Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

This question, celebrated among Theologians as well, comprises for us three principal difficulties: First, it is debated whether Adam, at his first rising, and from the very instant of his creation, possessed sanctifying grace, or rather received it afterwards. Second, whether his grace was so great that it would exclude every sin whatsoever, even venial. Third, whether, had Adam always remained innocent, all his posterity would have been born confirmed in grace.

Notandum 1. From the Seraphic Doctor, in 2. dist. 21. art. 1. qu. 1. ad 3.

That grace is said to be a perfection of nature, not only because it assists, but also because it excludes its defect: whence in every nature of a rational creature there is some natural defect which by grace is to be excluded, however perfect that nature may be in the genus of creature: and therefore it does not follow that if something befits anyone by grace, it befits him by nature. And if it be objected that God could have given to nature what He gave to grace, it must be said that nature was not apt to receive it: for as the nature of a moral work is one thing, and of a natural work another, and the property of a moral work cannot befit a natural work unless it would cease to be natural: for praise and blame, which is the property of a moral work as such, cannot belong to a natural work as such: so, in like manner, neither can the property of grace befit nature.

Such are his words. Now all Princes of Theology agree that Adam had sanctifying grace before his fall: for thus the greater number of holy Fathers judge, whom the Master of the Sentences reports in 2. dist. 29, and the Councils of Orange and of Trent define the truth well: for the latter in Session 5, in the decree On original sin, Canon 1, has thus: if anyone shall not confess that the first man, when he had transgressed the commandment of the Lord in Paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted, etc.: let him be anathema. It is clear, therefore, that Adam had holiness and justice before the fall: for no one loses what he has not. But Theologists contend among themselves in resolving whether Adam was created with sanctifying grace, or whether he received it after his creation. The former part Saint Thomas defends, p. 1. qu. 95; the latter, however, Hugh of Saint Victor upholds, lib. 1. De Sacramentis. p. 6. Alexander of Hales, p. 2. q. 91. Saint Bonaventure, in 2. dist. 29. art. 2. qu. 2, and likewise the Subtle Doctor, the same distinction, num. 7.

Notandum 2. From the same, there, art. 3. q. 2.

That the efficacy of merit comes principally from three things, namely from the difficulty of the work, from the promptitude of the will, and from the greatness of charity. The difficulty of the work contributes much to merit: and so much so that a man who is of far less charity than an Angel can merit so as to arrive at angelic sublimity, as is gathered from what is said of John the Baptist. He that is lesser in the kingdom of Heaven is greater than he. For it is not to be doubted that John was exalted to the orders of the excellent Angels. And yet according to the state of the way he was of less charity than any of them. Promptitude of the will also contributes very much, but a will is prompt for merit according to that which it has accepted: however great the grace in a man may be, unless the will be consonant with grace, it will never elicit meritorious works: and the more the will is subject to grace and conformed to it, the more is man exercised in meritorious works. The greatness of charity is more principal among all things that contribute to merit, because according to its quantity the recompense of substantial reward is measured. For the weight of love is that which gives value to meritorious works. If, therefore, a comparison of the efficacy of meriting in gratuitous gifts be made according to the state after the fall, and according to the state before the fall, it can be answered that as to the first condition, namely as to difficulty, the virtues now are more efficacious than they were then.

For now virtue is assailed more, and by being assailed is proved and examined, than then, as appears in the holy Martyrs.

Notandum 3. Three genera of venial sin can be distinguished: one indeed befalls a man by the surreption of sensuality: another arises from some sudden and undeliberate movement of reason, as is the first movement of infidelity or of despair: these two genera of venial sin certainly could not have fallen in the state of innocence, since in it sensuality was so subject to reason that it neither overstepped its command nor refused its moderation. Reason itself, moreover, was so disposed, and so confirmed by divine gift, that nothing went forth into act except perfected by the counsel, deliberation, and election of man. But besides these two genera of venial sin there is a certain third, which from its genus is venial by reason of the imperfection of the act and the levity of the matter; such is an idle word, and a lie either jocular or officious: which genus of venial sin the Doctor contends could be admitted in the state of innocence, in 2. dist. 21. lib. 3. But Alexander of Hales protests against it, 2. par. collat. 2. On sins; Saint Thomas, 1. 2. qu. 89. art. 9.; Saint Bonaventure, the same distinction, art. 3. qu. 1, although he does not deny that the contrary opinion is probable; he affirms, however, that it is commonly not approved by the Doctors. And indeed, he says, that opinion has an improbability, if one attends to the perfection of the state and the rule of rectitude in which Adam was: from which he could not have departed, since he had nothing impelling him, except by contemning divine justice, and violating his innocence, and corrupting his nature: all which things make the first fault of Adam not venial but mortal, nor could it have been otherwise. And this is the common opinion which the Doctors today approve, that the first sin of Adam ought to have been not venial but mortal.

