Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

Three things above all come to be resolved here in this Question: First, whether the eternal law is altogether invariable and immutable. Second, whether it is truly the fountain and origin of all other laws, both natural and positive. Third, whether it is one or manifold.

NOTE 1. From our Alensi, in the place cited, member 2, the eternal law can be known comprehensively by no creature whatsoever, but by God alone: for since this law is nothing else than the first unchangeable truth, or God himself, it is certain that as God alone knows and comprehends himself, so he alone can comprehend the eternal law, and know its infinite pre-eminence and all its endowments. Wherefore St. Augustine, book 3 of the Confessions, chapter 3, says: I was ignorant, and knew not the true inward justice from the most just law of almighty God, by which the manners of regions were formed, since that law itself was everywhere. Hence in book De vera religione, chapter 31, he says: There is a law according to which God judges all things, and of which none can judge. Nevertheless this eternal law of God can be known by creatures, not only intuitively by the Blessed, but even discursively by Wayfarers, namely in the effects, which bear some likeness and irradiation or participation of it, greater or lesser: partly because all knowledge of truth is a certain irradiation of the eternal law: and there is no knowledge in intellectual creatures that does not know truth, and therefore none that does not have some knowledge of the eternal law: partly because all rational creatures have impressed upon them the natural law, which is nothing else than a certain participation and spark of the eternal law: and finally, because there is no creature possessed of reason who cannot judge from the most orderly administration of this Universe that all things subsist so steadfastly and unchangeably through the divine and supreme governance of the divine Administrator. Hence St. Augustine, book De vera religione, chapter 30, says: The reason of the eternal law is impressed upon us: for it is that by which it is just that all things be most orderly. Therefore although we cannot comprehend that eternal law, nevertheless we can know it through its various effects, as one who does not see the Sun in its substance perceives it by its irradiation and diffused light.

NOTE 2. A twofold causality of the eternal law with regard to the other laws can be distinguished: one belongs to the genus of efficient cause, inasmuch as God, concurring with intellectual nature through the light of reason — which is held to be the proximate principle of created law — and applying the intellect of the Prince to preceptive judgment, is said to be the universal cause of all laws. For since in all ordered movers the virtue of the second mover is derived from the first mover, and since God is the universal cause infusing being into all effects, hence by the eternal law, which is in him the supreme reason of government and administration, he is held to concur in the constitution of the other laws: for the eternal law itself is like a certain universal cause infusing its power into all laws. The other causality pertains to the genus of exemplar cause, because every created law can be held to have the power of directing and regulating human acts insofar as it conforms to the eternal law, as to its supreme and most perfect exemplar in regulating.

NOTE 3. In every law a threefold state can be distinguished. The first indeed is that which it has in the internal disposition of the Legislator, inasmuch as in his mind that law is already held to be drawn up, and established by his absolute decree and firm will. The second state is that which the law has when externally constituted and set forth to subjects by whom it is to be fulfilled. The third finally is with respect to the things which are commanded by that law. Considered in the prior manner, the eternal law is an internal act of God, whereby he decrees from eternity what is to be fulfilled by creatures in time: but in the latter manners it is held to be something external. Now by which of these modes it is held to be invariable and multipliable will here have to be determined.

First Conclusion. — THE ETERNAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE LEGISLATOR IS IMMUTABLE: BUT MUTABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT OVER WHICH IT COMMANDS, AND TO THE MATTER ABOUT WHICH IT IS CONCERNED. This Conclusion embraces three parts, which St. Augustine hands down and confirms. The first indeed in book 3. Confessionum, c. 7. where he says: I was ignorant of the true inward justice which judged not by custom, but by the most upright law of almighty God, by which the manners of regions and days were formed according to regions and days; while that law itself was everywhere and always, not one thing here and another there, nor different at different times. But whatever is such, says Alensi in member 5, is simply immutable: therefore the eternal law is simply immutable. The same St. Augustine confirms this very thing in the book De vera religione, where, speaking of that eternal law, he says: Who doubts that this law neither grows greater nor less with the intervals of places and times, since its power surpasses all things? This is the law of all arts, since it is altogether immutable. But the three parts of the Conclusion he explains and proves together in book 1 De libero arbitrio, chapter 6, where he says: That law which is called the highest reason, which must always be obeyed: by which the wicked merit a wretched life, the good a good life: by which finally that law which we said must be called temporal is rightly borne and rightly changed: cannot but seem to anyone understanding it unchangeable and eternal. As if he said: The eternal law, which is the highest reason of things to be done by God, is altogether immutable in itself: although its effects are mutable, because they are temporal.

