Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

It is certain that everything which the natural light judges and indicates of itself to be necessary, or in harmony with rational nature, is to be reckoned as the matter of the Natural Law; for the natural law, according to the most common teaching of Theologians, is distinguished above all from positive law in this, that the former concerns things necessary by the nature of the thing for the uprightness of a rational creature, while the latter concerns things necessary only from the will of the Legislator. Hence not only the first principles of morals, but also practical conclusions evidently deduced from them, belong to the law of nature, as the Doctor rightly teaches in 3 dist. 37 n. 6. I say, he declares, that some things can belong to the Law of Nature in two ways: in one way as first practical principles arising from their terms, or as conclusions necessarily following from them: and these are said to belong most strictly to the Law of Nature. For such conclusions are as necessary to a rational creature as the principles from which they are deduced; since if the conclusion be destroyed, the principle likewise falls, according to the mode of arguing from the opposite of the consequent. Wherefore the Apostle deservedly comprehends under the Law of Nature generally, Rom. 2, all those things which the nations judge by natural instinct to be good or evil, or to be done or avoided. Therefore everything must be held with certainty to pertain to the law of nature which the natural light judges to beseem or unbecome rational nature. But what things specially pertain to that law itself is not so certain.

Note 2. The laws and precepts of nature must be regarded not only respectively with respect to that nature considered according to its natural state, but also with respect to the same nature as it is raised to the supernatural state and illuminated by the light of faith. For since the ingenerate light of nature universally teaches that what is fitting to nature itself ought to be suitably pursued; and since rational nature can be led not only to an end fixed by the Author of nature, but also to an end determined by God himself as author of grace through fitting means: it follows that the precepts of the Law of nature intimate and indicate that every end owed to nature itself ought to be fitfully pursued. Hence, given the institution of the Sacraments, for example, whereby the supernatural end can be attained, the Law of nature, which universally teaches that the end is to be attained by means fittingly applied, likewise teaches that the Sacraments are not to be received unworthily, nor treated irreverently. For although these and similar precepts are sometimes called supernatural, because indeed they are ordered to a supernatural end, yet they are truly connatural to rational nature raised to the state of grace and ordered to a supernatural end, and as such are distinguished against positive precepts: for right reason illumined by faith can judge, even setting aside any particular ordinance of a higher order, that the Sacraments are not to be administered to the unworthy, nor treated unworthily. Whence, in order to discern the precepts of the Law of nature, inasmuch as they are distinguished against the precepts of positive law, heed must be paid to the light of nature not only in nature considered in its natural state, but also as it is raised to the state of grace and illuminated by the light of faith.

Note 3. The controversy is chiefly raised concerning the acts of virtues and the precepts of the Decalogue, namely whether the native law is concerned with these as with matter suitable and proper to itself, so that, any positive ordination of the Legislator being set aside, these are declared by the natural light to be to be pursued and fulfilled as agreeable to rational nature. Now since virtues are of two kinds, of which some are necessary for duly instructing man in those things that pertain to the natural state, which serve for rightly regulating his threefold inclination, whereby he is carried either toward the conservation of himself, or toward the propagation of his species, or toward entering duly into society with superiors, equals, and subjects; while others are not so necessary but fall only under counsel, and are called works of supererogation: the question arises how the Law of nature is concerned with these. And since likewise the precepts of the Decalogue are of two tables, and some pertain to God, such as the three precepts of the first table, while others pertain to life to be duly ordered with respect to men, the difficulty is likewise raised whether all these precepts of either table of the Decalogue pertain to the matter of the Law of nature.

Three things here especially remain to be determined: First, whether every act of virtue pertains to the law of nature. Second, whether the law of nature commands not only the entity of the act of virtue, but also the manner in which it ought to be elicited. Thirdly, finally, whether, and how, all the precepts of the Decalogue pertain to the law of nature itself.

