Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

Dispensation can be distinguished as twofold, namely properly so called, and less properly so called. The former is a relaxation of law and precept, made by the authority of a superior exercising his full right, whereby, that is, of his own pleasure and without some grave concurrent cause requiring it, he exempts some person from the obligation of fulfilling and doing what the law commands. The latter, however, is a mere declaration, whereby the superior signifies that, on account of grave concurrent causes, such a person is to be exempted from the obligation of keeping the law. Thus, for example, the Supreme Pontiff is held to dispense with full right perfectly, when of his own pleasure and motion he dispenses someone from keeping the fast on that day on which he himself had commanded all the faithful to fast: but he dispenses improperly, when, for example, he declares that one who had vowed continence is not bound to keep his vow, when he is so violently agitated by the goads of incontinence that the danger of committing some sin of the flesh is evident, and of losing his salvation. The former dispensation falls upon matter subject to the authority of the one dispensing; the latter, however, pertains even to matter of a higher order, not subject to him.

Note 2. That since the precepts of the Decalogue are of a twofold difference, and some of them are said to be of the first table, which regard God immediately; others, however, of the second table, which pertain to the right of our neighbour to be kept; and since, as we have already said, the precepts of the first table are of the strictest right of nature, if you except the third, namely on keeping the Sabbath, while the rest are only of the proper right of nature, but not the strictest; thence a grave difficulty arises among Theologians; whether God can dispense in any precepts of the Decalogue. On this matter there are two extreme opinions. The first indeed denies that God can dispense by His absolute power in any precept of the Decalogue, except the third concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath. So St. Thomas q. 100. art. 8. and his Commentators and Disciples, whom Suarez cites and follows 2. De Legib. cap. 15. Salas tr. 1. disp. 5. sect. 9. Vazq. disp. 179. c.2. Aversa q. 19. sect. 3. The second, diametrically opposed, holds that God can dispense by His absolute power in certain precepts of the Decalogue. So the Doctor Subtilis with his followers, Gabriel. Almainus. Marsilius. S. Poncius 1. dist. 17. Ockam 2. q. 19. Petrus Alliacen. 1. dist. 11. Andr. de Castronovo dist. 45. Gerson. and others. That, however, the controversy may be resolved more easily and more evidently,

Note 3. That every precept, whether affirmative or negative, involves two precepts: one indeed affirmative, the other truly negative: for the affirmative precept on worshipping God, for example, not only induces the positive obligation of worshipping and loving God at determined and fitting times, but moreover involves the negative precept of never doing or willing to do anything that would impede that divine worship and love: but this negative precept binds always and forever, because nowhere is it licit to will not to love, nor to worship God. Similarly the negative precept of not worshipping false gods, nor killing without cause, involves that very negative precept whereby we are forbidden at any time whatsoever to bestow worship upon false gods: and moreover it involves the affirmative precept of applying all the means which will seem necessary for the observance of that negative precept. It must be observed that when the precept is simply negative, then the affirmative precept joined to it determines only to a means conducive to the observance of that negative precept. Similarly, when the precept is simply affirmative, then the negative precept involved in it determines only to a means necessary for the observance of the affirmative precept.

These things thus premised, three things especially must be determined in the present Question: First, that God can truly dispense with a dispensation properly so called in certain precepts of the Decalogue, and in those things which are of the natural law. Secondly, whether He cannot dispense in the two prior precepts of the first table. Thirdly, whether for any cause human authority, Pontifical or civil, can dispense in those things which are of the natural law.

First Conclusion. — GOD CAN TRULY DISPENSE IN CERTAIN THINGS WHICH ARE OF THE NATURAL LAW: BUT ESPECIALLY IN THE PRECEPTS OF THE SECOND TABLE OF THE DECALOGUE, IF YOU EXCEPT THE EIGHTH. So the aforementioned Doctor q. 37. n. 5. and following.

Proof of this conclusion is usually offered: First indeed from various texts of Scripture, whereby it is established that God dispensed in the precepts of the second table, and also in those which seem to be of the natural law: since indeed in Exodus 11. and 12. He seems to have dispensed in the seventh precept, thou shalt not steal, with the Israelites, that namely they might steal the vessels of the Egyptians: and in Deuteronomy 23. with these same Israelites that they might lend to strangers at usury, which is truly theft. Likewise, for an equal reason He dispensed in the sixth precept with Osee, commanding him that he should take a woman that was a harlot, and beget from her children of fornication. Finally He dispensed with Abraham in the fifth precept against killing, when He commanded him to slay and immolate his son. Whereupon God can dispense, and did in fact dispense, in the precepts of the second table, and in those which are not of the strict right of nature.

I confess it may be answered to the first head, that the concession made to the Israelites that they should despoil Egypt, and that they should carry away with them the vessels of gold and silver which they conveniently received from the Egyptians, was not so much a dispensation of the seventh precept as its explanation; since by that precept only the taking away of another's property is forbidden, whereas what the Israelites received from the Egyptians were not the goods of the Egyptians, but their own: first indeed by the title of the donation made to them by God, who, since He holds supreme power by reason of His supreme dominion over all temporal goods, and of disposing of them according to His good pleasure, can grant them also to whomsoever He will. Secondly, by the title of the wages of their labours, of which they had been defrauded by the Egyptians, as Sacred Scripture attests Wisdom 10. God rendered to the just the reward of their labours: for the Israelites had been oppressed by the Egyptians with most grievous labours through many years altogether without any wages. Thirdly, finally, by a title avenging religion: for St. Augustine says lib. 22. contra Faustum cap. 71. The Egyptians were sacrilegious and iniquitous; for using that gold wickedly to the injury of the Creator, they served their idols, and had afflicted foreign men with gratuitous labour unjustly and grievously: worthy therefore were these (namely the Israelites) to whom such things were commanded, and those, (namely the Egyptians) to suffer such things. Which reasons Philo the Jew elegantly expressed in lib. 1. De vita Moysis, where he says that that spoiling of the Egyptians is excused from sin by a triple title, namely by the title of labour bestowed, by the title of compensating the injury inflicted, and by the title of a just war. First, he says, that they might receive the necessary reward of long-continued labour. Then, that for the injuries received in the time when they had served, if not for merit, yet they might recover some loss; or that, victorious in war, they might despoil the vanquished of their goods.

