Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

Note 1. Human law can be changed in three ways: first, by Dispensation, or relaxation of the law with regard to certain persons, or certain acts, or effects of the law in those cases in which otherwise it would bind, or would have such an effect; as when someone is exempted from fasting during the time of Lent, not on account of infirmity, but on account of the concession and relaxation of the supreme Pontiff; for dispensation is defined by the Gloss on the chapter requiritur, I. q. 6, as a relaxation of the common law made with knowledge of the cause by him who has the right of dispensing. Secondly, by abrogation, which can take place in three ways; namely, either by a contrary custom, or unwritten law: or by the simple revocation of the Prince: or by a contrary law expressly derogating from the former one, or enacting its opposite. Thirdly and finally, human Laws are changed by Cessation, or simple discontinuance, as when a law enacted for a time expires once that time has lapsed; just as the Mosaic law ceased, which had been instituted only that it might prepare the way for the Evangelical law.

Note 2. Dispensation is to be distinguished from Privilege in this respect, just as also from Absolution, namely that a Privilege properly speaking is a private law, which can at times exist not only against the law, in which case there would be a simple dispensation, but also beyond the law, for which reason it is not a dispensation but a privilege. Similarly, Absolution is not against the common law, but rather in accordance with it, if the person to be absolved merits it. Dispensation, however, is against the common law, since it is a relaxation of the law. Hence dispensation is not unfitting called a wound, or wounding, of the law. For law obtains force and vigor from a twofold cause: first indeed from the authority of the Legislator, whose prudence imposes a rule upon human acts: secondly, from custom, which is the restricting force of the law: for when any rigor of the law is relaxed, something is taken away both from the authority of the Legislator and from custom, and thus a wound is as it were inflicted upon the law. This however comes about through dispensation: for through it something is taken from the custom confirming the law, just as also from the authority and prudence of the Legislator, who through a dispensation is tacitly taxed with lesser prudence, in that he seems not to have foreseen that case.

Note 3. In this matter the abrogation of a law differs from its dispensation, suspension, derogation, and correction; for to abrogate a law is to take away entirely all its force and obligation; but to dispense is only to restrict and limit that law with regard to some person, or some effects, its obligation persevering with regard to the rest. To suspend a law is to prevent it from obtaining its binding force: but to derogate from it is to dissolve its binding force, which it had already possessed. To derogate from a law is to take it away not wholly but in part. To amend a law is to moderate its binding force, adding something to it, or subtracting something from it. Finally, a law is said to cease either when the time for which it was prescribed comes to an end, or when the cause for which it was enacted ceases: for the cause ceasing, the effect ceases. These things having been noted in advance, it must be resolved by whom, and concerning what matters, a dispensation, abrogation, and cessation of human law can be made.

First Conclusion. — EVERY AND ONLY THAT PRINCE, AS WELL ECCLESIASTICAL AS POLITICAL, WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ENACT LAWS, CAN DISPENSE IN THEM BY PLENARY RIGHT: YET WHOEVER IS A PRELATE OR INFERIOR SUPERIOR CAN DISPENSE IN THEM BY AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO HIM. This is common as regards each part; of which

the first is evident of itself: for he who has the faculty of enacting laws also has the authority to revoke and abrogate them, namely so that they may no longer have any binding force toward the whole community for which they were prescribed. Therefore much more does he have the authority to dissolve the force and obligation of the law toward certain members of that community, the same binding virtue ever persevering toward the rest, with whom no such relaxation has been made: but this is properly to dispense in a law: therefore every Prince, as well Ecclesiastical as Political, who can enact a law, can also dispense in it.

The second part is also evident: for whoever has delegated power from an Ecclesiastical or Political Prince, in whom lies the power of enacting laws, can also dispense in them according to the faculty granted to him: so that if he has committed to him a plenary power of dispensing and relaxing with regard to the obligation of subjects according as it may seem expedient to him from any law whatsoever of the delegating Prince, this delegate will be able, a just cause intervening, to absolve those subjects from the laws.

