedient to assume a nature propagated from Adam than one formed from elsewhere.

First Conclusion. — It was more fitting to assume and repair the human nature than the Angelic.

That this indeed is abundantly proved by the very operation of God, since His divine wisdom weighs and works all things in weight, number, and measure. Nowhere did He apprehend Angels, but He apprehended the seed of Abraham, says St. Paul to the Hebrews 2.

Moreover the reason of this greater fittingness can be sought, partly on the side of the very constitution of human nature itself, partly on the side of its greater capacity for reparation. On the side indeed of its constitution, and this for a threefold cause, which the Seraphic Doctor assigns and examines in Book 2, dist. 2, qu. 2; whereof the first is sought from the reason of origin and propagation of one man from another: for since one man takes his origin from another, which does not befit an Angel, it was the more becoming that the Person of the Son, who is distinguished from the Person of the Father according to origin, should receive that nature in which the property of filiation resides. And this indeed was done in the assumption of human nature: for He Himself, who was eternally the Son of the Father, in time was made the Son of the Virgin Mother. The second reason is, on account of the greater similitude of man with God by reason of the rational soul itself, which, as we said in the first Notable, emulates, as it were, the immensity of God, being whole undivided in its whole body, as God is whole in each single part of the world. Hence, says the Seraphic Doctor, the rational soul represents God not only as He is considered in Himself, but inasmuch as it is united to the body, which it rules, and in which it inhabits, as God fills heaven and earth. Thirdly finally, the reason of greater congruity is sought from the manifold composition of man; for since man is composed of corporeal and spiritual nature, and in a certain manner is every creature: for he has being with the elements and inanimate things, life with plants, sense with animals, understanding with Angels: hence it is, that when human nature is assumed and deified, in a certain manner every nature is exalted in it, while in a part like to itself it is hypostatically united to the deity: whence the assumption of human nature would contribute far better to the perfection of the universe than the Angelic could have contributed, if it had been assumed.

That greater fittingness also appears on the side of reparation, and this for three causes: First indeed, because human nature stood more in need of reparation: Second, because it was less unworthy thereof: Third, because reparation would have profited men more than the prevaricating Angels.

Human nature indeed stood more in need of reparation than the Angelic, for Alensis says, qu. 1, memb. 2, that in the first man was the whole human nature; therefore, by his sinning and perishing, at once all his progeny perished: but it is otherwise concerning the fallen Angels, since none of them comprised the whole Angelic nature, but their sins were personal; nor on account of the fallen prevaricating Angels did the whole Angelic nature perish; since very many remained faithful and obedient to God; and therefore there was not so much need for them of remedy and reparation: otherwise with humanity, which through the sin of one man had been corrupted and lost in all; moreover it did not befit the divine mercy, and the supreme goodness of God, to consign the rational nature most akin and similar to Himself to eternal ruin and perpetual damnation. For that was unworthy of the goodness of God, that things created by Him should pass away into destruction on account of the fraud of the devil against men, says St. Athanasius, in the book De Incarnatione Verbi Dei.

Second, man was less unworthy of the divine mercy; since human sin was not so grave as Angelic sin, whether you consider the genus of the sin, or the circumstance, or the occasion. Considering indeed the genus of the sin: for although man and Angel sinned through pride; yet far disparate is the guilt of each, since, says Alensis, man sinned by coveting all the knowledge of God, but the Angel His omnipotence: now God in no wise wills to communicate His omnipotence to any creature in any state whatever, because by reason of that omnipotence He is the principle of all creatures, which pre-eminence He wills to be common to none; but knowledge He wills to communicate to a creature in the state of glory, for He demonstrates Himself, and all things that are in Him, to the blessed minds, upon whom He bestows the light of all His knowledge. Since therefore it is supreme inordinateness to covet that to which no creature is ordained: hence it is that the Angel sinned more gravely by coveting omnipotence, than man by emulating knowledge, to which he was ordained.

Graver also was the sin of the Angel than of man by reason of circumstance, since man sinned by reason of some nescience: for he deemed the divine threat made to him to be intended rather for trial than for punishment: but the Angel sinned from certain knowledge, and therefore from malice; and thus his sin was against the Holy Spirit, and consequently irremissible. Finally also less was the sin of man than of the Angel by reason of occasion, for man did not sin by his own propensity and determination to evil, but instigated and importuned by his wife, who, deceived by the serpent, led her husband into deception. It was just therefore that he who had fallen through another should also be raised up through another, since he could not rise by himself: but it was otherwise concerning the Angel, who had fallen not by the cunning of another, but by his own malice. Finally less profitable would redemption have been for the lost Angels than for men, since the Angels, once fallen, possess a will hardened in evil, nor are they further capable of doing penance. Add to these, that the ruin of the Angels could have been repaired by men, namely by promoting them to the seats of the fallen Angels, as St. Anselm excellently demonstrates in book 1, Cur Deus homo, chapters 16 and 17; but the fall of men could not fittingly have been supplied by substituting another nature in place of the human: since no creature inferior to man appears capable of the divine glory.

