Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

Tam abstrusa, tamque a sensibus, et mentis captu longe remota est peccati originalis natura, ut ipse S. August. lib. De moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 22. scribere non dubitaverit; De peccato antiquo nihil est praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius. Unde non mirum si in huius difficultatis enodatione tanta sit, tamque multiplex Auctorum pugna, ut vix numerari possint diversae eorum sententiae. Quorum praecipuae ut innotescant,

NOTANDUM 1. Varios Haereticos circa propositam veritatem fuisse hallucinatos. Primo namque fuerunt quidam erronei, inquit Guillelmus Parisiensis lib. De vitis, et peccatis, cap. 5. dicentes animam humanam naturaliter diligere corpus, et desiderare coniunctionem ipsius, et propterea cum eidem coniungitur, nimio gaudio amplecti corpus, arctiusque ei coniungi quam deberet, et hoc, inquiunt, originale peccatum dicitur, quo peccat anima nimio isto gaudio, et amplexu quam deceat arctiori.

Secunda erronea sententia fuit Mathiae Illyrici Centuriatorum Antesignani, hominis revera ad monstra exeogitanda quodammodo nati, qui in libello de peccato originis, docet illud non esse accidens naturae superadditum, sed ipsammet animae rationalis substantiam ipso Adami peccato substantialiter vitiata, et ex imagine Dei quam in creatione acceperat in imaginem diaboli transformatam: quem errorem prius videtur docuisse Lutherus, siquidem in explicatione Psalmi 50. tractans illa verba, Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, ait: Non loquitur David de ullis operibus, sed simpliciter de materia, et ipso esse, et dicit; Semen humanum, idest massa, ex qua conceptus sum, tota est vitio et peccato corrupta: materia ipsa est vitiata: lutum illud ex quo vasculum hoc fingi coepit, damnabile est. Et paulo post, Foetus. inquit, in utero antequam nascimur, et homines esse incipimus, peccatum est. — Tertia erronea sententia est Lutheranorum, et Calvinistarum asserentium peccatum originale esse ipsam concupiscentiam habituale, sive fomitem peccati, quem contendunt esse vere, et proprie, ac formaliter peccatum.

Variae pariter fuerunt Doctorum Catholicorum de peccati originalis natura sententiae. Primo namque Gregorius Ariminensis dist. 30. qu. 2. art. 1. et Gabriel ibidem, necnon et Guillelmus Parisiensis Tract. de vitii, cap. 4. docent peccatum originale esse morbidae animae qualitatem ob Adae transgressionem in posteros ex vitiata carne per virulentum serpentis afflatum derivatam; ita quod caro sic infecta animam inficiat, eo modo quo liquor optimus ac vitio infundatur. Secundo, plurimi contendunt peccatum originale esse fomitem concupiscentiae, quatenus habet annexam privationem iustitiae originalis debitae: ita ut fomes sit velut materiale, privatio autem ista formale peccati originis; quae sententia tribuitur S. Thomae qu. 82. art. 3. et S. Bonaventurae dist. 30. art. 2. qu. 1. Tertio Rottensis Articulis 2. contra Lutherum, and nonnulli alii post ipsum, affirmant peccatum originale essentialiter consistere in ipso reatu poenae, quo nempe parvuli ex Adamo propagati in ipsa sua conceptionis momento afficiuntur. Quarto, plurimi Theologi, maxime ex recentioribus, volunt rationem formalem peccati originalis consistere in aliqua privatione, quam tamen non omnes eodem modo explicant: aliqui enim dicunt eam consistere in privationе subiectionis mentis ad Deum: alii in privationе iustitiae originalis, et subiectionis partis inferioris superiori parti, necnon et immunitate donorum spiritualium quibus Adamus fuerat exornatus: aliqui in privationе gratiae sanctificantis qua collata fuerat Adamo, in posteros, nisi peccasset, transferenda. Quinto denique probabilior eorum mihi videtur opinio, qui censent peccatum originale esse ipsummet Adami peccatum in posteros transfusum, quatenus nempe moraliter omnes in eo peccaverunt tamquam in suo capite; cui sententiae plurimi subscribunt: imprimis vero Albertus Pighius Controversia prima: Catharinus in Opusculo De casu hominis cap. 8. Salmeron In caput 5. Epistolae ad Romanos, disputatione 15. et 16. ubi addit hanc sententiam debere esse omnium Catholicorum; nam Ita aperte intulit Paulus, inquit, dicendo omnes homines in Adamo peccasse, ut qui hunc sensum ex eius verbis non eliciunt, plane delirare videntur. In eandem sententiam eunt plurimi recentiores, quos refert, et sequitur Egidius de Presentatione lib. 2. De pura Virginis Conceptione, qu. 1. art. 5. Ipsis autem omnibus praeluxit Subtilis Doctor, ut infra demonstrabimus, cuius sententia ut notior fiat,

NOTANDUM 2. Peccatum originale dupliciter considerari posse. Primo, quatenus fuit actuale, hoc est actu commissum, et sic nihil est aliud quam peccatum primi Parentis prout ab illo personam omnium posterorum sustinente commissum est; sic enim omnes in ipso moraliter peccaverunt, et omnes eundem inobedientiae, et transgressionis actum commiserunt, quatenus omnes ille unus homo fuerunt, ut loquitur S. Augustinus, lib. 1. De peccatorum meritis, et remissione, cap. 10. Sicut autem nonnisi moraliter omnes homines in Adamo unus homo fuerunt, ita nonnisi moraliter illo peccante peccaverunt. Seconda spectari potest quatenus est habituale, et habitualiter manens in Adami posteris, donec eluatur; et ut sic nihil aliud est, quam homines in Adamo peccasse moraliter, et propter illud peccatum a se moraliter commissum in primo Parente, esse vere, et realiter Deo exosos, ac privatos ipsius gratia, omnibusque donis, et innocentiae charismatibus ad se transfundendis, nisi cum Adamo peccante peccassent, et talium donorum cum ipso indigni fuissent.

NOTANDEM 3. Quod quemadmodum homines possunt unum aliquem in suum caput morale eligere, suasque voluntates in illum derollvere, ut omnium nomine aliquid agat, et quod ipse fecerit censcantur ipsi fecisse, proindeque omnibus imputetur ac si ipsi fecissent; ita Deus, qui supremus omnium voluntatum nostrarum est Dominus, potuit illas in Adamum transfundere, ipsumque in caput nostrum morale constituere, ita ut sors omnium nostrum, sive in bonum, sive in malum, ex decreto, et pacto divino ab eo ita penderet, ut quemadmodum ius ad sanctitatem originalem, et felicem illum statum in quo fuerat ipse conditus habuissemus, si divinis mandatis obtemperasset, sic eiusdem transgressione illius peccatum ad omnes derivaretur per propagationem naturalem ab ipso descendentes derivatione, et communicatione morali. Qua fit ut Adami peccatum personale sit moraliter peccatum omnium posterorum; nimirum quia peccatum illud commissum fuit a primo Parente veluti capite totius generis humani personam omnium posterorum sustinente, et in quem omnium voluntates erant moraliter a Deo transfusae, ita ut quod ille bene, vel male ageret, imputaretur omnibus veluti membris in ipso capite moraliter, et representative operantibus. His ita praelibatis, primo expugnanda sunt alienae sententiae; demum ea quae nobis probabilior apparet, erit confirmanda.

Conclusio prima. — Peccatum originale non est ipsa substantialis animae corruptio.

Primo, quia ex illa erronea sententia, sequeretur dari aliquam substantiam per se malam: at hoc sapit haeresim Manichaeorum, qui peccatum substantiam quamdam, seu naturam esse asserebant: quod utique pridem damnatum fuit ab Ecclesia, et sanctorum Patrum auctoritate proscriptum. Nam Basilius in Oratione, quod Deus non sit auctor malorum, ait: Non imagineris esse aliquam propriam substantiam mali: nam malitia non est aliquid subsistens. Sanctus Gregorius Nazianzenus, Oratione in sanctum Baptisma: Crede, inquit, nullam esse mali essentiam, nec per se subsistere, nec a Deo creatum. S. Epiphanius Haeresi 37. Malum, inquit, aliquando non erat, neque radix ulla fuit malitiae: neque malum est quiddam per se subsistens, etc. Denique Augustinus pluribus, sed maxime lib. 6. contra Iulianum, cap. 1. docet peccatum originale non esse corpus, neque substantiam. Et in Psalmo 62. generaliter ait: Iniquitas ipsa non est substantia: non enim iniquitas est natura quam formaverit Deus: sed iniquitas est perversitas quam formavit homo.

