Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

St. Augustine, in book 1 of De Libero Arbitrio, chapters 5 and 6, calls the eternal law the supreme reason existing in God, which must always be obeyed, or the supreme reason by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered; or, as he says in book 22 of Contra Faustum, chapter 27: The eternal law is the reason or will of God commanding that the order of nature be preserved and forbidding that it be disturbed. Concerning this law certain points must here be examined in the following Questions. The First will disclose whether there is a divine eternal law, and what it is: the Second, how manyfold it is and of what kind; the Third, what subjects it has.

The divine reason, in which the eternal law is chiefly established, can be considered in three ways: First, inasmuch as it is the knowledge of all effects, both actual and possible: for the Apostle says to the Romans 4: he calleth those things which are not, as those that are, God knowing them. Second, inasmuch as it is operative of creatures, namely by unfolding the divine will to it, and by demonstrating to it possible creatures, to which it can grant existence through its divine decree: wherefore it is said in the Psalm that he made the heavens in understanding. Finally, third, divine knowledge can be regarded inasmuch as it is directive and governing of all creatures toward their ends. Now in this last acceptation of divine knowledge the eternal law of God seems chiefly to be established.

Note 2. That although the eternal divine law agrees with the divine providence in this, that each seems to be a direction and ordination of things whatsoever toward ends fitting to themselves, nevertheless the eternal law seems to be distinguished from the divine Providence in many respects. First, indeed, in this, that it contains the most general rules by which created things are ordered to their ends: whence it regards per se and primarily the good of the Universe: but the divine Providence embraces only private and particular rules by which each thing is directed to its end, and regards the singular good of each thing. Second, the eternal law imports a power of binding; but Providence infers no obligation. Third, Providence is compared to the eternal law as a particular conclusion to a universal principle; for just as positive law hands down rules in general, v. g. that God is to be worshipped, according to which prudence gathers that here and now one must act: so the eternal law in God hands down general rules by which God intends the universe to be governed; for instance, that the stone move downward, but fire upward: that good be pursued, and evil fled: but Providence disposes the motions of creatures in particular according to the special good of each: and therefore Providence is reduced to the eternal law as to a principle.

Note 3. That the eternal law is distinguished from the other laws in this, that the eternal law is not a law given, but bearing; not impressed, but expressing: not the participation of some law, but the origin and fountain of all others: for from it all temporal laws are derived, which are therefore called impressed and participated laws. Moreover the eternal law is immutable: but the other laws are mutable: whence St. Augustine, book De Vera Religione, c. 17. says:

As the art of medicine, while it remains the same and is in no way itself changed, yet changes its precepts for the sick, because our health is mutable: so the divine Providence (which he here uses for the eternal law), though it be altogether immutable, yet succors mutable nature in varied ways, and according to the diversity of diseases commands or forbids different things useful to different men: whence it does not begin to exist, since from death they tend back to their own nature, that is, toward nothingness, by reason of what they lack — rather it reduces and establishes them.

Hence the same St. Augustine, book 1. De Libero Arbitrio, having asked: Why therefore is this one law, from which all other temporal laws for the governing of men are varied, not able on that account to be itself varied in any way? Evodius answers:

I understand that it cannot altogether; for no force, no chance, no collapse of things has ever effected that it not be just that all things be most orderly, and whatsoever things flow forth from the eternal law, however variable, do not cease to be from it as from an unvarying one.

Finally, third, the eternal law and the temporal are distinguished, in that mortal men, and as yet miserable, are subject to the latter; but those gifted with beatitude and enjoying God, as Evodius excellently unfolds with the same Augustine in the same place c. 10. saying: I think that the blessed, for the love of those eternal things, live under the eternal law; but upon the miserable the temporal is imposed.

These things thus premised, two things briefly remain here to be unfolded: The first, whether this eternal law of God distinct from the other laws is to be admitted. The second, what is its genuine definition.

First conclusion. — TRULY THE ETERNAL LAW OF GOD IS TO BE ADMITTED, NAMELY WHEREBY GOD FROM ETERNITY ORDAINED WHAT THINGS ARE TO BE DONE OR AVOIDED BY A RATIONAL CREATURE, THAT IT MAY ATTAIN THE END PRESCRIBED FOR ITSELF. Thus commonly the Theologians with our Alensis 3. part. qu. 26. memb. 1. which certainly is confirmed first by the authorities of St. Augustine praised in the first Notable, —

It can also be confirmed by the very consensus of the wisest of the Philosophers; for Cicero says in book 2. De Legibus.

It was the opinion of the wisest that law was neither devised by the genius of men, nor any device of peoples, but something eternal, which governs the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding. And therefore they said that that chief and ultimate law was the mind of all things ratione, either compelling, that is commanding, or forbidding, of God: from which law, when they gave it to the human race from the gods, it is rightly praised.

Alensis proves the conclusion in the place cited by three reasons. First: no evil ought to go unpunished; and therefore every evil ought to be punished by the ordination of some law: but every evil is not punished by the temporal law; for St. Augustine says in book 1. De Libero arbitrio, cap. 5. That law, which is borne for the governing of cities, seems to concede and leave unpunished many things, which are avenged by the divine Providence: therefore the eternal law ought to be admitted, whose application that divine Providence is, whereby those sins may be punished. — Second. very many temporal laws are mutually contrary, and must continually be reconciled in some rule of justice: but they cannot be so reconciled except by a law having nothing contrary to it, such as is the eternal; and therefore it is to be admitted. The major stands from St. August. lib. 1. De Libero arbitrio, c. 6. Two laws seem so contrary to themselves, that one of them grants the power of conferring honor upon the people: the other does not, so that in no way could they be together in one city; shall we say that any of them is unjust, and ought by no means to have been borne? — Finally, it is necessary that there be some law in God: but this cannot be except eternal: therefore it is necessary that there be an eternal law. The minor stands. For God is immutable, and consequently nothing can happen to him anew. The major similarly appears: for since God has Providence, there is necessarily supposed in him a certain practical reason of the whole governance of the Universe, according to that of Boethius 3. De Consolatione: who governest the world with perpetual reason, wherefore the same, lib. 4. Prosa 6. says: Providence is the divine reason constituted by the supreme Prince, whereby he disposes all things: therefore that reason of God holds the true reason of an eternal law; for, says St. Isidore 2. Ethymologiarum, if law consists in reason, everything constituted by reason will be a law.

