Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

Although sin, considered formally, is a pure and bare privation, and therefore has neither species nor any form by reason of which it could be distinguished, and one sin be per se severed from another; nevertheless the Theologians assign various species of sin, according to its various consideration.

First, then, sin by reason of the principle from which it flows as from a vitiated fountain is distributed into original and personal. Original is that which is committed by another's will through natural propagation of communion in Pasch. Hence against the preceptive law one sins by omission of the act enjoined; against the prohibitive law one sins by commission of the act forbidden. For, says St. Augustine, book De perfectione Iustitiae, chapter 3, Sin is acknowledged to exist in two ways: either those things are done which are forbidden, or those things are not done which are commanded. Of this division into commission and omission St. Augustine, among others, makes mention, q. 20. in Levit., expounding that word of Leviticus 7: As a sacrifice is offered for sin, so also for a trespass. There he holds that by "sin" commission is to be understood; by "trespass," omission. For as, he says, in the praiseworthy rite it is one thing to decline from evil, and another to do the good to which we are admonished, Scripture saying: Decline from evil, and do good: so in the damnable it is one thing to decline from good, and another to do evil: and that is the trespass, this the sin. For what else does "trespass" signify but a thing forsaken? — Fifth, by reason of the affection and object, into carnal and spiritual: which division the Apostle indicates, 2. ad Corinth. 7. Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit. Those sins are called carnal which are committed about sensible objects, and have attached a delectation of flesh and sense; thus gluttony and luxury are called carnal sins, because they are consummated in the delectation of foods and venereal acts. Spiritual, however, are those which are occupied about spiritual objects, and have attached a spiritual delectation: thus pride, envy, and the like, which are consummated in the mere apprehension of some thing desired beyond measure and prescription, or possessed to one's wish. Hence St. Gregory, book 31. Moral. chapter 31, teaches that of the seven capital sins two are chiefly carnal, namely gluttony and luxury; the other five, however, spiritual. Carnal sins have more of conversion to the creature than of aversion from God; spiritual sins, on the contrary, more of aversion than of conversion: whence these are graver as regards guilt, those greater as regards adherence; or, as St. Gregory says, carnal sins are of less guilt and of greater infamy: because carnal sins have less attached reason and discourse and light, and less deliberation and liberty, forasmuch as they are about the delectations of touch and taste, which are common to us and to brutes. Hence by carnal sins man is made like to brutes; but by spiritual sins he becomes like to the devil. — Sixth, the division of sin is made by reason of the object into those sins which are committed against God, neighbor, and self: for sin is an inordinate act dissolving the order established by divine Providence: but a threefold order is chiefly distinguished in man: one indeed by comparison to God, whom he ought in all things to obey, and to whose divine law, as the supreme rule of his actions, he ought to be conformed; another by comparison to the rule of reason, inasmuch as all actions and motions both of mind and of body ought to be elicited according to the dictate of reason. Finally, since man is a political animal and capable of society, he has a third order toward those men with whom he ought to live and converse. Hence when man departs from the first order, and withdraws the love and service due to God, he is said to sin against God, as the sacrilegious, the heretic, the blasphemer, etc.; when he exorbitates from the second order, and follows not the dictate of reason, he is said to sin against himself, as the avaricious, the gluttonous, the luxurious, etc.; but when he falls short of the third order, and offends human society which he is naturally bound to preserve, then he is said to sin against his neighbor, as thieves, homicides, adulterers. — The seventh division is made by reason of the faculties from which sins proceed, into sins of the mouth, of the heart, and of deed. Which division can be regarded in two ways; namely either by reason of the faculty eliciting the act, or by reason of the degree of the same sin. In the first manner, sin of the heart is called that which by its nature is consummated in the heart; as heresy, despair, hatred. Sin of the mouth, that which is consummated in the mouth, as detraction, perjury, blasphemy. Finally, sin of deed, that which is consummated in the deed, as theft, homicide, etc. Secondly, that three degrees of the same sin may be distinguished, which is consummated in the deed, v. g. in the first there is consent in the heart, then incentive words in the mouth, finally the dishonest deed: which are parts integrating one morally complete act; for otherwise it is only inchoate and incomplete; or, as St. Gregory says, book 4. Moral., chapter 27, in another way those degrees of sins are distinguished; for sin, he says, is conceived by suggestion, nursed by delectation, consummated by consent: suggestion is made by the adversary, delectation by the flesh, consent by the spirit. — The eighth division, by reason of the manner in which one sins, is made into sin from ignorance, from passion or infirmity, and from malice. Sin from ignorance is called that which proceeds from culpable and vincible ignorance, and therefore leaving sufficient voluntariness for the ratio of sin; for invincible ignorance, since it altogether removes the ratio of voluntariness, also excuses from sin, whether it be of fact or of natural law; since, as St. Augustine says, book De libero arbitrio, chapter 19, That which you know against your will is not imputed to you as guilt, but that you neglect to seek what you know not. Sin from infirmity or passion is called that which proceeds from some grave temptation, and motion of the sensitive appetite drawing the will to consent, and therefore diminishing the voluntariness of liberty; as when one sins from the agitation of anger, of grave sadness, or of motions of concupiscence. Sin from malice is called that which is perpetrated without such ignorance or passion, and therefore from perfect liberty. Hence sin from malice obtains the gravest place, from passion the less, from ignorance truly the least. Or, as St. Gregory says, book 15. Moral., chapter 16, Graver indeed through infirmity than through ignorance, but far graver through study than through infirmity is one lost. — Although however every sin is generally against God thrice-one [trinum et unum], nevertheless appropriately certain sins are said to be against the Father, others against the Son, others against the Holy Spirit: for, says St. Bonaventure in the Centiloquium 1. p. sect. 25, Against the Father, to whom power is attributed, one is said to sin, when one sins from infirmity: against the Son, to whom Wisdom is attributed, who sins from ignorance: against the Holy Spirit, to whom Goodness is attributed, who sins by reason of the subject sin is divided into proper and alien: proper is called that which is committed by the sinner himself; alien truly that which, though perpetrated by another, is nevertheless imputed to us by reason of counsel, prescription, persuasion, flattery, protection, or on account of the defect of fraternal correction.

These things thus premised, three things chiefly occur here in the Question to be resolved: First, what is habitual sin. Second, what is sin of commission and omission. Third, what is venial sin, and how it is distinguished from mortal. That these may be the more easily resolved and made apparent, it pleases to propose this Question distributed under divers Paragraphs, with as many titles and conclusions.

§ I. IN WHICH IS SITUATED THE FORMAL RATIO OF HABITUAL SIN.

IT MUST BE NOTED that from past actual sin there remains in the soul of the sinner a certain stain, by reason of which the sinner is said to be defiled, unclean, unseen of God, and odious, as sacred Scripture signifies in many places; thus Eccli. 31. Blessed is the man who is not found without stain. Jerem. 2. Thou art stained in thy iniquity before me. Ezech. 36. I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your defilements; and often elsewhere. Similarly Scripture frequently asserts that, actual sin having passed, man is still denominated a sinner, and remains in the state of sin, until it be forgiven him, as Rom. 5. When as yet we were sinners, and elsewhere most frequently. And Trent, session 6. chapter 7. teaches, that in justification man is made from unjust just, and from enemy friend.

