Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

Although sin has no efficient cause properly so called, as St. Augustine subtly warns, lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 7, saying: No one seeks an efficient cause of an evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, because neither is that an effecting, but a defecting; for to defect from Him who supremely is, to that which is less, this is to begin to have an evil will. Moreover, to wish to find causes of these defections when they are not efficient, as I said, but deficient, is like wishing to see darkness, or hear silence. Although, I say, sin acknowledges no efficient cause properly so called; nevertheless certain quasi-causes of it are wont to be assigned: and these twofold in kind: some indeed interior, residing in the very sinner himself; others, however, exterior, and subsisting outside him. Of the former kind three are commonly enumerated; namely ignorance on the part of the intellect; concupiscence on the part of the appetite, and malice on the part of the will. Of the latter kind likewise three are assigned: namely the devil by suggestion and temptation. Adam by traduction and propagation, as well as any sinner whatsoever by scandal, counsel, impulse, etc. Finally, heretics assign God Himself as the efficient cause of sin, not only insofar as He concurs to the entity of the sinful act: but also insofar as He commands that act, and induces the human will by His command and impulse to elicit it. In the present Question there will be discourse of the intrinsic causes of sin: in the following, of the extrinsic causes.

Notandum 1. That THREE modes of sinning are generally distinguished: the first indeed from ignorance of the intellect: the second from passion or weakness of the appetite: the third from the malice and liberty of the will, by which the will, at its pleasure, with no preceding ignorance, nor inciting passion, wills sin under some reason of useful or delectable good. For since the will has no necessity of embracing that which the intellect shows to be honest, but can be borne spontaneously and by its own motion toward that which is worse, even against the dictate of reason: thence it comes about that it can sin, not only from ignorance, or from a defect of cognition which, were it present, would hold back from sin, nor only from concupiscence, which moves and allures the will to obey it; but it can also sin from malice: namely when knowingly, and freely, and spontaneously, of its own accord, nod, and mere motion, it lapses into sin; for which reason Adam is held to have sinned: inasmuch as he sinned not moved by concupiscence, which he then lacked, nor induced by ignorance or error, because he was not seduced in the transgression, 1 Timoth. 2. Now these three genera of sins are gathered from Sacred Scripture: for of sins from ignorance David speaks, Psal. 21, praying God thus: The offenses of my youth, and my ignorances, remember not, O Lord. And the Apostle, 1 Timoth. 1: I obtained the mercy of the Lord, because acting ignorantly I did it in unbelief. Of sins of concupiscence Daniel speaks, cap. 23: Beauty deceived you, and concupiscence subverted your heart.

Similarly St. James, cap. 1: Every one is tempted by his own concupiscence etc. But of sins from malice there is discourse John 31 [sic], as of one who of set purpose departed from God, and would not understand all His ways. The same three genera of sins the Holy Fathers acknowledge, especially St. Augustine, who, lib. 83 qq., question 26, says:

Other sins are of weakness, others of inexperience, others of malice. Weakness is contrary to virtue; inexperience is contrary to wisdom; malice is contrary to goodness.

A similar sentiment of St. Gregory the Great Gratian reports, distinction 2 De Poenitentia cap. 22, in these words:

it must be known, that sin is committed in three ways; for it is perpetrated either through ignorance, or through weakness, or through deliberate purpose. And indeed more gravely from weakness than from ignorance; but far more gravely is one sinned from deliberate purpose than from weakness.

But since sin from malice is especially said to war against the Holy Spirit, therefore there will be for us a special discourse of this genus of sin, when we shall treat of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Here, therefore, there remains only to be determined how ignorance and concupiscence can be culpable, and inducive to sin.

Notandum 2. That concupiscence is a cause of sin; for, says St. James, chapter 1: Every one is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and allured: then concupiscence, when it hath conceived, bringeth forth sin, but sin, when it is completed, begetteth death. The same St. Paul teaches ad Rom. 7, saying: I delight in the law of God according to the inward man: but I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin which is in my members. And although this vice resides in the inferior part of man, which is called sensuality, and is borne impotently toward sensible and delectable goods, especially of taste and touch, for which reason the Apostle, Romans 7, calls concupiscence the law of the members; and dwelling in the flesh wandering astray: nevertheless in the will itself some similar vice resides: for the will, or the superior part of man, is prone to covet useful and delectable goods repugnant to the honest, and that even with the dictate of reason resisting, and most frequently either forestalling it, or, what is worse, overcoming it. Whence the Apostle, ad Galatas 5, after he had said that the flesh concupisceth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, enumerates among the works of the concupiscence of the flesh not only those things which pertain to sensuality, such as fornication, uncleanness etc., but also those which regard the superior part of man, or both parts, namely servitude of idols, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths, quarrels, etc. All which he calls works of the flesh, understanding by the flesh the whole man insofar as he lives carnally, not according to God, but according to himself. But since we have already several times treated of concupiscence, both in Disp. de statu naturae purae, and in the preceding Article, where we showed that it is not sin properly so called; therefore here there is need to treat only of ignorance. Wherefore

