Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

It is certain that the Natural Law is one: 1. by unity of light, because it illuminates man with a single natural light, and proclaims and demonstrates to him what must be done and what must be omitted. 2. By unity of principle, because it has one God as its Legislator and Author. 3. By unity of end, because it looks toward this one end, that it may constitute man upright according to the inclination of nature. Whether it is also one by unity of precept is to be resolved here. The sense of this question can be threefold: First, whether the precepts of the law of nature are the same among all. Second, whether those precepts are many, or indeed only one. Third, whether, on the hypothesis that they are many, they can be reduced to one.

Note 2. The precepts of the law of nature are of a twofold kind; for some are general, and known to all men, such as these: good is to be done, evil to be shunned: what you would not have done to yourself, do not do to another, etc. Others are proper and particular, which are inferred from those general principles; and this in two ways: for either they are deduced with ease and without any difficulty, such as this one: what belongs to another is not to be kept against the owner's will: or they can be inferred from general principles only with great diligence, such as this one: money is not to be lent at usury. It is asked, then, whether both of these kinds of precepts of the law of nature are the same among all men whatsoever, or can be diverse.

Note 3. The precepts of the law of nature, both general and particular, can be considered either as regards certainty, or as regards knowledge and evidence. Now it is certain that the general ones are more certain and better known than the particulars, since they become known through the very ingenerate light of reason: whence just as in speculative matters the first principles, which are apprehended by understanding, are far more certain and better known than the conclusions drawn from them by science, so too in practical matters the first precepts, which are the matrix rules of things to be done, seem to be far more certain than the particular precepts that are inferred from them.

These things thus premised, three things remain here to be determined: First, whether the general precepts of the law of nature are the same among all men whatsoever, considered in whatever state. Second, whether the particular precepts have the same force, certainty, and knowledge among all. Third, whether the precepts of the law of nature are many in any given man, and how they are ordered among themselves.

First Conclusion. — The natural law is entirely the same in all men considered in whatever state, as regards the general principles. This is common among Theologians and Jurists.

Proof, first indeed, because this law is like a property consequent not upon the proper and particular reason of some individual, but upon the specific nature: but this nature is the same in all: therefore also the law itself. Then, just as in speculative matters the first principles are known, whose truth no one can dissent from, so in practical matters, as regards the first principles and general precepts, there is the same truth and the same rectitude known to all. Finally, everywhere and always it is acknowledged and held as certain that good is to be embraced, evil to be shunned: that what you would not have done to yourself is not to be done to another: and therefore these precepts are accessible to all and everywhere.

You will say. Diverse nations have established various laws contrary to the precepts of natural law: for Julius Caesar, book 6 On the Gallic War, reports that among the Germans theft was once not disapproved, but permitted. The same concerning the Lacedaemonians is reported by Castro from Plutarch, book On Penal Law, chapter 14. Similarly Plutarch reports in the life of Lycurgus that adultery was approved by him as permitted by nature: but theft and adultery conflict with the very precepts of the law of nature: therefore these do not seem to be known to all. —

I distinguish the major: nations have established many laws opposed to the general precepts of nature, and which stand in the manner of first principles in practical matters — this I deny; opposed to the particular precepts, and those inferred from the former ones — this I concede. For just as although all men agree in the first principles of speculation, nor does any of them call their truth into doubt, nevertheless they very often conflict with one another over the conclusions drawn from those principles, so likewise, although all men agree together in the general precepts prescribed by the law of nature: yet they can deviate from the truth when from those general principles they infer particular laws as if agreeing with nature: whence it is no wonder if those special laws sanctioned by different Nations conflict not only among themselves, but even with the very general precepts of nature.

You will say 2. The law of nature is that which is contained chiefly in the Gospel, as we read in dist. 1: yet what is contained in the Gospel is not common to all; For all men do not obey the Gospel, says St. Paul to the Romans 10. Therefore the law of nature is not one among all.

I answer to the minor, that it is not to be understood thus, as if all things contained in the Gospel were of the natural law, but the sense of that proposition is only that those things which are of the natural law are handed down fully in the Gospel: whence when Gratian had said, There the law of nature is found which is contained in the Law and the Gospel: immediately explaining himself he adds: That each one is bidden to do to another what he wishes done to himself; upon this law of nature very many precepts of the greatest Evangelical law are founded.

