Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine
Claude Frassen (1620–1711)
Tractatus I: De Creaturarum Corporalium, seu totius Mundi formatione, et ordinatione
Disputatio I: De opere primae diei
Disputatio II: De opere secundae diei
Disputatio III: De opere tertiae diei
Disputatio IV: De opere quartae diei
Disputatio V: De opere quintae diei
Disputatio VI: De opere sextae diei
Tractatus II: De mirando Hominis opificio, ejusque varia sorte
Disputatio I: De statu purae naturalis hominis, seu de nativis et ingenitis hominum dotibus
Articulus I: De naturali hominis statu, et ingenita ejus praecellentia
Quaestio I: An possibilis sit naturae purae status
Quaestio II: Qualis esset naturae purae status; sive an eisdem corporis, et animae defectibus, quibus nunc praemimur, subiaceret
Quaestio III: Qualiter homo per ingenitas suas praecellentias cunctis creaturis praecellat
Articulus II: De dignitate et praecellentia humani corporis
Quaestio I: Qualis, et quam miranda sit humani corporis fabrica
Quaestio II: Quanta sit hominis dignitas ex recta eius dispositione
Quaestio III: Quanta sit humani corporis dignitas ex eius unione cum anima rationali
Articulus III: De animae rationalis dignitate et praecellentia
Quaestio I: Quid, qualis, et ex quo sit anima rationalis
Quaestio II: An, et quomodo anima rationalis formata sit ad imaginem, et similitudinem Dei
Quaestio III: In quo maneat sita ratio imaginis, et similitudinis Dei in homine
Disputatio II: De statu naturae innocentis
Articulus I: De Paradiso terrestri protoparentum innocentium domicilio
Quaestio I: Quid sit Paradisus terrestris
Quaestio II: Quis, et qualis sit Paradisi terrestris situs
Quaestio III: Quae nam sit Paradisi terrestris magnitudo, et amoenitas?
Quaestio IV: Quibus praecipuis arboribus Paradisus terrestris consitus fuerit
Articulus II: De naturalibus et ingenitis hominis innocentis dotibus
Quaestio I: Quaenam fuerit protoparentum corporea formatio, et exercitatio
Quaestio II: Qualis, et quanta fuerit protoparentum in statu innocentiae sapientia, et scientia
Quaestio III: Qua ratione propagatum esset genus humanum in statu innocentiae
Notandum 1. Certain of the holy Fathers were of the opinion that, had the innocence of that state persevered, men would have been born without the commingling of the sexes. This was especially the sentiment of S. Gregory of Nyssa, in his book De hominis opificio, asserting in c. 17 that if the first man had not sinned, there would have been no use of marriage, nor would men have been multiplied as now happens through carnal copulation; but that the race of men would have been propagated in some certain and unknown manner, namely in that way in which he believed the Angels to have been multiplied; for, says he, if that emulation by which we create ourselves equal to the Angels had not fallen away through sin — "we would have had no need of marriage for our increase: but whatever is that great mode of increase belonging to incorrupt nature, which indeed assuredly cannot be set forth in words, nor grasped by the conjectures of men, yet exists in them in some measure: the same would avail for those who are diminished but a little from the Angels, men; which would have brought the increments of the human race up to the full culture of the Creator."
The same is the opinion of holy Damascene, lib. 2, cap. 30, affirming that the propagation and succession of men from themselves occurred in consequence of their condemnation to death on account of transgression. To these are consonant the words written by S. Chrysostom, Homil. 18 in Genesim, expounding those words of the fourth chapter: Adam knew his wife. But the chiefest reason of these was the shameful character of the conjugal act on account of the heat of lust and the corruption of integrity: wherefore
Notandum 2. From S. Bonaventure, in 2 dist. 20, art. 1, quaest. 3: that if the state of innocence had persevered, there would indeed have been delight in the conjugal act, yet moderate and measured, according as the reason of man was able to temper it: and therefore it would not have been so great as it is now. For now, because that power has chiefly gone forth from under the empire of reason — since reason lost the bond and bridle of original justice, whereby it commanded the interior powers — the same, its reins loosened, precipitates itself with its whole impulse and endeavor upon whatever delightful thing is offered it, not by reason of the intensification of the moving power, but by reason of the defect of the retarding power. Hence, just as an unruly horse, its bridle broken, runs more swiftly and impetuously than when it is bridled and held back by its rider, although it has not greater strength; and so must this matter be understood in the case at hand. And this is what Augustine says, De Civitate Dei: Those marriages worthy of the felicity of Paradise would have begotten offspring to be loved, and would not have had shameful lust. And therefore the reasons are to be granted which show that there would not then have been so great an intensity of delight as there is now, when it is now so great that it does not observe due measure and order. So the Seraphic Doctor.