The Conclusion is likewise proved by theological reason: Every internal act of the divine intellect and of the divine will is altogether invariable in itself: but mutable with respect to the diverse intrinsic objects at which it terminates: now the eternal law of God itself is an act both of intellect and of will: for indeed it is the highest reason and the absolute decree of God whereby God from eternity determined and ordered what is to be fulfilled by creatures in time etc. The major stands from what we have said concerning the immutability of the divine will. The minor likewise is clear from what has been said above.

You will say 1. Every commanding law contrary to another is mutable: for the law varies according to the variation of commands: but the eternal law commands contraries, as St. Augustine indicates in the books of the Confessions, saying: Lord, if now you command what you sometimes enjoined, who doubts that this must be done? —

Alensi distinguishes the major: Every commanding law contrary according to contrary reasons is mutable, I concede: otherwise, he denies. Likewise, the minor being distinguished, he denies the consequence: for the eternal law never commands diverse things according to contrary reasons, but according to one immutable reason, namely according to that which it judges to accord with the wise ordering of things according to the variety of times. Whence the whole change must be referred to the temporal things themselves, and not to the eternal law. For as Alensi says, just as the art of medicine, while it remains the same and is by no means changed, yet changes its prescriptions for the sick, because our health is mutable, so the divine Providence, though altogether unchangeable, yet succours the mutable variety of the creature according to the diversity of maladies: it commands or forbids different things to different ones: whence there is variety in the temporal effect.

You will say 2. Every judgment uttered under condition, and not absolutely, is mutable, especially that which depends besides upon free choice: but the judgment of the eternal law is uttered under condition, and not absolutely, and especially depends upon free choice: therefore the judgment of the eternal law is mutable: and consequently that law also is mutable. The minor is clear: because the eternal law nowhere judged nor said absolutely: this man shall be damned; but always under this condition: if he be finally evil: likewise it did not say absolutely: this man shall be saved; but under this condition: if he be finally good: but each of these conditions of final goodness or wickedness depends on free choice, and consequently the judgment of the eternal law, depending on that final goodness and wickedness, is mutable. —

I answer with Alensi, distinguishing the major: that judgment is mutable according to the act by which it is uttered, and the subject into which it is uttered, I concede: according to the reason by which it is uttered, I deny. And likewise, the minor being distinguished, the consequence must be denied. It is true indeed that although it is contingent that this man will remain finally in wickedness or in final goodness, nevertheless it is not contingent that if he remain in final wickedness he will be punished; nor is it equally contingent that if he persevere finally in goodness and in the state of grace he will be rewarded. For, says Alensi, the eternal law of God, and the reason which says that if you remain in evil finally, you shall be punished; and if you remain in final goodness, you shall be rewarded: this reason, I say, is altogether immutable and absolute: nor does it depend in any way upon the free choice of man persevering in grace or in sin: just as upon either perseverance depends the infliction of punishment or the bestowal of reward. Alensi explains this distinction otherwise, saying that the eternal law is mutable according to the sentence, but not according to the counsel, according to that saying of St. Gregory: God changes not his counsel, but his sentence:

But counsel, he says, is the divine reason according to which God judges and disposes all things: while sentence is the very name given to the temporal effect which follows from the counsel and ordination of God. If therefore, he says, we speak of the law according to the reason of counsel, it is itself immutable; if according to the reason of sentence, thus it is mutable, because the very temporal effect following from it is changed daily; but that very reason according to which he judges and disposes, and from which the effect is derived, remains immutable. And so in the first manner the eternal law is named, namely insofar as it is taken for counsel or reason; but insofar as it is taken according to sentence, it is called not eternal, but temporal.

Second conclusion. — ALL JUST LAWS, PROPERLY SO CALLED, ARE DERIVED FROM THE ETERNAL LAW.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture, for in Proverbs 8 divine Wisdom testifies: By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things. Hence in John 19 Christ, addressing Pilate, said: Thou shouldst not have any power against me, unless it were given thee from above. Wherefore the Apostle in Romans 13 rightly affirms that there is no power but of God: and he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God. This is so true that even the very power of tyrants is derived from God himself, who grants them kingdom and principality on account of avenging the sins of the people: for although their judgments are unjust, yet it is just that the sins of the people be punished by unjust judgments: and this reason of just vengeance is derived from the eternal law.