Now that by which, actual sin having passed, man is denominated a sinner, is rightly called the stain of sin, in similitude namely of the stain found in bodily things: for as a body is said to be stained, when from the contact and commixture of another it not only loses its native first splendor or luster, but is also defiled and polluted with a certain foulness; so the soul contracts a spiritual stain, while adhering to a creature by the inordinate affection of the will, which is as it were a certain touch of the soul, it loses the luster and splendor which it obtained from the presence of sanctifying grace. For the soul, says St. Augustine, midway between God and creatures, by conversion to God is illuminated, bettered, and perfected: but by conversion to creatures, is darkened, worsened, and corrupted. Now this stain remains in man so long as sin has not been remitted, nor the pristine splendor of the soul restored by the infusion of sanctifying grace. Whence this stain stands in the manner of a habit, and signifies the same among Theologians as habitual sin; yet with this difference, that habitual sin more clearly designates man offended of God and ungrateful; but the stain better expresses him himself as polluted and unclean before God. In what, however, the ratio of this stain, or of habitual sin, is to be placed, the Authors do not agree among themselves; but what has seemed truer in so doubtful and various a sentiment of the Authors will be made plain below.

First Conclusion. — The formal ratio of habitual sin does not consist in the privation of the luster of sanctifying grace, nor in the sole reatus of punishment, or destination of the sinning man to punishment: but it is the very past actual sin morally persevering in the will of the sinner, by reason of which he is deprived of grace and ordered to punishment, until the sin be washed away and forgiven. This Conclusion consists of three parts: the First of which the Doctor proves in 4. d. 1t. q. 1. n. 3. where he first subtly premonishes, namely that there is a twofold justice: habitual, he says, namely grace and charity; and actual, namely the rectitude born to inhere in the elicited act, because the act is born to be elicited conformably to its rule, and in that conformity its rectitude consists: so, since opposites are said in as many ways, there will be a twofold injustice: habitual, namely the privation of grace in him in whom it ought to inhere, and actual, namely the privation of that rectitude in the act in which it ought to inhere. But after the intrinsec and extrinsec act passing away, there remains a certain habitual injustice. » These things premised, he proves that the ratio of that habitual sin is not to be placed in the sole privation of grace: otherwise, he says, he who had committed two mortal sins, and he who one, would be equally sinners intensive and extensive: because in them there is as much grace as to intension, and the sole itself is deprived as to extension, as much in him who committed one, as in him who two thousand: and therefore one is not said less a sinner after the passing act than another. The antecedent is proved: Because in every mortal sin the privation of grace is so made that nothing of it remains, and consequently by no succeeding sin can that privation be made more intense, nor more extensive, speaking of privation so habitual: because it deprives only one habit; as it is not born to inhere except as sole [unicus]. » Thus the Doctor: by which he openly demonstrates that habitual sin does not consist in the sole privation of grace; for thence it would follow that he who admitted more sins, after the first sin, would contract no iniquity and malice; since he would not incur a new privation of grace; for grace by the first sin is altogether supposed extinct; and therefore no privation of it can be induced by subsequent sins.

— Second, venial sin also leaves after itself a certain stain; and therefore can have even the ratio of habitual sin: and yet it does not deprive of grace, neither wholly nor in part: and therefore the ratio of habitual sin does not consist in the very privation of grace. The minor is plain, because venial sin is opposed to grace neither formally, nor effectively, nor meritoriously, as I suppose from what is to be said and from the common sentiment of Theologians: and consequently it does not induce a privation of grace. The major also stands: for venial sin remains habitually until it be remitted; for it is subjected to the sacrament of Penance through confession, and other remedies instituted by Christ the Lord: and of it that is true which is said 1 John 3. The blood of Christ cleanseth us from all sin: and that of Ephesians 5. Lutans it with the washing of water in the word of life, that he might present to himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle: and consequently habitual sin, at least taken generally, inasmuch as it embraces both mortal and venial, is not formally a privation of grace. — Third, there can be a persevering privation of grace without any sin whatsoever: therefore in it is not to be placed the formal ratio of persevering sin. The antecedent is plain; both because in the state of pure nature there would be sin, and the stain of sin; and yet in that state there would be no privation of grace, inasmuch as that state is nowise ordered to supernatural being; and because, speaking absolutely, there could be mortal sin and yet grace not destroyed, as I suppose from what is said in the Treatise on Penance, because mortal sin being admitted God is not absolutely necessitated to take away grace from him who sins: nor is grace otherwise taken away by the sole evil act, or by the omission of an act of precept, than because God, on whom it physically depends, ceases to conserve it: and therefore if God did not cease to conserve it, grace would subsist with sin not forgiven; and conversely sin could be forgiven, and therefore its stain blotted out without any restitution of grace: consequently sin does not consist in its [grace's] privation: finally because one could have the due of having grace, and conserving it for one year only, and within that year sin mortally: but the year elapsed, the due of having grace would cease, and consequently the privation of grace would cease, and yet for all that habitual mortal sin would not cease until it were remitted: therefore habitual mortal sin is not the very privation of grace. The supposition laid down in the major is plain; for it does not imply God ordering anyone to sanctifying grace within some time beyond which he would not will to conserve it, whether meanwhile that man sin or not, nor further ordering him to that grace.

The second part also is proved, namely that habitual sin formally does not consist in the sole ordination to punishment: both because the ordination to punishment comes from the divine will, and therefore is not morally evil, nor offends God: but habitual sin is neither from God, nor a thing morally good, but is a certain turpitude and offense of God: therefore it is not to be placed in the sole ordination to punishment: and because it often happens that the sinner is efficaciously and absolutely ordered to undergoing temporal punishment, even the mortal and venial sin being remitted, as is evinced by very many texts of sacred Scripture; and the Council of Trent teaches, session 11. chapter 8. Therefore in that ordination to punishment does not consist the formal ratio of persevering and habitual sin. The consequence is plain, because the sin being remitted through contrition, or through the Sacrament, there usually remains in man, though justified and cleansed from all guilt, an obligation and ordination to some punishment, to be paid either in this life or in Purgatory: therefore etc. Finally because even if God had ordained no punishment, man could sin, and would remain and persevere in the state of sin and of the contracted stain, until it were remitted; but in that hypothesis he would not be ordered to punishment, consequently habitual sin does not consist in that ordination to punishment.

Finally the third part is proved, namely that habitual sin is nothing else than the very actual sin morally persevering, until it be remitted, or a condign satisfaction be exhibited and accepted. Both because besides that past sin so morally permanent nothing apter and more convenient can be assigned whereby man may be esteemed and denominated a sinner: therefore the formal ratio of habitual sin is truly held to be placed in it. The antecedent is plain from the disproof of the other sentiments: the consequence also is evident: for as from an act existing man is denominated an actual sinner; so from the same morally and habitually persevering he ought to be denominated a sinner by habit, or reatus. And because if anything stood in the way of the formal ratio of sin being placed in actual sin morally persevering, chiefly this, that the act physically passes away, and therefore cannot morally persevere: but this reason is none. Which I thus prove: for although many human acts do not physically subsist any longer, nevertheless they persevere morally in order, either to some denomination, or to obligation and moral effects, as is plain in contracts, which persevere so long as they are not dissolved; likewise in vows, which subsist until they be either fulfilled or relaxed by dispensation, even should the man repent of the beginning of the contract, or of the vow elicited, or however much he revoke and retract the very act by a contrary will. The same holds in the offense and injury inflicted upon another man; for although this has physically vanished, nevertheless it so long morally remains, until either full satisfaction be made, or the injury be gratuitously remitted: therefore similarly the offense of God is held to remain habitually in order to staining the soul and conferring the denomination of sinner, until God forgive the offense, or liberally accept satisfaction: therefore the whole deformity of habitual sin consists in the past act morally persevering in order to the hatred and aversion of God, grave or light, from which follows the ordination to the punishment to be undergone. Finally because this very thing St. August. teaches, book 1. De Nuptiis et Concup. c. 26. where he thus says: This is not to have sin, not to be guilty of sin: for if anyone v. g. commit adultery, even though he never do it thereafter, he is guilty of adultery until his reatus be remitted. He has therefore sin, although that which he committed no longer is, because with the time in which it was done it has passed away. For if to desist from sin were this, not to have it? They remain if they are past, except that they have passed away in act; they remain however in reatus? That is, as he explains book 6. Ad Iulianum, chapter 19, They remain in memory, under the hidden laws of God, which are written after a manner in the minds of Angels, that no iniquity go unpunished except that which the blood of the Mediator shall have expiated.