First Conclusion. — It is more probable that Adam was not created with sanctifying grace, but received it after his creation as a gift. Thus the aforesaid Doctors, and especially the Subtle One, who teaches that sanctifying grace was distinct from original justice, and stood to it as the exceeding to the exceeded. For original justice exceeded grace itself in things: for original justice not only subjected reason to God, but also sense to reason, and body to soul: moreover, it joined the mind to God more promptly, more delightfully, and more firmly: then, it admitted no sin, not only mortal, but not even venial: finally, it made man perform every moral good promptly and pleasantly and without any interior molestation. But sanctifying grace conquers and excels original justice in this, that it joins man to God more excellently, namely as to an end and supernatural good, and makes man truly pleasing and a friend of God, and His son, and heir of eternal life; and such that he can merit even de condigno eternal life.

Alexander of Hales proves this conclusion for us in the place cited, from this, that from it the majesty of power, the beauty of wisdom, and the order of divine goodness appear more manifestly;

so that, he says, by reason of the first He might be praised, by reason of the second revered, by reason of the third loved. To the praise of majesty it contributes that man was first created according to nature, then informed by grace, that he might know in himself that grace was the gift of God, and distinguish it from natural things, and, distinguishing, attribute it not to his own nature, but to God his Creator: and from this render thanks due to God: and thus the divine succor would not be made void, but would be spent upon the glory of the Helper. And this is what Augustine wills, De gratia et natura, saying: Better is the mercy of God by which He is assisted, when both Creator and Savior are known, than when the creature, as if sound and whole in its powers, is made void by the succor of the Savior. The beauty also of wisdom is manifested by this, that man is led to perfection gradually, and according to the progress of times: for it belongs to the wise to distinguish each thing according to the opportunity of time. Whence, since God could produce creatures into being, distinguish, and order them at once, He willed them first to be produced into being, and afterwards distinguished, and thirdly created, for the manifestation of His wisdom: so, although He could give to man nature, grace, and glory at once, that the beauty of order might be preserved, He willed first to make man in the state of a well-instituted nature; and afterwards to add the gift of grace; then to superadd the complement of glory. The order also of goodness is manifested in this: because divine goodness so communicates its goodness to the rational creature, as to grant it not only the effect of good, but also in a certain manner the power of cooperating, that so it may communicate itself more perfectly to such a creature. And therefore as He would not give glory to man unless there preceded in man in a certain manner the merit of condignity by the use of grace — for the work of charity merits all things ex condigno — so He would not give grace, except with a preceding merit of congruity through the good use of nature, that so man might be made more glorious and more praiseworthy.

Saint Bonaventure proves this same point in nearly the same manner. The reason, he says, why the Lord willed to give grace after natural things, when He could give both at once, is taken from a threefold order, namely from the order of wisdom, of goodness, and of justice. The order of wisdom required this, that as gratuitous being is of another genus than natural being, so it would be conferred on man at different times: and as the elements of the world were first created and distinguished in time before they were adorned, for the sake of commending the order of wisdom, so also it would be done concerning man, who is a lesser world. To the order of goodness also this was fitting, for by this order something is said to be ordered to its end; therefore grace is given to man in an ordered way when it is given to him as more useful and more fruitful: but the grace of God is the more useful and fruitful to us, the more pleasing to God we are on account of it; and therefore, as it ought to be given so that from the very order of giving it might be known that gift to be gratuitous, therefore it was not infused from the creation, but upon a nature already perfect and constituted: it was superinfused. The order also of justice required this; for God according to the common law requires some disposition and preparation on our part in order that He may infuse grace into anyone, either in him into whom He infuses it, as in an adult; or in another assisting, as happens in the case of an infant: and therefore grace was not created with man, but was deferred until man should in some manner dispose himself by act and use of reason to receive it, that so that word of Augustine (De verbis Apostoli, after the middle) might be verified in the first man, who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee. It is clear, therefore, that a manifold order required this, that man should first be made in natural things before > he should be adorned with gratuitous gifts.

