Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

Note 1. That among the princes of theology there are various opinions concerning original Justice. For Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 6, qu. 11, teaches that original Justice was a certain natural rectitude infused into the human will, by which the will itself could dominate the sensitive appetite and bend it at its nod whithersoever it would: to which rectitude is opposed the natural curvature and proneness to evil inflicted upon the will on account of sin. This he explains by the example of a rod, which is first straight, then is bent and curved. And he confirms it from this, that if original Justice were not something purely natural, it does not appear how man was wounded in his natural endowments through sin; for he would only be said to have been despoiled of gratuitous gifts, if original Justice, which he lost through sin, had been something supernatural. — But the Doctor rejects and impugns this opinion as false and improbable in 2 dist. 29 n. 3; whence the other theologians agree with the Subtle Doctor himself that original Justice was something supernatural. Yet they differ among themselves in explaining it. First, indeed, very many Thomists, with Soto, lib. 1 De Virtute et Gratia c. 5, judge that original Justice was sanctifying grace itself granted to the first Parents, and they strive to draw Saint Thomas, 1 part qu. 95 art. 1, and in 2 dist. 20 art. 1, over to their side. An entirely opposite opinion is maintained by Saint Bonaventure in 2 dist. 29 art. 2 qu. 2, and Alexander of Hales, 2 part qu. 90, as well as Cajetan, expounding Saint Thomas conformably in 1 part qu. 95. For these affirm that original Justice is a certain supernatural charity entirely distinct from charity and sanctifying grace. The other theologians, however, contend that original Justice is neither charity and sanctifying grace, nor something one and distinct from them, but something aggregated out of charity together with other gratuitous gifts bestowed upon the first Parents, by which namely their will was subjected most perfectly to God, and the sensitive appetite to the will, nor did it rebel against it.

Note 2. That it is most certain that the first Parents, so long as their innocence lasted, did not experience that rebellion of the interior part against the superior, which is customarily named concupiscence, or the fuel of sin. And this is gathered, First, from that text Ecclesiasticus 7: God made man right. Second, from the Apostle to the Romans 7, ascribing the repugnance of flesh against spirit, and of concupiscence against reason, to the precept as their cause. Third, a posteriori, because Adam and Eve before sin were naked and were not ashamed; but after sin they knew themselves to be naked and immediately covered themselves, on account namely of the inordinate motions which they then felt, from which they were before immune. Fourth, by the authority of Saint Augustine and of the other Fathers, who everywhere set down concupiscence as an effect of original sin. This doctrine is also that of many Councils, and especially of the Council of Trent, session 5, in the decree on sin, where it says that Concupiscence is indeed called sin, not because it is truly and properly sin, but because it comes from sin and inclines to sin. — Now this gift is called Justice, because it was the natural perfection of the whole man and of all his faculties, and the best disposition and affection of all the powers of the soul, both among themselves and in order to their proper acts, by which namely God is said to have made man right. Moreover it is called original, both because the first Parents had it from their origin, and because it was to be transmitted through original generation from Adam to his posterity; not indeed by the power of natural propagation and seed, or of any purely natural cause, but proximately from God, no otherwise than the natural soul itself is created by Him immediately as the organic body is capable of receiving it.

Note 3. That five effects of original Justice can above all be distinguished. First, for it made human nature entire; that is, equipped in its faculties for acting, and complete and perfect in all things that naturally belong to it. Second, it constituted it right, namely with that natural rectitude from which arose man's vehement and prompt moral propensity to every good, and his alienation and aversion from every evil; by the defect of which rectitude, which happened through sin, man took on a certain curvature and obliquity of soul, so often named and upbraided in the divine letters; which is nothing else than a certain natural inclination of the soul toward created and fleeting goods, and aversion from goods eternal and divine. Third, it so perfected in orderly fashion all the powers of our nature that the inferior were most perfectly subjected to and obedient of the superior, and their actions in no wise impeded or retarded them, but rather assisted them; while the superior suffered no sadness in ruling and moderating the inferior. Fourth, it made man not only most greedy of knowing every truth, but also rendered him capable of attaining perfect knowledge and science of all things that can naturally be known, as well as strong and constant for performing every moral good and for declining every evil and vice. Fifth and last, it secured for man every felicity naturally desirable: so that, as Saint Augustine says, lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 10, No good would be lacking to man which a right will could wish; nor any evil present which would offend the flesh or the soul of man living happily.

