Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

ADAM is in truth our Prince, the beginning of our race, and of our guilt, says mellifluous Bernard: for that first Sower and Parent of men derived upon the whole human race, together with its degenerate nature, the entire flood of sin by vitiated propagation, and introduced it; for, saith the Apostle, as by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. Rom. 5. Our Theological dissertation therefore proceeds by a straight step, when, after the crime of our First Parents has been laid open, and the divine chastisement inflicted upon them set forth, it descends to uncover the sins of the rest of men: and above all the head of all sins, which is therefore called Original; either because it is the fountain and origin of the others: or because by origin itself, that is, by natural generation, it is transfused into us: or — which I judge the more fitting account to give — because it took its rise from the first Parent and origin of mankind, and was derived upon all his posterity as from a poisonous fountain and a vitiated root. For which cause Ignatius calls it Iniquity: Irenaeus, the Handwriting which Adam wrote: St. Chrysostom, Radical sin: Cyprian, the contagion of ancient death: Dionysius, the habit of dissimilitude from God ingenerated in man: others again an Hereditary stain, or that defilement, the Handwriting of death, and the mark of irregularity, which everyone propagated from Adam contracts, whereby he becomes illegitimate to receive and obtain the sacred order of Angels, as our Maioronius sweetly speaks. — But how necessary, and of how great weight and moment the determination of the present controversy is, hence appears, that from the assertion of original sin the knowledge of several Articles of faith is drawn out and confirmed; for, saith St. Augustine, book 1. against Julian, chapter 2., they are those wherein sometimes even the most learned and best defenders of the Catholic rule do not accord among themselves while the fabric of faith remains safe, and the one says something better and more certain than the other concerning the same matter. Now this, with which we are at present occupied, pertains to the very foundations of faith. Whosoever labours to shake in Christian faith what is written,

by a man death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive, labouring to take away the whole that we believe in Christ. Hence in the book On original sin, having proposed in chapter 20. various questions which may be discussed and agitated on either side without peril of error and heresy, he concluded at last, chapter 24.: But in the cause of two men, through the one of whom we were delivered over under sin, through the other we are redeemed from sins: through the one we were precipitated into death, through the other we are set free unto life: of whom the one lost us in himself by doing his own will, not his who made him: the other made us his own in himself, not by doing his own will, but his by whom he was sent: in the cause therefore of these two men proper Christian faith consists.

Wherefore every effort must be spent upon deciding and elucidating the matter of the present controversy; and that we may execute it in a congruent order, we subjoin the five following Questions: whereof the First will disclose whether there be original sin. The Second, what it is. The Third, how it is transmitted. The Fourth, what miseries and calamities it has brought upon the whole human race. The Fifth, by what punishments, after this life, it is punished.

MOST GRAVE certainly, and such as long and sorely vexed the Church, is the present Question; for various heretics of old existed, and exist even now, who, blinking in meridian light, affirm that no burden has truly been transfused from the First Parents of mankind into their posterity, contracted by origin and propagation; that these may appear more evident,

Note 1. That although very many think Carpocrates to have been the primary impugner of original sin, yet the concurrent opinion of others is that Rufinus was the first discoverer of this unclean fountain and error; who, as Caelestius testified before the Fathers of the Council of Carthage, taught that there is no transduction of sin from Parents into little ones. For, as St. Augustine relates, book On original sin, chapter 3., where he copies out the acts of the aforesaid Council, when Caelestius had been asked whether he had said, That the sin of Adam had harmed him alone, and not the human race: and had answered that he was in doubt concerning the traduction of sin, because he had heard certain Catholic Priests denying it: being asked again by Paulinus the Deacon who those were, he answered, the holy Priest Rufinus at Rome, who abode with St. Pammachius. I heard him saying that there is no traduction of sin. From that Rufinus therefore Pelagius likely imbibed this error, as well as others, so that what the one spread abroad secretly, the other proclaimed openly. For although Pelagius before the Fathers of the Palestinian Synod pronounced Anathema against those who hold, That the sin of Adam harmed him alone, and not the human race: and that Infants are in that state in which Adam was before his prevarication, as St. Augustine relates in several places, chiefly in the book On original sin, chapter 12.: yet he said these things, saith the same, chapter 13., lest the Catholic Synod should be deceived, or the new heretic condemned. For, as he adds, chapter 15., when the disciples of Pelagius asked him why he had pronounced such an Anathema; he answered that he had condemned those propositions because, as he himself says, Not upon the first man only, but also upon the human race did that first sin bring harm: not by propagation, but by imitation; that is, saith St. Aug., not because he drew from him any vice, since from him they were propagated, but because they imitated him first sinning, since afterwards they sinned; by which craftiness, saith c. 21., he so much the more covertly deceived the Judges, as he expounded it so much the more cunningly. But, saith St. Augustine in the same place c. 2., Caelestius stood yet more freely in this error, so much so that neither in the Episcopal judgment at Carthage would he condemn those who say that the sin of Adam harmed him alone, and not the human race: and that infants who are born are in that state in which Adam was before his prevarication: And in the city of Rome in his little book, which he gave to the most blessed Pope Zosimus, he thus asserted more expressly, that original sin binds no one of the little ones. And Julianus defended this error above all most keenly, having written many books on this matter against St. Augustine, as will be shown more fully below.

Note 2. That the errors of the Pelagians touching the present controversy are contained especially in these five propositions: whereof the First affirmed that Adam had harmed himself alone, nor had by his crime shaken human nature or his posterity: the Second, that little ones contract no fault and punishment on Adam's part in their propagation: the Third, that baptism is not necessary to men for the remission of sins, but only that they be reborn in Christ and obtain an hereditary right to the kingdom of Heaven; whence Pelagius was wont to say, Infants dying without baptism, whither they go not, I know: whither they go, I know not, that is, saith St. Augustine, relating these words in the book On original sin, he did not consent: the Fourth, they asserted diseases, death, and the other calamities and straits of our nature not to be effects of original sin, but mere defects and necessities of human nature: the Fifth finally, they taught concupiscence, or the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, to be neither evil of punishment nor evil of fault; but a good of nature itself, fitting, and a necessary incentive unto the propagation of the human race, which flourished in Adam even in the state of innocence before sin.

Note 3. That all these erroneous opinions, long since buried, were in later centuries recalled forth from the abyss of darkness into light through various errors. For the Anabaptists taught therefore that little ones ought not to be baptized, not only because they must first be taught than regenerated, but also because they were defiled by no stain of sin. Before them had shone forth the Armenii, and Ilbigenses, as St. Antoninus testifies in the Summa of Theology part 3. title 12.; and likewise the Albanenses, as Alphonsus a Castro, Bernardus Luthenburgensis, and Prateolus teach: whom Sanderus undeservedly confounds with the Albigenses, Heresy 151. for the Albanenses flourished in the time of Leo the Third Pontiff, and Constantine the Sixth Emperor about the Year of the Lord 796.; the Albigenses truly in the time of Innocent the Third Pontiff, and Frederick the Second Emperor. Before these had shone Peter Abaillardus; for he, as St. Bernard writes, Epist. 109., did not rightly feel concerning the sin of origin, teaching, as the same Epistle 109. relates, that Christ came not into the world, nor suffered and died, except that He might teach and instruct us by word and example. Thence St. Bernard gathers that Abaillardus judged that Adam harmed us only by a perverse example unto sinning, and that infants, who are not capable of institution and examples, neither perished in Adam, nor are called through Christ. But as touching the punishments and natural calamities arising from original sin, very many Reformers confess indeed that they arise from the sin of Adam: yet that they suppose no crime in his posterity. So judged Zuinglius, Iacobus Faber in the Commentaries chapter 5. upon Romans, and in the Apology for the same commentaries; where he teaches that we draw nothing from Adam save an obligation unto death. The same equally judged Erasmus, as Suarez proves in many places, chapter 2. On original sin. —

The same most pestilent error certain men of our own days labour to renew, the Socinians namely, who, that they may evacuate the grace of Christ, and His merit and satisfaction, impiously snarl that the blood of Him shed upon the cross conduces nothing at all to the expiation of original sin, which, say they, is none at all, and a wholly vain figment. That therefore we may meet their impiety, the following must be defended and confirmed according to our strength

Single Conclusion. — Truly there exists original sin, or that which, commutatively by origin and vital propagation, committed by Adam the first Parent as it were the head of the whole human race, thence flows over upon posterity as into the members. This is of faith, and is proved by various arguments, which, that they may appear more evident and efficacious, it pleases to propose and weigh singly under the following Paragraphs.

§ 1. — Original sin is proved by the plain oracles of holy Scripture. — First indeed from that of Genesis 17. The male, whose flesh of his foreskin shall not be circumcised, that soul shall be destroyed out of his people, because he hath made void my covenant: and hereupon, saith St. Augustine, lib. 16. De Civit. Dei, cap. 27. Because circumcision was the sign of regeneration, not undeservedly is the generation damned for the Original sin whereby first the testament of God was dissipate, unless regeneration deliver. For, as the same saith lib. On orig. Sin, c. 30. If the justice of so horrible a punishment be sought, will not all that argumentation of these Pelagians concerning free will, and the laudable soundness and purity of nature, however subtle it be, rebounded and contrary, leap asunder? For what evil, I ask, has the infant committed by his own will, that others being negligent and not circumcising him, he himself should be damned with so severe damnation, that that soul perish out of its people? He subjoins c. 31. Whence then is that most lost Infant rightly punished, unless because he pertains to the mass of perdition, and is justly understood to be born of Adam, damned by the obligation of the ancient debt, unless thence he had been freed not according to debt, but according to grace? — Secondly, the same stands from that of Psalm 50. Behold in iniquities I was conceived, and in sins my mother conceived me. And likewise from that of Job 14., where according to the version of the Seventy we read: No one is clean from filth, nor the Infant whose life is of one day upon the earth. Wherein certainly nothing is more illustrious for proving this truth: for if no one is clean from filth, nor the Infant of one day, assuredly there is some sin which is contracted by natural propagation itself. Nor does the Vulgate differ from that version, while it renders: Who can make clean him that is conceived of unclean seed? is it not thou only? For indeed if God alone can make clean a man conceived of unclean seed, it follows that from conception itself man is unclean with the uncleanness of sin; both because to God alone is attributed that He can cleanse from it: and also because it speaks of that filth by reason of which man must be led unto judgment, as appears from the preceding words: and dost thou think it meet to open thy eyes upon such a one, and to bring him into judgment with thee? Both the aforesaid testimonies of Job and David Jerome and Augustine use for proving Original sin. Jerome indeed upon those words of Job, This little verse, saith he, sets forth the cause of the whole human race: as in Job, even if he be of one day upon the earth he cannot be clean from the filth of sin. But he is conceived, and is born in Original sin, which is drawn from Adam, but is cleansed by baptism through the grace of God. But the verse of the Psalmist is thus weighed by St. Augustine: What is it that he says himself was conceived in iniquity, unless because iniquity is drawn from Adam? Also with that iniquity the bond of death itself is joined: no one is born save drawing punishment, drawing the merit of punishment. — Thirdly above all this truth is proved from that to the Romans 5. By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. From which this argument can be deduced: by one man entered into this world a certain sin, which made all men sinners, and thereby obnoxious to death: but such a sin cannot be actual, that is, committed by actual will, since even infants are obnoxious to death, and often times without number die before they have done anything good or evil by their own will: therefore that sin, through which they become obnoxious to death, must needs be contracted by origin itself. It is confirmed from the following words; for the Apostle subjoins: As by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so also by the obedience of one many shall be constituted just, properly namely sinners, as properly just, as sin reigned unto death, so also grace may reign by justice unto life eternal through Jesus Christ our Lord. Nor ought it to move anyone that the Apostle said, many, as though not all are constituted sinners; both because by many are understood all who are born of Adam, who truly are many: for it is not infrequent in Scripture that all be signified by many, which St. Augustine proves On Genesis chapters 17. and 22.; in the former of which God said to Abraham: Father of many nations have I constituted thee: in the latter truly: in thy seed shall all nations be blessed: concerning which words, saith St. Aug., it has been shown that the same all are many, and the same nations all: so also when it has been said, by one sin passed into all, and afterwards by the disobedience of one many were constituted sinners, they themselves are many who are also all. Then because not all simply have been constituted sinners by Adam: since neither Eve, nor Christ, nor blessed Virgin were stained by Adam's sin.

The Pelagians answered 1. To that testimony of the Apostle, that indeed truly sin entered into the world through one man, not by propagation, but by imitation; so that the first Parent opened to his posterity the way of sinning, and by his example enticed them unto sin. — But to this excuse St. Augustine thus shuts the approach, lib. On the merits and remission of sins, chapter 9. If the Apostle, he saith, had brought forward to commemorate that sin which entered into this world not by propagation, but by imitation, he would have said its prince to be not Adam, but the devil, of whom it is written, first of John 3., the devil sinneth from the beginning; of whom also it is read in the book of Wisdom 2., But by the envy of the devil death came into the world: For because that death came thus from the devil into men, not because they had been propagated from him, but because they had imitated him, he immediately subjoins: but they imitate him who are on his part. Wherefore the Apostle, when he commemorated that sin and death, which had passed from one unto all by propagation, placed as its prince him from whom the propagation of the human race took its beginning. — Moreover the Apostle comprehends not only adults, but even little ones; since even little ones are obnoxious to death, which he teaches entered through sin, and is the punishment and effect thereof, teaching universally, affirming: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned: but into little ones Adam's sin did not pass by imitation, since before the use of reason they cannot imitate it by sinning: therefore it must be confessed the Apostle speaks not of the passage of sin by imitation, but by propagation. — Finally St. Paul affirms that the sin of Adam is so transmitted to posterity, as the justice of Christ to the regenerate: As therefore, saith St. Augustine in the same place, he in whom all shall be made alive, besides that he offered himself to them as an example of justice to be imitated, gives also the most hidden grace of his Spirit to the faithful, whilst latently he infuses it even into little ones: so also he in whom all die, besides that he is to them, who transgress the command of the Lord by will, an example of imitation, with hidden stain also of carnal concupiscence corrupted in himself all coming of his stock.

The Pelagians answered 2. By sin indeed the Apostle here signifies that sin which is contracted by origin, yet not properly, but metonymically speaking; so that his sense was, that by one man sin entered into this world, that is, one man sinning, a certain malady and proneness unto sinning, mortality, and other miseries entered into the world: for these effects of sin the Apostle called sin metonymically: so Zuinglius expounds this place. — On the contrary, in the aforesaid words the Apostle manifestly distinguishes sin from its punishment, such as death is: asserts both to have entered into the world by one man, namely Adam; and deservedly indeed; for if by sin he understood its own punishment when he says: sin entered into this world, and by sin death, the sense would be, that death entered into this world, and by death death; which locution would certainly be altogether absurd. Add that although metonymically sin be sometimes taken for the punishment of sin in Scripture, in which sense the Apostle calls concupiscence sin; nowhere nevertheless does Scripture affirm anyone to sin, or to be a sinner, for the sole cause or punishment of sin: here truly the Apostle expressly pronounces, In whom all have sinned. The Pelagians answered finally, that sin in those words of the Apostle does not signify the original sin of the sons of Adam, but their actual sin, which is said to have entered into the world through one man, because then first sin began to be in the world, when it was in Adam, who was a part of the world. Thus also Zuinglius expounds it in his book On Baptism. — On the contrary, if this interpretation held place, it would follow that not through one man, but through one Angel, sin entered into this world, since the Angel existed as part of the world, and sinned, before man. But if Zuinglius says the Apostle must be understood of the corporeal world, and of its bodily parts, still it will not be true what the Apostle says, that sin entered into this world through one man: for Eve sinned before Adam, and she sinning, sin entered into this world: therefore the Apostle speaks not of that actual sin alone of the first Parent having entered into this world, but also of its transference unto posterity, not by imitation, but by propagation. — Finally the Apostle insinuates the same truth from that passage to the Ephesians, chapter 2.: We were by nature children of wrath even as others, that is, from the beginnings of our nature, or from our conception and nativity, we were liable to the wrath and vengeance of God. But no one is liable to the wrath and vengeance of God except by reason of sin: therefore we truly inherit the sin of our first Parent from his propagation.