It confirms 1. Grace agrees more with glory than nature with grace: but in man grace precedes glory: therefore by equal reason, indeed by much stronger reason, nature preceded in time the good of grace. — It confirms 2. By grace the marriage between God and the soul is made: but the law of marriage is that it be not made without mutual consent: therefore it seems that grace ought not to be given to any adult unless consent precede: if, therefore, Adam was first, before his nature could consent: therefore he had not nature and grace together. — It confirms 3. The gift of grace is fruitless unless it be foreknown of God: for no one can preserve grace in himself unless he be pleasing to God for it: therefore, since that which is superadded to naturals holds more the character of the gratuitous than what is naturally infused, and the gift of grace is merely gratuitous: therefore it seems that not from the very creation, but afterwards, the gift of grace was conferred on man.

Objection 1. That of Ecclesiasticus 7. God made man right: but the rectitude of man as to the soul, of which Scripture speaks, is measured by conversion to the last end simply, which is the effect of grace and charity. Likewise to the Ephesians 1. Paul speaks thus: Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth; that is, of true [holiness], according to the Hebrew phrase. By which words, according to the common exposition of the holy Fathers and Interpreters, the Apostle teaches that we are renewed by the merits of Christ to that justice and supernatural holiness in which we were at the beginning in Adam. The Council of Trent is also clear, in the Canon 3 of the place cited. — I answer. These and similar authorities are to be understood thus: not that God, as soon as He created man, at once endowed him with virtue and adorned him; but because He then made him disposed to receive grace and the virtues, as Alexander of Hales and the Seraphic Doctor say.

Objection 2. God made man perfect as to age, and as to knowledge from the beginning of his condition: therefore by equal reason it seems He made him perfect as to the rectitude of the will: but the rectitude of the will consists in the gift of grace; therefore it seems he had the gift of grace at the beginning of his condition. It is confirmed: God created the other corporeal creatures in a perfect state, and trees, for example, He created in that magnitude in which they could produce their proper natural fruits: therefore equally it was fitting that He create man in that state and perfection in which he could produce the meritorious fruits of eternal life, to which He had destined him; and presently that He adorn him with sanctifying grace, which is the root and principle of the merit of eternal life. — Alexander of Hales and the Seraphic Doctor answer, that it is not the same concerning the perfection of age and knowledge, as concerning the perfection of virtue: for the perfection of age and knowledge is not so far removed from the perfection of nature as is the perfection of grace; for man by the power of nature infused into him can arrive at perfect age, and can advance in knowledge: but never can man of himself acquire the perfection of grace; indeed it is necessarily required that it be infused by the Lord. To the confirmation they say, that there was not a like reason in the other creatures and in man; for of these there was not, nor ought to have been, but one perfection, namely the natural: but of man, as to the soul, a threefold one, namely natural, of grace, and of glory: which ought to have been distinguished according to the opportunity of time and of state.

You will say 3: God created man to His own image and likeness: but, as Saint Augustine expounds, the image is in natural things, the likeness in gratuitous things: therefore man was created both in natural things and in gratuitous things. — The same answer, that the likeness is there understood in graces freely given: or it must be said that God is said to have made man to His image and likeness, not because when He at once gave the image, He also at the same time gave the likeness, but because He gave the one, namely the image, and made him apt for the other, namely for the likeness, which afterwards He gave him according to place and time; whence as far as the force of the words goes, it cannot be concluded that the image of God and the likeness were in man at once and together.

Second Conclusion. — While the state of innocence persevered, man could have sinned venially: and therefore the first sin of Adam could have been not mortal. Thus the Subtle Doctor in the place cited: and he proves this truth thus, num. 1. The rectitude of innocence more repugns mortal sin than venial: for if, notwithstanding his rectitude, he could have sinned mortally: therefore much more could he have sinned venially, even while it remained in the state of innocence: otherwise venial sin would less repugn the rectitude of innocence than mortal, if it would corrupt it entirely. — Second, from one extreme to the other there is no passage except through a mean: but venial sin is a mean between justice and mortal sin: therefore, etc. — Third, if man could not have sinned venially in the state of innocence, it would be chiefly because he had some intrinsic gift incompatible with venial sin: but this is false: therefore. The minor is proved: because no intrinsic gift can be assigned in that state more incompatible with venial sin than the gifts of faith, hope, charity, and the moral virtues infused per se, if such moral virtues be given, and those acquired are incompatible with it: but these gifts are not incompatible with venial sin, as appears in the most holy men, who without doubt can sin venially even without the loss of those gifts: therefore the state of innocence, as to all the intrinsic gifts it included, could be compatible with venial sin. Moreover, original justice did not unite man to God more than the most excellent sanctifying grace, which is granted to wayfarers: but sanctifying grace, however small, can be found and subsist with venial sin, as it was in the Apostles: therefore likewise original justice could subsist with venial sin in Adam.

