Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

IMMEDIATELY after God had formed the first parents and established them in Paradise, in order to test their observance, He laid upon them this law, addressing Adam, Gen. chap. 2: Of every tree of Paradise thou shalt eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat: for in whatsoever day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die the death. This law indeed Tertullian elegantly calls the fountain of all laws and as it were their matrix, in the book against the Jews, c. 1: The primordial, he says, law is that which was given to Adam and Eve in Paradise, as it were the mother of all the commandments of God: For if they had loved their God, they would not have acted against His commandment: if they had loved their neighbor, that is, themselves, they would not have believed the persuasion of the serpent, and so would not have committed homicide upon themselves, by falling from immortality, by acting against the commandment of God: they would also have abstained from theft, and would not have secretly tasted of the fruit of the tree, nor would they have wished to hide themselves beneath the tree from the sight of the Lord, nor, the devil falsely asserting it, would they have been made partakers by believing him that they were to be like God; and so neither would they have offended God as a father, who had fashioned them out of the clay of the earth as it were from the womb of a mother. If they had not coveted what was another's, they would not have tasted of the illicit fruit. Therefore we recognize that under this general and primordial law of God, which God had sanctioned to be observed in the fruit of the tree, all the commandments of the later law were specially implanted, which sprang forth in due season: for it belongs to the same one afterwards to give the law who before had set forth the commandment, since it belongs also to the same to instruct afterwards who before had undertaken to form the just. For what wonder if He augments discipline who instituted it? if He perfects who begins? Of this primordial law, then, the mother of all, we must treat in the present section: resolving first, for what cause God prescribed the law to the first parents: secondly, how they transgressed this divine law: thirdly, how grave a sin this transgression was.

Note 1. That five kinds of divine laws can be assigned. The first indeed is the Natural Law, which God instilled into all men together with nature itself, which is made known to all men by the innate light of reason, and binds all alike: whose general precepts are, that some supreme Divinity is to be worshipped, and that one is not to do to another what he would not have done to himself. The second is the supernatural Law of faith, hope, and charity, binding indeed all men, and at all time simply, yet given to men not in a natural manner but by the supernatural gift and grace of God. The third was the Mosaic Law, which God gave not to all, but to the one people of the Hebrews only: whose observance plainly did not at all bind the other nations.

I speak, moreover, of the law of Moses as regards its ceremonial and judicial precepts. The fourth is a divine Law binding not indeed at all times, nor simply, but binding all nations only by institution of God after the promulgation of the Gospel, such as the law of receiving baptism. The fifth is the private Law, which God imposed upon one or another, or upon a few men: and of this kind was that law by which God forbade Adam to eat of that tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for by this law it is certain the first parents of mankind were bound.

Note 2. That although the precept of not eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil seems to have been given to Adam alone; nevertheless it was enjoined also upon Eve. Wherefore Eve, speaking to the serpent, Gen. 3, says: Of the fruit of the trees that are in Paradise we eat; but of the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of Paradise God hath commanded us not to eat, etc. She confesses therefore that that precept had been laid upon her and her husband by God. — Now it can be conceived in three ways that that commandment was enjoined upon both parents: either because both heard God commanding and forbidding; or because that precept was first given to Adam, and signified through him to Eve; or finally, because it had first been intimated to Adam, and afterwards announced both to him and his wife. St. Augustine affirms that the second way commends itself more to him, lib. 8. De Genesis ad litteram, cap. 17, and this seems consonant with the narration of divine Scripture, which, when it related that man had been placed by God in Paradise, straightway subjoins that this precept had been laid upon him, and thereafter commemorates the formation of Eve, whereby it seems signified that this precept had been imposed upon Adam before Eve was formed. — Nevertheless some hold that that precept was given to both parents at once, and this seems signified in the Version of the 70. Interpreters, where, whereas our Vulgate reports that precept in the singular number, it renders it in the plural, writing: Eat not, ye shall die the death: and this seems demonstrated in chapter 1. of Genesis, where Moses narrates that God said to Adam and Eve: Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed over the earth, etc., that they may be for food for you. From this one may thus argue: when God said these things to them, either the precept concerning not eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil had already been given, or not. Not the former, otherwise by these latter words, whereby He permits the eating of all fruits and herbs without any restriction, God would have seemed to abrogate the former law of not eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. If the latter, therefore Eve had already been formed when this precept was given: and so it could have been signified to both parents at once. But Moses named only Adam, to whom the precept had been given, according to our Vulgate edition, because plainly it had been given principally to Adam alone, seeing that upon the observance or transgression of that precept hung the preservation or loss of the felicity received, both for Adam himself and for his posterity.

