Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

Note 1. The gravity of a sin can be gathered either from the species of the sin itself: thus adultery is graver than simple fornication; or from the intention of the sinner's affection, as if one be seized with more vehement zeal and more intense affection for sinning; or from the effect of the sin, that is, from the harm which follows upon it; thus homicide is graver than theft: or from the various circumstances joined to the sin, which amplify its gravity, such as the quality of the person, place, time, and other things of that kind. Now it is certain that if the species of the sin of our first Parents be considered, it was not the most grievous of all; for it would have been graver had they sinned by blasphemy, infidelity, or by contempt or hatred of God. Nor should I hesitate to say that Judas, and all heresiarchs, such as Arius, Luther, Calvin, etc., according to the species of sin, sinned more gravely than Adam: for he sinned against a positive law; they, however, at once against both positive and natural law: he violated a precept concerning an indifferent thing; these, concerning things evil in themselves. Therefore the gravity of the sin of the first parents must be inquired into on another ground, whereby it may be judged the most grievous of all sins.

Note 2. From the Seraphic Doctor Bonaventure, book 2, distinction 21, article 3, question 3, one sin is said to be graver than another in three ways: either on account of greater concupiscence: or on account of greater ingratitude: or on account of greater corruption. If the first is considered, it is certain that Adam's sin was neither the greatest absolutely, nor the greatest of all human sins; for the devil sinned out of greater concupiscence; and also many sons of Adam sin out of greater concupiscence than did the first Parent. But if a sin is called greater in the second way, namely as regards ingratitude, then also Adam's sin was not the greatest absolutely; because the devil sinned out of greater ingratitude, since he perceived more good things in his creation, and fell from a more sublime state: it was nevertheless the greatest of all human sins, because he stood in a nobler and higher state than any of his descendants who fell into sin. There remains, therefore, to be seen whether Adam's sin was the greatest by reason of injury.

Note 3. That although Cajetan, expounding those words of Genesis chapter 3, The woman took of the fruit of the tree, and did eat, affirms Eve's first sin to have been the least, both from its root, that is, the affection of liberty; and from its reason for sinning, namely the appetite for divine similitude; and from the thing desired, which was the knowledge of good and evil; and from the species of the exterior act, which was to eat the fruit beautiful to the eyes and sweet to the taste; and from the cause of the sinning, namely the seduction of the serpent; and finally from the condition of the sinner, because she was a woman, and therefore of the weaker sex for resisting the devil: nevertheless, if the sins of both parents be compared with one another, it is certain that Eve's sin was by far graver in some respect than Adam's sin, as will appear.

Two things, therefore, must be resolved in this Question: First, whether and how the sin of each first Parent was the gravest of all human sins: Second, which of the two, Adam or Eve, sinned more gravely.

First Conclusion. — The sin of the first Parents was not the gravest of all human sins by reason of intrinsic malice, much less only by reason of injury and ingratitude.

This is common among Theologians, and the Subtle Doctor proves it thus in book 2, distinction 22, question 2, n. 3: the gravity of a sin is gathered either from its being opposed to a more intense or more perfect goodness, or from its being against a more necessary goodness, that is, against that which is commanded by more precepts: but from neither head was the sin of the first Parents graver than all human sins. Not indeed from its being opposed to a more perfect goodness: since the perfection of divine love is more excellent than obedience; for greater than all virtues is charity; therefore it is graver to hate God than not to obey Him. Nor yet from its being against a more necessary goodness, or one commanded by more precepts, because indeed they violated the single precept prescribed to them not to eat of the forbidden fruit: but sins, says the Doctor, which are committed by Adam's posterity against the ten precepts of the Decalogue, are sins against which are commanded more precepts, and which are to be observed by the law of nature: therefore that sin was not the gravest of all.

He proves, secondly: Adam's sin was chiefly an inordinate love of his wife: but that love of itself was not contrary to the precept of loving God, which is the greatest, except in the manner in which other sins are opposed to this precept: nor is it even against the second precept of loving one's neighbor so plainly as hatred of one's neighbor is: for who doubts that it is graver to hate one's neighbor than to love him with excess? Therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. Blasphemy is a graver sin as regards intrinsic species than the inordinate love wherewith Adam loved Eve, and than his eating of the forbidden fruit: since the former is against the precept of the natural law and of the first table, whereby God is commanded to be loved and honored: the latter is only against the positive precept of obedience and love of neighbor: therefore it follows that Adam's sin was less grave than very many sins of his posterity; and deservedly does the Doctor infer in the same place, that had Adam been damned for that sin, he would have suffered a lesser punishment than many who are damned.

