Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

Since the chief power and rationale of every law consists in its obligation to pursue or avoid something, the right and just method of speaking requires that, after having delineated the essence of the Natural Law, we now declare its binding force: which we shall indeed carry out in the following Questions; the First of which will disclose over what matter the Law of Nature extends itself; the Second, in what way men are held and obliged to fulfil its precepts.

It is certain that everything which the natural light judges and indicates of itself to be necessary, or in harmony with rational nature, is to be reckoned as the matter of the Natural Law; for the natural law, according to the most common teaching of Theologians, is distinguished above all from positive law in this, that the former concerns things necessary by the nature of the thing for the uprightness of a rational creature, while the latter concerns things necessary only from the will of the Legislator. Hence not only the first principles of morals, but also practical conclusions evidently deduced from them, belong to the law of nature, as the Doctor rightly teaches in 3 dist. 37 n. 6. I say, he declares, that some things can belong to the Law of Nature in two ways: in one way as first practical principles arising from their terms, or as conclusions necessarily following from them: and these are said to belong most strictly to the Law of Nature. For such conclusions are as necessary to a rational creature as the principles from which they are deduced; since if the conclusion be destroyed, the principle likewise falls, according to the mode of arguing from the opposite of the consequent. Wherefore the Apostle deservedly comprehends under the Law of Nature generally, Rom. 2, all those things which the nations judge by natural instinct to be good or evil, or to be done or avoided. Therefore everything must be held with certainty to pertain to the law of nature which the natural light judges to beseem or unbecome rational nature. But what things specially pertain to that law itself is not so certain.

Note 2. The laws and precepts of nature must be regarded not only respectively with respect to that nature considered according to its natural state, but also with respect to the same nature as it is raised to the supernatural state and illuminated by the light of faith. For since the ingenerate light of nature universally teaches that what is fitting to nature itself ought to be suitably pursued; and since rational nature can be led not only to an end fixed by the Author of nature, but also to an end determined by God himself as author of grace through fitting means: it follows that the precepts of the Law of nature intimate and indicate that every end owed to nature itself ought to be fitfully pursued. Hence, given the institution of the Sacraments, for example, whereby the supernatural end can be attained, the Law of nature, which universally teaches that the end is to be attained by means fittingly applied, likewise teaches that the Sacraments are not to be received unworthily, nor treated irreverently. For although these and similar precepts are sometimes called supernatural, because indeed they are ordered to a supernatural end, yet they are truly connatural to rational nature raised to the state of grace and ordered to a supernatural end, and as such are distinguished against positive precepts: for right reason illumined by faith can judge, even setting aside any particular ordinance of a higher order, that the Sacraments are not to be administered to the unworthy, nor treated unworthily. Whence, in order to discern the precepts of the Law of nature, inasmuch as they are distinguished against the precepts of positive law, heed must be paid to the light of nature not only in nature considered in its natural state, but also as it is raised to the state of grace and illuminated by the light of faith.

Note 3. The controversy is chiefly raised concerning the acts of virtues and the precepts of the Decalogue, namely whether the native law is concerned with these as with matter suitable and proper to itself, so that, any positive ordination of the Legislator being set aside, these are declared by the natural light to be to be pursued and fulfilled as agreeable to rational nature. Now since virtues are of two kinds, of which some are necessary for duly instructing man in those things that pertain to the natural state, which serve for rightly regulating his threefold inclination, whereby he is carried either toward the conservation of himself, or toward the propagation of his species, or toward entering duly into society with superiors, equals, and subjects; while others are not so necessary but fall only under counsel, and are called works of supererogation: the question arises how the Law of nature is concerned with these. And since likewise the precepts of the Decalogue are of two tables, and some pertain to God, such as the three precepts of the first table, while others pertain to life to be duly ordered with respect to men, the difficulty is likewise raised whether all these precepts of either table of the Decalogue pertain to the matter of the Law of nature.

Three things here especially remain to be determined: First, whether every act of virtue pertains to the law of nature. Second, whether the law of nature commands not only the entity of the act of virtue, but also the manner in which it ought to be elicited. Thirdly, finally, whether, and how, all the precepts of the Decalogue pertain to the law of nature itself.

First Conclusion. — The law of nature is concerned with all the acts of virtues considered in common: but if they are regarded in particular, not all are of the natural law. This comprises two parts, of which

The first part is proved: Everything pertains to the natural law to which man is inclined according to his nature: but man is naturally inclined to act according to virtue: for each thing has a natural inclination according as its own proper form requires, just as fire is naturally inclined to heat; now the proper form of man, which is the rational soul, requires that man act according to virtue. And hence it is that St. Damascene said that the virtues are natural to man.

The second part is proved in like manner; because many things are done by man according to virtue to which nature does not incline first and of itself, but which men have discovered by inquiry of reason as accommodated to living well and tranquilly: or if nature inclines first to those things, yet it does not incline to them by way of precept, such being some acts of virtue.

You will object against the first part of our proposition: acts of virtue which are only of counsel are not of the natural Law, since they are not in precept: therefore it is false that all acts of virtue are of the natural law. Likewise, acts of supernatural virtues are not of the natural law; for nature dictates nothing about supernatural works. Likewise, it would follow from this part of our proposition that it cannot be established among those things which first something is commanded by human law, belongs to the genus of virtue, and therefore, if our doctrine be true, is of the law of nature. — I answer to the first part, that acts of virtue of counsel only are of the natural law if they are regarded in the universal: but not if they are considered in particular: but things regarded in the universal, as such, do not fall under precept, but only those in particular; for nothing is commanded except what is to be done: but things in the universal are not to be done, but only things in particular. Whence it is one thing for a thing to be of the natural law, and another for it to be of the precept of the natural law; just as the Evangelical counsels are indeed of the Evangelical law, yet are not of the precept of that Evangelical law. To the second part I say the Conclusion is especially to be understood of the natural virtues. But if it be extended also to supernatural virtues, I say that nature dictates concerning them, if not immediately, at least mediately and confusedly, insofar as it dictates concerning the last end, which is the clear and intuitive vision of God, to which the acts of supernatural virtues are ordered as means to an end. To the third I say there is a distinction between the natural law and human law, in that things which are of human law, if considered in the universal, are of the natural law, and in no wise if considered in particular: for, as Aristotle says 5 Ethic., chap. 7. Natural right has the same force everywhere, and not because it seems or seems not: but positive right is that which from the beginning matters not whether it be done thus or otherwise: but after it has been enacted, it matters much: wherefore it has all its force from imposition. Whence I say that things which are of the natural law differ only in a twofold way: for some are so necessary for the attainment of the end that their necessity is evident to all: such are these precepts, not to lie, not to commit adultery. Others indeed are necessary, but their necessity is not evident to all; rather they need declaration and careful industry, for example, that such a contract is usurious: others again are things which conduce to the end but are not necessary, and vary with the diversity of times and regions: and these are of the natural law in the universal: but they are not of the natural law in the particular.

