Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

To be noted 1. That although the kinds of torments in Hell whereby the reprobate are to be tormented are diverse, yet all of them are reduced chiefly to three heads, namely the pain of loss, of sense, and of the worm. The first is the very privation forever of the divine vision and fruition; the second, horrible torment from hellish fire, cold, and other ministering creatures of divine justice that torment; the third, finally, is the ever-tormenting bite and stimulus of conscience. The first answers the aversion from God; the second, the conversion to creatures; the third, the internal delight which is made apart from the dictate of reason and the divine law, whereby the sinner sins in the very aversion from God and conversion to creature: now it is certain that by this threefold punishment adult reprobates are to be tormented, as can be shown by very many texts of Scripture, above all from that of Matthew 25, Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels: and also from that of Mark 9, Their worm dieth not, and the fire is not extinguished: whether however infants departing this life with original sin alone are to be punished by this threefold pain must be determined in the present place.

To be noted 2. That it is certain indeed, and altogether undoubted among Catholics, that all departing this life, even with original sin alone, are punished with the pain of loss. For this rests on most manifest texts of Scripture, especially from that of John 3, Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. And 1 Corinthians 15, For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive: that is, as no one is freed from the death contracted through Adam unless he be united to Christ through baptism as to his head, and incorporated into Him as His member; so no one can attain eternal life except through this incorporation. Finally from that of Apocalypse 20, Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection; in these the second death hath no power: but unbaptized infants have no part in the first resurrection: therefore over them the second death, namely the want of the divine vision, which is life eternal, hath power.

Likewise it has been defined in Councils: first indeed the Palestinian, or Diospolitan, as St. Augustine testifies, book De gestis Pelagii, c. 8, where he relates that Pelagius was compelled to anathematize that assertion, that infants, even if they be not baptized, have eternal life. But this being denied, saith St. Augustine, what will remain but eternal death? Likewise the Council of Carthage in Augustine, num. 90: Whoever, it saith, denies that little children are freed from perdition through the baptism of Christ, and receive eternal salvation, let him be anathema. Likewise the Council of Milevis in the Epistle in Augustine 92. The like it repeats writing of the Pelagians:

If little children be imbued with no sacraments of Christian grace, that they shall have even eternal life they do not presume to contend.

The same the Florentine teaches in the last session, writing:

The souls of the dead who depart with actual mortal sin, or with original sin alone, presently descend into hell, yet to be punished with pains unlike one to the other.

Finally the Council of Trent, session 5, especially Canon 1, repeating the doctrine of the preceding Councils, anathematizes those who assert that little children draw nothing from Adam of original sin, which must needs be expiated by the laver of regeneration for the attaining of eternal life.

The same all the Holy Fathers teach, especially as many as pressed hard upon the calamity of the Pelagians or Semi-Pelagians. Above all St. Augustine, book 1, De origine animae, chapter 9. To unbaptized infants, he saith,

let no one promise a middle place, where one listeth, as it were, between damnation and the kingdom of Heaven, or some quiet or felicity whatsoever: for this the Pelagian heresy promised them.

And book 2, chapter 12, he saith:

The authority of the Catholic Councils, and of the Apostolic See, most justly condemned Vincentius, the heretical Pelagian, because they dared to give to unbaptized infants a place of quiet and salvation, even outside the kingdom of Heaven, etc.

To these subscribe St. Prosper, book 2, De vocatione gentium, c. 8. What is it, he saith,

that so great a multitude of infants is alienated from perpetual salvation, as many as in these ages thousands of men are left outside the eternal rite?

And St. Fulgentius, book De fide ad Petrum, chapter 2. Infants, he saith,

to whom there can be inherent no proper merits of will, either good or evil, are held by an indissoluble bond in eternal damnation.

The same holds St. Anselm, book De Conceptu Virginali, chapter 27, and all the rest, followers and disciples of St. Augustine. These things I have noted at somewhat greater length, that thereby it may appear how execrable, and how much to be condemned, is the assertion of Calvin, Zwingli, and other heretics, whereby they teach that the whole human nature has been so restored through Christ, that not only the children of the faithful, as Calvin wills, but even of infidels, as Zwingli asserts, in the Declaration on original sin, though dying without baptism, can attain eternal life.

To be noted 3. That although all Catholic Doctors agree that infants departing this life with original sin alone are to be condemned to the pain of loss and perpetual want of the divine vision; nevertheless they controvert among themselves whether those infants also suffer any pain of sense and of the worm; in the resolution of which difficulty there are chiefly four diverse opinions of Authors.

The first indeed, most rigid, contends namely that those infants departing with original sin are deprived not only forever of the vision and fruition of God, but also punished with the very pain of the fire and worm of eternity: yet more mildly than damned adults, forasmuch as they are infected with lighter guilt. Thus above all taught Gregory of Rimini, in 2 dist. 3. For this same opinion fought keenly our Florentius Conrius, Archbishop of Tuam, in the Treatise published at the end of Jansenius's work De statu parvulorum sine baptismo decedentium ex hac vita: in which Treatise he contends that the opposite opinion is not only false, but also bordering on heresy, and that original sin, as he himself says, is utterly evacuated. To him subscribe very many Moderns; above all our Poncius in the Commentary on distinction 33, where n. 77 he congratulates himself that while still a youth he had enjoyed the grave and religious conversation of the aforesaid Most Illustrious Conrius; in whom, he saith,

I experienced several proofs of supreme humility joined with so great profundity of doctrine, which I admire even now, and often recall for my own profit.