And certainly St. Augustine lucidly expounds this truth in book 1 De libero arbitrio, c. 6, where he writes: In temporal law nothing is just and legitimate which men have not derived to themselves from this eternal law. And lib. 5. De Civit. Dei, cap. 21. Let us not attribute, he says, the power of giving kingdom and empire except to the true God, who gives the happiness of the kingdom of heaven to the pious: but the earthly kingdom both to the pious and to the impious, as it pleases him to whom nothing unjust is pleasing. And a little below: He who gave to Marius gave also to Gaius Caesar: who to Augustus, he also to Nero; who to the Vespasians, whether father or son, most gentle emperors, he also to Diocletian most cruel: and lest it be needful to go through each one, he who gave to Constantine the Christian, gave also to Julian the Apostate.

Proof 2. The conclusion touched upon by induction holds through all laws; since indeed the natural law itself is derived from the eternal law itself: for all goodness universally is from eternal goodness; and in turn the natural law, which instills in us what is good, is from the eternal law itself, and is a certain participation of it implanted and impressed upon our minds, according to that of Psalm 4: The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. The positive divine law is likewise a certain derivation of that eternal law, seeing that God prescribes nothing to man in time whose reason he had not from eternity in himself. Finally, all human laws, whether gathered and established through human inquiry, or from natural light and reason, or from revealed reason, are also deduced from the eternal law of God itself: since indeed the natural and divine law, from which human laws are inferred, take their origin from the eternal law of God itself, by equal reason all those human laws ought to be judged deduced from it. Whence St. Augustine, book 1 De libero arbitrio, c. 5: In temporal law nothing is just and legitimate which men have not derived to themselves from the eternal law. Which is surely confirmed according to that of James 1: Every best gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, descending from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.

You will say. Those laws cannot be derived from the eternal law of God which are opposed to it and establish things contrary to it: but human laws are sometimes of this kind: for human law leaves unpunished what is just to punish; for St. Augustine says, in the book praised just above, book 1 De libero arbitrio, cap. 5, from that law which is borne for the governing of cities, it grants much, and leaves unpunished, things which are avenged by divine Providence: therefore some human laws do not accord with the eternal law of God. Moreover, human law judges free and exempt from punishment those whom the eternal law of God itself consigns to torments, as St. Augustine confirms in the same place by the example of those who kill lest they be killed, or lest they lose temporal goods. For how, he says, before that law, namely the eternal law, are those free from sin who for these things which ought to be contemned are guilty of human slaughter? Finally, human law grants some evils to be done, likewise out of an affection of lust and disordered will, which certainly the eternal law of God forbids, for instance to kill a man for preserving his possessions: whence St. Augustine in the same place: How can I judge those to be without lust who fight with the sword for those things which they can lose unharmed? or if they cannot, what need is there for these things to proceed even to the killing of a man? Therefore since human laws for the most part oppose the eternal law of God, they do not seem to be derived from it. —

I distinguish the major: human laws are not derived from the eternal law of God which positively oppose it as contrary, and according to the reason of injustice, and with perfect contrariety — this I concede: which oppose it only negatively, and by reason of a less perfect conformity — this I deny. And similarly the minor must be distinguished. Whence to the authorities of St. Augustine it must be said, first indeed, that temporal law ought to punish only those things which run counter to its end, which is the conciliation of peace among men: whence it does not take upon itself the avenging of evils which disturb the peace of man with God; for it leaves these to be avenged by the eternal law of God, which the same Augustine explains in the same place, saying: It seems to me that this law, which is written for the Roman people, does rightly permit, and that vengeance is taken by divine Providence; for it takes upon itself the avenging of those things which suffice for conciliating peace among unskilled men. Similarly, although temporal law exempts from punishment those whom the eternal law adjudges to torments, still they do not seem to conflict with one another; for human law punishes evils only so far as it detects them running counter to its end, namely the conciliating of peace among men; but the eternal law, since it regards not only the peace to be conciliated among men, but also in God himself, thence it comes to pass that it sometimes accounts guilty those whom human law absolves: whence in the same place St. Augustine says: Indeed I even approve this law, namely temporal law, though uncultivated and less perfect: it seems that the former leaves many things unpunished which nevertheless are avenged by divine Providence, and rightly. Finally, to the third point the same Augustine replies that nowhere does temporal law command anything to be done out of lust; for by hypothesis when someone repels force from himself, either he does it justly and in order, for instance for the sake of defending citizens, as a soldier or judge, who is the minister of the law: or he does it inordinately. If the first, he ought to obey the law without lust which commands it. If the second, the law does not command it, but leaves it in his power: for it is free to that man to kill a man for those things which unwillingly he can lose.

