Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

From the Subtili Doctore in 1. dist. 2. qu. 1. n. 10. a twofold possibility can be distinguished: namely, the logical and the physical. The logical possibility, he says, is the mode of a composition formed by the intellect, whose terms do not include a contradiction; and in this way the proposition, that God can be produced, and that God is God, is possible in this manner. Real, or physical, possibility however is that which is taken from some potency in a thing, as from a potency inherent in something, or terminated to it as to its term. That is, that is called physically possible which can be the real term of some productive potency, just as before creation the world was possible; and innumerable creatures are still said to be possible, which God by His infinite power could produce, yet which by the counsel of His wisdom He never produces. Of both possibilities there will be question here: for we undertake to determine whether that proposition, God is man, involves any contradiction, or whether the union of Divinity with humanity does not exceed the supreme power of God.

NOTANDUM 2. It is certain that no medium is given between these two, being possible and being impossible; for no medium is given between involving a contradiction, which is impossible, and not involving a contradiction, which is possible; yet a medium is admitted between these two: demonstrating that something is possible, and demonstrating that something is impossible; for many things are possible, concerning which nevertheless no positive natural medium is given by which their possibility is demonstrated; but these, because they are possible, cannot be demonstratively proved to be impossible, for truth is not opposed to truth, but to falsehood alone: wherefore if it be true that something is possible, it is false that it be impossible: but an argument which concludes a falsehood can in no wise be demonstrative.

NOTANDUM 3. For God to become incarnate is not for God to be transmuted into flesh, but for God remaining God to become man in the unity of supposit; so that the Divine person not only terminates and supposits the Divine nature, but also the human; wherefore as Peter is said to be man, because his person sustains and persons the human nature, so God is said to be man, because the Divine person of the Word sustains and terminates the human nature. From this termination moreover there follows in God an intrinsic denomination, whereby He is said to be intrinsically united to man: for this denomination suffices that the human nature be substantially and intimately united to the Divine person. Yet it is not on this account an intrinsic denomination, as though the human nature informed God, who is said to be man: hence that denomination, God is man, approaches in some way to extrinsic denomination, and also recedes from it. It approaches indeed, because the human nature does not inform God, who is said to be man, while nevertheless other intrinsic denominations are drawn from an informing form. It recedes truly, because other extrinsic denominations are either from forms accidentally united, or from terms existing outside the subject denominated: but this denomination is taken from a human nature personally and substantially united to the Word, which terminates its personal dependence.

These things thus premised, two things especially must be determined in this Question: First indeed whether that personal union of the divine nature with the human is possible. Second, whether all the reasons can be solved which seem to assail that possibility.

Conclusio prima. — It is made possible for the human nature to be united to the Divine Word in the unity of supposit.

Proof first: From act to potency is a legitimate consequence: but that union has in fact been accomplished; therefore it is possible to come about. The major stands, for what truly is has no repugnance to existing. The minor is of faith, and stands with all those moments by which we shall prove in the third following Section against the Jews that the Messiah has come, and that the Mystery of the Incarnation has been accomplished.

The Doctor proves secondly in 3. dist. 1. q. 1. n. 4: That is possible which presents no repugnance: but in no wise does it conflict for a nature to be united to the Word in the unity of supposit: therefore it can be done. He proves the Minor: if any repugnance existed, it would be sought either from the side of the Word assuming, or from the side of the nature assumed: but from neither head can a repugnance be deduced. Not indeed from the side of the Word assuming: for it would conflict either because the person is divine, or because the person of the Word is peculiar. Not the first, because, says the Doctor, to terminate the dependence of the human nature infers nothing repugnant to the divine person; since it does not import composition, to which act and potency are required; seeing that the divine person is not an informing act, but only the term terminating the dependence of the human nature. Nor does it equally enter into any potentiality, limitation, or dependence, because for that termination or union nothing is required per se except that the terminator be independent of that which it terminates: but the Word is independent of the human nature which He terminates, as God, although He terminates the dependence of creatures upon Himself, He is not held to depend upon them in any wise.