All these reasons St. Bernard passes over luminously and divinely in the first sermon on Advent, in these words:

Let it be known that the higher Angels passed over into an affection of malice and wickedness, nor did they sin from any ignorance or infirmity; wherefore it is necessary that those unwilling to be punished perish: for the love of the Father and the honor of the king loves judgment. On this account He also created men from the beginning, who might fill up that place and restore its ruins. It is written to me that no redemption lies open to the Angels: namely, the pride of the Devil dies, which pride is the root of pride, and the pride of the Devil admits no remedy of penance, and therefore is not redeemed; nevertheless He afterward created no creature from his light: hinting by this very fact that man was yet to be redeemed, since he had been tripped up by another's malice, so that another's charity might profit him. Thus, Lord, I beseech Thee, may it please Thee to care for me, because I am weak: because out of my land I was secretly taken away and not without guilt was cast into the pit: not wholly guiltless indeed, but as regards him who seduced me, in some measure guiltless.

You will say 1. That nature appears more unible with God which has a greater affinity with Him: but the Angelic nature has a greater and more intimate affinity with God than the human: therefore etc. The major is evident, for things to be united must have a certain proportion to one another. Likewise the minor, because, says St. Isidore in the books De Trinitate, the more subtle a nature is, the more fully does it stand forth in expression toward a likeness of the divine unity: but the Angelic nature is subtler than the human, being devoid of all commerce and society with body: therefore it approaches more closely to the likeness of the divine nature than the human does: and consequently is more unible with it.

I distinguish the major: that they have a greater affinity with the divine nature under that aspect by which it is unible with itself, I concede: otherwise I deny: but the human nature has a greater likeness and proportion with the divine nature under the aspect by which it is unible with it than the Angelic nature; because the notion of person, through which God is unible to man, is more expressed by man, who draws origin from another, than by an Angel, who does not proceed from another Angel in such a way: therefore although the Angel, by reason of his simplicity, expresses the divine essence more fully under the aspect of essence, because he is wholly spiritual; yet he does not so perfectly express the divine persons and the mode of procession, whereby one draws origin from another, as men do; and hence he does not have a greater, but rather a lesser affinity with the divine nature, under that aspect by which God is unible with a creature.

You will say 2. That nature must be said to be more unible with God which on account of its excellence is worthier and more apt to be raised up and exalted: but the Angelic nature, since it is far more excellent than the human, is also worthier and more apt to be raised up through incarnation: therefore it was more fitting that it be assumed than the human. — The Seraphic Doctor answers dist. 2 q. 2 ad 2, that although the Angel is higher in nature than man; yet it befitted man rather than the Angel to be exalted through the grace of union, both for the confutation of the pride of Lucifer, who wished to make himself equal to God, and for the commending of the grace of God, that it may appear that elevation in glory comes not from nature, but rather from divine grace: wherefore the Savior, associating to Himself, chose the poor and lowly rather than the rich and powerful, that He might break the pride of men, and that no creature might glory in His sight.

You will say 3. The major appears from mercy, where misery is greater: but far greater is the misery of the lost Angels, since their sin was graver than that of men: therefore it beseemed the divine mercy more to redeem them than men.

I deny the minor: for far greater was the misery of lost men than of Angels, seeing that not all the Angels fell, as men did, nor did the whole Angelic nature perish, as did the human; wherefore it was more fitting that men be repaired than Angels. Add to this, that the lost Angels were less worthy of mercy on account of their pride and hardened malice: for since they are universally obstinate in malice, says the Seraphic Doctor ad 1., they would not be inflamed toward humility, nor would they be kindled to charity by the exhibition of so great a benefit and example; for we see this today in many sinners, for whom on account of their habitual perversity the Passion of Christ the Lord profits but little.

You will say 4. From him should redemption congruously have begun, from whom the transgression took its beginning: but this has its origin from an Angel, who was the author of the whole transgression: therefore reparation ought likewise to have been begun from him. — The Seraphic Doctor answers, that

The transgression of the human race took its beginning from the devil, and from man, but with this difference, that it proceeded from man as from the principal author, but from the devil as suggester and instigator: since however Christ is the author of our redemption, it was more fitting that He inaugurate it from the author of the transgression, inasmuch as restoration directly corresponds to perdition: and as in the first Adam the consummation of our transgression was made, so through the second Adam the perfection of our redemption would be wrought.

