Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

Notandum 1. From Hugh of St. Victor, lib. 1. De Sacramentis, par. 6. cap. 12., that man was first instructed from the very beginning of his condition with a threefold knowledge: namely, the knowledge of his Creator, that he might know by whom he had been made. Secondly, knowledge of himself, that he might know what had been made, and what he ought to do. Thirdly, finally, knowledge of Him with whom he had been made, and what he ought to do concerning Him, and in Him. Of what kind, however, this threefold knowledge was must be determined here.

Notandum 2. From the Seraphic Bonaventure in 2. dist. 23. art. 2. qu. 3., that there is a fourfold genus of knowing God: namely, through faith, through contemplation, through apparition, and through open vision. The first is of common grace; the second of excellent grace; the third of special grace; and the fourth of consummating glory. And the sufficiency of these modes is gathered thus: for everything that is known is known through something present; if, therefore, God is known, it is necessary that He be known by the intellect through something present. But I call present this according as Augustine calls it present which is present to the intellect to be seen. Either, therefore, I know God through His being present to me, or through His being present to others. If through His being present to others, this is the cognition of faith: for that God is Three and One, this I believe on the word of the Son of God, who declared and preached it, and of the Holy Ghost, who inspired it. For what we believe we owe to authority, as Augustine says. De Utilitate credendi, cap. 11. But if I know God through His being present to me, this can be in a threefold manner: either through His being present to me in His proper effect: and then it is contemplation; which is so much the more eminent as man more sensibly feels in himself the effect of divine grace, or as he likewise knows better how to consider God in exterior creatures. Or He is present to me in His proper sign: and thus there is apparition, as God appeared to Abraham in a subject creature, which figured Him, and as the Holy Ghost appeared in a dove. Or God is present in His light, and in Himself: and such is the cognition whereby God is seen in His countenance, or face to face; and such is open vision, which is wholly called the reward of all merits. Therefore the first and last genus of cognition did not befit the state of innocence. The first indeed, on account of its enigmatic cognition, and because the cognition of faith is for the most part from hearing. But the last could not be there on account of its supreme perfection: therefore it was not exhibited to man, but rather promised as a reward. Now the two middle ones, namely of contemplation and of apparition, could be common to both states: especially the cognition of contemplation, which is in both states: yet it flourished there above all, both on account of the purity of the soul, and also on account of the subjection of the flesh and of the lower powers, which two the soul for the most part lacks in the state of lapsed nature; therefore it cannot attain to that degree of contemplation. This is from St. Bonaventure. Yet I would not tacitly concede that Adam did not have the light of faith, since faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, and the hinge and pivot of all eternal salvation; unless perhaps the Seraphic Doctor should wish that Adam indeed had the habit of faith, but not the act regarding those things of which he had evident and scientific knowledge.

Notandum 3. From the same author, ibidem qu. 1., that progress in knowledge can be considered in a threefold way: either on the part of the things knowable, or on the part of the modes of knowing, or on the part of a greater aptitude in knowing. According to the first mode, since some things come to pass in the natural course, or miraculously; others in a voluntary course; it is certain that in the cognition of those things which indeed come to pass in the natural course, Adam could not have progressed as regards the acquisition of a new habit: for he received (as Hugh says, and the Master in the text) from the beginning of all things full knowledge. He could nevertheless have progressed as regards another mode of knowing, and as regards a greater habit of knowing. As regards another mode, he could progress, because what he knew by simple knowledge he could know by experience: and what he knew by intellect he could know also by sense. He could also progress as regards a greater aptitude, because from frequent consideration of those things which he knew, he would have been readier and more prepared to judge concerning those things of which he had cognition through an innate habit. For although the first man had no slowness of dullness through the burden of a mortal body, yet his spirit had a certain lesser swiftness through the vitalization of an animal body: and thus in the cognition of natural things Adam would in some way by no means have stood still. — But in the cognition of those things which come to pass in a voluntary course, and miraculously, or simply supernaturally, he could have progressed: not only as regards the mode of knowing, but even in acquiring new cognition. Nor is this wonderful, because in order to know divine mysteries he needed supernatural illumination: but in order to know the secrets of another, he needed the direction of that person himself. Nor did such progress derogate from the state of innocence, since even the blessed Angels make progress in the cognition of divine mysteries and human secrets: wherefore it is said in Ephesians 3.: That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to Principalities and Powers through the Church. So far he.