The second opinion teaches that infants dying in original sin will indeed be punished with no pain of fire and of sense: yet that they will suffer the pain of the worm, or of sadness and sorrow, for the loss of eternal beatitude. This taught Abulensis on chapter 25 of Matthew, Bellarmine book De statu peccati, chapter 6, and others. The third affirms that infants thus departing are indeed deprived of the eternal vision and fruition of God, yet will have after the day of judgment a certain temporal beatitude, inasmuch as they will inhabit the earth as it were an earthly Paradise, full of wisdom and instructed in moral virtues, and refreshed also by the companionship and apparitions of Angels. Thus Catharinus book De statu Parvulorum decedentium sine baptismo; Albertus Pighius in the first Controversy on original sin; which opinion Salmeron also deems probable on chapter 5 of Romans. Fourth and last, the opinion teaches indeed that infants departing in original sin are to be punished with the eternal want of the vision and fruition of God, and likewise to be destitute of all natural beatitude: yet not to be tortured with any pain of sense or of the worm. Thus the Subtle Doctor with the Master of the Sentences in 2 dist. 33, and St. Thomas in the same place qu. 1. art. 1 and 2, and likewise the Seraphic Doctor Bonaventure in the same place art. 2. qu. 1, where, having reported the first opinion on this matter, he subjoins:

that position is milder which accords better with piety, faith, and the judgment of reason: that because infants departing with original justice lack justice, and the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is the first inheritance of eternity, they are deprived forever of the vision of God: but because in her was the inheritance, therefore they are placed in the place of naught, namely hellish; but because they had not in themselves actual delectation of sin, neither in spirit nor in flesh, therefore they feel not the harshness of the pain of fire.

That we may subscribe to which opinion, as the more probable, let there be

One Conclusion. — Infants departing this life with original sin alone suffer no pain of sense, nor of the worm, or remorse of conscience.

Proof is made first from Sacred Scripture: for Apocalypse 18: How much she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her: but little ones have in no wise glorified themselves, nor have they been in any delicacies: therefore they deserve no torment and sorrow. Likewise in Isaiah at the end, and Mark 9, fire is joined with the worm: Their worm, he saith, dieth not, and their fire shall not be extinguished; but it is evident that little ones will suffer no punishment from the bite of the worm, that is, from a conscience of an evil work pricking and afflicting the soul; therefore it is credible that they will also suffer no punishment of material fire.

Proof is made second from the authority of the Holy Fathers, and especially of St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 10 on holy Baptism, where, having enumerated three kinds of men dying without baptism — of whom some despised baptism; others omitted it through their own negligence; and the third, that is, infants, lacked it through the negligence of others — he pronounces thus concerning the punishment of all of them:

I judge that it will come to pass that the first indeed shall pay penalties both for their other crimes and for the contempt of baptism: but the others shall pay penalties indeed, yet lighter, as those who departed from baptism not so much by depravity of soul as by folly: lastly, the final ones shall be touched neither by heavenly glory nor by punishments from the just Judge; inasmuch as, although they were not signed with baptism, they nevertheless lack wickedness, and have suffered this loss rather than made it: for not everyone who is unworthy of punishment straightway receives the honor he merits, just as not everyone who is unworthy of honor straightway merits punishment.

Conrius replies, chapter 15. First indeed, that Gregory there defines nothing about our controversy, but only says that those who have not received baptism will not have its effect, namely eternal life. Second, that they ought not to be punished with torment on account of that defect committed in not receiving the Sacrament, as they are to be punished who despised or neglected to receive baptism. On the contrary, Gregory manifestly asserts that these little ones are to be touched neither by heavenly glory nor by punishments on account of the loss of baptism, which they suffer involuntarily; and he says the reason why they are not touched by punishments after this life is that they lack wickedness, that is, that they are not culpable by their own iniquity. And therefore Nicetas the ancient, his Commentator, gathers from these words that infants dying without baptism are not to be tortured by the punishment of fire. A middle grade of those, he saith, who feel neither the sweetness of the heavenly kingdom nor are tortured by any punishments: in which also the little ones who have not been washed by baptism shall be placed. The same St. Gregory of Nyssa teaches, Oration 1 On Infants who are snatched away prematurely, near the end, whose words are these:

The untimely death of infants suggests to us that it must not be understood to be with pains and mourning for one who has so ceased to live: nor that he is in equal lot and the same condition with those who have been purged in this life by every virtue.

And the same must be said of adults, if any likewise die with original sin alone: for since their condition is equal to that of infants, the same must be judged concerning the punishment of both. The same truth St. Augustine openly teaches in many places, but especially book 3 De libero arbitrio, chapter 23, where he says:

The unskillful say, what need was there that he should be born, who departed this life before he had entered upon the merit of that life? Or of what sort shall he be accounted in the future judgment, for whom there is a place neither among the just, since he did nothing rightly, nor among the wicked, since he sinned nothing?

To whom it is answered, embracing the whole, that the most orderly connection of the whole creature, whether through places or through times, cannot have been superfluously created, of whatever sort a man may be, wherein not even one leaf of a tree is superfluously created; but indeed it is superfluous to complain of the merits of him who merited nothing. For it must not be feared lest life could be a certain middle thing between a rightly done deed and sin, and the sentence of the Judge cannot be a middle thing between reward and punishment. In which words St. Augustine does not assign some middle place between Heaven and Hell to those dying with original sin alone, but a middle sentence between the reward which is due to those who by their own will have merited something of good, and the punishment which is due to those who by their own will have bred punishment for themselves: wherefore, as Bellarmine says,

little ones dying without baptism shall not be without the punishment common to original and actual sin, whereby the grace of God is lost, which punishment is the privation of the divine vision; but they shall be free from that punishment which is proper to actual sin, which punishment is called of fire, or of sense.

