Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine
Claude Frassen (1620–1711)
Tractatus I: De Creaturarum Corporalium, seu totius Mundi formatione, et ordinatione
Disputatio I: De opere primae diei
Disputatio II: De opere secundae diei
Disputatio III: De opere tertiae diei
Disputatio IV: De opere quartae diei
Disputatio V: De opere quintae diei
Disputatio VI: De opere sextae diei
Tractatus II: De mirando Hominis opificio, ejusque varia sorte
Disputatio I: De statu purae naturalis hominis, seu de nativis et ingenitis hominum dotibus
Articulus I: De naturali hominis statu, et ingenita ejus praecellentia
Quaestio I: An possibilis sit naturae purae status
Quaestio II: Qualis esset naturae purae status; sive an eisdem corporis, et animae defectibus, quibus nunc praemimur, subiaceret
Quaestio III: Qualiter homo per ingenitas suas praecellentias cunctis creaturis praecellat
Articulus II: De dignitate et praecellentia humani corporis
Quaestio I: Qualis, et quam miranda sit humani corporis fabrica
Quaestio II: Quanta sit hominis dignitas ex recta eius dispositione
Quaestio III: Quanta sit humani corporis dignitas ex eius unione cum anima rationali
Articulus III: De animae rationalis dignitate et praecellentia
Quaestio I: Quid, qualis, et ex quo sit anima rationalis
Quaestio II: An, et quomodo anima rationalis formata sit ad imaginem, et similitudinem Dei
Quaestio III: In quo maneat sita ratio imaginis, et similitudinis Dei in homine
Disputatio II: De statu naturae innocentis
Articulus I: De Paradiso terrestri protoparentum innocentium domicilio
Quaestio I: Quid sit Paradisus terrestris
Quaestio II: Quis, et qualis sit Paradisi terrestris situs
Quaestio III: Quae nam sit Paradisi terrestris magnitudo, et amoenitas?
Quaestio IV: Quibus praecipuis arboribus Paradisus terrestris consitus fuerit
Articulus II: De naturalibus et ingenitis hominis innocentis dotibus
Quaestio I: Quaenam fuerit protoparentum corporea formatio, et exercitatio
Quaestio II: Qualis, et quanta fuerit protoparentum in statu innocentiae sapientia, et scientia
Quaestio III: Qua ratione propagatum esset genus humanum in statu innocentiae
Articulus III: De eximiis hominis innocentis corporis et animae supernaturalibus dotibus
Quaestio I: Quaenam et qualis fuerit primorum parentum iustitia originalis
Quaestio II: Qualis, et quanta fuerit gratia primis parentibus concessa
Quaestio III: An, et quale homo innocens dominium habebat in animantes, et alios homines
Disputatio III: De statu naturae lapsae
Articulus I: De tentatione, lapsu, et poena primorum Parentum
§ I: De tentatione primorum Parentum
Quaestio I: Quonam instrumento diabolus usus fuerit ad primos parentes tentandos
Quaestio II: Quonam motivo ductus fuerit diabolus ut Protoparentes nostros tentaret
Quaestio III: Quis fuerit serpentis tentationis progressus et ordo
§ II: De primariae legis impositione, transgressione, et vindicta
Quaestio I: Qua de causa Deus legem praescripserit protoparentibus non edendi ex fructu arboris scientiae boni et mali
Quaestio II: Quonam mortali peccato divinam legem sibi praescriptam Adam, et Eva primario fuerint transgressi
Quaestio III: Qualis, et quanta fuerit peccati primorum parentum gravitas
§ III: De poena primis Parentibus ob eorum perdullionem irrogata
Quaestio I: Quibusnam specialibus poenis primi parentes in sui reatus vindictam flerunt affecti
Quaestio II: Quid primis parentibus contigerit post divinam in eos animadversionem
Articulus II: De peccato originali ab Adamo in omnes ejus posteros transducto
§ I: De originalis peccati existentia
Quaestio I: Quibus momentis probari possit originalis peccati existentia
MOST GRAVE certainly, and such as long and sorely vexed the Church, is the present Question; for various heretics of old existed, and exist even now, who, blinking in meridian light, affirm that no burden has truly been transfused from the First Parents of mankind into their posterity, contracted by origin and propagation; that these may appear more evident,
Note 1. That although very many think Carpocrates to have been the primary impugner of original sin, yet the concurrent opinion of others is that Rufinus was the first discoverer of this unclean fountain and error; who, as Caelestius testified before the Fathers of the Council of Carthage, taught that there is no transduction of sin from Parents into little ones. For, as St. Augustine relates, book On original sin, chapter 3., where he copies out the acts of the aforesaid Council, when Caelestius had been asked whether he had said, That the sin of Adam had harmed him alone, and not the human race: and had answered that he was in doubt concerning the traduction of sin, because he had heard certain Catholic Priests denying it: being asked again by Paulinus the Deacon who those were, he answered, the holy Priest Rufinus at Rome, who abode with St. Pammachius. I heard him saying that there is no traduction of sin. From that Rufinus therefore Pelagius likely imbibed this error, as well as others, so that what the one spread abroad secretly, the other proclaimed openly. For although Pelagius before the Fathers of the Palestinian Synod pronounced Anathema against those who hold, That the sin of Adam harmed him alone, and not the human race: and that Infants are in that state in which Adam was before his prevarication, as St. Augustine relates in several places, chiefly in the book On original sin, chapter 12.: yet he said these things, saith the same, chapter 13., lest the Catholic Synod should be deceived, or the new heretic condemned. For, as he adds, chapter 15., when the disciples of Pelagius asked him why he had pronounced such an Anathema; he answered that he had condemned those propositions because, as he himself says, Not upon the first man only, but also upon the human race did that first sin bring harm: not by propagation, but by imitation; that is, saith St. Aug., not because he drew from him any vice, since from him they were propagated, but because they imitated him first sinning, since afterwards they sinned; by which craftiness, saith c. 21., he so much the more covertly deceived the Judges, as he expounded it so much the more cunningly. But, saith St. Augustine in the same place c. 2., Caelestius stood yet more freely in this error, so much so that neither in the Episcopal judgment at Carthage would he condemn those who say that the sin of Adam harmed him alone, and not the human race: and that infants who are born are in that state in which Adam was before his prevarication: And in the city of Rome in his little book, which he gave to the most blessed Pope Zosimus, he thus asserted more expressly, that original sin binds no one of the little ones. And Julianus defended this error above all most keenly, having written many books on this matter against St. Augustine, as will be shown more fully below.
Note 2. That the errors of the Pelagians touching the present controversy are contained especially in these five propositions: whereof the First affirmed that Adam had harmed himself alone, nor had by his crime shaken human nature or his posterity: the Second, that little ones contract no fault and punishment on Adam's part in their propagation: the Third, that baptism is not necessary to men for the remission of sins, but only that they be reborn in Christ and obtain an hereditary right to the kingdom of Heaven; whence Pelagius was wont to say, Infants dying without baptism, whither they go not, I know: whither they go, I know not, that is, saith St. Augustine, relating these words in the book On original sin, he did not consent: the Fourth, they asserted diseases, death, and the other calamities and straits of our nature not to be effects of original sin, but mere defects and necessities of human nature: the Fifth finally, they taught concupiscence, or the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, to be neither evil of punishment nor evil of fault; but a good of nature itself, fitting, and a necessary incentive unto the propagation of the human race, which flourished in Adam even in the state of innocence before sin.