These matters having been thus set forth in outline, there remains here to be determined of what kind was the wisdom and knowledge of Adam, both as regards natural things and as regards supernatural things.

First Conclusion. — Adam in the state of innocence possessed the most perfect science of all natural things, and a certain and evident cognition thereof.

It is proved first from that passage of Ecclesiasticus, c. 17., where concerning the first parents we read thus: Discipline of understanding filled them: knowledge of the spirit he created in them: with sense he filled their heart, and showed them good and evil; in whom are not obscurely signified the four principal parts of Philosophy. Indeed Logic, through discipline of the understanding, since that discipline consists wholly in handing down rules and precepts by which the intellect, when instructed, reasons perfectly: but Metaphysics, through knowledge of the spirit, since it is concerned with the noblest species of being, namely God and the Angels: but Physics, through which "with sense he filled their heart," that is, he adorned their soul with sciences drawn from corporeal things by the aid of the senses: and by the last words Moral Philosophy is plainly expressed, since it directs the intellect to knowing good and evil, that the will may embrace the former and abhor the latter.

It is proved likewise by a threefold argument: The first indeed: that which God produces proximately and immediately, those things are most perfect: but Adam God alone created without any intervening efficient cause contributing concurrence, both as to body and as to soul: therefore he was created most perfect by God on both sides. Therefore just as he was formed with a perfect body, namely as regards completeness of age, height of stature, strength and firmness of powers, and the power of generating others; so there is no doubt that he was created perfect in soul and mind: and therefore since the natural perfection of the mind is science, Adam had this from the beginning. — Second reason: as Adam was to be the sower and parent of humankind according to carnal generation, therefore he had to be created at a perfect age, and fit for generation: and since the same man was to be the first Doctor and Ruler of men, it was indeed fitting that he be created with a perfect faculty of teaching and ruling other men: but this cannot be done without science. For, as Aristotle writes in the first and second books of the Metaphysics, The sign of one who knows is the ability to teach others: and that which is the cause why other things are such, must itself be maximally such. — Third reason: if Adam had been created without science, and ought to have acquired it gradually by study and labor, he would have dwelt for a long time in ignorance of truth: but ignorance of truth, and unacquaintance with things that lie open to the senses, would have been exceedingly troublesome and bitter to a man most desirous of knowledge: yet nothing troublesome or bitter would have happened to him in that state, either in soul or in body: therefore Adam was not created ignorant and unknowing. For if he had long been ignorant, he would easily, on account of ignorance of truth and of things, have assented to false opinions and lapsed into absurd errors; namely by approving false things as true, or rejecting true things as false, which, as Augustine said most excellently, belongs not to the nature of man as created, but to the punishment of the condemned.

You will say 1.: Adam believed the serpent, who deceived him, to be capable of speech: therefore he did not acknowledge its nature, and consequently was not a Philosopher. Next, he believed this serpent promising science, and in order to obtain it broke the commandment imposed upon him by God: therefore he then did not possess science. Finally, after the eating of the forbidden fruit Holy Scripture testifies that the eyes of the First Parents were opened: not indeed the eyes of the body, for they were not blind, but the eyes of the mind and of the heart: therefore they were ignorant, for ignorance is called blindness of the mind.

I answer to 1. and to 2., denying that Adam supposed serpents to be capable of speech: but he believed that beneath the serpentine form some Angel lay hid, who spoke true things to him, promising a science, not natural and philosophical, which he already possessed most perfectly, but supernatural, theological, and independent, namely such as God comprehends in Himself, as is clear from those words uttered from the serpentine mouth: You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. To which add that not Adam, but Eve was deceived by the serpent. To 3. I say that the eyes of their mind were opened, not by any infusion or acquisition of a new science, but by the use and experience of the former; for they knew themselves stripped and despoiled of all the gifts and ornaments of innocence and of original grace, with which they had been enriched at their formation, and they experienced the rebellion of the inferior part against the superior, namely of the body against the soul, which before sin was unknown to them.

You will say 2.: With Cajetan expounding the passage of Moses about the imposition of names made by Adam: Adam did not have science of all corporeal things, seeing that evidently he did not know the elements, the heavens, and the stars: for since these are the principal parts of the world, out of which this world is joined together and constituted integral, their perfect cognition is reserved to God alone, who, as David says Psalm 116.: He that telleth the multitude of the stars, and calleth them all by their names: whence it follows that the cognition of celestial things is known to God alone, and therefore not granted to Adam himself.