Sequeretur secundo, Deum, et parentes esse causas peccati originalis; illum animam creando; hos corpus generando; quod utique omnes debent execrari; quippe cum non solum in infinitam Dei bonitatem pugnet, sed et in ipsam Scripturam sacram, qua diserte pronuntiat omnem a Deo conditam naturam esse bonam. Sic Sapientiae 11. Diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti: et secundam ad Timotheum 2. omnis creatura Dei bona est.

Tertio sequeretur, vel hominem mutari essentialiter in Baptismo, et in resurrectione gloriosa, vel peccatum originale nusquam elui; quod directe militat in ipsammet Scripturam sacram docentem peccata omnia deleri per Baptismum. Sic Romanorum 8. Nulla est damnationis iis qui sunt in Christo Iesu: qui non secundum carnem ambulant. Ephesiorum 5. Mundans lavacro aquae in verbo vitae, ut exhiberet ipse sibi gloriosam Ecclesiam non habentem maculam neque rugam. Et prima Ioann. 1. Sanguis Christi emundat nos ab omni peccato. Sequeretur denique animam esse corruptibilem, siquidem homo secundum illam mutatur substantialiter per peccatum.

Impugnatur iterum haeretica illa sententia: homo peccato originali inquinatus, vel est eiusdem substantialis speciei cum homine mundato originali peccato, vel non. Si sit: ergo nulla facta est in ipso substantialis mutatio, quando a statu peccatoris ad statum gratiae transiit. Si non sit: ergo alteruter non est animal rationale, vel erunt homines essentialiter diversae speciei, quod nullus Philosophorum hactenus somniarit. Secundo, non magis peccatum originale deberet esse forma aliqua substantialis teterrima superinducta, quam quodcumque aliud peccatum mortale, propter paritatem rationis: sed absurdum est, quod alia peccata mortalia sint substantiae aut formae substantiales, alias toties homo mutaretur substantialiter quoties peccat, et qui plura admisisset peccata, longe plures haberet gradus substantiae quam qui minus peccasset, vel qui iustus esset. Denique, illa corruptio, et mutatio substantialis qua fieret in anima, necessario fieri deberet per introductionem alicuius formae substantialis advenientis: sed hoc dici nequit; produceretur enim vel a Deo, vel ab homine peccante. At produci non potest a Deo; Deus enim non potest esse causa peccati. Non etiam ab homine, quia nullum habet in se principium quo talem substantiam produceret; illud unicum principium, si quod esset, maxime voluntas a qua peccatum procedit: sed voluntas tantum producit actus, qui solum sunt accidentia, non autem substantiae: ergo, etc.

Obiciunt Illyricus varios Scripturae textus. Primo quidem illud Genes. 6. ubi iuxta Hebraicam editionem legimus: Figmentum humani cordis malum est ab adolescentia sua: ergo massa ipsa cordis, hoc est substantia, dicitur esse mala. Ad Rom. 6. Vetus homo noster crucifixus est ut destruatur corpus peccati: quibus peccatum vocatur vetus homo, et dicitur habere corpus: ergo est substantia. Et codem cap. 6. dicit Apostolus: Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore ad obediendum concupiscentiis eius: ergo peccatum est aliquid regnans, et habens concupiscentias: adeoque debet necessario esse substantia, et non accidens. Denique, imago Dei in homine non erat aliquod accidens, sed substantia; sicut enim dicitur Genes. 1. Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ita dicitur Genes. 5. Adam genuit filium ad imaginem suum: certum est autem filium esse ad imaginem patris, non propter sola accidentia, sed propter naturae similitudinem. Sed si imago Dei substantia erat, profecto etiam imago diaboli substantia esse debet. Amisit autem homo per peccatum imaginem Dei, et induit imaginem diaboli, iuxta illud Ioannis 8. Vos ex patre diabolo estis: et ad Colossenses 3. Induite novum hominem qui renovatur secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum: ergo cum ipsa imago diaboli sit substantia, etiam originale peccatum erit quid substantiale.

Nego has omnes consequentias, et ad primum contextum respondeo, per figmentum cordis non intelligi ipsam substantiam cordis, sed operationes eius quas in se fingit sive tacit, et sic ex illo testu nihil adversum nos urgetur. Vel dico quod etsi intelligeretur ipsa cordis substantia, inde non sequeretur illam esse peccatum; potest enim esse mala denominative a peccato, seu operatione mala, quamvis nec ipsum peccatum, nec mala operatio esset quid substantiale: sicut potest dici infirmus homo et doctus ab infirmitate et doctrina, licet neutra sit substantia. Ad secundum dico, per corpus peccati non intelligi aliquid substantiale, sed ipsam massam, seu congeriem peccatorum. Deinde loquitur Apostolus de peccatis actualibus. Denique, si quid inferri posset, sequeretur ipsum peccatum originale esse aliquod corpus in anima residens, peccatum enim in anima sedem habet: sed hoc asserere stupidum esset: ergo, etc. Ad alterum Apostolicum textum dico, peccatum regnare in mortali nostro corpore eo modo quo superbia in superbo, et in avaro avaritia dominatur; cum tamen neutra sit substantia, sed accidens; regnare autem dicuntur, quatenus inclinant, et movent ad actus sibi conformes. Ad tertium dico, ipsam quidem animae substantiam esse revera imaginem Dei, sed nego illam per peccatum deperdi, vel in aliam transformari: iste namque fuit error Origenis pridem ab Ecclesia damnatus, ut colligitur ex Epiphanio Haeresi 61.

Obicies 2. Peccatum originale est fons, et origo omnis mali: ergo est substantia. — Respondeo negando consequentiam: ita enim appellatur, quia est fons omnis mali, quatenus ob ipsum commissum, Deus subtraxit iustitiam originalem, et auxilia quibus mediantibus non committerentur peccata: sed ex eo non sequitur quod sit substantia; quamvis enim esset accidens, posset habere hanc rationem fontis, et originis.

Obicies 3. Quidquid est difforme, seu non conforme legi, est peccatum: sed ipsamet substantia hominis descendentis ex Adamo, est non conformis legi Dei: ergo est peccatum. — Nego maiorem: solum namque illud peccatum est, quod ex natura sua est non conforme legi: sic autem substantia hominis non est difformis legi Dei, sed hoc competit per se operationi ipsius. Quae responsio confirmatur, quia qua ratione quidquid esset non conforme legi Dei deberet esse peccatum, etiam quidquid esset conforme legi Dei deberet esse opus bonum, et virtus ac meritum, quo nihil absurdius. Itaque quidquid est non conforme legi Dei, est peccatum, vel habens peccatum; sicut quidquid est conforme est opus bonum, vel habens opus bonum; sed non quidquid est non conforme hoc modo debet esse peccatum.

Conclusio secunda. — Peccatum originale non est formaliter concupiscentia, nec fomes ad malum inclinans. Haec est de fide contra Lutheranos, et Calvinistas.

Probatur primo: Per Baptismum eluitur quidquid habet veram, et propriam rationem peccati: sed concupiscentia non tollitur in renatis per Baptismum: ergo concupiscentia non est formaliter peccatum originale. Maior constat tum ex Apostolo ad Romanos 8. Nihil damnationis est in his qui renati sunt in Christo. Tum ex Concilio Tridentino Sess. 5. Canone 5. Si quis per Iesu Christi Domini nostri gratiam, quae in Baptismate confertur, reatum originalis peccati remitti negat, aut etiam asserit non etiam tolli totum id quod veram, et propriam peccati rationem habet, sed illud dicit tantum radi aut non imputari, anathema sit. Tum denique ex sanctis Patribus: Hieronymo Epistola ad Oceanum: Quomodo, inquit, iustificati sumus, et sanctificati, si peccatum aliquod in nobis relinquatur? Augustino contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, cap. 3. ubi ait: Baptismus abluit peccata omnia, prorsus omnia, sive originalia, sive addita. Minor etiam constat tum ipsa experientia qua unusquisque ex renatis per Baptismum in seipso fomitem illum deprehendit, quo ad bona delectabilia etiam vetita stimulatur. Tum ex Apostolo ad Romanos 7. dicente: Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae. Tum denique ex eodem Concilio Tridentino ibidem: Manere autem in baptizatis concupiscentiam, vel fomitem haec sancta Synodus fatetur, et sentit; quae cum ad agonem relicta sit, nocere non consentientibus, seu viriliter per Christi Iesu gratiam repugnantibus non valet; quinimo qui legitime certaverit coronabitur.