Nor does it matter that in Epistle 28 to Jerome, and in the book De dono perseverantiae, chapters 11 and 12, he says that in that place he did not doubt of the damnation of little ones; but that he was unwilling to touch that question about which there was no contention between himself and the Manichees, against whom he was fighting. That, I say, does not matter: for there he says nothing else was certain to himself than punishment in general, and the damnation of little ones. But it is one thing that their damnation is certain, which is most certain among all Catholics; and another thing concerning the species and quality of the punishment, concerning which there have been various opinions of Catholics hitherto, and concerning which he himself doubted even after the arising of the Pelagian heresy, in many places, as in the same Epistle 28, where he says thus: But when we come to the punishments of little ones, believe me, I am pressed by greater straits, and I find not at all what I should answer. And book 5 contra Iulianum, chapter 11: I do not say, he saith,

that little ones dying without the baptism of Christ are to be punished with so great a punishment that it would rather have been expedient for them not to be born.

And a little after:

Who would doubt that unbaptized little ones, who have original sin alone, shall be in the most light damnation of all? Which, of what sort and how great it shall be, because I cannot define, yet I dare not say that it would be more expedient for them to be nothing than to be there. Certainly it would rather be expedient for them not to be, than to burn in the fire of Hell forever: for who would choose this, if he be wise?

This same truth the supreme Pontiffs taught, and especially Innocent III, as is related book 3 Decret. de baptismo, et eius effectu, chapter maiores. Where, teaching that an adult sleeping or out of his mind is not to be baptized — for he is held to be in baptism whoever would have actual sin together with original — he subjoins this reason of his assertion and resolution: Moreover, he saith,

the punishment of original sin is the privation of the vision of God: but the actual punishment of sin is the everlasting torment of hell: whence if to anyone the first were remitted, the other not remitted, such a one would not be without the vision of God on account of the original remitted, and would be tormented in hell forever on account of the guilt of actual crime: but these, as incompossible things, by no means suffer one another: nay, they are adverse to each other mutually.

In which words the Pontiff openly teaches that no other punishment corresponds to original sin than that very privation of the vision of God: as the punishment of sense and the torments of hell correspond to actual sin; and therefore, since infants are guilty of no actual sin, neither ought they to be tortured by any punishment of sense or of conscience.

Conrius replies, chapter 16. That the Pontiff indeed says truly that the punishment of original sin is the privation of the vision of God; but does not say that this is the sole punishment, nor exclude the punishment of eternal torment: just as, when he says the punishment of actual mortal sin is the torment of everlasting hell — likewise. On the contrary, the Pontiff speaks of one who is at once infected with original sin while actual mortal sin remains habitually in him: and he says that in such a one the former sin cannot be remitted while the latter remains; likewise he speaks of how any remission is made in reality according to the law laid down by God, namely through the infusion of justifying grace, which gives the right to hereditary eternal life. From which it follows that if to anyone having actual mortal sin original sin were remitted through baptism granted to him — as indeed it ought to be remitted, if baptism were to be administered to him; since baptism ought to be administered for no other reason than that of washing away original sin — it would follow, I say, that he would have a right to the vision of God on account of the remission of original sin, and at the same time the debt of lacking it, and of suffering the eternal torment of hell on account of actual sin, which two things are incompossible, as the Pontiff truly says; who, since he sets these two in opposition to each other — namely, that original sin merits the privation of the vision of God, but actual mortal sin merits the everlasting torment of hell — must be understood to mean the first member of this division exclusively: so that the sense is, that original sin merits only that privation, but actual mortal sin merits the ultimate torment of hell: otherwise that division and opposition between these two would be altogether null, and the Pontiff would conclude nothing, if he meant that both original and actual sin merit both punishments. Nor does it matter that for actual mortal sin both these punishments are owed, namely the privation of the vision of God, and the torment of fire and worm. For thence it does not follow that the Pontiff's reasoning is weak; since he argues ad hominem, and demonstrates most excellently against those who contended that baptism ought to be administered to those sleeping or out of their minds who had actual mortal sin, that it ought not to be administered to them; because plainly it would be frustrated of its effect; since it could not remit original sin without the actual mortal sin: but as actual mortal sin was committed by voluntary deliberation, so it must be blotted out by voluntary penance: and since those asleep and out of their minds are incapable of such penance, they are also incapable of receiving baptism: otherwise, as the Pontiff most excellently concludes, if baptism had its effect in them, namely the remission of original sin, without the remission of actual sin, which ought to be washed away by contrition at least virtual, it would follow that a man so baptized would at once become an heir of the heavenly kingdom on account of the original sin remitted, and condemned to the torments of hell on account of the actual, which things being incompossible, the Pontiff rightly gathers that baptism ought not to be conferred upon him; whereby it is manifest how wrongly the glossator, and also certain moderns, have said that the Pontiff's reasoning is superficial.

Likewise Eugenius IV taught in the letters of union with the Greeks, when he defines that the souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or in original alone, descend straightway into hell, yet to be punished with unequal punishments; unequal, that is, according to the inequality of sins, so that those who depart in actual mortal sin are punished with the privation of the divine vision, and moreover with sensible punishments of fire and other torments: but those who pass away with original sin alone suffer no sensible punishment whatsoever, but only the punishment of loss, namely the privation of the divine vision. For the Pontiff cannot be understood to speak of an inequality of punishments according to intensity, because in that way even actual sins are punished with unequal punishments.