It could likewise be replied to the second, that by those words God did not grant the Jews the faculty of lending at usury to strangers; for where God said, Thou shalt not lend to thy brother at usury, by this He sufficiently signified that to take anything at usury is simply evil: whence it could be said that it was licit for the Jews to lend at usury to strangers materially only, but not formally; because what they exacted above the principal from strangers could be their own, either by the title of the donation made to them by God, who is the supreme administrator and distributor of things, by which reason He had given them the land of the Amorrhites and of others: or by the title of a just war, as St. Ambrose holds lib. De Tobia c. 15. where he says:

From him exact usury, whom you desire rightly to harm, against whom arms are justly carried, whose usuries are legitimately taken away, whom you cannot conquer in war. From him exact usury, whom it is not a crime to kill: without the sword he fights who demands usury, without the sword he takes vengeance, whoever shall have been a usurious exactor of an enemy.

To the fact of Osee it could likewise be replied that what was commanded was to take into legitimate marriage a wife who had previously been a harlot: so St. Augustine interprets it lib. Contra Secundinum, cap. 21. What, he says, is hostile to the Christian faith, if a harlot, having abandoned fornication, be changed into chaste wedlock? And further below: Therefore when He commanded Osee to take a harlot as wife, counsel was given for correcting the rite of the woman, and the Sacrament was expressed in figure. Nor does he pass over what is added there, Make thee sons of fornication: for these words signify either that the Prophet is commanded to adopt as legitimate the sons begotten by that harlotous woman; or that they are called sons of fornication because they were born of a woman who had previously been a harlot; for it is not unusual in Scripture that things sometimes retain the denomination of what they previously were: for Eve after her formation was called by Adam bone. Bone now of my bones: because before her formation she had been such. Or finally, that it might be signified that the Jews themselves had departed from the true worship of God, exhibiting worship to idols, which in Scripture is a kind of fornication, according to that saying: They shall be counted accursed who commit fornication against thee. Wherefore, setting aside these texts,

Proof of the Conclusion from the authority of St. Bernard lib. De Praecepto et Dispensatione c. 3. where, after he had distinguished a threefold necessity, namely stable, inviolable, and immutable, and had said that the necessity which is stable is that which, handed down and sanctioned by our predecessors, steadfastly perseveres, nor is it granted to any subjects whatsoever to vary or change it in any way: that which is immutable is the necessary which is so established by divine and eternal reason that for no cause whatever can it be altered, even by God Himself in any degree: while the inviolable necessity is that which, not handed down by man, but divinely promulgated, does not suffer to be changed at all except by God who delivered it: he adds:

By way of example, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, and the remaining precepts of that tablet of the law: which, although they admit of no human dispensation whatsoever, so that it neither has been nor ever will be lawful for anyone to absolve any man from them in any way: the Lord nevertheless dispenses from these when He wills and as He wills: whether when the Egyptians were to be despoiled by the Hebrews: or when He commands the Prophet to lie with a harlot. Surely one of these would be reckoned nothing but a grave act of theft? and the other nothing but the foulness of disgrace, had not the authority of the One commanding excused both deeds?

Saint Bernard therefore holds that God can truly dispense in some precepts of the Decalogue. — Nor will he cease to object that Saint Bernard must be understood of a dispensation improperly so called. This answer plainly militates against the very words of Saint Bernard, as is evident both from the examples he brings forward; and from the fact that in that book he treats expressly of a dispensation properly so called; and finally because Saint Bernard grants to God such authority to dispense as he denies to men: but the adversaries themselves confess that men can dispense with a dispensation improperly so called in precepts which are of the natural law: therefore they must confess that Saint Bernard is to be understood of a dispensation properly so called, which he attributes to God.

Proof moreover of the Conclusion: God can dispense in the precept forbidding the killing of an innocent: but that precept is of the natural law, and one of the precepts of the Decalogue: therefore a dispensation can be made in them. The minor is evident. The major is proved: for God to be truly held to dispense properly in the precept against killing an innocent, it suffices that by His authority He make that killing, which would otherwise be illicit, become licit: but God can do this, indeed in fact He has done it: therefore God truly can dispense in certain precepts of the Decalogue. The major is established; for this reason a prince is accustomed to dispense in a law laid down by himself, and a Pontiff to dispense in the eating of flesh on Friday, e.g., because each makes licit by his authority that act through the dispensation in all the circumstances in which it would otherwise be illicit, if no dispensation from his law were present. The minor is proved: the killing of Isaac, which Abraham efficaciously intended at God's command, had all the circumstances on account of which it would have to be judged prohibited by the Decalogue precept thou shalt not kill, if there were not a divine dispensation, no less than the eating of meat on Friday by a healthy man of good will has all the circumstances by reason of which it would be an illicit and sinful act if there were not a dispensation of the supreme Pontiff with respect to that healthy man: therefore just as that eating of flesh by that healthy man truly becomes licit by reason of the dispensation; so likewise that killing of the innocent Isaac truly became licit also by reason of the divine dispensation: and consequently that killing was only not evil on account of the dispensation made by that same divine mandate by which God had commanded that killing; and consequently it is true that God in fact dispensed in certain precepts of the Decalogue.

