Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

Two things especially are proposed for discussion in this Question: First, whether the natural law binds in conscience to the fulfilling of its precepts. Second, whether it binds so that those precepts be fulfilled out of love of God, or by the motive of divine love natural or supernatural: whose resolution, that it may appear more evident,

Note 1. That conscience is an act of the practical intellect judging something to be done or avoided in the singular. Hence also the name is deserved. It is called an act, that it may be distinguished from synderesis, and from the law or natural light, which are after the manner of a habit, from which conscience proceeds as an effect from its causes. Intellect is added, since conscience, by a just etymology of its name, sounds the same as knowledge with another, that is, the concurrence of knowledge for forming a judgment: whence Ecclesiasticus chap. 7. Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often cursed others, that is, it instructs thee and points out thy curses to thee, setting before thine eyes as it were the evil thou hast committed: wherefore Origen, book 2. on chapter 2. of Romans, Conscience, he says, is the corrector of the spirit, and the pedagogue of the soul, that when it admonishes of better things, it may chastise, convict, and accuse of faults: the rest is added to signify that conscience does not consist in the first operation of the intellect, which is the simple cognition and apprehension of a thing, nor in the second by which there is deliberation, but in the third which is judgment; for conscience judges practically, and after the manner of a definitive sentence that something is worthy of praise or blame: whence

Note 2. That obligation to do something can be said to be threefold, according to the threefold principle from which the operation to be performed is urged; namely, from counsel, from precept, and from advantage. Things done from counsel regard only the greater or lesser perfection and utility of the one acting: those from precept introduce necessity; and if done otherwise, they are subject to penalties and chastisement: but those from advantage regard only the private good and utility of the one acting. And although these three principles sometimes concur in keeping the precepts of any law whatever; yet here the discourse concerns only the obligation proceeding from precept: namely, whether we are bound to fulfil the precepts of the law of nature, such that whoever omits them ought to be punished with penalties either by man or by God.

Note 3. That the love of God is customarily distinguished as twofold, namely natural and supernatural, innate and infused; whereby we love God as the author, moderator, and end of nature, or as the bestower, propagator, and remunerator of grace. And we suppose as certain that in human nature there can be a love of God as author of nature distinct from supernatural love of Him. We suppose further that the innate law itself contains a special precept about loving God as the artificer, ruler, and end of nature. We suppose finally that this precept is affirmative, and does not bind except at opportune times. Whence although every natural precept tends toward God as the last end, and redounds to the glory of God, because by it His divine will is fulfilled, even if the agent does not formally intend this; nevertheless it is not necessary that one fulfilling the precepts of nature always have an actual love of God joined thereto, as will be proved below.

First Conclusion. — THE NATURAL LAW BINDS IN CONSCIENCE TO THE KEEPING OF ITS PRECEPTS.

Proof, first from the Apostle to the Romans 2. where he says: Whosoever have sinned without the law, that is without the written law, shall perish without the law: but they ought not to perish, unless because they are sinners, nor be sinners, unless because they have violated the natural law, concerning which the Apostle subjoins: The Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law… Their conscience bearing witness to them. And therefore the Apostle judges that the natural law binds in conscience, and that its transgressors are held guilty of divine chastisement and vengeance.

It is proved further from the same Apostle, Romans 11. last verse: All that is not of faith is sin, that is, what is not of the dictate of conscience judging the good or the licit to be that which is done; for the Apostle there takes faith for conscience, and for such a dictate, as is clear from the text.

It is confirmed from Innocent III, on chapter 13. De restitutione spoliatorum, saying: What is against conscience builds toward hell: doubtless because the dictate of conscience is the proximate rule of human actions, to which they must conform that they may be honest and licit.

Reason urges this same truth; for, as we said above, the natural law commanding or forbidding is the command of God as author of nature, to whom obedience is due as to a legitimate superior, and it is against reason itself to withdraw oneself from His command: but every divine law, and every divine command, binds in conscience: therefore also the natural law. Then, the natural law is the proximate rule of moral honesty, and what is opposed to it carries moral evil attached; but everything that carries moral evil attached is against conscience; therefore everything done against the law of nature fights against conscience, and consequently the law of nature itself binds in conscience to the keeping of its precepts. Finally, the natural law forbids or commands all that disgraces or befits rational nature; but as often as illicit things are admitted, or necessary ones are not done, sin is committed against conscience itself, which most of all approves licit things and disapproves illicit ones: therefore, etc. — Hence it appears that the law of nature sometimes binds under mortal sin; namely according to the gravity of the matter, and the disposition and affection of the sinner; since whoever sins in a grave matter against the precepts of the natural law knows formally, and actually or virtually, that he gravely offends God as author and ruler of nature, in which virtual contempt of God is involved sufficient for mortal sin. Wherefore the Apostle praised above rightly said, that whosoever have sinned without the law shall perish without the law; namely on account of sins committed, not indeed against the positive and written law, which they did not know, and therefore are said to have sinned without the law; but against the natural law, which no one possessed of reason is ignorant of.