Utrainque hanc propositionem confirmat S. Augustinus lib. 6. contra Iulianum, cap. 19. ubi diserte probat quod etsi concupiscentia ex originali peccato promanans remaneat in renatis quantum ad actum, non tamen remaneat penes reatum. Ego, inquit, de concupiscentia dixi, quae est in membris repugnans legi mentis, cuius reatus eius in omnium peccatorum remissione transierit: sicut e contrario, sacrificium idolis factum, si deinceps non fiat, praeterit actu, sed manet reatu, nisi per indulgentiam remittatur. Quiddam enim tale est sacrificare idolis, ut opus ipsum cum fit praetereat, eodemque praeterito reatus eius maneat venia resolvendus. Tale est carnis concupiscentia, ut maneat in homine secum per continentiam confligente, quamvis reatus qui fuerat generatione contractus, iam sit regeneratime transactus. Actu enim manet, non quidem abstrahendo et illiciendo mentem, eiusque consensu concipiendo et pariendo peccata, sed motu, quibus mens resistat, desideria commeando. Ipse quippe mutus actus est eius, quamvis mente non consentiente desit effectus.

Quibus verbis S. Augustinus declarat quod etsi concupiscentia quatenus seminarium est peccati originalis et cum ipso coniuncta remittatur in Baptismate quantum ad reatum, hoc est, quantum ad rationem formalem peccati originalis cuius est tradux, tamen ex integro subsistit in renatis quantum ad suum vigorem suamque efficacitatem, utpote cum in eis motus illicitos et rationi adversantes plerumque suscitet, subindeque ipsa non est peccatum originale.

Probatur secundo ex illo S. Iacobi, cap. 1. Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus, et illectus. Deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum; peccatum vero cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem. Quibus quatuor res videtur Apostolus distinguere: Primo concupiscentiam, idest, potentiam appetendi pronam, et stimulantem ad malum, et tres eius motus, nempe suggestionem, delectionem, et consensum: concupiscentiam autem, idest potentiam pronam, et primum eius motum, non appellat S. Iacobus peccatum: delectationem autem, quae est partus imperfectus, dum non est plene deliberatus, peccatum vocat, sed non mortale: denique partus perfectus, hoc est desiderium cum pleno consensu, quod vocat peccatum consummatum, generat mortem, idest, fit plene mortale.

Confirmatur ex sanctis Patribus qui praefatum contextum sic explicant, maxime vero S. Augustinus membro 6. adversus Iulianum, cap. 5. Sed, inquit, cum dicit Apostolus Iacobus: unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus, et illectus: deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit parit peccatum: profecto in his verbis partus a pariente distinguitur, pariens enim est concupiscentia, partus peccatum. Sed concupiscentia non parit, nisi conceperit, non concipit, nisi illexerit: hoc est, ad malum perpetrandum obtinuerit voluntatis assensum. Idem docet S. Chrysostomus Homilia 13. in Epistolam ad Romanos; Ipsae, inquit, passiones in se peccatum non sunt: effrenata vero rerum immoderantia peccatum operata est. Et ut exempli gratia unam illarum tractem, concupiscentia quidem peccatum non est; quando vero egressa modum foras eruperit, tunc demum adulterium fit, non a concupiscentia, sed a nimio, et illicito illius luxu. Similiter S. Hilarius in Psalmum 118. exponens versiculum 29. Viam iniquitatis amove a me, ait: Viam peccati qua ad peccatum pergere promptum est, amoveri a se deprecatur, idest, omnia corporalium voluptatum desideria auferri, nec tentationem aliquam concupiscentiae, aut ignorantiae, qua tamquam per viam ad peccatum itur, ingruere. Denique S. Bernardus in Sermone de sex tribulationibus, Peccatum, inquit, in foribus est, nisi ipse aperias, non intrabit: appetitus in corde prurit, sed nisi sponte cesseris, nihil nocebit; consensum cohibe, ne praevaleant haec, et immaculatus eris.

Ipsis concinit Subtilis Doctor in 2. dist. 32. n. 7. ubi inquirens ac resolvens quid sit peccatum originale, quaestionemque resolvens ex doctrina S. Anselmi, lib. 1. De conceptu virginali, cap. 27. nimirum quod peccatum originale sit carentia iustitiae originalis quatenus debite: cum sibi obiecisset quod aliqui SS. Doctores videntur rationem formalem peccati originalis constituere in concupiscentia; respondet,

that concupiscence, whether as a habit or as a proneness in the sensitive appetite: and none of these is formally sin, for there is no sin in the sensitive part according to chapter 3 and 4 there. Or it can be taken as it is a proneness in the rational appetite, that is, in the will, toward concupiscing delights immoderately, which is apt to delight together with the sensitive appetite to which it is joined, and in this way concupiscence is the material element of original sin: because through the lack of original justice, which was like a bridle restraining it from immoderate delight, it becomes, not positively but through privation, prone to concupiscence of immoderate delights: as he illustrates in chapter 5 by the example of a ship with a broken rudder: and of a horse with a broken bridle, which is left to itself: and from this it executes the disordered motion which that bridle would have restrained.

Ita Doctor. Ex quibus apparet quantum hallucinentur Lutherani, ac Calvinistae, dum sanctos Patres suis erroneis dogmatibus patrocinari adfirmant.

Probatur tertio: ideirco concupiscentia, et fomes ad malum stimulans censeri posset originale peccatum, quia revera peccatum proprius dictum esset: sed falsum consequens: ergo et antecedens. Maior constat. Probatur minor: si homo crearetur in puris naturalibus absque aliquibus habitibus innatis, aut acquisitis virtutum moralium, haberet concupiscentiam non minus quam modo; quia haberet appetitum inclinantem ad bonum delectabile, sive esset prohibitum, sive non: et voluntas ipsius esset naturaliter inclinata ad conformandum se appetitui; concupiscentiam autem habere nihil aliud est quam habere appetitum, et voluntatem hoc modo: sed in tali casu non esset necesse ut fieret ullius praecepti transgressio: ergo potest esse concupiscentia absque ullo peccato. Deinde, peccatum originale reperitur in animabus parvulorum non baptizatorum quando moriuntur, sicut et in animabus aliorum omnium qui absque baptismo in re, vel in voto decedunt: sed in parvulis nulla est concupiscentia, nullusque peccati fomes: ergo peccatum originale non est peccati fomes, neque concupiscentia. Denique concupiscentia est effectus et poena peccati originalis: ergo esse nequit ipsum originale peccatum. Consequentia patet; quamvis enim unum, et idem possit esse peccatum, et poena peccati, et etiam causa peccati; tamen hoc sine dubio intelligendum per comparationem ad diversa; nequit enim res una esse peccatum, et poena, atque effectus peccati respectu eiusdem: alioquin esset poena, et effectus respectu sui ipsius, et per hoc prior ac posterior seipsa. Antecedens est ipsius sancti Augustini pluribus in locis, maxime vero lib. 6. in Iulianum cap. 3. Concupiscentia, inquit, poena peccati est, quia reddita est meritis inobedientis. Necnon et lib. De continentia, cap. 7. ubi comparat peccatum originale febribus: concupiscentiam vero languori, qui sanatis febribus remanet. Aliud, inquit, carere febribus, aliud ab infirmitate, quae febribus facta est, recalescere. Et intra: Prima curatio est causam removeri languoris, quod per omnium fit indulgentiam peccatorum: secundo, ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiscendo, etc. Quibus aperte docet peccatum, quod in baptismate remittitur, causam dici languoris, idest, concupiscentia remanentis: igitur ipsa concupiscentia non potest dici peccatum originale; alioquin esset causa sui ipsius.