The Iuliani answered, the patron of the Pelagians, that the saying of the Apostle could by force of speech and the Greek text be thus rendered: We were quite children of wrath. And truly St. Jerome does not reject this interpretation, although he more approves and follows the other. — But that reading in which "of nature" is to be preferred St. Augustine proves from the supreme consensus of all Latin codices: Oughtest thou not, saith he, to have been admonished hence, before thou didst defend the Catholic faith against them: because scarcely is a Latin codex found, if it do not now begin with us to be emended, or rather changed into a faulty one, wherein "of nature" is not written? Which antiquity of the Interpreters ought certainly to have done more blindly, unless this antiquity were also of the faith, which your novelty desires to resist. (Lib. 6. Contra Iulianum, cap. 10).

§ 2. — The same truth is proved from the Councils. — First indeed from the Palestinian Council, in which the Pelagian Heresy, already published by Caelestius the disciple of Pelagius, was proscribed and condemned; for when all the articles had been recited wherein were contained all the errors of Pelagius and Caelestius, whose principal ones St. Augustine relates in the book On the acts of Pelagius, chapters 18. and 30., Pelagius being asked by the Fathers of the Synod what he thought of them, said: I anathematize those who so hold, or have ever so thundered: with which words however he mocked the too great credulity of the Fathers, and indeed even St. Augustine himself, who, as he says in the book On original sin, chapter 11., I was rejoicing that by that answer of Pelagius that question was concluded safe: and it seemed to me most openly confessed to him, that original sin is in little ones: by anathematizing those who believed that the sin of Adam harmed him alone, and not also the human race, and who opined little ones to be in that state in which that first man was before his prevarication. But afterwards when I had read his four books, and had found the man still thinking against the Catholic faith concerning little ones, I began to wonder more, both at his imprudence in the Ecclesiastical judgment, and his mendacity in so great a Question.... For in the same books he both speaks against the passage of sin from Adam into little ones, and glories in the acts of the Palestinian Synod; where he was thought quickly to have condemned those who so hold, and by absolving while deceiving he stole them away. — Secondly, the same truth was defined in the second Council of Milevum under Innocent the First, in which by Canon 1. this sentence concerning original sin is handed down. It hath pleased, that whosoever denies little ones newly taken from their mothers' wombs to be baptized, or says that they are baptized indeed unto the remission of sins, but contract nothing from Adam of original sin, which is expiated by the laver of regeneration: whence it follows, that in them the form of Baptism, unto the remission of sins, must be understood not true, but false, let him be anathema. — Thirdly, the same did the second Council of Orange define under Felix the Fourth against the Semipelagians and Massilians, in which by Canon 2. it is defined: If anyone asserts that Adam's prevarication harmed himself alone, and not his posterity, or certainly affirms that only the death of the body, which is the punishment of sin, but not also sin itself, which is the death of the soul, passed through one man into the whole human race, he will do injustice to God, contradicting the Apostle saying: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death passed into all men, in whom all have sinned. — Fourthly, the same was determined in the Florentine Council in the decree of Eugene the Fourth Supreme Pontiff, wherein it is defined that the souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or in original sin alone, descend immediately into hell, to be punished however with disparate pains. — Finally, this same was determined most clearly of all by the Council of Trent, Session 5. Canon 2. and following; where it repeats word for word and renews the decrees of the Councils of Milevum and Orange, thus writing: If anyone asserts that Adam's prevarication harmed himself alone, and not his posterity etc. And Can. 3: If anyone asserts that this sin, which is one by origin, and transfused into men by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one proper to him, and is taken away either by the forces of human nature, or by any other remedy than by the merit of the one Saviour our Lord Jesus Christ, etc. let him be anathema.

§ III. — The same is proved by the authority of the SS. Fathers. — Most constant among the SS. Fathers, and concordant, was ever the opinion concerning the transfusion of the sin of Adam into posterity: for saith St. Augustine book 3. On the merits and remission of sins, chapter 7. From the beginning even to this present time, in which this novelty strives to be: this concerning original sin was guarded with such constancy among the faith of the Church, that by those who treated the divine eloquia it was rather brought forward as most certain for refuting other things, than that it should be attempted to be refuted by anyone as false. Which indeed he proves with very many sentences of the SS. Fathers, which St. Augustine himself selected and produced, as may be seen in book 1. against Julian, chapters 3. and 7.

There can be brought forward in the first place St. Dionysius the Areopagite book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 6., where he ascribes the sin of the first man to the whole of human nature, not only according to punishment, but also with respect to guilt: Human nature, saith he, at first foolishly fallen away from divine benefits, took up on account of its merit the various passages of life, and the end of corruptible death. Indeed that pernicious defection from celestial goodness, and the prevarication of the sacred law in Paradise, whereby of its own accord, lulled by blandishing and hostile frauds of the adversary, it had knocked out the seat of the vital yoke, it handed over to things contrary to divine goods. By which he teaches that human nature therefore lacked the divine benefits bestowed upon it in its first formation, because voluntarily deficient from God it had knocked out the vital yoke by the frauds of Satan. — Secondly, there comes forth St. Ignatius, who in his Epistle to the Trallians thus speaks: Be ye therefore girt with meekness, imitators of the passions of Christ, and of his love, wherewith he loved us, giving himself for us that he might cleanse us by his blood from ancient impiety. — Thirdly, St. Justin Martyr, who in his dialogue with Trypho says: That He came not for Himself we hold ascertained; for neither was there need to Him of the washing of baptism, nor of the advent of the Spirit in the species of a dove, as neither did He sustain to be born, and crucified on account of indigence of such an office: but for the cause of the human race, because He considered sin through Adam unto death, and the fraud of the seduction of the serpent — that meanwhile I may pass over His own guilt while He acted ill for Himself. — Fourthly, Irenaeus of Lyons

First can be brought forward St. Dionysius the Areopagite, book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. 6, where he ascribes the sin of the first man to the whole of human nature, not only as regards punishment, but even as regards guilt: Human nature, he says, at the beginning foolishly fallen away from the divine benefits, on its merit he took upon himself the manifold passibilities of life, and the end of corruptible death. For indeed that pernicious defection from the celestial goodness, and the transgression of the sacred law in Paradise, whereby of its own will, soothed by the flattering and hostile frauds of the adversary, it had struck out the vital yoke, it handed down to things contrary to the divine goods. By which he teaches that human nature therefore lacked the divine benefits conferred upon it in its first formation, because willingly falling away from God it struck out the vital yoke by the frauds of Satan. — Secondly, there comes forward St. Ignatius, who in his Epistle to the Trallians speaks thus: You therefore girt with gentleness, imitators of your

Bishop, book 6, cap. 17. He destroyed, he says, the handwriting of our debt, fastening it to the cross: that as by the wood we were made debtors to God, so by the wood we receive the remission of the debt. And cap. 19. As, he says, the human race was bound over to death through a Virgin, so it is saved through a Virgin, the virginal disobedience being balanced by an equal scale against virginal obedience; for still, upon the sin of the first-formed man there succeeds, by the correction of the First-begotten, the rectitude of the serpent's craft by the simplicity of the dove, and we are loosed from those bonds by which we had been bound over to death. From these words St. Augustine, book 1 contra Iulianum, cap. 3, thus conjures him: Do you not see what the ancient man of God thinks of the ancient wound of the serpent? What of the similitude of the flesh of sin, by which the wound of the serpent in the flesh of sin is healed? What of the sin of the first-formed man, by which we had been bound? — Fifthly, Tertullian in the book *De Ani

§ IV. — The same truth is proved by theological reason. — First the Seraphic Doctor proves it, dist. 30, qu. 2, by a threefold reason drawn from the lack of the vision of God, the shamefacedness of reason, and the predominance of concupiscence. First indeed, the lack of the vision of God makes this manifest, because no one ought to be deprived of the eternal good for which he was made, unless he have in himself something by which he is unworthy to be presented to the divine aspect: and such a thing is nothing but guilt: if therefore all as many as are, are deprived of the vision of God unless they be reborn through the baptism of water, or of the Spirit; it is plain that all as many as are contract guilt from their origin. — Secondly, from the shamefacedness also of reason, this makes it manifest: for no one rationally blushes at those passions which he has from nature, unless they be in him through some fault: but every man naturally blushes at the motion of the genital members: from this therefore it is gathered, and man

The Subtle Doctor proves it secondly in 2 dist. 32, n. 8: Whosoever is propagated from Adam and lacks the original justice which he had received from God to be handed on to his posterity, is defiled by original sin: but all the posterity of Adam, unless prevented by a special divine privilege, lack that original justice: therefore, etc. The minor stands of itself by that experience whereby each one of us experiences himself to be stripped of those eminent gifts with which Adam had been illumined at the very beginning of his formation. The major the Doctor proves from that teaching of St. Anselm in book 1 De Conceptu Virginali, c. 27, who says: The voluntary desertion of justice which he committed does not accuse him, nor does the incapacity of receiving excuse the persons, as he declares in cap. 2: Because it made for itself that incapacity by deserting justice in the first Parents, in whom the whole nature was, and it is always debtor to have that power which it received for the observing of justice always. From which thus

who might sin less would be punished equally. It is plain from another quarter, from the divine law, whereby it is established that justice is propagated as it were naturally through the father not setting up an obstacle by sin, not indeed because the father would transfuse it, since it is a supernatural gift; but that God himself would cooperate with nature in the regular manner of giving justice to the one propagated, just as he now creates the intellectual soul for the perfectly organized body. So this Doctor.

It is proved thirdly from the necessity of baptism: for baptism is absolutely necessary for the remission of sin: but according to Apostolic tradition, as St. Dionysius teaches in the book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, in the last chapter, Origen Homilia 8 on Leviticus, Cyprian book 3, Epistle 3, and other Fathers of the Church, baptism is to be administered to infants; therefore it supposes in them sin to be washed away: not actual; therefore original. The major is proved: both from the words of Christ saying John 3: Unless a man be born again of Water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God: but why ought he to be reborn through grace, unless his generation had been corrupted through sin? And because those who are baptized were dead in sin, and through baptism rise again and walk in newness of life, as the Apostle says to the Romans 6: therefore those who are baptized suppose sin. For they who are baptized are cleansed and washed; Ephesians 5.

It is proved fourthly from the Redemption of Christ: for Christ the Lord underwent death not only for adults, but also for little ones: since St. Paul says 2 Corinthians 5: Christ died for all: but Christ suffered death only for those who, dead in sin, were to be vivified, as the Apostle signifies in the same place writing: if one died for all, then all were dead: therefore infants were dead in sin; otherwise Christ would not have died for them, and they would have been wholly without share in his Passion. Whosoever therefore, as St. Augustine says in the response to cap. 17 of book 2 against Julian, says that infants are free from that sin in which enmities were made, most certainly denies that they pertain to that reconciliation for the sake of which Christ was made mediator. He accordingly separates them also from that justification which takes place in the blood of Christ, for the shedding of which, when he commended it to be drunk, it was said to be for no other purpose than the remission of sins. Hence it follows that for infants not having sins the death of Christ profits nothing at all.

§5. — THE OBJECTIONS ARE PROPOSED AND SOLVED. 1. THOSE WHICH ARE SOUGHT FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE.

You will object 1. That of Ezekiel cap. 18: The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father: therefore those who draw their origin from Adam are not stained by his sin.

I answer 1. Ezekiel is to be understood of the personal sins of parents, which are not passed on to the offspring, and by reason of which sons are not subjected to divine vengeance unless by actually sinning they follow the wicked examples of their parents.

I answer 2. That Adam's transgression was also morally the iniquity of his posterity, who were constituted in him as in the head of human nature, and transgressed the law of God together with him. Hence St. Augustine says book 1 De peccatorum meritis, cap. 10: Certainly it is manifest that there are other sins proper to each, in which only those sin whose sins they are

I answer 3. St. Augustine, book 6 in Iulianum cap. 20, says that the aforesaid words of Ezekiel are prophetical, and that in them is promised the benefit of the New Testament and of the spiritual inheritance pertaining to the other world, whereby through regeneration the paternal handwriting was to be blotted out, so that the sin of the old Adam might no longer harm those who had put on the new Adam through baptism; for in this New Testament, as St. Augustine says, Through the blood of the Testator the paternal handwriting being destroyed, man begins by being born again not to be liable for his paternal debts, by which he had been bound in being born.

You will object 2. That word of the Apostle to the Romans 5, saying: As by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so also by the obedience of one shall many be constituted just: but not all are constituted just by this: therefore neither are all made unjust by that. Moreover the Apostle says significantly, many were constituted sinners, but he does not say all: therefore he holds that the posterity of Adam become sinners not by propagation but only by imitation of his sin.

To the first, I answer by denying the minor: for it is certain that through the obedience of Christ all are constituted just, since Christ was made obedient for all, and merited for all the means necessary for justification and salvation: therefore by the same reason that all are justified through Christ, who are spiritually reborn in him, so also all are constituted sinners through the disobedience of Adam, who are born from him and propagated from him.

To the second St. Augustine answers, book 6 contra Iulianum, cap. 21: by the many the Apostle means All, according to the customary phrase of Scripture: which he confirms from that of Genesis 17, where God says to Abraham: I have made thee father of many nations: yet Genesis 22 says: In thy seed shall all nations be blessed: concerning which St. Augustine says that the same all are shown to be the same many, and the same many the same all: But, he says, Scripture so spoke because there can be certain things that are all, which are not many: just as we call all the Gospels, and yet they are contained in a brief number, that is four: and again there can be some things many, yet not all, as we say many believe in Christ, yet not all believe. Hence among all those unto death through Adam, all unto life through Christ; because as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive: that is, from the first origin of the human race no one unto death except through Adam, and no one through Adam except unto death: and no one unto life except through Christ, and no one through Christ except unto life.

You will object 3. The same Apostle saying in the same place: Death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them who had not sinned in the similitude of the transgression of Adam: but to sin in the similitude of Adam's transgression would be to be stained with his sin: therefore it is false that all the posterity of Adam are defiled with his sin.

I deny the minor: For as St. Augustine says book 1 De peccatorum meritis, cap. 11, the sense of the Apostle is that death reigned even before the written law, or the times of Moses, over those also who did not sin actually, as Adam sinned, or, as St. Augustine says, Who had not yet with their own and proper will sinned as he did, but drew from him original sin, which is the form of what was to come: because in him was constituted the form of condemnation for his future posterity who were to be created from his propagation, that from one all might be born unto condemnation, from which nothing delivers except the grace of the Savior: therefore so far is original sin from being impugned thereby, that rather it is defended.

You will insist: The Apostle says in the same place that the grace of Christ abounded unto more than the sin of Adam abounded: therefore at least there are more who were not stained by the sin of Adam.

