Scotus Academicus, Tomus sextus: De Legibus Divinis et Humanis

The present Question is an appendix and explanation of the former; in it, namely, certain parts of the definition of law are set forth more clearly, and are established by ampler discussion and declaration, in so far as, by explaining the conditions of law which pertain to its proper notion, its genuine constitutive difference may the more easily be made known. Wherefore

Note 1. It is certain that law must necessarily be brought to bear upon and directed to someone, or to some persons; for St. Paul says to the Romans 3: We know that what things soever the law speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the law: therefore any law whatever essentially connotes some relation to those to whom it is prescribed; and consequently, in order to explain its notion, the term of this relation and ordination must necessarily be declared.

That this may appear more plainly, it must be observed that man can be regarded under a threefold aspect and relation: namely, either in himself, and with necessary respect to God — for instance if we suppose only one man in the world; or to other men in general; or specifically to those with whom he lives in society. In the first consideration man is ruled by the natural law; in the second by that which they call the law of nations; in the third truly by the civil law, which prescribes the reason of things to be done or avoided, that a peaceful and whole society may be preserved.

Moreover it is evident that every law must be directed to man as to its connatural term; since inferior creatures are not capable of laws properly so called, inasmuch as they are incapable of moral acts, which ought to be directed and regulated by law. And although Angels are capable of receiving and fulfilling the divine law, nevertheless no mention is now made of them, especially since we undertake to explain those laws which pertain to ordering man toward his natural or supernatural end. Hence there remains only to be determined whether it is of the reason of law that it be prescribed for some multitude, or whether it can also be directed to one single person.

Note 2. Community can be distinguished as twofold: one indeed from nature, the other from institution. Natural is that whereby men agree together in the same rational nature, which is ordained to society and intercourse; for Man, as Aristotle says, is an animal born and apt for society: but the latter is the political or mystical conjunction of men in the same congregation and same assembly. To the former community pertains the natural law, which is proposed to each man by the light of reason; because it is not borne to each and every man in particular and individually, as such he is, e. g. Peter or

Paul, but in species, and inasmuch as he is man. The latter community can be subdivided into two kinds: one indeed Ecclesiastical, instituted not by human but by divine right; because it has been ordered by God Himself under some head designated by Him, and with some union toward a supernatural end. Such of old was the Synagogue of the Jews, now truly the more excellent Catholic Church, which was instituted by Christ the Lord Himself not for one people or another only, but for the whole world, and ordered by the same with certain laws and sanctions, under the obedience of one head acting in the place of Christ the Lord Himself. To a community of this kind divine positive laws per se first pertain: as the laws of the Old Testament were prescribed for instituting the Jews, and the law of grace of the New Testament was promulgated for the universal Church, for forming the worship of God and the right instruction of the faithful. To the same likewise belong the Canonical laws, although not all are constituted for the universal Church, but according to the intention or power of those who enact them. Another community is Political, namely that which is an assembly of men associated together by human right in order to some natural end, joined under some head; for which reason Aristotle said in Book 3 of his Politics, chapter 10, that a city is the multitude of citizens having among themselves a moral bond under one principal moderator. — Which is again distinguished by the moral Philosophers, and by the jurists, into perfect and imperfect.

A perfect community is called that which is capable of political governance, or which suffices to itself in this order, as Aristotle asserted in book 1 of his Politics, chapter 1, that the city is a perfect community; and with stronger reason the kingdom, of which the city itself is a part, will be a perfect community. That community is called imperfect which does not suffice to itself, and in which the individual persons are not gathered together as principal members to constitute one political body, such as the household, over which the father of the family presides: for such a community, speaking per se, is not governed by its own power of jurisdiction, but by dominative power: and thus, according to the diversity of dominion, it participates in a diverse manner of commanding respectively toward diverse subjects; for the right, or quasi dominion, of the father of the family over his wife is one thing, another over his sons, another over slaves and servants; whence neither does it have perfect unity, or uniform power, nor does it even participate properly in political regimen: and therefore it is called an imperfect community.