Notandum 3. From the Seraphic Doctor in Centiloquio 1 p. Sectione 5, that ignorance can be distinguished of manifold kind. First, indeed by reason of form, either absent or present; One thing, he says, is ignorance of negation, another of privation, another of depraved disposition. Ignorance of negation is in little children, which is neither fault nor punishment until the predetermined time. Ignorance of privation is in adults, who at the determinate time are ignorant of what they can know, or forget what they once learned. Ignorance of depraved disposition is that whereby one holds opinions contrary to faith, which can be called erroneous, and it is in heretics. Second, by reason of object it is divided into speculative and practical. The former is opposed positively, or privatively, to speculative cognition: the latter truly to practical cognition. Likewise one is ignorance of fact, another of law. Of law, either of natural law, and this does not excuse, since it is written in the heart of man: or of divine law, as of the Law, the Prophets, the Gospel, and Apostolic doctrine; and this he accuses as of a great and mortal delict in Prelates, especially Bishops and Metropolitans, who are bound to render a reason of faith and hope. But he accuses as venial simple and unlettered Clerics, who when they could have learned, would not. Laymen, however, he accuses in no wise, because it does not pertain to them, provided they do not despise it. If it is of positive law, as of laws and decrees, he accuses judges alone. If it is ignorance of law containing moral ecclesiastical constitutions for discerning sins, he accuses Priests and Confessors.

But if it is ignorance of fact, or of indifferent things, thus it sufficiently excuses, whether of things necessary for salvation, and thus either cannot be avoided, as in a madman, who from birth lacked the judgment of reason, and this excuses: or can be avoided, as in Jews and Pagans, who could have known that Christ suffered for the salvation of men, and this does not excuse. Third, by reason of intellect and will, one ignorance is known, and a certain one not known: another voluntary, and a certain one involuntary: another culpable, and a certain one inculpable. For it is not the same thing for ignorance to be voluntary and for it to be culpable: for that it may be culpable, it must be against duty; but any voluntary ignorance whatsoever is not against duty, because it is lawful for us, nay expedient, to be ignorant of many things. Again, ignorance of will is twofold: one is called affected, which is directly willed: another crass or supine: not affected indeed, but not attempted with all due diligence, but with some negligence. But this negligence has various degrees: for when someone does not sufficiently avoid and repel ignorance, it proceeds sometimes from weakness, because in repelling it itself there is tedium and annoyance: sometimes from mere liberty: sometimes truly from defect of intelligence: because namely the ignorance itself, or the duty of knowing, does not become known so perfectly as is needed. Fourth, with respect and in comparison to acts of the will, a certain ignorance is called antecedent, a certain subsequent, and a certain concomitant. The first is the cause of the act, insofar as without it that which is done would not be done, as when a hunter kills a man thinking him to be a beast: for in truth he would not slay him, if he knew him to be a man. The second is that of which the will is somehow the cause, as when a hunter, doubting whether that which he discerns moving among thickets, brambles, or woods, be a man or a beast, neglects to inquire more diligently, and meanwhile brandishes his weapon. The third is not the cause of the act, but is only with the act, which would no less be done if it were absent, as if the hunter thinks indeed that it is a beast at which he hurls his weapon, although it be a man, nevertheless he would no less have killed, even if he had known him to be a man: but there is no doubt that this ignorance is a cause of sin, since altogether voluntarily it leads to homicide. Fifth, by reason of subject, one ignorance is vincible, another invincible. That is called invincible when it is not in anyone's power to know that which he ignores, or when he cannot with all human diligence applied conquer and repel from himself his ignorance; such is the ignorance of the mysteries of faith in those infidels who have heard nothing of the Gospel, nor could hear, no one preaching the Gospel among them, who on that account are called infidels negatively. Vincible is that by which, with moral diligence applied, it can be overcome, and that in two ways; for, says the Seraphic Doctor, one can be removed with great difficulty, such as is in the very dull-witted, and this excuses from so much, but not from the whole guilt of fault, if it concerns things necessary for salvation: another can be removed with facility, as in the ingenious; but this does not excuse. Similarly invincible by nature, as in a child who does not use reason, and in a decrepit old man who does not discern, and in one born insane; this excuses from the whole. Another is invincible through fault, as in one who through fault becomes furious; and this, says the Seraphic Doctor, according to some does not excuse from the whole. — Again, invincible ignorance is twofold: one indeed of fact, another truly of law. The former is that whereby some fact is ignored and cannot be known unless another teach and disclose it: such was the ignorance of Abimelech, who had taken Sara as wife not knowing her to be the spouse of Abraham: whence when he was accused of this fact by God, he answered deservedly: Lord, wilt thou slay a nation that is ignorant and just? Did not he himself say to me, She is my sister, etc. And God said to him: I know that thou didst it in the simplicity of thy heart. The latter truly is ignorance of some law. And this again is twofold: one indeed is invincible ignorance of the natural law, for instance ignorance of that precept, God is to be worshipped, parents are to be honored, one must not do to another what one would not have done to oneself: the other truly of positive law, such as for example ignorance of that Evangelic law prescribing the necessity of baptism for obtaining salvation, Unless one be born again of water, etc. But since all the aforesaid species of ignorance are reduced chiefly to the vincible and invincible: therefore there will be discourse of these principally in the following Conclusions, of which the first treats whether those things which are done from ignorance are sins. The second, whether ignorance itself is a special sin distinct from others, under the formal aspect of ignorance. The third finally, whether those things which are done from invincible ignorance are imputed to fault, as certain more recent heretics contend, affirming that things done from invincible ignorance of fact, or of positive law, are not held culpable; otherwise, however, of those things which are done from invincible ignorance of natural law.