He answers in the same place that St. Augustine says that word many does not signify a comparison in that place, but is equivalent to the word all: For neither, he says, are more justified than are condemned: but it abounded far more: for Adam bewailed guilty from one offense; but Christ by his grace looses and forgives also those men who have added the offenses of their own will to that original one in which they were born: and so the sense is, that the grace of Christ was not limited only to washing away original sin, which is contracted from Adam; but also to wash away those which are afterwards actually committed; or that the grace of Christ is more powerful and efficacious to justify men than the sin of Adam was to stain them. Whence indeed the grace of Christ truly abounded unto far more than the sin of Adam; since the Blessed Virgin, free from original sin, was enriched and endowed most copiously with the grace of Christ. Eve likewise was not guilty of Adam's sin, nay she was the occasion of the sin itself, yet she was justified by the grace of Christ; for as St. Augustine says in the same place, The kingdom of death in any man whatsoever is destroyed only by the grace of the Savior,

You will object 4. That word of the Apostle 2 Corinthians 5: We must all be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that everyone may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil: therefore only those are to be damned who have committed their own sin.

I deny the consequence, for as St. Augustine argues most excellently, book 6 Contra Iulianum, cap. 10: Infants will be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, or they will not: if they will not be manifested, what does that sentence avail you, when it does not pertain to them (namely infants) whose cause is now being treated? but if they will be manifested, how shall each of them receive what he did, who did nothing, unless because there pertains to him what was done through the hearts and mouths of those doing it, whether they believe or believe not?... For how does he receive good so as to enter into the kingdom of God, if each receives what he did, unless because there pertains to the infant even what was done through another, that is, believed? As therefore what he believed pertains to him, that he may receive good, that is, obtain the kingdom of God; so there pertains to him also that he did not believe, that he may receive the judgment of condemnation, because that too is an Evangelical sentence saying: he that believeth not shall be condemned.... Whence therefore, however importunely you would not have the infant carry away evil from another's sin, and would have him carry away good from another's right deed, not any good whatsoever, but the kingdom of God: for it is another's, since he believed through another, just as

You will object 5. That word of the Apostle to the Romans 3: By the law is the knowledge of sin: where therefore there is no knowledge of the law, there neither can there be knowledge of sin: but where there is no knowledge of sin, there neither is transgression: and therefore neither can damnation be there. For Paul himself testifies to this Romans 1, saying: for where there is no law, neither is there transgression. Now therefore consider the force and power of these testimonies, which is so great that it utterly subverts all the commentaries of all the Theologians on original sin. For this disease cannot bring upon us damnation, which only then follows, when we have beheld the law set before our eyes, yet still impelled by this disease and the affection of corrupt nature, we transgress the law. Thus Zwinglius.

I answer, that the aforementioned consequence of Zwingli is null; for the Apostle does not say, "where there is no knowledge of the law, neither is there transgression," as Zwingli's collection would require; but "where there is no law, neither is there transgression," which is most certainly true; for no transgression can be feigned unless there be a law which is violated by transgressing. Next, Zwingli assumes as certain the very point at issue in the Question, namely that actual sin alone, which is transgression, is properly the sin by which God can damn men; this all Catholics flatly deny, and we proved the contrary above from open texts of Scripture. Equally false is what he supposes as certain, namely that there is no damnation where there is no transgression of the law; for the same Apostle says in Romans 9 that infants did neither good nor evil, and hence did not transgress the Law by their own will: in Romans 5 itself he writes: "As by the offence of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification." And to the Ephesians, 2, he affirms that we are all by nature children of wrath — that is, guilty by our very birth and propagation. Finally, we can assert that even infants are transgressors of the Law, according to that of Osee 6: "But they, like Adam, have transgressed the covenant; there have they dealt treacherously against me" — namely, in Paradise, where Adam violated the law given him by God, and in which, as in their head, all sinned and transgressed.

THE AUTHORITIES OF THE HOLY FATHERS WHO SEEM TO DENY ORIGINAL SIN ARE PROPOSED AND ANSWERED.

You will object 1. Clement of Alexandria, book 3 of the Stromata, near the end, where he says: "Let them tell us then where the infant that is born was formed, or how it fell under Adam's curse, since it has done nothing?" Therefore he judges infants not to be guilty of Adam's sin.

I deny the consequence: for it is not established whose words these are, whether Clement's own, or those of the heretics whom he attacks in the same place, who taught that marriage was to be rejected because generation was evil, seeing that infants, though stained by no act of their own, yet, as holy Job says, "are not clean from filth" — which Clement certainly indicates; for he immediately subjoins: "It remains therefore for them (it seems) consequently to say that generation is evil, not only that of the body, but also that of the soul." Therefore those heretics did not deny original sin, but rather affirmed it, in order that from that assertion they might reject marriage and establish their own error.

You will object 2. St. Ambrose, in his Commentary on chapter 5 of Romans: "The death of the dissolution of the body is when the soul is separated from the body. There is also another death, which is called the second, in Gehenna, which we do not suffer through sin, but acquire on occasion of our own sin; from which the good are immune, only so far as they are in hell below, but in the higher, as it were, in a balance; because they could not ascend into Heaven."

I answer 1. That this Commentary on the Apostle does not appear to be by St. Ambrose, but by some other Author contemporary with Ambrose; for he lived at the time of Pope Damasus, as he testifies in the Commentary on the third chapter of the former Epistle to Timothy. Secondly, to say that this Author, whoever he may be, does not deny original sin, but rather establishes it: for a little before, expounding the aforesaid words, explaining that text "in whom all have sinned," he says: "It is therefore manifest that all sinned in Adam as in a mass; for he himself, corrupted by sin, begat all those who were born under sin. And thus also all are sinners, because we are all from him."

You will object 3. St. Chrysostom, whom the Pelagians claimed as the chief patron of their error, because he seemed in various places to deny original sin, especially in the Epistle to Theophilus, where, having said: "Blessed be God, who alone worketh wonders, who made all things and adorned all things: behold, he now enjoys the serene brightness of liberty who a little before was held captive; they are about the Church who were wandering in pilgrimages, and they occupy the lot of justice who were shut up in the confinement of sin. For they are not only free, but also holy; not only holy, but also just; not only just, but also sons; not only sons, but also heirs; not only heirs, but also brethren of Christ; nay, not only brethren of Christ, but also co-heirs; not only co-heirs, but also members; not only members, but also a temple; not only a temple, but also an instrument of the Spirit" — he subjoins: "Such are the dignities of faith through baptism; but to many the grace of baptism seems to consist only in the remission of sins. We, however, have already reckoned ten honors of baptism. For this reason also we baptize infants, although they are not stained with sin; namely, that sanctity, justice, adoption, inheritance, and the brotherhood of Christ may be bestowed upon them."

St. Augustine answers, book 1, chapter 6 of Contra Iulianum, against Julian, who had objected that aforesaid authority: "Do you then dare so to set forth these words of St. John the Bishop, as if opposed to so many and such great sentences of his, and so to sever him from their most harmonious fellowship and make him an adversary to them? Far be it, far be it, to believe or say such an evil of so great a man. Far be it, I say, that John of Constantinople should resist, on the baptism of little ones and their deliverance from the paternal handwriting through Christ, so many and so great Bishops of his own, and above all Innocent of Rome, Cyprian of Carthage, Basil of Cappadocia, Gregory of Nazianzus, Hilary of Gaul, Ambrose of Milan." Then he expounds the aforesaid words, saying that according to the Greek idiom "sins" is read in the plural, not "sin" in the singular, so that the genuine Latin version would be: "Therefore also we baptize Infants, although not having sins." Whence St. Augustine subjoins: "Certainly it was not said that little ones are not stained with sin, or sins, because John then spoke when no one was pressing this Question; more securely will he speak when we are no longer disputing." — Further, even if it be read singularly "with sin," it must be understood of personal sin, as St. Augustine explains in the same place, saying: "John therefore, comparing parents with their elders, whose own sins are remitted in baptism, said that they had not sins." — Finally, in other codices, especially of the Paris edition of the year 1556, we read: "We baptize infants that they may not be stained with sin," that is, that they may be cleansed from sin — surely none other than original. But that St. Chrysostom did not attack original sin, but rather defended it, St. Augustine proves in the same place from several texts taken from him, especially from the same Epistle to Theophilus, where he says: "Christ came once, and found the instrument, the paternal handwriting, which Adam wrote. In the beginning he introduced the debt; we have increased the interest by later sins." Whereupon Augustine addresses Julian thus: "Do you hear a man Catholic in Faith, and learned, and able to teach, distinguishing the debt of the paternal handwriting, which adhered to us hereditarily, from those debts whose interest accrued through our own sins? Do you hear what is revealed to little ones in baptism, who have not yet contracted debts of their own, and yet could not be immune from the paternal handwriting?"

ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM REASON AND THEOLOGY ARE PROPOSED AND ANSWERED.

The Pelagians chiefly brought forward five arguments by which they assailed and attacked the assertion of original sin, as St. Augustine indicates in book 2 of Contra Iulianum, chapter 9. "Yours," he says, "are the arguments by which you say: If God creates men, they cannot be born evil together with Him; if marriage is a good, nothing evil arises from it; if all sins are remitted in baptism, those born of the reborn cannot draw original sin; if God is just, He cannot damn sins in the children while He forgives the parents their very own; if human nature is capable of perfect justice, it cannot have natural vices." But that the solutions of these objections may become more evident and easier, it pleases us to propose them, as well as others like them, one by one. Therefore:

You will object 1. God cannot be the artificer of evil: but He Himself is the author of all men who are born: therefore men being born cannot be evil, and hence neither infected with original sin.

St. Augustine answers, in the book De peccato originali, chapter 32, that two things must be distinguished in the procreation of men, namely nature and vice. "Together," he says, "both are propagated, both nature and nature's vice, one of which is good and the other evil. The one is taken from the bounty of the Creator; the other is drawn from the condemnation of origin. The cause of the one is the good will of the supreme God; of the other, the evil will of the first man. The one shows God the institutor of the creature; the other shows God the punisher of disobedience. Finally, Christ Himself, the very same, is the maker of man on account of creating the one, and is made man on account of healing the other." From which it follows that that evil, or original vice, must be referred not to God but to the disobedience of Adam as to its proper cause. It follows likewise that deliverance from this sin is not to be despaired of; for nature is not to be destroyed but perfected, that this disease may be cured. Which that heavenly physician can easily accomplish, who came to seek and to save that which was lost. Thence the same St. Augustine, book 2 against Julian, chapter 1: "Nor is perfection of virtue to be despaired of, through the grace of Him who can change and form nature vitiated from its origin."

You will object 2. A good tree cannot make evil fruits: but marriages are good: therefore from them evil children and sinners cannot be born.

St. Augustine answers 1., book 2 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, chapter 20: "Not only from wedlock but even from adultery something good is in children, according to the work of God by which they are created; but according to original sin they are born unto condemnation from Adam the first, not only if they are generated of adultery, but even if of wedlock, unless they be regenerated in Adam the second, who is Christ." Whence he concludes in the following chapter: "Rightly therefore have we said that the good of marriages cannot be accused on account of the original evil which is drawn thence, just as the evil of adultery cannot be accused on account of the man who is naturally born thence; because human nature which is born, whether of wedlock or of adultery, is the work of God; which, if it were evil, would not be to be generated; if it had no evil, would not be to be regenerated." And to conclude both in one word: "human nature, if it were evil, would not be to be saved; if no evil inhered in it, it would not be to be saved. Whoever therefore says that it is not good denies the good, confessing the Creator; but whoever denies that evil inheres in it mocks the merciful grace of the Saviour." Wherefore in men who are being born neither are adulteries to be excused on account of the good which is thence created by the good Creator; nor are marriages to be accused on account of the evil which is there to be healed by the merciful Saviour.

He answers 2. that chapter 26, the context of the Gospel aforesaid, is to be understood of two wills of men, namely the good and the bad; calling this good and that bad tree, because good works arise from a good will, and evil from an evil one. But if we set marriage down as a good tree, according to that Gospel similitude which he commemorated, we shall assuredly, on the contrary, set fornication down as an evil tree. He subjoins: "Wherefore if man is there called the fruit of marriage, as good from a good tree, doubtless man ought not to be born of fornication, for indeed an evil tree does not make good fruits." Moreover, if he should say that adultery ought not to hold the place of that tree, but rather human nature, of which man is born: so also here it will not be marriage that is the tree, but human nature, of which man is born. Nothing therefore does that Gospel similitude avail for this question, because marriages are not the cause of the sin which is drawn from the one being born and expiated in the one reborn; but the voluntary sin of the first man is the cause of the sin. Spouses therefore, whilst they beget children, propagate nature indeed corrupt and vitiated; but the guilt of that corruption must be referred not to themselves, but to the first man.

You will object 3. No one gives what he has not: but most parents, begetting children, no longer have original sin, seeing that it was expunged in them through baptism: therefore they cannot transfuse it into their children.

St. Augustine answers, book 3 of De peccatorum meritis, chapter 8 and following, that man regenerated in Christ, and thereby justified, does not beget carnal offspring according to that whereby he is regenerated, that is, according to the Spirit which he received in Christ; but according to that whereby he was born, that is, according to the flesh which he drew from Adam. Whence, having proposed this objection of the Pelagians — "but if Baptism cleanses that ancient offence, those who are born of two baptized persons ought to be free from sin: for they could not transmit to posterity what they by no means had" — he answers: "If the difficulty of refuting falsehoods and persuading truths resisted me among the dull and contentious on account of the obscurity of the natures of things, I would surely have recourse to examples which are in use and at hand, and would interrogate them in turn, that they might tell me how the sin which is cleansed through Baptism remains in those whom the baptized have begotten? They themselves would explain how the foreskin which is removed by circumcision remains in those whom the circumcised have begotten? how also chaff, which is separated by human labor with such diligence, remains in the fruit which is born from the purged grain? With these and such examples perhaps I would try to persuade both, that the sacraments of cleansing are superfluously believed applied to the sons of the cleansed, than that with right counsel the little ones of the baptized should be baptized: although it can happen that to a man having both seed, of death in the flesh and of immortality in the spirit, what harms his son generated of the flesh does not harm himself regenerated through the spirit; and what was cleansed in this one by remission should also be in that one, to be cleansed by a similar remission, as by circumcision, as by threshing and winnowing. But now, since we deal with those who confess that the sons of the baptized must be baptized, we act better thus, that we say:" (Then he presses the Pelagians thus:) "You who assert that sons ought to be born without sin of men cleansed from the stain of sin, why do you not add that in the same way it can be said of Christian parents that they ought to beget Christian sons?... What will you answer? Do you ask whether Christians are not born of Christians: save that generation does not make, but regeneration makes, Christians? Render therefore to yourselves this reason, that similarly of sins no one of you is born, but all are cleansed by being reborn. And hence to men equally cleansed, because the man who is born of reborn men is reborn, that he too may be cleansed. They could not [scil. could] parents transmit to posterity what they by no means had: not only as wheat chaff, and the foreskin from the circumcised; but also, as you yourselves say, the faithful transmit infidelity to posterity — which is now not of those manifest regenerated ones, but the vice of mortal seed, in that flesh they were generated. For even those little ones whom you command to be made faithful through the sacrament of the faithful, you do not deny to be born unbelievers from faithful parents."