You will say 1. This sentiment openly contradicts the Subtle Doctor: therefore it is less rightly assigned and proved by us. The antecedent is plain from the passage above cited by us num. 6. where, having impugned the sentiment of St. Thomas affirming habitual sin to consist in the privation of grace, and that of the Master of the Sentences constituting it in the dissimilitude of the soul to God which remains from actual sin, he concludes: There is not therefore anything absolute, or relative positive, or privative there, whence the sinner is called sinner from the time of the cessation of the act until penance: but only a certain relation of reason inasmuch as it is the object of the intellect or will of God: because after he has committed it, the will of God orders him to the punishment corresponding to the sin: and then the intellect foreknows it, and for every time, until the due punishment be paid. And he confirms this both by the authorities of St. August. and from the fact that after meritorious acts which did not augment grace, there remains in the justified only a relation of reason, inasmuch namely as he is ordered through the divine will to such or such glory on account of those merits: therefore the Subtle Doctor holds habitual sin to consist in the sole ordination to punishment.

I deny the antecedent: for although this may seem the sentiment of many disciples of the Subtle Doctor, nevertheless, as the most learned of his scholiasts, Cavellus, rightly admonishes, such was not the mind of the Subtle Doctor himself; he does indeed will that nothing medium be given between the act of sin and the obligation to punishment, whereby one is called a sinner; yet he does not say that relation to be habitual sin: nay rather he holds it itself to be the past act remaining virtually and morally, as is to be gathered from what he brings forth both here and elsewhere; for in the passage soon cited n. 5. he infers it absurd that a real relation should be that whereby one is a sinner, because this relation would be from God: but a real relation to punishment would also be from God: therefore he does not hold habitual sin to be formally placed in it. Moreover dist. 21. q. 1. he says: According to the holy Fathers the remission of guilt is distinguished from the remission of punishment. Therefore he distinguishes the persevering reatus of guilt from the obligation to punishment. Moreover in the same place he takes habitual sin and unremitted mortal sin for the same. Therefore when here he says habitual sin consists in the relation to punishment, he is to be understood not formally but effectively; so that his mind was that the ratio of habitual sin is not to be formally placed in the very ordination to punishment, but only that this ordination proceeds from the very sinful act morally persevering.

You will say 2: Habitual sin is the effect of actual sin: therefore it is not the very actual sin morally persevering; for nothing is the effect of itself. — I answer, habitual sin can be considered in two ways, namely either physically, according to the real inclination which man, repeating sins, contracts toward committing others more easily and proneously, in that manner namely in which habits are generated through repeated acts; or morally, and under the formal ratio of sin, inasmuch namely as it is a certain stain in the soul persevering after the admitted actual sin. These things premised, I distinguish the antecedent; habitual sin considered physically is the effect of actual sin, I concede; for a vicious habit is generated only through vicious acts: considered morally is the effect of actual sin, I deny: for thus it is the very actual sin persevering, until it be altogether forgiven of God.

You will say 3: If habitual sin were the very actual sin unforgiven, it would follow that for God to forgive sin would be to will efficaciously that that sin be forgiven, and therefore that divine forgiveness would have itself for object, which is ridiculous. — I answer, the object of forgiveness is not the very forgiveness itself; but that right which God had of hating and punishing the sinner, which right indeed God relaxes when He remits the sin, and consequently brings it about that that sin no longer morally remains, nor does God have any longer the right and occasion of hating and punishing the very sinner: for as the act of the divine will, whereby God rationally hated the sinner and decreed to punish him, had for object the right to that hatred, and likewise to the punishment rationally to be inflicted: so the efficacious will of not retaining, or that forgiveness of sin, has for object the same right, to relax it; for diverse acts of the will can be occupied about the same thing, willing and nilling.

§ II. — WHETHER SIN OF OMISSION CAN BE WITHOUT ANY POSITIVE ACT OF THE WILL.

IT MUST BE NOTED that it is evident from the preceding Question that sin of commission is an act of free will elicited against the precept of law: but there remains a great difficulty to be solved concerning sin of omission; namely whether it has some act joined to it, by reason of which the omission of the will is held sinful. It is certain indeed that no culpable omission is given without some positive act of the intellect; for omission cannot be culpable unless it be voluntary, nor voluntary without cognition: for voluntary is that which proceeds from a principle freely with cognition: yet that cognition is not held to be the cause of omission, nay rather it often recalls from it, putatively when the intellect dictates to the will that it is fitting to hear Mass on Sunday, and make the annual confession, that satisfaction be made to the prescriptions of the Church. Whether however for that culpable omission there is required also some act of the will, whereby namely man positively wills to omit the prescribed act: or whether culpable omission can be given altogether without every act of the will, is variously controverted among Theologians: but what seems to us truer to be said, will open

Second Conclusion. — It is more probable that sin of culpable omission can come to be without any positive act of the will which should be its cause.

It is proved first: to sin by sin of omission is not to posit the due act: but the will can freely not posit the due act without exercising any positive act, but only foreseeing that it ought to exercise that act: therefore also it can sin by sin of omission without utterly any positive act which should be the cause of that omission. The major stands.

But the minor is plain from Aristotle 5. Ethic. chapter 3. teaching that not to act is no less in the power of the will than to act, since each depends upon its liberty: therefore since for contracting the malice of sin there is not required a positive act whereby that malice be intended, but it suffices that it be foreseen, and foreseen not be impeded, the will will also be able without any contradiction culpably to omit the due act, exercising no positive act, but only foreseeing the obligation of the instant precept, and then ceasing from every act.

Then, the will, with precedent cognition necessary for operating freely, and all else prerequisite for acting, is free to operate or not operate, both per se and through another inferior power subordinated to it: therefore it can abstain from every act, both its own and of another power; and consequently just as under urgency of the precept of loving God v. g. or honoring parents, it can love and honor them without any precedent act whereby it wills this; otherwise there would have to be a process into infinity in acts of the will, if it could not will without another precedent act of volition: so similarly it can without any elicited act cease from every act of love or honor, in which it will sin by not positing the due act.