Note 3. That all these erroneous opinions, long since buried, were in later centuries recalled forth from the abyss of darkness into light through various errors. For the Anabaptists taught therefore that little ones ought not to be baptized, not only because they must first be taught than regenerated, but also because they were defiled by no stain of sin. Before them had shone forth the Armenii, and Ilbigenses, as St. Antoninus testifies in the Summa of Theology part 3. title 12.; and likewise the Albanenses, as Alphonsus a Castro, Bernardus Luthenburgensis, and Prateolus teach: whom Sanderus undeservedly confounds with the Albigenses, Heresy 151. for the Albanenses flourished in the time of Leo the Third Pontiff, and Constantine the Sixth Emperor about the Year of the Lord 796.; the Albigenses truly in the time of Innocent the Third Pontiff, and Frederick the Second Emperor. Before these had shone Peter Abaillardus; for he, as St. Bernard writes, Epist. 109., did not rightly feel concerning the sin of origin, teaching, as the same Epistle 109. relates, that Christ came not into the world, nor suffered and died, except that He might teach and instruct us by word and example. Thence St. Bernard gathers that Abaillardus judged that Adam harmed us only by a perverse example unto sinning, and that infants, who are not capable of institution and examples, neither perished in Adam, nor are called through Christ. But as touching the punishments and natural calamities arising from original sin, very many Reformers confess indeed that they arise from the sin of Adam: yet that they suppose no crime in his posterity. So judged Zuinglius, Iacobus Faber in the Commentaries chapter 5. upon Romans, and in the Apology for the same commentaries; where he teaches that we draw nothing from Adam save an obligation unto death. The same equally judged Erasmus, as Suarez proves in many places, chapter 2. On original sin. —
The same most pestilent error certain men of our own days labour to renew, the Socinians namely, who, that they may evacuate the grace of Christ, and His merit and satisfaction, impiously snarl that the blood of Him shed upon the cross conduces nothing at all to the expiation of original sin, which, say they, is none at all, and a wholly vain figment. That therefore we may meet their impiety, the following must be defended and confirmed according to our strength
Single Conclusion. — Truly there exists original sin, or that which, commutatively by origin and vital propagation, committed by Adam the first Parent as it were the head of the whole human race, thence flows over upon posterity as into the members. This is of faith, and is proved by various arguments, which, that they may appear more evident and efficacious, it pleases to propose and weigh singly under the following Paragraphs.
§ 1. — Original sin is proved by the plain oracles of holy Scripture. — First indeed from that of Genesis 17. The male, whose flesh of his foreskin shall not be circumcised, that soul shall be destroyed out of his people, because he hath made void my covenant: and hereupon, saith St. Augustine, lib. 16. De Civit. Dei, cap. 27. Because circumcision was the sign of regeneration, not undeservedly is the generation damned for the Original sin whereby first the testament of God was dissipate, unless regeneration deliver. For, as the same saith lib. On orig. Sin, c. 30. If the justice of so horrible a punishment be sought, will not all that argumentation of these Pelagians concerning free will, and the laudable soundness and purity of nature, however subtle it be, rebounded and contrary, leap asunder? For what evil, I ask, has the infant committed by his own will, that others being negligent and not circumcising him, he himself should be damned with so severe damnation, that that soul perish out of its people? He subjoins c. 31. Whence then is that most lost Infant rightly punished, unless because he pertains to the mass of perdition, and is justly understood to be born of Adam, damned by the obligation of the ancient debt, unless thence he had been freed not according to debt, but according to grace? — Secondly, the same stands from that of Psalm 50. Behold in iniquities I was conceived, and in sins my mother conceived me. And likewise from that of Job 14., where according to the version of the Seventy we read: No one is clean from filth, nor the Infant whose life is of one day upon the earth. Wherein certainly nothing is more illustrious for proving this truth: for if no one is clean from filth, nor the Infant of one day, assuredly there is some sin which is contracted by natural propagation itself. Nor does the Vulgate differ from that version, while it renders: Who can make clean him that is conceived of unclean seed? is it not thou only? For indeed if God alone can make clean a man conceived of unclean seed, it follows that from conception itself man is unclean with the uncleanness of sin; both because to God alone is attributed that He can cleanse from it: and also because it speaks of that filth by reason of which man must be led unto judgment, as appears from the preceding words: and dost thou think it meet to open thy eyes upon such a one, and to bring him into judgment with thee? Both the aforesaid testimonies of Job and David Jerome and Augustine use for proving Original sin. Jerome indeed upon those words of Job, This little verse, saith he, sets forth the cause of the whole human race: as in Job, even if he be of one day upon the earth he cannot be clean from the filth of sin. But he is conceived, and is born in Original sin, which is drawn from Adam, but is cleansed by baptism through the grace of God. But the verse of the Psalmist is thus weighed by St. Augustine: What is it that he says himself was conceived in iniquity, unless because iniquity is drawn from Adam? Also with that iniquity the bond of death itself is joined: no one is born save drawing punishment, drawing the merit of punishment. — Thirdly above all this truth is proved from that to the Romans 5. By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. From which this argument can be deduced: by one man entered into this world a certain sin, which made all men sinners, and thereby obnoxious to death: but such a sin cannot be actual, that is, committed by actual will, since even infants are obnoxious to death, and often times without number die before they have done anything good or evil by their own will: therefore that sin, through which they become obnoxious to death, must needs be contracted by origin itself. It is confirmed from the following words; for the Apostle subjoins: As by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so also by the obedience of one many shall be constituted just, properly namely sinners, as properly just, as sin reigned unto death, so also grace may reign by justice unto life eternal through Jesus Christ our Lord. Nor ought it to move anyone that the Apostle said, many, as though not all are constituted sinners; both because by many are understood all who are born of Adam, who truly are many: for it is not infrequent in Scripture that all be signified by many, which St. Augustine proves On Genesis chapters 17. and 22.; in the former of which God said to Abraham: Father of many nations have I constituted thee: in the latter truly: in thy seed shall all nations be blessed: concerning which words, saith St. Aug., it has been shown that the same all are many, and the same nations all: so also when it has been said, by one sin passed into all, and afterwards by the disobedience of one many were constituted sinners, they themselves are many who are also all. Then because not all simply have been constituted sinners by Adam: since neither Eve, nor Christ, nor blessed Virgin were stained by Adam's sin.
The Pelagians answered 1. To that testimony of the Apostle, that indeed truly sin entered into the world through one man, not by propagation, but by imitation; so that the first Parent opened to his posterity the way of sinning, and by his example enticed them unto sin. — But to this excuse St. Augustine thus shuts the approach, lib. On the merits and remission of sins, chapter 9. If the Apostle, he saith, had brought forward to commemorate that sin which entered into this world not by propagation, but by imitation, he would have said its prince to be not Adam, but the devil, of whom it is written, first of John 3., the devil sinneth from the beginning; of whom also it is read in the book of Wisdom 2., But by the envy of the devil death came into the world: For because that death came thus from the devil into men, not because they had been propagated from him, but because they had imitated him, he immediately subjoins: but they imitate him who are on his part. Wherefore the Apostle, when he commemorated that sin and death, which had passed from one unto all by propagation, placed as its prince him from whom the propagation of the human race took its beginning. — Moreover the Apostle comprehends not only adults, but even little ones; since even little ones are obnoxious to death, which he teaches entered through sin, and is the punishment and effect thereof, teaching universally, affirming: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned: but into little ones Adam's sin did not pass by imitation, since before the use of reason they cannot imitate it by sinning: therefore it must be confessed the Apostle speaks not of the passage of sin by imitation, but by propagation. — Finally St. Paul affirms that the sin of Adam is so transmitted to posterity, as the justice of Christ to the regenerate: As therefore, saith St. Augustine in the same place, he in whom all shall be made alive, besides that he offered himself to them as an example of justice to be imitated, gives also the most hidden grace of his Spirit to the faithful, whilst latently he infuses it even into little ones: so also he in whom all die, besides that he is to them, who transgress the command of the Lord by will, an example of imitation, with hidden stain also of carnal concupiscence corrupted in himself all coming of his stock.