He subjoins a similar answer in book 1 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, producing the example of the olive producing the wild olive. For thus he writes in chapter 19: "What is born of this concupiscence of the flesh, assuredly is born unto the world, not unto God. But one is born unto God when he is reborn of water and the Holy Ghost. The guilt of this concupiscence regeneration alone remits, which generation draws. Therefore let that which is generated be regenerated, because it cannot otherwise come to pass that what has been drawn be remitted. For that what has been remitted in the parent is drawn into the offspring is done in wondrous ways indeed, but nevertheless it is done. These things, invisible and incredible to unbelievers, but true, divine Providence provided in certain shrubs, that they might have some visible example. For why should we not believe that for this reason it was instituted that from the olive a wild olive be born? Ought it not to be believed that in some thing created for the uses of men the Creator provided and instituted what might serve as an example for the human race? It is wonderful therefore how, delivered from the bond of sin through grace, they nevertheless beget bound by the same bond, who must be delivered in the same manner: we confess, it is wonderful. But that the embryos of wild olives lie hidden even in the seeds of olives — when would this be believed, unless it were proved by experience? Therefore as a wild olive is begotten from the seed of a wild olive, and from the seed of an olive nothing but a wild olive, although between the wild olive and the olive there is the greatest difference: so from the flesh of a sinner, and from the flesh of a just man, a sinner is begotten on either side, although between the sinner and the just there is the greatest difference. Now the sinner is begotten none as yet in act, new in origin, but old in guilt: man from the Creator, captive from the deceiver, needing the Redeemer. But it is asked how captivity can be drawn into offspring even from parents already redeemed? And because it is traced out by no easy reasoning, nor explained in speech, it is not believed by unbelievers, as if even that which we said of the wild olive and of the olive, that the foetus of a dissimilar kind be like, some reason tacitly finds, or speech explains. But this can be seen by him who wishes to experience it. Let it be therefore in an example, whence also that may be believed which cannot be seen."

Whence I distinguish the minor: parents cannot transfuse into their children that which they have not, neither formally nor virtually — I concede: that which they have not formally, but only virtually — I deny: parents, moreover, although when they generate they have not original sin formally in themselves, yet always retain it virtually; namely, in the power of the seed and of the concupiscence of corrupted nature, which are the causes, or instruments, of generation, or of the union of the soul with the body, through which union original sin is contracted.

You will object 4. The redemption of Christ does not profit men who believe not: therefore neither does the transgression of Adam harm those who sin not, since it is not more efficacious.

St. Augustine answers, book 3 of De peccatorum meritis, chapter 2, that as the grace of Christ profits little ones baptized, believing only in another's person; so likewise sin, committed by the actual consent of the head of the whole human race, harms them: "therefore as," he says, "the spirit of justice of those through whom they are reborn, by his answer, transfers into them the faith which they could not as yet have by their own will: so the flesh of sin of those through whom they are born transfers into them death, which they had not as yet contracted by their own life. And as the spirit of wickedness regenerates the faithful in Christ, so the body of death had generated them in Adam as sinners: for that is carnal generation, this spiritual: that makes sons of the flesh, this sons of the spirit: that sons of death, this sons of resurrection: that sons of the age, this sons of God: that sons of wrath, this sons of mercy; and hence those bound by original sin, these freed from the bond of every sin."

You will object 5. Julian, in St. Augustine, book 2 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, chapter 28: "This one who is born does not sin, that one who begat does not sin, this one who fashioned does not sin; through what crevices then, creeping in amidst so many safeguards, do you feign the entrance of sin?"

St. Augustine answers in the same place: "Why do you seek the hidden crevice, when it has a most open door? By one man, saith the Apostle; by the offence of one, saith the Apostle; by the disobedience of one man: what do you seek further? what do you seek more openly? what more curiously!" Therefore the consequence of Julian must be denied: for although the father who generates is not the cause of sin, nor the son who is born, nor God who fashioned: it does not follow from thence that there is no cause of that sin, especially since the Apostle says: "By one man sin entered into this world."

You will object 6. Every sin is voluntary: but original sin in infants cannot be voluntary, since they lack the use of reason and liberty: therefore it cannot have the ratio of sin in them. The major is proved from that of St. Augustine, book De vera religione, chapter 11: "So voluntary is sin an evil, that in no way is it sin unless it be voluntary."

The Subtle Doctor answers, in 2, number 11: "'Every sin must be voluntary to the sinner, insofar as it is in his power, either secundum se or secundum alium, in whom he is morally constituted as in a head' — I concede: 'it must be voluntary, so that it be in the physical power of his own will not to have it' — I deny; and similarly, distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence." Thus does St. Augustine solve the aforesaid argument, book 2 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, chapter 28, where, to Julian saying: "If sin is from the will, the will which makes sin is evil; if from nature, nature is evil," he answers: "Sin is from the will." He asks perhaps, whether it is original sin? I answer: it is altogether original sin, because this also was sown from the will of the first man, that it might be in him and pass over into all. This same he often inculcates in book 1 of the Operis imperfecti against Julian, where to Julian himself objecting what he himself had written in the book De duabus animabus, namely that "sin is the will of losing or retaining that which justice discerns, and whence it is free to abstain," and inferring from thence that there is no original sin in little ones: inasmuch as Julian said, "there is no sin without will; and there is no will where liberty is not unfolded; and there is no liberty where there is not the faculty of choice through reason": which certainly is not found in infants — St. Augustine responds in the same place, chapter 47. "These three things," he says, addressing Julian, "do you distinguish, and know that one thing is sin, another the punishment of sin, another both. You understand which of these three pertains to that definition, wherein there is will of doing that which justice forbids, and whence it is free to abstain. For sin is defined in this manner, not the punishment of sin, not both." Then, explicating the three members of this division, he subjoins: "Now these three genera have their species, of which it would now be long to dispute. Of these three genera take examples, if they are required; of the first genus there occurs in Adam, without any manner of question: for many are the evils which men do, from which it is free to abstain: but to none is it so free as it was to him who served God, by whom he was founded upright, abiding wholly depraved by no vice. Of the second genus, however, insofar as it is only the punishment of sin, the example is that evil which anyone does from the evil part, but only suffers: as when for his crime he who sinned is slain, or is tortured by any other punishment of the body. But the third genus, wherein sin itself is, and the punishment of sin, can be understood in him who says: 'the evil which I would not, that I do.' And finally, applying the distinction to the argument of Julian, he says that original sin pertains not to the first member of the division, but to the third: and hence it is no wonder if it be not comprehended by that definition of his related by Julian, seeing that it was handed down only concerning sin spoken of in the first manner. 'First,' he says, 'we mentioned original sin: for we now treat of sin, not of the punishment, which is not sin, although it follows by the merit of sin: which indeed little ones suffer, since there is in them a body dead because of sin; yet death of the body itself is not sin, or any bodily torture whatsoever. That third genus, insofar as it is, is sin, that it be both itself and the punishment of sin, which indeed is inherent in those being born, yet the origin of this sin descends from the will of the sinner. For Adam was, and in him we all were. Adam perished, and in him all perished.'"

You will insist: That is called voluntary which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with cognition: but original sin in little ones proceeds from an extrinsic principle, namely Adam, and without any cognition, seeing that they are destitute of reason: therefore it can in no wise be voluntary in them, nor be imputed to fault. Further, the free voluntary must be in the power of that will to which it is called voluntary, namely so that it may be or not be: but original sin is not in the power of the will of little ones, and hence in them it is neither voluntary nor free. Finally, that what is done through the will of another may be judged voluntary to me, it is necessary that I have committed my offices to him: but the posterity of Adam did not commit their own will to him, that namely in their stead he might keep or lose original justice at pleasure, seeing that they did not yet exist: therefore the privation of original justice, wherein original sin consists, cannot be voluntary in them.

I answer to the first: that original sin, in the manner in which it is voluntary, is from an intrinsic principle with cognition — not indeed in us, but in Adam: for something is said to be voluntary in two ways: namely physically, and in order to our own proper will; or morally, and in order to the will of another, in whom our own proper will is morally judged to be contained; of which kind is the will of the Ward, which is morally judged to be the will of the Tutor, and of the Actor; and also the wills of minor sons are morally contained in the will of the Fathers. Hence, since the wills of all men were morally contained in Adam the First Parent, after the manner of a Father and Head of all, he himself sinning freely and with perfect cognition, so likewise are we judged to have sinned in him. For as the blow given by the hand is voluntary, and with cognition, not by the will and cognition existing in the hand, but by the will of the whole supposit whose part the hand is: so original sin contracted by children is truly voluntary; not by a will existing in them physically, but by the will of Adam, in whom, as in the head of the whole human community, the wills of all men are morally contained. Therefore I distinguish the major: "that is called voluntary which is from an intrinsic principle with cognition" — either physically, and in itself only — I deny: or morally, and in another — I concede. And thus distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence: for although original sin be not voluntary in us physically, and by an act of our own will, yet it is voluntary morally; namely by the will of Adam, who, since he is the principle of human nature not only natural but also moral, what he committed can be reputed morally intrinsic to others.

To the second I distinguish the major: "the personal voluntary, proceeding physically from the proper will of the agent, must be in the power of his will" — I concede: "the capital voluntary, or proceeding from the head of some moral member, must be in the physical power of the will of that member itself" — I deny; for it suffices thereto that that voluntary thing be in the physical power of the head containing morally the wills of the members. Similarly, distinguishing the minor, the consequence must be denied; for since original sin is not voluntary to little ones by the will of the person, but only by the will of the head of human nature, it is not required that it be in their physical power to have this defect or not to have it; but it suffices that it was in the physical power of the will of Adam to sin or not to sin.

To the third I say, that for original sin to be judged voluntary to men by the will of the head, it is not necessary that they committed their own right and consent to Adam their First Parent with regard to the keeping or loss of original justice: but it suffices that God, constituting him Adam our head natural and moral, constituted the wills of all of us alike in him morally: for since He is the supreme Lord of us and of our things, and holds the wills of men in His power more than they themselves do, as St. Augustine says in the book De Correptione et gratia, chapter 14, He was able to ordain that the will of Adam, the First Parent of all, with regard to the loss or keeping of original justice, should be alike the will of all his posterity: not insofar as they are singular persons; for thus each of them has his own will: but insofar as they are parts and members of the whole body, and multitude of men, of which Adam is the head and origin.

You will object 7. No one sins in that which he cannot avoid: but little ones cannot avoid original sin: therefore it cannot be deputed to them as fault.

The Doctor distinguishes the major, dist. 32, number 14: "No one sins in that which he cannot avoid, neither in himself, nor in another in whom he is morally contained" — he concedes: "that which he cannot avoid secundum se, but could avoid it in another" — he denies; and similarly, distinguishing the minor, he denies the consequence: for although little ones secundum se physically cannot avoid original sin, yet they could avoid it in Adam: whence they do not indeed sin by actual and personal sin, which would arise physically from their will: but by original sin, which is transmitted together with human nature itself. "For as," St. Augustine says, book 2 of De Nuptiis and Concupiscence, chapter 5, "through the will of that one all sinned in him the evil, when all those were the one man," therefore each drew original sin.

You will object 8. Nothing natural is culpable, seeing that Aristotle says in 3 Ethicorum: "In natural things we are neither praised nor blamed"; whence no one will reproach one born blind, but rather pity him: but original corruption is natural, since it necessarily follows nature itself, and is the same in all: therefore it is not to be blamed; and hence neither is it sin.

The Seraphic Doctor answers, from St. August. lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 10: that something can be called natural in two ways, namely that which follows nature itself according to its institution; or that which accompanies it according to its corruption: that which is natural in the prior manner is not culpable, whence Aristotle rightly said that reproach must not be cast upon men laboring under natural defect, as the blind born blind: but that which is natural in the latter manner is culpable; inasmuch as it is not only natural, but also voluntary, both physically on the part of the head, and morally on the part of the member contracting sin together with nature.

Julian the Pelagian was insisting, that what is accidental in parents cannot be natural in sons: but the sin of Adam was accidental in him: therefore it cannot be judged natural or innate in his sons.

St. Augustine answers, book 6 contr. ipsum Iul., chapter 6, denying the major, and confirms it by the example of Fundanus, the Carthaginian rhetorician, who, though the vice of luxury was accidental in him, begat sons of luxury. "By which example," St. Augustine says, "that sentence of yours would be overturned, whereby you do not grant natural things from accident: for it was accident in the father which was made natural in the son."

You will object 9. The sin of origin, if it existed, would exist in the body or in the soul: not in the body, because this is not the seat of sin, although it is often the seedbed and conflagration; nor even in the soul, for this is created immediately by God alone; for if it were made by traduction from Adam, and, like the body, were propagated through generation, it would be subject to death, as also the body. Therefore it proceeds from God alone: but God is not the author of sin, nor straightway the artificer of a sinful soul. Therefore original sin is none.

I answer with Bellarmine, book 4 of De Statu peccati, chapter 10, near the end: that this argument of the Pelagians ever seemed most difficult to St. Augustine, and almost insoluble. Wherefore in book 5 cont. Iulianum, chapter 1, expounding two modes of explaining the corruption of the soul from original sin and its propagation, he writes: "Lest, namely, soul and flesh be punished together with both, unless what is born be emended by punishing. Indeed, either both vitiated is drawn from man; or one into the other, and whilst in the vitiated case it is corrupted, where the hidden justice of the divine law is inculcated. But which of these be the true, I learn more willingly than I say, lest I dare to teach what I know not. Yet this I know, that of these that is truer which true, ancient, catholic faith, which believes and asserts original sin, would pronounce not false. That faith is not denied, and this which lies hidden concerning the soul, either is learned in leisure, or, as many other things in this life, is known without the blemish of salvation. More must I care, whether in little ones or in grown ones, by what help the soul be holier, than by what merit it be vitiated."

Although indeed the solution of this question appears truly difficult, nevertheless, to the argument we shall say that the soul is touched through generation, not indeed so that it is made by its force; but so that it is united to the body by the mode of a form, which union is the formal terminus of generation: but the whole man is he himself consisting of soul and body: whence, since the whole man is judged propagated from Adam, the whole man also is said to be stained, as well according to the body as according to the soul. But in what manner that sin is produced by Parents into posterity, we shall show below.

Tam abstrusa, tamque a sensibus, et mentis captu longe remota est peccati originalis natura, ut ipse S. August. lib. De moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 22. scribere non dubitaverit; De peccato antiquo nihil est praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius. Unde non mirum si in huius difficultatis enodatione tanta sit, tamque multiplex Auctorum pugna, ut vix numerari possint diversae eorum sententiae. Quorum praecipuae ut innotescant,

NOTANDUM 1. Varios Haereticos circa propositam veritatem fuisse hallucinatos. Primo namque fuerunt quidam erronei, inquit Guillelmus Parisiensis lib. De vitis, et peccatis, cap. 5. dicentes animam humanam naturaliter diligere corpus, et desiderare coniunctionem ipsius, et propterea cum eidem coniungitur, nimio gaudio amplecti corpus, arctiusque ei coniungi quam deberet, et hoc, inquiunt, originale peccatum dicitur, quo peccat anima nimio isto gaudio, et amplexu quam deceat arctiori.

Secunda erronea sententia fuit Mathiae Illyrici Centuriatorum Antesignani, hominis revera ad monstra exeogitanda quodammodo nati, qui in libello de peccato originis, docet illud non esse accidens naturae superadditum, sed ipsammet animae rationalis substantiam ipso Adami peccato substantialiter vitiata, et ex imagine Dei quam in creatione acceperat in imaginem diaboli transformatam: quem errorem prius videtur docuisse Lutherus, siquidem in explicatione Psalmi 50. tractans illa verba, Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, ait: Non loquitur David de ullis operibus, sed simpliciter de materia, et ipso esse, et dicit; Semen humanum, idest massa, ex qua conceptus sum, tota est vitio et peccato corrupta: materia ipsa est vitiata: lutum illud ex quo vasculum hoc fingi coepit, damnabile est. Et paulo post, Foetus. inquit, in utero antequam nascimur, et homines esse incipimus, peccatum est. — Tertia erronea sententia est Lutheranorum, et Calvinistarum asserentium peccatum originale esse ipsam concupiscentiam habituale, sive fomitem peccati, quem contendunt esse vere, et proprie, ac formaliter peccatum.