You will say. Law necessarily requires someone to whom it can be prescribed: but from eternity there existed no one to whom a law could be prescribed: therefore no eternal law could have existed. The major is evident, for law is an act of command; and it conflicts that there be a command unless there exist a subject to whom the command is given. The minor likewise holds, since from eternity God alone existed, to whom a law would have to be given and fulfilled. I deny. Similarly I distinguish the proof of the minor: that a command cannot be eternal in fact, and actually intimated to a subject, I concede: that it cannot from eternity be conceived in the divine will, which decrees from eternity all things that will be committed to execution at different times, I deny.

You will say 2. It belongs to the nature of law that it be promulgated; since law is an ordinance made by superior authority in one having a community, intimated to subjects, and promulgated: but from eternity there could be no promulgation of any law, seeing that from eternity there were no creatures to whom a law could be promulgated: therefore no law could have been from eternity. — Alexander of Hales answers that law can be considered as derived either from legendo, reading, or from ligando, binding. In the former way, it is certain that it is eternal, because in the mind of God it was read forth and made manifest, and, as it were, narrated: but in this way it had no need of promulgation. But according to the latter derivation, namely inasmuch as law binds, it can again be regarded in two ways, namely actively or passively: that is, either on the part of God, or on the part of the creature bound or obligated by the law to do or omit something. In the former way it can be called eternal, if not according to act, at least according to habit; for, he says, the same distinction must be made of the law binding in God as of the divine dominion; and divine dominion is spoken of either according to habit, or according to act. Therefore just as dominion is said of God in habit from eternity, dominion in act from time, so law, if it does not import a habit of binding, is thus from eternity in disposition to bind, and in this way it is called the eternal law; but if it imports an act of binding, not so. Whence, in sum, he answers that it is enough with respect to the nature of law that it have of itself the force of binding, although it does not yet actually bind, because it has not yet been applied and promulgated.

I answer 2. the promulgation of law can be considered either on the part of the legislator promulgating, or on the part of the subject to whom it is promulgated. In the former way the law is prior in the legislator promulgating than in the subject to whom it is promulgated: whence in form I answer by distinguishing the minor: no law could be promulgated from eternity, the promulgation being taken on the part of creatures, I concede: the promulgation being taken on the part of God, the supreme legislator, I deny. But the reason why this promulgation on the part of God the legislator suffices, while that promulgation on the part of the human legislator does not suffice, and human laws necessarily require to be made known to subjects by promulgation, is evident: namely because, since the eternal law is the immutable decree of God, it is altogether unchangeable: whence without any change in itself, issued from eternity, it will oblige in time: but the decree of man is changeable; hence so long as it is not promulgated in the manner of a law, it always stands rather in the manner of a proposal to enact a law, which can be revoked, than in the manner of a law firmly established and enacted. Whence in the eternal law no other public promulgation is required in order that it oblige in act, but only that it come to the notice of the subject. Wherefore if the decree of the divine will were made known to us by internal revelation, this would suffice to oblige.

Second conclusion. — ST. AUGUSTINE SETS FORTH A THREEFOLD DEFINITION OF THE ETERNAL LAW. The first indeed in book De libero arbitrio, c. 6, saying, that I may briefly explain the name of the eternal law, it is that by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered. The second he sets forth in the book

De vera Religione, chapter 31. The eternal law is the immutable truth, which is the law of all arts, and the law of the omnipotent Artificer. The third finally in the same book, and chapter De libero arbitrio, when he says that the eternal law is the supreme reason to which it is always due that we obey: by which the wicked merit misery, the good a good life: by which that which is temporal is rightly borne and rightly changed.

But Alexander of Hales weighs this threefold definition in the same place:

The eternal law, he says, can be considered with respect to goods, or evils: or inasmuch as it regards goods alone. And this in two ways, because it can be considered inasmuch as it regards goods generally, or goods specially, qua they are the goods of a rational creature alone. Therefore as to the first notion, this definition suits it: The eternal law is that by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered: for the eternal law, inasmuch as it is the right of ordering, regards goods and evils: because God makes and orders good things: but evil he does not make, yet orders it: whence as to order is the common act of the law itself with respect to goods and evils, so is the notion of it as it regards goods and evils. But inasmuch as it regards goods generally, whether they be the goods of a rational creature or of an irrational one, this definition suits it: the eternal law is the law of all arts, and the law of the omnipotent Artificer. For inasmuch as it is the art of the omnipotent Artificer, it regards the divine cause, which is the art and cause of all goods. But inasmuch as it regards the goods of a rational creature alone, this definition suits it: The eternal law is the supreme reason to which it is always due that we obey, etc. For the rational creature is to be ordered through laws, whence temporal law is borne by man; and over men: and so since it belongs to him to enact temporal laws, as is said in the definition, it is clear that this is with respect to the rational creature. Likewise what it says: to which it is always due that we obey, suits it with respect to the rational creature, because to the rational creature alone belongs that act which is to obey.

It must be observed, however, that the last of those three definitions or descriptions seems more fitting: for the two former rather regard providence than the eternal law. The third, however, explains the eternal law itself more lucidly. — It could nevertheless be defined more briefly and clearly, by saying that the eternal law is the very reason of the divine wisdom, or the very act of the divine will, whereby God from eternity decreed that the rational creature be bound in time to do this or that thing, or to abstain from it. —

The eternal law is the supreme directive reason of all actions and motions. It is called 1. reason, because every law is an ordination of reason or mind. It is called 2. supreme reason, because it is the ultimate and highest rule to which the ordering of creatures toward their end is required. It is called 3. the directive reason of all actions and motions, because it is concerned with actions and motions, inasmuch as motions and actions are the means by which every creature tends toward the end owed to it.