I deny the antecedent; for first it is false that the cognition of the heavens and of the stars is reserved to God alone; seeing that Solomon, cap. 7. of the book of Wisdom, says of himself: He himself gave me the true knowledge of the things that are, that I might know the disposition of the world, and the virtues of the elements, the beginning and ending and midst of times, the alterations of their courses and changes of seasons, the circuits of years and positions of stars: the natures of living creatures and the rage of beasts, the force of winds and thoughts of men, the differences of plants and virtues of roots, and whatsoever things are hidden and unforeseen I learned: for Wisdom, the artificer of all, taught me. From which it is clear that there was granted to Solomon perfect science of the world, of the elements, and of the stars, and of all things hidden and concealed: therefore much more to Adam. Nor is it true that the perfect cognition of those things was so reserved to God alone that Adam could not obtain it. Nor does it matter that Adam imposed names only upon flying and terrestrial animals, but not upon earth, nor sea, nor heavens, and stars, as if he had not had science of them. For he had perfect science of stones, metals, plants, and fishes, yet we nowhere read that he imposed names upon these things: — It must nevertheless be observed that three things are to be excepted from this general science which I contend was in Adam: First indeed, he did not know all future contingents. Secondly, certainly and evidently he did not know the arcanum and secrets of hearts, for both of these cognitions lie hidden even from the Angels. Finally thirdly, he did not have science of all the present individuals of each species: for he did not know all the individuals of fishes, nor every number of grains of sand, or of stones: for cognition of this kind neither pertains to the perfection of the human intellect, nor contributed to the perfection and felicity of the state of innocence.

You will ask: Whether Adam excelled the other men in wisdom?

I assert: that he did; since first he had a greater amplitude of science; for he knew all natural things, which has been granted to no one hitherto. Next he had a more excellent mode of knowing; for others know many things only by probable reasoning, or not from causes but from effects, or not by ostensive demonstration but only by that which leads to impossibility: but Adam held perfect cognition of each thing and from its proper causes. Finally thirdly, he had a more firm immobility of science: for in the state of innocence science could not be lost, neither through long cessation from act, nor through corruption of the interior sense, nor through forgetfulness, as sometimes happens in other mortals.

Nor does it matter that Holy Scripture makes Solomon wiser than all men who had gone before him, and who were to come after him: for thus God speaks to Solomon in 3. Kings, cap. 3.: I have given thee a wise and understanding heart, insomuch that there hath been no one like thee before thee, nor shall arise after thee. For thence it is not concluded that Solomon was wiser than Adam: otherwise it would be permitted to infer that he also surpassed in wisdom Christ the Lord, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge: which certainly no believer would admit. Therefore the aforesaid words of Scripture signify only either that Solomon was wiser than all those who acquired wisdom for themselves by study, labor, and art, among whose number Adam is not to be reckoned: or that he was wiser than all, not indeed men, but Kings and princes, as he himself indicates near the end of the first chapter of Ecclesiastes: I, he says, am become great, and have surpassed in wisdom all that were before me in Jerusalem: or finally he is said to be wiser than all those who at that time were accustomed to be called wise: which is indeed signified in 3. Kings, cap. 5. in these words: The wisdom of Solomon surpassed the wisdom of all the Orientals and Egyptians, and he was wiser than all men: wiser than Ethan the Ezrahite, and Heman, and Chalcol, and Dorda, sons of Mahol etc... And he discoursed upon trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh out of the wall: and he discoursed upon beasts, and birds, and creeping things, and fishes, and they came from all peoples to hear the wisdom of Solomon.

Second Conclusion. — Moreover Adam in the state of innocence had cognition of supernatural things.

This is sufficiently gathered both from the preceding Conclusion, wherein it was proved that he was constituted in a most perfect state as to body and soul: and therefore it was necessary that he have a most excellent cognition of all things, such as that whereby supernatural things are known: and from the following Article, wherein it will be proved that he was formed with sanctifying grace, of which faith is as it were the foundation: For it is impossible, says St. Paul to the Hebrews 11., to please God without faith: But faith is a cognition of supernatural things; for it is defined by the same Apostle, ibidem, as the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.