Notandum 3. From the same, qu. 1: that the corruption of integrity entails three things: namely, the opening of the enclosures, penal suffering, and foul delight. The first is of nature: the second is punishment: the third truly is the viciousness of corruption, which holds a middle place between fault and punishment. If therefore man had known his wife in the time of instituted nature, there would have been therein an opening of the enclosures: yet there would not have been therein penal suffering, nor foul delight; because the generative power would neither be corrupt nor infected: nay, those members would obey reason, as Augustine says, just as the mouth, the hands, and the tongue obey. Whence, as the hand is opened and closed, and the mouth opened and closed, and there is therein no suffering or punishment, nor any foul delight, so would it have been in instituted nature: nor would it have been more shameful then to speak of those members than it is to speak of others; for it is not shameful to speak of a thing because nature shrinks from and blushes at that act by reason of the foulness residing in it; but by reason of the intemperate and disordered delight annexed to it.
Conclusio prima. — In very truth the human race would have been propagated in the state of innocence through the commingling of the sexes. So it accords with the more numerous throng of holy Fathers, by whom it was judged that the posterity of Adam was to be begotten in no other manner than by the customary union of the sexes: yet without that heat of lust which overrode reason. Let one suffice above the rest, S. Augustine, who in lib. 1 contra Iulianum, cap. 1, says: Nor even if human nature had not been vitiated by the sin of the first men, could sons be begotten otherwise than from the commixture of bodies: but they are under the power of the devil who are born of the commixture of bodies before they are reborn through the Spirit, because they are born with concupiscence, whereby the flesh concupisceth against the spirit, and compels the spirit to concupiscence against itself. And in lib. 2 De peccato originali, c. 35 and 36: Marriages, says he, without doubt would have existed even had sin not preceded, for neither for any other cause was she made for him as an aid, not of another man, but a woman. And those words of God, increase and multiply, are not a foretelling of sins to be condemned: but a blessing of marriages to be founded, etc. But had nature not been dishonored by sin, we think such marriages would have been in Paradise that in them, for the sowing of offspring, the will of nature would move the genital members as the foot moves to walk, the hand to work, the tongue to speak: but they would not be moved by the heat of lust: nor, as now happens, would the integrity of virginity be violated for conceiving offspring by a turbulent ardor: but it would have obeyed the command of most tranquil charity. And in that manner there would be neither pain nor blood of the virgin in her coming together, even as there would not be the groaning of the mother in childbirth.
S. Bonaventure proves this truth in the place cited, quaest. 1, both by the authority of Scripture and by reason. For, says he, men were spoken to in the state of innocence, as it is written: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth. And another text of Scripture declares that woman was made for a helper unto man. This also accords with right reason, which says that the power of generating pertains to the completion of nature: but the use of generation to the complement and perfection of the heavenly city; and because in the state of innocence nature was more perfect than in the state of the way: and had man stood, the heavenly city would by no means have been defrauded of the multitude of its citizens; it must be posited that man in the state of innocence could generate, and would have generated; and because neither man by himself nor woman by herself would have sufficed for generating, therefore by commixtion there would be made a conjunction of one to the other, and they would render each other mutual aid in the procreation of offspring for multiplying the human race; and therefore had man stood, there would have been generation and the commixtion of the sexes. — It is confirmed from Genesis 2: Woman was given as a help unto man: but surely for nothing else than for the generation of offspring; for in all other things man could be aided by man either better or certainly no less well. Then again, the distinction of the sexes is for nothing save generation: but in its primary condition the distinction existed in the human species as in others: therefore if distinct sexes concur to one effect only by being mingled, it seems that had man stood, man and woman would have been mingled. Finally, man had generative power: but it is plain that he could not conceive offspring within himself, since he had neither the place in which the fetus should be nourished, nor the passage by which it should go forth: therefore it seems that, that he might generate, it was necessary for him to mingle with and come together with woman.