Pontius confirms it from this, in the same place: When, he says, it is said that venial sin would take away the state of innocence and its supreme rectitude, either this is understood of the innocence and rectitude as to all things that state included, or as to some things, which being subsequently taken away, the rectitude and innocence which existed antecedently would not remain integral. But the first is manifestly false, because venial sin ought not to take away faith, hope, or charity, nor sanctifying grace, which without doubt are involved in the state of innocence. The second likewise can by no means stand: for that which venial sin would take away would be either a negative thing or an absolute thing: if they were certain negations, certainly none other than the negation of venial sin itself, which without doubt can be of the reason of innocence and rectitude; for he is more innocent and more right who has no sin than he who has some: but although venial sin would take away this part of innocence and rectitude, Adam would not on that account cease to be simply just and innocent; nor would it follow that it would be mortal sin, if he lost this part of his innocence and rectitude: therefore, etc. If it had taken away something positive, especially something of the intensity of some habit or act of virtue, which he would elicit if he had not committed venial sin, and with which venial sin would not be compatible: but either it would not diminish anything of any habit of virtue: or, if it did diminish, it would not be mortal sin to diminish it, as neither is it mortal sin in us to diminish something of the intensity of a virtuous habit, if we do so by losing [grace] venially. Therefore venial sin would not overthrow the state of innocence.

The Doctor himself confirms 2. this truth in the same place: There is given some act which from its genus, that is, from the side of light matter about which it is occupied, is only venial sin, when namely no prescription of a superior intervenes, by which it is prohibited under mortal [sin]; for example a light lie and an idle word: but God did not prohibit all acts of this kind to Adam under mortal sin, for such a prohibition cannot be found: therefore if Adam had done such an act, as in truth he could have; for he could have said an idle word and jested with his wife: therefore in that state he could sin venially.

You will say 1: Every sin is a certain disorder of man: but any disorder whatever repugned the supreme rectitude, in which man innocent was constituted according to all his parts and faculties, both of soul and of body: therefore in that state venial sin also repugned. The major is evident; the minor is proved: that repugns rectitude which destroys it: but the disorder of sin of any kind destroys rectitude: therefore, etc. — The Doctor denies the minor in the same place, n. 1. For not, he says, would any sin whatever have corrupted that rectitude, whether actual or habitual, which man would have had in the state of innocence, and which would concern that state, either as its essence, or as its property, or accident; for mortal sin far more repugns innocence and rectitude than any venial sin whatever: but this would not be true, if any venial sin whatever excluded that rectitude equally with mortal. And as with habitual knowledge an actual opinion can stand, because these two do not repugn one another, so with the supreme habitual rectitude of the state of innocence an actual venial sin could consist. Moreover, as with a preeminent meritorious act venial sin of vainglory can subsist, and this would not take away the merit of that act, so it seems that with the supreme actual rectitude venial sin could stand.

You will urge: Here, if these things were true, it would follow that venial sin could also stand with the state of beatitude; since from the aforesaid answer, venial sin could subsist with an act of the most preeminent charity, such as is in the Blessed: but the consequent seems erroneous: therefore also the antecedent from which it follows. — The Doctor answers, that although the Blessed perhaps could sin on account of his liberty, speaking of physical power; yet that act would not be venial sin, because indeed the Blessed has the precept of continuing always the act beatific, and of loving God as much as he can; nor would he be judged to love Him thus if he should offend Him even lightly in any way. It can also be answered otherwise, by denying the consequence: because indeed the Blessed has something by which he is morally determined not to sin venially, namely the very vision and beatific love, by which he is borne so sweetly and with all his powers into God, that nothing repugnant and displeasing to God can adhere; but an innocent man would not have similar things: therefore there is no parity.