First Conclusion. — INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE IS HENCE A CAUSE OF SIN: NOT DIRECT, BUT INDIRECT.

This Conclusion consists of three parts: of which

The first is evident from various texts of Scripture, in which man is said to sin through ignorance: thus Leviticus 4, If the princes shall sin through ignorance; and again: If a soul shall sin through ignorance: and cap. 5 sacrifices are appointed to be offered for those who shall have sinned from ignorance. Similarly ad Hebraeos 9 the Apostle affirms that once each year the high priest of the Jews entered not without blood into the Holy of Holies, whom he offered, he says, for his own and the people's ignorance, that is, for his own and the people's sins committed from ignorance. Finally Osee, cap. 4, adducing the cause of vices inundating the land, assigns ignorance alone, or defect of the knowledge of God. There is, he says, no truth, there is no knowledge of God in the land: Malediction, lying, and homicide, and adultery have overflowed, and blood hath touched blood.

This same truth St. Bernard excellently demonstrates, Epist. 77, ad Hugonem de Sancto Victore, which now holds the place of special Treatises in tome 4 of his works, where, refuting the error of those denying that sin occurs through ignorance, after he had cited the aforesaid texts of Scripture, thence he gathers thus:

If ignorance, he says, were never sin, why was it said in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that into the second tabernacle the high priest alone entered once a year, not without blood, which he offered for his own and the people's ignorance? If the sin of ignorance is none, then Saul did not sin when he persecuted the Church of God, since indeed he did this while remaining in unbelief. He was therefore doing well in that he was a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and an injurious man, when he was breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, being therein abundantly a zealous imitator of his fathers' traditions. Therefore he ought not to have said, I obtained mercy, but rather I received my reward, since ignorance rendered him immune from sin, and zeal besides judged him worthy of reward. If, I say, one never sins through ignorance, what then do the Apostles allege against those who slew them, since they not only did not know it was evil to kill them, but moreover thought that in so doing they were rendering obedience to God? But also in vain did the Savior pray upon the Cross for His crucifiers, since, as He Himself bears witness, they knew not what they did, and by no means sinned in such wise. For it is not lawful even to suspect that the Lord Jesus lied, when He openly declared that they knew not what they did. And if perhaps anyone doubt of the Apostle that, emulating his own flesh like a man, he could have lied where he says: For if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory; does it not appear from these things in how great shadows of ignorance he lies who denies that one can sometimes sin through ignorance?

This very thing the Subtle Doctor teaches in book 2, d. 43, n. 2, where he explains how sin from passion is against the Father, from ignorance against the Son, from malice or from full liberty against the Holy Spirit. The will, he says, because it is joined to the sensitive appetite, is apt to take delight along with it; and therefore, sinning occasionally from the inclination of the sensitive appetite toward its own pleasurable object, one sins from passion, which is called sin from weakness or from impotence, and is appropriated to the Father, to whom power is attributed. It also acts through intellectual cognition; and therefore when reason errs, it does not rightly will, and its sin arising from an error of reason is called sin from ignorance, and is against the Son, to whom wisdom is attributed. Thirdly there would be the will's sin according to itself, from its own liberty, neither taking delight with the sensitive appetite nor arising from an error of reason; and this is properly from malice, and is appropriated against the Holy Spirit, to whom goodness is appropriated. The Doctor therefore holds that in very truth one can sin through ignorance.