Note 3. It is equally certain that Princes can establish laws and edicts concerning tributes and revenues to be justly paid to them by their subjects; which indeed the King of kings Himself approved by His own oracle in Matthew 22, saying: Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's. Just, I say, are those laws, because although they immediately regard the utility and advantage of the Prince to whom tributes are paid, yet remotely they look to the common good; because the more the Prince abounds, the more easily can he repel the enemies of the commonwealth, and relieve his subjects, lest, war pressing hard or some grave necessity and calamity impending, they be harassed by unwonted subsidies. Wherefore Christopher Marcellus, in the oration which he delivered at the fourth session of the Lateran Council under Julius the Second, aptly said: If there be no resources for the Prince, he cannot protect the city, nor declare war, nor preserve peace, nor guard himself within his walls. Hence tributes, the treasury, mints, payments, rents, pensions, taxes must be instituted by the Prince, as is fitting; since these are not poured back into the good of the Prince alone, but into the utility and advantage of the Commonwealth. But whether those laws be just whose utility and fruit redound to the advantage of the Prince alone, must here be determined. These matters having been premised, three things occur here to be determined: First, whether law must of necessity be prescribed to some whole community, so that it cannot be directed to particulars. Second, whether it is ordered per se to the good of the community. Third, whether the Prince can justly enact laws which conduce only to the private good of individuals.

First Conclusion. — It is of the essential reason of law that it be prescribed for some entire community.

The truth of this Conclusion appears especially from this, that law is distinguished from precept in this, that a precept is prescribed to one, law to all: inasmuch as the former regards private direction and ordering of a part, the latter public governance and the moderation and administration of the commonwealth. Moreover it is proved: first indeed by a kind of induction; for the eternal and natural law does not befit one man alone, but is traced in the hearts of all: Likewise the divine law, both old and new, were prescribed to communities, the former indeed to the Jewish people, the latter to the Church universal and propagated through the whole world. The same is evident concerning the civil law; since in book 1 of the ff. De legibus it is said: law is a common precept: ff., same title. Rights are constituted not for individual persons, but generally. The same is evident concerning the Canonical laws; for the Canons and decrees published by the Fathers are said to be public laws. Hence Gregory IX. in the proemium of the Decret. says: Therefore law is set down, that noxious appetite be limited by the rule of right, whereby the human race may be formed to live honestly. Wherefore in 1. ff. De legibus, the definition of law is handed down in this manner: Law is a common precept, the counsel of prudent men, the correction of offenses which are contracted voluntarily or through ignorance, the common pledge of the commonwealth.

It is proved secondly both from this, that law is the principal act of political or royal prudence, whereby it looks per se first to the good of the whole commonwealth or community to which it is prescribed; and consequently it is ordered not to one person only, but to the whole community; and also because, as will appear within, it is of the reason of law that it be perpetual: but no particular person, in this mortal state, for which especially law is prescribed, can be perpetual: therefore law, formally taken, cannot be prescribed to him, but to the community: which is held to be perpetual in so far as it perseveres through continuous succession.

You will object 1. In Canon law law is distinguished into private and public: and the Canons indeed, cap. Licet, de regularibus, and cap. Duce sunt, will the latter to be prescribed to a community, the former truly to a private person. The same likewise is handed down in Civil law; for the Instit. De iure naturali, gentium, et Civili. divide the laws of princes into general ones, which bind all, and personal ones, which are not drawn into precedent, because the princes do not will these: therefore it is not of the reason of law that it be enacted for the whole community.