The Pelagians answered 2. By sin indeed the Apostle here signifies that sin which is contracted by origin, yet not properly, but metonymically speaking; so that his sense was, that by one man sin entered into this world, that is, one man sinning, a certain malady and proneness unto sinning, mortality, and other miseries entered into the world: for these effects of sin the Apostle called sin metonymically: so Zuinglius expounds this place. — On the contrary, in the aforesaid words the Apostle manifestly distinguishes sin from its punishment, such as death is: asserts both to have entered into the world by one man, namely Adam; and deservedly indeed; for if by sin he understood its own punishment when he says: sin entered into this world, and by sin death, the sense would be, that death entered into this world, and by death death; which locution would certainly be altogether absurd. Add that although metonymically sin be sometimes taken for the punishment of sin in Scripture, in which sense the Apostle calls concupiscence sin; nowhere nevertheless does Scripture affirm anyone to sin, or to be a sinner, for the sole cause or punishment of sin: here truly the Apostle expressly pronounces, In whom all have sinned. The Pelagians answered finally, that sin in those words of the Apostle does not signify the original sin of the sons of Adam, but their actual sin, which is said to have entered into the world through one man, because then first sin began to be in the world, when it was in Adam, who was a part of the world. Thus also Zuinglius expounds it in his book On Baptism. — On the contrary, if this interpretation held place, it would follow that not through one man, but through one Angel, sin entered into this world, since the Angel existed as part of the world, and sinned, before man. But if Zuinglius says the Apostle must be understood of the corporeal world, and of its bodily parts, still it will not be true what the Apostle says, that sin entered into this world through one man: for Eve sinned before Adam, and she sinning, sin entered into this world: therefore the Apostle speaks not of that actual sin alone of the first Parent having entered into this world, but also of its transference unto posterity, not by imitation, but by propagation. — Finally the Apostle insinuates the same truth from that passage to the Ephesians, chapter 2.: We were by nature children of wrath even as others, that is, from the beginnings of our nature, or from our conception and nativity, we were liable to the wrath and vengeance of God. But no one is liable to the wrath and vengeance of God except by reason of sin: therefore we truly inherit the sin of our first Parent from his propagation.
The Iuliani answered, the patron of the Pelagians, that the saying of the Apostle could by force of speech and the Greek text be thus rendered: We were quite children of wrath. And truly St. Jerome does not reject this interpretation, although he more approves and follows the other. — But that reading in which "of nature" is to be preferred St. Augustine proves from the supreme consensus of all Latin codices: Oughtest thou not, saith he, to have been admonished hence, before thou didst defend the Catholic faith against them: because scarcely is a Latin codex found, if it do not now begin with us to be emended, or rather changed into a faulty one, wherein "of nature" is not written? Which antiquity of the Interpreters ought certainly to have done more blindly, unless this antiquity were also of the faith, which your novelty desires to resist. (Lib. 6. Contra Iulianum, cap. 10).
§ 2. — The same truth is proved from the Councils. — First indeed from the Palestinian Council, in which the Pelagian Heresy, already published by Caelestius the disciple of Pelagius, was proscribed and condemned; for when all the articles had been recited wherein were contained all the errors of Pelagius and Caelestius, whose principal ones St. Augustine relates in the book On the acts of Pelagius, chapters 18. and 30., Pelagius being asked by the Fathers of the Synod what he thought of them, said: I anathematize those who so hold, or have ever so thundered: with which words however he mocked the too great credulity of the Fathers, and indeed even St. Augustine himself, who, as he says in the book On original sin, chapter 11., I was rejoicing that by that answer of Pelagius that question was concluded safe: and it seemed to me most openly confessed to him, that original sin is in little ones: by anathematizing those who believed that the sin of Adam harmed him alone, and not also the human race, and who opined little ones to be in that state in which that first man was before his prevarication. But afterwards when I had read his four books, and had found the man still thinking against the Catholic faith concerning little ones, I began to wonder more, both at his imprudence in the Ecclesiastical judgment, and his mendacity in so great a Question.... For in the same books he both speaks against the passage of sin from Adam into little ones, and glories in the acts of the Palestinian Synod; where he was thought quickly to have condemned those who so hold, and by absolving while deceiving he stole them away. — Secondly, the same truth was defined in the second Council of Milevum under Innocent the First, in which by Canon 1. this sentence concerning original sin is handed down. It hath pleased, that whosoever denies little ones newly taken from their mothers' wombs to be baptized, or says that they are baptized indeed unto the remission of sins, but contract nothing from Adam of original sin, which is expiated by the laver of regeneration: whence it follows, that in them the form of Baptism, unto the remission of sins, must be understood not true, but false, let him be anathema. — Thirdly, the same did the second Council of Orange define under Felix the Fourth against the Semipelagians and Massilians, in which by Canon 2. it is defined: If anyone asserts that Adam's prevarication harmed himself alone, and not his posterity, or certainly affirms that only the death of the body, which is the punishment of sin, but not also sin itself, which is the death of the soul, passed through one man into the whole human race, he will do injustice to God, contradicting the Apostle saying: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death passed into all men, in whom all have sinned. — Fourthly, the same was determined in the Florentine Council in the decree of Eugene the Fourth Supreme Pontiff, wherein it is defined that the souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or in original sin alone, descend immediately into hell, to be punished however with disparate pains. — Finally, this same was determined most clearly of all by the Council of Trent, Session 5. Canon 2. and following; where it repeats word for word and renews the decrees of the Councils of Milevum and Orange, thus writing: If anyone asserts that Adam's prevarication harmed himself alone, and not his posterity etc. And Can. 3: If anyone asserts that this sin, which is one by origin, and transfused into men by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one proper to him, and is taken away either by the forces of human nature, or by any other remedy than by the merit of the one Saviour our Lord Jesus Christ, etc. let him be anathema.
§ III. — The same is proved by the authority of the SS. Fathers. — Most constant among the SS. Fathers, and concordant, was ever the opinion concerning the transfusion of the sin of Adam into posterity: for saith St. Augustine book 3. On the merits and remission of sins, chapter 7. From the beginning even to this present time, in which this novelty strives to be: this concerning original sin was guarded with such constancy among the faith of the Church, that by those who treated the divine eloquia it was rather brought forward as most certain for refuting other things, than that it should be attempted to be refuted by anyone as false. Which indeed he proves with very many sentences of the SS. Fathers, which St. Augustine himself selected and produced, as may be seen in book 1. against Julian, chapters 3. and 7.