The Doctor proves this truth in book 2, distinction 32, n. 2, where, having said: This seems to be the opinion of the Masters, that the damned for original sin alone will have no punishment of exterior sense, as fire, he proves it with a threefold reason: the first indeed,

because, he saith, the damned for original sin alone will have no punishment of exterior sense, as fire, who have had no inordinate delectation, to which delectation the bitterness of afflicting fire might correspond as its proper punishment: neither will they have any interior punishment, as sadness, because if they were sad over their state — since sadness, according to St. Augustine, is over those things which happen to us against our will: therefore they would involuntarily sustain their state, and would will the opposite, and thus would murmur against the divine disposition, and thus would have an inordinate disposition of the will, which seems absurd. For the divine sentence is disposed, that wheresoever the tree shall fall, there it shall be, in Ecclesiasticus. Therefore since these have had no inordinate volition in that state, it follows that they will have no interior sadness. Moreover, if they were sad over the privation of beatitude and the divine vision, since they despair of it, because they will have no hope; therefore they would have the gravest punishment among the punishments of all the damned, namely sadness from desperation. It seems also that the punishment of sadness is simply greater to man, as it is distinguished against pain [dolor], than any other punishment of sense: because as the will is more the appetite of man, inasmuch as he is man, than the sensitive appetite: so whatever he does, or suffers, according to the will, he simply does and suffers more inasmuch as he is man, than according to any other appetite; and thus he simply suffers more if he be sad, than if he feel pain: and thus it does not seem that any sadness should be posited in them.

So the Doctor, whose words and opinions it has pleased to transcribe here, that it may appear how wrongly certain men affirm him to have thought otherwise.

The Angelic Doctor proves this same truth with various reasons: First indeed: the punishment of sense corresponds to sin according to conversion to a changeable good; for although such a punishment is owed even to aversion from God found in personal sin, this nevertheless proceeds from the fact that such aversion is not a pure aversion, but partakes somewhat of conversion, because it is voluntary by the act of one's own will, and by reason of this participation the punishment of sense is owed to it: but in original sin there is not a conversion to a changeable good, even by participation, since such sin is not voluntary by the act of one's own will, but only by the will of the head: therefore the punishment of sense is not proportioned to original guilt. Second reason: that guilt which does not render one worthy of vituperation and rebuke, much less renders one worthy of any sensible and positive punishment, since this is sharper and harsher: but through original sin no one becomes worthy of reprehension and vituperation: therefore neither of sensible and positive punishment, or of the torment of eternal fire. The major is evident: the minor is proved from Augustine, book De duabus animabus, chapter 11, where he openly teaches that He who did not do what He could cannot be worthy of any reprehension; and he subjoins that this is so known and perspicuous to everyone, that Pastors chant it in the mountains, and Poets in the theaters, and the unlearned in circles, the learned in libraries, and Masters in schools, and High Priests in sacred places, and mankind in the whole orb of the earth. But infants have contracted original sin in such wise that they could not fail to contract it: therefore according to the mind of St. Augustine they are worthy of no rebuke or reprehension. So Gonetius after St. Thomas. I add that the sin of origin does not take away in man the natural order, but the supernatural, namely conversion to God through the gift of grace, which is of the supernatural order. It is just, therefore, that the punishment corresponding to original sin be only the privation of a supernatural good, such as the lack of the vision of God; and not the infliction of sensible punishment, whereby the creature serves God as vindicator and avenger, to punish that natural disordination which the sinner actually caused in the nature of things, using creatures against the prescription and glory of God. Moreover the Church, in enjoining due satisfaction and punishment for sins, imitates the order and manner of divine Justice in punishing offenses: but the Church imposes no positive punishment on account of original sin; therefore it is a sign that neither does divine justice inflict any sensible punishment on account of it.

The Assertors of the contrary opinion object 1. various texts of Scripture, by which they strive to prove that little ones are to be tortured with eternal fire and punishment together with those sinning actually. First indeed, that of Matthew 25, wherein the universal Judgment is described, to which all Gentiles are said to be gathered; and one part of them to be stationed at the right hand, and the nobler place, the other truly at the left, or baser; and those at the right are to be called into the kingdom; but to those who will be at the left the Judge shall say: Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire: but little ones passing away with original sin are not at the right hand, nor to be called into the kingdom: therefore they are to be stationed at the left, and thrust into eternal fire with the other reprobate. It is confirmed from the same St. Matthew, chapter 13, where, the parables having been premised — of the wheat to be gathered into the barn, and the cockle to be cast into the fire, and of the net cast into the sea gathering good and bad fishes — Christ infers: So shall it be at the consummation of the world: the Angels shall go out, and shall separate the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire, where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth: which are signs of a most grievous punishment of sense and remorse of conscience: but little ones dying without baptism are not to be reckoned among the just: therefore they are to be placed with the wicked and sinners, and with them cast into the furnace of fire. Moreover, from the same chapter 3, the Precursor of Christ the Lord, speaking of Him as the future Judge, saith: Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly cleanse his floor; and will gather his wheat into the barn; but the chaff he will burn with unquenchable fire: but little ones dying without baptism are not grains to be brought into the barn: therefore they are to be fuel of the unquenchable fire to come. I deny all these consequences; and to the first text I say with St. Augustine, book Contra Donatistas, chapter 4, and book De Fide, et operibus, chapter 15, and elsewhere, that by those words of Matthew there is described chiefly the form of the future judgment of those who lived in the Church; and therefore the aforesaid words do not regard little ones dying with original sin, inasmuch as they lived nowhere in the Church. Nor does it matter that in the same chapter it is read: All Gentiles shall be gathered before him: for often in Scripture the word all is used for the far greater part, such as the multitude of adults in respect of infants; in which sense St. Paul, 2 to the Corinthians 5, saith: We must all be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that everyone may render the things proper to his body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil. But little ones cannot render the good or evil works proper to their body, since they have elicited none at all: and therefore that word all does not regard them, but only adults. — That this, however, is the genuine evangelical sense, appears from the text: both because the Lord there compares the good and the wicked to sheep and goats, which are numbered in the same flock of the same shepherd: but it is evident that the flock of Christ the good Shepherd is none other than the Church, in which indeed there are good and wicked, but all baptized and faithful; while all the unbaptized are excluded; and therefore those infants who pass from the living with original sin: and because those stationed at the left shall hear the sentence of the Judge thundering against them, Go into everlasting fire; they shall hear also the cause of their damnation, namely that they did not do works of mercy toward the poor, the Judge saying, For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, &c. But the little ones of whom we speak can neither be judged nor damned on account of those omitted works of mercy: hence that sentence of the Judge, Go into everlasting fire, does not regard them. Finally, because this very thing St. Augustine openly teaches in the places soon to be praised: for in book De fide, et operibus, chapter 15, he saith: Therefore he saith he will separate all the Gentiles which shall have pastured mixed together in the same pastures, that it may appear they shall say to him: Lord, when saw we thee suffering this and that, and did not minister to thee? They who believed in him, but cared not to work good works. And in book Contra Donatistas: We shall act, he saith, so that the cause and person of the cockle may not prejudice the cause and person of the wheat: although they be threshed together in the same floor, until they be separated by the last winnowing: so that the cause and person of the goats may not prejudice the cause and person of the sheep: although the mixed flocks be kept in common pastures, until by the supreme Shepherd in the last judgment some be separated to the left, others to the right: so that the cause and person of the bad fishes may not prejudice the cause and person of the good fishes, although they be held within the same nets, to be separated on the extreme shore, that is, at the end of the sea, which signifies the end of the world: by which parables and figures the Church was foretold as about to have good and wicked together until the end of the world. Therefore, according to the opinion of St. Augustine, the formula of the judgment described by Matthew does not regard all men whatsoever, but only adults. — Hereby is manifest the easy solution of both texts alleged in confirmation; since by the floor, the net, the field, is signified not the universe, in which all men dwell, but the Church alone, in which the faithful act.