Note 3. That it was fitting that the precept imposed upon the first parents should be partly difficult, partly easy, of observance. Difficult indeed, that it might furnish man with suitable matter for meriting well of God: easy truly it ought to have been, lest if it had been too arduous and hard it would have brought sadness and trouble upon man, which least befitted a most happy state of innocence. — Now the difficulty of this precept consisted chiefly in two things: First, that the prohibition of not eating from that tree seemed to diminish man's liberty and dominion over bodily things: Secondly, from this, that by the very interdict man was forbidden the eating of the tree most splendid to behold and most beautiful in sight, unto the coveting of whose fruit the mind of man was carried away by very many enticements; and abstinence from that tree seemed the more difficult, the more it provoked man's appetite by the greater allurements of its beauty. — The facility of that precept consisted in three things: First indeed, because the eating of only one tree was forbidden, since elsewhere man had the faculty of eating of all the other trees with which that garden of delights was planted and filled. Next, the facility of keeping that interdict appears from this, that the other trees, from which the faculty of eating was permitted, were equal to that forbidden tree in beauty, sweetness, and usefulness: nay even far more excellent: for better and more excellent was the tree of life granted to man, or certainly soon to be granted. Thirdly, finally, the lightness and facility of this precept appears from the comparison of Adam's trial with the temptation and trial of Abraham, or Job, or the Martyrs. — And the easier was the observance of this precept, so much the graver and more inexcusable was its transgression, as St. Augustine elegantly weighs and expounds lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 15. Whosoever says the condemnation is excessive, or deems it unjust, certainly knows not how to measure how great was the iniquity in sinning, where there was so great a facility of not sinning. For as great obedience is not undeservedly celebrated in Abraham, because a thing most difficult was commanded him, to slay his son: so disobedience was the greater in the man made in Paradise, insofar as what was commanded was of no difficulty. And as the obedience of the second man was so much the more praiseworthy, in that He was made obedient even unto death: so the disobedience of the first man was so much the more detestable, in that he was made disobedient even unto death. — Alcimus Avitus, praised above, describes the equity and easy observance of this law in these verses:

Meanwhile the first parents, whom the Supreme Author had joined, Are placed in the paradisal seat. Then the Ruler proposes rewards in such a law: O supreme work of thy maker, whom our hand alone Created, when I bade the rest be born by my word, Behold ye how most beautiful in fertile richness is the grove Served by many riches? All these things shall be given Unto your foods without end, hence let food be sought: Take the granted harvests, and pluck the fruits. Here let secure rest abide in sweet devotion of labor, Enjoying delights in long-lived life. Yet there is in the midst of the wood the tree which ye behold, Bearing in bud the knowledge of right and wrong: From approach to this let the touch be forbidden and restrained Nor let perhaps rash care press upon you to learn What the Teacher forbids: better for the blessed not to know Than that seeking harm: I swear by the world which we made, That if anyone shall take the forbidden fruit from the tree, The crime committed hangs by the peril of death. I speak not of things immense; easy is the custody of right; The keeper also shall live, the violator shall find an end.

These things being premised, three things remain to be resolved in the present Question: First, what is the reason of the law imposed upon the first parents, or for what cause God imposed the law upon them: Second, what is the caution of the same law, that is, what it forbade: Thirdly, finally, what is the sanction of that law, or what punishments it portended to transgressors. Which three will be unfolded in the following Conclusions.

First Conclusion. — THE HOLY FATHERS PROPOSE VARIOUS CAUSES OF THIS INTERDICT, SOME OF WHICH SEEM LESS APPROVABLE.