I answer, by the private law in those Canons is understood a vow conceived under the special inspiration of the Holy Spirit, or divine inspiration itself, which is called a law improperly and metaphorically: because it is written in the heart, and impels and obliges toward the fulfilling of what was promised by the vow, after the manner of a law. But to the text

Institutes says that by personal law is understood that which is borne in favor of, or in punishment of, some person and his successors, or whose execution pertains to that person; but from this it is not licit to conclude that law is not prescribed to the community respectively, that is, for them as members of the community, and for the common good, at least mediately; inasmuch namely as it benefits the common good that the merits of some member of the republic be endowed with privileges, so that others may be thereby spurred and kindled to promote the good of the republic itself through outstanding deeds and diligent works.

You will object 2. Law is the rule of man's moral operations: but not only communities of men, but also individual men have need of this rule, that they may be directed to the end prescribed for them: therefore law of itself does not imply respect to the human community alone, but also to individual men considered singly and individually. It is confirmed. Law is directed most of all to that person by whom it ought to be fulfilled: therefore it is directed rather to a true person than to a fictitious one; for fiction always supposes the truth which it imitates: but the community is a fictitious person; whereas each particular man is held to be a true person: therefore with stronger reason law is directed to individual men than to the whole community.

I answer, that law is not called common precisely because it is prescribed only to the community as community, and as a certain mystical body considered abstractively: but because it ought generally to be proposed as to be kept by all the members of that mystical body for which it is set forth as the rule of right acting. By this reasoning the response to the confirmation is also clear: for law is proposed generally, so that it may pertain to all and each according to the exigency of the time: whereby it is true that it is directed more to true persons than to fictitious ones. In one word, law according to its prescription and designation regards the whole community immediately: but according to execution it bears directly upon the individual members of that same community; and thus it is directed more to singular persons than to the community itself.

You will object 3. When law is borne for the community, either it obliges the community alone as such, or it also comprehends the individual members of that same community: if the first, then the community conducts itself as a particular person, and thereupon law could be directed to one person only: if the second, it is rightly concluded from this too that law can be borne for one alone; if indeed it so benefits it.

I answer, that law is ordinarily borne for the community not collectively, but distributively: namely for this reason, that it be kept by all and each of the community, with an accommodation distributed according to the condition of the law. Nevertheless sometimes law can be borne upon the community itself, as community: namely by commanding, or prohibiting some act, which ought to be exercised by it alone as community, and not by its individual members considered separately, as is evident from the statutes and fixed laws by which the superiors and prefects of Congregations, Universities, Chapters, and Colleges are at times bound to perform certain things concerning the public and common administration of such a body committed to their direction.

You will object 4. Some precept does not seem to be distinct from law: but a precept can be prescribed to one person only: therefore also law.

The minor is evident. The major however is proved: for some precept can be prescribed on account of the common good, and from the power of governing the republic, and of ordering its individual members to their due end: but in this the reason of law especially prevails: therefore, etc. — I deny the major, for precept and law are distinguished from one another, and if perhaps not physically, and as to the natural species of acts, at least they are distinguished morally: namely because law has other conditions than precept: for although every law is a precept, yet not every precept is a law, but it must have special conditions by which it is distinguished from a precept. First, indeed, a precept, although it can be prescribed to the whole community, does not necessarily require this, but can be imposed upon a particular person: whereas law always necessarily regards a community of persons, as has been proved. Second, a precept expires with the death or removal of the one imposing it, even if it be prescribed absolutely and without any limitation of time; but law does not cease by the death of the legislator, since by its nature it demands to be perpetual. Third, a precept can be imposed by any superior whatsoever; but law cannot be borne except by him who obtains the supreme and legislative power either from God or from the republic; whereupon the reason of precept and of law is far different.

Second conclusion. — It belongs to the nature of law that it be prescribed on account of the common good.