There can be brought forward in the first place St. Dionysius the Areopagite book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 6., where he ascribes the sin of the first man to the whole of human nature, not only according to punishment, but also with respect to guilt: Human nature, saith he, at first foolishly fallen away from divine benefits, took up on account of its merit the various passages of life, and the end of corruptible death. Indeed that pernicious defection from celestial goodness, and the prevarication of the sacred law in Paradise, whereby of its own accord, lulled by blandishing and hostile frauds of the adversary, it had knocked out the seat of the vital yoke, it handed over to things contrary to divine goods. By which he teaches that human nature therefore lacked the divine benefits bestowed upon it in its first formation, because voluntarily deficient from God it had knocked out the vital yoke by the frauds of Satan. — Secondly, there comes forth St. Ignatius, who in his Epistle to the Trallians thus speaks: Be ye therefore girt with meekness, imitators of the passions of Christ, and of his love, wherewith he loved us, giving himself for us that he might cleanse us by his blood from ancient impiety. — Thirdly, St. Justin Martyr, who in his dialogue with Trypho says: That He came not for Himself we hold ascertained; for neither was there need to Him of the washing of baptism, nor of the advent of the Spirit in the species of a dove, as neither did He sustain to be born, and crucified on account of indigence of such an office: but for the cause of the human race, because He considered sin through Adam unto death, and the fraud of the seduction of the serpent — that meanwhile I may pass over His own guilt while He acted ill for Himself. — Fourthly, Irenaeus of Lyons
First can be brought forward St. Dionysius the Areopagite, book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. 6, where he ascribes the sin of the first man to the whole of human nature, not only as regards punishment, but even as regards guilt: Human nature, he says, at the beginning foolishly fallen away from the divine benefits, on its merit he took upon himself the manifold passibilities of life, and the end of corruptible death. For indeed that pernicious defection from the celestial goodness, and the transgression of the sacred law in Paradise, whereby of its own will, soothed by the flattering and hostile frauds of the adversary, it had struck out the vital yoke, it handed down to things contrary to the divine goods. By which he teaches that human nature therefore lacked the divine benefits conferred upon it in its first formation, because willingly falling away from God it struck out the vital yoke by the frauds of Satan. — Secondly, there comes forward St. Ignatius, who in his Epistle to the Trallians speaks thus: You therefore girt with gentleness, imitators of your
Bishop, book 6, cap. 17. He destroyed, he says, the handwriting of our debt, fastening it to the cross: that as by the wood we were made debtors to God, so by the wood we receive the remission of the debt. And cap. 19. As, he says, the human race was bound over to death through a Virgin, so it is saved through a Virgin, the virginal disobedience being balanced by an equal scale against virginal obedience; for still, upon the sin of the first-formed man there succeeds, by the correction of the First-begotten, the rectitude of the serpent's craft by the simplicity of the dove, and we are loosed from those bonds by which we had been bound over to death. From these words St. Augustine, book 1 contra Iulianum, cap. 3, thus conjures him: Do you not see what the ancient man of God thinks of the ancient wound of the serpent? What of the similitude of the flesh of sin, by which the wound of the serpent in the flesh of sin is healed? What of the sin of the first-formed man, by which we had been bound? — Fifthly, Tertullian in the book *De Ani
§ IV. — The same truth is proved by theological reason. — First the Seraphic Doctor proves it, dist. 30, qu. 2, by a threefold reason drawn from the lack of the vision of God, the shamefacedness of reason, and the predominance of concupiscence. First indeed, the lack of the vision of God makes this manifest, because no one ought to be deprived of the eternal good for which he was made, unless he have in himself something by which he is unworthy to be presented to the divine aspect: and such a thing is nothing but guilt: if therefore all as many as are, are deprived of the vision of God unless they be reborn through the baptism of water, or of the Spirit; it is plain that all as many as are contract guilt from their origin. — Secondly, from the shamefacedness also of reason, this makes it manifest: for no one rationally blushes at those passions which he has from nature, unless they be in him through some fault: but every man naturally blushes at the motion of the genital members: from this therefore it is gathered, and man
The Subtle Doctor proves it secondly in 2 dist. 32, n. 8: Whosoever is propagated from Adam and lacks the original justice which he had received from God to be handed on to his posterity, is defiled by original sin: but all the posterity of Adam, unless prevented by a special divine privilege, lack that original justice: therefore, etc. The minor stands of itself by that experience whereby each one of us experiences himself to be stripped of those eminent gifts with which Adam had been illumined at the very beginning of his formation. The major the Doctor proves from that teaching of St. Anselm in book 1 De Conceptu Virginali, c. 27, who says: The voluntary desertion of justice which he committed does not accuse him, nor does the incapacity of receiving excuse the persons, as he declares in cap. 2: Because it made for itself that incapacity by deserting justice in the first Parents, in whom the whole nature was, and it is always debtor to have that power which it received for the observing of justice always. From which thus
who might sin less would be punished equally. It is plain from another quarter, from the divine law, whereby it is established that justice is propagated as it were naturally through the father not setting up an obstacle by sin, not indeed because the father would transfuse it, since it is a supernatural gift; but that God himself would cooperate with nature in the regular manner of giving justice to the one propagated, just as he now creates the intellectual soul for the perfectly organized body. So this Doctor.
It is proved thirdly from the necessity of baptism: for baptism is absolutely necessary for the remission of sin: but according to Apostolic tradition, as St. Dionysius teaches in the book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, in the last chapter, Origen Homilia 8 on Leviticus, Cyprian book 3, Epistle 3, and other Fathers of the Church, baptism is to be administered to infants; therefore it supposes in them sin to be washed away: not actual; therefore original. The major is proved: both from the words of Christ saying John 3: Unless a man be born again of Water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God: but why ought he to be reborn through grace, unless his generation had been corrupted through sin? And because those who are baptized were dead in sin, and through baptism rise again and walk in newness of life, as the Apostle says to the Romans 6: therefore those who are baptized suppose sin. For they who are baptized are cleansed and washed; Ephesians 5.
It is proved fourthly from the Redemption of Christ: for Christ the Lord underwent death not only for adults, but also for little ones: since St. Paul says 2 Corinthians 5: Christ died for all: but Christ suffered death only for those who, dead in sin, were to be vivified, as the Apostle signifies in the same place writing: if one died for all, then all were dead: therefore infants were dead in sin; otherwise Christ would not have died for them, and they would have been wholly without share in his Passion. Whosoever therefore, as St. Augustine says in the response to cap. 17 of book 2 against Julian, says that infants are free from that sin in which enmities were made, most certainly denies that they pertain to that reconciliation for the sake of which Christ was made mediator. He accordingly separates them also from that justification which takes place in the blood of Christ, for the shedding of which, when he commended it to be drunk, it was said to be for no other purpose than the remission of sins. Hence it follows that for infants not having sins the death of Christ profits nothing at all.
§5. — THE OBJECTIONS ARE PROPOSED AND SOLVED. 1. THOSE WHICH ARE SOUGHT FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE.
You will object 1. That of Ezekiel cap. 18: The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father: therefore those who draw their origin from Adam are not stained by his sin.
I answer 1. Ezekiel is to be understood of the personal sins of parents, which are not passed on to the offspring, and by reason of which sons are not subjected to divine vengeance unless by actually sinning they follow the wicked examples of their parents.
I answer 2. That Adam's transgression was also morally the iniquity of his posterity, who were constituted in him as in the head of human nature, and transgressed the law of God together with him. Hence St. Augustine says book 1 De peccatorum meritis, cap. 10: Certainly it is manifest that there are other sins proper to each, in which only those sin whose sins they are
I answer 3. St. Augustine, book 6 in Iulianum cap. 20, says that the aforesaid words of Ezekiel are prophetical, and that in them is promised the benefit of the New Testament and of the spiritual inheritance pertaining to the other world, whereby through regeneration the paternal handwriting was to be blotted out, so that the sin of the old Adam might no longer harm those who had put on the new Adam through baptism; for in this New Testament, as St. Augustine says, Through the blood of the Testator the paternal handwriting being destroyed, man begins by being born again not to be liable for his paternal debts, by which he had been bound in being born.
You will object 2. That word of the Apostle to the Romans 5, saying: As by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so also by the obedience of one shall many be constituted just: but not all are constituted just by this: therefore neither are all made unjust by that. Moreover the Apostle says significantly, many were constituted sinners, but he does not say all: therefore he holds that the posterity of Adam become sinners not by propagation but only by imitation of his sin.
To the first, I answer by denying the minor: for it is certain that through the obedience of Christ all are constituted just, since Christ was made obedient for all, and merited for all the means necessary for justification and salvation: therefore by the same reason that all are justified through Christ, who are spiritually reborn in him, so also all are constituted sinners through the disobedience of Adam, who are born from him and propagated from him.
To the second St. Augustine answers, book 6 contra Iulianum, cap. 21: by the many the Apostle means All, according to the customary phrase of Scripture: which he confirms from that of Genesis 17, where God says to Abraham: I have made thee father of many nations: yet Genesis 22 says: In thy seed shall all nations be blessed: concerning which St. Augustine says that the same all are shown to be the same many, and the same many the same all: But, he says, Scripture so spoke because there can be certain things that are all, which are not many: just as we call all the Gospels, and yet they are contained in a brief number, that is four: and again there can be some things many, yet not all, as we say many believe in Christ, yet not all believe. Hence among all those unto death through Adam, all unto life through Christ; because as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive: that is, from the first origin of the human race no one unto death except through Adam, and no one through Adam except unto death: and no one unto life except through Christ, and no one through Christ except unto life.