It is confirmed: God in fact commanded Abraham to slay his son in those circumstances, in which, setting aside the command, he would have sinned by killing him; nor did any moral change intervene on the part of that killing to be done except the change which arose from that command, insofar as it was commanded; therefore by a true dispensation God made that killing, which would otherwise have been illicit, to be licit.

The adversaries reply, that divine command given to Abraham concerning the killing of Isaac could not have had the character of a dispensation; because a command obliges to something to be done, whereas a dispensation does not introduce such an obligation, but merely permits a thing to be done licitly.

Against: a dispensation, as a dispensation, precisely has the force of removing the obligation and prohibition of the act upon which the dispensation falls; but a command to do some thing which is otherwise prohibited has the same character and force: since by that very fact it obliges to something to be done, and removes the prohibition by which that thing was guarded against; although besides it has the character of obliging to the act in which the dispensation is made, and whose prohibition is removed by that affirmative command. Which indeed is clear from an example; for there is no one who would not confess that, if the supreme Pontiff were to command another to eat meat on Friday, who was otherwise obliged by the command of the Church not to eat it: the supreme Pontiff would truly dispense with him; and the command to do a thing which is otherwise prohibited has the force and character of a dispensation. Add that by the same reason by which God commanded Abraham to kill his son, He could also not command, but grant him an express and formed license to kill him; but in that case such a killing would be licit: therefore God can properly dispense in the precept, thou shalt not kill.

They reply 2. It is true indeed that that killing would be licit by reason of that divine command, without which it would not be licit if such a command were absent; true, they say, but this would not come about through a true dispensation, but through a subtraction and mutation of matter; for not every kind of killing is forbidden by that precept of the Decalogue, Thou shalt not kill, but only that which is done by private authority. Hence in fact secular Princes confer the faculty of killing, yet do not dispense in that precept.

Against: if secular Princes, by their sole authority, could make a killing of a man, which would otherwise be unjust, become licit, they would truly be held to dispense properly in that precept, thou shalt not kill, just as they can dispense in laws and commands laid down by themselves: therefore since God can dispense by His sole authority, without any mutation of matter, that is, the obligation of that precept, thou shalt not kill, always remaining, which obligation would make that killing illicit, unless either the divine command or counsel intervened: God must truly be held to dispense in that precept.

Finally others will reply, that command given to Abraham was indeed a dispensation; but not one which is a relaxation of the precept: but only one such that that killing of Isaac should not be counted homicide.

But this response is utterly futile: for to say that a dispensation is a relaxation of a precept is nothing else than to say that it is such that by reason of it a precept, which otherwise would oblige if that dispensation were absent, once it is posited is not held to oblige: but that dispensation by which God made it possible for Abraham to kill his son without any sin was of this kind: therefore it likewise truly relaxed the precept.

You will object 1. That Saint Augustine asserts God cannot dispense in the law of nature; for in book De vera religione, chap. 31. he says: Nor could the Father judge concerning the eternal law: and in book one De libero arbitrio, chap. 6.: To the eternal law, he says, there must always be obedience rendered, and it is unchangeable. And further on: Can it ever be unjust that the wicked be wretched, but the good blessed, or that an honorable and grave people create magistrates for themselves: while the dissolute and wicked lack these more willingly? Do you not see this law to be eternal and unchangeable.

I answer, these authorities can rightly be understood of the ordinary power, whereby God indeed disposes all things according to the laws and rules prescribed by Himself, and not of the extraordinary power, whereby according to His pleasure, beyond the ordinances He has established, He can do something by Himself, or command that it be done by another: or the aforesaid authorities can be understood of the strictest law of nature, in which manner, as I judge, the first and second authorities are to be taken. The third, however, is to be understood of the eternal and natural law, as far as it is so from the nature of the thing, unless an act of the divine will disposing the matter otherwise intervenes: for it is certain that it would be unjust for an upright people to create magistrates for itself, if indeed God forbade it, just as He truly can forbid it. Similarly also it could be just that a dissolute and wicked people not lack such authority with the faculty of creating magistrates for itself, if God so commanded.

You will object 2. If God could dispense in the precepts of the second table, especially in Thou shalt not kill, it would follow that a war could be given just on both sides without ignorance: for he with whom God dispensed in the precept of killing could licitly attack someone; but he whom he attacked could also licitly defend himself, and assail and kill the attacker; yet it is against the common opinion of Theologians that a war can be just on both sides without ignorance: therefore our assertion conflicts with the common opinion of Theologians.

I answer 1. this objection militates as much against the Adversaries as against ourselves: since the Adversaries do not deny that God cannot give license in certain cases in which it would not be licit to kill unless God so granted or commanded; for this is plainly evident from the killing of Isaac enjoined upon Abraham, whether meanwhile God brings it about by dispensing, as we assert, or by changing that matter and withdrawing it from the obligation of natural law, as the Adversaries will: but in that case it would be equally licit for him who was to be killed to defend himself and resist his assailant, whether God gave license to kill by changing the matter of that obligation, or by dispensing in that precept Thou shalt not kill: and this difficulty must be solved as much by the Adversaries as by ourselves.