You will say 2. If man in the state of innocence could have committed some venial sin, either he would have grieved for it, or he would have grieved not at all: if he had grieved, that grief and sadness would have been a punishment of the soul, contrary to the joy with which man in that state enjoyed fullness everywhere; if he had grieved not at all, this very thing would have aggravated his fault, and made him worse and worthy of graver punishment. It is confirmed: venial sin is evil per se, for the avoiding of which, namely, however small a punishment of the body it is right to undergo: hence when it has been committed, conscience doubles the remorse, and penitence has necessarily annexed to it; but these repugn the most felicitous state of innocence: For there was nothing, as Augustine writes, lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 10. that would offend the flesh or mind of man living felicitously in that state.

For there was in him a tranquil security from sin, which remaining, there was no evil at all that could sadden him from any quarter. And in the same book, cap. 26. The sum, he says, was in the flesh health, in the mind entire tranquillity: as in Paradise there was no heat or cold: so in its inhabitant there approached no offense of good will from cupidity or fear, nothing at all sad, nothing was vainly glad: for joy was made perpetual from God, into whom charity burned from a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith unfeigned.

All which things, as is evident, repugn the state of innocence; therefore venial sin equally repugned it. — I answer, that if an innocent man had committed a venial sin, he could indeed have grieved for it, with that grief, namely, which would not overthrow the happiness of the state, but only somewhat diminish it. For as he could by venial sin somewhat diminish the fervor of charity and the purity of innocence, so equally could he by his own will shake the pleasantness and felicity of his state. Therefore I confess that in that felicitous state there was nothing at all that would offend the soul and flesh of man, except insofar as he himself freely willed this to be in him. There would equally be in his soul the supreme tranquillity, so long as he himself did not disturb it by sinning lightly: nor finally was any vain joy in him, which would be mortal; yet some joy vain venially could well be in him, which he could admit at his pleasure. By which things it easily becomes sufficient for the authority of Saint Augustine. Add that Saint Augustine speaks only of that which in fact happened: for it is likely that Adam in fact admitted no venial sin before his mortal transgression: but Saint Augustine does not speak of what would have happened, if that felicitous state of innocence had long persevered.

You will urge. Any fault, even the lightest, repugns more the felicity of the state of innocence than any punishment or bodily infirmity whatever; since the former is a greater evil and greater misery: but from Saint Augustine man in the state of innocence would suffer no infirmity, no molestation of body: For neither, says Saint Augustine, would he hunger nor thirst, nor would any molestations in or from his body be inflicted on any of his senses: whence as the divine providence looked to directing creatures for that state so that none would harm man, so it looked to the same to preserve him from venial sin, which would be a far greater evil. — I distinguish the antecedent. It equally repugned on the part of the state, I concede: on the part of man freely acting, I deny. I confess, therefore, that on the part of the state of innocence the offense and sadness of the soul repugned as much as the molestation of the body, if indeed man, as endowed with supreme liberty, had always most faithfully adhered to his author by love and contemplation: but since by his liberty he could have voluntarily exceed or fail lightly in some things, he could also sin lightly, and therefore freely incur a light molestation and offense of body and soul. Whence in form I distinguish the minor: man in that state would not feel any molestation of body except such as he himself would freely procure for himself, I concede: he would not feel any which he would voluntarily and at his pleasure procure for himself, I deny. Whence to Saint Augustine I say, that in that state man would not hunger, nor suffer other molestations of body, except light ones, which indeed he himself would wish to experience and suffer according to his will. Hence the divine providence looked to keeping those molestations from innocent man which he himself would not wish to incur from his liberty; but not those which at his pleasure he would wish to experience: wherefore the consequence must be denied: for as the providence of God did not look to removing from him bodily molestations which at his pleasure he would wish to assume, so neither did it look to that preventing, lest an innocent man some venial sin a... [truncated]

You will say 3. For the sin of the innocent first man a punishment is due, certainly none other than death: but death is not due for venial sin, but for mortal: therefore the first sin of innocent man necessarily ought to have been mortal, and therefore could not have been venial. — The Doctor denies the major; for to that sin committed there could correspond not some punishment of the body, but a displeasure of the mind at its admission: also that venial sin could be expunged by a more fervent act of charity, and a greater effort applied in fulfilling the divine service. Or finally, if some corporeal punishment had to be inflicted, there was no need that it be death: for the separation of the soul from the body fell as punishment on account of the separation of the soul itself from God by mortal sin. Since, therefore, by venial sin the soul would not have been severed from God, neither was it to be punished with bodily death, but only with some light punishment of soul or body, which would not repugn that most felicitous state.

