Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

The divine reason, in which the eternal law is chiefly established, can be considered in three ways: First, inasmuch as it is the knowledge of all effects, both actual and possible: for the Apostle says to the Romans 4: he calleth those things which are not, as those that are, God knowing them. Second, inasmuch as it is operative of creatures, namely by unfolding the divine will to it, and by demonstrating to it possible creatures, to which it can grant existence through its divine decree: wherefore it is said in the Psalm that he made the heavens in understanding. Finally, third, divine knowledge can be regarded inasmuch as it is directive and governing of all creatures toward their ends. Now in this last acceptation of divine knowledge the eternal law of God seems chiefly to be established.

Note 2. That although the eternal divine law agrees with the divine providence in this, that each seems to be a direction and ordination of things whatsoever toward ends fitting to themselves, nevertheless the eternal law seems to be distinguished from the divine Providence in many respects. First, indeed, in this, that it contains the most general rules by which created things are ordered to their ends: whence it regards per se and primarily the good of the Universe: but the divine Providence embraces only private and particular rules by which each thing is directed to its end, and regards the singular good of each thing. Second, the eternal law imports a power of binding; but Providence infers no obligation. Third, Providence is compared to the eternal law as a particular conclusion to a universal principle; for just as positive law hands down rules in general, v. g. that God is to be worshipped, according to which prudence gathers that here and now one must act: so the eternal law in God hands down general rules by which God intends the universe to be governed; for instance, that the stone move downward, but fire upward: that good be pursued, and evil fled: but Providence disposes the motions of creatures in particular according to the special good of each: and therefore Providence is reduced to the eternal law as to a principle.

Note 3. That the eternal law is distinguished from the other laws in this, that the eternal law is not a law given, but bearing; not impressed, but expressing: not the participation of some law, but the origin and fountain of all others: for from it all temporal laws are derived, which are therefore called impressed and participated laws. Moreover the eternal law is immutable: but the other laws are mutable: whence St. Augustine, book De Vera Religione, c. 17. says:

As the art of medicine, while it remains the same and is in no way itself changed, yet changes its precepts for the sick, because our health is mutable: so the divine Providence (which he here uses for the eternal law), though it be altogether immutable, yet succors mutable nature in varied ways, and according to the diversity of diseases commands or forbids different things useful to different men: whence it does not begin to exist, since from death they tend back to their own nature, that is, toward nothingness, by reason of what they lack — rather it reduces and establishes them.

Hence the same St. Augustine, book 1. De Libero Arbitrio, having asked: Why therefore is this one law, from which all other temporal laws for the governing of men are varied, not able on that account to be itself varied in any way? Evodius answers:

I understand that it cannot altogether; for no force, no chance, no collapse of things has ever effected that it not be just that all things be most orderly, and whatsoever things flow forth from the eternal law, however variable, do not cease to be from it as from an unvarying one.

Finally, third, the eternal law and the temporal are distinguished, in that mortal men, and as yet miserable, are subject to the latter; but those gifted with beatitude and enjoying God, as Evodius excellently unfolds with the same Augustine in the same place c. 10. saying: I think that the blessed, for the love of those eternal things, live under the eternal law; but upon the miserable the temporal is imposed.

These things thus premised, two things briefly remain here to be unfolded: The first, whether this eternal law of God distinct from the other laws is to be admitted. The second, what is its genuine definition.

First conclusion. — TRULY THE ETERNAL LAW OF GOD IS TO BE ADMITTED, NAMELY WHEREBY GOD FROM ETERNITY ORDAINED WHAT THINGS ARE TO BE DONE OR AVOIDED BY A RATIONAL CREATURE, THAT IT MAY ATTAIN THE END PRESCRIBED FOR ITSELF. Thus commonly the Theologians with our Alensis 3. part. qu. 26. memb. 1. which certainly is confirmed first by the authorities of St. Augustine praised in the first Notable, —

It can also be confirmed by the very consensus of the wisest of the Philosophers; for Cicero says in book 2. De Legibus.

It was the opinion of the wisest that law was neither devised by the genius of men, nor any device of peoples, but something eternal, which governs the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding. And therefore they said that that chief and ultimate law was the mind of all things ratione, either compelling, that is commanding, or forbidding, of God: from which law, when they gave it to the human race from the gods, it is rightly praised.

