Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

Note 1. Moses, after he had said that man was made to the image of God, immediately added: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth. By which words he indicates that dominion and empire over all living creatures was given to man: since it was most fitting that he whom God had made like unto Himself in the dignity of nature, He should also make like unto Himself in the authority and power of ruling; for dignity bereft of powerful protection, as it were unarmed and weak, gradually grows vile. Moreover, Moses by this one argument above all wished to declare that man was made to the image of God, namely that as God presides over and commands the whole world, so man, as it were the Vicar of God, presides over all animals and bears dominion over them. Hence all the holy Fathers and Doctors of Theology agree that the empire of man over the brute animals was universal: Theodoret alone seems to cry out against it, who in question 20 on Genesis judges that those huge fishes which we call Cete and whales were not made for the sake of man, nor are subject to his empire. It must be observed, he says, that not all animals were created for the sake of man, but only those over which he is said to rule: namely the fishes of the sea, the fowls of the air, and the cattle of the earth: perhaps also the creeping things of the earth, on account of the necessary use of the medicines which are compounded from them; yet those huge Cete and the wild beasts of the earth were not made for the sake of man... Man therefore does not rule over those huge Cete, nor over the beasts, which perhaps were not created from the beginning on his account. But this opinion of Theodoret, as being less true, the other holy Fathers reject.

Note 2. There are four ways by which it can be brought about that an animal, however savage and truculent, be reduced to the power and use of man: First indeed by certain secret means, which consist of certain fixed words and charms, and are called incantations, as happens especially in the case of Serpents; hence the royal psalmist praises the asp, that it stoppeth its ears, lest it hear the voice of one charming. Second, by changing the soil, and varying the customary food: for if Lions be transferred to very cold regions, and be nourished and fatted with softer and better food, they gradually relax their ferocity, lay down their strength and the ardor of their spirit, and become daily less vigorous. Third, by kindness: for animals cast off their rage and ferocity toward those by whom they are cared for, fed, and kindly treated, whom they not only do not harm, but with whom they even play familiarly, and whom they fawn upon: indeed they suffer themselves to be beaten by them; of which thing Pliny records very many and wondrous examples in book 8 concerning Lions and Elephants. Fourth and finally, by art and industry animals are not only compelled to obey man, but are also taught to comply with his words and every nod, and to do what is commanded: hence Magpies and Parrots learn to utter even human words, and many other birds learn to pour forth very many songs.

Note 3. The dominion of man over men is twofold: one indeed servile, the other however civil and liberal. The first is over slaves, subjected voluntarily and in hope of wages, or by compulsion and through violence to masters commanding; the other is over free men, who of their own accord chose one man or many, by whom, according to prescribed laws, they might be ruled and governed. Now between these two kinds of ruling one may observe a twofold distinction, since empire over slaves is compelled and violent, and therefore involuntary and bitter; but over free men it is voluntary and pleasant, inasmuch as it was voluntarily chosen and undertaken by them for the sake of their own good. Moreover, empire over slaves is wholly directed and referred to the good and profit of the one ruling; wherefore it cannot but be burdensome and odious to subjects: for it is against the natural appetite of man that whatsoever he does and labors at should redound not to his own, but to another's utility. But empire over free men is referred not to the good of the ruler, but of the subjects, or rather to the public and common good. Whether, then, one or the other, or both of those empires flourished in the state of innocence, is here to be determined.

First Conclusion. — Not only in the state of innocence did man have empire over all brute animals; but even after the Fall, although with lesser authority, he still retains it. This conclusion has two parts, of which

The first is openly delivered in holy Scripture, not only in those words of Genesis, chapter 1, verse 26, praised in the first Note, but also often elsewhere. Thus in Psalm 8: Glory and honor hast thou crowned him, and hast set him over the works of thy hands: all things hast thou subjected under his feet. And in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 17, where there is described of what sort man was when created by God, we read among other things: He gave him power of the things that are upon the earth, he laid the fear of him upon all flesh, and he had dominion over the beasts and fowls, etc. Which indeed God wished to confirm and prove when he brought all living creatures to Adam, that he might impose names upon all and each of them; by this act, as it were, handing over to Adam possession of that dominion which he had over the animals, and bringing it about that all living creatures, each receiving its own name from Adam, should in a manner pledge to him subjection, obedience, and servitude, as soldiers and slaves are wont to do: for as often as they subject themselves either to a Commander or to a Hero, they receive a name from him, whereby they may be distinguished from the other fellow-soldiers, so that by this appellation, being called forth, they may become more prompt in obedience.