You will say 1. A law cannot bind to a penalty which it can neither manifest nor inflict: but the natural law cannot manifest eternal punishment, since it is not known by natural light, nor indeed can it inflict it: therefore it cannot bind under guilt of eternal punishment; and consequently neither under mortal sin, which introduces the guilt of eternal punishment.

I deny the major. For in order to incur the liability to some punishment, it is not necessary that the punishment be made manifest by the law, nor that the subject and transgressor know the punishment due to his transgression: but it suffices that he commit an act worthy of such a punishment, which is known and inferred from God as the author of nature, and the vindicator of the natural law.

You will say 2. The natural law does not make obligation, but presupposes it: therefore obligation is not its effect. The antecedent is clear from what has been said: for the natural law is distinguished from positive law in this, that the latter forbids something because it is evil: but the former forbids something which becomes evil because it is forbidden. And the same holds proportionally for command and for the precept of doing good because it is good.

I answer. With Suarez, book 2, chapter 9, this objection is a confirmation of our assertion: for, he says, if this law forbids something because it is evil, it induces a proper and special necessity of avoiding it, because this is intrinsic to the prohibition, namely that what is forbidden be avoided. This objection also proves that this law presupposes something which pertains to the intrinsic due of nature; since each thing in a certain manner owes to itself that it do nothing at variance with its own nature. But beyond this due, the natural law likewise adds a special moral obligation, which the experts in law call natural obligation: not because it is not moral, but that they may distinguish it from civil obligation.

Second conclusion. — THE NATURAL LAW DOES NOT OBLIGATE US TO DO ALL THINGS OUT OF A NATURAL LOVE OF GOD.

Proof: The precept of loving God, which is imposed by nature, is affirmative: but an affirmative precept does not bind always, but only at some certain and determinate time: therefore by the natural law we are not bound to elicit all our acts out of love of God the author of nature. The major is evident. The minor likewise; for this is the difference between an affirmative and a negative precept, that the former binds only at some certain determinate time; the latter, however, infers a perpetual obligation at every moment of time; since nowhere is it licit to steal, to commit homicide, etc. It follows therefore that the love of God is not necessary as often as the ordination of other precepts obliges; and accordingly other precepts of nature can be observed without an actual love of God as the author of nature. — Next, the honest good of the other virtues has from itself, and per se, that it can be honestly loved, and from its own motive, for instance the temperate because it is temperate: but it is consonant with reason, and congruent with the law of nature, to love whatever is honest as such, although concerning some other external amiable object it is not required, for instance concerning loving God: therefore natural precepts of virtues of this kind can be fulfilled without any actual love of God. Finally, the obligation of doing all things for God is shown by no natural reason, or sufficient authority: and therefore it ought not to be affirmed gratuitously.

You will say. The Apostle, first to the Corinthians 10, admonishes that all things are to be done to the glory of God: therefore truly all works must be done out of love of God. — I distinguish the antecedent: that the Apostle admonishes this as something which is precepted by the natural law, I deny: as a counsel which he himself supplies, and which to observe is indeed best and most salutary, but not necessary under pain of sin, I concede.

You will say 2. St. Augustine, book 1, On the Morals of the Church, chapter 11, says that all goods are to be referred to the highest good: whence he infers in chapter 11 that nothing is virtue except the supreme love of God, and through this he defines all the virtues: therefore in book 19, Of the City of God, chapter 25, he says that it is proud to love even the virtues themselves on account of themselves, because God alone is supremely good, and therefore He alone is to be willed on account of Himself: therefore all things which are done are either vicious, or must be done out of love of God. Which same Augustine indeed confirms in book 1, Retractations, chapter 15, where he says that the will without charity is a vicious cupidity.

I answer. St. Augustine in these and similar sayings wishes nothing else than that either there be no perfect virtue, meritorious of eternal salvation, without habitual charity and sanctifying grace: or that the will without charity itself be a vicious cupidity, that is, that it be very often overcome by vicious cupidities; because on the one hand it is very weak, and prone to evil, owing to the natural corruption of man; on the other, however, it is deprived of the abundance of aids which are given to the just and to the friends of God. But St. Augustine does not wish every elicited act which does not proceed from the love of God to be vicious; for the honest good is lovable on account of itself, and it suffices for the honesty of the act, even if one does not think of God actually, nor has thought of Him beforehand in such wise that a past love of God might somewhat influence the act.

Suarez adds, book 2, chapter 11, number 5, that it is one thing to love something as the highest good; another indeed to love something as a good lovable per se. The former is proper to God; the latter, however, is communicated by God Himself to every honest good, and therefore in thus loving the honest good, nothing is done against God. Nor does it follow from this that all created goods are to be lovable on account of themselves, because there are no inferior goods, useful or delightful, which are not to be desired on account of honesty. Finally, although a created honest good is loved on account of itself, it is not loved as the last end: but such a love by its nature tends into God, and this is sufficient, that the man not be said to enjoy such a good, but to use it; but then would he be said to enjoy it, when he should constitute in it his last end, and this is what Augustine said was proud.