You will object against the other part of our Conclusion. First, the Law of nature commands that we obey superiors: therefore since Christ is a superior, the law of nature commands that we obey him; and consequently all the precepts instituted by Christ the Lord must be reckoned to be of the law of nature. Moreover, just as the visual power perceives all colors, and accordingly is inclined to see all colors, whether those colors be produced by nature, or by art, or by a natural faculty: by equal reason, if, as was said in the prior part of the Conclusion, nature inclines to the acts of virtues viewed generically, and inasmuch as they are virtuous acts, it will likewise incline to those acts of virtue from whomsoever, and in whatsoever manner, those virtues are commanded or counseled. —

I answer the first, I grant the antecedent and the first consequence, denying the second: for precepts, inasmuch as they proceed from the Legislator through some judgment and voluntary ordination, are not reckoned to belong to the law of nature, if they be considered in particular. To the second, I deny the consequence; because colors of whatever kind are contained within the breadth of the object of sight, and accordingly pertain per se to the visual power, and that power is in turn per se ordered to beholding them; but the acts of supernatural virtues are not contained within the natural genus, nor are they comprehended by natural reason; and therefore it is no wonder if they do not fall under the precepts of nature.

You will object 3. against either part of the Conclusion: Not all sins are against the law of nature: therefore neither do all acts of the virtues, even natural ones, both in common and in particular, pertain to the law of nature. —

I distinguish the antecedent: they are not against the law of nature inasmuch as it is considered only according to the reason of an animal, and insofar as it is common to all animals, namely in that manner in which the defilers of males are said to sin against nature, I grant: they are not against nature, inasmuch as it is rational, and insofar as it follows the dictate of right reason and the natural light dictating what things befit man or disbefit him, I deny. For it must be known, as we said above, that three grades are distinguished in man: namely, of a substantial and living being, of a sentient animal, and of a rational and sociable one; from which follow diverse inclinations of man toward various goods. Hence it comes about that man regarded according to the first grade is said to sin against nature, either when he kills himself, or when he denies himself necessary nourishment; for, as Tully says, chapter 1 De Officiis, "In the first place, every genus of animals has been endowed by nature with the instinct to defend its life and its body." But regarded according to the grade of a living animal, and inasmuch as he is ordered to the preservation of his species in a becoming manner, he is said to sin against nature as often as he admits the abominable crimes of sodomy, bestiality, etc., which fight against the lawful propagation of mankind. Finally, man regarded according to the grade of reason: all sins whatsoever are said to be against the nature of man, because they are contrary to reason and to the innate natural light dictating what is to be pursued and what to be shunned. Yet the two first kinds of sins are especially said to be against nature, because indeed it is horrible and unspeakable to commit that from which even brutes themselves shrink.

Second Conclusion. — The natural law brings it about that the act commanded of virtue be done voluntarily, with prior knowledge of the precept, and that it be ordered to an honest end, and done decently. This conclusion embraces especially three parts, of which

The first is proved: The natural law directly regards human action: but an act cannot be human unless it be done voluntarily, and consequently be free: therefore such a mode of acting regards the very natural law. Hence it follows that, through failure of this condition, he does not properly satisfy the precept of justice, or of mercy, who restores another's property, or gives alms to one in extreme need, while in drunkenness, or otherwise impeded in the use of reason; for he who does the work of the law involuntarily, although he may seem to keep it, is nevertheless a transgressor of the law, as St. Augustine teaches, book 2 contra duas epistolas Pelagii chapter 9, affirming that where good is done not out of love of justice, but out of fear of punishment, in such wise that the fear be so servile that it carry with it the conjoined desire not to do the work commanded if no punishment were to be inflicted upon the delinquent; he, I say, does not satisfy the law, nor is he reckoned to accomplish the good. — Yet he who would so restore or confer alms would not be bound again to give alms or make restitution; because the matter of the precept has been taken away by the other receiving what is his own, and the necessity of the poor man relieved.

The second part is also evident; for in order that an act be truly an act of virtue and human, it must not only be voluntary, but also elicited with advertence and deliberation: and it cannot be such without some prior knowledge of the precept. Nevertheless I should judge that it is not required absolutely, for fulfilling the precept of nature, that it be distinctly known in particular; the reason is, because the law commands nothing else than that the act be done: whence if it happen that someone voluntarily give alms to a poor man in extreme need, and consequently at the time when the natural precept obliges, although he who gives the alms did not recognize that necessity and obligation, he truly satisfies the precept; so that afterwards, when he shall have learned of this obligation, he is not bound again to give alms. Similarly, even if the obligation of worshipping God on some day, for instance of hearing Mass, be unknown to him who yet on that very day hears Mass out of devotion, he is held to have satisfied the precept, nor is he bound afterwards, when aware of the obligation of the precept, to hear Mass anew: inasmuch as the precept bears only the obligation of hearing Mass, which he satisfied by hearing Mass, even though he did not recognize such a precept.

The third part is also evident, namely that the law of nature brings it about that the act be done on account of an honest end and motive: because the native law is ordered to the perfection of man: but man is not held perfect in operating unless he act from a motive of honesty, and according to the decency and honesty consonant with his nature: therefore nature brings it about that works be done in such a manner. Yet it is not necessary that one operate in such a manner in order to fulfill the precepts of nature: since the tenor of the precepts conveys nothing else than that an honest act be commanded, for instance that the neighbor's necessity be relieved through alms, and property restored to its proper owner: which can be fulfilled even on account of an end not honest; for he who restores a debt keeps the natural precept of restitution, even if he do it in an unbecoming manner; and he who gives alms keeps the natural precept of mercy, even if he bestow the alms itself out of vainglory. Hence it comes about that some law of nature can be fulfilled by an indifferent act, which, since no other law forbids it, follows that some law of nature can by means of it be fulfilled without transgression of any other law: nay, it can even be fulfilled by an act vitiated by circumstance, and forbidden by another precept of nature: thus, for example, someone satisfies the precept of giving alms or honoring parents, even if he execute it out of vainglory, which is forbidden by another law of nature, so that, as we already said, he who has thus bestowed alms on a poor man in extreme need is not bound, on account of another honest motive, to give alms again. — I confess however that by an act vicious by reason of circumstance the whole law of nature is truly not kept nor fulfilled; for this law differs from positive human law in this, that a human precept can be wholly kept by an act vitious by circumstance or end, because that malice which inheres in such an act is often not against any human precept, but only against the general law; which, since it is ordered to the moral perfection of man, intends not only the execution of that which right reason dictates to be done, but also the manner in which it is required that man be held to operate decently.