This same thing also natural reason urges; for when the natural order is restored, the administration and ordination of the best divine providence requires that the things which are more imperfect be subjected to superiors, and that inferior things be ruled by superiors and depend upon them: thus the Elements and Mixts serve for the food of plants; plants are nourishment for animals, and both for men. Therefore since man excels the brutes, and these lack prudence and reason, it was fitting that they be ruled through men; and for this cause man was begotten by nature naked and unarmed, destitute of all things; wherefore both the animals and whatsoever corporeal things were created by God for his clothing, arming, furnishing, and adorning were subjected to him.

The second part is also proved, namely that this dominion over the animals persevered in man even after the Fall: since after the Flood, Genesis 9, God said to Noe and his sons: Let your fear and dread be upon all the beasts of the earth, and upon all the fowls of the air, with all things that move upon the earth: all the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand: whence St. Ambrose, book 6 of the Hexaemeron: It is written, he says, that nothing in nature is taller and stronger than the Elephant, nothing more terrible than the Lion, nothing more savage than the Tiger: yet these serve man, and lay aside their nature by human training: they forget what they were born to: they put on what they are bidden. What more? They are taught like little ones, they serve like domestics, they are harnessed like the weak, they are beaten as the timid, they are corrected as the unruly: they pass into our ways, since they have lost their own motions. I confess indeed that the empire of man over the animals after the Fall is far different from that which obtained in the state of innocence; for then the use of this dominion was most full and most ample, and by no means laborious or difficult: for neither, so far as man was concerned, was there any impediment or difficulty, nor any resistance in the animals. Hence some Theologians teach that in the state of innocence the animals were subject and obedient to man, just as in man himself the inferior part was subject to the superior; therefore as reason then ruled most fully and entirely over the senses and affections, so man ruled over the animals. — But after the Fall that empire was greatly diminished, as to its use and execution; for we can command but few animals, nor do we command even these without great labor. Hence Hugh of St. Victor, in his annotations on Genesis, expounding those words, let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, says: Man ought to have dominion over all: but by sin he lost dominion, both over the greatest and over the least: he nevertheless retained dominion over the middle sort for his consolation. Over the greatest, as over Lions, he lost dominion, that he might know that he had lost his proper dignity: over the least he lost it, as over Fleas and Flies, that he might know his own frailty. Nevertheless even after sin, the animals, however fierce and stupid, obeyed exactly those men conspicuous for innocence and holiness. For to Eliseus, 1 Kings chapter 2, the Bears submitted in vengeance upon the boys who had insolently called him bald: and Daniel, chapter 6, dwelt familiarly, nay harmlessly, with hungry Lions for many days. We also read of the Seraphic Father Francis, and of St. Antony of Padua, that they called to themselves the very fishes, birds, and certain other animals at their pleasure, and held them in attendance as long as they willed. But other men, although with some difficulty, nevertheless even after the Fall rule over each kind of animals, subduing the beasts to their governance by their industry and sagacity of mind, and use them for service and custom, as is evident of Lions, Wolves, and also Fishes, which are taken either by hunting or by fishing, and pass into the use of man. — This indeed St. Basil weighed in a wondrous manner, Homily 10 on Genesis, where, speaking of the power given to man over the fishes, he gathers it from this, that the fishes fear even the shadow of man, and that by fishing they pass into his use. By what reason at last shall we distinguish, he says, the empire over the fishes? He answers: if thou shalt have pondered with thyself how the waters were terrified by the shadow of thy body, when thou hast presented thyself to the swimmers in the pool, obscure to any seer. What Master so governs his household with such authority: that when affairs at home are sometimes in confusion, if the master approach, he bestows tranquility upon them with no trouble of his own, and restores all things to order according to the comeliness of each, and renews them by the presence of himself alone as ruler: so that at the mere sight of a man every aquatic creature changes itself into another figure and habit? So much does the reason of a freer life and of uprightness avail it: not so does it now dare to come forth even to the surface of the sea or of the standing pool by swimming, that in such nativities it may breathe forth a magnanimity largely worthy of any; but if it behold man standing nearer to it, fleeing it trembles and withdraws: then, subjoining the manner in which the Cete and the Whales are taken, he concludes: Man, opulent, endowed with the principate of reason in seeking all things, recalls to duty and obedience the lingering, as it were fugitive and ill-disposed slaves, who are curved to him by no placable tenacity; these his own necessity compels to serve him, and they serve their Emperor. By these arguments indeed it becomes clear that there was implanted by the Maker Himself in all, from the cradle, the instinct of commanding, and a prerogative conceded to man established in every place and nation.

Second Conclusion. — In the state of innocence Some men were to have presided over others: not indeed by servile dominion, but civil: namely because it would have contained nothing violent, involuntary, or bitter mixed in.