The second part is also evident, namely, that ignorance is not of itself and directly the cause of sin: for since ignorance is the privation and lack of necessary cognition, it cannot have any positive influence directly upon the sinful act; for privation, since it is a non-being, can be endowed with no activity whatsoever, with no influx whatever. Yet it concurs in the sinful act indirectly and per accidens, inasmuch as it removes that which would forbid sin, namely by taking away the science and knowledge which, if present, would impede sin: in the same manner as one who removes the walls sustaining the roof of a house is said to be the cause of the fall of that roof; not because he directly casts down and overthrows the roof itself, but because he takes away the support upon which it rested and leaned. — This however must be understood of every kind of ignorance whatsoever that can concur in some evil being done which would not be done without it, according to the disposition of the affection of the agent, who is so disposed in his will that if he adverted that what he does is evil, he would not do it; for example, if he knew this to be a Cleric, he would not strike him; if he knew that what stirs among the brambles is a man, he would not brandish his spear at him nor slay him.

Second Conclusion. — IGNORANCE IS NOT A SPECIAL SIN DISTINCT FROM THE SIN OF MALICE FROM THE SIN COMMITTED BY REASON OF IT.

It is proved: To that extent only would that ignorance, considered in itself, be a special sin, inasmuch as it would be opposed to some particular virtue distinct from other virtues; or at least inasmuch as it would be opposed to other virtues in a special manner: but no particular virtue can be assigned to which this ignorance is opposed; for ignorance is not opposed per se except to the virtue of studiousness; but this virtue does not import an obligation to know all things, and to fortify all one's acts with due knowledge beforehand; but only prescribes rules and manner in acquiring science; and therefore the ignorance which accompanies sinful acts is not held to be opposed to this virtue.

Proved 2. No reason can be assigned why there should be any ratio of evil in invincible ignorance, or in negligence of setting it aside, rather than in any other ignorance whatsoever, unless inasmuch as some superior specially forbids that ignorance, or inasmuch as by it one is exposed to the danger of committing some other sin: but even vincible ignorance, suppose of philosophical things, of itself is not sin, unless it be specially forbidden by a superior, or there would follow from it danger of committing some other sin: therefore, by the same reasoning that invincible ignorance is not of itself a special sin, but only somewhat insofar as it is against the precept of a superior forbidding such ignorance; by the same reason vincible ignorance can only be sin to that extent, inasmuch as it opposes the will of the superior forbidding it; and thus it is held to be nothing else than sin, than disobedience; seeing that it is evil precisely because it opposes the will of the superior.

Proved 3. and the preceding reasons are confirmed: Ignorance is evil only insofar as it is unseemly and against duty: but insofar as it is the cause of sin it is not against a duty special and distinct from that sinful act of which it is held to be the cause: therefore, etc. The minor is proved: ignorance can be understood to be against duty in two ways: first, by reason of itself, if indeed there be a duty of knowing something per se, namely by reason of studiousness, or by reason of supernatural faith: but by this reason it is not held to be a special sin, inasmuch as it is ignorance precisely and directly, but only inasmuch as it takes on the character of the vices and defects opposed to those virtues themselves; and therefore it cannot be a special sin distinct from others, under the formal character of ignorance. Then secondly, ignorance is held to be evil, not indeed by reason of itself, but by reason of the peril or evil to follow from it. Now in this way ignorance likewise cannot be a special sin distinct from that peril and voluntary evil: for the whole guilt of the one who sins through ignorance concerns the evil known in that ignorance, on account of which the ignorance itself is to be avoided: but this ignorance is not a special sin distinct from that deed which by reason of it is admitted; for according to the diversity of that evil which may be, there is a different character of the ignorance; for if it be a peril of injustice, that ignorance takes on the character of injustice; if however it be a peril of intemperance, or of another sinful act, there is also a different malice in that ignorance; and therefore it must not be held to be of itself a distinct and special sin.

You will say 1: Whoever assumes the charge of Preacher or Confessor or Rector of souls, by that very fact is held to sin, if he vincibly ignores what he ought to teach, even though no other sin would follow from this: therefore vincible ignorance is a special sin. —

I deny the consequence, for to that extent he would be held to sin, inasmuch as he would sin either against obedience, if he had assumed the charge of teaching from precept; or against justice, if he received a stipend by reason of this teaching; or against charity, if indeed by reason of that ignorance some harm would follow to his neighbor, especially in spiritual things, and in those that pertain to salvation: and therefore in that case the ignorance would not be a special sin distinct from disobedience, or injustice, or defect of charity.