You will say 4. In that felicitous state the superior faculties would be perfectly ordered to God: therefore there would be no obliquity in the inferior: but by venial sin obliquity is made: therefore this would not be admitted in that state. The first consequence is proved: obliquity cannot be in the inferior unless it has first been in the superior: but no obliquity can be in the superior, so long as they are perfectly ordered: therefore, etc. — The Doctor answers, num. 4. That not every disorder in the superior power is mortal sin: a light movement made by surreption concerning some opinion about the articles is a disorder in the portion or in the superior power, for it can be about such an object as cannot be considered except by the superior powers, as that God is three and one, and yet not every light movement there is mortal sin: although sin in the superior power is graver than in the inferior: by which he understands by the superior portion the will and intellect, insofar as they are borne to God; by the inferior, indeed, the same faculties as they regard other things.

It will be objected. by the Thomists, by our Haedus: In venial sin, either it would be by surreption, or by suggestion, or by deliberation, or by passion: by none of these would it be: therefore there would be none. The major is clear from the division of the parts. The minor is thus proved through the parts: First, it would not be by surreption, because surreption arises from the tumult of appetite and sense, which there would be none in that state. Second, it would not be by suggestion, because the devil would not suggest by temptation what he knew could stand with the integrity of that state in the opinion of Scotus, but that which could not stand with it: and accordingly he would suggest mortal sin, not venial. It would not be by deliberation, because since the will would be right and joined to the last end, it would not admit a light disorder from it, which it could easily avoid, since the intellect would represent it as incompossible: nor could he propose it as useful or delectable, since only a vehement delectation, which would induce mortal fault, could turn that will right and adhering to God. It could not be by passion, since since there would be no struggle nor dissension between the parts of the soul, there was not whence passion or perturbation would exist. From which enumeration it comes about that every venial sin would be excluded from that state. Such are his words. — He himself answers that in truth indeed in that state it could not have been sinned venially by the suggestion of concupiscence, but well by the suggestion of the devil, who could have tempted man lightly and induced him into something that would not be altogether conformable to the divine ordination. He could also have sinned venially by deliberation, for example from a light delectation which he would have perceived in laughing at a beautiful thing, hearing a pleasing sound, tasting sweet food, lightly pleasing himself in his own perfection, and not referring these to God as last end: for from the levity of the matter that sin, grave from elsewhere, could have been venial. Certainly whoever shall have seriously attended how easily venial sin is admitted, will not there deny that it could creep in in many ways.

You will say 5. If man in the state of innocence could commit some venial sin, for example utter a jocose lie, it would follow that from that actual lie often repeated there could be generated a habit of lying: but a habit of this kind repugns the state of original justice: therefore also the potency to sin venially, whether from imperfect deliberation, or from the object, or from the smallness of the matter. The consequence of the major is evident; for if man can in original justice commit some venial sin once, he can also commit it again and again: for no reason of disparity can be assigned: for from repeated acts a habit is generated. But the minor is persuaded: a vicious habit, such as would be produced from the aforesaid acts, since from its nature it inclines the will to evil, and consequently infuses into it some difficulty in the avoidance of sin and the prosecution of good, evidently repugns the perfection and felicity of the state of innocence: therefore, etc. — I deny the consequence of the major; for man constituted in the state of innocence, even if he admitted some venial sin, nevertheless on account of the perfect charity by which he would burn toward God, would not only wash it away by a more ardent act of charity, but would also be so displeased with himself on account of that venial admission, that he would expend all care and all diligence that hereafter he would decline a similar fall: and therefore it would not be to be feared that from a venial sin once admitted, by repeated acts of the same, a vicious habit would be generated.