First Conclusion. — The law of nature is concerned with all the acts of virtues considered in common: but if they are regarded in particular, not all are of the natural law. This comprises two parts, of which

The first part is proved: Everything pertains to the natural law to which man is inclined according to his nature: but man is naturally inclined to act according to virtue: for each thing has a natural inclination according as its own proper form requires, just as fire is naturally inclined to heat; now the proper form of man, which is the rational soul, requires that man act according to virtue. And hence it is that St. Damascene said that the virtues are natural to man.

The second part is proved in like manner; because many things are done by man according to virtue to which nature does not incline first and of itself, but which men have discovered by inquiry of reason as accommodated to living well and tranquilly: or if nature inclines first to those things, yet it does not incline to them by way of precept, such being some acts of virtue.

You will object against the first part of our proposition: acts of virtue which are only of counsel are not of the natural Law, since they are not in precept: therefore it is false that all acts of virtue are of the natural law. Likewise, acts of supernatural virtues are not of the natural law; for nature dictates nothing about supernatural works. Likewise, it would follow from this part of our proposition that it cannot be established among those things which first something is commanded by human law, belongs to the genus of virtue, and therefore, if our doctrine be true, is of the law of nature. — I answer to the first part, that acts of virtue of counsel only are of the natural law if they are regarded in the universal: but not if they are considered in particular: but things regarded in the universal, as such, do not fall under precept, but only those in particular; for nothing is commanded except what is to be done: but things in the universal are not to be done, but only things in particular. Whence it is one thing for a thing to be of the natural law, and another for it to be of the precept of the natural law; just as the Evangelical counsels are indeed of the Evangelical law, yet are not of the precept of that Evangelical law. To the second part I say the Conclusion is especially to be understood of the natural virtues. But if it be extended also to supernatural virtues, I say that nature dictates concerning them, if not immediately, at least mediately and confusedly, insofar as it dictates concerning the last end, which is the clear and intuitive vision of God, to which the acts of supernatural virtues are ordered as means to an end. To the third I say there is a distinction between the natural law and human law, in that things which are of human law, if considered in the universal, are of the natural law, and in no wise if considered in particular: for, as Aristotle says 5 Ethic., chap. 7. Natural right has the same force everywhere, and not because it seems or seems not: but positive right is that which from the beginning matters not whether it be done thus or otherwise: but after it has been enacted, it matters much: wherefore it has all its force from imposition. Whence I say that things which are of the natural law differ only in a twofold way: for some are so necessary for the attainment of the end that their necessity is evident to all: such are these precepts, not to lie, not to commit adultery. Others indeed are necessary, but their necessity is not evident to all; rather they need declaration and careful industry, for example, that such a contract is usurious: others again are things which conduce to the end but are not necessary, and vary with the diversity of times and regions: and these are of the natural law in the universal: but they are not of the natural law in the particular.

You will object against the other part of our Conclusion. First, the Law of nature commands that we obey superiors: therefore since Christ is a superior, the law of nature commands that we obey him; and consequently all the precepts instituted by Christ the Lord must be reckoned to be of the law of nature. Moreover, just as the visual power perceives all colors, and accordingly is inclined to see all colors, whether those colors be produced by nature, or by art, or by a natural faculty: by equal reason, if, as was said in the prior part of the Conclusion, nature inclines to the acts of virtues viewed generically, and inasmuch as they are virtuous acts, it will likewise incline to those acts of virtue from whomsoever, and in whatsoever manner, those virtues are commanded or counseled. —

I answer the first, I grant the antecedent and the first consequence, denying the second: for precepts, inasmuch as they proceed from the Legislator through some judgment and voluntary ordination, are not reckoned to belong to the law of nature, if they be considered in particular. To the second, I deny the consequence; because colors of whatever kind are contained within the breadth of the object of sight, and accordingly pertain per se to the visual power, and that power is in turn per se ordered to beholding them; but the acts of supernatural virtues are not contained within the natural genus, nor are they comprehended by natural reason; and therefore it is no wonder if they do not fall under the precepts of nature.