Finally, if it could not omit the due act without some positive elicited act; this chiefly either because that act of the will is free, or because it is sinful, or because such a positively elicited act would necessarily be prerequired from elsewhere: but from neither head can the necessity of that elicited act be claimed. Not indeed from the ratio of sin: for it is manifest that sin comes to be as often as something is omitted which can be done and ought to be done: and therefore that omission of the due act will always be sinful, whether it presuppose a positive act or not. Nor does it arise from the ratio of the voluntary and free; for in order that something be voluntary and free, it is not necessary that the will operate about it; but it suffices that it be in the power of the will to do or not do a thing: therefore as the first willing can be free and voluntary without every other act, so also the not-willing, or abstaining from every act of willing, can be voluntary and free, without every other act; and consequently omission can be voluntary and free, without utterly any positive act. — It is confirmed, every free act ought to be in the power and dominion of the will: but if free omission cannot be given without every presupposed act, no act will be in the power and dominion of the will: therefore if pure free omission cannot be given, no act will be free. The major is certain; otherwise there would be no discrimination between necessary and free causes. But the minor is proved: if pure free omission cannot be given without every act, no act will be in the power of the will so as to be or not be, because that act is in the power and dominion of the will which it can posse or not posse at its arbitrament; for the digestion of food taken is not in the power of the will, because after the food is taken, will it or nil it, the food is digested: likewise when sound is made and the ears open, the hearing of the sound is not in our dominion, for we can indeed hear, but we cannot not hear: but if the will cannot omit any act except by positing another imperant act, whereby the omitted act be impeded, there will be utterly no act which the will can posse and not posse at its arbitrament, because if we have power and dominion actual over one act through another imperant act, I ask, whether we have dominion over the very imperant act per se alone? if we have over it per se alone, and without another act; therefore some act is given which we can freely omit and suspend without another act: if we have it not per se and immediately: therefore we have it through a third act, and over the third through a fourth imperant, and so into infinity. But it implies us to have dominion over something through that over which we have no dominion, whereas necessarily there must be given something over which per se and by reason of itself we have dominion: therefore it implies that we have through some act actual dominion over one act over which per se and by reason of itself we have no dominion: therefore either necessarily our acts are not in our power, which is to deny liberty, or it must be confessed that we have the power of positing and not positing free acts per se and by reason of themselves, and without another act.

You will say 1: By experiment it has been found that there is no omission of the due act, whether interior or exterior, without some act which be the cause or occasion of it: therefore it is false that pure omission can be given utterly without another positive act. The antecedent is plain: first indeed concerning the omission of what is precepted, v. g. of hearing Mass, unless man either will expressly to omit that assistance, or voluntarily do something whereby he is impeded and recalled from hearing mass; for therefore someone does not hear Mass on a holy day either because he writes, or walks, or executes something else, nor can any external omission be assigned whose cause was not some exterior occupation, or some act which conflicts with the observation of the precept. The same must be said of the omission of an interior act; for therefore the will omits to elicit the due act because it is detained by another act; for it is always occupied in the love of some object; as the intellect in the cognition of some object. — I answer to the first; with Martinus and the other assertors of our sentiment, that omission of an act, or quasi-external act indeed cannot be given without another act or quasi-external act; yet that it can proceed from the will through the pure omission of an internal act; for if anyone v. g. sit at home already long, or study, he can, the time of hearing the Sacred pressing, omit hearing the Sacred by this alone, that he have no will of leaving that place or study; nor is it necessary that the will here and now positively will to sit or study, but it suffices that it not will to command the external powers the motion and egress necessary for the execution of the precept. To the second I say it is false that the will is always detained in the actual love of some object; and although it should so happen, thence it would not follow that that love is necessarily the cause of the omission; for it is not necessary that the will not will, or not love one object, because it is occupied in the love of another: but from its mere liberty it can omit the love of any sufficiently proposed object; for the reason of not doing something can be other than the lovableness of some other object, v. g. the irksomeness of the enjoined work, the difficulty of going to the Sacred in rainy season, etc.

They object 2. Sin cannot be given without the exercise of liberty: but liberty cannot be exercised through the pure omission of an act: therefore pure omission, excluding whatever act of the will preceding or concomitant, cannot be sin. The major is plain. The minor is proved: the exercise of the will, as free, ought to be vital: for the will, as free, is a vital power: therefore its exercise as free is an exercise of life, and consequently vital: but pure omission and negation of act cannot be vital; for to live in second act is to move oneself from within [ab intrinseco], but the will does not move itself through negation of action and motion, and therefore the pure omission of an act is not an act of life: therefore liberty cannot be exercised through pure omission and negation of act. — I deny the minor, and to its proof I say, for life in second act no positive motion is required, but the voluntary negation of motion suffices, whereby namely, all things prerequisite for acting being posited, namely sufficient cognition of the precept obliging to the act, and likewise the others desired for operating, the will at its arbitrament purely does not will that which it is bound to will here and now; for this voluntary negation of act, since it proceeds from the will freely omitting the act, can as much be held an indication of life as the positing of an act; since the will is of itself indifferent to acting or not acting, it is evident that when it determines itself to either part of contradiction this determination is some at least interpretative exercise of life and liberty; for everything to which the power of free will extends is held to be its exercise. This negation of act equally suffices for sin; for as the will is held to sin when it freely elicits or commands a prohibited act, so must it be said to sin whenever it freely omits a precepted act.

They insist: The will then only sins when it determines itself voluntarily to the other part of contradiction against the prohibitive precept, or imperative of act: but it cannot thus determine itself without some positive act: therefore etc. The minor is proved: the will cannot determine itself unless it pass from the state of first act to the state of second act: but this passage cannot come to be without some positive act. That this may be understood more evidently, let two instants be conceived, in the prior of which the will be in first act, and indifferent to determining itself, not yet having any act; in the posterior truly let it also lack every act; I ask what more it will have in the posterior than in the prior? certainly nothing; inasmuch as it has no positive act, and consequently it is no more to be held determined in the posterior instant than in the prior: therefore neither more to be held to sin. It is confirmed: that is absolutely necessary for the will to be held to pass from first act to second act, besides which all other things can competently belong to it in the state of first act: but all other things which concur to sin can belong to the will in the state of first act, except the very physical act, therefore without that positive physical act it can neither determine itself nor sin. The minor is proved: besides the physical act there can be considered in the will only the precept with sufficient cognition of its obligation, and likewise the lack of operation: but advertency to the precept befits the will in the state of first act; the lack of operation also befits it; for while it is in first act, it does not operate: therefore every other thing besides the positive physical act befits the will in the state of indifference and first act. It is confirmed again: sufficient cognition of the obligation of the precept being posited in the intellect for weighing down the will and inclining it to the act, either it sins by not willing the elicition of the act, or it sins not: if the first, therefore it sins before every determination: if the second, therefore something has come to it in the state of second act which it had not had in the state of first act: but this is nothing else besides the positive act: therefore etc. — I deny the minor, for the determination of the will can well enough be understood from this, that the will freely abstain from the act which it could elicit if it would: for since the indifference of liberty is to acting or not acting, all things desired for operation being posited, by this very thing that being able to act it does not act, it determines itself to the other part of contradiction, and passes from the state of first act to the state of second act; not indeed by the positing of an act, but by its free omission: for since that omission hangs upon the very liberty of the will, when it omits to act, which it could execute if it would, it is held interpretatively to will not to act, and to be in that state as if it so decreed, I will not act: and therefore it is equally held to pass from the state of first act to the state of second act. Nor are two instants to be conceived, in one of which the will be indifferent in first act, and in the other lack act, as two instants of duration successively corresponding to each other; but it is only to be understood that in the very instant in which the will freely omits to operate, that omission hangs upon its liberty, so that it can will to elicit the act or not will it: therefore when it omits the act, it omits it because interpretatively it wills not to posit it. To the confirmation likewise I say, indeed the will in first act can have advertency to the obligation of the precept, and in that state not sin, but remain in indifference and suspension: but to be reduced to second act through that interpretative non-volition, and therefore to sin: namely because sufficient cognition for operating being posited in the intellect, and the others prerequisite for acting, the will purely does not will that which it is bound to will here and now. Whence it does not follow that it sins before every determination: for by this, that the will able to act and not act does not act, it is virtually or interpretatively held to will not to act, and consequently sufficiently to determine itself to not acting: for everything to which the power of free will immediately extends is held to be its exercise and determination.