Third Conclusion. — All the precepts of the Decalogue, if you except the third concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath, pertain to the law of nature: yet not in the same manner. This is the doctrine of the Doctor in 3 dist. 37 n. 6 and following, as to its three parts, of which

The first is proved: That belongs to the law of nature, according to Aristotle, 5 Ethics, chapter 1, "which everywhere has that force, not because it seems so or seems not so:" that is, it has its force from the nature of the thing, and not because it is instituted voluntarily and arbitrarily: now such is the law by which we are bound to observe all the precepts of the Decalogue, excepting the special determination of the feast day; for that law does not arise from any voluntary and arbitrary institution: otherwise it would not prevail among all Nations: but it obliges by the force of natural reason alone, as is evident regarding the worship of God, and the honor of parents frequently shown, and likewise regarding homicide, adultery, and the rest: therefore all the precepts of the Decalogue must be judged to pertain to the law of nature. Furthermore, those things pertain to the natural law which most of all befit rational nature: but such are all the precepts of the Decalogue; for what befits man more than to worship with due worship the supreme Artificer of his formation, namely God, and likewise those from whom he received life and nature? What so congruous, and so necessary for human society and tranquillity, as to avoid and flee adulteries, thefts, homicides, and other things of this kind, which are forbidden by the precepts of the Decalogue? Finally, in this the natural law differs from positive law, that the former supposes in its object the honesty which it commands, and the moral deformity and malice which it prohibits: but the latter does not so suppose in its object, which commands or prohibits, the moral necessity of doing or omitting, but introduces it: those things which the natural law commands are not good because commanded, nor evil because prohibited; but on the contrary it commands them because they are good and morally necessary from the nature of the thing, or prohibits them because they are evil and naturally unbecoming of themselves: whereas those things which are commanded by positive law are morally necessary only because they are commanded; and those which are prohibited by it are evil and illicit only because prohibited: but all things which are commanded or prohibited by the Decalogue, excepting the determination of the feast day in the Sabbath, are good and honest, or shameful and unbecoming from the very nature of the thing, and apart from any positive law whatsoever, as appears in the worship of God, the honor of parents, homicide, theft.

The second part is also evident, namely that the worship to be rendered to God chiefly on the Sabbath day is not of the law of nature, or as the Doctor says:

The third precept, which concerns the Sabbath, is affirmative, inasmuch as some worship is to be exhibited to God at a determined time; and as regards the determination of this time or of that, it is not of the law of nature strictly speaking. Nor likewise does it belong to the negative part which is included: namely, by which a servile act is prohibited for a determined time, hindering one from the worship then to be exhibited to God: for that act is not prohibited except because it impedes or withdraws from that worship which is commanded.

In these words the Doctor first supposes three things to be involved in the precept concerning the keeping of the Sabbath: First, that some worship is to be exhibited to God at some determined time; and as regards this, that precept is affirmative, nor does it oblige so that at all times some positive worship be exhibited to God. Second, that this worship be rendered to God on the Sabbath day; and as regards this, that precept also is affirmative. Finally, the third thing that precept comprises is that one must abstain from servile works on those Sabbath days; by reason of which this precept is negative; because servile works are permitted on no part of the Sabbath day. These things presupposed, he concludes that this precept, as regards the two latter heads, is not of the strictest law of nature, and consequently is not indispensable. Which indeed is evident as regards the first head: since the Church has transferred that obligation from the Sabbath day to Sunday; which certainly she would not have done if the precept concerning the exhibiting of worship to God on the Sabbath day had been of the strictest law of nature. Add that no reason can be assigned which would urge the exhibition of worship to God rather on the Sabbath or on Sunday than on Friday or Thursday, if only the natural light is considered. Therefore just as there is not a precept of exhibiting a particular worship to God on Thursday or Friday from the dictate of natural light; so neither would it have to be exhibited on the Sabbath or on Sunday unless a positive law commanded God to be honored on the Sabbath or on Sunday: therefore this worship to be exhibited on such a day is not of the law of nature.

The same truth is also evident as regards the second head, namely concerning abstaining from servile works on those days: both on account of the reasons already set forth; and because, as the Doctor said, insofar as abstaining from those works is a precept, insofar would those servile works remove from the divine worship to be rendered: therefore if there is not a precept of the strictest law of nature concerning the exhibiting of worship to God on Sabbath days or Sundays rather than on other days, neither will there be a precept of such law to abstain from servile works on those days rather than on others.

But as regards the first head which that precept includes, namely that worship should be specially rendered to God at some determined time rather than at another, whether it be of the strictest law of nature, the Doctor resolves nothing, but with the matter balanced on either side he remains in doubt.

Finally, the third part of the Conclusion is evident, namely that not all the precepts of the Decalogue are equally of the law of nature: for, says the Doctor in the same place, the law of nature is twofold, namely proper, and strict, which obliges to doing or not doing independently of the act of any will commanding or prohibiting; another indeed most strict, which can admit no dispensation whatsoever, such as are the two former precepts of the first table; namely that God alone is to be honored, nor is worship to be exhibited to strange gods; and that the divine name of God is not to be taken in vain; for these two precepts of the first table are most strictly of the law of nature; because, says the Doctor, num. 6, it follows necessarily: if God is, He is to be loved as God: and that nothing else is to be honored as God, nor is irreverence to be shown to God; and consequently in these God could not dispense, so that anyone might licitly do the opposite of such a prohibition. As if the Doctor were saying: it is known from the terms that no injury can be inflicted on God without fault, because it is evident that irreverence is not to be exhibited to parents or kings and other superiors: therefore much more evident is it that no irreverence ought in any way to be inflicted upon God, who is the King of Kings, and the Parent of all men.