You will object 3. against either part of the Conclusion: Not all sins are against the law of nature: therefore neither do all acts of the virtues, even natural ones, both in common and in particular, pertain to the law of nature. —

I distinguish the antecedent: they are not against the law of nature inasmuch as it is considered only according to the reason of an animal, and insofar as it is common to all animals, namely in that manner in which the defilers of males are said to sin against nature, I grant: they are not against nature, inasmuch as it is rational, and insofar as it follows the dictate of right reason and the natural light dictating what things befit man or disbefit him, I deny. For it must be known, as we said above, that three grades are distinguished in man: namely, of a substantial and living being, of a sentient animal, and of a rational and sociable one; from which follow diverse inclinations of man toward various goods. Hence it comes about that man regarded according to the first grade is said to sin against nature, either when he kills himself, or when he denies himself necessary nourishment; for, as Tully says, chapter 1 De Officiis, "In the first place, every genus of animals has been endowed by nature with the instinct to defend its life and its body." But regarded according to the grade of a living animal, and inasmuch as he is ordered to the preservation of his species in a becoming manner, he is said to sin against nature as often as he admits the abominable crimes of sodomy, bestiality, etc., which fight against the lawful propagation of mankind. Finally, man regarded according to the grade of reason: all sins whatsoever are said to be against the nature of man, because they are contrary to reason and to the innate natural light dictating what is to be pursued and what to be shunned. Yet the two first kinds of sins are especially said to be against nature, because indeed it is horrible and unspeakable to commit that from which even brutes themselves shrink.

Second Conclusion. — The natural law brings it about that the act commanded of virtue be done voluntarily, with prior knowledge of the precept, and that it be ordered to an honest end, and done decently. This conclusion embraces especially three parts, of which

The first is proved: The natural law directly regards human action: but an act cannot be human unless it be done voluntarily, and consequently be free: therefore such a mode of acting regards the very natural law. Hence it follows that, through failure of this condition, he does not properly satisfy the precept of justice, or of mercy, who restores another's property, or gives alms to one in extreme need, while in drunkenness, or otherwise impeded in the use of reason; for he who does the work of the law involuntarily, although he may seem to keep it, is nevertheless a transgressor of the law, as St. Augustine teaches, book 2 contra duas epistolas Pelagii chapter 9, affirming that where good is done not out of love of justice, but out of fear of punishment, in such wise that the fear be so servile that it carry with it the conjoined desire not to do the work commanded if no punishment were to be inflicted upon the delinquent; he, I say, does not satisfy the law, nor is he reckoned to accomplish the good. — Yet he who would so restore or confer alms would not be bound again to give alms or make restitution; because the matter of the precept has been taken away by the other receiving what is his own, and the necessity of the poor man relieved.

The second part is also evident; for in order that an act be truly an act of virtue and human, it must not only be voluntary, but also elicited with advertence and deliberation: and it cannot be such without some prior knowledge of the precept. Nevertheless I should judge that it is not required absolutely, for fulfilling the precept of nature, that it be distinctly known in particular; the reason is, because the law commands nothing else than that the act be done: whence if it happen that someone voluntarily give alms to a poor man in extreme need, and consequently at the time when the natural precept obliges, although he who gives the alms did not recognize that necessity and obligation, he truly satisfies the precept; so that afterwards, when he shall have learned of this obligation, he is not bound again to give alms. Similarly, even if the obligation of worshipping God on some day, for instance of hearing Mass, be unknown to him who yet on that very day hears Mass out of devotion, he is held to have satisfied the precept, nor is he bound afterwards, when aware of the obligation of the precept, to hear Mass anew: inasmuch as the precept bears only the obligation of hearing Mass, which he satisfied by hearing Mass, even though he did not recognize such a precept.