First indeed seems to be disapproved Theophilus of Antioch, in the second book to Autolycus, where he affirms that the eating of that tree was forbidden for this reason, that Adam, since he was still an infant and unknowing, did not yet perceive the usefulness of that tree: For, he says, during that time he is said to have been still an infant; and therefore less fit to take in that knowledge. For even a little child, when first born, cannot yet properly take food, but is first nourished with milk: then, as age advances, he comes to more solid food: something of this kind, therefore, must have befallen Adam. But this reason can by no means be approved; since we demonstrated above that Adam was endowed by God, from the very beginning of his formation, with surpassing wisdom, and with knowledge both of himself and of all other things.

It profits us therefore to hear first Tertullian, book 2. against Marcion, writing that the law was prescribed to the first parents by God for this reason, that they might live uprightly and justly. For He had not, he says, brought forth man merely unto living, so as not to bring him unto living rightly, that is, with respect to God and His law. To live indeed He had conferred upon him when He made him a living soul; but to live rightly He had enjoined upon him with the help of obedience to the law. — St. Chrysostom, Homily 16. on Genesis, affirms that the fruit was the primary end of that divine commandment, that man might feel himself subject and liable to God as his Lord; and that he ought not to live by his own right and arbitrament, but to obey another's power and command. By that small precept, he says, He wished to show him his dominion over him. Which indeed he straightway explains by an elegant similitude. Just as, he says, some munificent lord, granting to someone ample and magnificent houses to enjoy, wishes to receive not their full price, but only its slight portion, that he may both reserve to himself the entire right of ownership, and that this user may know for certain that he is not the master of the house, but that he has received it by that man's benefit and liberality, to be used by him; so our Lord, since He had committed to man whatsoever is visible, and had assigned to him both a dwelling in Paradise and its delights for the refreshment of his spirit: lest, being little by little carried away sidewise in mind, he should believe that those very things which are seen exist of themselves and rashly, and should think of himself above the measure of his dignity, He forbade him the use of that one tree. — To him accords St. Augustine, lib. 8. De Genesis ad litteram, cap. 13. Finally, he says, by the sinner nothing else is coveted than not to be under the dominion of God, when that is committed in which, lest it be committed, the command alone of the ruler ought to be regarded. And if that alone were regarded, what else would be regarded than the will of God? Why indeed the Lord commanded, He Himself shall see: it is for the servant to do what He commanded, and perhaps for him who merits to ask hereafter why He commanded. But yet, that we may no longer seek the cause of this commandment, if this tree is good, why is it forbidden? If it is bad, why, being bad, did He make it? ... It is therefore in Paradise because it is good, but I will not have thee touch it. Wherefore shall I not touch it? Because I wish thee obedient, not contradicting Me. ... Serve, hear first the command of the Lord, and then learn the counsel of Him who commands: Good is the tree, touch it not. Wherefore? because I am the Lord, and thou art the servant: this is the whole cause. If it is small, dost thou disdain to be a servant: but what profits thee except to be under the Lord? how shalt thou be under the Lord, unless thou be under precept? — St. Cyril of Alexandria teaches that this was the scope of the giving of the law: that man might know himself subject to another, and lest the abundance of so many good things and pleasures make him insolent. To him subscribes Basil of Seleucia, Oration 2. On Adam: That when thou understandest Him forbidding, thou mayest at once know the Bestower, he says: and He suggests to thee the record of that one transgression, from whom are all things. Accords also Procopius in his Commentary on this passage: When God wished, he says, to render man immortal, lest he should attribute that benefit to his own or proper virtue, He acted in this manner: He willed that he should give thanks to Him, from whom he had received not only that he is, but that he is well. To him also He appointed the present life as a palestra, and as it were a lesson of the life to come. — But St. Augustine confirms that that precept was given to Adam for the praise of obedience alone: and thence that the evil of disobedience was known to be so great, since, whereas that tree was not in itself evil and harmful, no other evil existed in the tasting of its fruit besides the evil of disobedience. Nor could it, he says, be better or more diligently commended how great an evil disobedience alone is, since man was made guilty of iniquity for this reason, because he touched the thing against the prohibition, whereas if he had touched it not forbidden, he certainly would not have sinned. Thence lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 12. he writes: if anyone be asked, as I said (namely, why human nature was so greatly corrupted by the prevarication of Adam), it ought not on that account to be thought that obedience was commended in the precept: which virtue in a rational creature is in a manner the mother of all virtues and their guardian. Inasmuch as it was so made, that to submit itself to Him is profitable for it: but to do its own will, pernicious both to itself and to Him by whom it was created. Therefore concerning the not eating of one kind of food, where so great abundance of others lay at hand, the precept was so brief and to be kept, so brief and to be held in memory; especially since covetousness did not yet resist the will, as happened after the transgression in regard to the punishment: it was judged with so much greater injustice, by how much more easily could the observance have been kept. He adds in book 1. against Faustus the Manichee concerning the Law and the Prophets, chapter 1., that the first man was prohibited from the food of that tree that obedience might be commended, which is the greatest virtue, and, so to speak, the origin and mother of all virtues, in that nature to which it was so given an arbitrium of free will, that nevertheless it must needs live under the power of a better.