Hence it follows 1. That the Supreme Pontiff has the faculty of dispensing in all Pontifical laws which either he himself or his predecessors have enacted: for he wields authority equal to that of his predecessors: and consequently his authority is not restricted by the holy laws enacted by his predecessors, because an equal has not power over an equal. He can also dispense in laws prescribed by Councils, even general ones, as experience itself makes clear: since the supreme Pontiff not rarely dispenses, both in the age prescribed by the Council of Trent for receiving sacred Orders, and in the degrees prohibited for contracting marriage. Hence the same Council, Session 25, chapter 22, De Reform., says: The Holy Synod declares that all things which have been enacted in this sacred Council have been decreed in such wise that in these the authority of the Apostolic See always is saved, and is understood to be saved. Reason also lends support: for at times there arises a need for dispensation in laws of this kind; but it would be most burdensome and most difficult to convoke the whole Church in General Council whenever dispensation were needed in those laws; and therefore that faculty of dispensing ought to reside in someone: certainly in none other than the supreme Pontiff, who is the head of the Church: therefore it must be established that he himself has the authority to dispense in all Ecclesiastical laws, both those enacted by his predecessors and those prescribed by all Councils, and in those which pertain to ecclesiastical discipline, as is gathered from the aforementioned sanction of the Council of Trent. — Yet this authority of the Supreme Pontiff in granting dispensations must be tempered according to the necessity and utility of the Church; for, says St. Bernard, book 2, De Consideratione, addressed to Pope Eugene, where necessity urges, it is excusable: where utility invites, the dispensation is praiseworthy: I say utility common, not private: for when neither of these is present, it is plainly not a faithful dispensation, but a cruel dissipation. — Hence those who assert that the Supreme Pontiff has at his own arbitrary will and pleasure the authority of dispensing from what is prescribed by Councils and canons, even though no public or private necessity intervene, not only gravely err, but, says Melchior Cano, bishop of the Canaries, book 5, De locis communibus, chapter 5, they do not uphold the authority of the Apostolic See but undermine it, they do not strengthen it but overturn it. Which argument the cardinal Contarini admirably confirms in the letter which he wrote on this matter to Paul III, Roman Pontiff, wherein, weighing the opinion of certain jurists who, swept away by excessive flattery, so promote and magnify the papal authority that certain of them do not scruple to say that the will of the Pontiff is a kind of rule by which his actions are directed, nor is any rule constituted for the Pontiff in positive law to be enacted, or abrogated, or even dispensed in; what the said most Eminent Cardinal thought of this doctrine we understand from the following:

This position, so false, so repugnant to right reason, so contrary to Christian doctrine, says the same cardinal, so deprives the governance of the whole Christian people, that nothing more pernicious could be found. For by the immortal God, the same man exclaims, does not this position savor of idolatry? For to what creature can this be attributed, that his will be the rule of his actions? Is not this proper to God alone? But those jurists, through ignorance of this pontifical power (what sort it is, and to what strength of soul it pertains, that it may endure) have not feared to bring forth so absurd a position into public. — Moreover, Contarini continues, what more contrary to the law of Christ, which is the law of liberty, could be devised, than that Christians should be subject to, and obliged to obey, a Pontiff to whom it has been granted by Christ that he enact laws at his pleasure, abrogate laws, dispense in laws, and hold in all these things his own will as rule? Does such dominion befit — I do not say Christian men who have been enrolled into the law of liberty, and therefore (as Augustine says writing to Januarius concerning the rites of the Church) are to be bound by as few exterior laws as possible: I do not say even free men — and any governance of free men, such as are the rightful and approved authorities of peoples? But to what lord over slaves, over whom lords command for their own advantage, and whom they use as animated instruments, does this dominion and lordship befit, that he command them according to his will? Away with, I beseech the immortal God, this impious doctrine from Christian men. » — When these and other things had been brought forward for the destruction of that position, he turns his discourse to the Pontiff: Most Blessed Father, you who excel in doctrine, and greatly avail in experience of affairs and natural prudence, consider whether from this doctrine lemere the Lutherans took occasion to compose those books of theirs on the Babylonian Captivity? For by the immortal God, what greater captivity and servitude could have been brought upon the Christian people than this which the doctrine of these jurists, of whom we speak, professes? None indeed. So the cardinal Contarini: whom not only the cardinalitial dignity, but above all the treatise which he composed in defense of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff against heretics, exempts from all sinister affection toward the Pontifical authority. — To these is added the deliberation and judgment of eight most learned Prelates who were convoked by the same Paul III before the Synod of Trent, that they might freely state by what means and remedies the abuses and diseases with which the Church was then afflicted could be cleansed; they answered ingenuously:

Alas, your Holiness knew well, they say, that the origin of these evils was thence, that certain Pontiffs, your predecessors, having itching ears, as the Apostle Paul says, kept for themselves teachers after their own desires, not that they might learn from them what they ought to do, but that by their industry and cunning a reason might be found whereby what pleased might be permitted. Thence it came about (besides the fact that flattery follows every principality, as the shadow the body, and access of truth to the ears of princes has always been most difficult) that teachers straightway came forth who taught that the Pontiff is the lord of all benefices: and therefore since a lord sells lawfully what is his own, it necessarily followed that simony could not fall upon the Pontiff, so that the will of the Pontiff, whatever it may be, is the rule by which his operations and actions are directed: whence without doubt it results that whatever pleases, that also is permitted. From this, Holy Father, as from the Trojan horse, so many abuses and so grave diseases broke into the Church of God, whereby we now see that she labored almost unto desperation of salvation, and that the report of these things flowed even to the infidels (let your Holiness believe those who know), who deride the Christian religion precisely on this account, so that, they say, because of us the name of Christ is blasphemed among the gentiles.

Those famous men, besides Contarini, included John Peter Carafa, who later became Supreme Pontiff under the name of Paul IV. There were present likewise Reginald Pole, the English cardinal and one of the presidents in the Council of Trent by appointment of the Pontiff, and Cardinal Sadoleto, together with other men illustrious alike for piety and for outstanding wisdom.

Hence it follows 2. That an inferior Prelate cannot dispense by force of his own ordinary power in the law of a superior Prelate; for to dispense is to take away in part the force of a law, and with respect to the person upon whom the dispensation is bestowed; but to take away the force of a law belongs only to him who enacted the law, or who enjoys power equal to his, not indeed to him who holds inferior power; and accordingly an inferior Prelate, by force of his ordinary power, cannot dispense in the law of a superior. Hence a dispensation granted by the Supreme Pontiff in vows, or in other matters which are of Divine or natural law, is utterly null and invalid unless a legitimate cause be present which would release the person dispensed from the force and obligation of laws of this kind: and thus that dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff ought rather to be called a declaration of dispensation than a dispensation; for no one besides God has authority to dispense with plenary right in those things which concern Divine law. — Hence also Bishops cannot dispense in the vows of their subjects which are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, such as especially the five following: perpetual chastity, approved Religion, pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles, to St. James of Compostella, and beyond the seas, or to the Holy Land; which indeed can be proved from the Extravagant Etsi dominici, where Sixtus IV. among other things reserves to the Apostolic See the absolution from these five vows, and excommunicates those who shall have presumed to absolve from them. But it can be answered that those confessors alone are excluded there who used to absolve under pretext of faculties conceded by the Apostolic See, whom he also excommunicates in the same place. Yet although in the law no vow is found expressly to be reserved absolutely, except beyond the seas on account of subsidy (of which cap. Quod super his 8. and cap. Ex multa de voto), nevertheless the style of the Roman Curia reserves also other things, which must be obeyed, unless elsewhere another custom has been legitimately prescribed, says Cardinal de Lugo lib. 2. cap. 10. dub. 18. — Bishops therefore can dispense in all those things which are not reserved to the Supreme Pontiff; for, the reservation of the Supreme Pontiff set aside, they have ordinary authority, and can in their own Diocese, in those things which pertain to jurisdiction, do whatever the Supreme Pontiff can do in the whole Church: for they are the princes of sacred things in their own Church: and consequently they have the power necessary for its right administration. Therefore they can rightly dispense first, in the vow of a Religion not approved, and in the vow of perpetual poverty and obedience, which would be made in such a religion not approved, namely where necessity should occur requiring a dispensation: because such a vow made is not truly a vow of religion; for a religion not approved by the Supreme Pontiff is not a religion. Likewise they can dispense in the vow of chastity not perpetual, for instance of 10. 15. 20. years, but not of 100., because a vow made of keeping chastity for a hundred years is held to be perpetual. Similarly in the vow of receiving sacred Orders: because it is not a vow of chastity, although this vow is annexed to the reception of Orders. Likewise in the vow of not seeking the debt; because these are not vows of entire chastity, but only partial, etc. — There are nevertheless some cases in which inferior Prelates have the faculty of dispensing in a law prescribed by a superior Prelate. The first case is, when the matter is light, so that the transgression of the law is reckoned only a venial sin; for as a venial sin is reserved to no one, but any priest whatsoever can absolve from it, so also from the obligation of the law can an inferior Prelate dispense on account of the lightness of the matter. The second is, when a motive for dispensation occurs frequently; for instance in the celebrating of Feasts, in fasting and the like; for it does not seem fitting to have recourse so often to the Prince Prelate, or Superior, as often as this frequent reason for dispensing occurs; for it would be very troublesome to the Prince this more frequent recourse to him in those matters which pertain to ordinary governance: and therefore the superior is justly presumed to concede to inferior Prelates authority for dispensing in those cases. The third is, when a grave necessity for dispensing occurs, nor is recourse to him easy, or there would be danger in delay, or grave detriment: thus a Bishop can dispense with one who, having made a vow of simple chastity, has contracted marriage and consummated it, so that he may seek and render the debt, on account of the danger of incontinence. Similarly he can dispense with spouses who by common consent have vowed continence, lest afterwards the same danger should beset both, or at least one of them. Fourthly, an inferior Prelate can dispense in those things which are so proper to one community that they in no way suit others; for those things which are proper to one community are better known and more evident to the immediate Governor than to the supreme Prince, or Prelate; and consequently he himself will be able to judge concerning them better than the superior. Finally, an interior Prelate can dispense when it is doubtful whether the case needs a dispensation or not; for then the presumption is in favor of liberty, which possesses; whence it comes about that a case, unless it be certain, is commonly not held to be reserved.