These things briefly premised, it must be determined: First, what original Justice was, namely whether something supernatural, or truly purely natural. Second, whether it was some supernatural quality distinct from charity and sanctifying grace. Third, in what subject it was placed, whether in the body or in the soul.

First Conclusion. — Original Justice was truly something supernatural. This is against Henry, whose opinion the Doctor impugns in this manner as false and improbable in the place cited. First indeed: if, as Henry wills, it is necessary that the naturally rectifying quality be taken away through sin, inasmuch as it is doubtless the difference between sinful man and man constituted in pure natural conditions: if, I say, this were necessary, it would follow that the will could not sin unless it previously had that natural rectitude: because according to him sin is the corruption of that rectitude itself: but this is absurd: both because the will of itself is free to conform itself rightly to reason or not to conform; and because in fact it sins thereafter even when it is already stained by sin; and therefore while it has not that rectitude: ergo for sinning it is not necessary that the rectifying quality be taken away. — Confirmation 1. If God were to create a will without that rectitude (as He truly can; for this quality, as Henry confesses, is separable from the will, as being really distinct from it), that will could doubtless, being free, elicit an act congruent or discrepant with right reason and the divine law; and consequently could sin: for if the first man could sin, even though furnished with original Justice, much more could he sin if he had it not; nor indeed did it compel him to disobedience, nay rather it stimulated and assisted him unto obedience: but in such a case he would not be deprived of that natural rectitude through the sin he committed: ergo for sinning it is not necessary that man be deprived of such a naturally rectifying quality. — Confirmation 2. If the rectifying quality ought necessarily to be removed by the first sin, it ought also to be removed by the second sin: but this is false, because it cannot be removed by the second, since it was already removed by the first; but what does not exist cannot be removed: ergo neither ought it be removed by the first. If, therefore, the first sin corrupted that rectitude, as Henry wills, the second and third also ought to corrupt it; which is certainly impossible, since it is supposed to have been taken away by the first sin.

He impugns, secondly: that rebellion of appetite against reason would equally and in like manner have existed in man created in pure natural conditions: ergo it did not happen through the privation of any natural rectitude. The antecedent is proved: it is natural for every appetite to be borne toward its proper object: and if it is an appetite not free, it is natural to it to be borne toward it supremely, and as much as it can; for such an appetite is drawn by its natural weight, and as it is not in its power to act or not act, so neither can the intensity of its act be greater or less; but it acts as much as it can. Since, therefore, the sensitive appetite of man, even in pure natural conditions, would have its own delightful object, it would tend toward it with all its force, and for that reason would impede the act of reason: for these powers, since they are in one and the same soul, impede one another mutually in their intense acts on account of that unity. Wherefore reason would then have to repress and curb that impulse of appetite: which could not be done without some difficulty and sadness on its part. Wherefore there would be rebellion there: for this is nothing else than the inclination of the inferior power toward its delightful object, and the difficulty of the superior power in restraining that appetite.

You will say 1. Mortality, and the rebellion of the sensitive part against reason, are effects and penalties of sin: ergo if nature stood in pure natural conditions without any supernatural gift and without sin, neither mortality nor rebellion would exist: and consequently immortality would be had, and concord of the sensitive part with reason: and therefore on account of that immortality and concord no supernatural gift is to be posited, and consequently original Justice, which confers these effects of immortality and concord, does not signify any supernatural gift. — I distinguish the antecedent. The Doctor [says]: they are penalties in fact, supposing the conferral of the gift by which they would be excluded, from which gift man was deprived on account of sin; [in this sense] he grants the antecedent: absolutely and simply, or considering nature itself precisely in itself, without gratuitous gifts superadded, he denies the antecedent: for thus considered, nature's condition would be to be subject to death and to suffer that rebellion, no less than it is the natural condition of a dog to die, and of a stone to descend downward.