It is proved first indeed, because this empire contributes most to the right and wise ordering of the human race; for all things are ordered more rightly where one obeys another, than where each fulfills his own will according to his own nod and judgment; hence quarrels, hence dissensions and contentions take their origin. Next, in the state of innocence the father would have had authority over his sons, and they would have obeyed their parents; and so civil and free empire was not repugnant to that state. Finally, if this civil dominion had been repugnant to the state of innocence, it would be chiefly on account of man's supreme integrity and liberty: but this did not conflict with civil empire itself; since there is no greater liberty, nor any more perfect rectitude, than in the blessed Angels: yet among them there is civil dominion itself: for superiors command inferiors: and so with better right could innocent men have commanded others, with that empire, namely, with which St. Augustine teaches that just men command others lib. 19. De Civit. Dei, cap. 15. For, he says, the just do not rule with a desire of domination, but with the duty of taking counsel for others: nor with the pride of presiding, but with the mercy of providing. This the natural order prescribes; so God made man.

You ask: Why therefore did God not say: Have dominion over men, as he said Have dominion over the fishes of the sea? etc. — I answer, it was fittingly so done, namely because dominion over the animals belongs to every man, since by reason of his being created to the image of God it accrues equally to all men: but truly the dominion of some men over other men does not belong to every man, but only to certain fixed men: nor does it accrue to them as they are men, but on account of their excellence of dignity, or prudence, or probity.

You will say: Woman was not reduced to the power of man except in punishment of sin; for God said, chapter 3 of Genesis, verse 16, denouncing punishment to the transgressing woman among other things: thou shalt be under the power of the husband, and he shall have dominion over thee: therefore in the state of innocence there was no dominion of the man over the woman, nor subjection of the woman to the man. — I answer, the subjection of the woman in the state of innocence was far different from that by which after the Fall she was reduced to the power of the man; for then that subjection would have been to the woman voluntary and pleasant, and wholly without molestation: both because the man would have commanded nothing of the woman except what was right and honest, and that with great equity and benevolence: and because the woman, since of her own accord she would have loved whatsoever was right and equitable, and whatsoever reason required to be done by her, would without doubt have willingly and gladly committed to execution whatsoever had been commanded her; then also because the woman, considering that she drew her origin from the man, and that she had been given to him by God for a helper, would with grateful mind have fulfilled all that had been entrusted to her by the man, that she might testify to him her gratitude and deference, and render the due assistance.

But it happened otherwise after the Fall; for this subjection of the woman under the power of the man is involuntary and bitter; and that for two causes: both because husbands often deal more harshly than is fitting with their wives, commanding them beyond what is good and equitable: then also because women, their nature corrupted and their will depraved, or on account of a certain natural lightness of wit and irascibility of mind, bear with difficulty being ruled by the man, and being subject to his empire. Moreover this depravity and perversity, both of the ruling man and of the obedient woman, was born of sin; and that molestation which subjection has annexed to it is truly a punishment of sin inflicted upon the woman: and so with merited right he said: Thou shalt be under the power of the husband, and he shall have dominion over thee. — All these things St. Augustine lucidly expounds, book 11 of De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 37, where he writes thus:

It must be judged, he says, in what manner properly that can be understood which was said to the woman: and thy turning shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee; for it is not fitting to believe that it was otherwise even before sin, than that the man should rule over the woman, and that she should be converted to him by serving him. Thus it can rightly be understood that this servitude is signified, which is of a certain condition rather than of love: so that even that servitude itself, which men afterwards began to serve the lusts of, may be found to have arisen from the punishment of sin. Paul indeed said: by charity serve one another, to the Galatians 5; but 1 Timothy 2: the Apostle permits not the woman to rule over the man: for the sentence of God gave this rather to the man, and he deserved to have the woman as his subject, not by nature, but by fault. Understand this of servile dominion; not of civil; for he said above that even before sin the woman was subject to the man, by love rather than by condition.

But Rupert observes, book 3 of De Operibus Trinitatis, chapter 21, that it is a heavier dominion for the wife to be subjected to the man as to a lord, than to be under the power of the man; For, he says, even according to the Roman laws, the woman is under the power of the man before she comes into the hand of the man: under the power of the man with impunity, yet again not as of a lord, but as of a tutor; so that without his authority it be not lawful for her to make a testament. But she who comes into the hand of the man, much more so long as the husband lives, shall not be permitted to make a testament without the man: whence the woman who comes into the hand of the man is said to be diminished in head. This law prevailed naturally also among the gentiles, Adam's law, who had neither read this scripture nor observed these sacred precepts of God, which the Lord of nature imposed, saying to the woman: thou shalt be under the power of the husband, and he shall have dominion over thee.