You ask: Whether a superior can dispense with regard to himself?

I answer 1. That there is no doubt but that a Prelate can dispense indirectly with regard to himself in vows and laws; namely by giving to one of his subjects the power by which he may dispense in his own vow; for thus he can give to a subject priest the power by which he may absolve him from sins, even from reserved cases: so likewise that by which he may release him from the obligation of a vow; otherwise the superior would be in a worse condition than the subject.

I answer 2. That it is probable that any Prelate whatsoever can dispense directly with himself in those same vows in which he can dispense with his subjects, which De Lugo indeed proves in the place cited dub. 17. First, because as he can dispense with his subjects in Laws even of superiors, when this is permitted to him, as in the law of fasting, of eating flesh, of hearing the Sacred rites, of reciting the Office: so also in these same he can dispense with himself, when a just cause underlies: therefore as he can dispense in the vows of subjects, so he can also in his own vows; for here no more jurisdiction is required over himself than there. Secondly, he can exempt himself, when a cause underlies, from the obligation which he contracts by natural law on occasion of his own law; why not also from the obligation which his own vow brings? Thirdly, the Pope can confer indulgences upon himself, absolving himself from the debt of punishment even if enjoined, as Henriquez teaches, De Indulgentiis, cap. 32. Therefore he can also absolve himself from the debt of a vow. Fourthly, because if anything stood in the way of a Prelate being able to dispense in his own vow, it would be through defect of jurisdiction over himself: for no one can exercise jurisdiction over himself; whence no one can absolve himself from sins: yet here this defect does not stand in the way. First, because this jurisdiction is no more required in the dispensation of vows than in the dispensation of laws, the conferring of indulgences, and the obligation through his own laws: yet the defect of jurisdiction over oneself does not prevent one from being able to do these things over himself, as is evident from what has been said. Secondly, because that jurisdiction demands a distinction of persons, is either because it is coercive, which is to be exercised upon the unwilling, as is the power of inflicting censure: or because it is contentious, distributing right between parties, for it does not seem equitable that anyone should pronounce right for himself in his own cause against the right of an adversary opposing himself; for thus he would be to himself both judge and defendant: or because it pertains to sacramental absolution, which by divine law demands a distinction of judge and thing judged: yet that jurisdiction which is required for the dispensation of a vow is none of these, as is evident of itself: therefore there is no reason why it should demand a distinction of person.