Variae pariter fuerunt Doctorum Catholicorum de peccati originalis natura sententiae. Primo namque Gregorius Ariminensis dist. 30. qu. 2. art. 1. et Gabriel ibidem, necnon et Guillelmus Parisiensis Tract. de vitii, cap. 4. docent peccatum originale esse morbidae animae qualitatem ob Adae transgressionem in posteros ex vitiata carne per virulentum serpentis afflatum derivatam; ita quod caro sic infecta animam inficiat, eo modo quo liquor optimus ac vitio infundatur. Secundo, plurimi contendunt peccatum originale esse fomitem concupiscentiae, quatenus habet annexam privationem iustitiae originalis debitae: ita ut fomes sit velut materiale, privatio autem ista formale peccati originis; quae sententia tribuitur S. Thomae qu. 82. art. 3. et S. Bonaventurae dist. 30. art. 2. qu. 1. Tertio Rottensis Articulis 2. contra Lutherum, and nonnulli alii post ipsum, affirmant peccatum originale essentialiter consistere in ipso reatu poenae, quo nempe parvuli ex Adamo propagati in ipsa sua conceptionis momento afficiuntur. Quarto, plurimi Theologi, maxime ex recentioribus, volunt rationem formalem peccati originalis consistere in aliqua privatione, quam tamen non omnes eodem modo explicant: aliqui enim dicunt eam consistere in privationе subiectionis mentis ad Deum: alii in privationе iustitiae originalis, et subiectionis partis inferioris superiori parti, necnon et immunitate donorum spiritualium quibus Adamus fuerat exornatus: aliqui in privationе gratiae sanctificantis qua collata fuerat Adamo, in posteros, nisi peccasset, transferenda. Quinto denique probabilior eorum mihi videtur opinio, qui censent peccatum originale esse ipsummet Adami peccatum in posteros transfusum, quatenus nempe moraliter omnes in eo peccaverunt tamquam in suo capite; cui sententiae plurimi subscribunt: imprimis vero Albertus Pighius Controversia prima: Catharinus in Opusculo De casu hominis cap. 8. Salmeron In caput 5. Epistolae ad Romanos, disputatione 15. et 16. ubi addit hanc sententiam debere esse omnium Catholicorum; nam Ita aperte intulit Paulus, inquit, dicendo omnes homines in Adamo peccasse, ut qui hunc sensum ex eius verbis non eliciunt, plane delirare videntur. In eandem sententiam eunt plurimi recentiores, quos refert, et sequitur Egidius de Presentatione lib. 2. De pura Virginis Conceptione, qu. 1. art. 5. Ipsis autem omnibus praeluxit Subtilis Doctor, ut infra demonstrabimus, cuius sententia ut notior fiat,

NOTANDUM 2. Peccatum originale dupliciter considerari posse. Primo, quatenus fuit actuale, hoc est actu commissum, et sic nihil est aliud quam peccatum primi Parentis prout ab illo personam omnium posterorum sustinente commissum est; sic enim omnes in ipso moraliter peccaverunt, et omnes eundem inobedientiae, et transgressionis actum commiserunt, quatenus omnes ille unus homo fuerunt, ut loquitur S. Augustinus, lib. 1. De peccatorum meritis, et remissione, cap. 10. Sicut autem nonnisi moraliter omnes homines in Adamo unus homo fuerunt, ita nonnisi moraliter illo peccante peccaverunt. Seconda spectari potest quatenus est habituale, et habitualiter manens in Adami posteris, donec eluatur; et ut sic nihil aliud est, quam homines in Adamo peccasse moraliter, et propter illud peccatum a se moraliter commissum in primo Parente, esse vere, et realiter Deo exosos, ac privatos ipsius gratia, omnibusque donis, et innocentiae charismatibus ad se transfundendis, nisi cum Adamo peccante peccassent, et talium donorum cum ipso indigni fuissent.

NOTANDEM 3. Quod quemadmodum homines possunt unum aliquem in suum caput morale eligere, suasque voluntates in illum derollvere, ut omnium nomine aliquid agat, et quod ipse fecerit censcantur ipsi fecisse, proindeque omnibus imputetur ac si ipsi fecissent; ita Deus, qui supremus omnium voluntatum nostrarum est Dominus, potuit illas in Adamum transfundere, ipsumque in caput nostrum morale constituere, ita ut sors omnium nostrum, sive in bonum, sive in malum, ex decreto, et pacto divino ab eo ita penderet, ut quemadmodum ius ad sanctitatem originalem, et felicem illum statum in quo fuerat ipse conditus habuissemus, si divinis mandatis obtemperasset, sic eiusdem transgressione illius peccatum ad omnes derivaretur per propagationem naturalem ab ipso descendentes derivatione, et communicatione morali. Qua fit ut Adami peccatum personale sit moraliter peccatum omnium posterorum; nimirum quia peccatum illud commissum fuit a primo Parente veluti capite totius generis humani personam omnium posterorum sustinente, et in quem omnium voluntates erant moraliter a Deo transfusae, ita ut quod ille bene, vel male ageret, imputaretur omnibus veluti membris in ipso capite moraliter, et representative operantibus. His ita praelibatis, primo expugnanda sunt alienae sententiae; demum ea quae nobis probabilior apparet, erit confirmanda.

Conclusio prima. — Peccatum originale non est ipsa substantialis animae corruptio.

Primo, quia ex illa erronea sententia, sequeretur dari aliquam substantiam per se malam: at hoc sapit haeresim Manichaeorum, qui peccatum substantiam quamdam, seu naturam esse asserebant: quod utique pridem damnatum fuit ab Ecclesia, et sanctorum Patrum auctoritate proscriptum. Nam Basilius in Oratione, quod Deus non sit auctor malorum, ait: Non imagineris esse aliquam propriam substantiam mali: nam malitia non est aliquid subsistens. Sanctus Gregorius Nazianzenus, Oratione in sanctum Baptisma: Crede, inquit, nullam esse mali essentiam, nec per se subsistere, nec a Deo creatum. S. Epiphanius Haeresi 37. Malum, inquit, aliquando non erat, neque radix ulla fuit malitiae: neque malum est quiddam per se subsistens, etc. Denique Augustinus pluribus, sed maxime lib. 6. contra Iulianum, cap. 1. docet peccatum originale non esse corpus, neque substantiam. Et in Psalmo 62. generaliter ait: Iniquitas ipsa non est substantia: non enim iniquitas est natura quam formaverit Deus: sed iniquitas est perversitas quam formavit homo.

Sequeretur secundo, Deum, et parentes esse causas peccati originalis; illum animam creando; hos corpus generando; quod utique omnes debent execrari; quippe cum non solum in infinitam Dei bonitatem pugnet, sed et in ipsam Scripturam sacram, qua diserte pronuntiat omnem a Deo conditam naturam esse bonam. Sic Sapientiae 11. Diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti: et secundam ad Timotheum 2. omnis creatura Dei bona est.

Tertio sequeretur, vel hominem mutari essentialiter in Baptismo, et in resurrectione gloriosa, vel peccatum originale nusquam elui; quod directe militat in ipsammet Scripturam sacram docentem peccata omnia deleri per Baptismum. Sic Romanorum 8. Nulla est damnationis iis qui sunt in Christo Iesu: qui non secundum carnem ambulant. Ephesiorum 5. Mundans lavacro aquae in verbo vitae, ut exhiberet ipse sibi gloriosam Ecclesiam non habentem maculam neque rugam. Et prima Ioann. 1. Sanguis Christi emundat nos ab omni peccato. Sequeretur denique animam esse corruptibilem, siquidem homo secundum illam mutatur substantialiter per peccatum.

Impugnatur iterum haeretica illa sententia: homo peccato originali inquinatus, vel est eiusdem substantialis speciei cum homine mundato originali peccato, vel non. Si sit: ergo nulla facta est in ipso substantialis mutatio, quando a statu peccatoris ad statum gratiae transiit. Si non sit: ergo alteruter non est animal rationale, vel erunt homines essentialiter diversae speciei, quod nullus Philosophorum hactenus somniarit. Secundo, non magis peccatum originale deberet esse forma aliqua substantialis teterrima superinducta, quam quodcumque aliud peccatum mortale, propter paritatem rationis: sed absurdum est, quod alia peccata mortalia sint substantiae aut formae substantiales, alias toties homo mutaretur substantialiter quoties peccat, et qui plura admisisset peccata, longe plures haberet gradus substantiae quam qui minus peccasset, vel qui iustus esset. Denique, illa corruptio, et mutatio substantialis qua fieret in anima, necessario fieri deberet per introductionem alicuius formae substantialis advenientis: sed hoc dici nequit; produceretur enim vel a Deo, vel ab homine peccante. At produci non potest a Deo; Deus enim non potest esse causa peccati. Non etiam ab homine, quia nullum habet in se principium quo talem substantiam produceret; illud unicum principium, si quod esset, maxime voluntas a qua peccatum procedit: sed voluntas tantum producit actus, qui solum sunt accidentia, non autem substantiae: ergo, etc.

Obiciunt Illyricus varios Scripturae textus. Primo quidem illud Genes. 6. ubi iuxta Hebraicam editionem legimus: Figmentum humani cordis malum est ab adolescentia sua: ergo massa ipsa cordis, hoc est substantia, dicitur esse mala. Ad Rom. 6. Vetus homo noster crucifixus est ut destruatur corpus peccati: quibus peccatum vocatur vetus homo, et dicitur habere corpus: ergo est substantia. Et codem cap. 6. dicit Apostolus: Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore ad obediendum concupiscentiis eius: ergo peccatum est aliquid regnans, et habens concupiscentias: adeoque debet necessario esse substantia, et non accidens. Denique, imago Dei in homine non erat aliquod accidens, sed substantia; sicut enim dicitur Genes. 1. Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ita dicitur Genes. 5. Adam genuit filium ad imaginem suum: certum est autem filium esse ad imaginem patris, non propter sola accidentia, sed propter naturae similitudinem. Sed si imago Dei substantia erat, profecto etiam imago diaboli substantia esse debet. Amisit autem homo per peccatum imaginem Dei, et induit imaginem diaboli, iuxta illud Ioannis 8. Vos ex patre diabolo estis: et ad Colossenses 3. Induite novum hominem qui renovatur secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum: ergo cum ipsa imago diaboli sit substantia, etiam originale peccatum erit quid substantiale.

Nego has omnes consequentias, et ad primum contextum respondeo, per figmentum cordis non intelligi ipsam substantiam cordis, sed operationes eius quas in se fingit sive tacit, et sic ex illo testu nihil adversum nos urgetur. Vel dico quod etsi intelligeretur ipsa cordis substantia, inde non sequeretur illam esse peccatum; potest enim esse mala denominative a peccato, seu operatione mala, quamvis nec ipsum peccatum, nec mala operatio esset quid substantiale: sicut potest dici infirmus homo et doctus ab infirmitate et doctrina, licet neutra sit substantia. Ad secundum dico, per corpus peccati non intelligi aliquid substantiale, sed ipsam massam, seu congeriem peccatorum. Deinde loquitur Apostolus de peccatis actualibus. Denique, si quid inferri posset, sequeretur ipsum peccatum originale esse aliquod corpus in anima residens, peccatum enim in anima sedem habet: sed hoc asserere stupidum esset: ergo, etc. Ad alterum Apostolicum textum dico, peccatum regnare in mortali nostro corpore eo modo quo superbia in superbo, et in avaro avaritia dominatur; cum tamen neutra sit substantia, sed accidens; regnare autem dicuntur, quatenus inclinant, et movent ad actus sibi conformes. Ad tertium dico, ipsam quidem animae substantiam esse revera imaginem Dei, sed nego illam per peccatum deperdi, vel in aliam transformari: iste namque fuit error Origenis pridem ab Ecclesia damnatus, ut colligitur ex Epiphanio Haeresi 61.

Obicies 2. Peccatum originale est fons, et origo omnis mali: ergo est substantia. — Respondeo negando consequentiam: ita enim appellatur, quia est fons omnis mali, quatenus ob ipsum commissum, Deus subtraxit iustitiam originalem, et auxilia quibus mediantibus non committerentur peccata: sed ex eo non sequitur quod sit substantia; quamvis enim esset accidens, posset habere hanc rationem fontis, et originis.

Obicies 3. Quidquid est difforme, seu non conforme legi, est peccatum: sed ipsamet substantia hominis descendentis ex Adamo, est non conformis legi Dei: ergo est peccatum. — Nego maiorem: solum namque illud peccatum est, quod ex natura sua est non conforme legi: sic autem substantia hominis non est difformis legi Dei, sed hoc competit per se operationi ipsius. Quae responsio confirmatur, quia qua ratione quidquid esset non conforme legi Dei deberet esse peccatum, etiam quidquid esset conforme legi Dei deberet esse opus bonum, et virtus ac meritum, quo nihil absurdius. Itaque quidquid est non conforme legi Dei, est peccatum, vel habens peccatum; sicut quidquid est conforme est opus bonum, vel habens opus bonum; sed non quidquid est non conforme hoc modo debet esse peccatum.

Conclusio secunda. — Peccatum originale non est formaliter concupiscentia, nec fomes ad malum inclinans. Haec est de fide contra Lutheranos, et Calvinistas.

Probatur primo: Per Baptismum eluitur quidquid habet veram, et propriam rationem peccati: sed concupiscentia non tollitur in renatis per Baptismum: ergo concupiscentia non est formaliter peccatum originale. Maior constat tum ex Apostolo ad Romanos 8. Nihil damnationis est in his qui renati sunt in Christo. Tum ex Concilio Tridentino Sess. 5. Canone 5. Si quis per Iesu Christi Domini nostri gratiam, quae in Baptismate confertur, reatum originalis peccati remitti negat, aut etiam asserit non etiam tolli totum id quod veram, et propriam peccati rationem habet, sed illud dicit tantum radi aut non imputari, anathema sit. Tum denique ex sanctis Patribus: Hieronymo Epistola ad Oceanum: Quomodo, inquit, iustificati sumus, et sanctificati, si peccatum aliquod in nobis relinquatur? Augustino contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, cap. 3. ubi ait: Baptismus abluit peccata omnia, prorsus omnia, sive originalia, sive addita. Minor etiam constat tum ipsa experientia qua unusquisque ex renatis per Baptismum in seipso fomitem illum deprehendit, quo ad bona delectabilia etiam vetita stimulatur. Tum ex Apostolo ad Romanos 7. dicente: Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae. Tum denique ex eodem Concilio Tridentino ibidem: Manere autem in baptizatis concupiscentiam, vel fomitem haec sancta Synodus fatetur, et sentit; quae cum ad agonem relicta sit, nocere non consentientibus, seu viriliter per Christi Iesu gratiam repugnantibus non valet; quinimo qui legitime certaverit coronabitur.

Utrainque hanc propositionem confirmat S. Augustinus lib. 6. contra Iulianum, cap. 19. ubi diserte probat quod etsi concupiscentia ex originali peccato promanans remaneat in renatis quantum ad actum, non tamen remaneat penes reatum. Ego, inquit, de concupiscentia dixi, quae est in membris repugnans legi mentis, cuius reatus eius in omnium peccatorum remissione transierit: sicut e contrario, sacrificium idolis factum, si deinceps non fiat, praeterit actu, sed manet reatu, nisi per indulgentiam remittatur. Quiddam enim tale est sacrificare idolis, ut opus ipsum cum fit praetereat, eodemque praeterito reatus eius maneat venia resolvendus. Tale est carnis concupiscentia, ut maneat in homine secum per continentiam confligente, quamvis reatus qui fuerat generatione contractus, iam sit regeneratime transactus. Actu enim manet, non quidem abstrahendo et illiciendo mentem, eiusque consensu concipiendo et pariendo peccata, sed motu, quibus mens resistat, desideria commeando. Ipse quippe mutus actus est eius, quamvis mente non consentiente desit effectus.