— Here must not be passed over the impious cavil and subtlety of Porphyry and other assailants of the Christian Religion, which, the devil suggesting it, they framed thus: The fruit of that tree of knowledge was either good or evil of itself: if good, why forbidden? if evil, why created by God, good and best? To which sophism Severianus of Gabala, Orat. 6., replying, answers that that fruit was truly of its nature most good, nor would it have been evil except from the event, and the eating against the interdict and will of God: but that tree was called of the knowledge of good and evil, because the good or evil of man, namely the continuation or loss of his very happiness, would thence arise; which Severianus illustrates by these examples:

There was called in the desert one fountain of water, Psalm. 80. 6. the water of contradiction: Thou didst prove me at the water of contradiction. Was then the nature of such water such, that it terrified the people into contradicting? Wherefore then Moses, having drunk of it, did not contradict God? Therefore as it was called the water of contradiction, not that it had such a nature, but on account of the thing which happened there. For because the people contradicted there, therefore it was called the water of contradiction. Again, Jacob saw God, as far as seeing was granted to man, and calls the name of the place: the vision of God. The place had not the vision or form of God; but because it had befallen him there, he named the place from it. Another place was called the peace of God. Upon the Angel appearing to Gedeon, seized with fear he said: woe is me, woe is me, I shall die: for I have seen the Angel of God. To whom the Angel: peace be to thee; fear not. And he built, it says, Gideon an altar, and called it: the peace of God. Therefore as the altar itself had not peace, but was the sign of the peace which had befallen him and been given him; just as also the water had not contradiction, but was so called from that which had happened in it: so also the wood had not knowledge, but because whosoever sins, comes to the knowledge of those things in which he sins, it received that name. That I may again speak by example, when sometimes we journey through places infested by robbers, it is customary to say: dreadful are those places. Has the place, I ask, fear? But on account of the robbers dwelling there we so speak. After the same manner, the tree was not of such a nature as to furnish that deadly knowledge itself, but received its name from Adam in that tragedy and sin.

Second Conclusion. — THE EATING ONLY OF THE FRUIT OF THE TREE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL, BUT NOT THAT OF ITS LIFE, NOR THE TOUCHING OF IT, WAS FORBIDDEN TO THE FIRST PARENTS BY GOD.