Moreover this truth is urged by a theological reason: for Adam had been founded by God principally on account of a supernatural end rather than a natural one: therefore just as in order that he might attain his natural end, the science of natural things was struck into him from the beginning, much more was it consonant that he be instructed in the cognition of supernatural things, whether through faith, or through contemplation, whereby he might attain his supernatural end: therefore it must be concluded with Hugh of St. Victor, lib. 1. De Sacramentis, parte 6. cap. 12: Man therefore knew his Creator: not with that cognition which is perceived outwardly from hearing alone, but with that which is rather ministered inwardly through inspiration. Not indeed with that whereby God is now sought by believers through faith while absent: but with that whereby He was then more manifestly discerned through the science of present contemplation.

But of what supernatural things he had attained cognition, it is uncertain to us. Probably, however, it seems that five genera of supernatural things were known by him: First indeed, he knew that supernatural rewards were laid up in the heavens for just men serving God holily and piously; and therefore he knew God as remunerator in the order of glory and eternal beatitude. For, as St. Paul writes to the Hebrews 11.: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Hence without doubt he knew that he had been founded for a supernatural end; since when he had been made perfectly endowed with the use of reason and free will, and able from the beginning to act well or ill, it was most fitting that his ultimate end should straightway become known to him: that he might know to what he ought to refer all his goods and himself. Thence he knew also all the means necessary for attaining that supernatural end, such as sanctifying grace, the three Theological Virtues, which cannot proceed from us, nor be acquired by our own powers, but must be gratuitously given by God. — Secondly, almost all Theologians agree that Adam in the state of innocence distinctly knew the mystery of the most holy Trinity, as St. Epiphanius affirms at the beginning of the book Panarius haereses. And truly indeed; for it was not consonant that the first man, heaped with such great goods, both natural and supernatural, should be ignorant of the mystery of the Trinity; especially since this mystery was indicated in the very formation of Adam himself in these words: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and afterwards God Himself said before Adam: Behold Adam is become as one of us. — Thirdly, he also knew the future Incarnation of the Son of God, as the Subtle Doctor affirms, teaching that although Adam had not sinned, nevertheless the Son of God would have become incarnate. St. Prosper adds in cap. 1. of the first part of De promissionibus Dei, et praedictionibus, that the union of Christ with the Church was also known to Adam himself: which Adam himself indeed signified in 2. Genesis uttering concerning his wife: Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: which words St. Paul adapts to the union of Christ with the Church in Ephesians, c. 5., subjoining: This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ, and in the Church. — Fourthly, also it is not improbable that Adam knew the fall of the Angels, who on account of pride were cast down from heaven and hurled into Tartarus: for this cognition greatly profited Adam, both unto humility and unto observance of the commandments of God, namely that he might avoid so tremendous a judgment: which Ecclesiasticus, cap. 17., indeed seems to signify, where among various gifts granted by God to the First Parents he also places the fact that he showed them his judgments. — Finally fifthly, Adam had perfect cognition of himself: for, as Hugh of Victor writes in the place cited, it was fitting that man from his first formation should have perfect cognition of himself, inasmuch as he should acknowledge both the debt of his obedience toward a superior, and not be ignorant of the debt of his providence toward an inferior. For this was to acknowledge himself: his condition, and order, and due, whether above him, or in himself, or below him, not to be ignorant: to understand of what sort he had been made, and how he ought to walk, what to do, what likewise to guard against. This whole was to acknowledge himself. If man had not had the cognition and discernment of these things, he would not have known himself, nor would he afterwards have stood guilty of transgression of them, if he had not previously been illuminated unto their cognition. But if it is asked, whether man then from the beginning had cognition of those things which were to come about concerning him, that is, whether he foresaw his fall and ruin, and all the other evils which passed first into himself, afterwards through him into all who were from him: and similarly whether he foresaw the goods which he would have had, if he had persevered in obedience; this seems altogether probable and consequent, that what pertained to instruction and the form of right living was of greater moment, that things to be done should be indicated to him rather than that future things should be foretold to him. For it would seem entirely to diminish the liberty of his arbitrium and the purity of his obedience, if man himself before merit were said to be prescient of future things: because he could neither hope for good things with a prescience of evils; nor, with a prescience of good things, would he have feared evils to come. Therefore for this reason it is judged more fitting, that the first man received science and precept of those things indeed which were to be done: but prescience of those things which were to come he had not, that his arbitrium might stand free toward either side. Thus Hugh. — This very thing St. Augustine confirms, lib. 11. De Genesi ad litteram, cap. 18., where concerning the first man existing in Paradise he inquires: If he was prescient of his future sin and of the divine vengeance, whence could he be blessed? Therefore drawn into Paradise he was not blessed. But if he was not prescient of his own future sin: therefore through this ignorance, either uncertain of that same beatitude: and how already believed blessed? Or certain by false hope, not by science, and how not foolish? He answers: But nevertheless of man still constituted in an animal body, to whom the fellowship of the angels was still to be given obediently serving, and the change of body from animal to spiritual, we can understand blessed life after a certain mode, even though he was not such as they were to whom the Apostle says: you who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the Spirit of lenity, watching thyself, lest thou also be tempted. Nevertheless not absurdly nor unworthily do we say that they were already blessed in this very thing, that they were spiritual, not only in body, but also strong in hope of faith, patient in tribulation. How much more, therefore, and in a more ample mode was man in Paradise blessed before sin, though uncertain of his own future fall, who so rejoiced in hope on account of the future reward of change, that there was no tribulation for which patience had to serve in enduring it? For although, not by vain presumption certain of the uncertain like a fool, but by hope not unfaithful, before he apprehended that life, wherein most certain of eternal life itself he was going to be, he could exult, as it is written, with trembling and exultation, much more abundantly in Paradise than the saints in these lands, he was blessed in a certain inferior mode than in that eternal life of the saints supercelestial angels, yet not in none.