Corollary. — From all these things it becomes manifest that man was created good by God from the beginning; and consequently it is plainly and impiously a fiction of Saturninus and of other heretics thereafter, concerning two kinds of men, of whom some are by nature good, but others evil and perverse. Which error St. Irenaeus most vigorously assails in book 4 against heresies, chapter 12, and overthrows it from this, that God saw all the things that he had made, and approved them as very good. Moreover, if goodness and malice were inherent in men by nature, thence it would follow that neither the evil would deserve blame and punishment, nor the good praise and reward. Then the exhortations and counsels of the prophets, and likewise the precepts and promises of Christ the Lord, would be derisory and vain, unless it were free to every man to avoid evil, and to pursue and embrace good.

But if, says St. Irenaeus, some had by nature been made good, and others indeed evil; neither would these be praiseworthy because they are good, for such they had been made: nor would those be blameworthy, for they also had been so instituted. But since all are of the same nature, and able both to retain and to work good, and again able to lose it and not do it; justly also among sensible men, how much more with God, are some praised, and receive the worthy testimony of election of good and perseverance: but others accused, and receive worthy condemnation, in that they rejected the just and good? And therefore the prophets indeed exhorted men to do justice, and also to work good; because this takes place in us, and through much negligence we have fallen into forgetfulness, and have need of good counsel; wherefore also the good One will give good counsel through the prophets.

Then, subjoining very many oracles of Christ the Lord in the Gospel and admonitions of the Apostle, by which he exhorts men to good and deters them from evil, he concludes: If therefore it were not in us to do these things, or not to do them, what cause has the Apostle, and much earlier the Lord himself, to give counsel, that some things indeed be done, but certain others be abstained from! — On this matter Theodoret also is to be consulted, sermon 5, De natura hominis, where with very many texts of Scripture he lucidly proves that no men are evil by nature, but that it is free to every man to pursue good and to turn away from evil.

You will say: Those who are by nature children of wrath are also evil by nature; for God is angry with none but the perverse: but by the Apostle all men are by nature children of wrath; for he says to the Ephesians 2: we were by nature children of wrath even as the rest. — I answer first, those words do not favor the error of Saturninus; for there is not established a twofold kind of men, of which one is good, the other truly evil, but it signifies all as utterly hostile to God. — Secondly, I say that men are by nature children of wrath not from a perverse nature created by God, …mal by nature vitiated through the sin of the first parent and propagated through human generation, as St. Augustine lucidly expounds, sermon 11 De verbis Apostoli, where expounding these same words, he says: Nature is not accused, of which God is the author. Nature was instituted good by God: but the first will was conquered by the serpent. Therefore what was in Adam a vice, propagated to us, has been made of nature. The vice of nature, with which man is born, none releases, but he who was born without vice.

You insist. Those who are children of the devil are so by their nature, and not only through the propagation of hereditary evil: but certain men are children of the devil; therefore certain men are evil by nature. — I distinguish the major with St. Augustine in the same sermon 11 De verbis Apostoli, chapter 15: if they are children of the devil by reason of generation, I concede; if only by reason of imitation, I deny. Moreover impious men are called children of the devil only through imitation, not truly through origin. He is called, says St. Augustine, your father, whom in your manners you have imitated. He confirms this from the words of the Apostle: My little children, of whom I am in labor again, etc. But in what this birth consists, the same Apostle declares when he says: Brethren, be ye imitators of me. Whence St. Augustine adds: On account of this imitation it is said to the impious: you are of your father the devil. For it stands in the catholic faith that the devil neither begot our nature, nor created it: in him there is only the seduction of the one going before, the imitation of the one following.

You will object. He who is carried away by the impulse of nature into evil, even unwilling, is truly evil by nature, as the Apostle himself testifies, Romans VII. 15: For that which I work, I do not the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, that I do. But if I do that which I will not: it is now no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me: therefore etc. — I distinguish the major: he who is so carried away and induced into evil that he can in no way resist, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Moreover no one is so vehemently impelled into evil, whether from intrinsic concupiscence, or from external temptation, but that by liberty and by the help of God he can recoil from it. Whence the same Apostle, when he had subjoined: Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? answers: the grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord.

You will urge. The same Apostle immediately adds in the same place: I myself then with the mind serve the law of God: but with the flesh, the law of sin. Therefore there are certain men who by the impulse of the flesh, and consequently by nature, are carried into evil, even notwithstanding the divine help. — I answer, that evil, or law of sin of which the Apostle speaks, is not simply some evil; for that law of sin is nothing else than the irritation and stimulus of concupiscence, which from their nature and of themselves are not evil, nor formally sin, as has been sufficiently and more than sufficiently proved above.