This is evident from chap. 2. of Genesis, where God commanded Adam, saying: Of every tree of Paradise eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat. In which words only the eating is provided for and prohibited, not the seeing or touching. Nor does it matter that Eve, speaking to the serpent, Genesis 3, said: Of the fruit of the trees that are in Paradise we eat: but of the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of Paradise God hath commanded us not to eat, and not to touch it. For the sacred Interpreters confess that that, not touch it, was added by Eve, that she might the more exaggerate the gravity of the precept: for already that precept had begun to displease them, inwardly corrupted by the persuasion of the serpent. As, says Cajetan, a woman forbidden by her husband to go out of the house answers: it is not permitted me by my husband to carry my foot outside my chamber: exaggerating, namely, the precept of her husband which displeased her: so Eve, exaggerating the divine precept, said that it was not permitted her to touch the fruit of that tree. — And so now truly the devil had crept into the soul of the woman: First indeed by exciting in her the desire of most vain liberty: Secondly by inspiring in her weariness and hatred of that precept. Whence it came to pass that the woman broke out into a false exaggeration of that precept. Whence Rupertus skillfully observes, lib. 3. De Trinitate, cap. 5., that Eve perverted the words of God, whereby He had prescribed the divine commandment, in three ways; first indeed by addition, when she said, not touch it: secondly by diminution, when she said, lest perhaps we die, for she added of her own that perhaps, which God certainly had not said: thirdly finally by mutation, when she said: of the tree that is in the midst of Paradise: for God had said of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: for in the midst of Paradise was also the tree of life, not forbidden to man. Hence Cajetan aptly says: it is gathered that the diabolical poison had crept into the affection and intellect of the woman alike: into the affection indeed, by the displeasure of the precept, whence straightway came forth the exaggeration of its bond and obligation: into the intellect truly by the hesitation about the future punishment, whence came forth that adverb, lest perhaps. — I confess nevertheless that some of the holy Fathers, when they report that law, include the touch also among things forbidden. Thus Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38. The law, he says, was the precept, both as to which trees they were to use, and which they ought by no means to touch. This same St. Augustine seems to prove, praised in the preceding Conclusion, in Psalmum 70., number 7. It is confirmed also by St. Alcimus Avitus in the book On the beginning of the world, where he takes those two, to eat and to touch, for the same thing: while he represents God commanding thus:

From approach to this let the touch be forbidden and restrained.

And straightway he introduces the woman answering the serpent:

This alone is the tree of the midst of the wood, which thou seest, Forbidden for food: for us to touch only These fruits is impious.

Whence certain ones think that in truth the touch, as well as the eating, of that fruit was forbidden to Adam; but that it was omitted before by Moses, and at length restored in the colloquy of the woman with the serpent; thus thinks Eugubinus: it is nevertheless not consistent to judge that Moses did not report that precept of God entire as it was, for neither did God, when He rebuked man for the violated precept, rebuke him for the touch, not for it, but only for the eating.

There are those who think that the law was prescribed by God at first to Adam alone, and that Eve, reporting it, added that the touch of that fruit was also forbidden, that she might impose upon Eve the greater caution, and turn her farther away from the danger of violating the law, as St. Ambrose observes, chap. 12. of the book De Paradiso: Most think, he says, that this saying is not the woman's, but Adam's: Adam said this to the woman, while he wished to make her more cautious, that he might add that God had commanded: neither touch it. For we have it that Adam alone, not Eve, received the commandment from God, for the woman was not yet formed. But I judge it better to say, with St. Ambrose himself in the same place above on that word: Touch not God had not said, but ye shall not eat: but then the fall begins to be the principle. For she who raves either added something superfluous, or, adding of her own, understood the commandment of God to be half-complete. The present series of reading therefore teaches us that we ought neither to take away anything from the divine words, nor to add.

Third Conclusion. — THE PUNISHMENT SANCTIONED BY GOD FOR THE VIOLATION OF THE AFORESAID COMMANDMENT WAS ANNOUNCED TO BE DEATH, NOT OF THE SOUL ONLY, BUT ALSO OF THE BODY. This Conclusion embraces three parts: First, that death was announced in vindication of the violated precept: Secondly, that that threatening is not to be understood only of the spiritual death of the soul: Thirdly, that it is to be taken chiefly for the death of the body.

