Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

The present Question is raised chiefly concerning the triple order of beings; namely, the divine, the rational, and the irrational. For there are three orders or kinds of acts, about which it can be doubted whether they are measured by the eternal law of God. The first indeed is the supreme kind, that of certain internal acts of God himself. The second, and lowest kind is that of the actions of lower natural agents, lacking reason. Finally the third is that of the free acts of intellectual creatures. Moreover it must be known that the acts of God can be distinguished as of three kinds; for some are called natural and necessary: such as the generation of the Word, the procession of the Holy Spirit; others are moral and free, such as the love of God by which he loves creatures; finally others can be called Artistic, insofar as they extend to producing and governing creatures. It is asked, then, whether all these divine acts are subject to the eternal Law.

NOTE 2. It is certain, and beyond controversy, that the natural acts of the divine intellect and of the divine will, insofar as they are regarded ad intra, do not depend upon the eternal law of God itself, because they are altogether necessary, nor do they proceed from a direction or motion proceeding through the dictate of reason; hence they cannot be subject to any law; because a law does not pertain to things necessary per se and intrinsically, which have no need of a rule, but regards only those acts which are altogether free, and can be directed and ordered. Hence the eternal generation of the Son of God, and the production of the Holy Spirit, fall not at all under the law, because they are acts altogether natural and necessary. Wherefore there would remain to be inquired whether the free acts which are in God, which insofar as they are free are called moral: but insofar as they are to operate ad extra they are called artistic — whether, I say, those acts are subject in any way to the eternal law of God, and are directed by it.

NOTE 3. The eternal law can be thought to be a measure or rule of the free acts of God in two ways: first indeed insofar as those acts are moral and honest: second truly insofar as they are ordered to something to be produced or governed. Regarded in the former way, it is certain that the divine free acts are regulated by the divine reason: because God always operates according to reason: not indeed according to an alien reason: therefore according to his own; hence the measure of the rectitude of the free acts of the divine will is the judgment of the divine intellect, which in order of operation precedes the very operation of the divine will. This also appears from a declaration and example, for if God speaks, he speaks truly, because he judges lying to be evil: if he promises, he fulfils, because he judges fidelity to be honest and consonant with his nature. Regarded in the latter way, the divine free acts can be thought to have a law, insofar as God as the artificer of things is held to prescribe to himself a certain manner of operating according to which he makes and orders his works, though he could make and order them otherwise. But whether in one or other, or in both ways God truly prescribes a law to himself, this must here be determined.

First Conclusion. — THE DIVINE WILL IN ACTING FREELY AND HONESTLY IS NOT SUBJECT TO LAW.

This is held by Alexander, memb. 8. art. 5., to whom subscribe St. Thomas 1. 2. q. 91. a. 1. ad primum, and the Recent Authors together with Suarez lib. 2. cap. 2.

Alexander proves this truth: First indeed by the authority of St. Augustine, who says in book 83. qq. He who seeks the fellowship of the divine will seeks something greater than the divine will: but if the divine will were subject to any law, it would have some directive cause of itself: hence it would have something greater: but this is impossible; and therefore it likewise conflicts with the divine will itself being subject to any law. Finally, the eternal law cannot be subject to itself: but the divine will itself is the eternal law: for St. Augustine says: So great is the difference in the understanding of reason when law is said, and when will is said: because will is said with respect to good, inasmuch as it accepts what is good; the same will is called law, inasmuch as it ordains what is good. Finally, St. Anselm confirms this same thing in book 1. Cur Deus homo, cap. 12., saying: since God is free, he is subject to no law, and to no one's judgment; so that nothing is seemly, nothing right, except what he wills, and therefore what he wills is just, and fitting; but that which is unjust and unseemly does not fall into his will; not on account of any law, but because it does not belong to his liberty.