Proof, first from distinction 4, c. Erit autem lex, where it is read: No law ought to be written for private advantage, but for the common utility of the citizens. Which certainly is drawn from St. Isidore, book 5, Etymologies, and this accords with the sanction of the Twelve Tables: The safety of the people is the supreme law. It is confirmed from St. Basil, Homily 14 on the beginning of Proverbs, not far from the beginning, where he said: If kingship is legitimate power, it is clear that he is rightly governed by precept and chosen by law; who indeed is truly worthy of this appellation, holding much weight and account, inasmuch as he regards what is useful to all in common, and ordains things not to the mark of his own advantage. And there he adds: In this the tyrant differs from the king, that the former regards and protects his own interests in whatever way: the latter seeks only to provide for his subjects. — It is confirmed moreover from the consensus of all profane authors, most especially Plato, dialogue 1, On Laws, where he says that legislators ought to establish laws for the sake of the common city. Likewise Aristotle in the Politics, chapter 1. Laws, he says, are to be ordered to the common salvation of the people. Similarly Cicero, who in book 1, On Laws, says: Laws were established to be instituted for the safeguarding of the republic.

Reason likewise lends its support. First indeed, because public power is of itself ordered to the public good: but all law must emanate from public power: therefore it must be ordered to the public good. — Then, every law is either from God the legislator, or from man: if from God, it is ordered to the common good; because it is either from God as author of nature, or from the same as author of grace: but in both ways it is ordered to the common good, namely to eternal beatitude, in which men enjoy their ultimate end. If from man, it is likewise directed to the common good: for kings and princes are not lords, but ministers of that kingdom, according to that of Wisdom 6: For when you were ministers of his kingdom, you judged not aright. And from that of the Apostle to the Romans 13: For they are the ministers of God in this very society: therefore they do not possess the power of establishing laws except for the common good: since indeed all power, which they exercise over subjects, is either from God or from the people: if from God, it is clear that it is conferred on account of the common good, which God chiefly intends: if from the people, the same is evident; for just as all confer it, so they confer it for this end and with this mind, that it be exercised for their public good, and not for the private advantage of the Prince alone: whence in the Eighth Council of Toledo, chapter 10, it is prescribed that he who is elected king swear not to look to the advantage of his own right, but to look to the welfare of his fatherland and his people. — Finally, this truth is evident by induction; for the natural law tends of itself to the common good of the whole of human nature: divine positive laws are ordered to the glory of God and the utility of men, according to that of Isaiah 51: A law shall go forth from me, and my judgment shall rest for a light of the peoples. Human laws also, both civil and Ecclesiastical, are ordered to the common good; otherwise they would not be held to be true laws; for the power of enacting laws is not granted to men, whether by God or by the republic, that they may use it at their pleasure and without reason; for even that most ample power conceded to the Apostles was given unto edification, and not unto destruction, as St. Paul teaches, 2 Corinthians 10. Wherefore Legislators ought to use that power for attaining the end of law; namely the good of the republic and the public felicity.

You will object 1. Many are the laws which are ordered to private good only, such as the natural law of preserving one's own life, even with the loss of another's life: likewise the law of giving alms to the poor, which regards only their particular utility: such also is the law of fraternal correction, which regards the amendment of a particular man: finally such are the Ecclesiastical laws concerning the reception of the Sacraments, for instance the making of annual confession and the receiving of sacred Communion at Easter. It is confirmed: even if there were no republic at all, and only one single man existed, the law of nature would no less prevail in him; for while the first Parent was alone, he was not without law, since the natural law had force in him: but such a law then could not be ordered to the common good, because then there was no society of men, nor any republic: therefore, etc.

I answer, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence: for it is one thing to speak of the proximate matter about which a law is concerned, another thing concerning the formal motive on account of which it occupies itself with such matter; I confess indeed that the proximate matter, about which the aforementioned laws in the objection are immediately concerned, is a particular good; nevertheless they are not occupied with it except on account of the motive of the common good which the law regards of itself first: for it concerns the republic to preserve the life of any citizen whatsoever; otherwise the republic itself would be extinguished, inasmuch as it coalesces only from private persons: it equally concerns it that citizens not be in need, otherwise they would be in danger of life, which pertains to the good of the republic. Whence although the law concerning making alms regards the private good of a particular person, as proximate matter; nevertheless it orders the whole of it into the common good, to which it pertains that the republic nourish its members, lest plagues or thefts rage in it. The same must be said of fraternal correction, which regards the amendment of the particular life of man for this reason only, that vices be eliminated from the republic: for that society cannot long stand, in which vice is praised or dissimulated, nor eliminated.