I answer 2. by denying the major: for it would not follow that the war in that case would be just on both sides: for he to whom God commanded the killing would not on that account be bound in every case to will to kill; but he would be held to abstain from killing in those cases in which there was danger lest he himself be killed, or lest he kill others whom he had no faculty to kill. For although God dispensed in the precept of the natural law with respect to the killing of Peter, for example, He nevertheless would not on that account be judged to dispense in the natural precept with respect to the killing of others, or with respect to the manifest danger of his own death: whereupon he would be held to abstain from carrying out the killing in those cases in which there was probable danger lest he either kill those whom it is not licit to kill, or himself be killed: whence if in such cases he did not desist from the killing, the war on his side would be unjust, but just on the side of those whom he attacked.

I answer 3. by denying the minor: for it is not absurd for a war to be just on both sides; for it is certain that while Christian kings contend among themselves, very many soldiers on either side judge themselves called by their princes to lawful war, and they are bound to kill the enemy soldiers. Nay, some even judge it probable, says Pontius, Comment. on dist. 37. n. 143., that even in the case in which some of the said soldiers would know by particular knowledge that their king was fighting unjustly against another king, provided it did not become publicly known, nor could they persuade themselves by opportune reasons to desist from killing their enemies without loss of their life, they are still bound to kill. It is certain, I say, or at least probable, that in such a case the war between the soldiers would be just on both sides, even without any ignorance on their part. — Add what Cavellus says in his Scholion on n. 5 of the aforesaid question 37, that in many cases war seems to many Doctors to be able to be just on both sides; for he who thinks in good faith that he is fighting can attack another whom he knows to be innocent, as Soto teaches 5. De Iust. quaest. 1. art. 1. Likewise one condemned as guilty against the private knowledge of the Judge can resist, scandal set aside, as Corrarubias affirms together with several others, 1. var. cap. n. 13. Likewise if two men in a shipwreck simultaneously attempted to seize a boat capable of holding only one, they could fight with each other, justly on both sides, to keep it for himself, whereby each could preserve his life, as Maior teaches in 1. dist. 15. quaest. 22. etc. Therefore war can sometimes be just on both sides.

You will object 3. The precepts of the natural law are affirmative or negative: the affirmative precepts enjoin that which is in itself just and right; the negative, however, prohibit that which is in itself iniquitous and unjust: but if the affirmative precepts were dispensable, it would be licit not to do that which in itself is licit to do; likewise if the negative precepts were also dispensable, it would be licit to do that which in itself is iniquitous and unjust: which consequence is absurd: therefore also the antecedent.

I distinguish the major: the affirmative precepts enjoin that which is just in itself and independent of any legislative precept whatsoever, I deny; that dependently upon some precept it is judged to be just, and that what is prohibited is judged to be unjust, I concede. For although certain things seem to be just or unjust insofar as they agree or disagree with the natural law and also with the dictate of right reason; nevertheless, since the natural law is nothing other than the very ordination of God prescribing those things which He judges in His pleasure to be fitting or unfitting for rational creature, it follows that the reason of that fittingness or unfitness is sought chiefly from the very ordination of God.

Similarly I distinguish the minor: that it would be licit not to do that which is in itself just, while it remains under the aspect of the just, I deny; that while it does not remain under the same aspect, I concede. It is certain, however, that a thing which was just, and therefore necessarily to be carried out by reason of the divine precept, ceases to be such when the divine dispensation supervenes, by which being posited, that which was just and necessary to do begins to be licit to omit.

You will say 1. All the precepts of the natural law have their foundation in nature, and in that measure are precepts of the natural law insofar as they are conjoined with nature: yet nature cannot even by the divine power be varied: for although from any given creature God can produce a more perfect one to infinity, He cannot however make man otherwise than he is: therefore He cannot equally dispense in the law of nature.

I distinguish the major: that those precepts are founded in nature, that is, have conjunction with nature from the ordination of God the author of nature, thus establishing the state of things, I concede; that is, that they flow from nature itself after the manner of an inseparable property, as though nature being unchanged, these could not vary, I deny: for, as we said, since that character of natural law depends upon the very ordination of God as author of nature, and since that divine ordination is free, God most freely can also command or prohibit whatever He judges fitting or unfitting, nature itself remaining unchanged according to its essence.

You will say finally: Dispensation is an imperfect and inchoate abrogation of law; for just as by abrogation it comes about that, all other circumstances remaining wholly the same, a law does not oblige which otherwise with those circumstances would oblige, so dispensation makes that it not oblige which otherwise would oblige: and hence abrogation is called the death of law; but dispensation the wound of law: therefore dispensation can occur only in that law which can be abrogated; just as he who is immortal is also invulnerable: but from what was said above, the law of nature cannot be abrogated, whereupon neither can dispensation be granted in it, even by God.

I distinguish the minor: the law of nature cannot be abrogated as regards all the precepts it contains, but especially as regards those which belong to the strictest law of nature, such as the two first precepts of the first table, I concede: as regards other precepts, such as the rest of the first or second table (excepting lying), I deny: for just as we contend that by divine authority dispensation can be granted in them with respect to certain persons, so too dispensation could be granted with respect to all; since divine authority and power is no more limited and restricted with respect to many than with respect to one: but that general dispensation would in reality be an abrogation of the law; and thereupon the natural law could be divinely abrogated as regards those precepts.