The Seraphic Doctor proves this truth with a fourfold argument. First, it is a lesser sin that is remissible than one irremissible: but that sin was remissible, as has been proven above: yet many sins are irremissible: therefore, etc. Secondly, graver is a sin which can by no means be excused, than one which admits some excuse: but the sin of the first Parents admits some excuse, in this that it was committed at another's instigation: but sin against the Holy Ghost admits no color of excuse: therefore that sin was not the most grievous sin. Thirdly, so much the graver is a sin, the more it proceeds from greater concupiscence: but in the first Parents there reigned the least concupiscence and perversity of will, since their nature was pure and sound: therefore it seems that that transgression arising from disobedience was not the greatest. Fourthly, graver is a sin which is against nature, and reason, and divine institution, than one which is only against a divine command: but the sin of the first Parents, which followed upon that temptation, was neither altogether against nature, nor against reason, but only against the divine institution: for neither did nature, nor reason, of itself dictate that of that tree one should not eat. Yet there are many sins which are against nature, and reason, and divine institution, which we call sins against nature: therefore it does not seem that that transgression of the first Parents was the greatest of all sins.

The second part is proven, namely that the sin of the first Parents was the gravest by reason of injury and harm, from what follows: for a greater injury, says the Seraphic Doctor, can be considered either intensively or extensively. Speaking intensively, Adam's sin was indeed not of the greatest injury; because it did not deprave his will as many sins do. But speaking extensively, that sin was of the greatest injury, because no sin exists which harmed so many persons, and passed through so many, as that sin which was committed: for from the primal temptation that harm was not proper to the sinners alone, but common to the whole human race: for those first Parents by their fall and ruin dragged down all their descendants, as many as were thereafter and ever shall be, into the destruction of sin and death. Wherefore St. Paul weighing this great harm in chapter 5 of Romans, says: By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. Gravest, therefore, was that sin, if you consider the harm consequent upon it, that is, the loss of so many goods never thereafter to be recovered, and the necessity of so many and such great evils, which that sin brought upon the whole human race.

There also aggravates Adam's sin, that he excelled in wisdom and in the grace of God, and had no inclination whatsoever toward evil: wherefore so much the greater was his iniquity in sinning, as greater was in him the facility of not sinning: whence St. Augustine lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 15. If anyone thinks the damnation of Adam too severe or unjust, he assuredly knows not how to measure how great was the iniquity in sinning, where so great was the facility of not sinning. Which indeed he elegantly declares by contraries, namely by comparison with the obedience of Christ the Lord: As, he says, the obedience of Christ was so much the more glorious because He became obedient unto death: so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable, because he became disobedient unto death. For then great is the punishment proposed for disobedience, and the thing commanded easy by the Creator: who shall sufficiently declare how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy matter, under so great an authority of command, and with so terrible a punishment threatening?

There accrues also to the gravity of the sin of each first parent, that the woman first, then the husband, rose up against God. For truly they exalted themselves against God when, not content with so great a dignity conferred upon them divinely, they desired to know more than was lawful, that they might be equal to God. There also they betrayed a monstrous ingratitude: they had been made to the image of God; this seemed little unless equality were added. Now there is no need that wicked and perverse men labor, not merely fruitlessly but perversely, in extenuating the sin of Adam and his wife. Nor indeed is it a light offense, but a detestable crime, that apostasy by which man withdraws himself from the dominion of his Creator, nay rejects and denies Him. Add that it was not a simple apostasy, but joined with atrocious insults and outrages against God Himself. Satan accuses God of lying, and of envy and malice: to so foul and execrable a calumny they subscribe. Finally, despising the command of God, they not only indulge their own lust, but enslave themselves to the devil. If anyone states the malice more briefly, unbelief opened the door to ambition. But ambition was the mother of contumacy, so that men, casting off the fear of God, might shake off His yoke. On this account St. teaches that by the disobedience of Adam sin entered into the world. It does not follow, however, from this that it was the gravest of all sins.