You will object 3. The same Apostle saying in the same place: Death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them who had not sinned in the similitude of the transgression of Adam: but to sin in the similitude of Adam's transgression would be to be stained with his sin: therefore it is false that all the posterity of Adam are defiled with his sin.
I deny the minor: For as St. Augustine says book 1 De peccatorum meritis, cap. 11, the sense of the Apostle is that death reigned even before the written law, or the times of Moses, over those also who did not sin actually, as Adam sinned, or, as St. Augustine says, Who had not yet with their own and proper will sinned as he did, but drew from him original sin, which is the form of what was to come: because in him was constituted the form of condemnation for his future posterity who were to be created from his propagation, that from one all might be born unto condemnation, from which nothing delivers except the grace of the Savior: therefore so far is original sin from being impugned thereby, that rather it is defended.
You will insist: The Apostle says in the same place that the grace of Christ abounded unto more than the sin of Adam abounded: therefore at least there are more who were not stained by the sin of Adam.
He answers in the same place that St. Augustine says that word many does not signify a comparison in that place, but is equivalent to the word all: For neither, he says, are more justified than are condemned: but it abounded far more: for Adam bewailed guilty from one offense; but Christ by his grace looses and forgives also those men who have added the offenses of their own will to that original one in which they were born: and so the sense is, that the grace of Christ was not limited only to washing away original sin, which is contracted from Adam; but also to wash away those which are afterwards actually committed; or that the grace of Christ is more powerful and efficacious to justify men than the sin of Adam was to stain them. Whence indeed the grace of Christ truly abounded unto far more than the sin of Adam; since the Blessed Virgin, free from original sin, was enriched and endowed most copiously with the grace of Christ. Eve likewise was not guilty of Adam's sin, nay she was the occasion of the sin itself, yet she was justified by the grace of Christ; for as St. Augustine says in the same place, The kingdom of death in any man whatsoever is destroyed only by the grace of the Savior,
You will object 4. That word of the Apostle 2 Corinthians 5: We must all be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that everyone may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil: therefore only those are to be damned who have committed their own sin.
I deny the consequence, for as St. Augustine argues most excellently, book 6 Contra Iulianum, cap. 10: Infants will be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, or they will not: if they will not be manifested, what does that sentence avail you, when it does not pertain to them (namely infants) whose cause is now being treated? but if they will be manifested, how shall each of them receive what he did, who did nothing, unless because there pertains to him what was done through the hearts and mouths of those doing it, whether they believe or believe not?... For how does he receive good so as to enter into the kingdom of God, if each receives what he did, unless because there pertains to the infant even what was done through another, that is, believed? As therefore what he believed pertains to him, that he may receive good, that is, obtain the kingdom of God; so there pertains to him also that he did not believe, that he may receive the judgment of condemnation, because that too is an Evangelical sentence saying: he that believeth not shall be condemned.... Whence therefore, however importunely you would not have the infant carry away evil from another's sin, and would have him carry away good from another's right deed, not any good whatsoever, but the kingdom of God: for it is another's, since he believed through another, just as
You will object 5. That word of the Apostle to the Romans 3: By the law is the knowledge of sin: where therefore there is no knowledge of the law, there neither can there be knowledge of sin: but where there is no knowledge of sin, there neither is transgression: and therefore neither can damnation be there. For Paul himself testifies to this Romans 1, saying: for where there is no law, neither is there transgression. Now therefore consider the force and power of these testimonies, which is so great that it utterly subverts all the commentaries of all the Theologians on original sin. For this disease cannot bring upon us damnation, which only then follows, when we have beheld the law set before our eyes, yet still impelled by this disease and the affection of corrupt nature, we transgress the law. Thus Zwinglius.
I answer, that the aforementioned consequence of Zwingli is null; for the Apostle does not say, "where there is no knowledge of the law, neither is there transgression," as Zwingli's collection would require; but "where there is no law, neither is there transgression," which is most certainly true; for no transgression can be feigned unless there be a law which is violated by transgressing. Next, Zwingli assumes as certain the very point at issue in the Question, namely that actual sin alone, which is transgression, is properly the sin by which God can damn men; this all Catholics flatly deny, and we proved the contrary above from open texts of Scripture. Equally false is what he supposes as certain, namely that there is no damnation where there is no transgression of the law; for the same Apostle says in Romans 9 that infants did neither good nor evil, and hence did not transgress the Law by their own will: in Romans 5 itself he writes: "As by the offence of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification." And to the Ephesians, 2, he affirms that we are all by nature children of wrath — that is, guilty by our very birth and propagation. Finally, we can assert that even infants are transgressors of the Law, according to that of Osee 6: "But they, like Adam, have transgressed the covenant; there have they dealt treacherously against me" — namely, in Paradise, where Adam violated the law given him by God, and in which, as in their head, all sinned and transgressed.
THE AUTHORITIES OF THE HOLY FATHERS WHO SEEM TO DENY ORIGINAL SIN ARE PROPOSED AND ANSWERED.
You will object 1. Clement of Alexandria, book 3 of the Stromata, near the end, where he says: "Let them tell us then where the infant that is born was formed, or how it fell under Adam's curse, since it has done nothing?" Therefore he judges infants not to be guilty of Adam's sin.
I deny the consequence: for it is not established whose words these are, whether Clement's own, or those of the heretics whom he attacks in the same place, who taught that marriage was to be rejected because generation was evil, seeing that infants, though stained by no act of their own, yet, as holy Job says, "are not clean from filth" — which Clement certainly indicates; for he immediately subjoins: "It remains therefore for them (it seems) consequently to say that generation is evil, not only that of the body, but also that of the soul." Therefore those heretics did not deny original sin, but rather affirmed it, in order that from that assertion they might reject marriage and establish their own error.
You will object 2. St. Ambrose, in his Commentary on chapter 5 of Romans: "The death of the dissolution of the body is when the soul is separated from the body. There is also another death, which is called the second, in Gehenna, which we do not suffer through sin, but acquire on occasion of our own sin; from which the good are immune, only so far as they are in hell below, but in the higher, as it were, in a balance; because they could not ascend into Heaven."
I answer 1. That this Commentary on the Apostle does not appear to be by St. Ambrose, but by some other Author contemporary with Ambrose; for he lived at the time of Pope Damasus, as he testifies in the Commentary on the third chapter of the former Epistle to Timothy. Secondly, to say that this Author, whoever he may be, does not deny original sin, but rather establishes it: for a little before, expounding the aforesaid words, explaining that text "in whom all have sinned," he says: "It is therefore manifest that all sinned in Adam as in a mass; for he himself, corrupted by sin, begat all those who were born under sin. And thus also all are sinners, because we are all from him."
You will object 3. St. Chrysostom, whom the Pelagians claimed as the chief patron of their error, because he seemed in various places to deny original sin, especially in the Epistle to Theophilus, where, having said: "Blessed be God, who alone worketh wonders, who made all things and adorned all things: behold, he now enjoys the serene brightness of liberty who a little before was held captive; they are about the Church who were wandering in pilgrimages, and they occupy the lot of justice who were shut up in the confinement of sin. For they are not only free, but also holy; not only holy, but also just; not only just, but also sons; not only sons, but also heirs; not only heirs, but also brethren of Christ; nay, not only brethren of Christ, but also co-heirs; not only co-heirs, but also members; not only members, but also a temple; not only a temple, but also an instrument of the Spirit" — he subjoins: "Such are the dignities of faith through baptism; but to many the grace of baptism seems to consist only in the remission of sins. We, however, have already reckoned ten honors of baptism. For this reason also we baptize infants, although they are not stained with sin; namely, that sanctity, justice, adoption, inheritance, and the brotherhood of Christ may be bestowed upon them."