Second Conclusion. — The precepts of the first table taken negatively, namely inasmuch as they prohibit irreverence shown to God, either through a vain cult of Him, or through taking His divine name in vain, are most strictly of the law of natural law: and therefore they are also indispensably established by God. This is the doctrine of the Doctor in 3. dist. 37. n. 6., where he says of the precepts of the first table, because they look to God immediately as their object, the two first indeed, if they are understood to be merely negative:

The first, Thou shalt not have strange gods: the second, Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain, that is, thou shalt not show irreverence to thy God; these are strictly of the natural law, because it follows necessarily, if God is, He is to be loved as God: and that nothing else is to be worshipped as God, nor is irreverence to be shown to God: and consequently in these God will not be able to dispense, so that anyone might licitly do the opposite of such a prohibition.

This is the doctrine of the Doctor, which all Thomists subscribe to, contending that all the precepts of the Decalogue are indispensable; hence they judge those of the first table to be especially indispensable.

Proof of this Conclusion: From the terms it is known that no injury or irreverence can be inflicted upon God without mortal sin: but the highest injury and irreverence would be done to God if He were hated, or if the cult due to Him were bestowed upon another: therefore these things cannot be done licitly. The major is proved: from the terms it is known that no moral evil is to be done, nor can that be done licitly which is known to be against the honest and moral good: for from this there would follow a contradiction, namely that it could be done licitly, and that it could not be so done: but no moral evil can be greater than to inflict irreverence upon God, the sovereign good: therefore no irreverence can licitly be inflicted for any reason. — Further, if God could dispense, and bring it about that irreverence toward Himself were done licitly, chiefly by an act of His divine will, whereby namely the infliction of irreverence, which would otherwise be illicit, would be made licit: but He cannot bring this about through that act of will: therefore neither can He dispense in it. The major and the consequence are evident. The minor is proved: it is no more known from the terms, or from any principle, that what God commands are licit and what He forbids are illicit, than it is known that in that case irreverence would have to be inflicted upon God: therefore just as by no act of His will can God bring it about that what He commanded to be done would not be done licitly, or that what He forbade to be done could be done licitly, for the same instant in which He commanded or forbade; so He cannot bring it about by any act of His will that irreverence toward Himself be licitly exhibited. — Finally, by the very fact that something would be done at the command of God, it would not be irreverent toward Him; since irreverence is not inflicted upon a Prince while satisfaction is made to His precepts and mandates: therefore it is impossible that God could grant the faculty of inflicting irreverence upon Himself.

You will say: From the preceding Conclusion it is clear that dispensation can be divinely granted in the negative precepts of the second table which pertain to the love of neighbor: therefore by equal reason dispensation will be able to be granted in the precepts of the first table which concern the love and cult of God. The antecedent is clear from what has been said. The consequence is proved: all the precepts of the second table are founded in the love of neighbor, and are referred to it uniquely as to their head: but the love of neighbor follows necessarily from the precept of loving God: therefore if this love of God admits no dispensation, neither does that; for the Apostle says, Rom. 13, Thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not kill, and if there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word. Which is proved above all by the authority of Christ the Savior, who says: On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the Prophets: therefore in this precept, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, all the precepts of the second table are necessarily included. The minor is proved, that the love of neighbor follows necessarily from the precept of loving God: the love of God, which is of the law of nature, is perfect love, and not disordered: but ordered love does not tend toward God as though to be appropriated to oneself alone, as if one loving God did not wish to be loved by others; for the love of the common good as appropriated to the one alone who loves it is disordered; and love of anyone who does not wish the beloved to be likewise loved by others is imperfect: therefore since the precept of loving God tends toward perfect and ordered love, it intends also that the love of neighbor follow necessarily from the precept of the love of God.

The Doctor answers in three ways: First indeed, the major can be denied: for it is not certain that loving God is most strictly of the law of nature, inasmuch as that precept is affirmative, but only inasmuch as it is negative, namely insofar as it prohibits hatred of God: hence, after he had premised a reason for defending the affirmative part, namely that the precept of loving God sometimes obliges by the law of nature, otherwise it would follow that a man throughout his whole life would not be bound to elicit any act of the love of God, which seems to conflict with the dictate of right reason: afterward he proves the denying part thus in the same place n. 7.: It is not certain that there is a precept of the strict law of nature that some man love God positively today: therefore neither tomorrow, nor at any other time, because there is no stronger reason why someone should be bound at some determinate time to love God positively than today. And therefore, he says, strictly speaking it does not seem how it can be concluded when anyone is held then or now to exhibit cult to God; and by equal reason not at any time indistinctly, because no one is bound to any act for an indeterminate time for whom he is not bound for some designated time, with suitable occasions concurring. That is, no one can be bound to elicit some act for a determinate time unless he is bound for some determinate time, which could be determined by occurring opportunities and particular circumstances occasionally concurring. Wherefore, with the reason on either side weighed, the Doctor leaves undetermined whether to love and worship God positively is a precept of the strictest law of nature.

He answers 2. by denying the minor, namely that the love of neighbor follows necessarily from the love of God. To the argument for this minor he says, that although the perfect love of God, which would be prescribed by the strict law of nature, is not the love by which one would wish to appropriate God to himself, as if unwilling that He be positively loved by others; nevertheless it could not be the love by which one would necessarily wish God to be positively loved by others, but it suffices that it be love of God Himself in Himself, abstracting from whether one wishes or does not wish God to be loved by others. But the reason why one loving God perfectly might not be bound to wish Him positively to be loved by others, or possessed by them, is because perhaps it would not please God Himself to communicate Himself to other men as He communicates Himself to the one loving Him; or because it would not be known to the lover that it pleased God to communicate Himself to others as well as to himself. For just as although God in fact wishes to communicate Himself to those whom He predestines, and thus to be loved by them with most perfect love, yet He does not wish to communicate Himself to those whom He does not predestine, or to be so loved by them: so it is not wonderful that one who loves God could not wish positively that He be loved by others, because it would not be established by natural knowledge that such a love elicited by other men would be acceptable to God: and accordingly the one preferred, by whom one loves God, cannot naturally oblige Him, so that He should wish to be loved by others.