Quibus verbis S. Augustinus declarat quod etsi concupiscentia quatenus seminarium est peccati originalis et cum ipso coniuncta remittatur in Baptismate quantum ad reatum, hoc est, quantum ad rationem formalem peccati originalis cuius est tradux, tamen ex integro subsistit in renatis quantum ad suum vigorem suamque efficacitatem, utpote cum in eis motus illicitos et rationi adversantes plerumque suscitet, subindeque ipsa non est peccatum originale.

Probatur secundo ex illo S. Iacobi, cap. 1. Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus, et illectus. Deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum; peccatum vero cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem. Quibus quatuor res videtur Apostolus distinguere: Primo concupiscentiam, idest, potentiam appetendi pronam, et stimulantem ad malum, et tres eius motus, nempe suggestionem, delectionem, et consensum: concupiscentiam autem, idest potentiam pronam, et primum eius motum, non appellat S. Iacobus peccatum: delectationem autem, quae est partus imperfectus, dum non est plene deliberatus, peccatum vocat, sed non mortale: denique partus perfectus, hoc est desiderium cum pleno consensu, quod vocat peccatum consummatum, generat mortem, idest, fit plene mortale.

Confirmatur ex sanctis Patribus qui praefatum contextum sic explicant, maxime vero S. Augustinus membro 6. adversus Iulianum, cap. 5. Sed, inquit, cum dicit Apostolus Iacobus: unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus, et illectus: deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit parit peccatum: profecto in his verbis partus a pariente distinguitur, pariens enim est concupiscentia, partus peccatum. Sed concupiscentia non parit, nisi conceperit, non concipit, nisi illexerit: hoc est, ad malum perpetrandum obtinuerit voluntatis assensum. Idem docet S. Chrysostomus Homilia 13. in Epistolam ad Romanos; Ipsae, inquit, passiones in se peccatum non sunt: effrenata vero rerum immoderantia peccatum operata est. Et ut exempli gratia unam illarum tractem, concupiscentia quidem peccatum non est; quando vero egressa modum foras eruperit, tunc demum adulterium fit, non a concupiscentia, sed a nimio, et illicito illius luxu. Similiter S. Hilarius in Psalmum 118. exponens versiculum 29. Viam iniquitatis amove a me, ait: Viam peccati qua ad peccatum pergere promptum est, amoveri a se deprecatur, idest, omnia corporalium voluptatum desideria auferri, nec tentationem aliquam concupiscentiae, aut ignorantiae, qua tamquam per viam ad peccatum itur, ingruere. Denique S. Bernardus in Sermone de sex tribulationibus, Peccatum, inquit, in foribus est, nisi ipse aperias, non intrabit: appetitus in corde prurit, sed nisi sponte cesseris, nihil nocebit; consensum cohibe, ne praevaleant haec, et immaculatus eris.

Ipsis concinit Subtilis Doctor in 2. dist. 32. n. 7. ubi inquirens ac resolvens quid sit peccatum originale, quaestionemque resolvens ex doctrina S. Anselmi, lib. 1. De conceptu virginali, cap. 27. nimirum quod peccatum originale sit carentia iustitiae originalis quatenus debite: cum sibi obiecisset quod aliqui SS. Doctores videntur rationem formalem peccati originalis constituere in concupiscentia; respondet,

that concupiscence, whether as a habit or as a proneness in the sensitive appetite: and none of these is formally sin, for there is no sin in the sensitive part according to chapter 3 and 4 there. Or it can be taken as it is a proneness in the rational appetite, that is, in the will, toward concupiscing delights immoderately, which is apt to delight together with the sensitive appetite to which it is joined, and in this way concupiscence is the material element of original sin: because through the lack of original justice, which was like a bridle restraining it from immoderate delight, it becomes, not positively but through privation, prone to concupiscence of immoderate delights: as he illustrates in chapter 5 by the example of a ship with a broken rudder: and of a horse with a broken bridle, which is left to itself: and from this it executes the disordered motion which that bridle would have restrained.

Ita Doctor. Ex quibus apparet quantum hallucinentur Lutherani, ac Calvinistae, dum sanctos Patres suis erroneis dogmatibus patrocinari adfirmant.

Probatur tertio: ideirco concupiscentia, et fomes ad malum stimulans censeri posset originale peccatum, quia revera peccatum proprius dictum esset: sed falsum consequens: ergo et antecedens. Maior constat. Probatur minor: si homo crearetur in puris naturalibus absque aliquibus habitibus innatis, aut acquisitis virtutum moralium, haberet concupiscentiam non minus quam modo; quia haberet appetitum inclinantem ad bonum delectabile, sive esset prohibitum, sive non: et voluntas ipsius esset naturaliter inclinata ad conformandum se appetitui; concupiscentiam autem habere nihil aliud est quam habere appetitum, et voluntatem hoc modo: sed in tali casu non esset necesse ut fieret ullius praecepti transgressio: ergo potest esse concupiscentia absque ullo peccato. Deinde, peccatum originale reperitur in animabus parvulorum non baptizatorum quando moriuntur, sicut et in animabus aliorum omnium qui absque baptismo in re, vel in voto decedunt: sed in parvulis nulla est concupiscentia, nullusque peccati fomes: ergo peccatum originale non est peccati fomes, neque concupiscentia. Denique concupiscentia est effectus et poena peccati originalis: ergo esse nequit ipsum originale peccatum. Consequentia patet; quamvis enim unum, et idem possit esse peccatum, et poena peccati, et etiam causa peccati; tamen hoc sine dubio intelligendum per comparationem ad diversa; nequit enim res una esse peccatum, et poena, atque effectus peccati respectu eiusdem: alioquin esset poena, et effectus respectu sui ipsius, et per hoc prior ac posterior seipsa. Antecedens est ipsius sancti Augustini pluribus in locis, maxime vero lib. 6. in Iulianum cap. 3. Concupiscentia, inquit, poena peccati est, quia reddita est meritis inobedientis. Necnon et lib. De continentia, cap. 7. ubi comparat peccatum originale febribus: concupiscentiam vero languori, qui sanatis febribus remanet. Aliud, inquit, carere febribus, aliud ab infirmitate, quae febribus facta est, recalescere. Et intra: Prima curatio est causam removeri languoris, quod per omnium fit indulgentiam peccatorum: secundo, ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiscendo, etc. Quibus aperte docet peccatum, quod in baptismate remittitur, causam dici languoris, idest, concupiscentia remanentis: igitur ipsa concupiscentia non potest dici peccatum originale; alioquin esset causa sui ipsius.

Obiciunt primo haeretici varia Apostoli oracula, quibus probare nituntur concupiscentiam revera esse formaliter peccatum. Sic ad Romanos 6. Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore. Intelligitur autem Apostolus de concupiscentia, subdit enim: ad obediendum concupiscentiis eius. Similiter cap. 7. Iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum; scio enim quod non habitat in me, idest in carne mea, bonum. Quibus verbis Apostolus concupiscentiam peccatum appellat: sed illa non potest esse peccatum actuale, cum non sit actus, sed habitus: ergo erit peccatum originale. — Respondent Doctores Catholici, concupiscentiam ab Apostolo peccatum appellari, non quod peccatum sit formaliter, sed quia est effectus peccati originalis, et causa peccati actualis. Loquitur enim Apostolus iuxta morem Scripturae sacrae, quae plerumque vocem peccati usurpat nunc pro ipsa culpa, nunc pro poena, quae est culpae effectus, nunc etiam pro causa peccati: nunc denique pro sacrificio, quod est peccati expiatio; Sic Deuteronomii 9. Moyses ait: Peccatum vestrum quam feceratis, igne combussi, et in frusta comminuens, in pulverem redegi. Ubi manifeste vitulus aureus dicitur peccatum, quia effectus, et causa peccati exstitit. Sic Oscae 1. Sacerdotes dicuntur comedere peccata populi. Sic ipsemet Apostolus, eodem cap. ad Romanos, legem, peccatum appellat, quia nimirum est causa manifestativa peccati. — Eamdem solutionem tradit Concilium Tridentinum Sessione 5. Canone 5. ubi legimus: Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat, Ecclesiam Catholicam numquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere, et proprie peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est, et ad peccatum inclinat. Quam utique doctrinam secutus erat S. August. lib. 1. De Nuptiis, cap. 23. ubi dicit concupiscentiam vocari peccatum. Quia, inquit, peccato facta est, cum iam in regeneratis non sit ipsa peccatum: sicut lingua vocatur locutio, quam facit lingua, et manus vocatur scriptura, quam facit manus. Itemque sic vocatur peccatum, quia peccatum si vincat, facit: sicut vocatur frigus piger, non quod a pigris fiat, sed quod pigros faciat.

Instabis ex S. Augustino lib. 5. contra Iulianum, ubi ait: Sicut infiditas cordis et peccatum est, quia in Deum non creditur, et poena peccati, qua cor superbum digna animadversione praemitur, et poena peccati cum aliquod male cordis errore committitur: ita carnis concupiscentia, adversus quam bonus concupiscit spiritus, et peccatum est, quia non est illi obedientia contra dominatum mentis, et poena, et causa peccati. — Respondeo ideoque S. August. concupiscentiam peccatum appellare, et non solum causam, vel effectum peccati, eo quod sit vitium, et naturae infirmitas tollens primam naturae veluti perfectionem, ingenitumque rigorem, quem in prima sui formatione a Deo acceperat: non autem ipsam peccatum appellat, quod sit proprie, et formaliter offensa Dei, ibi enim agebat contra Pelagianos, qui concupiscentiam quasi naturae perfectionem laudabant. Ut scilicet, inquit ibidem S. August. cap. 30. eam tamquam bonum naturale laudando suum pestiferum dogma confirment, quo asserunt prolem, quae per illum nascitur, nullum trahere originale peccatum.

Urges: S. August. ibidem comparat concupiscentiam cum caecitate cordis, qua Deo non creditur: sed cordis caecitas proprie et formaliter est peccatum: ergo et concupiscentia. — Respondeo 1. Negari posse consequentiam: non enim opus est, quod quae inter se comparantur, in omnibus quadrent, sed sufficit quod in aliquibus conveniant, ut omnibus fere comparationibus accidit. — Secundo dico, ipsam cordis caecitatem per se formaliter non esse peccatum: infideles enim, qui nihil unquam de Evangelio audierunt, nec audire potuerunt, habent negativam cordis caecitatem, et mysteriorum fidei ignorantiam, quae tamen caecitas in ipsis non est culpanda, ut docet S. August. Epistola 106. scribens: In illis qui non audierunt, neque potuerunt, poena peccati est non credere, non autem peccatum. — Tertio dico S. August. ibidem concupiscentiam appellare peccatum, quia interdum permittit Deus, ut homo cedat concupiscentiae motibus, et in novum peccatum ruat, in vindictam scilicet prioris peccati: unde ibidem explicans illud Apostoli ad Romanos: Tradidit Deus in desideria cordis eorum, ait: Aliud est habere mala desideria cordis, aliud tradi eis, utique ut consentiendo eis possideatur ab eis, quod fit cum divino iudicio traditur eis... Cum ergo dicitur homo tradi desideriis suis, inde fit reus, quia desertus a Deo, cedit eis, atque consentit, vincitur, trahitur, possidetur; a quo enim quis devictus est, huic et servus addictus est, et fit ei peccatum consequens praecedentis poena peccati. Quibus patet S. August. non appellare peccatum omnes concupiscentiae motus, sed tantum eos, quibus homo in poenam praecedentis peccati iusto Dei iudicio cedere permittitur. Alioquin, ait ille, frustra dictum est Ecclesiastici 18. Post concupiscentias tuas non eas, si iam quisque non reus est, quod tumultuantes, et ad mala trahere nitentes sentit eas, nec eas sequitur: si eis traditur exercens adversus eas gloriosa certamina, si vivit in gratia.

Obiciunt 2. Quidquid formaliter opponitur legi, et dictamini rationis, peccatum est: sed concupiscentia opponitur legi rationis, iuxta illud ad Romanos 7. Sentio aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae: ergo peccatum est. Non actuale; ergo originale. Deinde: quidquid in peccatum inducit, etiam peccatum est: sed concupiscentia, ex eodem Apostolo ibidem, inducit, et captivat in lege peccati: ergo peccatum est. Denique: solum peccatum odio habetur a Deo; diligit enim omnia, quae sunt, et nihil odit eorum, quae fecit: solum autem peccatum non facit: adeoque quod odio habet, peccatum censeri debet: sed Deus odio habet concupiscentiam, ut docet S. Augustinus in Psalmum 37. Expendens illa verba: Malitiam autem non odivit, ait: Peccatum, et iniquitatem oderis, ut iungas te Deo, qui tecum illud oderit, iam coniunctus mente legi Dei, mente servi legi Dei: ibi autem loquitur de concupiscentia, quam peccatum appellat.

Respondeo ad primum, distinguendo maiorem: id quod opponitur legi, et dictamini rationis formaliter, ac per se, est etiam formaliter peccatum, concedo: quod opponitur tantum causaliter, nego. Et similiter distincta minore, nego consequentiam, concupiscentia enim per se non opponitur dictamini rationis, quippe cum prosit homini ad pugnam, et coronam. — Ad secundum nego maiorem, non enim id omne, quod ad peccatum inducere potest, peccatum est, sed tantum id peccatum formaliter appellatur, quod voluntas pleno, ac libero assensu contra divinam legem admittit. — Ad tertium denique nego maiorem: non enim solum odio habetur a Deo id quod est malum morale formaliter, sed etiam id quod est malum morale causaliter, seu causa malitiae moralis, ut constat in habitu vitioso, qui odio habetur a Deo, quatenus inclinat ad actus malos, licet per se non sit formaliter peccatum. Ad Augustinum dico, ipsum ibidem concupiscentiam appellare peccatum, quatenus nempe ipsi homo voluntarie succumbit: unde ait: Aliud est non pugnare, et esse in poena certa, atque perpetua: aliud pugnare, et vincere: aliud pugnare, et vinci; aliud nec pugnare, sed trahi. Sunt enim homines prorsus, qui non pugnant, quales est iste, de quo loquitur cum dicit malitiam non odio habuisse: Quomodo enim pugnaret contra eam, quam non odit? Iste a malitia trahitur, nec pugnat. Sunt autem, qui pugnare incipiunt, sed quia de viribus suis praesumunt, ut ostendat illis Deus, quia ipse vincit, si se homo subiungat Deo, et pugnantes vincuntur, et cum quasi ceperint tenere iustitiam, fiunt superbi, et eliduntur: isti pugnant, sed vincuntur. Quis est autem, qui pugnat, et non vincitur? Qui dicit: Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae.

Obiciunt denique: Christus Dominus eos omnes naturae humanae detectus assumpsit, qui non sunt formaliter peccatum: ergo quos non assumpsit formaliter esse peccatum censendum est: sed neque fomitem, nec concupiscentiam induit: ergo signum est quod concupiscentia, et fomes sit peccatum. — Nego maiorem; non enim tantum non assumpsit eos detestans, qui sunt formaliter peccatum; sed etiam eos, qui sunt peccatum causaliter, qualis est concupiscentia, cuius motus quamvis non sint peccatum formale, tamen quatenus ad actus venereos inclinarent Christi sanctitatem, ac dignitatem dedecent: sicut et ipsius corpus dedecent defectus naturales caecitatis, claudicationis, monstruositatis, quos propterea non erat conveniens, ut assumeret.