He proves it likewise by reason: if the divine will were subject to some law, that would be either positive, or natural: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because a positive law is that which is laid down by the free will of some superior to command, and to oblige by his precept, or will him upon whom the law is imposed: but God has no superior, nor can he oblige himself by way of precept, and law, because he is not superior to himself: therefore he is in no way capable of a positive law. Nor the second; for although in the divine intellect practical judgments and dictates precede, by which God judges what becomes his goodness, mercy, justice, or wisdom, such as that one must not lie, that sins must be vindicated, that promises must be fulfilled, etc.: yet these cannot have the character of law with respect to the divine will, both because they propose no precept nor intimate the will of anyone; but only show, by indicating, what the nature of the thing holds: whereas a law is a precept, and inclination of the will of some superior legislator: and also because those practical judgments of God are not made by way of commanding, but only of directing: and therefore they cannot have the character of law.

Second Conclusion. — ALL IRRATIONAL BEINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW OF GOD.

The Conclusion is evident, First indeed from the authority of Sacred Scripture: namely from all those places in which God is said to have prescribed a law to the heavenly elements, and to other things devoid of reason. Thus Proverbs 8. When he gave to the sea its bound, and set a law to the waters that they should not pass their limits. Which Job indeed splendidly declared, c. 38., where, reporting the words of God, he says: I said: Thus far shalt thou come, and thou shalt go no further, and here thou shalt break thy swelling waves. Likewise also Psalm 148. Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfil his word. The same appears in Matthew 6. Luke 12. and 1. Cor. 15.

Proof 2. from the authority of St. Augustine, lib. 5. De Civit. Dei, cap. 11, where writing of God he says: *From whom is all motion, all species, all order, whence also measure, number, weight; from whom is whatsoever naturally is, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever condition: from whom are the seeds of forms, the forms of seeds, the motions of seeds, and of forms: by which He judges that all creatures without exception, even those devoid of reason, are not only derived from God as from the supreme Maker of all things, but are also directed and administered by Him as by the eternal Administrator and Governor of things. The same truth he expounds in the book De libero arbitrio, chapters 5 and 6, where he says: The eternal law is the reason existing in the mind of God, by which all things are directed to their ends through consonant means. And in lib. 83, q. 3, near the end, he says: The unchangeable law moderates all changeable things with most beautiful governance.

This truth is likewise proved by reason: Those things are subject to the eternal law of God from whom they have the principle of acting, and are regulated toward their ends; but God from eternity sanctioned and appointed for each creature such a principle peculiar to itself, whereby it can exercise its power unto an end, so as to arrive at fitting ends: therefore etc. Moreover, just as our will commands the members of our body, and imposes upon them by its command not only the necessity of bearing burdens, but also directs and orders them to burdens suited to their faculties: so also the divine will commands all created things, and imposes upon them the necessity and rule of acting according to its divine ordinance. This Job declared when he wrote that the creature obeys God unto the day of battle, and likewise the Wise Man in chapter 5, when he affirms that for the glory of God the whole world shall fight against the foolish.

You will say 1. Only those can be subject to the divine law to whom a law can be signified and promulgated: but no law can be promulgated or signified to creatures devoid of reason: therefore etc. —

I distinguish the minor: A law cannot be signified nor promulgated to irrational creatures by promulgation properly so called, namely that by which the mind of the legislator is expressed and made known to subjects, inasmuch as they, understanding the will of their superior, commit it to execution — this I concede; by promulgation improperly so called, namely through a certain impression of power which may be the principle of acting according to the will of the administrator of things — this I deny. For as the promulgation of law stands related to men, because by the promulgation of the law there is impressed upon them a certain directive of human acts, so does the impression of the active principle stand related to natural things, which by reason of their dependence upon God, the moderator and maker of all, operate at His nod.

You will say 2. Irrational creatures are not capable of precept: therefore neither of law: and consequently they cannot be subject to the eternal law of God. —

I distinguish the antecedent: They are not capable of moral precept, which is the rule of the moral operations of a rational creature — this I concede; they are not capable of natural precept, which is made by the impression of a motive principle in order to the obtaining of an end — this I deny: for God prescribes to all creatures the necessity and rule of acting, according to the capacity of each, in accordance with that word of Ps. 148: He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away.