You will say 2: Every Christian is bound to know the articles of faith, the precepts of the Decalogue, and of the universal Church, just as the Religious has a duty of knowing the precepts of his rule, and likewise the Priest the rite of saying the Office and of celebrating: therefore vincible ignorance of these will be sinful: but no malice of another sin can be assigned which belongs to that ignorance itself: therefore this, precisely by reason of itself, and insofar as it is ignorance, is held to be evil; and therefore it has a special malice distinct from other sins. —

I deny the subsumption: for by the same precept by which the Christian is bound to observe the commandments, the Religious to fulfill his rule, and the Priest duly to celebrate and recite the Office, they are also bound to the knowledge desired for this end; and consequently, if they culpably ignore what they ought to know, they will indeed sin against such precepts enjoined upon them, but they will not be affected with a special sin by reason of that ignorance alone.

Third Conclusion. — INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE, EVEN THAT WHICH CONCERNS THE NATURAL LAW, EXCUSES FROM SIN.

This is common among the Theologians against the Recent heretics, the followers of Luther and Calvin, who teach that invincible ignorance of fact and of positive law indeed excuses from sin; but not so invincible ignorance of the natural law.

But the conclusion is proved by as many as have fought most keenly against the Innovators, most especially Antonius Deschamps, lib. 3 De Haeresi Ianseniana, disp. 1; Martinonus in Antiiansenio, disp. 18; and they prove it, I say, First indeed from Sacred Scripture, but most of all from John 15, where Christ, speaking of the Jews refusing to give Him the faith and veneration due to Him as Messiah and Son of God, says thus: If I had not done works which no other man hath done, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin; clearly affirming that they were to be excused from sin if they had been ignorant that He was such, and unless He had sufficiently proved by wondrous works that He was such. But if (as certain learned men of recent times rightly argue) invincible ignorance of an obligation excuses from guilt those who do not acknowledge God speaking to them personally in Christ, equal is the reason that it should excuse those who do not acknowledge Him through, as it were, another mouth, by the dictate of reason and the natural law commanding. —

Similarly St. Paul, Romans 1, says the Gentiles are therefore inexcusable because, having known God through His visible works, they glorified Him not as God, signifying that they would be excusable had they not known God at least in such a way, and had not labored under total and invincible ignorance of Him; but if such ignorance excused from guilt those who glorify not God, to whom certainly glory and adoration are due by natural law, and that most especially, equal is the reason that it should excuse concerning other things due by the same natural law.

The same truth is urged from the holy Fathers, but most of all from St. Augustine, upon whose authority the Adversaries seem chiefly to rely. This, I say, most holy Doctor, lib. 3 De libero arbitrio, cap. 19, discoursing of that ignorance which arises from Adam's sin, and which the Adversaries say is of the natural law, affirms that all that is done through it are not sins except improperly and metonymically; since indeed they are effects of original sin, just as speech is called tongue because it is made by the tongue: and writing is called hand, because it is done by the hand:

That, he says, which everyone through ignorance does not do rightly, and which, willing rightly, he cannot do, are called sins because they draw their origin from that sin of the free will of our first Parent: for that preceding sin merited these following ones. For as we call tongue, not only the member we move in our mouth while speaking, but also that which follows upon the motion of this member, namely, the form and tenor of the words; so we call sin not only that which is properly called sin, for it is committed by free will, and by one who knows: but also that which necessarily follows from its punishment.

And in the same chapter, to those murmuring and complaining of the ignorance and blindness contracted from Adam's sin, he answers with this general assertion: There is not imputed to thee as fault that thou art ignorant unwillingly, but that thou neglectest to seek what thou dost not know. And he repeats and confirms the same, lib. De Natura et Gratia, cap. 67, and lib. 1 Retractationum, cap. 9, and likewise lib. 22 Contra Faustum, cap. 17, where he teaches that the incest of drunken Loth was not guilty or imputable to him, because he did it in ignorance: but that only his drunkenness was to be blamed in him, which he knowingly admitted; and therefore he was not to be punished except so far as drunkenness deserved. — The same do all the other Fathers teach: Chrysostom, Homily 15 on the Epistle to the Romans: No one, he says, sinned ignorantly... for if they sinned ignorantly, they were surely unworthy that punishments should be given them. Likewise they reject all those testimonies by which it was proved in the first Question that sin must necessarily be voluntary, that is, committed knowingly and freely.