They urge: That interpretative volition suffices neither for the determination of the will nor for sin: therefore in very truth for determination and sin a positive volition is desired. The antecedent is proved: for the ratio of determination and sin it is required that there be something in the very determiner and sinner: but the interpretative volition is not in the will itself a parte rei, but in the intellect alone interpreting that omission as an actual volition: therefore by that interpretative volition the will cannot be held to determine and sin. — I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I distinguish the major: it is required that there be something by way of positive act formally and actually, I deny: fundamentally and virtually, I concede. Therefore that interpretative volition is indeed formally and actually in the intellect interpreting and judging that omission to be voluntary and sinful, but fundamentally and virtually it is in the will itself, inasmuch namely as it can will the elicition of the due act, and yet at its liberty does not will to elicit or command that act.

They object 3. Everything voluntary ought to proceed from the inclination of the will about the proposed object, and likewise from the motion and influx of the specificative object: but that inclination of the will and motion of the object cannot come to be without some positive and physical act: therefore there cannot be a pure voluntary omission. The minor is proved: to omit from an attracting motive is to omit from love of that motive; v. g. to abstain from sin from the attracting motive of pleasing God is to abstain from love and desire of His divine good-pleasure; as to abstain from sin from a deterring motive, because it displeases God, is to abstain from fear of displeasing God: but love and fear are positive acts of the will; therefore in such omissions some positive act of the will always concurs. — I deny the minor; and to its proof I say, that omission of an act can be given without any motive retracting or removing the will to operate.

They insist: Something must be given whereby the will passes from the state of indifference, in which it could omit the act or not omit it, to the determined state, in which it truly omits it: but in pure omission nothing of the sort is given: therefore it remains in the state of indifference. — I answer: I distinguish the major: something real and positive must always be given, I deny the major; something at least negative and interpretative must be given, I concede the major. I distinguish likewise the minor, and deny the consequence: for something indeed is given in the intellect, namely the cognition of good or evil, but in the will something positive is not always required, because as the indifference of the will to acting positively is determined and removed through the very act which it posits, nor is another act required, otherwise an act would be given to the act, so it is determined to omitting through the non-act, or through the interpretative act, which is also called negative, by this very thing that such omission, or such negative act, is in its power.

You will object 1. It is impossible that the will omit freely unless it be moved by some amiable good, or averted from some evil, because while the motive moves the will, the will is moved: but for the will to be moved is to pass from non-act to positive act: therefore such motion cannot be without some positive act. — I answer: I distinguish the major: unless it be moved positively, I deny the major: interpretatively, I concede the major. I distinguish likewise the minor and the proof: for the will to be moved positively is for it to elicit some positive act on account of the reason of good or evil proposed: but the will to be moved interpretatively is for it to have in its power to act or not act: and yet not to act, and to suspend every act about the object and positive motive: for as when the motive moves to a positive act it effects nothing immediately in the will, because the motive is only in the intellect; so when the motive moves to pure omission it effects nothing in the will, nor does it elicit any act in it; for the will determines itself, both to its acts and to the omission of acts; but it is not intrinsece determined by objects; otherwise it would be no more free than the appetite of brutes.

You will insist: Omission ought to be posited by virtue of a motive: but omission posited by virtue of a motive either is only the motive being in the mind, and the omission in the thing: or not. Neither can be said; because if it is only the motive being in the mind, and the omission in the thing: the omission will not hang upon the motive: therefore it will have no motive, and thence will not be free. But if it is something else, it can be nothing but a positive act: therefore either it will not be free, or a positive act will inhere in it: — I answer: I concede the major; to the minor I say, three things are required that omission be posited completely by virtue of a motive: namely 1. there must be a motive in the mind, 2. there must be omission in the will, and 3. there must be no act which prohibits the omission; because by this very thing that a motive is sufficiently applied in the mind, and there is no other act prohibiting the omission, by that very thing it is in the power of the will to omit or not omit, because the will, all requisites being posited, always has of itself the power of suspending every act. Hence if Peter be in bed on Sunday, on which the Sacred is to be heard, and three motives of omitting the Sacred offer themselves; namely first he think it sweet to rest softly in bed; second he think it pleasant to converse in bed with a friend present; third he think it troublesome to be in the temple amid summer heats with a numerous people: then if he omit on account of each singly, there will be a threefold free omission, not one; because three times it will be in the power of the will to omit or not omit the Sacred. — But if the adversaries suppose the three motives to be apprehended at once by the intellect, and that threefold evil, or threefold disconvenience, to be proposed at once to the will, so that it freely omit the Sacred, then the omission hangs upon that threefold motive, nor does he omit the Sacred from one motive only, but from three partial ones. — But if they say the omission ought to be ordered to the motive, that it hang upon the motive; I shall answer, that it is proper to reason to order, not to the will; because the will (st is a faculty which neither orders nor refers one thing to another. Then, that the motive be the cause of suspending and omitting the act is nothing else; as the motive of a positive act is nothing else than its being the cause why a positive act is posited, nor is another act required whereby the first act be referred to the motive; otherwise a process would be given into infinity.

But on the contrary. THEY URGE: When three motives are proposed at once for doing something positively, putatively for hearing the Sacred, I can positively will to hear the Sacred on account of one only of the three motives, not on account of the other two, putatively for obtaining rain, not for obtaining knowledge, nor for converting sinners: therefore by parity, if pure free omission can be given, and three motives of omitting be proposed at once, he will be able to omit on account of one of the three, not on account of the other two; but this cannot be said; therefore it cannot be explained whereby the omission hangs upon one motive and not upon another. — I answer: It must be supposed that those three motives are apt, and each sufficient to move to omission; otherwise this hypothesis would be useless, and then I concede the antecedent; I distinguish the consequent: he will be able to omit on account of one, not on account of the other two, if he positively reject those two, I concede the consequence: if he do not positively reject them, I deny the consequence: as if he positively will to hear the Sacred on account of one only of the three; putatively for obtaining knowledge, then either he must positively reject the other motives, saying, I do not will to hear the Sacred for obtaining rain; or at least he must suspend the act of the will about those motives for whose sake he does not hear the Sacred. In like manner he will be able to omit on account of one only if he positively say, I do not will to omit the Sacred, neither on account of the troublesome heat, nor on account of the sweet softness of the bed; but unless he positively reject those two, he cannot omit on account of one but on account of all at once; because, as was said, the three together make one total cause why he omits: therefore on account of those together it is in the power of the will of positing or not positing the omission of the Sacred.

You ask: Whether, and how, every act conjoined with a culpable omission, and incompossible with the observance of an affirmative precept, is a sin?

I ANSWER that a positive act which is the direct cause of a culpable omission is a sin by reason of that omission, even if from its own species and object it were otherwise good: whereas an act that in no way influences the omission, but stands related to it merely per accidens and only concomitantly, unless it be otherwise evil, is not vitiated by the omission with which it is joined.