St. Augustine answers, book 1, chapter 6 of Contra Iulianum, against Julian, who had objected that aforesaid authority: "Do you then dare so to set forth these words of St. John the Bishop, as if opposed to so many and such great sentences of his, and so to sever him from their most harmonious fellowship and make him an adversary to them? Far be it, far be it, to believe or say such an evil of so great a man. Far be it, I say, that John of Constantinople should resist, on the baptism of little ones and their deliverance from the paternal handwriting through Christ, so many and so great Bishops of his own, and above all Innocent of Rome, Cyprian of Carthage, Basil of Cappadocia, Gregory of Nazianzus, Hilary of Gaul, Ambrose of Milan." Then he expounds the aforesaid words, saying that according to the Greek idiom "sins" is read in the plural, not "sin" in the singular, so that the genuine Latin version would be: "Therefore also we baptize Infants, although not having sins." Whence St. Augustine subjoins: "Certainly it was not said that little ones are not stained with sin, or sins, because John then spoke when no one was pressing this Question; more securely will he speak when we are no longer disputing." — Further, even if it be read singularly "with sin," it must be understood of personal sin, as St. Augustine explains in the same place, saying: "John therefore, comparing parents with their elders, whose own sins are remitted in baptism, said that they had not sins." — Finally, in other codices, especially of the Paris edition of the year 1556, we read: "We baptize infants that they may not be stained with sin," that is, that they may be cleansed from sin — surely none other than original. But that St. Chrysostom did not attack original sin, but rather defended it, St. Augustine proves in the same place from several texts taken from him, especially from the same Epistle to Theophilus, where he says: "Christ came once, and found the instrument, the paternal handwriting, which Adam wrote. In the beginning he introduced the debt; we have increased the interest by later sins." Whereupon Augustine addresses Julian thus: "Do you hear a man Catholic in Faith, and learned, and able to teach, distinguishing the debt of the paternal handwriting, which adhered to us hereditarily, from those debts whose interest accrued through our own sins? Do you hear what is revealed to little ones in baptism, who have not yet contracted debts of their own, and yet could not be immune from the paternal handwriting?"
ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM REASON AND THEOLOGY ARE PROPOSED AND ANSWERED.
The Pelagians chiefly brought forward five arguments by which they assailed and attacked the assertion of original sin, as St. Augustine indicates in book 2 of Contra Iulianum, chapter 9. "Yours," he says, "are the arguments by which you say: If God creates men, they cannot be born evil together with Him; if marriage is a good, nothing evil arises from it; if all sins are remitted in baptism, those born of the reborn cannot draw original sin; if God is just, He cannot damn sins in the children while He forgives the parents their very own; if human nature is capable of perfect justice, it cannot have natural vices." But that the solutions of these objections may become more evident and easier, it pleases us to propose them, as well as others like them, one by one. Therefore:
You will object 1. God cannot be the artificer of evil: but He Himself is the author of all men who are born: therefore men being born cannot be evil, and hence neither infected with original sin.
St. Augustine answers, in the book De peccato originali, chapter 32, that two things must be distinguished in the procreation of men, namely nature and vice. "Together," he says, "both are propagated, both nature and nature's vice, one of which is good and the other evil. The one is taken from the bounty of the Creator; the other is drawn from the condemnation of origin. The cause of the one is the good will of the supreme God; of the other, the evil will of the first man. The one shows God the institutor of the creature; the other shows God the punisher of disobedience. Finally, Christ Himself, the very same, is the maker of man on account of creating the one, and is made man on account of healing the other." From which it follows that that evil, or original vice, must be referred not to God but to the disobedience of Adam as to its proper cause. It follows likewise that deliverance from this sin is not to be despaired of; for nature is not to be destroyed but perfected, that this disease may be cured. Which that heavenly physician can easily accomplish, who came to seek and to save that which was lost. Thence the same St. Augustine, book 2 against Julian, chapter 1: "Nor is perfection of virtue to be despaired of, through the grace of Him who can change and form nature vitiated from its origin."
You will object 2. A good tree cannot make evil fruits: but marriages are good: therefore from them evil children and sinners cannot be born.
St. Augustine answers 1., book 2 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, chapter 20: "Not only from wedlock but even from adultery something good is in children, according to the work of God by which they are created; but according to original sin they are born unto condemnation from Adam the first, not only if they are generated of adultery, but even if of wedlock, unless they be regenerated in Adam the second, who is Christ." Whence he concludes in the following chapter: "Rightly therefore have we said that the good of marriages cannot be accused on account of the original evil which is drawn thence, just as the evil of adultery cannot be accused on account of the man who is naturally born thence; because human nature which is born, whether of wedlock or of adultery, is the work of God; which, if it were evil, would not be to be generated; if it had no evil, would not be to be regenerated." And to conclude both in one word: "human nature, if it were evil, would not be to be saved; if no evil inhered in it, it would not be to be saved. Whoever therefore says that it is not good denies the good, confessing the Creator; but whoever denies that evil inheres in it mocks the merciful grace of the Saviour." Wherefore in men who are being born neither are adulteries to be excused on account of the good which is thence created by the good Creator; nor are marriages to be accused on account of the evil which is there to be healed by the merciful Saviour.
He answers 2. that chapter 26, the context of the Gospel aforesaid, is to be understood of two wills of men, namely the good and the bad; calling this good and that bad tree, because good works arise from a good will, and evil from an evil one. But if we set marriage down as a good tree, according to that Gospel similitude which he commemorated, we shall assuredly, on the contrary, set fornication down as an evil tree. He subjoins: "Wherefore if man is there called the fruit of marriage, as good from a good tree, doubtless man ought not to be born of fornication, for indeed an evil tree does not make good fruits." Moreover, if he should say that adultery ought not to hold the place of that tree, but rather human nature, of which man is born: so also here it will not be marriage that is the tree, but human nature, of which man is born. Nothing therefore does that Gospel similitude avail for this question, because marriages are not the cause of the sin which is drawn from the one being born and expiated in the one reborn; but the voluntary sin of the first man is the cause of the sin. Spouses therefore, whilst they beget children, propagate nature indeed corrupt and vitiated; but the guilt of that corruption must be referred not to themselves, but to the first man.
You will object 3. No one gives what he has not: but most parents, begetting children, no longer have original sin, seeing that it was expunged in them through baptism: therefore they cannot transfuse it into their children.