The conclusion is proved likewise by theological reason, First indeed: that ignorance excuses from all sin which takes away every character of voluntariness; since, as we have said, natural reason itself urges that sin is so far voluntary that it is in no way held to be sin if it be not voluntary: but invincible ignorance takes away from the act every character of voluntariness, since it removes from the intellect the cognition without which it cannot be voluntary, according to the definition received by all from Aristotle: voluntary is that which is from a knowing principle, etc.: therefore invincible ignorance is not the cause of sin, but excuses from it. — Secondly, God does not constrain man to impossibilities: but He would command impossibilities if invincible ignorance did not excuse from sin. Proof: our will, since it is a blind potency, and cannot tend toward the unknown, is held to have in its power only that which is shown it by the intellect to be done or omitted: but invincible ignorance takes away all advertence and cognition of the intellect concerning the thing to be done or omitted; and therefore that ignorance impedes the thing's being in the power of the will to be done or omitted: and consequently, if man were bound to fulfill the precepts of the natural or positive law which he invincibly ignores, he would be held to be bound to impossibilities. — Thirdly finally, the same truth is proved by dissolving the principal foundation of the Adversaries. Wherefore invincible ignorance of the natural law would be culpable, but not ignorance of positive law or of fact, because, they say, knowledge of the natural law is connatural to human nature, and naturally due to it, and all men would have been endowed with it in the state of innocence had it persevered; and therefore its ignorance is vicious, nor could it have been inflicted except in punishment of sin: otherwise is it with cognition of deeds, or of positive law, even divine; for since God's positive law hangs upon His free will, which can enact so many and such laws, at such time and place and occasion, as ... [truncated]

All ignorance of those things which one is bound to know is sin; because it fights against the law by which one is commanded to know it: whether thou canst already know it, or whether thou canst not. That thou now canst not, was brought about by Adam's sin, which is also thine, because in it all have sinned. Wherefore the Scholastics err, when they excuse such ignorance, which they call invincible, from sin because it is invincible, as they speak:

Although we can also demonstrate that it is not simply invincible, since it has followed upon Adam's voluntary sin. — But this argument is null; first, for it is false that is said, that invincible ignorance of the natural law does not excuse from sin, because it is a punishment of original sin; for from that it would follow that madness, fury, and frenzy would not excuse from sin, because these too are punishments of sin, as the Adversaries concede. Similarly it would follow that a man blind from birth, who through that blindness committed something amiss — suppose he killed an infant while striving to drive off a barking dog — would not be excused from sin, because the blindness which he could plead is a punishment of sin: which certainly no one of sound mind can admit. Equally false is what they say, that ignorance of positive law excuses from sin because it was not inflicted in punishment of sin; for ignorance of the Gospel in infidels, e.g., who have heard nothing of Christ, is a punishment of original sin: and the same ignorance is ignorance of divine positive law, as the Adversaries concede. Ergo ignorance of divine positive law is a punishment of original sin. The major is proved: every effect of reprobation, according to the opinion of the Adversaries, proceeds from the judgment of God punishing and reproving on account of original sin: yet ignorance of the Gospel in infidels is an effect of reprobation; because, they say, it is the dereliction or desertion by which God has not mercy upon them: ergo ignorance of the Gospel in infidels, according to the opinion of the Adversaries, proceeds from the judgment of God punishing and reproving them on account of original sin: and consequently it is a punishment of original sin; and straightway false is what they bring forth, namely, that ignorance of positive law is not culpable, because it is not inflicted in punishment of original sin.

The Adversaries object: various texts of Sacred Scripture, by which they strive to prove that certain deeds done from invincible ignorance are called and held sins: thus Gen. 20, the act of King Abimelech taking Sara in marriage, whom he invincibly ignored to be the wife of Abraham, is called sin. And 1 Kings 14, Jonathan is condemned to death because he had tasted honey contrary to the command of his father unknown to himself. And Luke 12, it is said that the servant who knows not the will of his lord, and does not do it, shall be beaten with few stripes, in comparison with him who knowing the will did it not. And Acts 3, St. Peter reprehends the Jews because they had killed the Author of life: although they did this ignorantly; For if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory, says the Apostle, 1 ad Corinthians 2. Ergo truly invincible ignorance of the natural law must be held culpable. —

I deny the consequence, for nearly all those texts signify ignorance either of fact, or of positive law, which the Adversaries concede excuses from sin; for in the first text the discourse is of the ignorance of Abimelech, who did not know Sara to be the wife of Abraham, which certainly was ignorance of fact. To the condemnation of Jonathan I say it was unjust; for Saul sinned in establishing that precept of so severe a fast under threat of death, but Jonathan did not sin in tasting a little honey in grave necessity, especially since he ignored his father's precept: which even if he had known, nevertheless his fault would have been slight or none, on account of the smallness of the matter, and the grave necessity of eating by which he was pressed, his strength already failing through weariness. Nor does it matter that God, as the same chapter relates, was unwilling to answer as if angry on account of the deed of Jonathan: for God willed by this silence to have Jonathan sought out and betrayed, that he might by openly disclosing to all his ignorance of the precept excuse himself, lest God or Saul seem accepters of persons. Add that that ignorance was of the law laid down by Saul, not of the natural law. As to the third, I say the discourse there is of a servant not wholly ignorant of the precept of his lord, but not equally knowing it, and not sinning from certain science and full advertence; and therefore sinning from vincible ignorance. To the last, I say its sense is that if the Jews had believed in Christ, and had fully acknowledged His Divinity, they would not have committed so great a crime: but their ignorance of this was not invincible, but vincible, and affected and voluntary, as is evident from that John 15: If I had not done works in them which no other man hath done, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin.