But as regards the precepts of the second table, the Doctor indeed grants that they are of the law of nature, though not indeed of the strictest; since dispensation can fall upon them. In another way, he says n. 8, certain things are said to be of the law of nature because they are very consonant to that law, although they do not follow necessarily from practical principles which are known from the terms; and are necessarily known to every intellect apprehending them: and in this way it is certain that all the precepts even of the second table are of the law of nature, because their rectitude is greatly consonant with the first practical principles necessarily known. By these words the Doctor does not assert that the precepts of the second table are not of the law of nature, as Suarez wishes lib. 2. cap. 15. num. 8. and Salas disp. 5. sect. 9. n. 56. and others who seem not to have understood the Doctor quite correctly; but the Doctor only wished that these precepts are not of the strictest law of nature, in that manner in which the two former of the first table: for here is the distinction between these two: the precepts of the second table are not of the proper law of nature, and they are not of the law of nature most strictly. The Doctor denies the first, and affirms the second; which he opens more plainly below, where, gathering together what he had said, he states: First it was denied that all the precepts of the second table are of the law of nature strictly speaking. Second it was granted that the two first of the first table are of the law of nature strictly speaking. Third doubt was raised about the third precept of the first table. And fourth it was granted that all are of the law of nature largely speaking.

Two things especially are proposed for discussion in this Question: First, whether the natural law binds in conscience to the fulfilling of its precepts. Second, whether it binds so that those precepts be fulfilled out of love of God, or by the motive of divine love natural or supernatural: whose resolution, that it may appear more evident,

Note 1. That conscience is an act of the practical intellect judging something to be done or avoided in the singular. Hence also the name is deserved. It is called an act, that it may be distinguished from synderesis, and from the law or natural light, which are after the manner of a habit, from which conscience proceeds as an effect from its causes. Intellect is added, since conscience, by a just etymology of its name, sounds the same as knowledge with another, that is, the concurrence of knowledge for forming a judgment: whence Ecclesiasticus chap. 7. Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often cursed others, that is, it instructs thee and points out thy curses to thee, setting before thine eyes as it were the evil thou hast committed: wherefore Origen, book 2. on chapter 2. of Romans, Conscience, he says, is the corrector of the spirit, and the pedagogue of the soul, that when it admonishes of better things, it may chastise, convict, and accuse of faults: the rest is added to signify that conscience does not consist in the first operation of the intellect, which is the simple cognition and apprehension of a thing, nor in the second by which there is deliberation, but in the third which is judgment; for conscience judges practically, and after the manner of a definitive sentence that something is worthy of praise or blame: whence

Note 2. That obligation to do something can be said to be threefold, according to the threefold principle from which the operation to be performed is urged; namely, from counsel, from precept, and from advantage. Things done from counsel regard only the greater or lesser perfection and utility of the one acting: those from precept introduce necessity; and if done otherwise, they are subject to penalties and chastisement: but those from advantage regard only the private good and utility of the one acting. And although these three principles sometimes concur in keeping the precepts of any law whatever; yet here the discourse concerns only the obligation proceeding from precept: namely, whether we are bound to fulfil the precepts of the law of nature, such that whoever omits them ought to be punished with penalties either by man or by God.

Note 3. That the love of God is customarily distinguished as twofold, namely natural and supernatural, innate and infused; whereby we love God as the author, moderator, and end of nature, or as the bestower, propagator, and remunerator of grace. And we suppose as certain that in human nature there can be a love of God as author of nature distinct from supernatural love of Him. We suppose further that the innate law itself contains a special precept about loving God as the artificer, ruler, and end of nature. We suppose finally that this precept is affirmative, and does not bind except at opportune times. Whence although every natural precept tends toward God as the last end, and redounds to the glory of God, because by it His divine will is fulfilled, even if the agent does not formally intend this; nevertheless it is not necessary that one fulfilling the precepts of nature always have an actual love of God joined thereto, as will be proved below.

First Conclusion. — THE NATURAL LAW BINDS IN CONSCIENCE TO THE KEEPING OF ITS PRECEPTS.

Proof, first from the Apostle to the Romans 2. where he says: Whosoever have sinned without the law, that is without the written law, shall perish without the law: but they ought not to perish, unless because they are sinners, nor be sinners, unless because they have violated the natural law, concerning which the Apostle subjoins: The Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law… Their conscience bearing witness to them. And therefore the Apostle judges that the natural law binds in conscience, and that its transgressors are held guilty of divine chastisement and vengeance.

It is proved further from the same Apostle, Romans 11. last verse: All that is not of faith is sin, that is, what is not of the dictate of conscience judging the good or the licit to be that which is done; for the Apostle there takes faith for conscience, and for such a dictate, as is clear from the text.

It is confirmed from Innocent III, on chapter 13. De restitutione spoliatorum, saying: What is against conscience builds toward hell: doubtless because the dictate of conscience is the proximate rule of human actions, to which they must conform that they may be honest and licit.

Reason urges this same truth; for, as we said above, the natural law commanding or forbidding is the command of God as author of nature, to whom obedience is due as to a legitimate superior, and it is against reason itself to withdraw oneself from His command: but every divine law, and every divine command, binds in conscience: therefore also the natural law. Then, the natural law is the proximate rule of moral honesty, and what is opposed to it carries moral evil attached; but everything that carries moral evil attached is against conscience; therefore everything done against the law of nature fights against conscience, and consequently the law of nature itself binds in conscience to the keeping of its precepts. Finally, the natural law forbids or commands all that disgraces or befits rational nature; but as often as illicit things are admitted, or necessary ones are not done, sin is committed against conscience itself, which most of all approves licit things and disapproves illicit ones: therefore, etc. — Hence it appears that the law of nature sometimes binds under mortal sin; namely according to the gravity of the matter, and the disposition and affection of the sinner; since whoever sins in a grave matter against the precepts of the natural law knows formally, and actually or virtually, that he gravely offends God as author and ruler of nature, in which virtual contempt of God is involved sufficient for mortal sin. Wherefore the Apostle praised above rightly said, that whosoever have sinned without the law shall perish without the law; namely on account of sins committed, not indeed against the positive and written law, which they did not know, and therefore are said to have sinned without the law; but against the natural law, which no one possessed of reason is ignorant of.

You will say 1. A law cannot bind to a penalty which it can neither manifest nor inflict: but the natural law cannot manifest eternal punishment, since it is not known by natural light, nor indeed can it inflict it: therefore it cannot bind under guilt of eternal punishment; and consequently neither under mortal sin, which introduces the guilt of eternal punishment.