Nor does it conflict because the person of the Word is peculiar; for if from this head any repugnance would arise, most of all because there could not be given a union to one person unless necessarily there were given union to the rest — for no other reason can be assigned: yet it is not so. For although that which convenes with the divine nature is likewise common indivisibly to each of the three persons; nevertheless that which convenes with one personalization ought not to be common to all: for it convenes with paternity to constitute the Father; but this same does not convene with filiation, nor with passive spiration: therefore there can convene with one of the divine persons the ratio of terminatively uniting the human nature hypostatically without this same convening with the others. But the reason, says the Doctor, wherefore each divine person can terminate the dependence of an alien nature is, because each divine personality is in itself and of itself formally independent: but anything independent in some genus can terminate another which has dependence in such genus: therefore a divine person independent in itself and of itself can sufficiently terminate such a dependence of the created nature.

Finally, that hypostatic union does not conflict from the side of the nature assumed: for if it conflicted, most of all because the singularity of some person could not be separated from that same personality, and consequently since no nature can be assumed unless existing, and consequently unless singular, because existence belongs to singulars, therefore neither could it be assumed unless personated; which since it conflicts, it would also conflict for a singular nature to be assumed: but this reason is null, for it has been sufficiently proved in the Metaphysics that personality is really distinct from singularity and separable, nor does it conflict that some substance be singular and yet further communicable; therefore God will be able to unite to Himself a singular nature with its personality set aside, and consequently from no head does that union of divinity with humanity conflict in the unity of person.

Conclusio secunda. — By no natural reason can the impossibility of the divine Incarnation be demonstrated.

Proof: Truth cannot be contrary to truth: but it is true that the Incarnation is possible, as is clear from the preceding Conclusion: therefore no natural reason, which presents any truth, can urge its impossibility. Further, if any reason could evince this impossibility, it would be sought either from the side of God as unable to assume the human nature in the unity of person, or from the side of the very nature itself, which would not be assumable in such a way: but from neither head does it conflict, as was proved above, and it will stand more amply from the solution of all the reasons soon to be objected: therefore, etc.

You will object 1. Pure act is not unible with any other: but each divine person is pure act: therefore it is not unible with an alien nature. The minor stands. The major likewise; for if act were united, it would no longer be pure act, because it would signify potentiality toward another with which it would be united: therefore, etc.

The Doctor distinguishes the major in book 11, n. 16. Actus purus cannot be united with another as a component part, so that with the other to which it is united it makes one per se, composed of parts standing to each other as matter and form: this he grants; it cannot be united in the manner of an infinite term supplying the place of some created term: this he denies; and, the minor having been granted, he denies the consequence.

You will insist: A divine person cannot be united to the humanity unless it constitute with it some one thing per se: but one thing per se is not constituted out of several things unless one of them have the role of act and the other that of potency: therefore if the divine Word is united to the humanity, it is necessary that it have the role of a component part.

I distinguish the minor: that one thing per se which comes about through composition and informing cannot be made except from parts, of which one is act and the other potency — this I grant; that which comes about through the termination of the dependence of one upon the other — this I deny. Now the divine Word is united to the humanity so as to constitute one Christ per se, not indeed in the manner of formal composition, but only in the manner of a divine person terminating and supplying the place of a created person.

You will urge: That union which would come about in the manner of a term would supply the place of human personality; therefore it would effect a true and real composition. The consequence is proved: Whatever supplies the place of personality ought to perform the same function as personality itself: but human personality effects a true composition with the individual nature; for it is an act informing and affecting that nature itself: therefore if a divine person supply the place of human personality, it ought to effect a composition with the nature assumed.

I deny the consequence; and in proof of its proof I answer first by distinguishing the major: that which supplies the place of personality ought to perform the same function as personality itself, inasmuch as it is the ultimate terminating efficient term, lest the nature have any further communication — this I grant; inasmuch as it is an act affecting and perfecting that nature itself in the manner of a form — this I deny. The former belongs to the formal and special notion of personality, precisely inasmuch as it is personality; not so the latter, because the notion of affecting and perfecting is common to personality with the other modes and forms, both accidental and substantial, if, as some hold, created personality itself be a mode or positive form.

I answer secondly by denying the minor; for, as we proved more fully in our Metaphysics, it is more probable, according to the mind of the Subtle Doctor, that the formal notion of person is not something positive, but only connotes, above the notion of the individual, the negation of any further communication of the individual nature to another as a supposit, with which it is deemed to make one being per se.

You will object 2. Among things that can be mutually united there must intervene a certain proportion: but between the divine person and created nature no proportion intervenes; for the divine person is infinite, created nature finite; and between the finite and the infinite there is no proportion: therefore they are not mutually unifiable.