Second Conclusion. — HUMAN LAWS CAN BE ABROGATED BY THE PRINCES AND LEGISLATORS WHO ESTABLISHED THEM, OR WHO HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF PRESCRIBING THEM: YET THEY OUGHT NOT TO BE ABROGATED UNLESS SOME GREATER UTILITY IS THENCE TO BE HOPED FOR. This Conclusion contains three parts, of which

Proof of the first: Human laws can be regarded either on the part of their principle, or on the part of their end: that is, either on the part of human reason, from which they are called, or with respect to human acts, which they direct: but on either side they are in truth changeable; and accordingly human laws can be abrogated and changed. The first part of the minor is evident: since human reason is finite and limited, and is accustomed to proceed from the imperfect to the perfect, whence it comes about that the Legislator cannot foresee all those things which can more conduce to the utility of the Commonwealth at any time whatever: it sometimes happens that posterity observe certain things to be adverse to the right administration of the Commonwealth which the Ancestors had raised up for the good government of the same: and consequently, on the part of human reason, which is constitutive of laws, it is certain that they are changeable. Also the second part of the same minor is clear: for often some law is expedient at one time which at another, the morals of men being varied, is judged not expedient: thus God governed men with other laws and precepts before and after the incarnation of Christ: thus likewise both Ecclesiastical and Political constitutions and sanctions are changed on given occasions, and according as the diverse necessity of affairs and times requires, for the establishing of the quiet of the faithful and of subjects, and of the right manner of acting.

Proof of the second part: For whoever enacted a law, or has the power of enacting, has also the authority of recalling it; since a law essentially depends upon the will and command of the Legislator and Prince, it follows that upon the change of the same will the law also ought to be changed. — Hence any Prince and Superior whatsoever can abrogate laws enacted not only by himself, or his predecessors, but even by inferiors, Prelates subject to himself; because the Superior has full power above the inferior: and consequently above all laws sanctioned by him. — Yet an inferior Prelate cannot recall or abrogate the laws of Superiors without their special concession: because the will and right of an inferior cannot prevail against the right and will of the Superior. Hence in the Clementine De electione cap. Ne Romani, Clement V. decrees that since the law of a Superior cannot be taken away by an inferior, the laws enacted by the Supreme Pontiffs concerning the election of the Supreme Pontiff cannot, while the see itself is vacant, be modified, corrected, or changed by the assembly of Cardinals of the Roman Church, or anything detracted from or added to them, or any dispensation made in any way whatever.

Also the third part is evident, namely that laws ought not to be abrogated or recalled unless a greater utility of the community follows thence: for, as Ulpian says in the old Digest lib. 1. title t. De Constitutionibus Principum law 2. In things to be established by us the utility must be evident, that one depart from that law which for a long time has been seen to be just. Since laws are established for the good of the community, their vigor ought to persevere so long as a greater utility of that community does not appear. Hence he would seem to sin against the public good who should recall laws conducing to its establishment and confirmation, unless a greater advantage to be followed thence outweighed the harm. Nevertheless the aforementioned abrogation without a just cause is valid, nor are subjects bound to obey the revoked law, even if no utility of the community intervene, because subjects are bound to keep the law only thus far, insofar, and as long as the will and command of the Legislator is morally continued, because from a will and command of this kind the whole law obtains its force and virtue: but the vigor of a law of this kind is not continued when he expressly recalls his will and his command. — Now a law can be abrogated in three ways: First, by the simple revocation of the Prince: Secondly, by the enactment of a new law repugnant to the former; for if the later law cannot stand together with the prior, it destroys it; because the later will of the Prince takes away the former, according to law. sed et posteriores, ff. de legibus. Yet then the abrogation is to be restricted as much as possible: inasmuch as it is commonly odious, and of itself harmful to the Commonwealth, unless necessity requires it. Wherefore laws, as far as possible, are to be reconciled among themselves, and concord is to be preferred to abrogation. Finally, thirdly, a law can be abrogated by contrary custom; since custom has the force of law, as has been said, it follows that as a law is abrogated by a contrary law, so it must be held to be abrogated by a custom opposed to it.

You ask: Whether, and in what manner, Human Laws are to be interpreted?