St. Augustine answers, book 3 of De peccatorum meritis, chapter 8 and following, that man regenerated in Christ, and thereby justified, does not beget carnal offspring according to that whereby he is regenerated, that is, according to the Spirit which he received in Christ; but according to that whereby he was born, that is, according to the flesh which he drew from Adam. Whence, having proposed this objection of the Pelagians — "but if Baptism cleanses that ancient offence, those who are born of two baptized persons ought to be free from sin: for they could not transmit to posterity what they by no means had" — he answers: "If the difficulty of refuting falsehoods and persuading truths resisted me among the dull and contentious on account of the obscurity of the natures of things, I would surely have recourse to examples which are in use and at hand, and would interrogate them in turn, that they might tell me how the sin which is cleansed through Baptism remains in those whom the baptized have begotten? They themselves would explain how the foreskin which is removed by circumcision remains in those whom the circumcised have begotten? how also chaff, which is separated by human labor with such diligence, remains in the fruit which is born from the purged grain? With these and such examples perhaps I would try to persuade both, that the sacraments of cleansing are superfluously believed applied to the sons of the cleansed, than that with right counsel the little ones of the baptized should be baptized: although it can happen that to a man having both seed, of death in the flesh and of immortality in the spirit, what harms his son generated of the flesh does not harm himself regenerated through the spirit; and what was cleansed in this one by remission should also be in that one, to be cleansed by a similar remission, as by circumcision, as by threshing and winnowing. But now, since we deal with those who confess that the sons of the baptized must be baptized, we act better thus, that we say:" (Then he presses the Pelagians thus:) "You who assert that sons ought to be born without sin of men cleansed from the stain of sin, why do you not add that in the same way it can be said of Christian parents that they ought to beget Christian sons?... What will you answer? Do you ask whether Christians are not born of Christians: save that generation does not make, but regeneration makes, Christians? Render therefore to yourselves this reason, that similarly of sins no one of you is born, but all are cleansed by being reborn. And hence to men equally cleansed, because the man who is born of reborn men is reborn, that he too may be cleansed. They could not [scil. could] parents transmit to posterity what they by no means had: not only as wheat chaff, and the foreskin from the circumcised; but also, as you yourselves say, the faithful transmit infidelity to posterity — which is now not of those manifest regenerated ones, but the vice of mortal seed, in that flesh they were generated. For even those little ones whom you command to be made faithful through the sacrament of the faithful, you do not deny to be born unbelievers from faithful parents."
He subjoins a similar answer in book 1 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, producing the example of the olive producing the wild olive. For thus he writes in chapter 19: "What is born of this concupiscence of the flesh, assuredly is born unto the world, not unto God. But one is born unto God when he is reborn of water and the Holy Ghost. The guilt of this concupiscence regeneration alone remits, which generation draws. Therefore let that which is generated be regenerated, because it cannot otherwise come to pass that what has been drawn be remitted. For that what has been remitted in the parent is drawn into the offspring is done in wondrous ways indeed, but nevertheless it is done. These things, invisible and incredible to unbelievers, but true, divine Providence provided in certain shrubs, that they might have some visible example. For why should we not believe that for this reason it was instituted that from the olive a wild olive be born? Ought it not to be believed that in some thing created for the uses of men the Creator provided and instituted what might serve as an example for the human race? It is wonderful therefore how, delivered from the bond of sin through grace, they nevertheless beget bound by the same bond, who must be delivered in the same manner: we confess, it is wonderful. But that the embryos of wild olives lie hidden even in the seeds of olives — when would this be believed, unless it were proved by experience? Therefore as a wild olive is begotten from the seed of a wild olive, and from the seed of an olive nothing but a wild olive, although between the wild olive and the olive there is the greatest difference: so from the flesh of a sinner, and from the flesh of a just man, a sinner is begotten on either side, although between the sinner and the just there is the greatest difference. Now the sinner is begotten none as yet in act, new in origin, but old in guilt: man from the Creator, captive from the deceiver, needing the Redeemer. But it is asked how captivity can be drawn into offspring even from parents already redeemed? And because it is traced out by no easy reasoning, nor explained in speech, it is not believed by unbelievers, as if even that which we said of the wild olive and of the olive, that the foetus of a dissimilar kind be like, some reason tacitly finds, or speech explains. But this can be seen by him who wishes to experience it. Let it be therefore in an example, whence also that may be believed which cannot be seen."
Whence I distinguish the minor: parents cannot transfuse into their children that which they have not, neither formally nor virtually — I concede: that which they have not formally, but only virtually — I deny: parents, moreover, although when they generate they have not original sin formally in themselves, yet always retain it virtually; namely, in the power of the seed and of the concupiscence of corrupted nature, which are the causes, or instruments, of generation, or of the union of the soul with the body, through which union original sin is contracted.
You will object 4. The redemption of Christ does not profit men who believe not: therefore neither does the transgression of Adam harm those who sin not, since it is not more efficacious.
St. Augustine answers, book 3 of De peccatorum meritis, chapter 2, that as the grace of Christ profits little ones baptized, believing only in another's person; so likewise sin, committed by the actual consent of the head of the whole human race, harms them: "therefore as," he says, "the spirit of justice of those through whom they are reborn, by his answer, transfers into them the faith which they could not as yet have by their own will: so the flesh of sin of those through whom they are born transfers into them death, which they had not as yet contracted by their own life. And as the spirit of wickedness regenerates the faithful in Christ, so the body of death had generated them in Adam as sinners: for that is carnal generation, this spiritual: that makes sons of the flesh, this sons of the spirit: that sons of death, this sons of resurrection: that sons of the age, this sons of God: that sons of wrath, this sons of mercy; and hence those bound by original sin, these freed from the bond of every sin."
You will object 5. Julian, in St. Augustine, book 2 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, chapter 28: "This one who is born does not sin, that one who begat does not sin, this one who fashioned does not sin; through what crevices then, creeping in amidst so many safeguards, do you feign the entrance of sin?"
St. Augustine answers in the same place: "Why do you seek the hidden crevice, when it has a most open door? By one man, saith the Apostle; by the offence of one, saith the Apostle; by the disobedience of one man: what do you seek further? what do you seek more openly? what more curiously!" Therefore the consequence of Julian must be denied: for although the father who generates is not the cause of sin, nor the son who is born, nor God who fashioned: it does not follow from thence that there is no cause of that sin, especially since the Apostle says: "By one man sin entered into this world."
You will object 6. Every sin is voluntary: but original sin in infants cannot be voluntary, since they lack the use of reason and liberty: therefore it cannot have the ratio of sin in them. The major is proved from that of St. Augustine, book De vera religione, chapter 11: "So voluntary is sin an evil, that in no way is it sin unless it be voluntary."
The Subtle Doctor answers, in 2, number 11: "'Every sin must be voluntary to the sinner, insofar as it is in his power, either secundum se or secundum alium, in whom he is morally constituted as in a head' — I concede: 'it must be voluntary, so that it be in the physical power of his own will not to have it' — I deny; and similarly, distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence." Thus does St. Augustine solve the aforesaid argument, book 2 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, chapter 28, where, to Julian saying: "If sin is from the will, the will which makes sin is evil; if from nature, nature is evil," he answers: "Sin is from the will." He asks perhaps, whether it is original sin? I answer: it is altogether original sin, because this also was sown from the will of the first man, that it might be in him and pass over into all. This same he often inculcates in book 1 of the Operis imperfecti against Julian, where to Julian himself objecting what he himself had written in the book De duabus animabus, namely that "sin is the will of losing or retaining that which justice discerns, and whence it is free to abstain," and inferring from thence that there is no original sin in little ones: inasmuch as Julian said, "there is no sin without will; and there is no will where liberty is not unfolded; and there is no liberty where there is not the faculty of choice through reason": which certainly is not found in infants — St. Augustine responds in the same place, chapter 47. "These three things," he says, addressing Julian, "do you distinguish, and know that one thing is sin, another the punishment of sin, another both. You understand which of these three pertains to that definition, wherein there is will of doing that which justice forbids, and whence it is free to abstain. For sin is defined in this manner, not the punishment of sin, not both." Then, explicating the three members of this division, he subjoins: "Now these three genera have their species, of which it would now be long to dispute. Of these three genera take examples, if they are required; of the first genus there occurs in Adam, without any manner of question: for many are the evils which men do, from which it is free to abstain: but to none is it so free as it was to him who served God, by whom he was founded upright, abiding wholly depraved by no vice. Of the second genus, however, insofar as it is only the punishment of sin, the example is that evil which anyone does from the evil part, but only suffers: as when for his crime he who sinned is slain, or is tortured by any other punishment of the body. But the third genus, wherein sin itself is, and the punishment of sin, can be understood in him who says: 'the evil which I would not, that I do.' And finally, applying the distinction to the argument of Julian, he says that original sin pertains not to the first member of the division, but to the third: and hence it is no wonder if it be not comprehended by that definition of his related by Julian, seeing that it was handed down only concerning sin spoken of in the first manner. 'First,' he says, 'we mentioned original sin: for we now treat of sin, not of the punishment, which is not sin, although it follows by the merit of sin: which indeed little ones suffer, since there is in them a body dead because of sin; yet death of the body itself is not sin, or any bodily torture whatsoever. That third genus, insofar as it is, is sin, that it be both itself and the punishment of sin, which indeed is inherent in those being born, yet the origin of this sin descends from the will of the sinner. For Adam was, and in him we all were. Adam perished, and in him all perished.'"