The adversaries urge, that if that passage of Matt. 20 [25] is understood not so much of little ones stained with sin as of adults, it will follow that it can in no wise be gathered from Scripture that they are to be stationed at the left, to be judged and damned: since neither do the Councils decree it, nor does Scripture elsewhere make mention of a separation of those to be judged into two parts, right and left. The minor, they say, cannot be denied salva fide: for all men whatsoever must be stationed before Christ the Judge in the general Judgment, to be judged. — I answer 1. by denying the minor: for Catholic Doctors are not wanting who affirm that those little ones will be present at that universal judgment, not indeed to be judged, since they have done nothing of good or evil that should come into judgment, but only to assist at the rendering of judgment, and to exhibit honor to Christ, as Abulensis teaches, question 323, on the preface of the Matthew chapter: or as St. Thomas affirms in I. dist. 47. q. 1. art. 3. ad 3: Children dying before the perfect age are to be present at the judgment, not to be judged, but to see the glory of the Judge. — I answer 2. that even if those children should be present at the judgment to be judged, thence it does not follow that they are to be placed at the left or right; for it can be said that they are to be stationed in a certain middle place, just as their state is middle between the good and the wicked, who are to be judged concerning their own acts.

Objection 2. That passage of Apoc. 20, where it is said: I saw a great and white throne, and one sitting upon it, and from his face heaven and earth fled away, and the rest of the dead great and small standing in the sight of the throne, and books were opened, and the book of life was opened, and he who was not found in it was cast into the pool of fire: but an unbaptized little one is not found in the book of life: therefore he is cast into the pool of fire. — I answer that that passage of the Apocalypse, as it is customarily alleged by the Adversaries, is not proved by right faith, but is truncated and mutilated; for after the words alleged in the objection, And another book was opened, which is of life: there is subjoined: and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books according to their works, and the sea gave up the dead that were in it: and death and hell delivered up their dead that were in them: and judgment was made of each one according to his works: whereby it is evident that John speaks only of adults to be judged according to their works good or evil: and concerning these same he afterwards adds, and whosoever of them was not found written in the book of life was cast into the pool of fire. Moreover, in the following chapter, the reward of the victors having been premised, the Apostle declares whom he had said to have been cast into the pool of fire, namely the fearful, unbelieving, murderers, &c. Nor does it stand in the way that he says there that the great and the small are to be judged: since John there understands the small not by age or stature, but by dignity and rank; that is, vile and abject men, such as servants, rustics, and handmaids; for he soon subjoins there that those small, equally with the great, are to be judged according to the works of each: and therefore by the small he does not understand infants, but only plebeian men. Hence Apoc. 19, inviting the birds to devour the flesh of the free and of servants, he adds, of the small and of the great: as if he said of plebeians and of nobles or princes.