I deny the major. For in order to incur the liability to some punishment, it is not necessary that the punishment be made manifest by the law, nor that the subject and transgressor know the punishment due to his transgression: but it suffices that he commit an act worthy of such a punishment, which is known and inferred from God as the author of nature, and the vindicator of the natural law.

You will say 2. The natural law does not make obligation, but presupposes it: therefore obligation is not its effect. The antecedent is clear from what has been said: for the natural law is distinguished from positive law in this, that the latter forbids something because it is evil: but the former forbids something which becomes evil because it is forbidden. And the same holds proportionally for command and for the precept of doing good because it is good.

I answer. With Suarez, book 2, chapter 9, this objection is a confirmation of our assertion: for, he says, if this law forbids something because it is evil, it induces a proper and special necessity of avoiding it, because this is intrinsic to the prohibition, namely that what is forbidden be avoided. This objection also proves that this law presupposes something which pertains to the intrinsic due of nature; since each thing in a certain manner owes to itself that it do nothing at variance with its own nature. But beyond this due, the natural law likewise adds a special moral obligation, which the experts in law call natural obligation: not because it is not moral, but that they may distinguish it from civil obligation.

Second conclusion. — THE NATURAL LAW DOES NOT OBLIGATE US TO DO ALL THINGS OUT OF A NATURAL LOVE OF GOD.

Proof: The precept of loving God, which is imposed by nature, is affirmative: but an affirmative precept does not bind always, but only at some certain and determinate time: therefore by the natural law we are not bound to elicit all our acts out of love of God the author of nature. The major is evident. The minor likewise; for this is the difference between an affirmative and a negative precept, that the former binds only at some certain determinate time; the latter, however, infers a perpetual obligation at every moment of time; since nowhere is it licit to steal, to commit homicide, etc. It follows therefore that the love of God is not necessary as often as the ordination of other precepts obliges; and accordingly other precepts of nature can be observed without an actual love of God as the author of nature. — Next, the honest good of the other virtues has from itself, and per se, that it can be honestly loved, and from its own motive, for instance the temperate because it is temperate: but it is consonant with reason, and congruent with the law of nature, to love whatever is honest as such, although concerning some other external amiable object it is not required, for instance concerning loving God: therefore natural precepts of virtues of this kind can be fulfilled without any actual love of God. Finally, the obligation of doing all things for God is shown by no natural reason, or sufficient authority: and therefore it ought not to be affirmed gratuitously.

You will say. The Apostle, first to the Corinthians 10, admonishes that all things are to be done to the glory of God: therefore truly all works must be done out of love of God. — I distinguish the antecedent: that the Apostle admonishes this as something which is precepted by the natural law, I deny: as a counsel which he himself supplies, and which to observe is indeed best and most salutary, but not necessary under pain of sin, I concede.

You will say 2. St. Augustine, book 1, On the Morals of the Church, chapter 11, says that all goods are to be referred to the highest good: whence he infers in chapter 11 that nothing is virtue except the supreme love of God, and through this he defines all the virtues: therefore in book 19, Of the City of God, chapter 25, he says that it is proud to love even the virtues themselves on account of themselves, because God alone is supremely good, and therefore He alone is to be willed on account of Himself: therefore all things which are done are either vicious, or must be done out of love of God. Which same Augustine indeed confirms in book 1, Retractations, chapter 15, where he says that the will without charity is a vicious cupidity.

I answer. St. Augustine in these and similar sayings wishes nothing else than that either there be no perfect virtue, meritorious of eternal salvation, without habitual charity and sanctifying grace: or that the will without charity itself be a vicious cupidity, that is, that it be very often overcome by vicious cupidities; because on the one hand it is very weak, and prone to evil, owing to the natural corruption of man; on the other, however, it is deprived of the abundance of aids which are given to the just and to the friends of God. But St. Augustine does not wish every elicited act which does not proceed from the love of God to be vicious; for the honest good is lovable on account of itself, and it suffices for the honesty of the act, even if one does not think of God actually, nor has thought of Him beforehand in such wise that a past love of God might somewhat influence the act.

Suarez adds, book 2, chapter 11, number 5, that it is one thing to love something as the highest good; another indeed to love something as a good lovable per se. The former is proper to God; the latter, however, is communicated by God Himself to every honest good, and therefore in thus loving the honest good, nothing is done against God. Nor does it follow from this that all created goods are to be lovable on account of themselves, because there are no inferior goods, useful or delightful, which are not to be desired on account of honesty. Finally, although a created honest good is loved on account of itself, it is not loved as the last end: but such a love by its nature tends into God, and this is sufficient, that the man not be said to enjoy such a good, but to use it; but then would he be said to enjoy it, when he should constitute in it his last end, and this is what Augustine said was proud.

Right, according to the etymology of the name, is so called either because it is close at hand, as Covarruvias wills, book 1 of his Commentary on Civil Law; for "iusta" sometimes signifies a likeness or equality in some office or action; or "ius" is said from "iubendo" (commanding), for "iussum" is the participle of the verb "iubeo" (I command); hence if from the participle "iussum" the second syllable be taken away, there remains the word "ius"; or if you pronounce two syllables separately, it will signify that "iussum", that is, command itself, is itself right — "ius sum", I am right; or lastly "ius" is derived from "iustitia" (justice), for, as Ulpian said in book 1, folio De iustitia et iure, "but right is so called from justice." For although justice rather seems to be derived from right than right from justice — for that is called just which accords with right, whence also justice is defined through right, because it renders to each one his own — nevertheless the appellation of right, of which the jurist speaks, could have arisen from justice: just as laughter is so called because it tends toward the object of laughter, although the visible object is denominated visible by that very sight. From this indeed "ius" could easily be derived, namely by taking away the last part of the word "iustum". And Saint Augustine approved this etymology in book 10 of De Civitate Dei, chapter 21, where he assumes it as a philosophical principle: "They say that to be right which flows from the fountain of justice." And in Psalm 145 he says: "Right and wrong are contraries, for right is what is just." Isidore likewise proved the same in book 5 of his Etymologies, chapter 3, saying: "Right is said of itself because it is just." Therefore, as "just" is denominated from justice, so "right" could be named from the just, and from justice, as far as the etymology of the word goes.