Objection 1. A sin is grave because it takes away a good: therefore that which takes away a more excellent good is graver: but Adam's sin took away a greater good than any other, inasmuch as it took away original justice from himself and his posterity: therefore it is the greatest sin.

I distinguish the first consequence with the Doctor: that it takes away more of a good from its intrinsic nature, I concede the consequence: that it takes away more of a good demeritoriously, I deny the consequence: and similarly I distinguish the assumption: that Adam's sin took away original justice from its intrinsic nature, I deny: demeritoriously, I concede; and I deny the second consequence. Therefore the gravity of a sin drawn from the good which is taken away by it must not be considered in whatever manner, because in fact all mortal sins take away habitual grace and the right to beatitude; and therefore by this argument sins would be equal: but those goods which are taken away by sin must be considered according to the special incompatibility which they have with the sins themselves, e.g., because hatred of God has from its particular reason an incompossibility with the love of God; but not with the love of creatures, nor with the love of temperance; and because intemperance from its particular reason has an incompossibility with the love of temperance: hence the gravity of hatred and of intemperance must be drawn from those goods to which they are opposed by their particular reason: and this being granted, since the love of God is a greater good than the love of temperance, therefore hatred of God must be judged of greater gravity than intemperance.

Objection 2. Punishment corresponds to fault: but against Adam's sin the greatest punishment was inflicted, namely his own death and that of his posterity: therefore it was the greatest.

I distinguish the major with the same Doctor: in such wise that no greater punishment may be inflicted than could deservedly be inflicted for a fault, I concede; in such wise that it could never happen that a greater punishment be inflicted for a sin not greater, I deny the major: and the minor being conceded, the consequence must be denied. Therefore the gravity of a sin can be gathered only from the gravity of punishment, when so great a punishment is inflicted for one sin as could not justly be inflicted for another: but so great a punishment was not inflicted for Adam's sin as could not be inflicted for certain sins which he himself could commit, and other men also. Or, as the Doctor speaks, that sin is greater to which a greater punishment is owed: provided that punishment be formally the punishment of that fault: but thus the greatest punishment was not owed to Adam's sin. Nay rather, had he himself been damned for that sin, he would not have been punished so severely for that sin as many others. And when you say that death was inflicted upon him for that sin, which is the greatest punishment; I say that he was not said before the fault to be immortal through anything intrinsic which would afterwards have been corrupted by sin: but through gratuitous gifts conferred upon him. We see, moreover, that sometimes for a small fault the greatest benefits are withdrawn, although no great punishment, indeed but a slight one, is inflicted for it.

Second Conclusion. — Eve's sin according to intrinsic species was graver than Adam's sin: but according to certain circumstances, Adam's sin was graver than Eve's sin.

This is common as regards both parts, against Cajetan above, and Bellarmine, book 3, De amissione gratiae. The first part St. Chrysostom establishes by his own judgment, Epistle 3 to Olympias, wherein he says: And indeed it is so much graver, namely Eve's sin, that compared with Adam's sin it is not even reckoned a sin, because it was not the man but the woman that was deceived, who, impelled into fraud, violated(?) the law of God, and tempered for herself and her husband the poisoned cup.

The Subtle Doctor proves this truth in book 2, distinction 21, question 1, n. 1, because Eve sinned by desiring some equality with God in the knowledge of good and evil: but thus Adam did not sin: but the sin of so great ambition was graver than the sin of an inordinate effect, whereby Adam loved his wife. Then Eve induced her husband to sin, which certainly was itself a most grave sin, which was not committed by Adam, nor any equivalent: therefore Eve sinned more gravely. But even had Adam likewise sought that equality with God, as Eve did, still by reason of the scandal committed by Eve it should be said simply that she sinned more gravely than Adam. For, as St. Ambrose says in the book De Paradiso, c. 21: The error, he says, of the woman entered first: for the man was the author of error to the woman, not the woman to the man. Whence Paul also says: Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression.