Alensis proves the conclusion in the place cited by three reasons. First: no evil ought to go unpunished; and therefore every evil ought to be punished by the ordination of some law: but every evil is not punished by the temporal law; for St. Augustine says in book 1. De Libero arbitrio, cap. 5. That law, which is borne for the governing of cities, seems to concede and leave unpunished many things, which are avenged by the divine Providence: therefore the eternal law ought to be admitted, whose application that divine Providence is, whereby those sins may be punished. — Second. very many temporal laws are mutually contrary, and must continually be reconciled in some rule of justice: but they cannot be so reconciled except by a law having nothing contrary to it, such as is the eternal; and therefore it is to be admitted. The major stands from St. August. lib. 1. De Libero arbitrio, c. 6. Two laws seem so contrary to themselves, that one of them grants the power of conferring honor upon the people: the other does not, so that in no way could they be together in one city; shall we say that any of them is unjust, and ought by no means to have been borne? — Finally, it is necessary that there be some law in God: but this cannot be except eternal: therefore it is necessary that there be an eternal law. The minor stands. For God is immutable, and consequently nothing can happen to him anew. The major similarly appears: for since God has Providence, there is necessarily supposed in him a certain practical reason of the whole governance of the Universe, according to that of Boethius 3. De Consolatione: who governest the world with perpetual reason, wherefore the same, lib. 4. Prosa 6. says: Providence is the divine reason constituted by the supreme Prince, whereby he disposes all things: therefore that reason of God holds the true reason of an eternal law; for, says St. Isidore 2. Ethymologiarum, if law consists in reason, everything constituted by reason will be a law.

You will say. Law necessarily requires someone to whom it can be prescribed: but from eternity there existed no one to whom a law could be prescribed: therefore no eternal law could have existed. The major is evident, for law is an act of command; and it conflicts that there be a command unless there exist a subject to whom the command is given. The minor likewise holds, since from eternity God alone existed, to whom a law would have to be given and fulfilled. I deny. Similarly I distinguish the proof of the minor: that a command cannot be eternal in fact, and actually intimated to a subject, I concede: that it cannot from eternity be conceived in the divine will, which decrees from eternity all things that will be committed to execution at different times, I deny.

You will say 2. It belongs to the nature of law that it be promulgated; since law is an ordinance made by superior authority in one having a community, intimated to subjects, and promulgated: but from eternity there could be no promulgation of any law, seeing that from eternity there were no creatures to whom a law could be promulgated: therefore no law could have been from eternity. — Alexander of Hales answers that law can be considered as derived either from legendo, reading, or from ligando, binding. In the former way, it is certain that it is eternal, because in the mind of God it was read forth and made manifest, and, as it were, narrated: but in this way it had no need of promulgation. But according to the latter derivation, namely inasmuch as law binds, it can again be regarded in two ways, namely actively or passively: that is, either on the part of God, or on the part of the creature bound or obligated by the law to do or omit something. In the former way it can be called eternal, if not according to act, at least according to habit; for, he says, the same distinction must be made of the law binding in God as of the divine dominion; and divine dominion is spoken of either according to habit, or according to act. Therefore just as dominion is said of God in habit from eternity, dominion in act from time, so law, if it does not import a habit of binding, is thus from eternity in disposition to bind, and in this way it is called the eternal law; but if it imports an act of binding, not so. Whence, in sum, he answers that it is enough with respect to the nature of law that it have of itself the force of binding, although it does not yet actually bind, because it has not yet been applied and promulgated.

I answer 2. the promulgation of law can be considered either on the part of the legislator promulgating, or on the part of the subject to whom it is promulgated. In the former way the law is prior in the legislator promulgating than in the subject to whom it is promulgated: whence in form I answer by distinguishing the minor: no law could be promulgated from eternity, the promulgation being taken on the part of creatures, I concede: the promulgation being taken on the part of God, the supreme legislator, I deny. But the reason why this promulgation on the part of God the legislator suffices, while that promulgation on the part of the human legislator does not suffice, and human laws necessarily require to be made known to subjects by promulgation, is evident: namely because, since the eternal law is the immutable decree of God, it is altogether unchangeable: whence without any change in itself, issued from eternity, it will oblige in time: but the decree of man is changeable; hence so long as it is not promulgated in the manner of a law, it always stands rather in the manner of a proposal to enact a law, which can be revoked, than in the manner of a law firmly established and enacted. Whence in the eternal law no other public promulgation is required in order that it oblige in act, but only that it come to the notice of the subject. Wherefore if the decree of the divine will were made known to us by internal revelation, this would suffice to oblige.