Proof 2. from the authority of St. Augustine, who defines the eternal law thus, book 22. Contra Faustum, chapter 21.: The eternal law is the divine reason, or the will of God, commanding that the natural order be preserved, forbidding that it be disturbed. Now the natural order of the rational creature is that it be subject to God through love, and that every creature, even itself, be above it through the same love. The natural order of the irrational creature is that it stand in that place in which the whole natural order requires. Again it is defined by the same Doctor thus: The eternal law is that by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered, book 1. De libero arbitrio, chapter 6.

You will say. To the eternal law praised shortly before from St. Augustine, it is always due that we obey: but to the divine will it is not always due that we submit; for from the same St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, a good son can with a good will wish his father to live, whom God wishes to die: therefore the eternal law is not rightly called the will of God. — Alexander of Hales answers the minor in the place cited, that

the rectitude of our will is not always attended in its conformity to the divine will with respect to the thing willed, but with respect to the one willing. For the motion of the will is compared to the one willing, and to the thing willed: therefore the conformity of my will to the divine must always be with respect to the one willing, but not always with respect to the thing willed: whence I ought to conform myself to him in such a way that I will what God wills me to will, but not so that I will whatever he wills. Whence upon that text Rectos decet collaudatio, the Gloss says: It is fitting that whatsoever God wills you to will, you also will: it does not say that you will whatsoever God wills; and thus the good son, willing his father to live, whom God wills to die, conforms his will, and obeys the divine will: because he himself wills himself to will it, namely that the father live. And this, Augustine says, he wills, that the son himself should will the father to live out of natural piety, whom he wills to die out of his own judgment.

Three things above all come to be resolved here in this Question: First, whether the eternal law is altogether invariable and immutable. Second, whether it is truly the fountain and origin of all other laws, both natural and positive. Third, whether it is one or manifold.

NOTE 1. From our Alensi, in the place cited, member 2, the eternal law can be known comprehensively by no creature whatsoever, but by God alone: for since this law is nothing else than the first unchangeable truth, or God himself, it is certain that as God alone knows and comprehends himself, so he alone can comprehend the eternal law, and know its infinite pre-eminence and all its endowments. Wherefore St. Augustine, book 3 of the Confessions, chapter 3, says: I was ignorant, and knew not the true inward justice from the most just law of almighty God, by which the manners of regions were formed, since that law itself was everywhere. Hence in book De vera religione, chapter 31, he says: There is a law according to which God judges all things, and of which none can judge. Nevertheless this eternal law of God can be known by creatures, not only intuitively by the Blessed, but even discursively by Wayfarers, namely in the effects, which bear some likeness and irradiation or participation of it, greater or lesser: partly because all knowledge of truth is a certain irradiation of the eternal law: and there is no knowledge in intellectual creatures that does not know truth, and therefore none that does not have some knowledge of the eternal law: partly because all rational creatures have impressed upon them the natural law, which is nothing else than a certain participation and spark of the eternal law: and finally, because there is no creature possessed of reason who cannot judge from the most orderly administration of this Universe that all things subsist so steadfastly and unchangeably through the divine and supreme governance of the divine Administrator. Hence St. Augustine, book De vera religione, chapter 30, says: The reason of the eternal law is impressed upon us: for it is that by which it is just that all things be most orderly. Therefore although we cannot comprehend that eternal law, nevertheless we can know it through its various effects, as one who does not see the Sun in its substance perceives it by its irradiation and diffused light.

NOTE 2. A twofold causality of the eternal law with regard to the other laws can be distinguished: one belongs to the genus of efficient cause, inasmuch as God, concurring with intellectual nature through the light of reason — which is held to be the proximate principle of created law — and applying the intellect of the Prince to preceptive judgment, is said to be the universal cause of all laws. For since in all ordered movers the virtue of the second mover is derived from the first mover, and since God is the universal cause infusing being into all effects, hence by the eternal law, which is in him the supreme reason of government and administration, he is held to concur in the constitution of the other laws: for the eternal law itself is like a certain universal cause infusing its power into all laws. The other causality pertains to the genus of exemplar cause, because every created law can be held to have the power of directing and regulating human acts insofar as it conforms to the eternal law, as to its supreme and most perfect exemplar in regulating.

NOTE 3. In every law a threefold state can be distinguished. The first indeed is that which it has in the internal disposition of the Legislator, inasmuch as in his mind that law is already held to be drawn up, and established by his absolute decree and firm will. The second state is that which the law has when externally constituted and set forth to subjects by whom it is to be fulfilled. The third finally is with respect to the things which are commanded by that law. Considered in the prior manner, the eternal law is an internal act of God, whereby he decrees from eternity what is to be fulfilled by creatures in time: but in the latter manners it is held to be something external. Now by which of these modes it is held to be invariable and multipliable will here have to be determined.

First Conclusion. — THE ETERNAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE LEGISLATOR IS IMMUTABLE: BUT MUTABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT OVER WHICH IT COMMANDS, AND TO THE MATTER ABOUT WHICH IT IS CONCERNED. This Conclusion embraces three parts, which St. Augustine hands down and confirms. The first indeed in book 3. Confessionum, c. 7. where he says: I was ignorant of the true inward justice which judged not by custom, but by the most upright law of almighty God, by which the manners of regions and days were formed according to regions and days; while that law itself was everywhere and always, not one thing here and another there, nor different at different times. But whatever is such, says Alensi in member 5, is simply immutable: therefore the eternal law is simply immutable. The same St. Augustine confirms this very thing in the book De vera religione, where, speaking of that eternal law, he says: Who doubts that this law neither grows greater nor less with the intervals of places and times, since its power surpasses all things? This is the law of all arts, since it is altogether immutable. But the three parts of the Conclusion he explains and proves together in book 1 De libero arbitrio, chapter 6, where he says: That law which is called the highest reason, which must always be obeyed: by which the wicked merit a wretched life, the good a good life: by which finally that law which we said must be called temporal is rightly borne and rightly changed: cannot but seem to anyone understanding it unchangeable and eternal. As if he said: The eternal law, which is the highest reason of things to be done by God, is altogether immutable in itself: although its effects are mutable, because they are temporal.