The first is evident from chap. 2. of Genesis, where God, prohibiting the eating of the forbidden fruit, said to Adam: In whatsoever day thou shalt eat thereof, thou shalt die the death: in which words, says Pererius lib. 4. cap. 1., God announced to Adam the most certain destruction of death, wishing namely to restrain him, by threats of this kind and the peril of punishment, as it were by a certain bridle. For men are moved chiefly by three things to observe the laws laid upon them: First, love and reverence of the Legislator, whose precepts, on account of the great benefits received from Him, or on account of His surpassing wisdom, authority, and legitimate empire over them, they acknowledge themselves bound to obey: Next, the hope of rewards promised to those who keep the law: Finally, fear of punishments, to which transgressors and violators of laws are to be subjected and chastised: and this last was expressed in those words: For in whatsoever day thou shalt eat thereof, thou shalt die the death. For fear has greater force for moving our souls than hope, threat rather than promise of reward, pain lastly than pleasure. — But why God did not threaten Adam the punishments of hell, far graver and more to be feared than death itself, a threefold reason can be rendered: First, that the fear of death affects man more vehemently than fear of hell, because the former is perceived by the senses and human feeling, while the latter consists in faith alone and revelation. Secondly, God wished to set before Adam that punishment which, if he violated the precept, necessarily both he himself and his posterity would undergo: although afterwards he should repent, and, penitent for his sin, return to the grace of God: but such a punishment was the death of the body, which neither Adam nor any of his posterity were able to escape; while the punishments of hell both the first parents themselves and very many of his posterity escape. Thirdly finally, St. Augustine brings forward lib. 13. De Civit. Dei, cap. 23. the reason, namely that the promise of eternal felicity, and the threatening of the punishments of hell, were to be openly revealed only in the New Testament. Therefore, he says, God threatened Adam with death, but said nothing of the second death, because He willed it hidden on account of the dispensation of the New Testament, wherein the second death is most openly declared, that first that death, which is common to all, may be weighed, from having dined upon that sin which was made common to all in one: but the second death certainly is not common to all, on account of those who according to purpose are called saints... whom the grace of God through the Mediator liberated from the second death.

The second part is also evident, namely that that threatening can be interpreted of the death of the soul: For there are two lives, says St. Augustine in Psalmum 70., one of the body: the other of the soul: as the life of the body is the soul: so the life of the soul is God. As if the soul depart, the body dies: so the soul dies, if it desert God. That the aforesaid threatening of God is to be understood of this death of the soul St. Gregory the Pope proves, lib. 6. Epistle 31. For if, he says, the soul of Adam, who first sinned, did not die in sin: how was it said to him concerning the forbidden tree: in whatsoever day ye shall eat thereof, ye shall die the death? And behold Adam and Eve ate of the forbidden tree, and yet afterwards lived in their flesh more than nine hundred years. It is clear therefore that he did not die in the flesh. If therefore he did not die in the soul, God uttered a false sentence concerning him, who said: that on whatever day he should eat, he would die. To him assent Origen, Homily 15. on Genesis: Rupertus lib. 2. De victoria Verbi Dei, cap. 2., and many others, who believe that God threatened the death of the soul. — But that not the death of the soul alone was designated in those words is hence evident, because sin must be judged not the infliction of punishment, but the demerit of that punishment; since punishment is such a thing as the judge himself imposes upon the transgressor of the law, not one of which he makes himself guilty: but the death of the soul, or sin, each one brings upon himself without the will of the judge; and accordingly the death of the soul was not solely, nor chiefly signified in those words. Which indeed is confirmed from the Council of Trent, Sess. 5. Canon 1., where anathema is pronounced against him who shall assert that Adam did not lose sanctity and justice by sin; nor incur, through the offense of that prevarication, the wrath and indignation of God; and therefore death, which God had before threatened him. He distinguishes therefore the death of the soul, and the loss of justice, from that death itself which God had threatened.