I answer 1. A threefold interpretation of human law can be distinguished: namely, authentic, customary, and doctrinal. For the interpretation of human laws is made either by the authority of the very one who enacted the law, and who opens up his mind and will concerning the observance of the law in doubtful matters: and this is called authentic; because it proceeds from the same source, namely the will of the Prince, from which the law itself flows; and thus this interpretation obtains the force of law, as is gathered from the last law in the Code de legibus; or it is made by a certain use and custom, by which laws are observed in this or that manner by this or that community, whence it comes about that custom itself is called the best interpreter of the laws, and this interpretation is called customary; or finally, the interpretation of the law is made through the doctrine and instruction of learned men, and this exposition is called doctrinal: which certainly differs from the former ones in that it does not obtain the force of law, since it proceeds not from the power of jurisdiction, but from the judgment of the learned. Hence it does not of itself impose obligation, but only detects and discloses it; especially when all the Doctors with unanimous accord concur and consent in the same meaning of the law. Now, for this doctrinal interpretation of the law to be rightly made, the following rules are most to be observed: First indeed, careful attention must be paid to the property of the words in which the law itself is conceived: for since laws ought to be clear and expressed in words properly signifying, those who interpret them doctrinally must above all attend to the sense of the words. Second, the very cause of the law must also be considered, or the motive on account of which the Legislator sanctioned this law; for that motive is the reason upon which, as upon a fulcrum, the law rests; whence, since the power of the Legislator in prescribing laws must be accommodated to reason, it is rightly concluded that the intention of the Legislator in prescribing the law is gathered from its motive and cause. Thirdly, finally, the mind and intention of the Legislator can be disclosed from the words preceding and following, as also from the end and circumstances, or from the ends of the law itself; if indeed other laws ... [truncated]

Now this doctrinal interpretation of the law is commonly called Epikeia, which is defined by Aristotle, 5. Ethic., cap. 10. as an emendation of the law where it fails through its universality, that is, an equitable and reasonable interpretation, whereby it is declared that the law does not bind in some particular case, although the words of the law be particular and seem to extend to all cases. Thus, for example, the general law is, a deposit must be restored to its owner when he demands it: yet the equitable and reasonable interpretation is that the deposit ought not to be restored in that case in which it would harm the one demanding it, or another innocent party: thus a sword ought not to be restored to a madman, who demands it in order to kill himself or another.

But Epikeia may be used in various cases: First, when it is evident that it is too hard to observe the law; for a human law must be possible according to nature and the custom of the country, that is, easy of observance, as we said elsewhere: therefore if in some case the observance of the law seems too hard, then Epikeia is needed, which is the emendation of the law on account of its defect. Thus the Machabees, lib. 1. cap. 2. when they saw that very many Jews had been slaughtered by their enemies on the Sabbath day, because on that sacred day they had judged that they must not resist their enemies, interpreted the law concerning the observance of the Sabbath, saying: Whosoever shall come against us to fight on the Sabbath day, we will fight against him: and we will not all die, as our brethren died in secret places. — Second, Epikeia may be used when it is probably judged that the law does not comprehend some case; but not when it is more probably thought that the law does comprehend that case: For, says Doctor Subtilis in 3. dist. 25. quaest. 1. n. 8. *in moral matters, when there are disputes about some sin, whether it is first mortal, as if one expert in knowledge should say that it is not lawful to trade thus, and another say that it is thus lawful, it is safer neither to proceed thus nor thus, but to expe> ct until the truth be manifest from elsewhere: for if it were so, that one

Doctor should say that someone sins mortally unless he do thus, then it would be a simple perplexity: therefore it is well to see carefully in moral matters before anything be asserted, namely because when one holds two contrary opinions he is perplexed, and would dangerously determine himself to one, unless upon diligent inspection of the matter he chose the more probable one. »

By which the Doctor signifies that in moral matters a probable judgment indeed sometimes suffices for acting prudently, namely when nothing more probable occurs: but when there is a concurrence of two probable opinions, we are bound to follow that which we judge more probable; otherwise we sin against the rules of prudence, which dictates that we should rather adhere to that opinion which exposes us to no danger at all of erring or sinning, than to that which renders us liable at least to the probable danger of sinning and erring: whence St. Chrysostom, Hom. 4. in Matth.

If you were about to buy a garment, you would go around to one merchant, and another: and where you found better garments, and at a cheaper price, you buy from him; ought not the people then to go around all the Doctors, and inquire, where the sincere truth of Christ is sold, and where the corrupted, so as to choose the truer one rather than a garment?

Thirdly, finally, Epikeia is to be used when we are uncertain whether the Legislator willed to comprehend this case, because the words of the law do not sufficiently signify it; and it is lawful to use Epikeia without recourse to a Superior, although for a time recourse may be permitted. The reason is, because when the question concerns only the signification of the words, we are not bound to interpret them according to the mind of the Legislator when he himself has not declared it, nor to have recourse to him, but we may, using our own right, interpret them according to the common sense, and according to the principles of that doctrine which hands down the true and genuine signification of the words, and that legitimate manner of interpreting them.