Third Conclusion. — Original sin is not some morbid quality derived from the corruption of the carnal appetite into the very soul.

It is proved first: That morbid quality, if there were such, would above all be the cause of the inclination to evil, and of the languor toward good: but this cannot be affirmed: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for the champions of that opinion can assert nothing else, since no other effect of that virulent quality can appear. But the minor is proved, first indeed, because an inclination and languor of this kind, experience being witness, subsists even in the regenerate after baptism, and therefore also the cause from which it flows must needs subsist: but original sin does not subsist after baptism: therefore it is not that morbid quality. — Secondly: Either the sin of the first parent, or the corruption of our flesh, is naturally the efficient cause of such a morbid quality caused in the soul, or God Himself must be assigned as its author: but neither can be affirmed. Not indeed the first: for how could the sin of the first parent, which was long since extinguished and physically perished, be the physical cause of such a quality in infants contracting original sin? How also could the corruption of the flesh, which is a material thing, naturally produce a spiritual quality in the soul? The second likewise cannot be said; for to assert that God is the cause of that morbid quality which is not connatural to us, by which we are inclined to sin and withdrawn from good, is not only absurd, but impious and blasphemous.

Objector: St. Ambrose, in the 7th chapter to the Romans, saying: How does sin dwell in the flesh, since it is not a substance, but the privation of a Gift? The sin of the first man made the body corrupt through sin; and that very corruption, through the condition of the offense, remains in the body, holding the force of the divine sentence given in Adam, by whose fellowship the soul is stained: therefore he truly holds original sin to be a morbid and virulent quality. Then St. Augustine, book 1. De Nuptiis, and concupiscence, ch. 25. says original sin is a certain affection of an evil quality, and a morbid affection: for inquiring how concupiscence remains in the regenerate he says: Although however it is now loosed from its guilt, it nevertheless remains until all our infirmity is healed, the renovation of the interior man profiting from day to day, until the exterior man shall have put on incorruption; for it does not remain substantially as some body or spirit, but it is a certain affection of an evil quality, as a languor: therefore he holds original sin to be some morbid quality. — I deny both consequents, and to St. Ambrose I say first, that those commentaries are probably not his, as we have said many times already. Then, even if they were his authorship, yet from the quoted opinion nothing against our Conclusion could be evinced; for the body to be corrupted through sin can only be understood insofar as it is deprived of the many gifts and graces by which it would have been illumined, had the happy state of innocence persevered, by reason of which the sensitive appetite would not have been carried with such impetuosity toward delectable good. Whence it comes about that from the fellowship of a body deprived of gifts of this kind, the soul is stained, insofar as its appetite is borne immoderately against the prohibition toward delectable objects, and thus original sin reigns, insofar as it has these effects in us, which otherwise would not have been. — To St. Augustine I say, that he calls original sin an affection of an evil quality, not because it is so physically, but because it is so morally; insofar as man, affected by that sin, holds himself in that manner... [truncated]

Fourth Conclusion. — The privation of original justice, however it be taken, cannot be called original sin. This is against the common opinion of the Thomists.

It is proved 1. Original sin, which is drawn by the posterity of Adam, and is to be cleansed in the laver of regeneration, is a true, and properly so called sin: yet the privation of original justice can by no means be called a true, nor a properly so called sin: therefore, etc. The major stands from what was said in the preceding Question, especially from the Council of Trent, Session 5. Canons 1. and 2. in which it is decreed that the sin which in little ones must needs be expiated in the laver of regeneration, in order to obtain life everlasting, is a true, and properly so called sin. But the minor is proved both from St. August. book 3. De libero arbitrio, ch. 19. where he says, That is not properly called sin which is committed with free will by one who knows: by which words he clearly signifies that every mortal sin, properly so called, is that which is committed with free will by one who knows; namely either of itself immediately, or mediated by another as moral head. But the privation of original justice can by no means be called a true and properly so called sin: Both because without all fault God could deprive man of all the justice and perfection which He had granted to the first Parent; for as He is bound by no right to confer such perfection, but had bestowed it on Adam from His mere liberality and divine munificence; so neither is He bound to preserve it, but at His pleasure He can take it away: that being taken away, and not preserved by God, in that case man would be said to be deprived of original justice, insofar as privation signifies the lack of a form, toward which the subject is inclined; yet thus it would by no means be sin; since it would happen apart from all fault of man: therefore, etc. Both because that privation of original justice in Adam and his posterity was willed by God: but God cannot will or approve sin: therefore that privation is not sin. The major stands: for that lack of justice after the commission [of sin] is an effect of the divine vengeance and chastisement of God upon Adam himself, and thereupon was willed by God. The minor also is manifest; for something is sin insofar as it is done against the divine vol... [truncated]

Then, if the privation of original justice were formally the primordial and hereditary sin, it would follow that it is not altogether blotted out and remitted by the sacrament of Baptism; since by Baptism that original justice is not restored which was committed to Adam to be handed on to posterity: since neither integrity, nor constant innocence, nor the concord of peace between body and soul and the harmony of their faculties, once lost, is repaired. But it is erroneous to assert that original sin is not altogether remitted by Baptism, as the Council of Trent defines, Session 5. Canon 5. in these words: If anyone shall deny that by the grace of Jesus Christ our Lord, which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted: or even shall assert that not the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is taken away: but shall say that it is only erased, or not imputed: let him be anathema. For in the regenerate there is left nothing by which God condemns them: because there is no condemnation to those who have been truly buried with Christ by baptism into death: who walk not according to the flesh, but putting off the old man, and putting on the new, which is created according to God, are made cleansed, pure, innocent, and beloved of God, heirs indeed of God, but co-heirs of Christ, so that nothing whatsoever delays them from the entrance of heaven. From these things it appears that by Baptism all that is altogether remitted which has the nature of original sin, nor is any whit of it found any longer in the regenerate; but since there is found in them the lack of original justice, it is a most evident argument that original sin does not consist in that privation and lack of original justice itself.

Finally, that which is the punishment of sin is not formally the sin itself: but the privation of original justice is the punishment of the sin of Adam and of all his posterity who sinned in him: therefore it is not formally sin. There is added in confirmation that God could create man in the state of pure nature, since, as has been proved, that state is possible: but in that state man would lack original justice and sanctifying grace, and yet would have no sin: therefore that lack of primordial justice cannot be formally original sin.

Some answer with Vasquez, in 1. 2. disp. 131. that the privation of original justice, but especially of grace, can be regarded in two ways: First, inasmuch as it is an evil to God, and takes away the subjection due to Him: Secondly, as it is an evil to man, and as it takes away a perfection promised and due to him, namely the subjection of the body to the soul, and of the interior appetite to the superior. In the former way, they say, the privation of grace, or of original justice, has the nature of fault, since it is a moral and voluntary aversion from God as the last end: but in the latter way it has the nature of punishment, since it is an evil and unbecoming to man, and ordained by God against the disorder and deformity of fault. — Against this, first: no fault, nor any sin, is efficiently from God: but the privation of original justice, or that lack of grace, by which the soul was subjected to God Himself, by which the body obeyed the soul in all things, is caused by God, who, as He alone could confer that gift of original justice, so also He can take it away. Secondly, the sin of Adam deserved as much the subtraction and lack of grace, and of subjection to God, as the lack of the subjection of concupiscence, and of appetite, to reason: therefore by the same reason that the lack of the subjection of the appetite to reason is said to be a punishment, by equal reason the lack of subjection to God ought also to be held a punishment inflicted on account of original sin. Thirdly finally, the privation of grace and of the subjection of the soul to God, however it be taken, is formally a punishment: therefore it is not formally sin. The antecedent is proved: that is formally a punishment which is inflicted in vengeance for some fault: but the privation of the subjection of the soul to God is inflicted upon the posterity of Adam on account of his sin; since God had entered into a pact with him concerning the giving of grace to his posterity, upon the hypothesis that he would not sin, and concerning its denial if he should sin, just as in fact He denies it on account of his sin: but this denial can be nothing else than a punishment. Which indeed is evident from a similar case, for if some Prince should so stipulate with a nobleman, that if he were faithful in his obed... [truncated]

You will say 1.: That which is joined with sin by the nature of the thing necessarily cannot be the punishment of sin: but the privation of grace in Adam and his posterity is necessarily joined with sin by the nature of the thing: therefore it cannot be called the punishment of sin. — I deny the major; for if this were true, it would follow equally that the privation of glory is not the punishment of sin; for this has a necessary consequence and connexion by the nature of the thing with sin: but this consequent is altogether absurd and erroneous.

I answer 2. I distinguish the major: that which is joined physically with a sinful act, either as an essential predicate, or its property, or as an accident inhering connaturally in the subject itself, cannot be its punishment, I concede the major. That which is joined by the Decree of God, and only morally by way of punishment inflicted by God in vengeance for a sinful act, I deny the major: and likewise the minor as distinguished, I deny the consequent.

Objector 2. St. Anselm, 1. De Conceptu virginali ch. 1. I know not how to understand anything else in those infants by the sin which is called original, than that through disobedience a nakedness has been made by the want of due justice: but this nakedness is the privation of that justice: therefore, etc. Then St. Dionysius, book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia ch. 2. calls original sin the state of dissimilitude of man with God, namely the supernatural, consisting in the lack of sanctifying grace; and therefore he holds that sin to be nothing else than the lack and privation of sanctifying grace. Finally the Council of Trent, Session 5. Canon 2. says, original sin is the death of the soul: but the death of the soul is nothing else than the privation of grace: for death formally is the lack of life, but the life of the soul is sanctifying grace. Moreover the same Council there Canon 3. 4. and 5. affirms original sin to be something intrinsic to the posterity of Adam, and to be a true, and properly so called sin: but nothing else is intrinsic to them which can be truly and properly called sin, besides the privation of grace, and of the justice due. Finally from the same Council Session 6. ch. 3. it is the same thing to contract original sin, as to borrow one's own injustice from Adam: but injustice properly and formally is the privation of justice: therefore the Council holds original sin to be nothing else than the lack of original justice. — I deny all these consequents, and to the authority of SS. Anselm and Dionysius, I answer that they can be understood causally and effectively; so that they wish original sin to be the efficient cause of that dissimilitude of the soul with God, and likewise of spiritual nakedness, and of the lack of all supernatural gifts; but not that original sin be formally that dissimilitude, or nakedness. Or I say, that they wish original sin to be in us morally; namely insofar as the sin of Adam is formally in us, and morally infects us. For a twofold dissimilitude with God, and injustice, can be distinguished; one actual,... [truncated]

Anselm to understand justice, and injustice as actual, but not habitual; for little ones after baptism do not lack habitual justice, but only actual; of which they are not yet capable. — To Trent, I say that it is likewise to be understood causally and effectively; so that original sin be the cause of the privation of grace, and of the death of the soul, and likewise of the lack of the justice due; since by reason of that sin, the soul is not only stripped of spiritual life, namely sanctifying grace; but also of all the other spiritual gifts, by which the soul itself was to be subjected to God, and likewise the body was to obey the soul in all things. But the Council does not will original sin to be formally that privation, or injustice: for as according to the same Council Session 6. ch. 7. Justification is not the sole remission of sins, but also the infusion of grace, and gifts: so injustice is not only the privation of justice, and of gifts, but also sin. But little ones contract both, since they participate in the sin of the first Parent morally transfused into them, and on account of it become hateful to God, and are deprived of supernatural habits.

Objector 3. Original sin formally and essentially consists in that which is first taken away by baptism, since this Sacrament was instituted for the blotting out of original fault: but by baptism the privation of original justice is taken away per se first, especially as to its primary effect, namely the lack of sanctifying grace: therefore original sin consists formally in the privation of original justice, but as the primary effect of sanctifying grace, which is to rectify the soul, and to join it to its last end. — I distinguish the major; that it is taken away first by baptism formally, I concede: causally, and consequently only, I deny: but the privation of grace and justice is taken away only consequently through the remission of sin, and the infusion of sanctifying grace, and likewise the bestowal of the supernatural virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity. Whence the primary effect of baptism is not the infusion of grace itself, but the cleansing of sin. And likewise the minor as distinguished, I deny the consequent.

Objector 4. That in each thing holds the character of the constitutive reason, from which as from a root and origin the other things pertaining to it emanate and follow: but from the privation of original justice as to its first effect, namely the conjunction of the mind to God, emanate the other disorders from the sin of Adam translated to us by generation: therefore such privation is the constitutive reason of original sin. The major stands: the minor is proved: from the sin of Adam there are derived into posterity the fomes, or concupiscence, and the rebellion of the inferior appetite against the superior, and likewise the penalties of the body, as sicknesses, pains, weariness of body, the necessity of dying, and other miseries by which we are tossed on every side: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor; for all those privations take their origin not from the very lack of sanctifying grace, but from the very guilt of fault, which little ones contracted in Adam as sinning in him as head; just as also the very privation of sanctifying grace, which emanates from the same guilt of fault: for not for any other reason did God strip Adam and his posterity of sanctifying grace, than because he himself rebelled against the divine mandate, and while he sinned, all his posterity also sinned in him, and with him.

Last Conclusion. — Original sin in the posterity of Adam is the very sin of Adam itself remaining in them morally, inasmuch as all sinned in it as in a head. This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor in 2. dist. 32. single question, num. 7. as the most learned Scholiast Cavellus rightly notes there, where, having said that Original sin is the privation of original justice: he subjoins: Yet it is not the privation of any habitual gift, but of the rectitude due to be inherent by way of term from a second act, caused in the will, and transfused by generation; whence it is deprived of habits not formally, but causally: and thus teach Herrera in 2. q. 82. art. 3. and Zimel. disp. 1. ad 1. and disp. 2. concl. 5. Poncius in 2. dist. 30. q. 2. Herinx disp. 6. sect. 2. But the Doctor's opinion was embraced by Pighius, controversy 1. Catharinus in Summa doctrina de peccato originali: Salmero in ch. 5. to the Romans disp. 45. and 46. where he adds, This opinion ought to be of all Catholics: for, he says, Paul so plainly spoke it, that they who do not elicit this sense from his words plainly seem to rave: and it is defended by very many of the Recent writers, whom Martinonus relates and follows disp. 20. sect. 5.

But this opinion is proved: First indeed from that to the Romans ch. 5. By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. And a little after, verse 15. By the offense of one many are dead. And verse 19. By the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners. The Council also of Trent Session 5. Canon 3. citing the aforesaid words of the Apostle, subjoins: If anyone shall say that this sin of Adam, which by its origin is one, and transfused into all by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one as his own, etc. From which it stands that original sin is one and the same of all: but it is not another sin which is one and the same of all posterity, unless the sin of the first Parent committed in the person of all: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed by the authority of SS. Fathers, but especially St. August. who teaches in many places that original sin is the single sin of all men, namely the sin of the first Parent in which all sinned: which indeed he demonstrates most clearly book 4. contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, ch. 1. where, praising the aforesaid words of the Apostle: In whom all have sinned: he adds these: In that man all sinned, when he sinned: since in him were all, because universally the sin of all was that which all, being born, were going to contract. And book 1. De Peccatorum meritis, et remissione, ch. 10. Certainly it is manifest that the sins of each are one thing, in which only those sin whose proper sins they are: another this, in which all sinned, when all those were one man. Likewise book 2. ch. 7. Lest, he says, they should be called the sins of others as not pertaining to little ones: since in Adam all sinned, when in that nature so implanted in him, in which he was able to beget them, that one man was all the fault. But they are called the sins of others, because they were not yet living their own lives, but whatever was in the future propagation, the life of one man contained. Then, subjoining the exception of the Pelagians, By no reason, they say, is it granted, that God who remits proper sins should impute the sins of others: he answers thus: He remits them, but to those regenerated by the Spirit, not begotten of the flesh. But He imputes them no longer as the sins of others, but as their own. For those were such when those who carried them propagated were not yet: for now by carnal generation they are already theirs, to whom they have not yet been remitted by spiritual regeneration. — And book 1. Retract., ch. 13. where, having examined what he had said in book De Vera Religione, ch. 14. that sin is so voluntary that in no way is it sin, unless it be voluntary: proceeding to original sin, he says thus: And that which in little ones is called original sin, while they do not yet use the free choice of the will, is not absurdly called also voluntary, because contracted from the evil will of the first man, it is in a certain manner hereditary. — Similar things the rest tea... [truncated]

It is proved secondly: That is original sin by which the posterity of Adam are constituted sinners, and which is transfused from Adam himself into them: yet the sin of Adam is that very thing by which his posterity are constituted sinners, and which is transfused from Adam himself into them: therefore, etc.