Note 2. The name of right, according to the thing itself, can be taken three ways. First, indeed, so that it be the same as the just. Now the just is taken in two ways according to Aristotle in book 5 of the Ethics, chapter 1, namely generically and in a wider signification for the lawful, and thus every work of virtue, insofar as it accords with the law, is called right and just; and particularly and more strictly for that which is regular and owed to another. For the just, strictly taken, involves these three things, namely equality, debt, and being directed toward another. Second, so that it be the same as law, which is the rule of the just; and since the sentence of a judge is likewise a kind of law, not public but private, it is also called right, on which account a judge is said to declare right and to preside over the declaring of right. Third, right is taken for legitimate power to obtain some thing, or to exercise some function or quasi-function, whose derogation and violation constitutes and effects injury.

Note 3. Right taken for the special just, that is, for that which is regular and owed to another, is the formal object of particular justice, because he is called just in a special manner who loves, intends, and preserves this due equality, while he is unjust who does not preserve it; whereupon this equality, insofar as it is owed, constitutes the formal object of particular justice; for the formal object of every virtue is that honest good which is intended in act through that virtue.

Now right taken in the second way, namely for law, is the rule of justice and of the other virtues; for virtues ought to be directed in their acts according to the dictate and precept of the laws; indeed if they are not conformed to the laws they will not be diligent nor praiseworthy. But insofar as right is employed for legitimate power, it is not indeed the object which justice intends but the formal object in respect of whom: for in justice, as in every virtue which is directed toward another, can be distinguished the object which and the object in respect of whom. The first is what the virtue itself intends and renders outwardly, and this in our case is the rendering of an equal thing insofar as it is owed, or the rendering of what is owed unto the equality of another's right; and such a thing owed cannot exist without a right in the other, for they are correlatives; for the owed is what is owed to a right; whereupon the object of justice includes an order to the right of another. The second, namely the object in respect of whom of justice, is he to whom the debt is rendered; and he is our neighbor insofar as he has a right to something by reason of which that thing is owed to him; for from his right in me or in mine is born in me the duty of rendering that which fulfills and exhausts that right; and that this may be done duly, justice inclines me to will it in affection and render it in effect.

These things having been premised, two things remain here to be opened up: First, what is the legitimate definition of right viewed universally. Second, how manifold is its distribution and division into various species and parts.

First Conclusion. — RIGHT VIEWED GENERALLY IS CORRECTLY SAID TO BE LEGITIMATE POWER TO OBTAIN SOME THING, OR TO EXERCISE SOME FUNCTION OR QUASI-FUNCTION, WHOSE VIOLATION CONSTITUTES INJURY.

First it is said power, that is, a certain aptitude toward something, whence we say something can be done; on which account we read in Genesis 23 that Abraham said to the sons of Heth: Give me the right of a sepulchre, that is, the faculty of burying. Now this power stands either by mode of active potency, as when there is a right to do or retain something; or by mode of passive potency, as in the right which you have to be nourished by your parents, guarded by rulers, served by servants; or by mode of a resisting potency, as in the right which anyone has that another not build in such a place, not raise a wall higher by constructing it, inasmuch as it would not obstruct sight nor light.

Second, legitimate, that is, granted by law; for a faculty which is not according to law is not a right but force and injury. Now the law granting this power is either divine positive, for example, to receive the sacraments; or natural, for example, to use the members for sustaining life by food and drink, to repel force with force; or lastly it is human, for example, to succession of inheritance, to acquiring, possessing, retaining, and alienating through various kinds of contracts; and there are as many kinds of rights as there are kinds of laws which grant right. From which it follows that this power is not something physical but only moral, belonging to man by some ordination, deputation, or concession of God or of men.

Third, to some thing, as to obtain some thing through hereditary succession, through testament, through liberal donation, through contracts, through occupation.

Fourth, to a function, as to the free use of one's members and goods and things specially pertaining to oneself; or quasi-function, for example, to civil and natural possession, to retain dominion, state, and condition in which one is. — Fifthly, finally, there is added, whose violation constitutes injury; because injury is nothing else than violation of another's right, which indeed occurs when, the right remaining intact, one acts against it. Hence when someone is deprived of an office removable at the will of a superior, no injury is done him unless elsewhere he have another right to exercising that office; for there can be a right to a right, and a dominion of right.

From these points gather that right is sometimes distinguished from equity and from good in many respects, as Louis Vives reports in his scholion on lib. 2. De Civit. Dei, cap. 17. Hence Aristotle, 5. Ethics, c. 10, says that equity is an emendation of the just: not indeed insofar as the just is taken for natural debt, which is right according to natural reason; for this nowhere fails if reason does not err; nor even insofar as the just is taken for legal justice, namely that which is established by human law: for although this sometimes fails, yet that failure proceeds not from the law, or from the legislator, but from the matter itself. Therefore, taking equity in either of these ways, it is not an emendation of right, but rather its origin and rule, according to that saying, l. 91. f. de regul. iur.: In all things, but especially in law, equity must be regarded: and so equity is said to be an emendation of the just insofar as equity is taken for a prudent moderation of the written law beyond the force of its words, as Suarez says, book 1, chapter 2; and thus equity is said to be opposed to strict right, for which reason Terentianus said: Between right and equity there is this difference, that right is what demands all things straight and inflexible, while equity is what remits much of the law. And it is with legal right that epieikeia is concerned; since it pertains to the judgment of a prudent man to interpret the words of human law when its exact observance would press against natural equity. For this reason a judge, or prince, interpreting the law thus, is said to act not by right, materially indeed and as the words of the law sound, but to act from equity and good. And therefore perhaps jurisprudence was called the art of the good and the equitable, because in interpreting laws one must always have regard to the good and the equitable, even though at times it may be necessary to temper the force and tenor of the words of the law, lest one depart from natural equity and good.

Second Conclusion. — RIGHT TAKEN GENERALLY CAN BE DIVIDED FIRST INTO NATURAL RIGHT, THE RIGHT OF NATIONS, AND POSITIVE RIGHT.