Obiciunt primo haeretici varia Apostoli oracula, quibus probare nituntur concupiscentiam revera esse formaliter peccatum. Sic ad Romanos 6. Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore. Intelligitur autem Apostolus de concupiscentia, subdit enim: ad obediendum concupiscentiis eius. Similiter cap. 7. Iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum; scio enim quod non habitat in me, idest in carne mea, bonum. Quibus verbis Apostolus concupiscentiam peccatum appellat: sed illa non potest esse peccatum actuale, cum non sit actus, sed habitus: ergo erit peccatum originale. — Respondent Doctores Catholici, concupiscentiam ab Apostolo peccatum appellari, non quod peccatum sit formaliter, sed quia est effectus peccati originalis, et causa peccati actualis. Loquitur enim Apostolus iuxta morem Scripturae sacrae, quae plerumque vocem peccati usurpat nunc pro ipsa culpa, nunc pro poena, quae est culpae effectus, nunc etiam pro causa peccati: nunc denique pro sacrificio, quod est peccati expiatio; Sic Deuteronomii 9. Moyses ait: Peccatum vestrum quam feceratis, igne combussi, et in frusta comminuens, in pulverem redegi. Ubi manifeste vitulus aureus dicitur peccatum, quia effectus, et causa peccati exstitit. Sic Oscae 1. Sacerdotes dicuntur comedere peccata populi. Sic ipsemet Apostolus, eodem cap. ad Romanos, legem, peccatum appellat, quia nimirum est causa manifestativa peccati. — Eamdem solutionem tradit Concilium Tridentinum Sessione 5. Canone 5. ubi legimus: Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat, Ecclesiam Catholicam numquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere, et proprie peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est, et ad peccatum inclinat. Quam utique doctrinam secutus erat S. August. lib. 1. De Nuptiis, cap. 23. ubi dicit concupiscentiam vocari peccatum. Quia, inquit, peccato facta est, cum iam in regeneratis non sit ipsa peccatum: sicut lingua vocatur locutio, quam facit lingua, et manus vocatur scriptura, quam facit manus. Itemque sic vocatur peccatum, quia peccatum si vincat, facit: sicut vocatur frigus piger, non quod a pigris fiat, sed quod pigros faciat.

Instabis ex S. Augustino lib. 5. contra Iulianum, ubi ait: Sicut infiditas cordis et peccatum est, quia in Deum non creditur, et poena peccati, qua cor superbum digna animadversione praemitur, et poena peccati cum aliquod male cordis errore committitur: ita carnis concupiscentia, adversus quam bonus concupiscit spiritus, et peccatum est, quia non est illi obedientia contra dominatum mentis, et poena, et causa peccati. — Respondeo ideoque S. August. concupiscentiam peccatum appellare, et non solum causam, vel effectum peccati, eo quod sit vitium, et naturae infirmitas tollens primam naturae veluti perfectionem, ingenitumque rigorem, quem in prima sui formatione a Deo acceperat: non autem ipsam peccatum appellat, quod sit proprie, et formaliter offensa Dei, ibi enim agebat contra Pelagianos, qui concupiscentiam quasi naturae perfectionem laudabant. Ut scilicet, inquit ibidem S. August. cap. 30. eam tamquam bonum naturale laudando suum pestiferum dogma confirment, quo asserunt prolem, quae per illum nascitur, nullum trahere originale peccatum.

Urges: S. August. ibidem comparat concupiscentiam cum caecitate cordis, qua Deo non creditur: sed cordis caecitas proprie et formaliter est peccatum: ergo et concupiscentia. — Respondeo 1. Negari posse consequentiam: non enim opus est, quod quae inter se comparantur, in omnibus quadrent, sed sufficit quod in aliquibus conveniant, ut omnibus fere comparationibus accidit. — Secundo dico, ipsam cordis caecitatem per se formaliter non esse peccatum: infideles enim, qui nihil unquam de Evangelio audierunt, nec audire potuerunt, habent negativam cordis caecitatem, et mysteriorum fidei ignorantiam, quae tamen caecitas in ipsis non est culpanda, ut docet S. August. Epistola 106. scribens: In illis qui non audierunt, neque potuerunt, poena peccati est non credere, non autem peccatum. — Tertio dico S. August. ibidem concupiscentiam appellare peccatum, quia interdum permittit Deus, ut homo cedat concupiscentiae motibus, et in novum peccatum ruat, in vindictam scilicet prioris peccati: unde ibidem explicans illud Apostoli ad Romanos: Tradidit Deus in desideria cordis eorum, ait: Aliud est habere mala desideria cordis, aliud tradi eis, utique ut consentiendo eis possideatur ab eis, quod fit cum divino iudicio traditur eis... Cum ergo dicitur homo tradi desideriis suis, inde fit reus, quia desertus a Deo, cedit eis, atque consentit, vincitur, trahitur, possidetur; a quo enim quis devictus est, huic et servus addictus est, et fit ei peccatum consequens praecedentis poena peccati. Quibus patet S. August. non appellare peccatum omnes concupiscentiae motus, sed tantum eos, quibus homo in poenam praecedentis peccati iusto Dei iudicio cedere permittitur. Alioquin, ait ille, frustra dictum est Ecclesiastici 18. Post concupiscentias tuas non eas, si iam quisque non reus est, quod tumultuantes, et ad mala trahere nitentes sentit eas, nec eas sequitur: si eis traditur exercens adversus eas gloriosa certamina, si vivit in gratia.

Obiciunt 2. Quidquid formaliter opponitur legi, et dictamini rationis, peccatum est: sed concupiscentia opponitur legi rationis, iuxta illud ad Romanos 7. Sentio aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae: ergo peccatum est. Non actuale; ergo originale. Deinde: quidquid in peccatum inducit, etiam peccatum est: sed concupiscentia, ex eodem Apostolo ibidem, inducit, et captivat in lege peccati: ergo peccatum est. Denique: solum peccatum odio habetur a Deo; diligit enim omnia, quae sunt, et nihil odit eorum, quae fecit: solum autem peccatum non facit: adeoque quod odio habet, peccatum censeri debet: sed Deus odio habet concupiscentiam, ut docet S. Augustinus in Psalmum 37. Expendens illa verba: Malitiam autem non odivit, ait: Peccatum, et iniquitatem oderis, ut iungas te Deo, qui tecum illud oderit, iam coniunctus mente legi Dei, mente servi legi Dei: ibi autem loquitur de concupiscentia, quam peccatum appellat.

Respondeo ad primum, distinguendo maiorem: id quod opponitur legi, et dictamini rationis formaliter, ac per se, est etiam formaliter peccatum, concedo: quod opponitur tantum causaliter, nego. Et similiter distincta minore, nego consequentiam, concupiscentia enim per se non opponitur dictamini rationis, quippe cum prosit homini ad pugnam, et coronam. — Ad secundum nego maiorem, non enim id omne, quod ad peccatum inducere potest, peccatum est, sed tantum id peccatum formaliter appellatur, quod voluntas pleno, ac libero assensu contra divinam legem admittit. — Ad tertium denique nego maiorem: non enim solum odio habetur a Deo id quod est malum morale formaliter, sed etiam id quod est malum morale causaliter, seu causa malitiae moralis, ut constat in habitu vitioso, qui odio habetur a Deo, quatenus inclinat ad actus malos, licet per se non sit formaliter peccatum. Ad Augustinum dico, ipsum ibidem concupiscentiam appellare peccatum, quatenus nempe ipsi homo voluntarie succumbit: unde ait: Aliud est non pugnare, et esse in poena certa, atque perpetua: aliud pugnare, et vincere: aliud pugnare, et vinci; aliud nec pugnare, sed trahi. Sunt enim homines prorsus, qui non pugnant, quales est iste, de quo loquitur cum dicit malitiam non odio habuisse: Quomodo enim pugnaret contra eam, quam non odit? Iste a malitia trahitur, nec pugnat. Sunt autem, qui pugnare incipiunt, sed quia de viribus suis praesumunt, ut ostendat illis Deus, quia ipse vincit, si se homo subiungat Deo, et pugnantes vincuntur, et cum quasi ceperint tenere iustitiam, fiunt superbi, et eliduntur: isti pugnant, sed vincuntur. Quis est autem, qui pugnat, et non vincitur? Qui dicit: Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae.