Second Conclusion. — The particular precepts of the law of nature, which are inferred from the general ones, are for the most part the same among all: yet they sometimes fail among very many, both as regards their rectitude and as regards knowledge of them. This likewise is common as regards both parts, of which the former is evident of itself: for many particular principles inferred from general ones are true, and are held as true by all. But the latter part is shown; because it sometimes happens that conclusions deduced from general principles are not right; thus, for example, from that general principle a deposit is to be restored to its owner, this conclusion which is inferred is not right: therefore a deposit is to be restored to the owner demanding it to the ruin of his fatherland. But the reason of this thing is, that common principles of operable things suffer exception and distinction in particular events. For there is a difference between speculative conclusions, and practical and operable ones, in that speculative ones have the same truth perpetually, and among all; practical ones not so, because they concern particular things which admit various circumstances, according to which those conclusions are varied. Hence it comes about that from a change of circumstances, that which was just and right ceases to be right and just. Wherefore although it be perpetually true in speculative matters that an odd number cannot be divided into two equal parts; yet in practical matters it is not perpetually true that a deposit, for example, is to be restored to the owner demanding it; for in those circumstances in which it would be demanded to the ruin of the commonwealth, it would not have to be restored to the petitioner; because private good must yield to the public good. It is clear, therefore, that the law of nature is not one among all according to the rectitude of particular prescriptions. — It is likewise clear that it also sometimes is not one and the same among all according to knowledge, and the inference of such prescriptions from general principles; because right judgment in things to be done is hindered sometimes either by passion, which perverts the use of reason, or by bad custom, or by the depraved disposition of nature itself; whence it comes about that robberies seemed to certain peoples not unjust; among others usury was not held right; among very many simple fornication had no place among crimes. — Hence also it comes about that concerning certain precepts inferred from general precepts there is sometimes less agreement among Theologians than concerning other precepts, which happens because the more the conclusion differs from the principles, the less evident it is; thus, for example, from this principle, what you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to another, there follows most evidently: therefore false testimony is not to be brought against another: but not so evidently is it gathered: therefore a lie is not to be told to preserve the life of a man: likewise from the same principle it is gathered most evidently that one must not steal: but not so evidently does it follow, that one's own money is not to be lent at usury: although these two, one must not lie to preserve the life of a man, and money must not be given at usury, are precepts of the law of nature equally with the two later ones, namely false testimony must not be brought, and one must not steal.

Third Conclusion. — The natural law has one first principle from which the others are derived as from a fountain, and to which they are recalled as to their head, namely: good is to be done, evil is to be avoided. This likewise is common among Theologians, and

Proof: As principles stand related to the speculative reason, so do they stand related to the practical reason: but just as in speculative matters this principle, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, is on that account judged to be the first of all principles, because all the conclusions of science are inferred from it, and proved by it: by parity of reason in practical matters this principle, good is to be done, evil avoided, is first and chief; since the others are recalled to it, and confirmed by it: therefore truly this principle will be the first. The minor is proved from the parity of reason; because as in speculative matters all principles are recalled and confirmed by the first, which is founded upon the reason of being and non-being, between which there is no medium; so likewise in practical matters all the precepts of the law of nature are recalled to this, good is to be done, and evil avoided, which can indeed easily be proved thus by induction. For the precepts of nature are of a threefold kind, of which some regard man as he is substance: others as he is an animal; others finally as he is rational; for since good is the object of appetite or inclination, as many inclinations as are to be distinguished in man by which he tends toward natural good, so many precepts of the law of nature are to be distinguished in him; since the native law is ordered to this one end, that it rectify the inclinations of man, and direct them to that which is fitting for him: but there is in man some inclination, inasmuch as he is a being, and substance: namely an inclination toward the conservation of his own being, and toward acquiring all those things which can serve his conservation and utility: there is moreover in him an inclination, inasmuch as he is an animal, toward the conservation of his species, by generating one like to himself: there is likewise in him an inclination, inasmuch as he is rational, that he enter into society not only with other men, and lead a social and political life without offense to others, but also with God as the Author of nature, to whom he is wholly ordered, and of whose knowledge and love he is capable: therefore likewise precepts of a threefold kind are to be distinguished in the law of nature, by which man may be directed and regulated. First respectively to himself, by living decently according to the inclination implanted by nature, whereby he is borne toward his own conservation in food and drink, and in warding off things harmful to him. Second, respectively to communicating his nature to another, whereby he is borne toward the conservation of the species by decently generating one like to himself. Finally third, by living decently in order toward God, and men with whom he ought to enter into society. To the first kind temperance furnishes precepts concerning food and drink taken moderately; fortitude however supplies force and strength for repelling things harmful to the conservation of life. To the second belong the precepts of chastity and prudence, by which propagation and the education of children may be fittingly accomplished. To the third truly pertain the precepts of religion, justice, etc. by which he may both worship God, and honor parents, and obey superiors, and live with all so that he offend no one. — To this are to be recalled those things which we read in St. Ambrose, comment. on chapter 5 of the epistle to the Romans.

The natural law has three parts, of which the first is this, that the Creator, when acknowledged, be honored, nor let His charity and majesty be deputed to any creature. But the second part is moral, that is, that one live well, with modesty governing. For it befits man, having knowledge of the Creator, to curb his life by law, lest the acknowledgment be made void. Truly the third part is docile, that the knowledge of God the Creator, and the example of morals be handed on to others, that they may learn how merit is placed with the Creator.

— But all these precepts are easily recalled to the first and chief precept, namely good is to be done, evil avoided; wherefore this precept is the first and chief to which the others can be recalled.