He answers 3.: That even if God were to be loved by the most strict and indispensable precept of the law of nature, and although by virtue of the same or another precept the neighbor ought similarly to be loved with that love by which we would be bound to wish him efficaciously to love God and to arrive at beatitude; nevertheless from this it would not follow that the precepts of the second table are to be observed by natural law, because only in that respect would it follow necessarily from the precept of having this love of neighbor that the precepts of the second table be observed, inasmuch as without such observation the neighbor could not be loved with such love: but it is not so; for there is no repugnance that one should wish God to love his neighbor, and him to arrive at ultimate beatitude, and at the same time should wish to kill him and despoil him of his goods. Indeed, one could judge, though erroneously, that that killing and that despoiling of goods would conduce him to attaining beatitude; namely if he judged himself to be in the state of grace, in which if he died, he would without doubt be saved: similarly one could judge that the possession of temporal goods would be harmful to the neighbor for obtaining beatitude; and therefore that the despoiling of those goods would conduce the neighbor to attaining beatitude, and consequently although one by the precept of loving God would be positively bound to wish even that God be loved by his neighbor, still it would not follow from this that by equal reason he would be bound to observe the precepts of the second table.

But to the authorities by which it was urged that the love of neighbor follows necessarily from the love of God, which is a precept of the law of nature, the Doctor answers n. 12., first that those things to which the love of neighbor extends indeed follow from the principles of the law of nature, yet they are not truly of the strict law of nature, but only reductively; and therefore they are not per se indispensable: for although the precepts of the second table follow naturally from the love of God, still it is not licit to infer from this that they are indispensable, but it is only concluded, that he who loves God is also bound to love his neighbor, and not to give him occasion of offending God; nor to inflict any injury upon him by taking away his goods: although these do not so necessarily follow but that God may dispense here and now with someone in that prohibition concerning taking away the goods of a neighbor and inflicting injuries upon him, according to His good pleasure.

You will say 2.: Things done against the precepts of the second table directly militate against the law of nature itself, and therefore are per se and of themselves evil and illicit, even independently of positive law: but in things that are per se evil, God cannot dispense; otherwise He would bring it about that evil could be done licitly, which implies a contradiction: for evil as evil is illicit: therefore in those things which are prohibited by the precepts of the second table, God cannot dispense.

I distinguish the major: that they militate directly and per se against the law of nature itself, I deny: from consequence and inference, I concede: that is, they are not of the strictest and indispensable law of nature; since indeed they are neither principles nor conclusions of such a law; but are only inferred consequently from the conclusions of such a law, and therefore ought not always to be judged indispensable. Or otherwise I say that the precepts of the second table are indeed forbidden, or commanded by the will of God, as the Author of nature, yet not commanded, or forbidden under pain of hell, or of privation of eternal life. For something can be prohibited or commanded in two ways: in one way under some penalty in general and indeterminately, or under a determinate penalty of a quasi-natural order, namely of temporal death, or imprisonment, or loss of honors. In another way something could be commanded or prohibited under pain of hell and of privation of beatitude, so that whoever transgressed the command would justly be judged worthy of hell or of privation of beatitude. But it is not necessary that whatever is commanded or prohibited in the Decalogue, especially in the second table, be prohibited or commanded by a precept of the natural law obliging to the eternal punishment of hell independently of any positive ordination of God. Nor indeed is it evident from the terms that there is so great malice in adultery, or homicide, or theft for example, that on account of those committed sins one ought to be punished with a penalty so dire and severe as is that penalty of eternal sense which in fact all adulterers, homicides, and thieves incur who depart this life without salutary penance: nor can any principles be assigned from which this could be naturally gathered, especially since from the nature of the thing it does not appear how injury is inflicted upon God through those crimes, or anything committed which has per se an incompatibility with the last end.

You will say 3. St. Paul to the Romans 2 affirms that whosoever have sinned without the law shall perish without the law. By which he seems to signify that even if there were no positive law of the precepts of the Decalogue, such as was in fact given to the Jews through Moses, and to us through Christ, still one who transgressed those precepts of the natural law could perish, and be punished with eternal death, and with loss of eternal beatitude. Which indeed is confirmed by the same Apostle, 1 Cor. 6: Know you not that the unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God? Do not err: neither fornicators, nor adulterers, etc. shall possess the kingdom of God. Therefore from the Apostle, even if there were no positive law, nevertheless those who perpetrated such crimes would be guilty of eternal damnation, and therefore the natural law obliges even to the punishments of hell.

I answer by denying the consequence: for the Apostle does not speak absolutely, and in the case in which there would be no positive law: but de facto and as things now stand, namely insofar as fornication, adultery, and other such things are prohibited by positive law under pain of eternal damnation. To the former text I say that the Apostle can be understood not of whatever sins are committed against the precepts of nature, but only of those which are committed against the precepts of the strictest natural law, such as are the two first precepts of the Decalogue, whereby the servitude of idols is prohibited, and irreverence toward God.

Third Conclusion. — No human power, whether ecclesiastical or civil, can dispense in those things which are of the natural law.

Proof 1. from the authority of St. Bernard in the praised First Conclusion, where, having conceded that God could dispense in the precepts of the second table, he says: Which although they admit no dispensation whatsoever, neither has it ever been lawful for anyone among men to loose them in any way from these, nor will it ever be lawful.