Obiciunt denique: Christus Dominus eos omnes naturae humanae detectus assumpsit, qui non sunt formaliter peccatum: ergo quos non assumpsit formaliter esse peccatum censendum est: sed neque fomitem, nec concupiscentiam induit: ergo signum est quod concupiscentia, et fomes sit peccatum. — Nego maiorem; non enim tantum non assumpsit eos detestans, qui sunt formaliter peccatum; sed etiam eos, qui sunt peccatum causaliter, qualis est concupiscentia, cuius motus quamvis non sint peccatum formale, tamen quatenus ad actus venereos inclinarent Christi sanctitatem, ac dignitatem dedecent: sicut et ipsius corpus dedecent defectus naturales caecitatis, claudicationis, monstruositatis, quos propterea non erat conveniens, ut assumeret.

Third Conclusion. — Original sin is not some morbid quality derived from the corruption of the carnal appetite into the very soul.

It is proved first: That morbid quality, if there were such, would above all be the cause of the inclination to evil, and of the languor toward good: but this cannot be affirmed: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for the champions of that opinion can assert nothing else, since no other effect of that virulent quality can appear. But the minor is proved, first indeed, because an inclination and languor of this kind, experience being witness, subsists even in the regenerate after baptism, and therefore also the cause from which it flows must needs subsist: but original sin does not subsist after baptism: therefore it is not that morbid quality. — Secondly: Either the sin of the first parent, or the corruption of our flesh, is naturally the efficient cause of such a morbid quality caused in the soul, or God Himself must be assigned as its author: but neither can be affirmed. Not indeed the first: for how could the sin of the first parent, which was long since extinguished and physically perished, be the physical cause of such a quality in infants contracting original sin? How also could the corruption of the flesh, which is a material thing, naturally produce a spiritual quality in the soul? The second likewise cannot be said; for to assert that God is the cause of that morbid quality which is not connatural to us, by which we are inclined to sin and withdrawn from good, is not only absurd, but impious and blasphemous.

Objector: St. Ambrose, in the 7th chapter to the Romans, saying: How does sin dwell in the flesh, since it is not a substance, but the privation of a Gift? The sin of the first man made the body corrupt through sin; and that very corruption, through the condition of the offense, remains in the body, holding the force of the divine sentence given in Adam, by whose fellowship the soul is stained: therefore he truly holds original sin to be a morbid and virulent quality. Then St. Augustine, book 1. De Nuptiis, and concupiscence, ch. 25. says original sin is a certain affection of an evil quality, and a morbid affection: for inquiring how concupiscence remains in the regenerate he says: Although however it is now loosed from its guilt, it nevertheless remains until all our infirmity is healed, the renovation of the interior man profiting from day to day, until the exterior man shall have put on incorruption; for it does not remain substantially as some body or spirit, but it is a certain affection of an evil quality, as a languor: therefore he holds original sin to be some morbid quality. — I deny both consequents, and to St. Ambrose I say first, that those commentaries are probably not his, as we have said many times already. Then, even if they were his authorship, yet from the quoted opinion nothing against our Conclusion could be evinced; for the body to be corrupted through sin can only be understood insofar as it is deprived of the many gifts and graces by which it would have been illumined, had the happy state of innocence persevered, by reason of which the sensitive appetite would not have been carried with such impetuosity toward delectable good. Whence it comes about that from the fellowship of a body deprived of gifts of this kind, the soul is stained, insofar as its appetite is borne immoderately against the prohibition toward delectable objects, and thus original sin reigns, insofar as it has these effects in us, which otherwise would not have been. — To St. Augustine I say, that he calls original sin an affection of an evil quality, not because it is so physically, but because it is so morally; insofar as man, affected by that sin, holds himself in that manner... [truncated]

Fourth Conclusion. — The privation of original justice, however it be taken, cannot be called original sin. This is against the common opinion of the Thomists.

It is proved 1. Original sin, which is drawn by the posterity of Adam, and is to be cleansed in the laver of regeneration, is a true, and properly so called sin: yet the privation of original justice can by no means be called a true, nor a properly so called sin: therefore, etc. The major stands from what was said in the preceding Question, especially from the Council of Trent, Session 5. Canons 1. and 2. in which it is decreed that the sin which in little ones must needs be expiated in the laver of regeneration, in order to obtain life everlasting, is a true, and properly so called sin. But the minor is proved both from St. August. book 3. De libero arbitrio, ch. 19. where he says, That is not properly called sin which is committed with free will by one who knows: by which words he clearly signifies that every mortal sin, properly so called, is that which is committed with free will by one who knows; namely either of itself immediately, or mediated by another as moral head. But the privation of original justice can by no means be called a true and properly so called sin: Both because without all fault God could deprive man of all the justice and perfection which He had granted to the first Parent; for as He is bound by no right to confer such perfection, but had bestowed it on Adam from His mere liberality and divine munificence; so neither is He bound to preserve it, but at His pleasure He can take it away: that being taken away, and not preserved by God, in that case man would be said to be deprived of original justice, insofar as privation signifies the lack of a form, toward which the subject is inclined; yet thus it would by no means be sin; since it would happen apart from all fault of man: therefore, etc. Both because that privation of original justice in Adam and his posterity was willed by God: but God cannot will or approve sin: therefore that privation is not sin. The major stands: for that lack of justice after the commission [of sin] is an effect of the divine vengeance and chastisement of God upon Adam himself, and thereupon was willed by God. The minor also is manifest; for something is sin insofar as it is done against the divine vol... [truncated]

Then, if the privation of original justice were formally the primordial and hereditary sin, it would follow that it is not altogether blotted out and remitted by the sacrament of Baptism; since by Baptism that original justice is not restored which was committed to Adam to be handed on to posterity: since neither integrity, nor constant innocence, nor the concord of peace between body and soul and the harmony of their faculties, once lost, is repaired. But it is erroneous to assert that original sin is not altogether remitted by Baptism, as the Council of Trent defines, Session 5. Canon 5. in these words: If anyone shall deny that by the grace of Jesus Christ our Lord, which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted: or even shall assert that not the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is taken away: but shall say that it is only erased, or not imputed: let him be anathema. For in the regenerate there is left nothing by which God condemns them: because there is no condemnation to those who have been truly buried with Christ by baptism into death: who walk not according to the flesh, but putting off the old man, and putting on the new, which is created according to God, are made cleansed, pure, innocent, and beloved of God, heirs indeed of God, but co-heirs of Christ, so that nothing whatsoever delays them from the entrance of heaven. From these things it appears that by Baptism all that is altogether remitted which has the nature of original sin, nor is any whit of it found any longer in the regenerate; but since there is found in them the lack of original justice, it is a most evident argument that original sin does not consist in that privation and lack of original justice itself.

Finally, that which is the punishment of sin is not formally the sin itself: but the privation of original justice is the punishment of the sin of Adam and of all his posterity who sinned in him: therefore it is not formally sin. There is added in confirmation that God could create man in the state of pure nature, since, as has been proved, that state is possible: but in that state man would lack original justice and sanctifying grace, and yet would have no sin: therefore that lack of primordial justice cannot be formally original sin.