The same also must be said of the laws of the Sacraments, which although they regard a particular good, namely eternal salvation of every believer; nevertheless they are ordered of themselves first to the common good, namely to the worship of God, which is the ultimate end of all men, and the common good of the whole human nature, in which all men communicate. In confirmation I say, that even if there were no commonwealth actually, some society of men would be no less possible: and since man is a social animal, the natural law regards him insofar as private in such a way that it also regards him insofar as he is aptly born for society, and community; and therefore that law although it may regard the particular man immediately, as the subject in which it resides; nevertheless it inheres in him for that end, that it order him toward rightly instituting society with others who either exist, or can exist. Hence Adam was alone with the law in such a way that nevertheless by his nature he sought a companion.

You will object 2. If every law essentially required to be ordered to the common good, it would follow that, the common good and public utility ceasing, the vigor and obligation of the law would likewise cease; nay rather, the motive of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases: but such a consequent is false: for although, e.g., someone may certainly know that the Church suffers no detriment from the fact that Peter takes up dwelling and associates with those publicly excommunicated, nevertheless by the common opinion he ought not to dwell with them: therefore laws are not always ordered into the common good.

I distinguish the consequence: that the vigor and obligation of the law ought to cease, if by public authority or something equivalent the motive of the law were declared to cease, I concede: otherwise, I deny: for just as public authority declares that the law obliges, so likewise it is necessary that something public intervene, which intimates that the motive of the law ceases: namely either the judgment of the Prince, or of the whole community, or of the wise men among whom the judgment of the community can be supposed to be deposited: for that the motive of the law cease altogether, it does not suffice that it cease with respect to some particular person, or some few out of the community: but it ought to cease with respect to at least the greater part of the community; otherwise particulars, whom this motive does not regard, do not cease to be bound by the law: e.g., the motive why the Council of Trent declared that clandestine marriages would henceforth be invalid, was that various frauds and evils might be met, which are wont to occur in this kind of marriages. Whence although someone in good faith, and without deceit, contracted a clandestine marriage, since no inconveniences and evils arise from it on account of which clandestine marriages entered into were prohibited, therefore such a contracted marriage does not cease to be invalid; for although the reason and motive of the law ceases in this particular case, it does not on that account cease in the general, to which the particular good ought to yield.

You will say 3. The laws and edicts of Princes by which they prescribe and exact tributes, are truly laws: but those in no way regard the common good of subjects, but only the private utility of the king: therefore it is not of the essence of law that it be ordered to the common good.

I distinguish the minor: that those laws of tributes to be paid regard the private utility of the king as proximate matter, I concede: as the sole end, I deny: for they are ordered to the felicity and security of the republic itself, namely that the King through revenues may both procure soldiers by whom the republic may be protected against enemies, and provide in all things for the common good of the republic itself.

You ask: whether a Legislator not intending the common good of the republic, but led into it by hatred, enacts laws, which nevertheless of themselves tend to the common good — whether, I say, those laws are to be called true and legitimate? — I affirm, because that perverse intention of the legislator is merely personal, nor does it redound into the act insofar as it regards the common utility; for just as the perverse intention of a judge does not affect the validity of the sentence, provided it be not against equity; and just as the perverse intention of a minister does not hinder the Sacrament, so long as it be not against its substance, namely if in confecting the Sacrament he indeed truly intend to do what the Church intends, but propose to himself some perverse end, namely either gain, or something else perverse; so in the present case the common good is to be regarded in the law itself, and not indeed in the very intention of the legislator. Which opinion St. Augustine plainly hands down, book 1. De arbitrio, writing: A law enacted for the sake of protecting the people cannot be accused of anyone's lust; since he who enacted it, if he enacted it by the command of God, that is, what eternal justice commands, could have done it devoid of all lust. But if he decreed this with some lust, it does not follow from that that it is necessary to obey that law with lust, and because a good law, it can proceed from a good man. He indicates also another reason of this below, writing, that although he enacted the law with lust, nevertheless that law can be obeyed without lust. Wherefore although the legislator sin through defect of good intention, which he ought to have toward the public good; yet because that constitution of itself is ordered into the common good, it suffices that it be judged to have this condition desired for a true and properly so-called law.