Objection 3. Various contexts of St. Augustine: First indeed from Sermon 14 De verbis Domini (sic), where he openly affirms little ones dying without baptism to be going into eternal fire, according to that sentence of the Lord, Go ye cursed, &c.; and he grants that the damnation of the said little ones does not consist in that exclusion alone from the kingdom of Heaven, without all pain and molestation: and thus that it is not only true damnation, which the Pelagians denied, but also the damnation of fire; The Lord will come, he saith there, chapter 3, and will judge of the living and the dead, and, as Frangellim? speaks, he will make two parts, the right and the left: to the left he shall say, that they go into eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his Angels: to the right he shall say, Come ye blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom, &c. This he names the kingdom, that the damnation with the devil: no middle place is left where thou mightest place infants, &c. And chapter 4: Then these shall drink into everlasting combustion: but the just into life everlasting: Behold he hath set forth to thee, what the kingdom is, and what eternal fire: so that although thou confessest the little one shall not be in the kingdom, thou shouldst confess him to be going into eternal fire. And a little after: He terrified them with the threat that they shall be in everlasting fire, whither without doubt they shall go, if they are not corrected; but he terrified them so much only because they shall not be in the kingdom, that when they saw themselves to lose the hope of the kingdom, they might not see anything else to follow except the punishment of eternal fire. Moreover, from the same St. Augustine: they who shall not rise with a glorious body shall suffer eternal punishments: but little ones passing away with original sin shall not so rise: therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved from book 6 Contra Iulianum, the chapter where he saith: But in those who shall not rise unto life, concupiscence shall be not felicitously, but penally; not because then shall anyone be cleansed from it: but because then it shall yield to the wicked not into delectations, but into torments. And in Epistle 146, which is to Consentius: Therefore, he saith, those who shall rise to judgment shall not be changed into that corruption which can suffer no corruption of pain, for that is of the sons and of the saints: but these shall be tormented with perpetual corruption, because their fire shall not be extinguished, and their worm shall not die. — The Seraphic Doctor answers, and with him the Subtle Doctor, art. 1. q. 1. ad 1, that Augustine in those words does not intend to say that little ones are tormented sensibly; but he intends to manifest their punishment as to the privation of the vision of God, and also as to the vileness of place, and he expresses this very abundantly, saying more, and intending less to be understood. Nor does he speak thus without cause: for this serves to extirpate that heresy which said that little ones are punished with no punishment. Whence as it is taught in morals, that he who wishes to arrive from one extreme at the middle ought, as it were, to incline toward the other extreme, as the Philosopher teaches; so also blessed Augustine, that he might extirpate that heresy which said little ones immune from all punishment, and reduce them to the middle, namely to the punishment of the privation of the vision of God, asserted simply that they are damned eternally with other sinners. But he explained this his meaning in the Enchiridion, where he said their punishment to be most mild. Thus St. Bonaventure. — The Subtle Doctor adds that much weight is to be given to the consideration against which heretics the Holy Fathers had the matter in hand; for wishing to extinguish the heresies springing up, they inclined to the other extreme; as Augustine against Arius seems to incline toward Sabellius, and conversely: likewise acting against Pelagius he seems to incline toward Arius (I think it should be written Manicheus) and conversely. — In a similar manner St. Thomas answers in 2. d. 33. q. 2. art. 1. ad 1, and q. 5 De malo art. 2. ad 1, where he says that the name of torment, fire, punishment, hell, torture, or anything similar, in the sayings of St. Augustine and of the other Holy Fathers, is sometimes to be taken in a wide sense for punishment generically; so that the species is put for the genus, and therefore the Saints used this manner of speaking so as to render detestable the error of the Pelagians, who asserted that there is no sin in little ones, nor any punishment owed to them. The same solution the weightier Theologians each and all hand down: Aureolus, Richard of Mediavilla, John Major on the same distinction 33, and Tostatus in the Defensorium, chapter 18.

The Notators of the Dogmatists respond, that to assert that St. Augustine and the other Holy Fathers disputing against heretics sometimes spoke excessively, is the same as to say they were accustomed to lie, that they might recall lying heretics to the truth; and thus by their example and deed approved the heresy of the Priscillianists, which asserted that lying is sometimes licit. How greatly St. Augustine execrated this is evident from his book to Consentius. — But truly I answer that one can be understood to speak excessively in a twofold manner: First indeed knowingly, that is, asserting something against his own mind which would be altogether alien from the truth: secondly unknowingly, and beside his mind, speaking indeed as he felt, but carried away by the heat of disputation sometimes declining to the other extreme. The first is to lie, and to go against one's mind: for he lies who speaks against his mind, whether he say what is true in reality, or what is false. The second truly is to be deceived; for he is deceived who says that to be which is not, or that not to be which is: even if he speak as he feels, and therefore does not lie. In the first manner the Holy Fathers fighting against heretics did not speak, inasmuch as they judged that they were always saying what is true: but that it befell them in the second manner the cited Princes of Theology affirm, and also very many moderns, with Cardinal Sadoleto book 3. Epist. 5, Genebrard epist. to Charles 9, Claude de Sainctes Bishop of Évreux in the book on the Atheisms of Calvin, &c., some of whom, besides the sayings of St. Augustine, confirm it with examples of many others, as of St. Jerome, who, writing in defense of Virginity against Julian, spoke more harshly concerning second marriages; St. Chrysostom, who, writing against the Anomoeans, seems to deny that God is to be beheld in Himself by the Blessed; Dionysius of Alexandria, who, wishing to confute Sabellius, inveighed so sharply against his heresy that he seemed to some to have divided the divine essence from the persons, and to have furnished Arius matter for his heresy: by which name also he was accused before St. Dionysius the Pope. Epiphanius the Deacon confirms this same concerning the cult of sacred images in the second Nicene Synod, act 6; and he adds generally that our holy Fathers, who expound to us the saving will of God, were accustomed to teach us the observance of the commandments by way of exaggeration; and to prepare hearers toward that commandment at which their scope tends, and to extol and magnify it. Theodoret confirms this matter with an example adduced, tom. 4. pag. 170, where he says the Holy Fathers often declined to the contrary part when they joined battle against the enemies of the Church. The very thing happens also to husbandmen, cultivators of plants: who, when they see some plant bending awry, not only erect it to the straight rule; but even bend it beyond the straight line toward the other part, that from a more vehement inclination to the contrary it may be brought to an upright state.