The Doctor distinguishes the major in the same place: there must be a proportion of entity to entity — this he denies; of relation, such as is between cause and effect, object and power, terminator and terminated — this he grants. Between God and a creature there is indeed no proportion of entity, but of termination, both on the part of God and on the part of the creature itself: for the creature, in the role of effect, terminates the fecundity and causality of God, by which it is produced; and God in turn, in the role of object, terminates the activity of the created intellect and will, by which He is perceived: therefore although there be no entitative proportion between the Word and the humanity itself, because the Word exceeds it infinitely in perfection and dignity; nevertheless there is a personal terminative proportion sufficient for the union of which we speak: for since the Word is an infinite person, it has the power of terminating all communication of a personable nature, whereby it depends upon Him as upon its cause.

You will insist: The infinite and the finite cannot even be at once in the roles of terminator and terminated: therefore no solution. The subsumption is proved: contraries cannot exist at once, on account of their repugnance: but the finite and the infinite conflict with each other more than contraries do, because they are more diverse, seeing that they do not agree in any genus, as contraries agree in the genus of quality and accident: therefore they cannot subsist at once.

The Doctor denies the subsumption, and of its proof he denies the minor. For contraries are not mutually incompossible because they have diversity: for quantity and whiteness are more diverse than whiteness and blackness, inasmuch as quantity and whiteness belong to different predicaments, whereas whiteness and blackness belong to the same predicament; whence things of different genus can subsist together, as quantity and whiteness, whereas things of the same predicament cannot be together, on account of their natural opposition: and consequently the incompossibility of contraries arises solely from their natural repugnance. But the divine and the human nature have from their particular nature no repugnance whatever with respect to the same supposit; hence, although they are more diverse than contraries, they can subsist together more easily in the same supposit than contraries can.

You will object 3. If the divine Word could become incarnate, it could also suffer: but it cannot suffer: therefore neither can it become incarnate. The major holds, because just as to incarnate is to act, so to be incarnate is to suffer; for to every action there corresponds a passion.

The Doctor denies the major, and in proof of its proof says that although to every transient action there corresponds a passion, and consequently although to active incarnation there corresponds some passion, as to active heating there corresponds the passion of passive heating: nevertheless the passion corresponding to the incarnating action is not signified by this word Incarnari, but is designated by the word to be assumed, or united: from the fact that Incarnare signifies to unite flesh effectively, or the human nature, to the supposit of the Word, making it be assumed by the Word through that special dependence which it has from Him by reason of the hypostatic union. Therefore the passive verb properly corresponding to the active verb Incarnare is not Verbum Incarnari, but the verb to be united, or assumed. From which it follows that that passion corresponding to active incarnation is only in the human nature, which is assumed, and not in the Word, which assumes. Although, therefore, grammatically speaking, says the Doctor, incarnari is a passive verb which seems to correspond to the active verb incarnare, yet really and significatively it is not the passive verb corresponding to it.

You will object 1. It implies that God is changed: but if He were incarnate, He would truly be changed, for He would acquire a new nature, and would be terminated by it, which previously He had not, and did not have: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor: for from the positing of the possibility of the Mystery of the Incarnation it does not therefore follow that God is changed, for that whole change is extrinsic to the Divine Word, since He receives no form in Himself by which He would be intrinsically affected anew; but that whole change is reflected back upon the human nature, which receives the person of the Word, to which it is substantially united, and by which that whole communication is terminated. The Apostle intimates this in Philip. 2, where he says: in habit found as a man, which words St. Augustine splendidly explains in lib. 83. qq., question 73, where, after premising a multiple notion of habit, he has this:

Habit, therefore, is said of that thing which happens to us as something had. Yet there is this difference, that certain of those things which happen to us so as to make a habit are not changed by us, but they themselves change us, remaining whole in themselves; just as when wisdom comes back to a man, it is not itself changed, but changes the man, whom it makes wise out of a fool. But certain things happen in such a way that they both change and are changed, just as food itself loses its own species and is turned into our body: while we, refreshed by food, are changed from weakness and languor into strength and vigor. There is, moreover, a third kind, when the very things which happen are changed, and in a certain manner are formed by those to which they make a habit, as is clothing: for when it is stored away or cast off, it does not have the form which it takes on when it is put on and drawn over the limbs; but the limbs themselves remain in their state both when clothed and when unclothed. And there can be a fourth kind, when those things which happen to make a habit neither change those to whom they happen, nor are themselves changed by the same; as a ring upon a finger.... Now this habit (by which indeed the Son of God is said to be found as a man) is not of the first kind; for the nature of man, remaining in itself, did not change the divine nature. Nor of the second; for man did not change God, and was not changed by Him. Nor of the fourth; for man was not so assumed that neither did God change him, nor was he changed by Him. But rather of the third; > for man was so assumed as to be changed into the better, and to be formed by Him ineffably more excellently and more closely joined, than clothing when it is put on by a man. By this name, therefore, of habit the Apostle sufficiently signified how he said made in the likeness of men, because he was made not by transfiguration into a man, but by habit.

The same holy Augustine again explains this by a most apt example, Serm. 27. De tempore.

For, he says, not because it was said: the Word was God, and the Word was made flesh, was the Word thus made flesh that He would cease to be God. For just as the Word which we carry in our heart becomes a voice when we utter it with our mouth, yet it is not changed into that voice, but, itself remaining whole, is assumed by it as it proceeds: so that it may both abide within to be understood, and sound without what is heard. Hence the same word is nevertheless uttered in sound which before had sounded in silence: and thus the word, though it is a voice, is not changed into voice: but abiding in the light of the mind, and assuming the flesh of the voice, it proceeds to the hearer, and leaves the thinker.

But to the argument brought forward for the confirmation of the minor I say that: that which acquires a new nature is indeed changed if it acquires it as receiving; but not if as bestowing and communicating itself to it: whereas when God in the Mystery of the Incarnation acquires human nature, He does not receive it into Himself, but communicates Himself to it, and thereupon is not changed: thus when any creature is newly produced, it has a real relation to God the creator, by reason of which God, who communicates Himself to that creature, acquires the character of terminus with respect to it, yet is not on that account changed.

You will insist: By the same reason that human nature is said to be changed by the Incarnation, the Divine Word would be said to be changed: therefore, etc. Proof of the antecedent: therefore human nature is said to be changed, because it receives into itself the divine nature, which it did not have in itself, or to which it was not personally united: but the Divine Word also, through the Incarnation, has personally conjoined to itself the human nature, to which it was not before united: therefore by equal reason it is said to be changed by the Incarnation.

I deny the antecedent: and the reason of the disparity is, that the Divine Word conjoins human nature to itself by the mode of terminating its dependence, in the character of person; but human nature receives into itself the person of the Word as its intrinsic complement; inasmuch, namely, as the Word supplies the place of created personality, which belongs to the substantial complement of the nature itself, whence it comes about that the nature itself is said to be perfected by that personal union of the Word, because the personality of the Word supplying the place of a created person confers upon the nature itself its complement, without which that nature would remain incomplete. It is otherwise, however, with the Divine Word, because the Divine Word acquires no perfection nor complement through that termination: for it would not be less infinitely perfect even if it did not supply the place of created personality.

You will urge: Although the Divine Word have the character of terminator with respect to the assumed nature, it would nonetheless truly be said to be changed: therefore the solution proposed above is null. Proof of the antecedent: it stands so, proportion preserved, that divine personality in the character of terminator is related to the nature, as the divine intellect is related to an intelligible object: but the divine intellect would truly be said to be changed, if it were newly terminated upon some intelligible object upon which it was not before terminated, inasmuch as

God would be judged to know something anew, which He did not previously know: therefore, etc.

I deny the antecedent, and against its proof, I deny the parity. The reason of the disparity is, that the divine intellect has for its object every intelligible being, by whatever account it may be intelligible; hence if it were newly terminated upon some object which it did not previously attain, it would truly be changed; because it would follow that it did not extend itself to everything that is intelligible, nor consequently equal the breadth of its object, toward which it naturally tends by its infinite power; it is otherwise, however, with the divine personality, which by its innate power does not demand to terminate personally every nature whatsoever, whether uncreated or created, but precisely and of itself is borne only to terminating the divine nature: wherefore its power is no less complete where it terminates only the divine nature than if it were to terminate whatever created natures.

Subsumes: Therefore the divine intellect extends itself to everything that is intelligible, and would be changed if it did not attain it from eternity, because it has infinite power of understanding: but also the divine personality has infinite power of terminating the communication of nature: therefore by the reason by which the divine intellect would be judged to be changed, if it were newly to perceive some intelligible object, by equal reason the divine personality would be judged to be changed, if it were newly to terminate the communication of some nature.