But whether the cognition of supernatural and divine things which Adam had in the state of innocence was more sublime and clearer than faith, though it was more interior and more obscure than the cognition of the same things through the light of glory; so that that light which Adam had was in some mode a medium between the light of faith and the light of glory: Hugh of Victor seems to affirm ibidem cap. 12., saying: it must nevertheless be known, that that first cognition of man which he had of his Creator, we truly say to be greater and more certain than that cognition which now consists in faith alone: so also that which will afterwards be revealed manifestly in the excellence of divine contemplation, we must confess it to be less. Man therefore, though supreme, knew his Creator, yet not so excellently, as he ought afterwards to have known, if he had persevered: for as the disobedience of man took away much of the first cognition through subsequent ignorance: so to that same cognition, if man had persevered in obedience, much would have been added through subsequent revelation. Here Hugh. Thence St. Bonaventure in 2. dist. 23. qu. 3. art. 2. qu. 3. says, that truly the cognition of the state of innocence is midway between the cognition of the state of glory and the state of misery, as also the place of Paradise is midway between this vale of misery and the heavenly Fatherland: and as earthly Paradise holds more with earth than with Heaven, so the cognition of Adam or the state of innocence is more conformable to the cognition of the present state than of the future. Whence in the state of glory alone will God be seen immediately, and in His substance, so that there will be no obscurity there: but in the state of innocence, and of lapsed nature, God is seen through a medium mirror, but differently: because in the state of innocence God was seen through a clear mirror: for there was no cloud of sin in the soul: but in the state of misery He is seen through a mirror obscured by the sin of the first man, and He is now seen the same through a mirror, and in an enigma. For an enigma, as St. Augustine says in the book De Trinitate, is an obscure similitude. Thus St. B... — But this cognition which Adam had in the state of innocence was so sublime and excellent that, refreshed by the contemplation of heavenly things, his mind was often rapt into ecstasy: which indeed the holy Fathers explain lucidly, weighing those words of Genesis 2.: The Lord God sent a sleep upon him: or as the Septuagint render it, he mingled ecstasy: whence St. Augustine De Genesi ad litteram, lib. 9. cap. 19.: That ecstasy, he says, which God sent upon Adam so that, lulled to sleep, he might slumber, is rightly understood to have been sent by God, that his very mind through ecstasy might become partaker as it were of the angelic court, and entering into the sanctuary of God might understand the last things: finally awaking as it were a prophet full, when he saw the woman his wife brought to him with the rib, he straightway uttered that which the Apostle commends as a great document: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh, etc.; which words, since Scripture itself testifies they were spoken by the first man, the Lord at length declares in the Gospel that God had spoken, that hence we might understand that on account of the ecstasy which had preceded in Adam, he could not speak divinely as a Prophet.