The first part of this answer is common among Doctors, and so certain that it seems to need only explanation. Assume, then, that someone out of an excessive desire for studying or playing omits hearing Mass on a feast day, so that by study and play he is hindered from hearing Mass: that study is truly evil; for it is the cause of an evil omission — just as almsgiving, although good and honorable of itself, would be vicious and contaminating if it moved a man to theft, whence he might have something to distribute to the poor; for what is of itself the cause of evil is evil. Yet that study has no other malice than that of the sin of omission; hence he who would omit Mass on account of study does not sin more than he would sin if he remained idle during all that time in which the precept of hearing Mass binds; for if that study were of itself evil for some other reason, chiefly because he would sin against the rules and rectitude of the virtue of studiousness — but it is not so; for one who hears Mass on a feast day out of a motive of vanity, e.g., loses the hearing of Mass by the rectitude of religion, which such a motive vitiates; yet neither is the hearing of Mass against religion, nor against the Church's precept; otherwise one thus hearing Mass would violate that precept, and consequently would sin mortally, not only against humility by reason of vanity, but also against religion by reason of the same vanity — which no Theologian admits: therefore from the fact that that study causing the omission lacks the moral honesty of the virtue of studiousness, it is not rightly inferred to be against that virtue, and to contract a twofold distinct malice, one against religion, another against studiousness.

You will say: He who omits Mass by reason of avidity for study sins directly against the virtue of studiousness, both because he studies at an unseasonable time, and because he performs it from an immoderate and excessive affection: but the virtue of studiousness ought to moderate and amend both: therefore he who omits Mass on account of study sins not only against the virtue of religion, but also against studiousness; and therefore contracts a twofold malice specifically diverse: one against religion, another against studiousness. — I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say, first, that he who studies while the precept of hearing Mass urges, does not study at an unseasonable time by the precise rules of studiousness, but only unseasonably by reason of another precept intervening; for studiousness, as much as lies in itself, has only this to regulate, that it moderate the excessive affection toward its proper object, namely by hindering anyone from studying prohibited or vain things, or from applying himself to studies for a longer time whereby his health and life are ruined; wherefore this rule being kept, if one contravene another precept then to be observed, he is not judged to sin against studiousness, but against another virtue, which commands the act that is omitted: that study indeed lacks the honesty of studiousness; yet it has not the dishonesty opposed to studiousness, but is vitiated from the circumstance of another precept, whose transgression it entails.

You will urge: He who on account of study omits hearing Mass establishes in study the ratio of the ultimate end, loving study indeed more than God, who is the author of the precept concerning hearing Mass: but thus to love study or any other creature is not only against the virtues of studiousness and religion, but even against charity, which commands the love of God above all things: therefore in that act there is manifold malice, one against religion, another against charity. — I deny the minor: since aversion from God as ultimate end accompanies utterly all mortal sins, it does not import a special malice against charity unless it be expressly and directly willed by the sinner; which scarcely, or rarely happens. Add, moreover, that they do not seem rather to establish their study as their ultimate end, nor consequently to sin more than he who omits Mass in order to remain at home doing nothing else, but remaining idle; yet all confess that this latter man does not seem to establish the ratio of ultimate end in remaining at home, nor to love it more than God; and consequently nor to contract any special sin: therefore neither ought the former to be judged, on account of study at an unseasonable time, to contract any special sin.

The second part of the answer is also evident, namely that an act which stands related to the omission only concomitantly and per accidens is in no way vicious. E.g., if someone resolve truly indeed to hear Mass, yet not meanwhile to remain idle, wishing to devote himself to studies, etc., if however from this it should happen that he thinks of hearing Mass only after midday, when he no longer has the faculty of hearing it, I say that that study is not vitiated, because in no way is it the cause of that omission: otherwise, if every act concomitant with an omission were vitiated by it, it would follow that he who resolves not to hear Mass ought then to suspend every other act however honest, and remain idle; for if he exercised any act, he would be judged to sin in the very act — which no Theologian would admit: therefore an occasional and per accidens cause can derive no malice into a work that is not ordered to it, as to an end. Hence neither does it stand in the way that such acts are incompossible with the observance of the precept: for from this it does not follow that they are the cause why the precept is not fulfilled, namely because they have not a free will joined for omitting the precept: for the adequate cause of a sinful omission is to be unwilling to approach Mass, or to lack the will of approaching: but it is per accidens that meanwhile a man remains at home, or studies; for equally would he omit Mass even if he were not at home, nor applied to study.

§ III. — How venial sin is distinguished from mortal.

It must be noted that it is of faith that not all sins which men commit in this mortal life are mortal, nor do they wholly take away sanctifying grace and justice from the soul; which Sacred Scripture indeed plainly sufficiently designates, indeed by various Oracles, but especially by that of Prov. 21: For a just man shall fall seven times, and shall rise again: but the wicked shall fall down into evil. It is also established from the Council of Milevis, at which St. Aug. was present; for it is defined in Can. 3: Item placuit ut quicumque dixerit... It has likewise pleased that whosoever shall say that in the Lord's Prayer the saints say the same, forgive us our debts, so that they say it not for themselves, because that petition is no longer necessary in them, but for others who are sinners in his people; and that each one of the Saints says not the same, forgive me my debts, but: forgive us our debts: so that it be understood that he asks this rather for others than for himself — let him be anathema. By which words it is signified that there are certain sins which do not take away charity and sanctifying grace from those who commit them: and consequently do not inflict upon them the death of the soul. Which indeed the African Council declared more expressly, as is evident from its Epistle 95 among the Epistles of St. Aug.; for at its end we read that many are the faithful who after their conversion to God live through the whole time of life without complaint: that is, says the Council, without crime, yet nevertheless are not without daily and light offenses. But this truth Trent defined, Sess. 6. chap. 11, in these words: Although in this mortal life, however holy and just men may at times fall even into light and daily sins, which are called venial, they do not on that account cease to be Just: for that voice of the Just is humble and true, forgive us our debts. — But whether, and how, venial sin differs from mortal by its intrinsic reason remains chiefly for us to fight with the heretics of this time: for John Wyclif taught that all sins are inductions of eternal death, yet de facto induce it only in the reprobate, and accordingly all the sins of the foreknown are mortal: but all the sins of the predestined are venial. Similarly Calvin, lib. 3. Inst. c. 4, says: The sins of the faithful are venial: not because they do not merit death, but because by the mercy of God they are not imputed, because they are granted pardon. Luther likewise taught that every sin is mortal by its nature; but becomes venial in believers.

Third Conclusion. — Venial sin is distinguished from mortal by its own nature, and not only from imputation, or non-imputation on the part of God.

It is proved, first indeed from Sacred Scripture; and that from Matt. 5: Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Racca, shall be in danger of the council: and whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire. From which divine oracle I argue thus: manifest reviling constitutes one in danger of hell fire, and by that fact is mortal sin: anger expressed by the sound of the voice, but not reaching to evil reviling, makes one in danger of the council, that is, it is uncertain whether he merits hell, or whether he is worthy of it or of a lesser punishment: therefore there are found certain sins which are lighter than to merit hell fire. For to what end would the Council be forced to discern whether some fault was to be punished by hell fire, if all faults merited hell fire? Therefore there are faults which by divine judgment are to be mulcted with temporal punishment alone. Again, anger which has burst forth entirely without any external sign does not make one in danger of the council, but of the judgment; that is, it is uncertain whether he merit some punishment, or none; from which it follows that he merit none eternal: since it is a lighter fault than that about which it could be doubted whether temporal punishment, or eternal, were merited. — Again, Luke 6, Christ the Lord addressing the hypocrite: And why seest thou the mote in thy brother's eye, but the beam that is in thy own eye thou considerest not? But motes cannot of themselves blind the eye in which they are: therefore there are certain light sins which not only actually do not extinguish grace, the light of the soul, as mortal sins do, which are designated by the beam; but which cannot extinguish it: and consequently by their intrinsic levity they are venial from their nature, and distinct from mortal.