You will say 3. Only those are subject to law who are capable of reward or punishment on account of the observance or transgression of the law: but irrational creatures, being devoid of cognition and liberty, are worthy neither of reward nor of punishment: therefore etc. — Our Alexander responds, member 8, article 5, that there is a twofold subjection to the eternal law: there is, he says, a subjection to the eternal law that is natural and without judgment, and in this way irrationals are subject to it by the first subjection; for St. Anselm says in book 1 of Cur Deus homo: Every creature which keeps a precept ordered to itself either naturally or rationally is said to obey God, most especially the rational creature, to whom it has been given to understand what it ought.

You will say 1. What is governed by law and reason cannot be fortuitous and casual: but among things devoid of reason there are many fortuitous things and things due to chance: therefore none of them is reckoned to be subject to law. —

I distinguish the minor: Many things are fortuitous and due to chance if they be referred to particular causes outside whose order they occur — this I concede; if they be referred to the divine ordination and governance — this I deny; since with respect to God, who foresees and orders all things in weight, number, and measure, nothing can be casual, although some things occur by chance, inasmuch as they happen outside the order of particular causes.

Third conclusion. — BOTH THE JUST AND THE WICKED AND THE REPROBATE ARE SUBJECT TO GOD'S ORDINATION: THE FORMER INDEED BY PERFECT SUBJECTION: THE LATTER BY IMPERFECT.

Proof of the first part, namely that the just are perfectly subject to the eternal law of God. That anyone may be perfectly subject to the law of God, he must participate in the divine law itself in two ways: first indeed by way of knowledge; secondly, by the motive principle of an interior law: but man with respect to good actions is directed and illuminated not only by natural knowledge, but also by the knowledge of faith and wisdom, and above his natural inclination to the good there is superadded to him interiorly the motive principle of grace and virtue: therefore the just man is perfectly subject to the eternal law of God.

Proof of the second part, namely that even the wicked and the reprobate are subject to the divine law. First indeed by the authority of St. Augustine, book De catechizandis rudibus: God knows how to order souls that desert Him, and out of their just misery to adorn the lower parts of His creature with the laws most fitting and most congruent to His admirable dispensation: therefore he holds that the souls of the reprobate, who desert God, are subject to the divine order: but that divine order is the very eternal law of God, by which it is just that all things be most excellently ordered: therefore etc. St. Anselm explains this truth clearly in book 1, Cur Deus homo: As those things, he says, which are contained within the compass of heaven cannot but be under heaven, nor can they in any way withdraw from heaven except by drawing near to it; so although no Angel or man should will to be subject to the divine will, yet he cannot flee it: for if he wills to flee it under the willing that commands, he flees under the willing that punishes. Boethius elegantly explains the same thing in book 4, De Consolatione, prose 6: It embraces all things, he says, so that if anyone depart from the assigned order, he falls back into another order. For the eternal law itself is like a circle: he who flees one part draws near to another: and thus although the wicked have departed from it as regards its precept, they are nevertheless under it as regards punishment.

You will say 1. From the Apostle, 1 Timoth. 1: The law is not made for the just, but for the unjust and disobedient: whence the Gloss, made, not imposed, that it may be above him, and rule over him; for he is rather in the law and with the law, because he is a friend of justice. —

Alexander of Hales answers, article 2, chapter 1, that to be under the law is taken in two ways; namely either by necessity of compulsion, or by the will of obeying: for otherwise the son is under the father, and otherwise the servant, because the servant is under the father compelled by necessity of fear, but the son by the will of obeying: whence the consequence must be distinguished: the just are not under the law by necessity and subjection of compulsion, I concede: by subjection of voluntary obedience, I deny: for the Gloss says on Psalm 1, expounding those words, in the law of the Lord is his will, it is one thing to be in the law, another to be under the law; he who is in the law acts according to the law: he who is under it is compelled by necessity of fear; but in this manner the just are not under the law, but in the first manner.

You will say 2. From the Apostle to the Romans 8: The wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God: but the wicked and the reprobate are said to be the wisdom of the flesh: therefore they are not subject to the eternal law. —

I distinguish the major: it is not subject to the law, by voluntarily obeying it so that through obedience it may obtain rewards, I concede: it is not subject to the law by necessity of vengeance, inasmuch as undoubtedly on account of its disorder, and its conflict with the eternal law of God, it draws down upon itself deserved punishment, I deny: for, as we have said, they who are not subject to the law as regards precept ought themselves to be subject as regards punishment.