You will say 2. If original Justice were a supernatural gift: ergo original sin would be merely the privation of that supernatural gift, since it is merely the privation of original Justice: but this is absurd; because then one constituted in pure natural conditions would be of equal condition with one having original sin, seeing that each would lack every supernatural gift: but it is absurd that they should be of equal condition: for thus each would be liable to punishment. — The Doctor answers in the same place: whatever may be said of the first consequence, denying the assumption with its proof; because although each would be equal as regards all positive natural perfections, and as regards the lack of every supernatural gift; nevertheless they would differ in this, that he who would have original sin would have the debt of death founded in the divine pact made with the first man concerning the having of original Justice; but one constituted in pure natural conditions would not have such a debt; whence in the latter the lack of the supernatural gift, in which original Justice consisted, would be a privation; in the former, however, it would not be a privation, but a simple absence of some form which he was not bound to have.

You will say 3. The will in pure natural conditions is right; for no curvature seems to belong to its nature, because such would be refunded into God, who is its author: ergo if it were produced without anything supernatural, it would have original rectitude; and consequently original Justice: ergo original Justice does not involve anything supernatural. — I answer 1., with the Doctor, that in the will, or in man, a twofold rectitude and original Justice can be considered: one which is nothing else than the faculty of free choice for acting well, without any derangement of actual or habitual sin: another which is some gift bringing with it the effects of concord of the inferior sensitive power with the superior rational, and of immortality, which he supposes the first Parents in fact had from the origin, and their successors would have had had they not sinned. The argument proceeds from the prior rectitude, not from the posterior; wherefore, granting the whole, it makes nothing to the point. I answer 2., with the same Doctor, by distinguishing the antecedent: rectitude excluding any sin whatever, I grant the antecedent; rectitude excluding rebellion and mortality, I deny the antecedent. Similarly I distinguish the consequence: original rectitude and justice excluding the curvature of sin, I grant the consequence; excluding rebellion and mortality of sin, I deny the consequence. I distinguish also the final consequent: ergo original Justice, that is, the rectitude of nature excluding sin, I grant the consequence; that is, that which removes rebellion and mortality, I deny the consequence.

You will say 4. According to the opinion of all theologians, man on account of the sin of Adam is not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts, but also wounded in his natural endowments: ergo he lost not only supernatural rectitude, but also that natural rectitude infused in him; otherwise he would only be said to be despoiled of gratuitous gifts. — I answer. That man is said to be wounded in his natural endowments is not with respect to human nature considered in pure natural conditions, but as it was created by God with original Justice, by which it had the power of rectifying and perfecting all natural things in order to every good connatural to man: which justice being lost through sin, that perfection of the natural powers also perished, and for that cause man is said to be wounded in his natural endowments. But if anyone were created in pure natural conditions, he would not be of equal condition with man infected by original sin; for because the latter is debtor to original Justice, which he received in Adam, whereas the former is not at all, therefore the latter is guilty, the former not at all: and the loss of the vision of God, contingently incumbent upon both, is in the one a privation and penalty on account of sin; in the other a mere negation of dignity arising from the condition of nature.

Second Conclusion. — Original Justice was really distinct from and different from sanctifying grace.

This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor in 2 dist. 29 num. 1, where he says: What if original Justice were some supernatural gift? It does not follow, however, that it must be a principle of meriting. For it stands related to grace, which is the principle of merit, as the exceeding to the exceeded: exceeding indeed, because it joins the will more firmly to the ultimate end than grace does: for thus it joins according to some, that no venial sin was thought to be compatible with it; but Charity suffereth together. And according to the premises, at least it joined in such sort that it was easier and more delightful for him to suffer from some sadness of the inferior than to acquiesce in some inferior delight, withdrawing from the delight of the end. This faculty grace had not, together with which remains proneness to evil and difficulty in good. But it exceeds grace in this, that it joins to the end as to a supernatural good, and supernaturally by meriting the attainment of such a good: not so this gift, but it joined only to that good as fitting and delightful.