You ask 2. When then can a law rightly be judged to be ordered into the common good? — I answer, that any law whatever is thus judged to be rightly and justly ordered, first when it regards either mediately or immediately the glory of God, and conduces to the ultimate supernatural end. Hence all civil Laws are iniquitous, nor do they obtain the reason of law, vigor, and dignity, if they conflict with the ordinance of God or of the Church: whence Can. Non licet, dist. 10. it is thus established: It is not licit for the Emperor, or for anyone keeping piety, to presume anything against divine mandates, nor to do anything which hinders Evangelical or Prophetic or Apostolic rules. And Can. Suscepimus te, it is decreed that Constitutions of Princes are to be postponed to Ecclesiastical laws: but where they have not stood against Evangelical and Canonical decrees, let them be held worthy of all reverence. Hence Pope Symmachus epist. 7. which is to the Emperor Anastasius writes thus: We indeed accept human powers in their own place, until they raise their wills against God: Moreover, since all power is from God, much more therefore that which is set over divine things. Defer to God in us, and we will defer to God in you: Moreover, if you do not defer to God, you cannot use his privilege whose rights you despise. And St. Augustine lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 21. What justice of man is that, he says, which takes away true man himself from God? From every quarter the law ought to be just. — Second, a law is judged ordered into the common good, while regarding a city, e.g., which is part of a kingdom, it regards more the good of the kingdom, than the good of the city: but otherwise if the contrary happen: for the good of the part is to be postponed to the good of the whole. — Third, that a law be into the common good, it is not required that it conduce to the good of all other kingdoms, but it can be judged ordered into the common good if it be useful to the kingdom to which it is prescribed: for since several kingdoms are not subordinated to one another, nor is one part of another, as a city is part of a kingdom, it is not necessary that where a law is useful to one kingdom, it ought also to profit other kingdoms: nevertheless as much as can be done, the Prince ought to provide lest, by enacting a law useful to his subjects, he harm neighbors, where the utility of both can be procured. Yet if the Prince cannot provide for the good of his own kingdom without some inconvenience to neighbors, he can no less legitimately enact a law which conduces to the common good of his kingdom, even though it be future to the ruin of neighbors; because before all things he ought to watch over the common good of his kingdom.

Third Conclusion. — A PRINCE COULD NOT ENACT JUST LAWS BY WHICH THE PARTICULAR GOODS OF SUBJECTS WOULD SO YIELD INTO HIS OWN PROPER ADVANTAGE THAT THEY BE IN NO WAY, EVEN REMOTELY, ORDERED TO THE COMMON GOOD OF SUBJECTS.