They object 2. St. Augustine contends keenly against the Pelagians that ignorance is evil, and that things done from it are sins: but he is not speaking of vincible ignorance: since he says the Pelagians often confess that vincible ignorance does not excuse from sin: much less does he treat of invincible ignorance of fact, or of positive law; since elsewhere he teaches that such invincible ignorance wipes away all guilt: therefore St. Augustine must be understood to speak only of ignorance of the natural law whenever he contends keenly against the Pelagians. They prove the major from texts of St. Augustine, most of all from Epistle 15 to Sixtus, where after he had premised: Human pride, as presuming upon the powers of free will, thinks itself excused when it is of ignorance, not of will, that it sins: finally concerning ignorance whether voluntary or necessary, that is, whether vincible or invincible, he concludes thus: wherefore every sinner is inexcusable, either by the guilt of origin, or by the addition also of his own will, whether he knows, or whether he knows not, whether he judges, or whether he judges not: because ignorance itself, in those who would not understand, is without doubt sin; in those however who could not, it is the punishment of sin: therefore in both there is not a just excuse, but a just damnation. Behold, he says every sinner is inexcusable, and his damnation just, whether he sinned because he would not know what the law commands, or because he could not know. They confirm 1. from the fact that the Synod of Palestine condemned this proposition of Caelestius, Oblivion and ignorance do not lie under sin, because they happen not according to will, but according to necessity. But Caelestius, they say, spoke of ignorance of the natural law alone: therefore the Synod holds that ignorance culpable.

They confirm 2. from the fact that St. Jerome, who wrote after that Synod the Dialogue between the Catholic under the name of Atticus, and the Pelagian under the name of Critobulus, confirms by many texts of Scripture the condemnation of that proposition of Caelestius, as legitimately done by the Council; and Critobulus asking whether by this men seemed to accuse human nature, and to cast envy upon God because He fashioned men such that they cannot be free from the sin of oblivion and ignorance, Atticus replies nothing else than that it is written: Seek not the things that are higher than thee, etc., and O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! By which he signifies that the discourse there is of ignorance of the natural law. —

I answer first, that from all these nothing whatever can be gathered against the truth of the Conclusion. For in order that anything might press, it would be necessary to demonstrate: First, that the Pelagians had spoken only of invincible ignorance. Secondly, since invincible ignorance can be threefold, one of fact, another of positive law, a third of natural law, it would be needful also to demonstrate that Pelagius had spoken only of ignorance of the natural law. But neither of these can be gathered, neither from St. Augustine, nor from St. Jerome, nor from the Synod of Palestine. Not indeed from St. Augustine, since he affirms generally against the Pelagians that all ignorance is evil, even ignorance of fact and of positive law, which he luminously teaches lib. 3 Contra Iulianum, c. 19, where, accusing him because he said that ignorance is justice, and proving it by the example of Abimelech to whom God said, I knew that thou didst this with a simple mind: thus does St. Augustine carp at him: Thou attendest not, O man, who seest not that by divine judgment anyone can be chastised not for his own, but for others' sins, how it could have come about that Abimelech sinned, although neither did he sin with adulterous heart, and God held his sin however small in the women pertaining to him. St. Augustine therefore holds that ignorance of fact, such as was that ignorance of Abimelech, even appears evil; since he calls it sin however small; and therefore it is false that St. Augustine said only invincible ignorance of the natural law is evil.

Then St. Augustine says that ignorance is evil which the Pelagians said were the beginnings, not punishments, of nature: but they affirmed this of all invincible ignorance, both of positive law and of natural law. For the Pelagians wished that ignorance and concupiscence were not the punishment of sin, but the beginnings of nature: as St. Augustine testifies, lib. De Dono perseverantiae, cap. 11. They say, he says, the Pelagians that ignorance and difficulty (that is, concupiscence), without which no man is born, are the beginnings, not punishments, of nature. Nay more, they asserted that perfect ignorance, that is, total and invincible, is good, and is called justice: as is to be seen concerning Julian in Augustine, lib. 3 Contra eundem, cap. 19, who to prove this adduced that Gen. 20: Lord, wilt thou kill a just and ignorant nation? And a little after, verse 6: I know that thou didst it in the simplicity of thy heart, and therefore did I keep thee, that thou shouldst not sin against me. And he added: from this it must be understood that perfect ignorance is named justice: because God said to Abimelech, who was about to lie with Sara, ignorant that she was the wife of another: And I knew that thou didst it with a simple mind. Which senseless opinion Augustine refutes both in the same book and in many other places, proving that ignorance and concupiscence are evil because they are appendices of original sin. Nor was he affirming this of ignorance of the natural law alone, seen in adults, but of that ignorance also with which a little child fresh from his mother's womb is overwhelmed: Not knowing where he is, what is done, by whom created, from whom he came, already guilty of offense, not yet capable of precept, wrapped and pressed in so deep a darkness of ignorance that at length he cannot even be roused from sleep, etc. Thus does he describe the ignorance of infants in the lib. De peccatorum meritis, cap. 36, and thus proves it to be the punishment of sin: If it is the nature of man thus to begin, and that nature is no longer vicious: why was not Adam created such? Why was he capable of precept? Therefore St. Augustine does not will, as the Adversaries contend, ig... [truncated]