Some answer with Vasquez, in 1. 2. disp. 131. that the privation of original justice, but especially of grace, can be regarded in two ways: First, inasmuch as it is an evil to God, and takes away the subjection due to Him: Secondly, as it is an evil to man, and as it takes away a perfection promised and due to him, namely the subjection of the body to the soul, and of the interior appetite to the superior. In the former way, they say, the privation of grace, or of original justice, has the nature of fault, since it is a moral and voluntary aversion from God as the last end: but in the latter way it has the nature of punishment, since it is an evil and unbecoming to man, and ordained by God against the disorder and deformity of fault. — Against this, first: no fault, nor any sin, is efficiently from God: but the privation of original justice, or that lack of grace, by which the soul was subjected to God Himself, by which the body obeyed the soul in all things, is caused by God, who, as He alone could confer that gift of original justice, so also He can take it away. Secondly, the sin of Adam deserved as much the subtraction and lack of grace, and of subjection to God, as the lack of the subjection of concupiscence, and of appetite, to reason: therefore by the same reason that the lack of the subjection of the appetite to reason is said to be a punishment, by equal reason the lack of subjection to God ought also to be held a punishment inflicted on account of original sin. Thirdly finally, the privation of grace and of the subjection of the soul to God, however it be taken, is formally a punishment: therefore it is not formally sin. The antecedent is proved: that is formally a punishment which is inflicted in vengeance for some fault: but the privation of the subjection of the soul to God is inflicted upon the posterity of Adam on account of his sin; since God had entered into a pact with him concerning the giving of grace to his posterity, upon the hypothesis that he would not sin, and concerning its denial if he should sin, just as in fact He denies it on account of his sin: but this denial can be nothing else than a punishment. Which indeed is evident from a similar case, for if some Prince should so stipulate with a nobleman, that if he were faithful in his obed... [truncated]

You will say 1.: That which is joined with sin by the nature of the thing necessarily cannot be the punishment of sin: but the privation of grace in Adam and his posterity is necessarily joined with sin by the nature of the thing: therefore it cannot be called the punishment of sin. — I deny the major; for if this were true, it would follow equally that the privation of glory is not the punishment of sin; for this has a necessary consequence and connexion by the nature of the thing with sin: but this consequent is altogether absurd and erroneous.

I answer 2. I distinguish the major: that which is joined physically with a sinful act, either as an essential predicate, or its property, or as an accident inhering connaturally in the subject itself, cannot be its punishment, I concede the major. That which is joined by the Decree of God, and only morally by way of punishment inflicted by God in vengeance for a sinful act, I deny the major: and likewise the minor as distinguished, I deny the consequent.

Objector 2. St. Anselm, 1. De Conceptu virginali ch. 1. I know not how to understand anything else in those infants by the sin which is called original, than that through disobedience a nakedness has been made by the want of due justice: but this nakedness is the privation of that justice: therefore, etc. Then St. Dionysius, book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia ch. 2. calls original sin the state of dissimilitude of man with God, namely the supernatural, consisting in the lack of sanctifying grace; and therefore he holds that sin to be nothing else than the lack and privation of sanctifying grace. Finally the Council of Trent, Session 5. Canon 2. says, original sin is the death of the soul: but the death of the soul is nothing else than the privation of grace: for death formally is the lack of life, but the life of the soul is sanctifying grace. Moreover the same Council there Canon 3. 4. and 5. affirms original sin to be something intrinsic to the posterity of Adam, and to be a true, and properly so called sin: but nothing else is intrinsic to them which can be truly and properly called sin, besides the privation of grace, and of the justice due. Finally from the same Council Session 6. ch. 3. it is the same thing to contract original sin, as to borrow one's own injustice from Adam: but injustice properly and formally is the privation of justice: therefore the Council holds original sin to be nothing else than the lack of original justice. — I deny all these consequents, and to the authority of SS. Anselm and Dionysius, I answer that they can be understood causally and effectively; so that they wish original sin to be the efficient cause of that dissimilitude of the soul with God, and likewise of spiritual nakedness, and of the lack of all supernatural gifts; but not that original sin be formally that dissimilitude, or nakedness. Or I say, that they wish original sin to be in us morally; namely insofar as the sin of Adam is formally in us, and morally infects us. For a twofold dissimilitude with God, and injustice, can be distinguished; one actual,... [truncated]

Anselm to understand justice, and injustice as actual, but not habitual; for little ones after baptism do not lack habitual justice, but only actual; of which they are not yet capable. — To Trent, I say that it is likewise to be understood causally and effectively; so that original sin be the cause of the privation of grace, and of the death of the soul, and likewise of the lack of the justice due; since by reason of that sin, the soul is not only stripped of spiritual life, namely sanctifying grace; but also of all the other spiritual gifts, by which the soul itself was to be subjected to God, and likewise the body was to obey the soul in all things. But the Council does not will original sin to be formally that privation, or injustice: for as according to the same Council Session 6. ch. 7. Justification is not the sole remission of sins, but also the infusion of grace, and gifts: so injustice is not only the privation of justice, and of gifts, but also sin. But little ones contract both, since they participate in the sin of the first Parent morally transfused into them, and on account of it become hateful to God, and are deprived of supernatural habits.

Objector 3. Original sin formally and essentially consists in that which is first taken away by baptism, since this Sacrament was instituted for the blotting out of original fault: but by baptism the privation of original justice is taken away per se first, especially as to its primary effect, namely the lack of sanctifying grace: therefore original sin consists formally in the privation of original justice, but as the primary effect of sanctifying grace, which is to rectify the soul, and to join it to its last end. — I distinguish the major; that it is taken away first by baptism formally, I concede: causally, and consequently only, I deny: but the privation of grace and justice is taken away only consequently through the remission of sin, and the infusion of sanctifying grace, and likewise the bestowal of the supernatural virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity. Whence the primary effect of baptism is not the infusion of grace itself, but the cleansing of sin. And likewise the minor as distinguished, I deny the consequent.

Objector 4. That in each thing holds the character of the constitutive reason, from which as from a root and origin the other things pertaining to it emanate and follow: but from the privation of original justice as to its first effect, namely the conjunction of the mind to God, emanate the other disorders from the sin of Adam translated to us by generation: therefore such privation is the constitutive reason of original sin. The major stands: the minor is proved: from the sin of Adam there are derived into posterity the fomes, or concupiscence, and the rebellion of the inferior appetite against the superior, and likewise the penalties of the body, as sicknesses, pains, weariness of body, the necessity of dying, and other miseries by which we are tossed on every side: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor; for all those privations take their origin not from the very lack of sanctifying grace, but from the very guilt of fault, which little ones contracted in Adam as sinning in him as head; just as also the very privation of sanctifying grace, which emanates from the same guilt of fault: for not for any other reason did God strip Adam and his posterity of sanctifying grace, than because he himself rebelled against the divine mandate, and while he sinned, all his posterity also sinned in him, and with him.

Last Conclusion. — Original sin in the posterity of Adam is the very sin of Adam itself remaining in them morally, inasmuch as all sinned in it as in a head. This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor in 2. dist. 32. single question, num. 7. as the most learned Scholiast Cavellus rightly notes there, where, having said that Original sin is the privation of original justice: he subjoins: Yet it is not the privation of any habitual gift, but of the rectitude due to be inherent by way of term from a second act, caused in the will, and transfused by generation; whence it is deprived of habits not formally, but causally: and thus teach Herrera in 2. q. 82. art. 3. and Zimel. disp. 1. ad 1. and disp. 2. concl. 5. Poncius in 2. dist. 30. q. 2. Herinx disp. 6. sect. 2. But the Doctor's opinion was embraced by Pighius, controversy 1. Catharinus in Summa doctrina de peccato originali: Salmero in ch. 5. to the Romans disp. 45. and 46. where he adds, This opinion ought to be of all Catholics: for, he says, Paul so plainly spoke it, that they who do not elicit this sense from his words plainly seem to rave: and it is defended by very many of the Recent writers, whom Martinonus relates and follows disp. 20. sect. 5.