Natural right, the Doctor says in 1. d. 17. q. 1. n. 3, is that whose truth is known from the terms; for, he says, such is a principle in the law of nature just as in speculative matters a principle is known from the terms, or what follows evidently from such a truth so known, of which kind is a demonstrated practical conclusion; and, strictly speaking, nothing else belongs to the law of nature except a principle or a demonstrated conclusion: yet by extending the term it is sometimes said to be of the law of nature whatever practical truth is consonant with the principles and conclusions of the law of nature: to such a degree that it is immediately known to all that it accords with such a law. From these words the Doctor teaches two things: first, that to be of natural right is whatever has an honesty that appears from the terms; for instance, God is to be worshipped: or whose honesty is inferred from a principle that appears from the terms; for instance, Sacrifices are to be offered to God; which is inferred from that principle, God is to be worshipped. Second, that those things can be reckoned to be of natural right which are consonant with the principles and conclusions of that right itself. Hence in 3. d. 37. n. 5 he distinguishes a twofold natural right, namely strict and most strict. He says, he says, that some things can be said to be of the law of nature in a twofold way: in one way, as first practical principles, known from the terms: or as necessary conclusions following from them: and these are said to be most strictly of the law of nature. He adds at n. 8: In another way some things are said to be of the law of nature because they are greatly consonant with that law; although they do not follow necessarily from practical principles that are known from the terms, and are necessarily known to every intellect apprehending them. And in this way it is certain that all the precepts of the second table are of the law of nature, because their rectitude is highly consonant with the first practical principles that are necessarily known. By these words the Doctor clearly teaches that there pertain to the natural law not only general principles known through themselves concerning things naturally honest and necessary; or concerning things base and illicit, as that virtue is to be embraced, vice to be shunned, God to be worshipped, each one's right to be preserved, and that one is not to do to another what he would not have done to himself: but also particular precepts and conclusions deduced from the general principles concerning whatever things are naturally necessary for living honestly and peaceably in society, or concerning their opposites; for instance, that no one is to be killed unjustly, that one is not to steal, not to lend at usury, and the like; of which some are known through themselves by the natural light, others need some discourse or discipline in order to become known to men, especially the more unlearned. That all these belong to the natural law is evident, because from the very nature of the thing, and with any positive law set aside, they are morally necessary, and their contraries are illicit: wherefore St. Paul, ad Rom. 2, affirms that the nations, following the guidance of the natural light, do naturally the things that are of the law, and are a law to themselves, that is, their conscience bearing witness to them.

But in a twofold way, says Hugo Grotius, book 1 and chapter 1 of the book De iure belli et pacis, it is customary to prove that something belongs to natural right:

Now from what is prior, now from what is posterior; of these reasons of proof the former is subtler, the latter more popular. A priori, if there be shown a necessary congruence or incongruence of any thing with rational and social nature: a posteriori truly, if not with most certain faith, yet at least with considerable probability, that is gathered to be of natural right which among all nations, or the more civilized ones, is believed to be such. For a universal effect requires a universal cause: and scarcely any cause of such an opinion seems able to exist besides the very sense itself of what is called common.

Whence Hesiod: For not wholly vain is the sentiment many
Which the people celebrate. To this Seneca accords, ep. 117: An argument of truth, he says, is that something appear so to all. And Cicero, l. Tusc.: The consent of all nations in a matter is to be deemed the law of nature.

Nor is this hindered by the fact that there are certain nations of barbarous savagery, to whom what seems just and equitable to others does not appeal, because, as Andronicus Rhodius says, among men endowed with a right and sound mind that law of nature, so called, is immutable. But if to those who are of a morbid and distorted mind it seems otherwise, that has nothing to do with the matter. For neither does he lie who says honey is sweet because to the sick it appears otherwise. Aristotle accords, Politics 1: What is natural is to be examined in those things that are well disposed according to nature, not in the depraved.

Hence the Doctor concludes in 1., the aforesaid dist. 17, that Gratian does not speak rightly concerning the right of the law of nature, holding that those things which are in the Scripture of the Old or New Testament belong to the law of nature. Because neither are all those things practical principles known from the terms, nor demonstrated practical conclusions: nor even evidently consonant with such principles and conclusions. Therefore it must be excluded, when he extends natural right to positive right from the Author of nature, as distinguished against positive right from someone who is not the Author of nature.

That is called the right of nations which has been introduced by the usage of all or most nations; namely with natural reason preceding and dictating it as evidently fitting for the human race and society. By this right of nations was introduced the division of goods, the acquisition of dominion over things which belong to no one, through their occupation. To the same belongs the immunity of ambassadors, and all those matters which are treated in cap. Ius gentium dist. 1, although among these is reckoned the right of keeping treaties of peace, and several others that could more fittingly be referred to the law of nature. Nor is it wonderful that the nations conspired in this right as it were by unanimous consent: since they recognized it to be most conformable to natural reason: accordingly individual nations are bound by that right, inasmuch as each nation fixed it for itself whether by its own proper choice and the inclination of nature, or in imitation of other nations. Whence, just as it was introduced by the customs of individual nations, so could it, absolutely speaking, be abolished by each through contrary custom or express revocation, as the Church abolished the right of nations concerning servitude with respect to Christian slaves.

Positive right is that which is not instituted with nature teaching, but by the will of him who has the power of establishing and enacting it. It differs according to the different authority; for divine right is one thing, human another. Divine indeed is that which is sanctioned by divine will, which is wont to be distinguished in the usual twofold manner, namely Old divine right, which God enacted in the Old Testament concerning the rites, ceremonies, and polity of the Jews: and New, or Evangelical, such as all those precepts which were sanctioned in the New Testament either for forming morals uprightly or for administering the sacraments. Positive human right is that which was enacted by human authority, or by mere man; and this again is twofold: namely civil, by the authority of secular Princes; and Canonical, which was instituted by the authority of Pontiffs, or Councils.

Justinian, book 1 of the Institutes, title 2, is of the opinion that the civil law is distinguished from the law of nations in this:

that the law of nations must be judged not from the institutions of peoples, but from that which natural reason itself dictates to be just, that is, from the knowledge of the honorable and the base, of the just and the unjust, implanted in the minds of men. But the civil law is that which particular peoples or their rulers and princes establish for the right ordering of the Republic and for the proper good of their subjects and the common good of the Republic. The civil law, he says, is distinguished from the law of nations in that all peoples who are governed by laws and customs use partly their own proper law, partly the law common to all men: for what each people establishes as law for itself is proper to that state itself, and is called the civil law, as it were the proper law of that state itself. But what natural reason establishes among all men is observed equally among all peoples, and is called the law of nations, as it were the law which all peoples use. Yet certainly the more mature must be considered, for, as we said above, what is natural and consonant with right reason is to be looked for in those who are well disposed according to nature, not in the depraved, as Aristotle says, book 1 of the Politics, chapter 5.

Moreover, right is divided into right simply so called, and right secundum quid. The first is that which is found between persons altogether distinct, and of different order, such as the right between princes and subjects: the second is that which is found between persons not altogether distinct, but only secundum quid.