I deny the parity: because the knowable object, inasmuch as it is knowable, of itself pertains to the adequate object of the divine intellect, which is every intelligible being: but any nature terminable hypostatically does not of itself pertain to the divine personality, because each nature, by reason of its formal and natural principle, demands to be terminated by its own personality: whence the case is not the same for a knowable object with respect to the divine intellect as for a terminable nature with respect to the divine personality. To these points add that the knowable object contributes to the perfection of the knowing power: for the more excellent an object is known, the more excellent is the intellectual knowledge; but a terminable nature does not of itself contribute to the perfection of the terminating personality; rather, personality itself of itself confers upon the nature personated and terminated its dignity and excellence, for the more worthy the supposit is, the worthier is the personated nature.

You will urge further: That which passes from potency to act is truly changed: but the divine nature by the Incarnation would pass from potency to act, because what was unifiable would become united: therefore it would be changed.

I distinguish the major: that which passes from potency to act passively or subjectively, that is, by way of inhering or informing, is changed, because it receives a new form which it did not have — I concede; actively, and by way of communication, I deny. And likewise, the minor being distinguished, I deny the consequence: for the divine nature is united to the human by way of active power; because that union is nothing other than the communication of the divine personality, whereby the Divine Word assumes the human nature into the unity of person.

You will object 5. From two beings in act there cannot be made one per se: but the divine nature and the human are beings in act; for each has all that which is required for its perfection: therefore either the union of both cannot be brought about, or what is united will not be a being per se.

I answer, that the human nature in Christ is indeed perfect in the order of nature, yet imperfect and incomplete in the order of person: because it lacks a proper personality, and thus it can subsist through the divine personality, and together with it make one per se, namely Christ.

You will object 6. Two contradictories cannot be verified of the same thing: but if the divine nature could be joined with the human in the same person, it would follow that it is at once finite and infinite, creator and creature, mortal and immortal, which are contradictories: therefore these things cannot come about.

I distinguish the major: contradictories cannot be true of the same thing according to the same respect — I concede; according to diverse respects, I deny; for man is at once mortal and immortal; mortal indeed by reason of his body, immortal however by reason of his soul. But Christ is said to be mortal by reason of the assumed humanity, immortal however by reason of the divine nature.

You will object the last: God cannot supply the effect of a formal cause: therefore neither can He supply the effect of created and human subsistence.

I distinguish the antecedent: every effect, I concede; some effect, I deny. Now human subsistence involves two things: first, that it affect by the mode of a form, should there be some substantial mode affecting the individual nature itself, as some hold; and this effect God cannot supply. The other, that it terminate the nature ultimately, and thus, by terminating, denominate that nature subsistent; and this God can supply equivalently by His own subsistence, not indeed by bestowing a connatural subsistence, but another equivalent one and far more worthy, namely His proper subsistence, which terminates the further communication of the created nature; but in a far worthier and more excellent manner than it is terminated by a proper personality.

You will insist: The personality of the Word cannot stand in place of a created person unless it contain that person eminently and virtually: but such is not the case, since, as the Doctor says, since the divine personalities are not formally perfect nor infinite, they cannot contain virtually the perfection of a created personality. Add that even if it contained it in such a manner, still on that account it could not stand in its place; seeing that the divine nature, which contains virtualiter created personalities, just as it contains any creature whatsoever, because it is formally infinite, nevertheless cannot supply the place of a created personality: therefore neither will the personality of the Word be able to accomplish this.

The Doctor denies the major in the same place, n. 1. For not because the person of the Word is infinite or perfect can it supply the place of a created personality, but because it is in every way independent in the order of person; therefore it can supply the place of any dependent person whatsoever: and for this reason, although the divine essence contains virtualiter and eminenter created personalities, nevertheless it cannot bear their place, because it is not itself formaliter independent in the order of person. Therefore, says the Doctor:

not from the perfection of personal being is it gathered that the personality of the Word can supply a created personality, but from this, that that personal entity is independent; and being independent at such a point, it can terminate the dependence of another upon itself, which dependence is naturally apt to have such a term. But this dependence is naturally apt to have a person for its term, and not a nature: therefore a divine person, being independent, can sufficiently terminate such a dependence of a created nature upon itself.