Proof 2. by reason: An inferior cannot absolve a superior, as is clear from dist. 21, cap. Interior: nor can an inferior loose one bound by a superior, as is found in c. Cum de Clerico aegrotante: but if dispensation could be made in the natural law by human authority, created and inferior authority would loose the obligation which men contracted by the ordination of God: therefore etc. Furthermore, Princes themselves and the Prelates of the Church are bound by the precepts of the natural law: therefore they cannot dispense in them. The consequence is plain: for those who are subject to precepts and held to keep them cannot dispense from the obligation of those precepts. The antecedent also is evident, since the precepts of the natural law pertain to all men whatsoever possessed of reason: therefore especially to those who ought above all to excel in reason and prudence, so as duly to direct and govern others. Finally, if Pontiffs and Princes could dispense in some precepts which either are of the natural law or pertain to it, they could above all dispense in the precepts of the second table: but they cannot do this, otherwise they could grant the power of committing fornication, of killing the innocent, and of taking the goods of others: but this, as is clear, is false: therefore that from which it follows is false also.

You will say: The Supreme Pontiff sometimes dispenses concerning the residence of Pastors: but the residence of Pastors is of the natural law, according to the Council of Trent session 23, c. 1, De reformatione: therefore dispensation can be granted in it. Likewise, it is of the natural law that he who has vowed render to the Lord what he has vowed: but the Supreme Pontiff dispenses in vows: therefore etc.

I answer first, by denying the minor: for the Council of Trent does not affirm that the residence of Pastors is of the natural law, but only signifies that it is of divine law. For it says:

Since by divine command it is enjoined upon all to whom the care of souls is committed, to know their sheep, to offer sacrifice for them, to feed them by the preaching of the word of God, by the administration of the sacraments, and by the example of all good works, to exercise paternal care toward the poor and other miserable persons, and to devote themselves to the other pastoral duties, all which can by no means be performed and fulfilled by those who neither watch over nor assist their flock, but desert it after the manner of hirelings: the most holy Synod admonishes and exhorts them, mindful of the divine precepts, touched by the whole flock, to feed and rule it in judgment and in truth.

By which words it is only signified that the residence of Pastors can be reckoned not indeed of the natural law, but of positive divine law: for from them it cannot be gathered that residence is of another law than that by which pastors are obliged to perform the duties which those absent cannot carry out: but the Council signifies that they are held to perform these, not by the law of nature, but by divine precept, and therefore the residence of pastors could not be reckoned to be of the natural law.

I answer 2. by distinguishing the major: that the Supreme Pontiff dispenses concerning the residence of pastors with a dispensation properly so called, which is done by his own right and his own authority, which looses the obligation of residing, no external grave cause concurring, I deny; with a dispensation improperly so called, which is only a declaration that pastors in that case are not held to reside, on account of grave causes calling them elsewhere, I concede. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff does not properly dispense concerning the residence of pastors when he grants them license to migrate elsewhere; but only declares that in some particular case pastors are not held to residence: for indeed Pastors alone ought to reside with the people committed to them, when the necessity or utility of the public good does not call them elsewhere, which indeed was prudently declared and enacted in the Council of Trent in the place cited, where, having declared that all Pastors, Even though they be Cardinals of holy Roman Church, are obliged to personal residence in their Church or Diocese, where they are held to discharge the office enjoined upon them, nor can they be absent except for certain causes: he adds:

For since Christian charity, pressing necessity, due obedience and faith in the Church, and the utility of the commonwealth sometimes require and demand that certain men be absent, the Most Holy Synod decrees that these causes of legitimate absence are to be approved in writing by the most blessed Roman Pontiff, or by the Metropolitan, or, in his absence, by the suffragan Bishop of longest residence, who must prove the absence of that same Metropolitan.

The supreme Pontiff, therefore, cannot in fact dispense with Bishops so that they do not reside during that time in which there is an obligation of law, whether natural or divine, to reside, except for a most grave cause, and such a one for which he can rightly judge that neither God nor nature, that cause being posited, obliges to residence. But when the supreme Pontiff dispenses Pastors from residence for light causes — if indeed he ever does this — he grants this only when the Pastor's presence does not seem so necessary or useful to the flock but that it can prudently be judged that in that case neither God nor nature commands such residence. To the second I answer in the same manner as to the first; for the supreme Pontiff properly dispenses in no vow or oath, nor even in ratified marriage; but on account of grave concurrent causes he merely declares that those who have emitted a vow are not bound by the law of nature to fulfil it in such a particular case; for it is indeed of the law of nature that he who vows, all circumstances remaining entirely the same, render to the Lord what he has vowed; but it is not of the law of nature that a vow be paid in certain concurrent circumstances and cases, namely if the matter of the vow be rendered morally impossible: e.g., if someone had vowed to give one hundred gold coins to the Church within a year, but after a month were stripped of all his goods and reduced to extreme necessity, then he would not be bound by the law of nature to pay the vow, because the matter of the vow is morally impossible to him; or if the observance of the vow be of lesser perfection and merit before God: as if, e.g., someone had vowed to give the Church a candle, he would without doubt satisfy the vow if in place of the candle he gave a golden chalice, because the law of nature never binds necessarily to omitting a greater good in order to pay a lesser good. The same must be said when danger of the loss of a greater good occurs, as if someone has vowed chastity by a simple vow, and afterwards, sorely vexed by the goads of concupiscence, found himself in danger not only of breaking the vow but also of sinning by the sin of fornication, or adultery, or some other worse sin, from which danger he would be delivered if, absolved from the vow, he could licitly take a wife: this, I say, in such a case the supreme Pontiff legitimately declares him not bound by the law of nature to remain in the vow: first because the vower himself must morally be judged not to have had the will of extending his vow to that morally impossible case; second, because the law of nature is not held to oblige to the performance of anything from which so grave a loss follows as is total incontinence; finally, because natural reason itself declares that when the loss of two goods diverse in reason and estimation must necessarily be incurred, the loss of the lesser rather than the greater good is rather to be made; for it is better to suffer the cutting off of an arm, or of another part of the body, than death itself, because the integrity of the body is a lesser good than the destruction of life. Therefore, since the state of virginal chastity, however excellent, is a lesser good than the state of sanctifying grace, whose loss he who has vowed is in peril of incurring: in that case the supreme Pontiff declares him absolved from the vow, and forthwith the supreme Pontiff does not dispense, nor can he dispense in any vow with perfect dispensation, just as he can dispense in ecclesiastical laws enacted by himself with full right and without any cause.