Which indeed is proved first from Scripture, Deuteronom. 17. where the form of the kingdom, and of rendering judgment, is prescribed in this manner: When he shall be constituted (King) he shall not multiply horses to himself, nor lead back the people into Egypt, being lifted up by the number of cavalry.... he shall not have many wives, who may allure his soul, neither immense weights of silver and gold. But after he shall have sat upon the throne of his kingdom, he shall write out for himself this Deuteronomy of the law in a volume, taking the copy from the Priests of the levitical tribe, and he shall have it with him, and shall read it all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, lest his heart be lifted up in pride above his brethren, nor decline to the right hand, or to the left, that he himself and his sons may reign long over Israel. To which divine edict kings have consented according to reason. — Hence 3. Kings cap. 21. God severely took notice of Achab, and Jezabel because they had occupied by force the vineyard of Naboth the Jezrahelite; and Ezechiel 34.¹ Pastors are gravely reproved, under which name all superiors are designated, because they feed themselves: To the Pastors of Israel who fed themselves: Are not flocks fed by Pastors? You ate milk, you were clothed with wool, and what was fat you killed: but my flock you did not feed. What was weak you did not strengthen, and what was sick you did not heal, what was broken you did not bind up, and what was cast away you did not bring back, and what was lost you did not seek: but with harshness you ruled over them, and with power. He has a similar reproof against Princes cap. 22. Hence cap. 46. God established: The Prince shall not take of the inheritance of the people by violence, and from their possessions: but from his own possession he shall give an inheritance to his sons.

The same truth is proved from the Eighth Council of Toledo cap. 1. in which it is held that while the Christian Kings of the Goths instituted and put on the principate, they ought to be such as are described in these words: They shall be assertors of the Catholic faith, they shall be modest in acts, judgments, and life, they shall be sparing rather than extended in provisions of things, that neither by force nor faction of writings, or definitions of whatever kind, they exact contracts from subjects, or intend them to be exacted: they shall be not looking to the advantage of their own right, but consulting their fatherland and people. — Something similar was established in the Council of Paris convened around the year of Christ 829. under Louis, and Lothaire Emperors; where among those things which are acknowledged to pertain to the justice of the King, this holds the first place, To oppress no one unjustly by power: but when a Prince converts the goods of subjects into his own private good, and in no way into the public, that one oppresses subjects by power: therefore, etc.

St. Bernard expressly expounds this truth lib. 3. De Consideratione to Eugenius the supreme Pontiff, cap. 3. where he says: A superior, and singularly: to what end? you need consideration, I say to you: Is it that you grow over your subjects? By no means, but that they grow over you. They constituted you Prince, but for themselves, not for you. Otherwise by what pact do you reckon yourself superior to those from whom you beg the benefice? Hear the Lord: Those who have power over them are called benefactors. But that is said of those who are outside. What is it to us? You would be called mendaciously, unless you were so beneficent that you intended to preside over benefits. It is the part of small and abject minds, not seeking advancement from subjects, but their own profit.... That saying repeated again and again belongs to no mean glory: I require not the gift but the fruit. And below cap. 5. he adds: What unworthy thing to you, than that holding the whole, you be not content with the whole, unless you make certain minutiae and meagre portions of that universality entrusted to you, as though they were not yours, but somehow you were of the whole? Where also he endeavors to remind you of the parable of Nathan, concerning the man who having many sheep coveted the one which belonged to the poor man. To this also returns the deed, nay rather crime, of king Achab, who held the sum of things, and coveted one vineyard. May God turn away from you what he heard: you killed and possessed.

This truth is likewise confirmed by a threefold argument, which the author of the book De regimine Principum, book 3, chapter 11, supplies. First, the true Prince must imitate God, by whose power he commands: but God so governs men for their salvation that he acquires nothing for himself from it; therefore the Prince ought to seek the common good, and not his own private good. Second, the Commonwealth is not the Prince's, but the Prince belongs to the Commonwealth, in accordance with that saying of Seneca in book 2 De Clementia: Know that your Commonwealth is not yours, but that you belong to the Commonwealth. But he who is wholly devoted to the Commonwealth is bound to procure its good only, and not another's; therefore, etc. Thirdly, finally, just as a Bishop, as such, is bound to procure, so far as he can, the salvation of souls, and to give himself wholly to securing their eternal good — whence that well-known saying: What Christians are, is for themselves; what Priests and Bishops are, is for you — so the Prince, by like reason, ought to watch over the temporal good of his subjects. Therefore just as a Bishop would deserve blame who, despising or neglecting his pastoral solicitude, gave himself wholly in retirement to contemplation, even though he proposed to pursue thereby his own private salvation; so also a Prince who directed his efforts to his own advantage, and did not devote himself to procuring and establishing the common good, would seem above all to deserve blame.