But how Eve came to her husband and solicited him to eat of the forbidden fruit, Alcimus Avitus explains most beautifully, Poem 2:

Ignorant of what was done, returning from another part, Adam, spread wholly through the grasses of the field, Sought his wife's embraces and chaste kisses. The woman met him, in whose heart audacity then First blew the spirited fury of a woman's rage, And thus she began to speak, for she feared her groaning, Keeping the deadly apple for her wretched husband: Take food, sweet spouse, from the vital germ, Which perchance will make you like to the Thunderer supreme And equal to the gods. This gift is no mere food That I bear, but now taught by experience. The first taste Touched my vitals, loosing the pact by daring peril. Believe gladly; it is a crime unmanly to have doubted. Did you fear, perchance, that a woman could go before you? At least follow, and lift up your fallen courage. Why do you turn your eyes away? why delay your prosperous vows? And long defraud the honor that is to come? Having spoken these words she handed the food of a death about to live, While the soul perished and crimes fed destruction. The unhappy man receives the words of an ill-whispering murmur And casts down his bent senses backward to the depths. No care shaken by trembling panic seized him, Nor did the woman hesitate so much at her first taste, But swift he follows, and from his wretched wife's mouth Constantly seizes the fickle, deadly poison.

The Doctor proves the second part in the same place, namely that Adam's sin, according to certain circumstances, was graver than Eve's sin: for sin, he says, can be aggravated by an accidental circumstance, on account of the excellence of the person and his dignity, who ought on this account the more carefully to guard against sin. Likewise on account of strength, and the possibility of resisting. Therefore the Master says in the text, that because Adam, assailed by exterior temptation, fell, he was so much the more severely to be punished, as he was cast down by a lighter impulse. For the temptation of the flesh is overcome with more difficulty: because what is of ourselves is strengthened against us: since therefore Adam was more circumspect, and nobler, and stronger to resist, therefore accidentally his sin was greater. Finally, original justice was delivered to Adam as to one more worthy, and more circumspect, and stronger, so that if he lost it, he would lose it for himself and his whole posterity. But it was not thus delivered to the woman; therefore Adam's sin was accidentally graver than Eve's sin: nevertheless formally, in a per se manner, and precisely in itself, Eve's sin was graver.

This same thing the Seraphic Doctor proves in book 2, dist. 21, qu. 3:

Sin, he says, can be called graver than another in three ways: namely by ingratitude, concupiscence, and subsequent corruption. If therefore we speak of greater gravity as regards ingratitude, the man sinned more gravely than the woman: on account of his having received more abundant gifts; and the same man forgetful of benefits contemned and offended his Benefactor. he was more ungrateful, and in his ingratitude stood forth more culpable.

But if we speak of superiority as regards concupiscence, thus the woman sinned more than the man; on account of her having sinned with a more perverse will, while she coveted to be made like to God, and more ardently desired, believing she could obtain what the devil suggested to her; and the same woman on account of a more perverse will sinned out of greater concupiscence. and as regards this she was more culpable than the man. — But if we speak of superiority of fault as regards the corruption following, a distinction must be made; because something can be said to corrupt in two ways: either after the manner of a cause, or after the manner of an occasion. If after the manner of a cause, because the sin of the man was the cause of the transfusion of sin into posterity, and thus corrupted himself and others, a greater corruption followed from the sin of the man, and as regards this. the fault of the man is said to have been graver: but if after the manner of an occasion, because the sin of the woman was the occasion of the sin of the man, and consequently of all others, in this way the woman can be said to have corrupted the rest, not only her descendants, but also her husband. Whence she sinned not only in herself, but also against her neighbor; and as regards this it can be said that in the woman the sin was graver.

By means of this distinction answer can be made to the arguments brought forward for either part, inasmuch as they proceed according to different members of this distinction. — Otherwise it could be said, which amounts nearly to the same, that sin can be called graver than another, either weighing the conditions on the part of the sinner, or on the part of the sin. If we weigh the gravity on the part of the sinner, the man is said to have sinned more gravely than the woman, both on account of the excellence of his gifts, and on account of the presidency of his state: because he was in a manner set over the woman. But if the conditions on the part of the sin are weighed, the woman sinned more gravely than the man, both on account of impiety toward God; and on account of iniquity toward her neighbor: for by her ambition she dishonored God, and by her suggestion cast down her neighbor.