Objection 4. Little ones are punished in this life with punishment of sense: therefore also in the other. The antecedent is established by the very experience, whereby we see little ones brought into this light subject to all the miseries of the present life. But the consequence is proved: if little ones after death were immune from punishment of sense, it would follow that they are of better condition in the other life than in the present: but the consequent seems absurd. — It is confirmed: little ones beyond the punishment of loss in the other life suffer also the punishment of the prison, since they will be detained in the pool of fire: again, they will be servants of the devil and of sin; for Christ saith, John 8: He that com-mitteth sin is the servant of sin, which must be understood not only of actual sin, but also of original, as Trent teaches, session 5: that man at once lost the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted, and incurred through the offense of the transgressor of this sort the wrath and indignation of God: and therefore death, with which God had before threatened him, and with death captivity under his power, who afterwards had the empire of death, that is, of the devil, &c., let him be anathema: but little ones are not freed from this servitude in this life, when they depart in the state of original sin: therefore neither in the other; and therefore beyond the punishments of loss and of the prison, they will have also the punishment of a most infamous servitude; they will live, namely, forever under the dominion of the devil, and consequently beyond the punishment of loss they will pay other punishments. — I answer to the first, distinguishing the antecedent: little ones are punished in this life with punishment of sense per se, I deny: per accidens, I concede; for death and the other corporal miseries of human nature are not punishments strictly per se for original guilt; but only the lack of original justice, which bestowed immortality and impassibility; and forthwith, that being removed, it is no wonder if death and temporal and corporal miseries overflow into the whole human race as appendices of nature itself. But since in the other life nothing is done by the power of nature, but according to the order of divine justice, whether in the soul or in the body; it does not follow, that if miseries pervade all men in this life per accidens and by reason of infirm nature, therefore also some corporal punishments ought to torture them in the other life; since in the other life nothing is done except by divine ordination: but it is not established that God has ordained those sensible punishments for mulcting original sin alone. Whence, in proof of the consequence, I deny the major: for although little ones in the other life suffer no punishment of sense, thence it does not follow that they are of better condition than they are in the present: for it far excels, with corporal miseries to have some hope of enjoying God, than to be without those miseries with desperation of that divine fruition. — To the confirmation I say that those little ones will be under the power of the devil so far as they will be deprived of supernatural beatitude, and will have the punishment of loss; but thence it does not follow that they will suffer any sensible molestation, interior or exterior; since those punishments are only appendices of actual sin.

Objection 5. Adam by sinning incurred not only the punishment of loss but also the punishment of sense: but he transfuses to posterity every punishment which he himself merited by sinning: therefore little ones passing away with original sin become subject to both punishments. — I deny the minor: for although the whole sin of Adam is transfused to posterity, it does not however inhere in them physically as perpetrated by their own will, or admitted or accepted by actual and personal consent: but only morally, inasmuch as what was done by Adam, as head of all and representing the person of all, is held to have been done by all posterity morally existing in him. Wherefore that sin has not the same mode of existing, nor the same condition; but one far different in Adam and in posterity: and therefore it does not follow that it ought to have in them the same punishment, and beyond the privation of grace and glory to have annexed the punishment of eternal fire: for punishment ought to be proportioned to guilt, according to Isaiah 27: In measure against measure when it shall be cast into her: but the defect which is transmitted by origin, having the character of guilt, since it is only a subtraction of a supernatural good, not however of a natural good, therefore merits no other punishment than the privation of that end toward which the supernatural good subtracted ordered.

Objection 6. Christ suffered grievous torments on account of original sin: therefore there corresponds also to this sin the punishment of sense. — I deny the consequence; for Christ suffered those punishments not only on account of original sin, but also on account of actual, signally of Adam and Eve, to whom the punishment of sense corresponded. Further, if original sin merited any punishment of sense, it can be said that it could be remitted and compensated through the death and sensible punishments endured by Christ the Lord unto that end: for debts can be variously compensated, as when satisfaction for a debt of money is made through services; and therefore even if the punishment of sense had been in some degree owed to original sin, thence it does not follow that little ones are now subject to it.

Objection 7. He who departs from the living with original sin ought to undergo a graver punishment than he who, created in the state of pure nature, would depart in the same: but the latter would incur the punishment of loss; since he would be deprived of eternal felicity: therefore the former beyond the punishment of loss ought to be adjudged to others, and therefore he ought to pay punishments of sense. — I distinguish the major with the Doctor, d. 38. q. 2. n. 1: he ought to suffer something graver which in both would have the character of punishment, I deny; that he would have only the character of punishment in him who is infected with sin, it concedes. For although man dying in the state of pure nature would lack forever the vision of God: nevertheless that lack would not inhere in him after the manner of a punishment, since it would not inhere in him by reason of sin. Which the Doctor indeed explains with this evident example: if someone had in mind to bestow some benefit upon two men, and one of them offended his benefactor, on account of which offense he would revoke his will of conferring the benefit upon both; in this hypothesis each would be defrauded of the benefit, yet under a diverse aspect: for he who had not offended would not be deprived of that favor on account of demerit: but on account of the good pleasure of him who had promised, and who no longer has in mind to confer the benefit upon him: whence, saith the Doctor, these would be unequal in that aspect of privation; for one would be deprived because guilty; the other truly not so. The same must be said in the present case.

Objection finally: Venial sin is far lighter than original: but the former is punished with the punishment of sense in the other life: therefore much more is original to be punished with a similar punishment. — I distinguish the major: Venial is lighter than original as to the guilt of fault, which corresponds to aversion from God and the privation of grace, I concede: as to the guilt of punishment which corresponds to voluntary conversion to creatures through inordinate delectation, I deny. And the minor denied, the consequent likewise must be distinguished: since the punishment of sense corresponds to one's own will, and to conversion and inordinate delectation, it is no wonder if venial sin be punished in the other life with punishment of sense, but original only with the punishment of loss.

You ask 1. What should be thought concerning the state of little ones passing from this life with original sin, namely whether they have any pain from the loss of eternal beatitude?