You will say: That cause which the supreme Pontiff would require in order to dispense legitimately either dissolves the obligation of the natural law or it does not: if it does not dissolve it, then the supreme Pontiff is judged truly to dispense with full right: if it does dissolve it, then recourse is had in vain to the supreme Pontiff for obtaining a dispensation from that obligation which already no longer exists.

I answer, that grave cause occurring truly does dissolve the obligation of the law of nature, and yet for that very reason recourse is none the less to be had to the supreme Pontiff, but that he may declare it dissolved, as the supreme head of the Church. For just as, although someone might be truly certain that the thing which his neighbor detains belongs to himself, he could not yet at times licitly claim it for himself by his own authority, but for this the sentence of a judge must be awaited and sought: so likewise, although someone may be certain that he has sufficient cause why he should be considered absolved from the obligation of paying a vow, yet he ought not break the vow until, the cause being set forth before the supreme Pontiff, he should have his declaration, whereby indeed both to himself and to the Church it is established that he is no longer bound to the payment of the vow.

You will insist: Not only does the supreme Pontiff declare that the obligation of the vow no longer presses, but he also truly absolves the vower from it: therefore he properly dispenses. The antecedent is clear, because he uses the word dispensing equally when he absolves from the obligation of a vow, and when he dispenses from a law laid down by himself: but while he uses this word in dissolving a law laid down by himself, he truly and properly dispenses with full right: therefore for a like reason he dispenses when he absolves from a vow.

I deny the antecedent, and for its proof I say, that although the supreme Pontiff uses the word dispensing in those declarations, it does not follow from this that he truly dispenses in them: for the word "I dispense" is equivocal, and sometimes signifies any act whatsoever of a superior by which something is made, or is known to be, licit which would otherwise be illicit, or would not be known to be licit, whether meanwhile that act be a proper dispensation or a mere declaration. Nor does it matter that he uses this word simply, both in dissolving the obligation of vows and in dissolving laws laid down by himself: for the diversity of signification in that case is not to be sought from the words, but from the nature of the subject matter. Hence, because the matter of Pontifical law is subject absolutely to the supreme Pontiff, so that without any antecedent cause he can by his own volition grant anyone a licence not to execute what is commanded, therefore when he grants this licence he is properly said to dispense: but because the matter of the natural law is not absolutely subject to any human authority, therefore the supreme Pontiff cannot dispense in it with full right, unless some grave cause concur. Whence then the word "I dispense" used by him does not have its true and proper signification: nevertheless he rightly employs that manner of speaking: partly because it is equivalent as regards the practice and common usage of the faithful; partly because it contributes not a little to removing the scruples of fearful consciences of the simple.

You will urge: The supreme Pontiff has the power of loosing whatsoever bond on earth, as is clear from those words of Matthew 18: Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven: therefore he can loose with full right any bond whatever of vow, of oath, and of ratified marriage.

I distinguish the antecedent: that he has this supreme authority with respect to determinate matter subject to himself, I concede; with respect to any matter whatsoever, I deny. Otherwise indeed the supreme Pontiff could dispense in the obligation of telling the truth, of eliciting the love of God, of preserving the life of an innocent man: and thus bring it about that lying, hatred of God, and perjury would be licit. Whence although the supreme Pontiff holds supreme power in the Church, yet he is not held able to loose every dispensation of man; otherwise, since the Emperor also holds supreme power in temporal affairs, he could likewise loose the natural obligation of subjects in promises, pacts, etc., which is nonetheless condemned in the Constitution Pastoralis, on judicial matters, at the end, where it is laid down that it is not lawful for the Emperor to abolish those things which are of the natural law.

You ask: whether the natural law can admit explication and declaration?

I affirm: since indeed all things which are of the natural law are not equally known and easy to understand, and since grave circumstances can at times occur, in which two conflicting precepts of nature seem to concur to be observed, declaration and explication are necessarily required, whereby it is established what is to be done in those circumstances. Thus, e.g., although the natural law commands that what belongs to another be restored, since nevertheless it commands that life and reputation be preserved, it follows that the sword is not to be restored to a madman while danger is present lest he kill either himself, or the restorer, or others. This declaration, however, is not properly to be called Epikeia: for since this is called by Aristotle, book 5 of the Ethics, chapter 10, an emendation of the law, on the part wherein it is deficient on account of its universality: this cannot fall to the law of nature, because the latter does not prohibit, nor command, universally and absolutely, but only in those cases in which the commanded act is necessary from the nature of the thing, and the prohibited act is evil, and necessarily to be fled.