Therefore the third part is proved, namely that that death announced was chiefly the death of the body; which indeed Adam suffered on that very day on which he sinned; not that he truly died, but that he was made subject to mortality. For although he was mortal by the constitution of his nature; nevertheless by reason of the gift of original justice he would in fact never have died anywhere if he had kept it; but it being lost, he was straightway made subject to mortality. For on that day, says St. Augustine, lib. 13 De Civitate Dei, cap. 23., he was changed to the worse, and nature vitiated, and by the most just separation from the tree of life, the necessity even of bodily death was made in them: with which necessity we are born. Wherefore the Apostle does not say: the body indeed shall die because of sin: but he says indeed: it is dead because of sin. So in book nine De Genesis ad litteram, cap. 10., where he uses the same testimony of the Apostle, and says that a certain deadly disease as it were invaded human bodies: For when they transgressed the precept, he says, in their members as it were some lethal sickness, death itself was conceived, etc. For what else do we begin, not to say being born, but altogether conceived, than a certain sickness, wherein we are doubtless to die? For it is not so necessary to die of the disease itself for him who has become hydropic, or dysenteric, or elephantiasic, as for him who has begun to have this body, in which all men are by nature children of wrath: because this He did not cause except by the prevarication [of the first]. — On this likewise Chrysostom must be heard, Homily 16. on Genesis. Although, he says, they lived for the space of many years, yet from the moment they heard that, earth thou art, and unto earth shalt thou return, and received the sentence of death, they became mortal: and from that time someone might deservedly say them to be dead. But Scripture signifying this spoke thus: on whatsoever day ye shall eat, ye shall die the death. As if it said: ye shall receive this sentence, that ye may be mortal henceforth: for as in human judgments, after sentence has been pronounced upon the accused, that his head be cut off, and he is straightway led to prison: although he remain there long, he is none the better already dead, and lives extinct, inasmuch as he has already undergone the very sentence of mortality: so also they from that very day from which the sentence of mortality was pronounced upon them, although they survived for a long time, were already dead by the sentence itself. — Or it must be said with St. Augustine lib. 13. De Civit. Dei, cap. 12., that God signified by the name of death every death that can happen to man, that is, of the soul as well as of the body: as well temporal as eternal: Since therefore it is asked, he says, what death God threatened to the first men if they transgressed the commandment received, and kept not the duty of obedient ones, whether of the soul or of the body, or of the whole man, or that which is called the second: The answer must be, all: for the first consists of two, the second of all together. For as the whole earth consists of many lands, and the whole Church of many Churches, so the whole death of all: since the first consists of two; one of the soul, the other of the body: that the first may be the death of the whole man, when the soul suffers penalties without God and without the body for a time: the second truly when the soul suffers eternal punishments without God together with the body. When therefore He said first to that man whom He had placed in Paradise; concerning the forbidden food, on whatsoever day ye shall eat thereof, ye shall die the death; that threatening embraced not only the former part of the first death, wherein the soul is deprived of God, nor only the latter, wherein the body is deprived of the soul; nor only that whole first death itself, wherein the soul separated both from God and from the body is punished: but whatsoever of death there is even to the last, which is called the second, and than which there is none later. In which words St. Augustine distinguishes a fourfold death; one of the soul and temporal, when the soul by sinning is separated from God; another of the body, and temporal, when the soul is separated from the body by decease: A third, which embraces both, namely the separation of the soul from God and from the body, as happens in the death of the reprobate: Fourthly finally, that whereby after the day of judgment soul and body shall be separated from God, which death is called second and last.

Notandum 1. That although Adam and Eve were guilty of violating only one divine commandment, this transgression nevertheless seems to have had various sins mingled in it. For in the first place Eve stood guilty of a fivefold crime, as may be gathered from those words of Genesis, chap. 3: And the woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave to her husband. She saw, I say, wherein there appears in Eve a certain inert idleness: namely, withdrawn from the contemplation of divine things, with wandering eyes she ranged about Paradise and its enclosure, and what was outside Paradise. Wherefore St. Bernard justly censures her in the treatise On the Steps of Humility: "Thou," he says, "intent upon another thing, meanwhile it steals secretly upon thee, creeping into thy heart; it addresses thee soothingly, by its flatteries it overcomes thy reason, by falsehood it allays thy fear, saying: No, thou shalt not die. It takes care whilst it whets thy appetite; it sharpens curiosity whilst it suggests cupidity; at length it offers what is forbidden, takes away what is granted: it holds out the apple and filches away Paradise: it labors with deadly venom, bringing forth things doomed to perish and beings destined to die: salvation perishes, yet the birth does not cease: we are born, we die: wherefore we are born to die, because we first die of knowing." — Second, Eve's vice was a certain vain curiosity: for she saw, says the sacred Text, that the tree was fair to the eyes, gazing upon it with her eyes more curiously than was fitting. The third was titillating pleasure, namely in seeing that the tree was good to eat. The fourth was a certain vanity, for she saw that the tree was delightful to behold, or as the Hebrew and Greek sound, desirable to be understood or contemplated: whereby indeed she perceived that the eating of that fruit could conduce to the participation and attainment of divine knowledge and contemplation. Finally, the fifth was a certain excessive cruelty toward her husband; whereby indeed she drew him into a share of her crime: for when, having eaten the fruit, she saw herself stripped and deprived of the divine gifts of innocence, and foreboded that she would soon be cast out of Paradise; lest she should be wretched and wander solitary, she led her husband into a share of the crime, and gave to her husband, who did eat.