You will say 6. That venial sin in that state would be either remissible or irremissible: but neither can be said: therefore there would be none. The major is clear as to the second part; for there is no reason why sin venial from its nature should be judged unworthy of pardon and remission. The first part also is evident; for if it were remissible, especially by some remedy, for example by a sacrament, or sacrifice, or some good work. But in that state of innocence sacraments and sacrifices do not seem fitting, since they were instituted for the remedy of infirmity and the supplement of the defect of the creature: but in that state there would be no defect. Similarly good works are not expiatory of venial sin, except insofar as they are satisfactory: but in that state there would be no satisfaction, which is expended only on account of an injury inflicted; but this infliction of injury toward God would not be venial fault, but mortal. Therefore etc. — I answer: that sin would indeed be remissible by more fervent acts of charity, or by the sacraments to be instituted, not indeed for repairing, but for increasing grace; and also by the sacrifices which could have been instituted for the honor of God and His supreme and excellent worship. There accrues to the confirmation of these things that in truth Adam seems to have sinned venially before mortal sin, as Saint Augustine teaches in many places, especially lib. De Gen. ad litt., cap. 5.: Nor is it to be thought, he says, that which was about to cast down man, unless there had preceded in the soul of man a certain elation to be repressed. There the word "about to cast down" signifies that Adam had not yet fallen from the state of innocence or grace. But the word "elation" signifies a preceding swelling of mind in which some fault inhered, not indeed yet mortal, but venial; from which, however, the devil conjectured that if he were tempted, he would sin more gravely. Now therefore before Adam sinned mortally by the transgression of the precept, he had sinned by a light and venial fault of elation. But if you say this was mortal sin: against [this], the devil was not about to cast down man, since he himself was already cast down, nimi... [truncated]

Third Conclusion. — If Adam had remained innocent, his posterity would have been confirmed in sanctifying grace: not indeed

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THEIR NATIVITY, BUT WHEN THEY HAD VANQUISHED AND SURMOUNTED THE FIRST TEMPTATION ASSAILING THEM. This is the doctrine of the Doctor in 2. dist. 20. quaest. 1. where he distinguishes a twofold confirmation: One, by which the ability to sin, even venially, is taken away: the other, by which sinning de facto is taken away. — The first befits only the comprehensors and the blessed: For the inability to sin, he says, cannot befit a wayfarer, otherwise there would be a contradiction, because certitude of beatitude is the greatest part of beatitude; but the inability to sin would then be knowable by anyone, as now the ability to sin is certain to us. But this infallible certitude of beatitude can befit only a comprehensor. Moreover, the will of wayfaring man in the state of innocence would not be fully satiated by some sensible good; and therefore it would not be so determined to some object that it could not desire another, even a prohibited one; and presently it could sin, and thus it would not be confirmed in grace. Finally, as long as in the object of the will of the wayfarer there is a defect of good, the will of the wayfarer can fail from rectitude by willing it, not according to the due circumstance; but as long as man is a wayfarer, an object cannot be joined to his will in which is the reason of all good: therefore as long as he is a wayfarer, he can fail from rectitude: and consequently he could sin; and therefore no wayfarer can be so confirmed in grace that he excludes the infallible potency of sinning. — But the latter confirmation in grace could have befit men in the state of innocence; namely so that they would never have sinned, nor consequently have lost justice, on account of a special, namely, assistance of divine providence, which would ward off the occasions of sinning: I say, says the Doctor, n. 3., that if a mere wayfarer could be confirmed, and the sons in the state of innocence had been in justice thus confirmed, namely after they had vanquished the first temptation, as the first father would have been confirmed if he had resisted the first temptation in that justice, which he would then have received for his sons... because all would have had it... [truncated]

By which the Doctor teaches three things: First, that the posterity of Adam could have been confirmed in grace: Second, that they would not have been thus confirmed by reason of the state of innocence, nor by the hereditary transfusion of the justice of the fathers into the sons; Third, that in fact they would be confirmed in grace as soon as they had vanquished the first temptation. — The first is clear, and Saint Anselm teaches it openly, lib. 1. Cur Deus homo cap. 38. In that justice, he says, in which the first men were constituted, it seems that if they had vanquished so as not to sin when tempted, they would be confirmed with all their propagation, so that they could sin no further: just as because, vanquished, they sinned, so were they weakened that, as far as in them lies, they cannot be without sin. By reason also this same is clear: for God confirmed many even after the fall in grace, as is clear of the Apostles and other eminent Saints: therefore much more would He have confirmed the posterity of Adam if they had preserved justice; for it is easy for God, in every occasion in which they could sin, to grant them efficacious grace, through which they would not sin, although absolutely and simply they could sin in every such occasion. Moreover, it is easy for God so to order things by divine providence that no grave temptation would befall man which man could not vanquish, so that although he could sin, nevertheless de facto he would nowhere sin, on account of that divine assistance. — The second also is clear, namely that the sons of Adam would not have been confirmed in grace by reason of the state of innocence, nor by the right of inheritance; Since, says the Doctor, that justice is a supernatural gift, it would be given to the offspring from mere divine liberality, as it was given to the Parent, who, if he had resisted the first temptation, would have been confirmed in that justice, because he would nowhere have lost it by sinning. Finally, inquiring whether the son would have been confirmed from the beginning of his nativity? He answers: I say not, because the son would not have received a more perfect justice than the father: but the father could lose it, and did lose it: therefore also the son: nor indeed did that justice necessitate... [truncated]