To confirm the same truth St. Amb. serm. 20. on Ps. 118, August. lib. 21. De Civit. Dei, cap. 26, and others bring forward that saying of Paul, 1. ad Corinth. 3: If any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones: wood, hay, stubble, etc., he shall be saved, yet so as by fire. By which things the Apostle compares venial sins with things most light by nature, namely wood, hay, stubble; for as by gold, silver, and precious stones he signifies works perfect and laudable, which examined in the judgment of God merit nothing but reward; so by wood, hay, and stubble he designates works useless and worthy of reprehension, but venial, which indeed bring detriment, and need purgation, yet do not cause one to fall from salvation: but nowhere would St. Paul have compared venial sins to hay and stubble, unless they were truly sins minute and most light, as St. Gregory says, lib. 1. Dialog., cap. 30: Minute sins, by their nature mortal, would rather be compared to iron, or leaden bronze.

Such is the concordant sentiment of all the Holy Fathers, whom Vasquez disp. 147, and Suarez lib. 1. De Statu Peccati. cap. 10 bring forward. One alone, however, suffices to confirm it, Augustine, who teaches in several places, especially lib. De Natura, et Gratia, cap. 36, that there are certain sins which do not take away sanctifying grace: For, he says, excepting the Virgin Mary, if we could gather together all the holy men and holy women living here, and ask them whether they were without sin: whatever excellence of holiness they had been endowed with, if they could be thus questioned; if we should say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.

You will object 1. Many testimonies of Scripture, by which they strive to evince that every sin is mortal from its nature, seeing that concerning sin generically Scripture pronounces Deuteron. 27: Cursed be everyone that hath not persevered in all things that are written in the book of this law. Ezekielis 18: The soul that sinneth, the same shall die. Rom. 6: The wages of sin is death. Iacobi 2: Whosoever shall offend in one point is become guilty of all: therefore etc. — I answer, these texts of Sacred Scripture are not to be understood of sins generically, but only of mortal ones; for if it denoted all sins whatsoever, even venial, it would follow that a just man could not only possibly, but even truly fall from the true life of grace, or be cursed of God, or be presently excluded from the inheritance of the kingdom of Heaven, or become guilty of the whole violated divine law: therefore those words are not to be taken of venial offenses, but of crimes only.

You will object 2. The Holy Fathers: first indeed Basil, in the Questions briefly expounded, question 4, where he says: it is said of every sin that it is the goad of death. And quest. 293: The difference, he says, between great and small sins in the New Testament it is not given to discern. Moreover St. August. teaches in several places that many venials gathered together condemn a man, especially tractate 11. in Ioan.: How, he says, do minute sins, if neglected, kill? Minute are the drops that fill the rivers: minute are the grains of sand: but if much sand be heaped on, it presses and crushes. Neglected bilge-water does this, which the onrushing wave enters little by little: but by entering long, and never being bailed out, it sinks the ship: therefore he truly holds that even the smallest sins can inflict eternal death. — I deny the consequence, and to St. Basil I say that he called venial sins the goad of death, not because they inflict it in reality, but because they dispose to it, inasmuch as venials dispose to mortals, especially when they are admitted more frequently. To the second I say that perhaps Basil alludes to the pharisaical difference between grave and minimal commandments reprehended by Christ; for they so expounded the precept concerning adultery, homicide, and love of neighbor as to say that the external work indeed was prohibited, but not the internal motions of the soul, of anger, concupiscence, etc.; similarly that friends indeed were to be loved, not so enemies: which difference Christ the Lord censures, Matthew cap. 5. For St. Basil cannot deny that in the New Testament the difference between the greatest and light sins is manifest, as is evident from the texts lauded above. — To St. August. I say that he is to be thus interpreted, as wishing that if venials be despised and neglected, they gradually dispose and lead a man to mortal crime; just as a curable wound, if more negligently cared for, gradually begets a deadly abscess, and in that way inflicts death. Which St. Greg. openly confesses, lib. 10. Moralia, cap. 14: If, he says, we neglect to cure small things, insensibly seduced we shall boldly perpetrate even greater ones.

You will object 3. Every offense is infinite of itself, and from its nature, and merits punishment infinite according to duration: but venial sin, since it is an offense of God, who is infinite, is held to be infinite; for the offense grows according to the dignity of the person offended: therefore it merits eternal punishment by its nature; and consequently it has not from its intrinsic levity that it is venial; but only from the mercy of God benignly remitting such punishment for some sins. — I deny the minor; for although venial sin be an offense of the infinite God, yet it is not infinite, as mortal sin is; because namely it does not turn man away from God as from the ultimate end, so as to convert him to a creature; but only diminishes the fervor of the same dilection and love; and therefore not into the infinite, in that manner in which mortal sin, which includes contempt of God, contracts from that contempt the malice of the infinite Divine Majesty, as it were morally infinite. From these things it is established that venial sin is rightly defined by the Seraphic Doctor in the Centiloquium part one, cap. 6.

Venial sin, he says, is concupiscence, or love of pleasure in a creature short of God. He adds in the same place that venial sin is distinguished threefold: for one is venial from surreption, and therefore it is venial, because it cannot then be avoided: and because it is committed beside reason, it is always venial. One is venial from thought without consent: and therefore venial, because it is not fully consented to, as in thought and delectation about a woman, short of consent in the delectation: and therefore venial it becomes mortal by complacency and consent. One is venial with delectation; and consent: and therefore it is venial, because it is not a deordination against a precept, as drunkenness and jocose lying: and this, although it be venial on account of the delectation, which is short of God, yet can become mortal on account of excessive concupiscence and contempt. Yet it is not to be understood that any venial sin by its essence becomes mortal; but because from a venial there is made a transit to a mortal by complacency and consent, or by concupiscence and contempt. But venial sin is cured by acts in which there is some humiliation and devotion, which acts indeed informed by grace are repugnant to the venial: and thus to the act of cure and the delectation of venials, grace gratum faciens they aid and invigorate. Things of this kind are contained in these verses:

Confiteor, tunndo, respergo, conteror, oro, Signor, edo, dono, per quae venialia pono, Unctio, poena lenis, compassio, quae fit egenis.

For here the remedies are: 1. general confession, 2. beating of the breast, 3. sprinkling of blessed water, and contrition of heart, 4. the Lord's Prayer, 5. Signation by the Bishop, 6. reception of the Eucharist, 7. forgiveness of the oblation, 8. Extreme Unction, 9. light penance, 10. fraternal compassion.

You ask 1. In what manner is venial sin severed from mortal?

The Doctor answers in 2. dist. 21. n. 3. that

mortal sin is not distinguished from venial in this, that one is with respect to the end, as mortal, and the other those things that are toward the end, as venial; but either can be, both about those things that are toward the end, and about the end: but they are distinguished in this, that mortal sin is a deordination opposed to ordination, without which the end cannot in any way follow; which ordination indeed has a precept, against which the deordination is made: and > therefore every deordination falling under a precept turns away from the end necessarily. But another is the ordination which can be with respect to following the end, which is not necessary, but useful, which is not of precept, but rather of counsel: and the deordination opposed to this is venial sin, nor does it make one fall from the end necessarily; but it makes that the act proceed not in the better manner in which it can.