You will say 1. To the people of Israel demanding a King, in 1 Kings, chapter 8, Samuel answered with the voice of God: This will be the right of the King that shall reign over you: he will take your sons, and put them in his chariots, and will make him horsemen, and runners before his chariots, and he will appoint of himself tribunes and centurions, etc. Your fields also, and your vineyards, and your best oliveyards will he take, and give to his servants, etc. Therefore the Prince has the right to convert the goods of private persons to his own benefit by laws and edicts.

I deny the consequence: for the law promulgated there is not legitimate royal law, but tyrannical, introduced by the violence of men and the insolence of perverse Princes, as appears from the very context: since it is related that when the people sought a King from Samuel, The word was displeasing in the eyes of Samuel; and when he had consulted God about this matter, the Lord, indignant, answered Samuel: Not you have they rejected, but me, that I should not reign over them, etc. Wherefore there is no doubt that God, in punishment of the rebellion of that people, set before them in place of the King whom they demanded a tyrant and his violent rule, as Clement of Alexandria explains in book 3 of the Paedagogus, chapter 4: When a king was asked for the people, he says, the Lord promises not a human ruler, but threatens how he will deliver unto them one given to insolence, a tyrant. And St. Gregory the Great, on the aforesaid words, says: When, he says, the right of the King is foretold, doubtless it is shown in the person of one carnal ruler what carnal men in general will do out of tyranny, not what the elect ought to imitate. For in the same history of the Kings we read that when King Achab took away Naboth's vineyard, he incurred the wrath of almighty God; but here, when the right of the King is foretold, fields, vineyards, and the best oliveyards are said to be taken away. Since, therefore, it is here foretold that which was committed there once only, it is shown that it is commanded not by divine judgment.

You will object 2. That saying of Christ in Luke 22: The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them, and they that have power over them are called benefactors: by which words he seems to establish a distinction between royal power and that which he himself was about to institute, attributing to civil power this authority, that they lord it over their subjects and are truly their Lords: but the Lord can convert the goods of his servants to his own benefit; therefore with stronger right can Princes enact laws and edicts whereby the particular goods of subjects are converted to their own and private uses.

I answer first, that in that passage there is no question of the rule of all kings, but only of the ordinary administration of the kings of the Gentiles, who, since at that time all were worshippers of devils, and scarcely any of them had a just administration, none, I judge, would say should be proposed to Christian Princes as a model.

I answer second, that by those words of Christ our Lord rather a manner of reigning is disapproved than approved: since Christ wished to deter his Disciples both from the desire of such rule and from its pattern: for he subjoins: But you not so.

Thirdly, finally, I say, that rather the contrary of what the objection intends can be gathered from that passage: since there the question concerns those Princes who, although they rule over the Gentiles, are nevertheless called benefactors, assuredly for no other reason than because they aimed more at the common good of their subjects than at their own private good.

You insist: Kings truly are lords of their subjects: since they bear rule over them: but a lord can dispose of the goods of his servant for his own private benefit: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major: they are lords by civil and political dominion, I concede: by despotic and lordly dominion, I deny,

And the minor I similarly distinguish: that a lordly and despotic lord can convert the goods of subjects to his own uses, let it pass: that a political and civil one can, I deny; for the members of the Commonwealth, over which the Prince presides, are citizens and free men, and not servants or captives.

You will object 3. Princes exercise the offices of God: therefore as God refers all things to himself, so Princes can licitly refer all the goods of subjects to their own private benefit. — I deny the consequence; for in order that the inference of him who objects might be legitimate, it ought thus to conclude: therefore as God refers nothing to his own benefit — because, as the Royal Prophet says, Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods — so neither ought Princes refer the goods of subjects to their private advantages; but what they gather from taxes paid, they ought above all to pour back into the utility of those same subjects.