The major stands; the minor is proved, both from the aforesaid words of the Council of Trent; then from the praised authorities of SS. Fathers; finally by reason itself, because the merit of Christ is imputed to little ones, and by reason of it they merit life everlasting morally: therefore the actual sin of Adam also can be imputed to little ones; so that by reason of it they demerit, which in fact they demerit on account of original sin; and consequently it can be called their demerit, and sin morally. Then, the privation of grace, and of supernatural gifts, is a punishment inflicted on the posterity on account of the sin of Adam: but it cannot be inflicted on little ones on account of any other sin than that of Adam, which is proper to them, inasmuch as all sinned in it: therefore, etc. Finally, as in political affairs we see the sins of Parents justly imputed to sons, and they on that account punished, because they are said to have sinned in their Parents; so by equal reason it must be said that the posterity of Adam, guilty of no actual sin, are nevertheless justly condemned by God to the death both of soul and of body, and other afflictions, because in that first Parent, as members in a head, all sinned: therefore it must be concluded with Bellarmine, book 5. De Statu peccati, ch. 18: Even if we should suppose that little ones in Adam, and with Adam, truly sinned, no reason will be able to explain how there is in newborn little ones any true fault: and this dogma of the Catholics will then seem not above reason, but against reason. For whatever we may say adheres in little ones from the sin of Adam, whether guilt, or aversion, or the privation of grace, or anything else: that could by no means give reason to little ones, or harm them, unless it proceeded from a free act, of whose action they were in some manner partakers... There remains therefore what we said above, that there cannot be in little ones anything which has the nature of fault, unless they were partakers of the acts of that precipitation of Adam. Thus Bellarmine, whence I can scarcely conceive how he went over to the opinion opposed to our conclusion.

You will say 1: The Council of Trent Session 5. Can. 3. teaches that original sin is transfused by propagation from Adam into posterity, is in all, and is proper to each one: and Session 6. ch. 3. says, When men are conceived they contract their own injustice: but the sin which was in Adam has none of these things; for neither does it inhere in posterity, or affect them intrinsically, but only extrinsically, and morally; nor is it the proper sin of each one, but one common for all; nor is it something translated by generation as by a cause: therefore according to Trent something distinct from the sin of Adam ought to be admitted, in which the essence of original sin consists. — I deny the minor; for the sin of Adam affects posterity, little ones, not only extrinsically, but also intrinsically, and is proper to them, inasmuch as they themselves all sinned in it, as in a head, which sin remains in them so long as it is not washed away by the saving laver of baptism: it is also transfused into them, not by imitation, but by propagation: namely inasmuch as men contract it by propagation and natural generation, and not only by imitation; that is, by sinning actually, in imitation of Adam sinning, as the Pelagians wished. — Likewise the sin of Adam is physically one in number, but morally multiple, and morally and estimatively multiplied by propagation; for it stands with respect to each one just as if it had been committed by them, in order that on account of it, morally and habitually inhering, they may be hateful to God, and destitute of His grace: whence from the Council nothing against the Conclusion is evinced.

You will urge: That which is common to all cannot be proper to each: but from the Council of Trent the sin of Adam is common to all: therefore it cannot be proper to each, such as original sin ought to be. — I distinguish the major: it cannot be proper, that is, peculiarly to itself, and not convening to others, I concede; it cannot be proper, that is, properly convening to each one, although it convene not peculiarly and privately to one alone, I deny. Likewise the minor as distinguished, I deny the consequent. For that which is physically one, common to many, can morally be proper to each of them by moral multiplication, by reason of which it is made morally and equivalently multiple: and it can be taken away from one, and persist in another, as was said above.

You press: The Council in the same Session Can. 5. declares anathema against him who shall say that by the grace of Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, there is not remitted to little ones all that which has in them the true and proper nature of sin: the Council therefore supposes that which is to be cleansed in little ones to be a true and proper sin inhering in them: but the sin of the first Parent cannot have in little ones the nature of a true, and properly so called sin; for otherwise the sin of Adam could inhere in little ones only by imputation: so that although it were truly extrinsic to them, nevertheless it is morally imputed to them in order to certain moral effects, as if it had been committed by them; but this is to be sin only by imputation, which directly militates against the aforesaid oracle of the Council: for if original sin were only the sin of Adam, as imputed to posterity, therefore the remission of that sin would be the same as that sin not being imputed: but this directly militates against the opinion of the Council declaring anathema against him who should say original sin is not taken away, but only erased, or not imputed: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor; for the sin of Adam transfused into posterity truly has the nature of a properly so called sin, nor only by external imputation, but by intrinsic guilt little ones are said on account of it contracted to be sinners, in the manner expressed above, namely because all sinned in Adam. Whence I say that the remission of that sin is partly no longer to be imputed to the little one, that is, its nature can no longer be held, so that the little one be on account of it hateful to God, and deprived of grace: partly also that all that is taken away which made the little one himself hateful, and deprived of grace, and which remained morally, until it should be remitted and cleansed. But when the Council says, that the whole is taken away which has the true, and proper nature of sin, and not only that it is not imputed; it decrees this against the heretics, who say concupiscence is a truly and properly so called sin, and that it persists in the regenerate, although it is not imputed in them: from which error... [truncated]

You will say 2: SS. Fathers expressly affirm original sin to be something other than the sin of the first Parent: therefore it is not the very sin of Adam which is transfused into posterity. The antecedent is proved from St. August. book 2. De Nuptiis, and Concupiscence, ch. 26. where he says: The voluntary sin of the first man is the original cause of sin: but the same cannot be the cause of itself; and therefore original sin is not the very sin of Adam transfused into posterity. Likewise St. Anselm, book De Conceptu Virginali, ch. 27. One thing, he says, was the sin of Adam, another is the sin of little ones: that was the cause, this was the effect. — I deny the antecedent, and to the aforesaid authorities I say that the sin of Adam is called the cause of original sin, because indeed, while he sinned as head, the posterity of him also sinned as his members; and therefore it was the cause why the rest sinned; for it contained to himself as their head and prince the wills, gifts, and rights of all men: whence, he losing them through sin, the rest equally lost them; and thus his sin was the moral cause of the multiplication and diffusion of sin in posterity, and the reason why we are hateful to God, and deprived of grace and justice, which would have been inherent in us from conception, if Adam had not sinned.

You will say 3: Our sins were morally in Christ as in our head, as the sin of Adam as of the head of men is in posterity as in members; according to that of Isaias 53. He hath laid on him the iniquities of us all: whence in Psalm 21. which was written concerning Christ about to suffer, that adorable Saviour names our offenses his own, in these words: Far from my salvation are the words of my offenses: hence St. Peter, first Epistle, ch. 2. says: Who himself bore our sins in his own body upon the tree: but Christ on that account was not truly a sinner, and stained with our sins, as we truly are sinners and stained with original sin: therefore we are sinners originally from elsewhere than from the sin of Adam morally inhering in us. — I distinguish the major: our sins were morally in Christ, in the manner in which the sin of Adam is morally in posterity, I deny; otherwise, I concede: for our sins were not in Christ morally, as if he himself had sinned while we sinned; so that our sins were as it were his own acts by the union, and transsumption of his will into ours: but only our sins are attributed to him, inasmuch as he discharged their punishments, and made satisfaction to the eternal Father for sinners: but the sin of Adam is in us morally as committed by us sinning with him. But there is the greatest difference between a sin attributed to anyone in order only to discharging punishments, and a sin morally committed by someone and ordained to the privation of original justice, and of sanctifying grace: for the first neither constitutes a sinner nor infects: nay rather it very often remains even in the justified, who although by sanctifying grace they are grateful and acceptable to God, nevertheless are still ordained to punishment on account of the sins committed and remitted to be suffered. But in the latter way a sin taken to oneself truly constitutes and infects sinners, and therefore has the true and properly so called nature of sin.

You will say 4: Sons are sometimes punished by God even to the fourth generation on account of the crimes committed by Parents, but for no other reason than because the sins of Parents morally remain in them: yet on that account they are not said to contract original sin from them: therefore even if the sin of Adam morally subsists in posterity, on this account it could not be called original sin. The major is proved by various texts of Scripture, but especially from that of Exodus 20. I am the Lord thy God, mighty, jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. The same he repeats ch. 31. Likewise among the maledictions which David utters against the impious, he says: Let the iniquity of his fathers be remembered in the sight of God. — Poncius distinguishes the major in the Commentary to Question 2. dist. 3.: Sons are thus punished with a punishment congruent and due to mortal sin on this account, that they be guilty of it, I deny the major: since the temporal punishments to which sons are subjected on account of the sins of Parents are not punishments congruent to mortal sin, seeing that this merits eternal damnation; and therefore the sin of the Parents does not morally subsist in them as to all manner of imputation, and ordination to punishment on account of mortal sin. I deny the minor: sons who are guilty, but only akin to those who sinned, I concede: but thus to be punished is not to be punished on account of a sin morally imputed, and resident in him who sustains the punishment: very often innocent subjects are struck with the heaviest punishment on account of the crimes of princes: thus the pestilence raged against the people of Israel on account of the swelling of vain glory expressed by David the King. — Otherwise I distinguish the same major: Sons are punished on account of the sins of Parents, because they imitate the depraved examples of Parents from vitiated propagation, I concede: they are thus punished, because the guilt of Parents passes into posterity, I deny: and thus the punishment due to sinners is transfused into their posterity no otherwise than because their fault, and crimes follow them, as SS. Aug. contra Adimantum explains, Gregory book 13. Moral., ch.... [truncated]

You will say 5: If original sin were the very sin of Adam, it would follow that, the sin of Adam being blotted out, they ought no longer to be, and to be denominated sinners from that sin: for a sin which has ceased physically, and also morally been abolished, can no longer stain, nor denominate a sinner: but the consequent is false, because otherwise there would have been no sin of origin from the beginning of the world: therefore, etc. — I deny the sequel of the major: because posterity are denominated sinners from the sin of Adam not precisely as it was Adam's, but as it was morally the proper sin of each one, and morally remains in them: wherefore although it has been abolished with respect to Adam, to whom it was forgiven, yet it is not forgiven to posterity, until they are justified through baptism. For God could forgive Adam his sin after he did penance, without forgiving that same sin to Peter being born.

You will urge: The sin of Adam cannot be contracted by his posterity except insofar as it perseveres: but this does not persevere any longer, since a sin does not persevere except so long as the sinner subsists: moreover Adam no longer exists a sinner: therefore his sin cannot be contracted by his posterity. — The Doctor answered in 2. d. 32. n. 15:

That as merit, when it passes away in itself, nevertheless remains in the knowledge and acceptance of God, because He so rewards for it, as if it were present: so when demerit passes away as to the act, it nevertheless remains in the divine knowledge, because He so punishes for it, as if it were already present. Thus therefore the ways by which it enters, of this negation, not to have original justice, will be God's not giving, and the demerit of Adam, in the knowledge of God, on account of which He does not give.

Thus the Doctor.

You will say 6: No one can be denominated evil from an action, unless he be its efficient cause, but infants are not the cause of the action by which Adam transgressed: therefore, etc. — I answer by distinguishing the major: unless he be its physical cause, I deny: physical, or moral, I concede: although infants are not the physical cause, yet they are the moral cause: moral, I say, not in that sense in which he who counseled, requested, commanded, or approved is called a moral cause; but in that which the Apostle signifies, when he said, all transgressed in Adam: which however is not true, neither physically, nor morally with the morality of counsel, command, or approbation; but with the morality of equivalence in order to incurring the aversion of God, and the privation of divine friendship, and of original justice.

You will say 7: Original sin is the effect of the sin of Adam, as St. Augustine teaches, and it can be proved that this proposition of causality is true, we are born original sinners for the same reason, because Adam sinned: therefore original sin is not the very sin of Adam; since the same cannot be the cause of itself. — It can be answered 1. Original sin according to all that it includes both in recto and in obliquo, is the sin of Adam, I deny: according to that which it includes in recto, let the antecedent stand in the good sense. But the sin of Adam is in some manner the cause of non-forgiveness, and moving God, so that He will not remit it to posterity, unless the remedy of the Sacrament, or of perfect contrition, be applied. I answer 2. the antecedent conceded, distinguishing the consequent: therefore original sin is not the very sin of Adam, according to the same morality, I concede: according to a diverse one, I deny. The original sin of Peter, e. g. is physically and really the very sin of Adam, but not inasmuch as it is morally the sin of Adam: yet nothing forbids that rather the sin of Adam be in some manner the cause of original sin according to the morality by which it is proper to each one; for moral diversity suffices for moral causality. Hence as in some sense this proposition is true, therefore we have sinned in Adam, because he himself sinned: so in the same sense the sin of Adam was the cause of the sin of posterity, although it was not diverse physically, but only morally.

You will say 8. In the same manner we are just by the obedience of Christ, as by the disobedience of Adam we are unjust, as is evident from that: As by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so also by the obedience of one man many shall be constituted just: yet by the obedience of Christ we are not just formally, as by a denominating form; but only efficiently, and meritoriously: therefore neither by the disobedience of Adam are we constituted formally unjust, and sinners. — I answer by denying the major; according to all manner of parity, for the Apostle does not intend this ch. 5. to the Romans when he says as by one, &c. otherwise he would also prove that as we are stained by the disobedience of Adam without our own act, so we are sanctified by the obedience of Christ without our own act, which is false; but he wished to signify only a parity in the general reason of cause, precisely taken; so that as the disobedience of Adam is the cause why we are unjust, so the obedience of Christ is the cause why we are just: yet he does not descend to the special modes of causing, in which rather he indicates a diversity, while concerning disobedience he says. we were constituted. with a past voice; but concerning obedience he says. shall be constituted. in the future. For although both be past, nevertheless, the disobedience of Adam once posited, whatever is necessary in order that those propagated from him be formally sinners, is posited; but the obedience of Christ being posited, whatever is necessary in order that they be formally just, is not yet posited; but it is further required that, certain dispositions being posited, they receive from God inherent justice, which Christ by his obedience merited, that they be saints, as Trent teaches Session 6.

Objector 9. If original sin is the very sin of Adam, it follows that posterity merit the same punishment which he himself merited: but the consequent is false, for Adam beyond the punishment of loss merited the punishment of sense: but little ones dying in original sin incur only the punishment of loss: therefore, &c. — I answer by denying the sequel of the major, because Adam sinned physically, and by his own will. but posterity only morally. and interpretatively by the will of Adam. But far greater is a voluntary, proper, and physical sin, than a moral interpretative one, because on account of that by which each thing is such, that is more, and therefore the liability to punishment is greater.