It must be observed, first, that the Doctor does not intend that every act elicited against some evangelical counsel is venial sin; for we have the counsel of giving alms, or of doing always what is more perfect when we can; yet it is not venial sin to be unwilling to give alms, or to do at some time what is less perfect, or to act indifferently. Therefore although every venial sin be against a counsel, yet not everything against a counsel is venial sin.

It must be observed, secondly, that when the Doctor says mortal sin is against a precept; venial indeed against a counsel; he does not take "precept" for everything that induces any obligation, whether grave or light, and whose transgression is imputed to some fault; for it is certain that venial sin even by this reason is against a precept. But there he takes "precept" in the manner of speaking of Sacred Scripture, and also of the Holy Fathers saying that the plenitude of the law, that is, the observance of the commandments and precepts, consists in the love of God and neighbor; whence it comes about that he who offends in one commandment becomes guilty of all: from which manner of speaking it seems to be gathered that nothing is against the commandment except what takes away the love of God and neighbor; and consequently by this reason venial sin cannot be held to be against the commandment and precept; seeing that it does not extinguish the love of God; but only diminishes its fervor. Similarly, while he says venial is against a counsel, by the name of counsel he does not understand a persuasion, or induction to do something short of entire obligation: for thus venial would not be against a counsel only; seeing that there is some obligation of avoiding it, otherwise it would not be held to be sin; but by the name of counsel the Doctor understands a persuasion of doing something, either without obligation, or with a light obligation not inferring perpetual separation from God.

From which it follows that the genuine and true distinction of venial sin from mortal is to be sought chiefly from this, that mortal is a grave offense and injury and grave transgression; venial, however, only light and imperfect.

You ask 2. Does venial sin differ specifically from mortal?

I answer, that they do not differ physically, and according to the entity of the act: for as the grave precept and the light precept about the same matter do not differ according to essence, but according to intension; so in like manner thus do not differ offenses in matter of the same species, grave or light; because they are committed against the precept of God, grave or light: therefore the theft of one farthing, and the theft of a hundred thousand do not differ in physical species; because they turn about the same matter, and against the same precept, Thou shalt not steal. Yet they differ in moral species, because one from its nature is separative from God, the other is not; and as that which is evil from its moral nature is constituted in a diverse species of moral malice, by this that it is prohibited by another prohibition; so also although the sin which is called venial, and that which is called mortal of itself, the prohibition under such a penalty being set aside, would be of the same species; yet by an accidental prohibition they could be constituted in a diverse moral species, about which, however, there can be no other difficulty than about the name. It is confirmed: because if it did not befit the mortal, from its specific moral nature, to separate from God, but from some accidental difference, of greater intension e.g., it could not be shown how many venial sins could not separate from God: but it is certain that they do not separate, however much they be multiplied: therefore it befits the mortal thus to separate not from greater intension, but from its specific moral nature.

You ask 3. Can venial sin become mortal?

The Seraphic Doctor answers lib. 3. Compendii Theologicae veritatis cap. 12. that venial sin, considered under the formal ratio of venial sin, can nowhere become mortal, neither as to the act, nor as to the stain; because no thing can change its species: but venial sin and mortal are diverse species of sin. — He answers, secondly, that an act which of itself is of the venial genus can become mortal in four ways:

First from conscience: because whatever is done against conscience builds up unto hell, even if it be against an erroneous one; and this is the reason: because since in sin there are two things, namely aversion, and conversion, sin is judged according to the first; since aversion from God is as it were the formal; and conversion to creatures the material. Therefore although to lift up a mote, or a straw, from the right may seem light, and indifferent, yet when it is done against conscience, it is mortal sin; because the incommutable good is spurned; and thus aversion is made from the Creator. Secondly from complacency: whence Aug. no sin is so venial that it does not become mortal, while it pleases. Thirdly from disposition, because frequently by a lapse into venials a man is disposed to mortals, and this according to that saying of Gregory: Thou hast escaped great rocks, beware lest thou be overwhelmed by sand: and he says the same thing, because often from the least sins one comes to great ones, as from a little spark sometimes arises a great fire: He that despiseth small things shall little by little fall away. Fourthly from progress, because when a venial arises, if it be not prohibited, it could progress even unto a mortal: not because the venial itself in substance could become mortal, but because from it occasionally there would be made a progress to the mortal: and this is evident in the first motions, which are reckoned among venials; but when the delectation grows strong to such a degree that consent occurs, already the sin is mortal.

You ask 4. By what marks chiefly are mortal and venial sin discerned?

I answer, that these four following rules are to be attended to, that such a discretion be made: The first is that for mortal sin the gravity of the divine precept is to be attended to, which is made known either from Scripture, or divine tradition, or reason. For those things which in Scripture are prohibited under penalty of death, execration, abomination, and exclusion from the kingdom of Heaven, or similar interminations, are to be understood to be gravely forbidden; such is that of the first to the Corinthians 6: Do not err: neither fornicators, nor serving idols, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor railers, nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God.¹ — But the gravity of the precept is discerned by reason, by regarding the dignity of the nature of the matter, to which God is to be judged to accommodate himself according to his benignity, and the sweet administration of his providence, so that he be held to have prescribed light things lightly, grave things gravely; unless elsewhere there be joined an intermination of most grave penalty: for it can happen that upon light matter, or even of itself indifferent, a grave precept be laid, sufficient for mortal sin, if that precept be violated with entire liberty; such was the precept given to the first Parent, Gen. 2: for it was concerning a thing of itself light and indifferent: nevertheless the commandment was grave, sufficient for mortal sin, inasmuch as enjoined under penalty of death in these words: In what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death. — The second rule is, that although the precept be grave, nevertheless the transgression can be light, if namely it be committed not from full and sufficient deliberation; but from surreption, and indeliberation of the will. Since indeed every sin ought to be voluntary, that is to be held the graver or lighter which is consummated with greater or less deliberation of the will. — The third is also helpful to observe, whether the sinful act be immediately against a divine precept, or immediately against a human one, and only mediately, and consequently against the divine: for indeed by this latter reason the gravity of the sin is much diminished: since the power granted to men is not simply supreme, nor without restriction, but ordered to an end, and tempered to it, from this it comes that neither can small goods be so severely commanded by men, nor small evils prohibited by men with the greatest penalty, that their grave commandment always suffice for mortal sin: the reason of which is that a lesser evil is not well nor usefully redeemed by a greater evil. But it is a greater evil that there be danger of sinning mortally, than that a small good be omitted, and by this reason a small evil admitted: therefore since men have not the power of commanding or prohibiting except unto edification, but not unto destruction, as St. Paul says of the Apostolic power granted to himself, second to the Corinthians 13: from this it comes that they cannot concerning small and light things constitute a grave commandment, whose transgression be mortal sin.

But you will say, the supreme Pontiffs sometimes gravely command certain light things concerning the manner of administering the Sacraments e.g. of celebrating Mass. — I answer, that this is not light, but grave, that the sacrifice be celebrated in a becoming order, and the Sacraments administered with congruous rite, especially since these regard the glory of God, and the reverence of the sacred thing.

Fourthly, finally, in human precepts it does not suffice for mortal sin that the thing be grave, but it is also required that the legislator intend gravely to command it; whence Sanchez rightly observes, lib. in Decalog. cap. 1. and with him Martinonus Disp. 18. Sect. 5. that not whatsoever the Pontiff forbids or commands, although he say that from affection of the divine Name he firmly commands or forbids them, do they therefore bind under mortal: but this is to be deduced from the gravity or necessity of the matter commanded, and from the penalties established for transgressors.