Secondly, sanctifying grace perfects man in order to the supernatural end, but not in order to the natural end, nor to the natural integrity and perfection of man: but this original Justice secured; they were therefore gifts diverse and pertaining to diverse ends and states of man. And as by original Justice man was not perfected supernaturally, because it was a gift of nature given to complete its integrity and perfection; so sanctifying grace, because it is of the supernatural order and directed to the supernatural state and end of man, had not the power of perfecting man naturally and in those things that pertain to the completeness of human nature: and since we can feign in our mind and conceive in thought some man perfect according to the whole integrity of nature and of its powers and their natural rectitude without supernatural sanctifying grace; for the natural order is diverse, nor does it depend essentially on the supernatural; it is consistent besides that original Justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace, and that it does not contradict its being able to be separated from it.

Lastly, thirdly, if original Justice were not distinct from sanctifying grace, it would follow that original justice ought to have been restored to Adam by penance, and to us by baptism: for Adam through penance recovered the grace he had lost through sin; and the same is given through the Sacrament of baptism also to the baptized: but the consequent is false: ergo also that from which it follows.

You will say. The effect of original Justice was to subject the sensitive appetite to the rational, and the soul to God: but this very thing sanctifying grace secures, and accordingly it seems not to be a diverse habit. — I distinguish the minor. That sanctifying grace secures the same with the same facility as original Justice, I deny; with some repugnance on the part of either appetite, I grant: and thus original Justice not only subjected the soul to God and the body to the soul; but it also secured this subjection without any reluctance, nay with the greatest complacency and delight of either subject part. Otherwise it happens in the subjection wrought by sanctifying grace: since this subjection is fulfilled only with the greatest difficulty; for although the Apostle had been illumined by sanctifying grace, and that preeminently, nevertheless he cried out groaning: I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind.

Third Conclusion. — Original Justice, adequately taken, was not one and a simple habit: but a manifold gift of God, by which the whole man would become upright and perfect: and therefore it desired not a single, but a various subject. Thus the Doctor in the place cited n. 1, where, after he had proved it necessary for man to have some supernatural gift whereby he might easily withdraw himself from sensible delights and moderate the sensitive appetite; he affirms again that other gifts were necessary in the inferior appetites, whereby they might be moved delightfully by the will according to right reason, even when they would abandon their own delights. "If it be said," he says, "that the inferior power of itself obeys reason delightfully, then it seems that something must be posited in the inferior power, whereby it is thus delightfully borne toward the delight of the will; for it does not seem that from the nature of that power it would be delightfully torn away from its delight; nor was it of its nature, inasmuch as it is inferior to the will, that it be delightfully torn from its delight by the will itself, because this essential order remains now, and yet now there is not such delight." For it would be necessary to posit in each inferior appetitive power individual gifts, so that each might be moved delightfully by the will through its own gift, and the will itself through its gift might move itself delightfully toward the inferior powers; and if there were such many gifts, nevertheless original Justice, which was in the will, was the chiefest. — By which it is evident how perversely certain Recent writers affirm