But this opinion is proved: First indeed from that to the Romans ch. 5. By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. And a little after, verse 15. By the offense of one many are dead. And verse 19. By the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners. The Council also of Trent Session 5. Canon 3. citing the aforesaid words of the Apostle, subjoins: If anyone shall say that this sin of Adam, which by its origin is one, and transfused into all by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one as his own, etc. From which it stands that original sin is one and the same of all: but it is not another sin which is one and the same of all posterity, unless the sin of the first Parent committed in the person of all: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed by the authority of SS. Fathers, but especially St. August. who teaches in many places that original sin is the single sin of all men, namely the sin of the first Parent in which all sinned: which indeed he demonstrates most clearly book 4. contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, ch. 1. where, praising the aforesaid words of the Apostle: In whom all have sinned: he adds these: In that man all sinned, when he sinned: since in him were all, because universally the sin of all was that which all, being born, were going to contract. And book 1. De Peccatorum meritis, et remissione, ch. 10. Certainly it is manifest that the sins of each are one thing, in which only those sin whose proper sins they are: another this, in which all sinned, when all those were one man. Likewise book 2. ch. 7. Lest, he says, they should be called the sins of others as not pertaining to little ones: since in Adam all sinned, when in that nature so implanted in him, in which he was able to beget them, that one man was all the fault. But they are called the sins of others, because they were not yet living their own lives, but whatever was in the future propagation, the life of one man contained. Then, subjoining the exception of the Pelagians, By no reason, they say, is it granted, that God who remits proper sins should impute the sins of others: he answers thus: He remits them, but to those regenerated by the Spirit, not begotten of the flesh. But He imputes them no longer as the sins of others, but as their own. For those were such when those who carried them propagated were not yet: for now by carnal generation they are already theirs, to whom they have not yet been remitted by spiritual regeneration. — And book 1. Retract., ch. 13. where, having examined what he had said in book De Vera Religione, ch. 14. that sin is so voluntary that in no way is it sin, unless it be voluntary: proceeding to original sin, he says thus: And that which in little ones is called original sin, while they do not yet use the free choice of the will, is not absurdly called also voluntary, because contracted from the evil will of the first man, it is in a certain manner hereditary. — Similar things the rest tea... [truncated]

It is proved secondly: That is original sin by which the posterity of Adam are constituted sinners, and which is transfused from Adam himself into them: yet the sin of Adam is that very thing by which his posterity are constituted sinners, and which is transfused from Adam himself into them: therefore, etc.

The major stands; the minor is proved, both from the aforesaid words of the Council of Trent; then from the praised authorities of SS. Fathers; finally by reason itself, because the merit of Christ is imputed to little ones, and by reason of it they merit life everlasting morally: therefore the actual sin of Adam also can be imputed to little ones; so that by reason of it they demerit, which in fact they demerit on account of original sin; and consequently it can be called their demerit, and sin morally. Then, the privation of grace, and of supernatural gifts, is a punishment inflicted on the posterity on account of the sin of Adam: but it cannot be inflicted on little ones on account of any other sin than that of Adam, which is proper to them, inasmuch as all sinned in it: therefore, etc. Finally, as in political affairs we see the sins of Parents justly imputed to sons, and they on that account punished, because they are said to have sinned in their Parents; so by equal reason it must be said that the posterity of Adam, guilty of no actual sin, are nevertheless justly condemned by God to the death both of soul and of body, and other afflictions, because in that first Parent, as members in a head, all sinned: therefore it must be concluded with Bellarmine, book 5. De Statu peccati, ch. 18: Even if we should suppose that little ones in Adam, and with Adam, truly sinned, no reason will be able to explain how there is in newborn little ones any true fault: and this dogma of the Catholics will then seem not above reason, but against reason. For whatever we may say adheres in little ones from the sin of Adam, whether guilt, or aversion, or the privation of grace, or anything else: that could by no means give reason to little ones, or harm them, unless it proceeded from a free act, of whose action they were in some manner partakers... There remains therefore what we said above, that there cannot be in little ones anything which has the nature of fault, unless they were partakers of the acts of that precipitation of Adam. Thus Bellarmine, whence I can scarcely conceive how he went over to the opinion opposed to our conclusion.

You will say 1: The Council of Trent Session 5. Can. 3. teaches that original sin is transfused by propagation from Adam into posterity, is in all, and is proper to each one: and Session 6. ch. 3. says, When men are conceived they contract their own injustice: but the sin which was in Adam has none of these things; for neither does it inhere in posterity, or affect them intrinsically, but only extrinsically, and morally; nor is it the proper sin of each one, but one common for all; nor is it something translated by generation as by a cause: therefore according to Trent something distinct from the sin of Adam ought to be admitted, in which the essence of original sin consists. — I deny the minor; for the sin of Adam affects posterity, little ones, not only extrinsically, but also intrinsically, and is proper to them, inasmuch as they themselves all sinned in it, as in a head, which sin remains in them so long as it is not washed away by the saving laver of baptism: it is also transfused into them, not by imitation, but by propagation: namely inasmuch as men contract it by propagation and natural generation, and not only by imitation; that is, by sinning actually, in imitation of Adam sinning, as the Pelagians wished. — Likewise the sin of Adam is physically one in number, but morally multiple, and morally and estimatively multiplied by propagation; for it stands with respect to each one just as if it had been committed by them, in order that on account of it, morally and habitually inhering, they may be hateful to God, and destitute of His grace: whence from the Council nothing against the Conclusion is evinced.

You will urge: That which is common to all cannot be proper to each: but from the Council of Trent the sin of Adam is common to all: therefore it cannot be proper to each, such as original sin ought to be. — I distinguish the major: it cannot be proper, that is, peculiarly to itself, and not convening to others, I concede; it cannot be proper, that is, properly convening to each one, although it convene not peculiarly and privately to one alone, I deny. Likewise the minor as distinguished, I deny the consequent. For that which is physically one, common to many, can morally be proper to each of them by moral multiplication, by reason of which it is made morally and equivalently multiple: and it can be taken away from one, and persist in another, as was said above.

You press: The Council in the same Session Can. 5. declares anathema against him who shall say that by the grace of Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, there is not remitted to little ones all that which has in them the true and proper nature of sin: the Council therefore supposes that which is to be cleansed in little ones to be a true and proper sin inhering in them: but the sin of the first Parent cannot have in little ones the nature of a true, and properly so called sin; for otherwise the sin of Adam could inhere in little ones only by imputation: so that although it were truly extrinsic to them, nevertheless it is morally imputed to them in order to certain moral effects, as if it had been committed by them; but this is to be sin only by imputation, which directly militates against the aforesaid oracle of the Council: for if original sin were only the sin of Adam, as imputed to posterity, therefore the remission of that sin would be the same as that sin not being imputed: but this directly militates against the opinion of the Council declaring anathema against him who should say original sin is not taken away, but only erased, or not imputed: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor; for the sin of Adam transfused into posterity truly has the nature of a properly so called sin, nor only by external imputation, but by intrinsic guilt little ones are said on account of it contracted to be sinners, in the manner expressed above, namely because all sinned in Adam. Whence I say that the remission of that sin is partly no longer to be imputed to the little one, that is, its nature can no longer be held, so that the little one be on account of it hateful to God, and deprived of grace: partly also that all that is taken away which made the little one himself hateful, and deprived of grace, and which remained morally, until it should be remitted and cleansed. But when the Council says, that the whole is taken away which has the true, and proper nature of sin, and not only that it is not imputed; it decrees this against the heretics, who say concupiscence is a truly and properly so called sin, and that it persists in the regenerate, although it is not imputed in them: from which error... [truncated]

You will say 2: SS. Fathers expressly affirm original sin to be something other than the sin of the first Parent: therefore it is not the very sin of Adam which is transfused into posterity. The antecedent is proved from St. August. book 2. De Nuptiis, and Concupiscence, ch. 26. where he says: The voluntary sin of the first man is the original cause of sin: but the same cannot be the cause of itself; and therefore original sin is not the very sin of Adam transfused into posterity. Likewise St. Anselm, book De Conceptu Virginali, ch. 27. One thing, he says, was the sin of Adam, another is the sin of little ones: that was the cause, this was the effect. — I deny the antecedent, and to the aforesaid authorities I say that the sin of Adam is called the cause of original sin, because indeed, while he sinned as head, the posterity of him also sinned as his members; and therefore it was the cause why the rest sinned; for it contained to himself as their head and prince the wills, gifts, and rights of all men: whence, he losing them through sin, the rest equally lost them; and thus his sin was the moral cause of the multiplication and diffusion of sin in posterity, and the reason why we are hateful to God, and deprived of grace and justice, which would have been inherent in us from conception, if Adam had not sinned.