The Conclusion is likewise proved by theological reason: Every internal act of the divine intellect and of the divine will is altogether invariable in itself: but mutable with respect to the diverse intrinsic objects at which it terminates: now the eternal law of God itself is an act both of intellect and of will: for indeed it is the highest reason and the absolute decree of God whereby God from eternity determined and ordered what is to be fulfilled by creatures in time etc. The major stands from what we have said concerning the immutability of the divine will. The minor likewise is clear from what has been said above.

You will say 1. Every commanding law contrary to another is mutable: for the law varies according to the variation of commands: but the eternal law commands contraries, as St. Augustine indicates in the books of the Confessions, saying: Lord, if now you command what you sometimes enjoined, who doubts that this must be done? —

Alensi distinguishes the major: Every commanding law contrary according to contrary reasons is mutable, I concede: otherwise, he denies. Likewise, the minor being distinguished, he denies the consequence: for the eternal law never commands diverse things according to contrary reasons, but according to one immutable reason, namely according to that which it judges to accord with the wise ordering of things according to the variety of times. Whence the whole change must be referred to the temporal things themselves, and not to the eternal law. For as Alensi says, just as the art of medicine, while it remains the same and is by no means changed, yet changes its prescriptions for the sick, because our health is mutable, so the divine Providence, though altogether unchangeable, yet succours the mutable variety of the creature according to the diversity of maladies: it commands or forbids different things to different ones: whence there is variety in the temporal effect.

You will say 2. Every judgment uttered under condition, and not absolutely, is mutable, especially that which depends besides upon free choice: but the judgment of the eternal law is uttered under condition, and not absolutely, and especially depends upon free choice: therefore the judgment of the eternal law is mutable: and consequently that law also is mutable. The minor is clear: because the eternal law nowhere judged nor said absolutely: this man shall be damned; but always under this condition: if he be finally evil: likewise it did not say absolutely: this man shall be saved; but under this condition: if he be finally good: but each of these conditions of final goodness or wickedness depends on free choice, and consequently the judgment of the eternal law, depending on that final goodness and wickedness, is mutable. —

I answer with Alensi, distinguishing the major: that judgment is mutable according to the act by which it is uttered, and the subject into which it is uttered, I concede: according to the reason by which it is uttered, I deny. And likewise, the minor being distinguished, the consequence must be denied. It is true indeed that although it is contingent that this man will remain finally in wickedness or in final goodness, nevertheless it is not contingent that if he remain in final wickedness he will be punished; nor is it equally contingent that if he persevere finally in goodness and in the state of grace he will be rewarded. For, says Alensi, the eternal law of God, and the reason which says that if you remain in evil finally, you shall be punished; and if you remain in final goodness, you shall be rewarded: this reason, I say, is altogether immutable and absolute: nor does it depend in any way upon the free choice of man persevering in grace or in sin: just as upon either perseverance depends the infliction of punishment or the bestowal of reward. Alensi explains this distinction otherwise, saying that the eternal law is mutable according to the sentence, but not according to the counsel, according to that saying of St. Gregory: God changes not his counsel, but his sentence:

But counsel, he says, is the divine reason according to which God judges and disposes all things: while sentence is the very name given to the temporal effect which follows from the counsel and ordination of God. If therefore, he says, we speak of the law according to the reason of counsel, it is itself immutable; if according to the reason of sentence, thus it is mutable, because the very temporal effect following from it is changed daily; but that very reason according to which he judges and disposes, and from which the effect is derived, remains immutable. And so in the first manner the eternal law is named, namely insofar as it is taken for counsel or reason; but insofar as it is taken according to sentence, it is called not eternal, but temporal.

Second conclusion. — ALL JUST LAWS, PROPERLY SO CALLED, ARE DERIVED FROM THE ETERNAL LAW.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture, for in Proverbs 8 divine Wisdom testifies: By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things. Hence in John 19 Christ, addressing Pilate, said: Thou shouldst not have any power against me, unless it were given thee from above. Wherefore the Apostle in Romans 13 rightly affirms that there is no power but of God: and he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God. This is so true that even the very power of tyrants is derived from God himself, who grants them kingdom and principality on account of avenging the sins of the people: for although their judgments are unjust, yet it is just that the sins of the people be punished by unjust judgments: and this reason of just vengeance is derived from the eternal law.

And certainly St. Augustine lucidly expounds this truth in book 1 De libero arbitrio, c. 6, where he writes: In temporal law nothing is just and legitimate which men have not derived to themselves from this eternal law. And lib. 5. De Civit. Dei, cap. 21. Let us not attribute, he says, the power of giving kingdom and empire except to the true God, who gives the happiness of the kingdom of heaven to the pious: but the earthly kingdom both to the pious and to the impious, as it pleases him to whom nothing unjust is pleasing. And a little below: He who gave to Marius gave also to Gaius Caesar: who to Augustus, he also to Nero; who to the Vespasians, whether father or son, most gentle emperors, he also to Diocletian most cruel: and lest it be needful to go through each one, he who gave to Constantine the Christian, gave also to Julian the Apostate.