To the confirmations I say, that the proposition condemned in the Synod of Palestine was general, and comprehended all invincible ignorance, both of fact or of positive law, and of natural law; and therefore if that condemnation presses anything, it militates even against the Adversaries themselves; since they will that invincible ignorance of positive law and of fact is not culpable. Which Antonius Deschamps subtly proves in the book praised above, cap. 2, from the very assertion of the Adversaries; for they affirm, he says, that those words of Caelestius were condemned in that sense which they set forth, because they were not discussed by the Bishops with more accurate examination, but as soon as they were proposed together with others of the same sort, without awaiting even Pelagius' response, the Bishops cried out: This the holy Synod rejects, and the holy Catholic Church of God. Therefore since that sentence of Caelestius speaks universally of every ignorance whatsoever which happens according to necessity, whether it be of fact or of law, it was proscribed also in this sense. —

It is confirmed: if the Fathers of the Synod of Palestine condemned Caelestius' proposition only insofar as it regarded ignorance of the natural law, why do they not note this? Why does St. Augustine, who described the acts of that Synod so as diligently and lucidly to explain each of the frauds of Pelagius by which he mocked the visiting Bishops — why, I say, does he not warn even by a word that Caelestius' proposition is true and Catholic if the discourse be of ignorance of fact or of positive law, but false and heretical if it speaks of ignorance of the natural law? Why finally is that sentence proscribed universally, which, since it has a threefold sense, is true in two, and false only in one? I add that it seems more probable that the Council proscribed rather ignorance of fact and of positive law than of natural law, as is evident both from its own words: for it adds, Since in the Law sacrifices are offered for ignorance as for sin: then from St. Jerome, lib. 1 Dialog. adversus Pelagianos, where, convicting the false dogma of Pelagius, and confirming the sentence of the Synod of Palestine by many testimonies of Scripture, he brings forth almost none other than those which speak of ignorance of fact or of positive law: as that Num. 35, verse 22, where he who kills by chance — suppose one who kills a man believing him to be a beast (which is ignorance of fact) — is commanded to flee to the Cities of Refuge, and there to abide until the High Priest die. And that Levit. 5, verse 2, where he who touches anything unclean which it is not lawful to touch, and it be done to him through ignorance (namely not knowing it to be unclean, which ignorance is of fact, or ignorant of the positive law against touching) and afterward learns of it, shall declare his sin, in which he perceives himself to have sinned. And what he adds from Levit. c. 22, that concerning similar ignorance it is plainly to be understood, if a man eat of the sanctified things through ignorance, iniquity and trespass are imputed to him. And from 1 Kings 12 he adduces to the same end what is said of Jonathan, where the discourse is of ignorance of positive law, namely of the royal precept. Ergo the Synod of Palestine... [truncated]

But invincible ignorance is called sin by Augustine, by the Synod, and by Jerome, not because it is sin properly so called, but in that manner namely in which concupiscence is called sin by the Apostle: namely because concupiscence as well as ignorance are effects of original sin, and lead to sin: but they do not hold that ignorance to be sin as though it were imputed to fault; for St. Augustine confesses that even that ignorance perseveres in the baptized, lib. 16 Contra Iulian., c. 16, speaking of one baptized: He is devoid of every sin, not of every evil. Which is put more plainly thus: He is devoid of every guilt of all evils, not of all evils... Does he lack the evil of ignorance, through which innumerable evils are perpetrated by those who know not? He adds: or is ignorance a small evil, through which man perceiveth not the things that are of the Spirit of God? speaking of course of the baptized, of whom the Apostle said: The sensual man perceiveth not the things that are of the Spirit of God: for it is foolishness unto him. Then he concludes: therefore they had not lacked so great an evil of ignorance in the laver of regeneration, where nevertheless they had without doubt lacked all sins. From which it is evident that the ignorance of which Augustine speaks is not held to be sin properly so called, as the Adversaries wish, since it is not washed away by baptism.