You will say finally. The sin of man was as mortal as that of the Angel: but mortal sin is irremediable: for it is called mortal for this reason, that it brings eternal death and devours one guilty unto perpetual damnation: therefore both man and Angel were unworthy of and incapable of redemption; and hence it was not more fitting that man be repaired than the Angel. — Alensis answers q. 1 memb. 2. To the first argument,

that irremediable is said in three ways, as also invisible: namely, negatively, privatively, contrarily. Irremediable negatively is that which can in no way be remitted: irremediable privatively is that which has nothing worthy whereby it ought to be remitted: irremediable contrarily is that which has a contrary disposition to remission, without which it can in no way be remitted. In the first way the sin of the Angel is called irremediable, and the sin of the damned: in the second way sins against the Holy Spirit are called irremissible, namely despair, presumption, etc., because they are under dispositions contrary to remission. In the third way every mortal sin is said to be irremissible, because no mortal sin has anything whereby it is worthy of remission. By this last reason the sin of man was irremissible, but not by the two first ways, and hence there is not the same reason concerning the reparation of man as of the Angel.

Second Conclusion. — It was fitting that the human nature be assumed sprung from the stock of Adam, rather than formed elsewhere. This Conclusion follows from what precedes, and St. Anselm proves it in the second book of Cur Deus homo, chapter eight, by a threefold argument:

First, it is just that he who makes satisfaction be either the same one who sinned, or someone from his origin: otherwise he who offended would not devote satisfaction: but it was just that satisfaction be made to God for the fault of man: therefore equally it is just that the man making satisfaction either be Adam, who offended, or someone from his offspring.

Second, if Adam had not sinned, the whole human race would have stood of itself in innocence, without the help and sustenance of another creature: therefore if it must rise again, it is more fitting that it rise through the help and aid of someone who is of the same genus: but if the man assumed were formed from elsewhere than the offspring of Adam, he would not be of the same state with the human race: therefore the human race would not rise through the help of one of its own genus.

Finally, when God first formed human nature, He produced only Adam, and from him drew forth the woman; by which He signified that He willed all men to be propagated from him as from one principle: wherefore Adam was the head and prince of all men before sin: therefore if that dignity must be repaired by the Incarnation of the Word, it was necessary that it be repaired either by Adam himself assumed, or by another man formed from his offspring: but Adam could not be assumed, because the properties of the man assumed are attributed to the divine person assuming: and consequently just as it would be true to say of Adam that he sinned, so also it would be true to say of the divine person that he had sinned: but this absolutely conflicts with the divine holiness: therefore it also conflicts that Adam himself be assumed by the Word: hence it is necessary that another man be assumed, who although he be from the offspring of Adam, nevertheless has had no sin.

You will say 1. It was fitting that the man who had to make satisfaction for the guilt of all should be most estranged from all sin: but such a one would not be, if he were from the offspring of Adam: therefore it was more fitting that the man making satisfaction be formed from elsewhere than from the stock of Adam. Proof of the minor: he who has no similarity of sinful flesh, nor any commerce with sinners, is more estranged from sin than he who is marked with those characters: but such would be the man formed from elsewhere than the blood of Adam; and such a one would not be he who was propagated from him: therefore it was more expedient that the man be created anew, to be assumed, than that he be propagated from Adam.

I distinguish the minor, and its proof: if that similarity of sinful flesh be by reason of guilt, I concede: if only by reason of the punishment due, I deny: but in the man assumed by the Word, that is, in Christ, there is no similarity of sinful flesh by reason of guilt; but only by reason of punishment, because the divine Word assumed a mortal body, that by His most bitter passion, and the frequent straits of His whole laborious life, He might expiate and discharge the punishment due to our sins.

You will say 2. It was more fitting that he who contracted the debt should pay it: but Adam himself contracted the debt of sin: therefore it was fitting that he himself pay it, and accordingly that his individual be assumed by the divine Word. —

I distinguish the major: if he can pay that debt of himself alone, or by the benefit and help of him with whom he has no absolute incompossibility, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But Adam could neither pay the debt of himself, nor by the help of any divine person with whom he might be united: because he was of limited entity and operation, and consequently could not exactly make satisfaction for the debt, which held the sum of indignity by reason of the Divinity offended. Nor indeed could he be joined with God in the unity of person, because since he was a sinner, it would follow also that the divine Person could be called sinful, which is altogether absurd: therefore this could neither be done nor ought to have been done.

You ask. Whether it was more fitting for Christ to be born of a Virgin than of a man and a woman. — I affirm: both because it was seemly that he who has the Father a Virgin in heaven should also have a Virgin Mother on earth: and because, says St. Anselm above:

In four ways can God make a man, namely, either of a man and of a woman, as constant usage shows; or neither of a man nor of a woman, as He created Adam: or of a man without a woman, as He created Eve: or of a woman without a man, in which way He may assume that man whom we seek.

Finally, because this more commended and illustrated the purity and integrity of the Incarnate Word.