Dices 1: The commixtion of the sexes implies shamefulness: but in the state of innocence there would have been no dishonesty nor shamefulness: therefore neither the commixtion of the sexes.
Respondeo: I distinguish the major: the commixtion of the sexes, with immoderate ardor of lust and unbridled motions of concupiscence, implies shamefulness — this I grant; where these are absent, I deny. That shamefulness and loathing, indeed, which now inheres in the very act of generation, is felt by reason of the deformity of lust and the immoderate pleasure of the sexes, which our first parents immediately after sin, to use the words of Augustine, felt, blushed at, and covered themselves. But this ardor of lust, shaming and deforming the act of generation, would not have been in the state of innocence. For in it the soul would have been wholly subject to God; and the interior part of man perfectly subjected and obedient to reason; so that, with that same facility and moderation with which we now move the other members of the body — feet for walking, hands for taking, mouth and tongue for speaking — in that state, without disturbance of reason, without ardor of lust, and without all foulness, man would have moved, ruled, and moderated those members of the body which nature furnished for generating.
Dices 2: There can be no generation except from the decision of seed: but in the state of innocence there would have been no decision of seed; for seed is a superfluity of nutriment: but wherever there is superfluity, there is vitiosity: but in instituted nature there was no vitiosity: therefore neither superfluity: consequently neither the seminal humor. Further, seed is a superfluity of the third digestion: but had man stood, there would not have been in him a superfluity of the second digestion, namely dung and urine: therefore neither a superfluity of the third. The first is plain from the Philosopher: the second is manifest, because those superfluities are never without foulness and ignominy: therefore if foulness and ignominy are not in man except through fault, in no wise would there have been superfluity in them.
Nego minorem: and for its proof I answer with S. Bonaventure in the place cited, quaest. 2, that there is a twofold superfluity, namely of residuum and of impurity. The superfluity of residuum is in seed; and this superfluity does not exclude necessity; nay, the very same thing which is necessary is superfluous — necessary for the species, superfluous for the individual: necessary for the generative power, but superfluous for the nutritive: and this superfluity is not repugnant to the goodness and complexion of nature, because it sounds not in defect but in complement. — There is also another superfluity of impurity, such as dung and urine, the flow of rheum, the emission of sweat, and things like these; and this is of a twofold difference: some comes from weakness of the contentive and conservative powers, as sweat and rheum, and such was not in Adam, for this cause, that the natural powers in him were efficacious in their operations; but the other is that which comes from the impurity of nutriment, and this would have been in Adam — such as the superfluity of excrement and urine, which exist for the separation of the pure from the impure; and that which is pure and fit should be assumed into nourishment, but that which is less fit should be cast outward, though not with such great stench and foulness, as the vessels and intestines and passages sufficiently indicate, which are naturally assigned to man from his first condition. So S. Bonaventure.
Dices 3: The generation of offspring cannot come to pass without corruption of the seal and virginal integrity: but in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption: therefore neither generation of offspring.