The Seraphic Doctor answered, dist. 33. q. 2, that although little ones have cognition of the lost beatitude, they will nevertheless be affected with no actual pain and no mourning, which he proves thus: «For those departing, he saith, in original alone hold as it were a middle place between those having grace, and those with actual guilt: and since the state of retribution ought to respond to the state of the present life, the souls of little ones ought to be placed in such a state, that they hold as it were a middle place between the blessed and those tortured with eternal fires. Since therefore the blessed lack the evil of sensible punishment, and therewith have the vision of God, while the damned on the contrary are in darkness, and are punished with sensible punishment: little ones, according to the right order of divine equity, ought to communicate in one with the damned, and in the other with the blessed: but they cannot communicate with the blessed in having the divine presence; because then they would communicate in nothing with the damned. For the presence of the vision of God does not stand together with sensible punishment: therefore they communicate with the blessed in this, that they lack all exterior or interior affliction: but with the damned in this, that they are deprived of the vision of God and of corporeal light. Little ones therefore, constituted by the just divine judgment as it were in the middle between the blessed and those simply wretched, know this, yet so that on the one side consideration generates desolation, on the other consolation: thus their cognition and affection are balanced with equal scale by divine judgment, and are perpetuated in such a state, that neither sadness casts them down, nor joy refreshes them: but herein the admirable order of divine Wisdom is shown forth, whereby she knows how to dispose all things in their places, and to order them to her glory. For as mercy is manifested chiefly in the blessed, and justice shines forth chiefly in the damned, so in these both mercy and justice are at once manifested. And hence it is clear that God does not make in vain souls which He knows will go out from the body before the reception of baptism. For God does all things unto the manifestation of His glory. — Therefore divine equity and immutability will consolidate them perpetually in the same state, both as to body and as to soul, whether as regards the cognitive part or the affective, so that they neither advance nor fall short: neither rejoice nor are sad: but remain always thus uniformly, that they may be matter for praising the divine judgment, which is so equitable and just, that no good remains unrewarded, and no evil unpunished, and most perfectly holds the middle between superfluous and diminished». Thus the Seraphic Doctor.

You ask 2. In what place will little ones dwell after the universal judgment, and what will be their exercise and occupation?

I answer that it seems more probable that they are to be shut up in certain subterranean places; for in those things which depend altogether upon the divine will, nothing is to be asserted except what God Himself has revealed through the Scriptures, or made known by sacred tradition, or the holy Fathers have taught by constant authority, or Councils have defined: but by none of these is it established that a middle place between heaven and hell is to be assigned to little ones after the last animadversion of the supreme Judge upon the reprobate: nay, the sacred Scriptures signify no more than two abodes of men after the day of the last judgment: one indeed in heaven with the blessed Angels, the other in hell with the demons; which are also the two cities, namely Jerusalem, and Babylon. And this St. Augustine testifies with very many witnesses: but especially book 1 De peccatorum meritis, et remissione, where he saith: «Nor is there any middle place for anyone, so that he could be otherwise than with the devil, who is not with Christ. Hence the Lord Himself, wishing to take away from the hearts of ill-believers that I know not what middle state which certain men were eager to attribute to unbaptized little ones, so that they should be in life eternal as it were by the merit of innocence, but because they are not baptized should not be with Christ in His kingdom, brought forth the definitive sentence to stop these mouths, where he saith: he who is not with me is against me». And Sermon 11 De verbis Domini, not far from the beginning: «No one, he saith, is left a middle place, where thou mightest place infants. Of the living and the dead judgment shall be made; some shall be at the right, others at the left; I know no other. If therefore there shall be a right and a left, and we know no middle place in the Gospel, behold, at the right is the kingdom of heaven. Possess, he saith, the kingdom: what is not there, is at the left. What shall be at the left? Go ye into eternal fire». — The Author of the Hypognosticon, who is either Augustine or another, ancient and learned by the consensus of all, book 5, beyond the middle: «The first place, he saith, the faith of Catholics believed by divine authority to be the kingdom of the heavens, whence, as I said, the unbaptized is excluded: the second, gehenna, where every apostate, or one alien from the faith of Christ, shall experience eternal punishments. A third we know not at all; nay, we shall not find it to be in the Holy Scriptures. Suppose, O Pelagian, a place from the workshop of thy perverse dogma, where little ones alien from the grace of Christ could possess the rest and glory of life». — But although they be thrust down in tortuous fashion into the internal places, and inhabit the uppermost part of the fire of hell, as some conjecture with the Angelic Doctor: thence nevertheless it is not consequent that they should be agitated by any punishment of sense, on account of the reasons expressed above. Although likewise their will is habitually averted from God: nevertheless it will be so actually rectified that they will nowhere pray, as is to be gathered from the following article from three Pontiffs condemned among the propositions of Baius. «From the habitual dominant will it comes about that a little one departing without the Sacrament of regeneration, when he shall have attained the use of reason, will actually hate God, blaspheme God, and repugn the law of God». — More probable indeed, I said, these things seem to us; for Authors of greater weight are not wanting who think more benignly concerning the state of these infants, namely Catharinus, Suarez, our own Smisinegius, tract. 3 De Deo uno, disp. 6. n. 399, and Lessius book 3 De divinis perfectionibus, chapter 22, where he indeed brought forth various things which, if they be true, the state of those infants will not so much be to be mourned. For he thinks that they will receive the sentence of the Judge, but a benign one, and will be heaped with natural goods both in body and in soul; and therefore will have illustrious knowledge not only of the whole Universe, but also of spiritual things, and even of God Himself, whose perpetual praisers and lovers they will be: whence he concludes it to be credible that their state will be far more felicitous than that of any mortal man in this life. But all these things are most uncertain; therefore to be believed with the less certainty.