You will say 2. If all human laws were derived from the eternal law, they would not be contrary to one another: but it is established that human laws, even just ones, are sometimes even contrary to one another: therefore etc. —

I deny the consequence; for they are contrary precisely because the eternal law demands such contrariety among them: since indeed the eternal law is most orderly, it exacts, according to the various circumstances which occur in subjects, that a change be made in law: otherwise there would be disorder if those who are variously affected were directed by the same laws. Whence St. Augustine, book De vera religione cap. 17: As the medical art, while it remains the same, is in no way itself changed, yet changes its precepts for the sick, because our health is mutable, so divine Providence, while it is itself immutable, succors the mutability of the creature in various ways, and according to the diversity of members commands one thing to some, another to others, or forbids.

You will say 3. Human laws are not derived from the eternal law, neither as conclusions, because human law does not follow necessarily from the principles of the eternal law; nor as determinations of the same eternal law, because men, the founders of laws, are ignorant of what was ordained from eternity concerning the laws which they establish: therefore etc. —

I answer, human laws are derived from the eternal law through the mediation of the natural law, from which they proceed either by way of conclusion from principles, as for example from the fact that evil is not to be done, the conclusion is gathered from that natural precept, that the innocent is not to be killed: but certain ones are derived by way of determination, as for example the law of nature, that he who has sinned ought to be punished: but that he should be punished by such and such a punishment, this is determined by human law. Those of the first kind have their force not only from human law, but also from natural law: but those which are established in the second manner obtain their force from human law alone: whence although the founder of a law may be ignorant of what was ordained from eternity concerning the law he establishes, still he is not ignorant of the natural law, which is the primary derivation of the eternal law, and by its presence he judges what ought to be established in those circumstances conformably to the law of nature.

You will say 4. If human laws are derived from the eternal law, they would oblige to their observance by divine right: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. —

I deny the consequence, because only those things bind by divine law which are from God as from the Legislator immediately; but such are not human laws, which are derived from the natural law to the eternal law only through the mediation of human prudence.

You will say 5. Concupiscence, which the Apostle calls the law of the flesh, or of the

fomes, is a true law: but that law is derived from the eternal law: therefore etc. The major is clear from that passage of the Apostle to the Romans 7. I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind and capturing me in the law of sin: Whence the Gloss: the law of sin is rightly called a law; because it is legitimately established, that he who did not obey his superior, his inferior does not serve him, namely the flesh. The minor likewise is evident, for that law of the fomes is evil, since as the Gloss says on these words of Paul to the Romans 8. The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath delivered me, there are two good laws: the law of the Spirit which takes away sin: the law of Moses by which sin is shown: the law of sin is evil, which makes men guilty: but that which is evil in itself cannot be derived from the eternal law of God: whence the Apostle to the Romans 8. The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the Divine law. —

Alexander of Hales answers, n. 6. a. 2. that the fomes in us is a punishment inflicted on account of the sin of Adam: but, he says, there is a twofold punishment, namely of deformity, and of passibility. Inasmuch as the fomes is a punishment of deformity, so it is not from God, because its act is deformed: because an act of deformation cannot be from God as from its principle, but from the devil. But inasmuch as it itself is a punishment of passibility and affliction, namely insofar as it afflicts the soul, so it is from God: for this affliction is temporal, and unto good, so that man compelled may return and be converted to God: for from this, that the soul sees itself so cast down, and subjected to such vileness and corruption, it is converted more quickly to God. And thus the fomes insofar as it is a punishment of passibility is from God, and ordered to God: for it is from divine justice. Therefore the law of the fomes can in one way be called the law of passibility: in another way the law of deformity. In the first way it is as afflicting: and in this way the Apostle calls it the law of the members. In this way it is, and is derived from, the eternal law: for it is called the law of passibility, that is, according as man through it has the law, that he be afflicted by it, and be converted to God: for in this way it regards the order of divine Justice. But inasmuch as the law of the fomes is called the law of deformity, so it is called by the Apostle the Law of sin: and thus that law is not from the eternal law, but from the devil, or from sin, because that law is evil.