You will say 3: Our sins were morally in Christ as in our head, as the sin of Adam as of the head of men is in posterity as in members; according to that of Isaias 53. He hath laid on him the iniquities of us all: whence in Psalm 21. which was written concerning Christ about to suffer, that adorable Saviour names our offenses his own, in these words: Far from my salvation are the words of my offenses: hence St. Peter, first Epistle, ch. 2. says: Who himself bore our sins in his own body upon the tree: but Christ on that account was not truly a sinner, and stained with our sins, as we truly are sinners and stained with original sin: therefore we are sinners originally from elsewhere than from the sin of Adam morally inhering in us. — I distinguish the major: our sins were morally in Christ, in the manner in which the sin of Adam is morally in posterity, I deny; otherwise, I concede: for our sins were not in Christ morally, as if he himself had sinned while we sinned; so that our sins were as it were his own acts by the union, and transsumption of his will into ours: but only our sins are attributed to him, inasmuch as he discharged their punishments, and made satisfaction to the eternal Father for sinners: but the sin of Adam is in us morally as committed by us sinning with him. But there is the greatest difference between a sin attributed to anyone in order only to discharging punishments, and a sin morally committed by someone and ordained to the privation of original justice, and of sanctifying grace: for the first neither constitutes a sinner nor infects: nay rather it very often remains even in the justified, who although by sanctifying grace they are grateful and acceptable to God, nevertheless are still ordained to punishment on account of the sins committed and remitted to be suffered. But in the latter way a sin taken to oneself truly constitutes and infects sinners, and therefore has the true and properly so called nature of sin.

You will say 4: Sons are sometimes punished by God even to the fourth generation on account of the crimes committed by Parents, but for no other reason than because the sins of Parents morally remain in them: yet on that account they are not said to contract original sin from them: therefore even if the sin of Adam morally subsists in posterity, on this account it could not be called original sin. The major is proved by various texts of Scripture, but especially from that of Exodus 20. I am the Lord thy God, mighty, jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. The same he repeats ch. 31. Likewise among the maledictions which David utters against the impious, he says: Let the iniquity of his fathers be remembered in the sight of God. — Poncius distinguishes the major in the Commentary to Question 2. dist. 3.: Sons are thus punished with a punishment congruent and due to mortal sin on this account, that they be guilty of it, I deny the major: since the temporal punishments to which sons are subjected on account of the sins of Parents are not punishments congruent to mortal sin, seeing that this merits eternal damnation; and therefore the sin of the Parents does not morally subsist in them as to all manner of imputation, and ordination to punishment on account of mortal sin. I deny the minor: sons who are guilty, but only akin to those who sinned, I concede: but thus to be punished is not to be punished on account of a sin morally imputed, and resident in him who sustains the punishment: very often innocent subjects are struck with the heaviest punishment on account of the crimes of princes: thus the pestilence raged against the people of Israel on account of the swelling of vain glory expressed by David the King. — Otherwise I distinguish the same major: Sons are punished on account of the sins of Parents, because they imitate the depraved examples of Parents from vitiated propagation, I concede: they are thus punished, because the guilt of Parents passes into posterity, I deny: and thus the punishment due to sinners is transfused into their posterity no otherwise than because their fault, and crimes follow them, as SS. Aug. contra Adimantum explains, Gregory book 13. Moral., ch.... [truncated]

You will say 5: If original sin were the very sin of Adam, it would follow that, the sin of Adam being blotted out, they ought no longer to be, and to be denominated sinners from that sin: for a sin which has ceased physically, and also morally been abolished, can no longer stain, nor denominate a sinner: but the consequent is false, because otherwise there would have been no sin of origin from the beginning of the world: therefore, etc. — I deny the sequel of the major: because posterity are denominated sinners from the sin of Adam not precisely as it was Adam's, but as it was morally the proper sin of each one, and morally remains in them: wherefore although it has been abolished with respect to Adam, to whom it was forgiven, yet it is not forgiven to posterity, until they are justified through baptism. For God could forgive Adam his sin after he did penance, without forgiving that same sin to Peter being born.

You will urge: The sin of Adam cannot be contracted by his posterity except insofar as it perseveres: but this does not persevere any longer, since a sin does not persevere except so long as the sinner subsists: moreover Adam no longer exists a sinner: therefore his sin cannot be contracted by his posterity. — The Doctor answered in 2. d. 32. n. 15:

That as merit, when it passes away in itself, nevertheless remains in the knowledge and acceptance of God, because He so rewards for it, as if it were present: so when demerit passes away as to the act, it nevertheless remains in the divine knowledge, because He so punishes for it, as if it were already present. Thus therefore the ways by which it enters, of this negation, not to have original justice, will be God's not giving, and the demerit of Adam, in the knowledge of God, on account of which He does not give.

Thus the Doctor.

You will say 6: No one can be denominated evil from an action, unless he be its efficient cause, but infants are not the cause of the action by which Adam transgressed: therefore, etc. — I answer by distinguishing the major: unless he be its physical cause, I deny: physical, or moral, I concede: although infants are not the physical cause, yet they are the moral cause: moral, I say, not in that sense in which he who counseled, requested, commanded, or approved is called a moral cause; but in that which the Apostle signifies, when he said, all transgressed in Adam: which however is not true, neither physically, nor morally with the morality of counsel, command, or approbation; but with the morality of equivalence in order to incurring the aversion of God, and the privation of divine friendship, and of original justice.

You will say 7: Original sin is the effect of the sin of Adam, as St. Augustine teaches, and it can be proved that this proposition of causality is true, we are born original sinners for the same reason, because Adam sinned: therefore original sin is not the very sin of Adam; since the same cannot be the cause of itself. — It can be answered 1. Original sin according to all that it includes both in recto and in obliquo, is the sin of Adam, I deny: according to that which it includes in recto, let the antecedent stand in the good sense. But the sin of Adam is in some manner the cause of non-forgiveness, and moving God, so that He will not remit it to posterity, unless the remedy of the Sacrament, or of perfect contrition, be applied. I answer 2. the antecedent conceded, distinguishing the consequent: therefore original sin is not the very sin of Adam, according to the same morality, I concede: according to a diverse one, I deny. The original sin of Peter, e. g. is physically and really the very sin of Adam, but not inasmuch as it is morally the sin of Adam: yet nothing forbids that rather the sin of Adam be in some manner the cause of original sin according to the morality by which it is proper to each one; for moral diversity suffices for moral causality. Hence as in some sense this proposition is true, therefore we have sinned in Adam, because he himself sinned: so in the same sense the sin of Adam was the cause of the sin of posterity, although it was not diverse physically, but only morally.

You will say 8. In the same manner we are just by the obedience of Christ, as by the disobedience of Adam we are unjust, as is evident from that: As by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so also by the obedience of one man many shall be constituted just: yet by the obedience of Christ we are not just formally, as by a denominating form; but only efficiently, and meritoriously: therefore neither by the disobedience of Adam are we constituted formally unjust, and sinners. — I answer by denying the major; according to all manner of parity, for the Apostle does not intend this ch. 5. to the Romans when he says as by one, &c. otherwise he would also prove that as we are stained by the disobedience of Adam without our own act, so we are sanctified by the obedience of Christ without our own act, which is false; but he wished to signify only a parity in the general reason of cause, precisely taken; so that as the disobedience of Adam is the cause why we are unjust, so the obedience of Christ is the cause why we are just: yet he does not descend to the special modes of causing, in which rather he indicates a diversity, while concerning disobedience he says. we were constituted. with a past voice; but concerning obedience he says. shall be constituted. in the future. For although both be past, nevertheless, the disobedience of Adam once posited, whatever is necessary in order that those propagated from him be formally sinners, is posited; but the obedience of Christ being posited, whatever is necessary in order that they be formally just, is not yet posited; but it is further required that, certain dispositions being posited, they receive from God inherent justice, which Christ by his obedience merited, that they be saints, as Trent teaches Session 6.

Objector 9. If original sin is the very sin of Adam, it follows that posterity merit the same punishment which he himself merited: but the consequent is false, for Adam beyond the punishment of loss merited the punishment of sense: but little ones dying in original sin incur only the punishment of loss: therefore, &c. — I answer by denying the sequel of the major, because Adam sinned physically, and by his own will. but posterity only morally. and interpretatively by the will of Adam. But far greater is a voluntary, proper, and physical sin, than a moral interpretative one, because on account of that by which each thing is such, that is more, and therefore the liability to punishment is greater.