S. Augustine answers, lib. 14, De Civitate Dei, cap. 26, that amid so great a facility of things and felicity of men, far be it from us to suspect that offspring could not be made without the motion of lust: but those members would be moved by the nod of the will as the others; and without the seductive stimulus of ardor, with tranquillity of soul and body, without any corruption of integrity, the seed of the marital wife would have been infused: for neither because experience cannot prove it is it therefore not to be believed; since those parts of the body would not be acted upon shamefully by ardor, but spontaneous power would employ them as need required: thus then could the male seed be implanted while the feminine integrity of the genital member remained whole in one of the spouses: even as now, with the same integrity preserved, the flux of menstrual blood can be emitted from the womb of a virgin: for by the same path could that be implanted by which this can be emitted; for as, in giving birth, not the groaning of pain but the impulse of maturity relaxes the female womb: so, for cherishing and conceiving, not appetite of lust but voluntary use would unite both natures.
Respondeo 2. It seems more probable that the seal of virginal integrity would even then have been opened through the act of generation. For the manner in which the act of generation is now accomplished, through the opening of the female part, is natural, seeing that it is observed also in the other animals. Therefore, setting aside the ardor of immoderate lust and the deformity of concupiscence, which befell the act of generation through sin and the privation of original Justice, this manner too would have been in the state of innocence: for the things natural to man were not changed on account of sin. Further, why should we fear to say that feminine bodily integrity would then have been taken away through the act of generation, when we cannot deny that it is corrupted in childbirth through the going forth of the offspring from the womb? Unless anyone should be so senseless and mad as to think that what in the most blessed Virgin was an excellent and singular miracle — that she bore her Son with her womb closed — would have been the customary lot of all women in that state. — I add that the sentiment of S. Augustine can be expounded in that sense in which S. Bonaventure used and distinguished it, as was observed in the 3rd Notabile.
Quaeres: Whether, if the state of innocence had persevered, only those men would have been born who are now elected unto eternal beatitude? — quaest. 100, a. 2, where answering the authority borrowed from S. Gregory the Pope, who says that if the state of innocence had persevered, only the predestined would have been about to be born, Dicendum, says he, that if Adam had not sinned he would not have begotten from himself children of gehenna: namely in such sort that from him they would contract that sin which is the cause of gehenna. They could become children of gehenna through free choice by sinning. He adds indeed: And if they did not become children of gehenna through sin, this would not be because they were confirmed in grace, but on account of divine providence, whereby they would be preserved immune from sin. Where you see that in this second part of the response he indicates that they would not sin mortally unto gehenna, God preserving them from sin. Yet since he places first, in the first position, the prior response denying that preservation, dicendum rather inclines toward that opinion.
AFFIRMING the opinion in truth, the Subtle Doctor defends it in 2 dist. 20, qu. 2: I say, says he, that only those now elect would have been born in the state of innocence; and he proves this first by the authority of S. Gregory, 1 Moralium, cap. 36, who says: had no rust of sin corrupted the first parent, he would by no means have generated from himself children of gehenna, but those alone who are now to be saved through the Redeemer would alone have been born elect from him; whose assertion, since no theological reason and no implication is repugnant to it, faith itself is not to be denied.
- The Doctor proves it by theological reason, because everyone willing orderly some end, and those means which conduce to its attainment, wills first the means nearer the end than those more remote: but God is one willing orderly: therefore He first wills Himself, or His goodness to be communicated to creatures, as His own ultimate end: therefore equally He ought to will those means which proximately confer upon fruition of His beatitude and goodness. Now of these means nearer is the election of man unto glory than that he be produced by this or that man, or that sin be permitted: therefore prior does that election take place than the permission of sin be decreed, or the nativity of that man from this or that man; and hence parents of this kind could not vary those determined and elected unto beatitude from the divine will, but the same in number would be born.