Third Conclusion. — THE ETERNAL LAW CONSIDERED IN ITSELF IS ONE ALONE: BUT ACCORDING TO ITS DIVERSE CONNOTATION TOWARD EXTERIOR THINGS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO IT, IT CAN BE RECKONED AS MULTIPLE.

This is Alexander of Hales, memb. 6.

He proves the first part, first indeed by the authority of St. Augustine saying in book Confessions: As the art of Medicine is one, and yet has a difference of precepts, so the eternal law is related to temporal laws, as the art of medicine to its precepts. Therefore St. Augustine holds that the eternal law considered in itself is one alone, nor does it admit plurality.

He proves secondly: If the eternal law of God is to be reckoned multiple, chiefly on account of the diversity of respects which it bears to things subject to it: but so it is not: for plurality is not admitted in divine things on account of diversity of respects toward what is external; otherwise, since this name Creator, e.g., involves several respects to created things, it would follow that several Creators could be said, which certainly is absurd: therefore similarly the diversity of the respects of the eternal law to temporal laws, and also to temporal things which are subject to it, does not introduce diversity into the eternal law itself.

Yet Alexander of Hales adds, that the eternal law can be considered either as it is the art, and exemplary cause of temporal laws, or as it is the reason constituting individual things in their due order, and enduring them to an end special and congruent to themselves, according to their dignity, and utility peculiar to them. Whence it comes about that the eternal law regarded as it is the eternal art of good and truth is said to be one alone: similarly as it is the reason ordering things to the divine and ultimate end, it is likewise one, because indeed there is one sole reason by which God orders and disposes all things created by himself on account of himself even unto his own glory: but inasmuch as things regard ends peculiar to themselves, there can be said to be several particular reasons in God by respect to diverse connotates, because indeed things are ordered among themselves variously by reason of their dignity and utility.

YOU ASK: Whether the Eternal Law itself is appropriated to the divine Essence, or to some Person?

THE SAME ALEXANDER OF HALES ANSWERS, memb. 4. That the eternal law is to be attributed immediately to the divine essence: since it is an absolute perfection of God common to the three divine Persons. Nevertheless it can be appropriated variously to the adorable Persons themselves: for since three things concur to any law whatsoever, namely authority, truth, and goodness, which concur that it be a law, namely the principle of law, the form of law, and the end: for by reason of the principle authority is owed to it, because no one can be the principle of law unless he has authority: but by reason of form truth is owed to it, because law is never borne without true reason: likewise by reason of the end goodness is owed to it, because law is not except unto good: whence the law is called a holy sanction, commanding the honest, and prohibiting the contrary. If therefore we regard authority in the eternal law, it is said to be in God according to the reason or intention of power; and thus it is appropriated to the person of the Father. But if we regard truth, according to the formal reason, thus it is appropriated to Wisdom, and so it befits the person of the Son. But regarding goodness, which is owed by reason of the end, thus it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. — From these it is clear how the effects and acts of law, namely to command, to forbid, to counsel, and to permit, to punish, and to reward, befit the eternal law; for the acts of commanding and forbidding befit it by reason of authority; but those two acts of counseling and permitting are attributed to it by reason of truth; but those two acts of punishing and rewarding pertain to it by reason of goodness. For it must be known that in law there ought to be found the reason of power, that it may command or forbid: likewise the reason of truth or wisdom, that it may be able to permit or counsel; finally the reason of goodness, that it may punish misdeeds, and recompense good deeds, for this pertains to goodness; and thus according to diverse reasons law comprehends power, wisdom, and goodness. Moreover, the aforesaid acts of law can be distributed according to the diverse powers and faculties of the soul, for to counsel and to permit regard the rational, for they are acts of law by reason of truth and wisdom, and this pertains to the rational: but to command and to forbid pertain to the irascible; but to punish, and to bestow reward pertain to the concupiscible; and thus it appears how the eternal law according to diverse intentions, and diverse acts, is appropriated to the three adorable Persons.