You will insist: That is called voluntary which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with cognition: but original sin in little ones proceeds from an extrinsic principle, namely Adam, and without any cognition, seeing that they are destitute of reason: therefore it can in no wise be voluntary in them, nor be imputed to fault. Further, the free voluntary must be in the power of that will to which it is called voluntary, namely so that it may be or not be: but original sin is not in the power of the will of little ones, and hence in them it is neither voluntary nor free. Finally, that what is done through the will of another may be judged voluntary to me, it is necessary that I have committed my offices to him: but the posterity of Adam did not commit their own will to him, that namely in their stead he might keep or lose original justice at pleasure, seeing that they did not yet exist: therefore the privation of original justice, wherein original sin consists, cannot be voluntary in them.
I answer to the first: that original sin, in the manner in which it is voluntary, is from an intrinsic principle with cognition — not indeed in us, but in Adam: for something is said to be voluntary in two ways: namely physically, and in order to our own proper will; or morally, and in order to the will of another, in whom our own proper will is morally judged to be contained; of which kind is the will of the Ward, which is morally judged to be the will of the Tutor, and of the Actor; and also the wills of minor sons are morally contained in the will of the Fathers. Hence, since the wills of all men were morally contained in Adam the First Parent, after the manner of a Father and Head of all, he himself sinning freely and with perfect cognition, so likewise are we judged to have sinned in him. For as the blow given by the hand is voluntary, and with cognition, not by the will and cognition existing in the hand, but by the will of the whole supposit whose part the hand is: so original sin contracted by children is truly voluntary; not by a will existing in them physically, but by the will of Adam, in whom, as in the head of the whole human community, the wills of all men are morally contained. Therefore I distinguish the major: "that is called voluntary which is from an intrinsic principle with cognition" — either physically, and in itself only — I deny: or morally, and in another — I concede. And thus distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence: for although original sin be not voluntary in us physically, and by an act of our own will, yet it is voluntary morally; namely by the will of Adam, who, since he is the principle of human nature not only natural but also moral, what he committed can be reputed morally intrinsic to others.
To the second I distinguish the major: "the personal voluntary, proceeding physically from the proper will of the agent, must be in the power of his will" — I concede: "the capital voluntary, or proceeding from the head of some moral member, must be in the physical power of the will of that member itself" — I deny; for it suffices thereto that that voluntary thing be in the physical power of the head containing morally the wills of the members. Similarly, distinguishing the minor, the consequence must be denied; for since original sin is not voluntary to little ones by the will of the person, but only by the will of the head of human nature, it is not required that it be in their physical power to have this defect or not to have it; but it suffices that it was in the physical power of the will of Adam to sin or not to sin.
To the third I say, that for original sin to be judged voluntary to men by the will of the head, it is not necessary that they committed their own right and consent to Adam their First Parent with regard to the keeping or loss of original justice: but it suffices that God, constituting him Adam our head natural and moral, constituted the wills of all of us alike in him morally: for since He is the supreme Lord of us and of our things, and holds the wills of men in His power more than they themselves do, as St. Augustine says in the book De Correptione et gratia, chapter 14, He was able to ordain that the will of Adam, the First Parent of all, with regard to the loss or keeping of original justice, should be alike the will of all his posterity: not insofar as they are singular persons; for thus each of them has his own will: but insofar as they are parts and members of the whole body, and multitude of men, of which Adam is the head and origin.
You will object 7. No one sins in that which he cannot avoid: but little ones cannot avoid original sin: therefore it cannot be deputed to them as fault.
The Doctor distinguishes the major, dist. 32, number 14: "No one sins in that which he cannot avoid, neither in himself, nor in another in whom he is morally contained" — he concedes: "that which he cannot avoid secundum se, but could avoid it in another" — he denies; and similarly, distinguishing the minor, he denies the consequence: for although little ones secundum se physically cannot avoid original sin, yet they could avoid it in Adam: whence they do not indeed sin by actual and personal sin, which would arise physically from their will: but by original sin, which is transmitted together with human nature itself. "For as," St. Augustine says, book 2 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, chapter 5, "through the will of that one all sinned in him the evil, when all those were the one man," therefore each drew original sin.
You will object 8. Nothing natural is culpable, seeing that Aristotle says in 3 Ethicorum: "In natural things we are neither praised nor blamed"; whence no one will reproach one born blind, but rather pity him: but original corruption is natural, since it necessarily follows nature itself, and is the same in all: therefore it is not to be blamed; and hence neither is it sin.
The Seraphic Doctor answers, from St. August. lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 10: that something can be called natural in two ways, namely that which follows nature itself according to its institution; or that which accompanies it according to its corruption: that which is natural in the prior manner is not culpable, whence Aristotle rightly said that reproach must not be cast upon men laboring under natural defect, as the blind born blind: but that which is natural in the latter manner is culpable; inasmuch as it is not only natural, but also voluntary, both physically on the part of the head, and morally on the part of the member contracting sin together with nature.
Julian the Pelagian was insisting, that what is accidental in parents cannot be natural in sons: but the sin of Adam was accidental in him: therefore it cannot be judged natural or innate in his sons.
St. Augustine answers, book 6 contr. ipsum Iul., chapter 6, denying the major, and confirms it by the example of Fundanus, the Carthaginian rhetorician, who, though the vice of luxury was accidental in him, begat sons of luxury. "By which example," St. Augustine says, "that sentence of yours would be overturned, whereby you do not grant natural things from accident: for it was accident in the father which was made natural in the son."
You will object 9. The sin of origin, if it existed, would exist in the body or in the soul: not in the body, because this is not the seat of sin, although it is often the seedbed and conflagration; nor even in the soul, for this is created immediately by God alone; for if it were made by traduction from Adam, and, like the body, were propagated through generation, it would be subject to death, as also the body. Therefore it proceeds from God alone: but God is not the author of sin, nor straightway the artificer of a sinful soul. Therefore original sin is none.
I answer with Bellarmine, book 4 of De Statu peccati, chapter 10, near the end: that this argument of the Pelagians ever seemed most difficult to St. Augustine, and almost insoluble. Wherefore in book 5 cont. Iulianum, chapter 1, expounding two modes of explaining the corruption of the soul from original sin and its propagation, he writes: "Lest, namely, soul and flesh be punished together with both, unless what is born be emended by punishing. Indeed, either both vitiated is drawn from man; or one into the other, and whilst in the vitiated case it is corrupted, where the hidden justice of the divine law is inculcated. But which of these be the true, I learn more willingly than I say, lest I dare to teach what I know not. Yet this I know, that of these that is truer which true, ancient, catholic faith, which believes and asserts original sin, would pronounce not false. That faith is not denied, and this which lies hidden concerning the soul, either is learned in leisure, or, as many other things in this life, is known without the blemish of salvation. More must I care, whether in little ones or in grown ones, by what help the soul be holier, than by what merit it be vitiated."
Although indeed the solution of this question appears truly difficult, nevertheless, to the argument we shall say that the soul is touched through generation, not indeed so that it is made by its force; but so that it is united to the body by the mode of a form, which union is the formal terminus of generation: but the whole man is he himself consisting of soul and body: whence, since the whole man is judged propagated from Adam, the whole man also is said to be stained, as well according to the body as according to the soul. But in what manner that sin is produced by Parents into posterity, we shall show below.