Proof 2. The conclusion touched upon by induction holds through all laws; since indeed the natural law itself is derived from the eternal law itself: for all goodness universally is from eternal goodness; and in turn the natural law, which instills in us what is good, is from the eternal law itself, and is a certain participation of it implanted and impressed upon our minds, according to that of Psalm 4: The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. The positive divine law is likewise a certain derivation of that eternal law, seeing that God prescribes nothing to man in time whose reason he had not from eternity in himself. Finally, all human laws, whether gathered and established through human inquiry, or from natural light and reason, or from revealed reason, are also deduced from the eternal law of God itself: since indeed the natural and divine law, from which human laws are inferred, take their origin from the eternal law of God itself, by equal reason all those human laws ought to be judged deduced from it. Whence St. Augustine, book 1 De libero arbitrio, c. 5: In temporal law nothing is just and legitimate which men have not derived to themselves from the eternal law. Which is surely confirmed according to that of James 1: Every best gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, descending from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.

You will say. Those laws cannot be derived from the eternal law of God which are opposed to it and establish things contrary to it: but human laws are sometimes of this kind: for human law leaves unpunished what is just to punish; for St. Augustine says, in the book praised just above, book 1 De libero arbitrio, cap. 5, from that law which is borne for the governing of cities, it grants much, and leaves unpunished, things which are avenged by divine Providence: therefore some human laws do not accord with the eternal law of God. Moreover, human law judges free and exempt from punishment those whom the eternal law of God itself consigns to torments, as St. Augustine confirms in the same place by the example of those who kill lest they be killed, or lest they lose temporal goods. For how, he says, before that law, namely the eternal law, are those free from sin who for these things which ought to be contemned are guilty of human slaughter? Finally, human law grants some evils to be done, likewise out of an affection of lust and disordered will, which certainly the eternal law of God forbids, for instance to kill a man for preserving his possessions: whence St. Augustine in the same place: How can I judge those to be without lust who fight with the sword for those things which they can lose unharmed? or if they cannot, what need is there for these things to proceed even to the killing of a man? Therefore since human laws for the most part oppose the eternal law of God, they do not seem to be derived from it. —

I distinguish the major: human laws are not derived from the eternal law of God which positively oppose it as contrary, and according to the reason of injustice, and with perfect contrariety — this I concede: which oppose it only negatively, and by reason of a less perfect conformity — this I deny. And similarly the minor must be distinguished. Whence to the authorities of St. Augustine it must be said, first indeed, that temporal law ought to punish only those things which run counter to its end, which is the conciliation of peace among men: whence it does not take upon itself the avenging of evils which disturb the peace of man with God; for it leaves these to be avenged by the eternal law of God, which the same Augustine explains in the same place, saying: It seems to me that this law, which is written for the Roman people, does rightly permit, and that vengeance is taken by divine Providence; for it takes upon itself the avenging of those things which suffice for conciliating peace among unskilled men. Similarly, although temporal law exempts from punishment those whom the eternal law adjudges to torments, still they do not seem to conflict with one another; for human law punishes evils only so far as it detects them running counter to its end, namely the conciliating of peace among men; but the eternal law, since it regards not only the peace to be conciliated among men, but also in God himself, thence it comes to pass that it sometimes accounts guilty those whom human law absolves: whence in the same place St. Augustine says: Indeed I even approve this law, namely temporal law, though uncultivated and less perfect: it seems that the former leaves many things unpunished which nevertheless are avenged by divine Providence, and rightly. Finally, to the third point the same Augustine replies that nowhere does temporal law command anything to be done out of lust; for by hypothesis when someone repels force from himself, either he does it justly and in order, for instance for the sake of defending citizens, as a soldier or judge, who is the minister of the law: or he does it inordinately. If the first, he ought to obey the law without lust which commands it. If the second, the law does not command it, but leaves it in his power: for it is free to that man to kill a man for those things which unwillingly he can lose.

You will say 2. If all human laws were derived from the eternal law, they would not be contrary to one another: but it is established that human laws, even just ones, are sometimes even contrary to one another: therefore etc. —

I deny the consequence; for they are contrary precisely because the eternal law demands such contrariety among them: since indeed the eternal law is most orderly, it exacts, according to the various circumstances which occur in subjects, that a change be made in law: otherwise there would be disorder if those who are variously affected were directed by the same laws. Whence St. Augustine, book De vera religione cap. 17: As the medical art, while it remains the same, is in no way itself changed, yet changes its precepts for the sick, because our health is mutable, so divine Providence, while it is itself immutable, succors the mutability of the creature in various ways, and according to the diversity of members commands one thing to some, another to others, or forbids.

You will say 3. Human laws are not derived from the eternal law, neither as conclusions, because human law does not follow necessarily from the principles of the eternal law; nor as determinations of the same eternal law, because men, the founders of laws, are ignorant of what was ordained from eternity concerning the laws which they establish: therefore etc. —

I answer, human laws are derived from the eternal law through the mediation of the natural law, from which they proceed either by way of conclusion from principles, as for example from the fact that evil is not to be done, the conclusion is gathered from that natural precept, that the innocent is not to be killed: but certain ones are derived by way of determination, as for example the law of nature, that he who has sinned ought to be punished: but that he should be punished by such and such a punishment, this is determined by human law. Those of the first kind have their force not only from human law, but also from natural law: but those which are established in the second manner obtain their force from human law alone: whence although the founder of a law may be ignorant of what was ordained from eternity concerning the law he establishes, still he is not ignorant of the natural law, which is the primary derivation of the eternal law, and by its presence he judges what ought to be established in those circumstances conformably to the law of nature.

You will say 4. If human laws are derived from the eternal law, they would oblige to their observance by divine right: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. —

I deny the consequence, because only those things bind by divine law which are from God as from the Legislator immediately; but such are not human laws, which are derived from the natural law to the eternal law only through the mediation of human prudence.