Again, right secundum quid is divided into paternal, economic, and masterly right. The first is between father and son; since indeed the son is a part of the paternal substance, they are not persons morally altogether distinct: nor can a perfect equality be established between them: seeing that a son cannot render an equivalent to his father: although nevertheless this right is called secundum quid, yet it is called right, insofar as right signifies a debt: for the son owes more to his father than to any other person: the same judgment holds of paternal right between God and men. Economic right is between wife and husband, who are reckoned even morally one person. Masterly right, finally, is between master and slave; he is his possession, and a certain animate instrument, says Aristotle; whence between them there is no right except secundum quid.

Moreover, right, on the part of the term which it regards, is divided into right to a thing, and right in a thing. Right to a thing, says Lessius, book 2, chapter 2, On Right in General, doubt 2, is called:

that which does not confer an action upon a thing, but only upon a person. Such is the right which accrues to you by stipulation, by donation, by purchase, or other contracts before the delivery of the thing; for if that thing be sold to another, and actually delivered to him, it remains his, nor can you claim it; because the thing was not obligated to you, but you have only a personal action against him who defrauded you: such also is the right which you have by election, petition, presentation to a benefice: indeed such even is that which you have by the collation of a benefice before acceptance, and by succession to an inheritance, before its acceptance. Right in a thing is called that which confers a real action, or which has a thing obligated to it. Such is that which is had by purchase and other contracts, the delivery of the thing following; by the collation of a benefice, acceptance following; by testament or succession ab intestato, acceptance following: such also is the right of dominion over a thing, and usufruct, that is, the right of using and of taking the fruits respectively in that which underlies those rights; likewise the rights which are called servitudes; also the right of hypothec and of pledge: finally every right which holds some thing bound to us, whether corporeal, as fields, houses, furniture; or incorporeal, as offices, benefices, revenues, servitudes, and the like, in such wise that from it we can receive fruits, or emoluments, or security for creditors, or honor, is called right in a thing. And wherever such a thing may pass, it can be claimed as bound to us; because everything passes with the burden with which it is affected.

Again, each kind of right, whether in a thing or to a thing, is variously distributed; namely, into dominion, usufruct, use, possession, etc. Dominion in general is the right of governing or of disposing of some thing as one's own. But that is said to be one's own which is so subjected and bound to him whose it is said to be, that he can dispose of it by his own right, not by the commission of another. Thus God has right over the whole creature as over his own thing, because he can decree concerning it whatever pleases him. Thus likewise the King has right and dominion over his kingdom, and anyone over his possessions.

But dominion can be divided into dominion of jurisdiction, and of property. Dominion of jurisdiction is the power of governing one's subjects. The acts of governing are to command, to forbid, etc. Dominion of property is the right of disposing of some thing as one's own for one's own advantage. From this dominion everyone is called lord of his own thing; whether he be a private person or a public one, or a community. For a public person and a republic can possess goods by private right, in the manner of a private person.

Usufruct is the right of using things belonging to another, and of taking their fruits, saving the substance of the things. It is called first the right of using, that the right may be excluded which a creditor has in a pledge, or a depositary in a deposit: for these cannot use those things; but if they use them against the will of the owner, they are bound to restore to him the estimation of the use. There is added of taking the fruits, that there may be excluded the bare right of using some thing, as a hired horse: for by usufruct not only the use of the thing, but the enjoyment of it is granted, that is, the right of receiving all the fruits proceeding from that thing. There is added thirdly, saving the substance of the things: because the usufructuary ought to reserve the thing intact for the proprietor. Hence it comes about that usufruct properly so called cannot be constituted in things which are consumed by use, as in wine, oil, grain, and money. Use is the right of using a thing belonging to another, saving its substance. Which definition is clear from what has been said above concerning usufruct.

The remaining divisions of right you will be able to gather from the various divisions of laws declared in the preceding Article; for since laws either flow from right, or confer right to a thing; it follows that there are as many rights of the genus as there are diverse laws.

You ask. How does the law of nations differ from purely natural law?

Some respond that natural law differs from the law of nations in this, that natural law is common to all living creatures, both brutes and men, as we said above from Justinian, book 1 of the Institutes.

But we have declared quite sufficiently that this is less rightly and aptly said; for there is no law truly common to men and other animals, because brute animals are not capable, properly speaking, of obedience, or of justice or injustice. Moreover, the natural law taken generically consists in the dictate of natural reason: but such a dictation cannot be found in brutes; and therefore there cannot be in them a law or rule of nature. Finally, the natural law is not regulated by conformity to sensitive nature, but to rational nature; for it dictates what befits rational nature; and consequently it does not pertain to brutes, which are wholly devoid of reason.

Others respond that the law of nations is purely positive and differs from natural law, because the latter is only permissive, while this is also preceptive, that is, the former only permits something to be done licitly; this moreover obliges one to do it.

But to the contrary; that which is permitted by the law of nations either is licit by natural law, or it is not. If the first, therefore it pertains to the law of nature. If the second, therefore the law of nations militates against the very law of nature and prevails over it, and makes licit what by the nature of the thing was illicit.

Add that by the law of nations many things are not only licit, but even commanded: for instance, that commerce be everywhere free: that certain persons be specially deputed to divine worship, through whom alone sacrifices may be licitly made, etc.

Certain others respond that the law of nations regards men not singly and considered apart, but inasmuch as they are gathered in some society: but natural law does not regard the community itself precisely, but men considered individually.

But this response likewise does not satisfy; for the very institution of society, whereby men live in the union of a city, or kingdom, or commonwealth, proceeds from the law of nations, yet does not arise from community; otherwise it would arise from itself, and would presuppose itself.

Therefore I judge it truer to say, that the law of nations differs from natural law in this, that those things which are prohibited or commanded by natural law are established by the force of natural reason alone; while those which are prohibited or commanded by the law of nations have joined to them at least interpretative human legislation, and an external institution common to all, or at least to most nations. Hence it comes about that the law of nations is truly human, and positive, both on the part of matter and on the part of form: for what natural law merely permits, the law of nations establishes absolutely, and commands to be done; thus, for example, natural law merely permits that there be a division of fields, if men wish to divide those things which nature has exposed in common: but the law of nations establishes that that division be absolutely made, in order better to avoid negligence in cultivating the fields, and to forestall confusion and disturbance of the commonwealth.