The third part is also evident, namely that the law of nature brings it about that the act be done on account of an honest end and motive: because the native law is ordered to the perfection of man: but man is not held perfect in operating unless he act from a motive of honesty, and according to the decency and honesty consonant with his nature: therefore nature brings it about that works be done in such a manner. Yet it is not necessary that one operate in such a manner in order to fulfill the precepts of nature: since the tenor of the precepts conveys nothing else than that an honest act be commanded, for instance that the neighbor's necessity be relieved through alms, and property restored to its proper owner: which can be fulfilled even on account of an end not honest; for he who restores a debt keeps the natural precept of restitution, even if he do it in an unbecoming manner; and he who gives alms keeps the natural precept of mercy, even if he bestow the alms itself out of vainglory. Hence it comes about that some law of nature can be fulfilled by an indifferent act, which, since no other law forbids it, follows that some law of nature can by means of it be fulfilled without transgression of any other law: nay, it can even be fulfilled by an act vitiated by circumstance, and forbidden by another precept of nature: thus, for example, someone satisfies the precept of giving alms or honoring parents, even if he execute it out of vainglory, which is forbidden by another law of nature, so that, as we already said, he who has thus bestowed alms on a poor man in extreme need is not bound, on account of another honest motive, to give alms again. — I confess however that by an act vicious by reason of circumstance the whole law of nature is truly not kept nor fulfilled; for this law differs from positive human law in this, that a human precept can be wholly kept by an act vitious by circumstance or end, because that malice which inheres in such an act is often not against any human precept, but only against the general law; which, since it is ordered to the moral perfection of man, intends not only the execution of that which right reason dictates to be done, but also the manner in which it is required that man be held to operate decently.

Third Conclusion. — All the precepts of the Decalogue, if you except the third concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath, pertain to the law of nature: yet not in the same manner. This is the doctrine of the Doctor in 3 dist. 37 n. 6 and following, as to its three parts, of which

The first is proved: That belongs to the law of nature, according to Aristotle, 5 Ethics, chapter 1, "which everywhere has that force, not because it seems so or seems not so:" that is, it has its force from the nature of the thing, and not because it is instituted voluntarily and arbitrarily: now such is the law by which we are bound to observe all the precepts of the Decalogue, excepting the special determination of the feast day; for that law does not arise from any voluntary and arbitrary institution: otherwise it would not prevail among all Nations: but it obliges by the force of natural reason alone, as is evident regarding the worship of God, and the honor of parents frequently shown, and likewise regarding homicide, adultery, and the rest: therefore all the precepts of the Decalogue must be judged to pertain to the law of nature. Furthermore, those things pertain to the natural law which most of all befit rational nature: but such are all the precepts of the Decalogue; for what befits man more than to worship with due worship the supreme Artificer of his formation, namely God, and likewise those from whom he received life and nature? What so congruous, and so necessary for human society and tranquillity, as to avoid and flee adulteries, thefts, homicides, and other things of this kind, which are forbidden by the precepts of the Decalogue? Finally, in this the natural law differs from positive law, that the former supposes in its object the honesty which it commands, and the moral deformity and malice which it prohibits: but the latter does not so suppose in its object, which commands or prohibits, the moral necessity of doing or omitting, but introduces it: those things which the natural law commands are not good because commanded, nor evil because prohibited; but on the contrary it commands them because they are good and morally necessary from the nature of the thing, or prohibits them because they are evil and naturally unbecoming of themselves: whereas those things which are commanded by positive law are morally necessary only because they are commanded; and those which are prohibited by it are evil and illicit only because prohibited: but all things which are commanded or prohibited by the Decalogue, excepting the determination of the feast day in the Sabbath, are good and honest, or shameful and unbecoming from the very nature of the thing, and apart from any positive law whatsoever, as appears in the worship of God, the honor of parents, homicide, theft.

The second part is also evident, namely that the worship to be rendered to God chiefly on the Sabbath day is not of the law of nature, or as the Doctor says:

The third precept, which concerns the Sabbath, is affirmative, inasmuch as some worship is to be exhibited to God at a determined time; and as regards the determination of this time or of that, it is not of the law of nature strictly speaking. Nor likewise does it belong to the negative part which is included: namely, by which a servile act is prohibited for a determined time, hindering one from the worship then to be exhibited to God: for that act is not prohibited except because it impedes or withdraws from that worship which is commanded.