You will say 5. Concupiscence, which the Apostle calls the law of the flesh, or of the

fomes, is a true law: but that law is derived from the eternal law: therefore etc. The major is clear from that passage of the Apostle to the Romans 7. I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind and capturing me in the law of sin: Whence the Gloss: the law of sin is rightly called a law; because it is legitimately established, that he who did not obey his superior, his inferior does not serve him, namely the flesh. The minor likewise is evident, for that law of the fomes is evil, since as the Gloss says on these words of Paul to the Romans 8. The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath delivered me, there are two good laws: the law of the Spirit which takes away sin: the law of Moses by which sin is shown: the law of sin is evil, which makes men guilty: but that which is evil in itself cannot be derived from the eternal law of God: whence the Apostle to the Romans 8. The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the Divine law. —

Alexander of Hales answers, n. 6. a. 2. that the fomes in us is a punishment inflicted on account of the sin of Adam: but, he says, there is a twofold punishment, namely of deformity, and of passibility. Inasmuch as the fomes is a punishment of deformity, so it is not from God, because its act is deformed: because an act of deformation cannot be from God as from its principle, but from the devil. But inasmuch as it itself is a punishment of passibility and affliction, namely insofar as it afflicts the soul, so it is from God: for this affliction is temporal, and unto good, so that man compelled may return and be converted to God: for from this, that the soul sees itself so cast down, and subjected to such vileness and corruption, it is converted more quickly to God. And thus the fomes insofar as it is a punishment of passibility is from God, and ordered to God: for it is from divine justice. Therefore the law of the fomes can in one way be called the law of passibility: in another way the law of deformity. In the first way it is as afflicting: and in this way the Apostle calls it the law of the members. In this way it is, and is derived from, the eternal law: for it is called the law of passibility, that is, according as man through it has the law, that he be afflicted by it, and be converted to God: for in this way it regards the order of divine Justice. But inasmuch as the law of the fomes is called the law of deformity, so it is called by the Apostle the Law of sin: and thus that law is not from the eternal law, but from the devil, or from sin, because that law is evil.

Third Conclusion. — THE ETERNAL LAW CONSIDERED IN ITSELF IS ONE ALONE: BUT ACCORDING TO ITS DIVERSE CONNOTATION TOWARD EXTERIOR THINGS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO IT, IT CAN BE RECKONED AS MULTIPLE.

This is Alexander of Hales, memb. 6.

He proves the first part, first indeed by the authority of St. Augustine saying in book Confessions: As the art of Medicine is one, and yet has a difference of precepts, so the eternal law is related to temporal laws, as the art of medicine to its precepts. Therefore St. Augustine holds that the eternal law considered in itself is one alone, nor does it admit plurality.

He proves secondly: If the eternal law of God is to be reckoned multiple, chiefly on account of the diversity of respects which it bears to things subject to it: but so it is not: for plurality is not admitted in divine things on account of diversity of respects toward what is external; otherwise, since this name Creator, e.g., involves several respects to created things, it would follow that several Creators could be said, which certainly is absurd: therefore similarly the diversity of the respects of the eternal law to temporal laws, and also to temporal things which are subject to it, does not introduce diversity into the eternal law itself.

Yet Alexander of Hales adds, that the eternal law can be considered either as it is the art, and exemplary cause of temporal laws, or as it is the reason constituting individual things in their due order, and enduring them to an end special and congruent to themselves, according to their dignity, and utility peculiar to them. Whence it comes about that the eternal law regarded as it is the eternal art of good and truth is said to be one alone: similarly as it is the reason ordering things to the divine and ultimate end, it is likewise one, because indeed there is one sole reason by which God orders and disposes all things created by himself on account of himself even unto his own glory: but inasmuch as things regard ends peculiar to themselves, there can be said to be several particular reasons in God by respect to diverse connotates, because indeed things are ordered among themselves variously by reason of their dignity and utility.

YOU ASK: Whether the Eternal Law itself is appropriated to the divine Essence, or to some Person?

THE SAME ALEXANDER OF HALES ANSWERS, memb. 4. That the eternal law is to be attributed immediately to the divine essence: since it is an absolute perfection of God common to the three divine Persons. Nevertheless it can be appropriated variously to the adorable Persons themselves: for since three things concur to any law whatsoever, namely authority, truth, and goodness, which concur that it be a law, namely the principle of law, the form of law, and the end: for by reason of the principle authority is owed to it, because no one can be the principle of law unless he has authority: but by reason of form truth is owed to it, because law is never borne without true reason: likewise by reason of the end goodness is owed to it, because law is not except unto good: whence the law is called a holy sanction, commanding the honest, and prohibiting the contrary. If therefore we regard authority in the eternal law, it is said to be in God according to the reason or intention of power; and thus it is appropriated to the person of the Father. But if we regard truth, according to the formal reason, thus it is appropriated to Wisdom, and so it befits the person of the Son. But regarding goodness, which is owed by reason of the end, thus it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. — From these it is clear how the effects and acts of law, namely to command, to forbid, to counsel, and to permit, to punish, and to reward, befit the eternal law; for the acts of commanding and forbidding befit it by reason of authority; but those two acts of counseling and permitting are attributed to it by reason of truth; but those two acts of punishing and rewarding pertain to it by reason of goodness. For it must be known that in law there ought to be found the reason of power, that it may command or forbid: likewise the reason of truth or wisdom, that it may be able to permit or counsel; finally the reason of goodness, that it may punish misdeeds, and recompense good deeds, for this pertains to goodness; and thus according to diverse reasons law comprehends power, wisdom, and goodness. Moreover, the aforesaid acts of law can be distributed according to the diverse powers and faculties of the soul, for to counsel and to permit regard the rational, for they are acts of law by reason of truth and wisdom, and this pertains to the rational: but to command and to forbid pertain to the irascible; but to punish, and to bestow reward pertain to the concupiscible; and thus it appears how the eternal law according to diverse intentions, and diverse acts, is appropriated to the three adorable Persons.

The present Question is raised chiefly concerning the triple order of beings; namely, the divine, the rational, and the irrational. For there are three orders or kinds of acts, about which it can be doubted whether they are measured by the eternal law of God. The first indeed is the supreme kind, that of certain internal acts of God himself. The second, and lowest kind is that of the actions of lower natural agents, lacking reason. Finally the third is that of the free acts of intellectual creatures. Moreover it must be known that the acts of God can be distinguished as of three kinds; for some are called natural and necessary: such as the generation of the Word, the procession of the Holy Spirit; others are moral and free, such as the love of God by which he loves creatures; finally others can be called Artistic, insofar as they extend to producing and governing creatures. It is asked, then, whether all these divine acts are subject to the eternal Law.