that the Doctor asserts original Justice to have been one single and simple habit, to be placed in the will alone. Original Justice, therefore, was the complex of all habits by which man became fitted to exercise expediently and perfectly all the actions befitting his nature. That it was not a single and simple habit is evident from this, that the faculties of our soul are some incorporeal and immortal, as mind and will: others mortal and corporeal, as those belonging to the sentient and nutritive soul: but how could it come about that one numerical habit should perfect so many powers distinguished not only in number and species but even in genus, especially since habit is distinguished by acts, and acts by objects? For in what power, I beseech, would that single habit of original Justice have been? If in the intellect, how would it have perfected the will? And even if it had been in both faculties, how nevertheless could it have made the powers of the sentient soul expedite and perfect for acting suitably to the judgment and command of reason? Therefore original Justice was not one habit, but contained all the habits that are needed for the completion of the integrity and rectitude of man and of all his faculties. — And so in the speculative intellect it contained all the speculative sciences of all things that can naturally be known by man, as Metaphysics, Physics, and all Mathematical disciplines. — In the practical intellect, concerning those things that man must do both privately and publicly, it had most exquisite prudence; also those arts which have an ingenuous and liberal use and honest delectation, as Agriculture, Music, Architecture, the art of painting and of sculpting. — In the will there were two habits: one toward God, namely of Religion, which renders worship and honor to God as the supreme principle of all things and their natural end, both by interior veneration of mind and by external rites and ceremonies: the other toward one's neighbor, namely of Justice, which is divided into distributive and commutative. — In the sensitive appetite, which is twofold, irascible and concupiscible, there were the moral virtues, by which they are gifted and rendered obedient to reason, namely Temperance and Fortitude: for it is natural that powers be perfected through their habits: and this is the natural mode whereby each several power is perfected, that it may be fit to perform its functions as it ought. And all the aforesaid habits original Justice contained in the most perfect, and, as they call it, heroic degree.

You ask: whether in the state of Innocence the sensitive appetite was so subjected to reason that it would never rise against its prescription, neither resisting it nor anticipating it?

The Doctor answers in 2 dist. 29 num. 1 that nothing certain can be determined in this matter: "For it can be said," he says, "that if original Justice in the soul had that effect, namely to make perfect tranquillity in the soul as regards all powers, so that the inferior nature would not incline against the judgment of the superior, or if it inclined as far as in it lies, it could yet be regulated and ordered by the superior without difficulty of the superior and without sadness of the inferior: since the fluctuating power had not this in pure natural conditions, it is necessary to posit in it a supernatural gift, whereby that tranquillity may be in the soul. Then it is asked: but is never by this removed all rebellion, so that the inferior power delightfully withdraws itself from its own proper delight?" "I answer," he says, "if the will delightfully abstains by condelighting with the inferior power, the whole man delightfully abstains from the delight of the inferior sensitive appetite: but not the whole man abstains without sadness if that inferior itself abstains with sadness: for this belongs to man simply, that it belongs to him according to his superior power, nor is it denied to him on that account, even though it does not belong to him according to his inferior power." He adds, moreover: nor perhaps is it necessary to posit that any sense of appetite could then be saddened, and hearing hear a shameful delectable thing, and either could offend the sensitive appetite, as a fitting sensible could delight; but the will would then have used well those sadnesses and delights of the inferior appetites, so that it would not have been immoderately saddened by the inferior appetites, as it would have used well their delights, not immoderately condelighting. By which the Doctor leaves it in doubt what is to be held concerning the proposed question. — Nevertheless I should believe it more probable that in that happy state of original Justice the motions of the sensitive appetite were so subject to reason that they never resisted it nor outran it: otherwise there would seem to be no difference between the state of innocence and of integral nature, and between the state of fallen nature repaired by the grace of Christ. And the Apostle proves this opinion, Romans 7, where he affirms that the rebellion of flesh against spirit arose chiefly from sin. Saint Augustine also teaches, lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 19, where he says: The motions of the appetite before sin in Paradise were not vicious. For they were not moved against right will toward anything: whence it would be necessary for them to be restrained by reason governing as with bridle-reins. For that now they are so moved, and in those who live temperately, and justly, and piously, are modified by restraining and bridling them, some more easily, some with more difficulty, is assuredly not health from nature, but languor from guilt.

You ask: How would it have come about that in that state the rational will, naturally conjoined to the sensitive appetite, would not be allured and affected by its delights, and would abstain from them of itself, without any difficulty or molestation? — The Doctor answers in the same place, that this happened because the will was held with a far greater delight about its object than was sensible delight: for it was more delightful to it to adhere to its ultimate end, and to those things ordered to that end, than to enjoy the pleasures of the senses.