In these words the Doctor first supposes three things to be involved in the precept concerning the keeping of the Sabbath: First, that some worship is to be exhibited to God at some determined time; and as regards this, that precept is affirmative, nor does it oblige so that at all times some positive worship be exhibited to God. Second, that this worship be rendered to God on the Sabbath day; and as regards this, that precept also is affirmative. Finally, the third thing that precept comprises is that one must abstain from servile works on those Sabbath days; by reason of which this precept is negative; because servile works are permitted on no part of the Sabbath day. These things presupposed, he concludes that this precept, as regards the two latter heads, is not of the strictest law of nature, and consequently is not indispensable. Which indeed is evident as regards the first head: since the Church has transferred that obligation from the Sabbath day to Sunday; which certainly she would not have done if the precept concerning the exhibiting of worship to God on the Sabbath day had been of the strictest law of nature. Add that no reason can be assigned which would urge the exhibition of worship to God rather on the Sabbath or on Sunday than on Friday or Thursday, if only the natural light is considered. Therefore just as there is not a precept of exhibiting a particular worship to God on Thursday or Friday from the dictate of natural light; so neither would it have to be exhibited on the Sabbath or on Sunday unless a positive law commanded God to be honored on the Sabbath or on Sunday: therefore this worship to be exhibited on such a day is not of the law of nature.

The same truth is also evident as regards the second head, namely concerning abstaining from servile works on those days: both on account of the reasons already set forth; and because, as the Doctor said, insofar as abstaining from those works is a precept, insofar would those servile works remove from the divine worship to be rendered: therefore if there is not a precept of the strictest law of nature concerning the exhibiting of worship to God on Sabbath days or Sundays rather than on other days, neither will there be a precept of such law to abstain from servile works on those days rather than on others.

But as regards the first head which that precept includes, namely that worship should be specially rendered to God at some determined time rather than at another, whether it be of the strictest law of nature, the Doctor resolves nothing, but with the matter balanced on either side he remains in doubt.

Finally, the third part of the Conclusion is evident, namely that not all the precepts of the Decalogue are equally of the law of nature: for, says the Doctor in the same place, the law of nature is twofold, namely proper, and strict, which obliges to doing or not doing independently of the act of any will commanding or prohibiting; another indeed most strict, which can admit no dispensation whatsoever, such as are the two former precepts of the first table; namely that God alone is to be honored, nor is worship to be exhibited to strange gods; and that the divine name of God is not to be taken in vain; for these two precepts of the first table are most strictly of the law of nature; because, says the Doctor, num. 6, it follows necessarily: if God is, He is to be loved as God: and that nothing else is to be honored as God, nor is irreverence to be shown to God; and consequently in these God could not dispense, so that anyone might licitly do the opposite of such a prohibition. As if the Doctor were saying: it is known from the terms that no injury can be inflicted on God without fault, because it is evident that irreverence is not to be exhibited to parents or kings and other superiors: therefore much more evident is it that no irreverence ought in any way to be inflicted upon God, who is the King of Kings, and the Parent of all men.

But as regards the precepts of the second table, the Doctor indeed grants that they are of the law of nature, though not indeed of the strictest; since dispensation can fall upon them. In another way, he says n. 8, certain things are said to be of the law of nature because they are very consonant to that law, although they do not follow necessarily from practical principles which are known from the terms; and are necessarily known to every intellect apprehending them: and in this way it is certain that all the precepts even of the second table are of the law of nature, because their rectitude is greatly consonant with the first practical principles necessarily known. By these words the Doctor does not assert that the precepts of the second table are not of the law of nature, as Suarez wishes lib. 2. cap. 15. num. 8. and Salas disp. 5. sect. 9. n. 56. and others who seem not to have understood the Doctor quite correctly; but the Doctor only wished that these precepts are not of the strictest law of nature, in that manner in which the two former of the first table: for here is the distinction between these two: the precepts of the second table are not of the proper law of nature, and they are not of the law of nature most strictly. The Doctor denies the first, and affirms the second; which he opens more plainly below, where, gathering together what he had said, he states: First it was denied that all the precepts of the second table are of the law of nature strictly speaking. Second it was granted that the two first of the first table are of the law of nature strictly speaking. Third doubt was raised about the third precept of the first table. And fourth it was granted that all are of the law of nature largely speaking.