Second conclusion. — ST. AUGUSTINE SETS FORTH A THREEFOLD DEFINITION OF THE ETERNAL LAW. The first indeed in book De libero arbitrio, c. 6, saying, that I may briefly explain the name of the eternal law, it is that by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered. The second he sets forth in the book

De vera Religione, chapter 31. The eternal law is the immutable truth, which is the law of all arts, and the law of the omnipotent Artificer. The third finally in the same book, and chapter De libero arbitrio, when he says that the eternal law is the supreme reason to which it is always due that we obey: by which the wicked merit misery, the good a good life: by which that which is temporal is rightly borne and rightly changed.

But Alexander of Hales weighs this threefold definition in the same place:

The eternal law, he says, can be considered with respect to goods, or evils: or inasmuch as it regards goods alone. And this in two ways, because it can be considered inasmuch as it regards goods generally, or goods specially, qua they are the goods of a rational creature alone. Therefore as to the first notion, this definition suits it: The eternal law is that by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered: for the eternal law, inasmuch as it is the right of ordering, regards goods and evils: because God makes and orders good things: but evil he does not make, yet orders it: whence as to order is the common act of the law itself with respect to goods and evils, so is the notion of it as it regards goods and evils. But inasmuch as it regards goods generally, whether they be the goods of a rational creature or of an irrational one, this definition suits it: the eternal law is the law of all arts, and the law of the omnipotent Artificer. For inasmuch as it is the art of the omnipotent Artificer, it regards the divine cause, which is the art and cause of all goods. But inasmuch as it regards the goods of a rational creature alone, this definition suits it: The eternal law is the supreme reason to which it is always due that we obey, etc. For the rational creature is to be ordered through laws, whence temporal law is borne by man; and over men: and so since it belongs to him to enact temporal laws, as is said in the definition, it is clear that this is with respect to the rational creature. Likewise what it says: to which it is always due that we obey, suits it with respect to the rational creature, because to the rational creature alone belongs that act which is to obey.

It must be observed, however, that the last of those three definitions or descriptions seems more fitting: for the two former rather regard providence than the eternal law. The third, however, explains the eternal law itself more lucidly. — It could nevertheless be defined more briefly and clearly, by saying that the eternal law is the very reason of the divine wisdom, or the very act of the divine will, whereby God from eternity decreed that the rational creature be bound in time to do this or that thing, or to abstain from it. —

The eternal law is the supreme directive reason of all actions and motions. It is called 1. reason, because every law is an ordination of reason or mind. It is called 2. supreme reason, because it is the ultimate and highest rule to which the ordering of creatures toward their end is required. It is called 3. the directive reason of all actions and motions, because it is concerned with actions and motions, inasmuch as motions and actions are the means by which every creature tends toward the end owed to it.

Proof 2. from the authority of St. Augustine, who defines the eternal law thus, book 22. Contra Faustum, chapter 21.: The eternal law is the divine reason, or the will of God, commanding that the natural order be preserved, forbidding that it be disturbed. Now the natural order of the rational creature is that it be subject to God through love, and that every creature, even itself, be above it through the same love. The natural order of the irrational creature is that it stand in that place in which the whole natural order requires. Again it is defined by the same Doctor thus: The eternal law is that by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered, book 1. De libero arbitrio, chapter 6.

You will say. To the eternal law praised shortly before from St. Augustine, it is always due that we obey: but to the divine will it is not always due that we submit; for from the same St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, a good son can with a good will wish his father to live, whom God wishes to die: therefore the eternal law is not rightly called the will of God. — Alexander of Hales answers the minor in the place cited, that

the rectitude of our will is not always attended in its conformity to the divine will with respect to the thing willed, but with respect to the one willing. For the motion of the will is compared to the one willing, and to the thing willed: therefore the conformity of my will to the divine must always be with respect to the one willing, but not always with respect to the thing willed: whence I ought to conform myself to him in such a way that I will what God wills me to will, but not so that I will whatever he wills. Whence upon that text Rectos decet collaudatio, the Gloss says: It is fitting that whatsoever God wills you to will, you also will: it does not say that you will whatsoever God wills; and thus the good son, willing his father to live, whom God wills to die, conforms his will, and obeys the divine will: because he himself wills himself to will it, namely that the father live. And this, Augustine says, he wills, that the son himself should will the father to live out of natural piety, whom he wills to die out of his own judgment.