You will say 7. If the state of innocence had persevered, none of the evil would have been reprobate, as the Doctor himself teaches, and also Saint Gregory, 1. Moralia: therefore none of his posterity could sin; and consequently all would be born confirmed in grace, not only before the first temptation vanquished, but even from the very beginning of their nativity. — The Doctor denies the first consequence: both because, although the posterity of Adam could sin, and perhaps also would in truth have sinned mortally, from this it would not follow that they would be reprobate: for they could recover lost grace by contrition, and God could from liberality and mercy institute remedies for expiating those sins, as indeed He instituted many after the fall; so that finally they would persevere finally in the state of innocence until they were translated into Heaven.

You will say 8. Good merit is far more efficacious and powerful than evil and sin: but the sin of Adam was the cause that his sons were born sinners: therefore his own good merit would be the cause that they be born just, and confirmed in grace. — The Doctor answers, first by distinguishing the major: good merit is more efficacious than evil, insofar as by a good conversion we are more efficaciously reconciled to God than many antecedent evils had been efficacious for impeding that reconciliation, he concedes the major: insofar as good could serve more for the justification of others than evil for their defilement, he denies. — He answers 2. by denying the consequence: because as the evil of Adam was not the cause why his posterity were confirmed in evil, but only why they be born evil: so his own good merit ought not to be the cause why they be born confirmed in good, but it would suffice that it be the cause why they be born good.

You will say 9. When one opposite is the cause of some effect similar to itself, the other opposite will likewise be the cause of the other effect similar to itself: but the injustice of Adam is the cause why the sons are born unjust: therefore his justice, if it had been present, would be the cause why the just be born. — The Doctor denies the major, if it be understood universally; for although by the sin of intemperance, for example, one could lose eternal beatitude, it does not from this follow that by the act of temperance one could attain that beatitude. Or, as the Doctor says, a corporeal quality can generate a corporeal quality, as heat heat; yet it does not from this follow that the incorporeal quality opposed to it can also produce an incorporeal quality; for an incorporeal quality is produced immediately by God alone.

You will say 10. The posterity of Adam before the first temptation surmounted would have had the same supernatural gift for repugning sin that would have been granted them after the temptation vanquished: therefore also before they would have been confirmed in grace. The consequence is clear: The antecedent is proved: the gift of confirmation, of which we speak, is nothing else than that divine benefaction by which sin could be guarded against, as often as the occasion of sinning should offer itself: but men would have had a gift of this kind before the first temptation vanquished, on the hypothesis that they had vanquished it; for they could not have vanquished it by the proper powers of nature; and therefore they had need of some supernatural gift, by which they would be made more vigorous for repugning the occasions of sin: therefore truly before the vanquished temptation they would have had the same gift of confirmation as afterwards. — I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say, that that gift of confirmation would not have been any divine benefaction whatever, by which sin could be guarded against: but it would have been that aid which from its nature would have the infallible power of morally removing the will from sin, although physically, on account of its innate liberty, it could have sinned. Which gift indeed was not granted to Adam himself from the instant of his formation; otherwise he would not have fallen: nor consequently would it be to be granted to his posterity, even if he had stood; for the condition of the sons ought not to be better than that of the parents. Whence although before sin Adam had some divine benefaction through which he could not sin: nevertheless that benefaction granted from heaven did not remove from itself infallibly his will from sinning; since in fact he succumbed to temptation: and therefore that divine benefaction was not the gift of confirmation, but only an aid sufficient for surmounting the temptation, which being vanquished there would have been conferred on him some supernatural gift more efficacious and more powerful, by which he could repugn sin.