NOTE 2. It is certain, and beyond controversy, that the natural acts of the divine intellect and of the divine will, insofar as they are regarded ad intra, do not depend upon the eternal law of God itself, because they are altogether necessary, nor do they proceed from a direction or motion proceeding through the dictate of reason; hence they cannot be subject to any law; because a law does not pertain to things necessary per se and intrinsically, which have no need of a rule, but regards only those acts which are altogether free, and can be directed and ordered. Hence the eternal generation of the Son of God, and the production of the Holy Spirit, fall not at all under the law, because they are acts altogether natural and necessary. Wherefore there would remain to be inquired whether the free acts which are in God, which insofar as they are free are called moral: but insofar as they are to operate ad extra they are called artistic — whether, I say, those acts are subject in any way to the eternal law of God, and are directed by it.

NOTE 3. The eternal law can be thought to be a measure or rule of the free acts of God in two ways: first indeed insofar as those acts are moral and honest: second truly insofar as they are ordered to something to be produced or governed. Regarded in the former way, it is certain that the divine free acts are regulated by the divine reason: because God always operates according to reason: not indeed according to an alien reason: therefore according to his own; hence the measure of the rectitude of the free acts of the divine will is the judgment of the divine intellect, which in order of operation precedes the very operation of the divine will. This also appears from a declaration and example, for if God speaks, he speaks truly, because he judges lying to be evil: if he promises, he fulfils, because he judges fidelity to be honest and consonant with his nature. Regarded in the latter way, the divine free acts can be thought to have a law, insofar as God as the artificer of things is held to prescribe to himself a certain manner of operating according to which he makes and orders his works, though he could make and order them otherwise. But whether in one or other, or in both ways God truly prescribes a law to himself, this must here be determined.

First Conclusion. — THE DIVINE WILL IN ACTING FREELY AND HONESTLY IS NOT SUBJECT TO LAW.

This is held by Alexander, memb. 8. art. 5., to whom subscribe St. Thomas 1. 2. q. 91. a. 1. ad primum, and the Recent Authors together with Suarez lib. 2. cap. 2.

Alexander proves this truth: First indeed by the authority of St. Augustine, who says in book 83. qq. He who seeks the fellowship of the divine will seeks something greater than the divine will: but if the divine will were subject to any law, it would have some directive cause of itself: hence it would have something greater: but this is impossible; and therefore it likewise conflicts with the divine will itself being subject to any law. Finally, the eternal law cannot be subject to itself: but the divine will itself is the eternal law: for St. Augustine says: So great is the difference in the understanding of reason when law is said, and when will is said: because will is said with respect to good, inasmuch as it accepts what is good; the same will is called law, inasmuch as it ordains what is good. Finally, St. Anselm confirms this same thing in book 1. Cur Deus homo, cap. 12., saying: since God is free, he is subject to no law, and to no one's judgment; so that nothing is seemly, nothing right, except what he wills, and therefore what he wills is just, and fitting; but that which is unjust and unseemly does not fall into his will; not on account of any law, but because it does not belong to his liberty.

He proves it likewise by reason: if the divine will were subject to some law, that would be either positive, or natural: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because a positive law is that which is laid down by the free will of some superior to command, and to oblige by his precept, or will him upon whom the law is imposed: but God has no superior, nor can he oblige himself by way of precept, and law, because he is not superior to himself: therefore he is in no way capable of a positive law. Nor the second; for although in the divine intellect practical judgments and dictates precede, by which God judges what becomes his goodness, mercy, justice, or wisdom, such as that one must not lie, that sins must be vindicated, that promises must be fulfilled, etc.: yet these cannot have the character of law with respect to the divine will, both because they propose no precept nor intimate the will of anyone; but only show, by indicating, what the nature of the thing holds: whereas a law is a precept, and inclination of the will of some superior legislator: and also because those practical judgments of God are not made by way of commanding, but only of directing: and therefore they cannot have the character of law.

Second Conclusion. — ALL IRRATIONAL BEINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW OF GOD.

The Conclusion is evident, First indeed from the authority of Sacred Scripture: namely from all those places in which God is said to have prescribed a law to the heavenly elements, and to other things devoid of reason. Thus Proverbs 8. When he gave to the sea its bound, and set a law to the waters that they should not pass their limits. Which Job indeed splendidly declared, c. 38., where, reporting the words of God, he says: I said: Thus far shalt thou come, and thou shalt go no further, and here thou shalt break thy swelling waves. Likewise also Psalm 148. Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfil his word. The same appears in Matthew 6. Luke 12. and 1. Cor. 15.

Proof 2. from the authority of St. Augustine, lib. 5. De Civit. Dei, cap. 11, where writing of God he says: *From whom is all motion, all species, all order, whence also measure, number, weight; from whom is whatsoever naturally is, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever condition: from whom are the seeds of forms, the forms of seeds, the motions of seeds, and of forms: by which He judges that all creatures without exception, even those devoid of reason, are not only derived from God as from the supreme Maker of all things, but are also directed and administered by Him as by the eternal Administrator and Governor of things. The same truth he expounds in the book De libero arbitrio, chapters 5 and 6, where he says: The eternal law is the reason existing in the mind of God, by which all things are directed to their ends through consonant means. And in lib. 83, q. 3, near the end, he says: The unchangeable law moderates all changeable things with most beautiful governance.

This truth is likewise proved by reason: Those things are subject to the eternal law of God from whom they have the principle of acting, and are regulated toward their ends; but God from eternity sanctioned and appointed for each creature such a principle peculiar to itself, whereby it can exercise its power unto an end, so as to arrive at fitting ends: therefore etc. Moreover, just as our will commands the members of our body, and imposes upon them by its command not only the necessity of bearing burdens, but also directs and orders them to burdens suited to their faculties: so also the divine will commands all created things, and imposes upon them the necessity and rule of acting according to its divine ordinance. This Job declared when he wrote that the creature obeys God unto the day of battle, and likewise the Wise Man in chapter 5, when he affirms that for the glory of God the whole world shall fight against the foolish.