Verily, however, since this proof of the Doctor can only be understood of election incomplete and merely designative, but not of election absolute, complete, and determinate, as we said demonstrating that the predestination of men is rendered efficacious only after merits foreseen, therefore I judge otherwise that the assertion of S. Gregory, and likewise of the Subtle Doctor, is to be proved. Those alone then would have been born who were foreseen as about to depart this life in final grace: but only those now elect are such: therefore only those would then have been born. The minor stands: the Major likewise, both because S. Gregory openly confesses that, had Adam stood, he would by no means have generated from himself children of gehenna: therefore all then to be generated were about to depart this life in final grace: then also because, as will be proved below, all the posterity of Adam, had he stood, after having conquered the first temptation and occasion of sinning, would in truth have been confirmed in grace: and hence none of them would have departed this world without sanctifying grace: finally, because though some had sinned, nevertheless they could have repented of sin, and repaired lost sanctifying grace through an act of contrition, and through a more fervent act of charity discharged the penalties due to their sin; and thereafter avoid occasions of sinning with greater prudence, and repel them with firmer mind: therefore none of them would have departed this life without sanctifying grace, and thus none of them would have been damned. — To the confirmation there accrue several probable reasons and conjectures, which Francis Macedo reports thus from S. Augustine, collat. 6, diff. t., sec. 4. The first is drawn from the condition of that state, which, since it was of integrity and innocence, ought to have been like virginity: namely either to remain intact, or to perish corrupted, for no middle was given. The second from the like, or rather from the opposite: through sin that whole state perished from the foundations: therefore through its innocence it would wholly stand entire and complete. The third from the proportion between the propagation of nature and the transfusion of justice: for as from one parent the whole nature is transmitted into posterity, so justice seemed to be transfused, God so ordaining, that one should answer to the other. The fourth from the covenant of God with man: which seems to have been of such kind that, had Adam obeyed, all his posterity would be saved: if otherwise, all damned, as happened through sin. The fifth from the difference of this state from the state of Redemption after sin: because if in that state there were mortal sins, private persons would need a necessary Mediator and Redeemer, and the grace of necessary redemption, which condition is proper to the present state of fallen nature, not to another. Whence it follows ex absurdo. Sixth, namely from the confusion of these states: for that state would become altogether like our state with Redemption and with the grace of the Mediator, with the Sacraments and remedies of sins, which do not appear able to be done away without the grace of the Redeemer: and consequently Christ would be in it passible, and there the grace of the Cross, or something similar. So Macedo.
To these conjectures the SS. Fathers also give the suffrage of their authority. For besides S. Gregory the Great already cited, S. Anselm adds, lib. 1, c. 18.: Had the first parents so stood that, tempted, they had not sinned, they would have been confirmed together with their whole progeny, so that thereafter they could not sin. — S. Augustine also favors it, lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 23, where, inquiring whether in the state of innocence other men were to be generated from the first parents, it being objected that there would be among them some sinners, and accordingly only the first parents righteous would remain, he answers against this affirmatively, saying: Much rather is it to be believed that the number of saints sufficient to complete that most blessed City would have been as great, even had no one sinned, as it is now gathered through the grace of God out of the multitude of sinners. He has like things in the book De correptione et gratia, cap. 10.
But whether truly those very ones alone who are in fact elected unto glory — that is, the selfsame men individually who are now effectually destined unto eternal beatitude — would have been born, innocence persevering, the Doctor seems to affirm in 2 dist. 20, quaest. 2, n. 3, where he says: I say (as has been said) that the same man in number, not only as regards the soul but even as regards the organic body, could have been son of Adam and son of Abraham; and from whichever of these two he had been, the same in number he would have been, because if nothing of the substance of the son be of the substance of the father, but the whole from the menses, as the Philosopher holds in the second De generatione animalium, or if the seed of the man concur there with that seed of the woman, I say nevertheless that the same matter from which this one is generated, which was in the state of fallen nature under the form of nutriment, could have been in the state of innocence under another form, for instance of an apple, or the like. So the Doctor, in which words he establishes two things, namely, that the same in number would have been born in the state of innocence who already are predestined; although perhaps they would not have had the same parents, because, says he, the same man can be son of Adam and of Abraham, that is, have had a different father. For in this individual man there are two things, namely form and matter, that is, soul and body. But the soul does not depend on parents, but is created and infused by God; the body, however, is formed from seed, which is not so proper to one that it might not be of another, since from diverse aliments the same seed can be generated. — Third, in a matter so doubtful and uncertain it is licit only probably to opine: let it suffice therefore with that Doctor and S. Gregory constantly to assert that no man in that state would have been damned, but that all would have been predestined and saved.