You will say 1. Only those can be subject to the divine law to whom a law can be signified and promulgated: but no law can be promulgated or signified to creatures devoid of reason: therefore etc. —

I distinguish the minor: A law cannot be signified nor promulgated to irrational creatures by promulgation properly so called, namely that by which the mind of the legislator is expressed and made known to subjects, inasmuch as they, understanding the will of their superior, commit it to execution — this I concede; by promulgation improperly so called, namely through a certain impression of power which may be the principle of acting according to the will of the administrator of things — this I deny. For as the promulgation of law stands related to men, because by the promulgation of the law there is impressed upon them a certain directive of human acts, so does the impression of the active principle stand related to natural things, which by reason of their dependence upon God, the moderator and maker of all, operate at His nod.

You will say 2. Irrational creatures are not capable of precept: therefore neither of law: and consequently they cannot be subject to the eternal law of God. —

I distinguish the antecedent: They are not capable of moral precept, which is the rule of the moral operations of a rational creature — this I concede; they are not capable of natural precept, which is made by the impression of a motive principle in order to the obtaining of an end — this I deny: for God prescribes to all creatures the necessity and rule of acting, according to the capacity of each, in accordance with that word of Ps. 148: He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away.

You will say 3. Only those are subject to law who are capable of reward or punishment on account of the observance or transgression of the law: but irrational creatures, being devoid of cognition and liberty, are worthy neither of reward nor of punishment: therefore etc. — Our Alexander responds, member 8, article 5, that there is a twofold subjection to the eternal law: there is, he says, a subjection to the eternal law that is natural and without judgment, and in this way irrationals are subject to it by the first subjection; for St. Anselm says in book 1 of Cur Deus homo: Every creature which keeps a precept ordered to itself either naturally or rationally is said to obey God, most especially the rational creature, to whom it has been given to understand what it ought.

You will say 1. What is governed by law and reason cannot be fortuitous and casual: but among things devoid of reason there are many fortuitous things and things due to chance: therefore none of them is reckoned to be subject to law. —

I distinguish the minor: Many things are fortuitous and due to chance if they be referred to particular causes outside whose order they occur — this I concede; if they be referred to the divine ordination and governance — this I deny; since with respect to God, who foresees and orders all things in weight, number, and measure, nothing can be casual, although some things occur by chance, inasmuch as they happen outside the order of particular causes.

Third conclusion. — BOTH THE JUST AND THE WICKED AND THE REPROBATE ARE SUBJECT TO GOD'S ORDINATION: THE FORMER INDEED BY PERFECT SUBJECTION: THE LATTER BY IMPERFECT.

Proof of the first part, namely that the just are perfectly subject to the eternal law of God. That anyone may be perfectly subject to the law of God, he must participate in the divine law itself in two ways: first indeed by way of knowledge; secondly, by the motive principle of an interior law: but man with respect to good actions is directed and illuminated not only by natural knowledge, but also by the knowledge of faith and wisdom, and above his natural inclination to the good there is superadded to him interiorly the motive principle of grace and virtue: therefore the just man is perfectly subject to the eternal law of God.

Proof of the second part, namely that even the wicked and the reprobate are subject to the divine law. First indeed by the authority of St. Augustine, book De catechizandis rudibus: God knows how to order souls that desert Him, and out of their just misery to adorn the lower parts of His creature with the laws most fitting and most congruent to His admirable dispensation: therefore he holds that the souls of the reprobate, who desert God, are subject to the divine order: but that divine order is the very eternal law of God, by which it is just that all things be most excellently ordered: therefore etc. St. Anselm explains this truth clearly in book 1, Cur Deus homo: As those things, he says, which are contained within the compass of heaven cannot but be under heaven, nor can they in any way withdraw from heaven except by drawing near to it; so although no Angel or man should will to be subject to the divine will, yet he cannot flee it: for if he wills to flee it under the willing that commands, he flees under the willing that punishes. Boethius elegantly explains the same thing in book 4, De Consolatione, prose 6: It embraces all things, he says, so that if anyone depart from the assigned order, he falls back into another order. For the eternal law itself is like a circle: he who flees one part draws near to another: and thus although the wicked have departed from it as regards its precept, they are nevertheless under it as regards punishment.

You will say 1. From the Apostle, 1 Timoth. 1: The law is not made for the just, but for the unjust and disobedient: whence the Gloss, made, not imposed, that it may be above him, and rule over him; for he is rather in the law and with the law, because he is a friend of justice. —

Alexander of Hales answers, article 2, chapter 1, that to be under the law is taken in two ways; namely either by necessity of compulsion, or by the will of obeying: for otherwise the son is under the father, and otherwise the servant, because the servant is under the father compelled by necessity of fear, but the son by the will of obeying: whence the consequence must be distinguished: the just are not under the law by necessity and subjection of compulsion, I concede: by subjection of voluntary obedience, I deny: for the Gloss says on Psalm 1, expounding those words, in the law of the Lord is his will, it is one thing to be in the law, another to be under the law; he who is in the law acts according to the law: he who is under it is compelled by necessity of fear; but in this manner the just are not under the law, but in the first manner.

You will say 2. From the Apostle to the Romans 8: The wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God: but the wicked and the reprobate are said to be the wisdom of the flesh: therefore they are not subject to the eternal law. —

I distinguish the major: it is not subject to the law, by voluntarily obeying it so that through obedience it may obtain rewards, I concede: it is not subject to the law by necessity of vengeance, inasmuch as undoubtedly on account of its disorder, and its conflict with the eternal law of God, it draws down upon itself deserved punishment, I deny: for, as we have said, they who are not subject to the law as regards precept ought themselves to be subject as regards punishment.