Notandum 2. From the Seraphic Doctor, in book 2, distinction 22, article 1, question 1.

The sins of Eve can otherwise be detected and assigned, namely pride, avarice, and gluttony: for, he says, pride is nothing other than an immoderate appetite for excellence; avarice is nothing other than an immoderate appetite for sufficiency; gluttony is nothing other than an immoderate appetite for food and drink that refreshes pleasantly. The devil, therefore, considering this to be the way to precipitate the woman into fault; first promised the excellence of dignity: You shall be as Gods. Second, he subjoined an abundance of knowledge: knowing good and evil. Lastly, he held out the experience of sweetness, when he showed the tree beautiful to see, and sweet to eat. Since, therefore, the woman consented to the diabolical suggestion; therefore first, in appetiting to be as God, there was pride: then, in appetiting to know good and > evil which she ought not, and to know more than she ought, there was avarice. Lastly, in experiencing the sweetness of the forbidden tree, there was gluttony: and herein she was guilty of transgression, and disobedience was involved in the fault. And thus it is clear that the sin of the woman was begun in pride, made progress in avarice, and reached consummation in gluttony. It is also evident that it was disordered with respect to the triple power, namely with respect to the irascible, while she appetited high things; with respect to the rational, while she appetited to know hidden things; with respect to the concupiscible, while she wished to taste delights. Whence from that sin sprang the roots of all sins.

Notandum 3. In the sinful act by which Adam stood as an open enemy, there also appear several circumstances of different sins. First indeed, an immoderate complacency toward his wife, and a disordered love, whereby he despised the divine commandment, so as to obey his wife persuading him to eat of the forbidden fruit. Second, a certain shameless avidity, and pestilential curiosity of experiencing what might lie hidden in that fruit which God had so strictly interdicted to him, and what he would obtain by tasting it. Third, there was a certain doubt concerning the truth of the divine threat: for when he had seen that Eve, after tasting the forbidden fruit, had not died, he stood in doubt about the meaning of those words of God: In whatsoever day thou shalt eat thereof, thou shalt die the death: namely, whether those words contained a definitive sentence, or only a comminatory one. Fourth, there was the sin of disobedience: for by eating the fruit forbidden him by God, he was disobedient; wherefore St. Paul, disputing of Adam's sin in Romans 5, seems to acknowledge nothing other than disobedience: For as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners: so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just. Finally, the fifth sin of Adam was of gluttony: for seeing the beauty of the apple, and hearing from his wife that it was of most delicious savor, he most ardently desired the eating of it. Whence Tertullian, in the book Against the Jews, chapter 3, elegantly says: "Adam had received from God the law not to taste of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, being to die if he should taste... Nor any longer grasping the things of the spirit, he yielded more easily to the flesh than to God: he obeyed food rather than precept; he sold his health to his appetite. He ate at last, and perished; otherwise safe, had he been willing to fast from one little tree. I hold, therefore, from the beginning, gluttony to be a homicide, deserving to be punished with the torments and penalties of hunger." These things being premised, it must be resolved in the present Question, which of these sins the first Parents chiefly committed in transgressing the divine law prescribed to them.

First Conclusion. — THE FIRST MORTAL SIN OF EVE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A DISORDERED LOVE OF HER OWN SELF, WHEREBY WITH PROUD MIND SHE APPETITED DIVINE EXCELLENCE, AND GAVE CREDIT TO THE DEMON PROMISING THROUGH THE SERPENT: you shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil.

It is gathered from St. Augustine, lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 13., where he writes: "But they began to be evil in secret, that they might fall into open disobedience: for that great work could never have been brought about, unless an evil will had preceded it. Now, what could be the beginning of an evil will, but pride? For the beginning of all sin is pride. But what is pride, but the appetite of a perverse height? For perverse height is, deserting Him to whom the soul ought to adhere as its principle, to become in some sort one's own principle. This happens when one is too well pleased with oneself, when one falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to please one more than oneself. That falling away is spontaneous: for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of the higher and unchangeable good, by which it was illumined that it might see, and kindled that it might love, it would not have turned thence to self-complacency, and have grown dark and cold thereby, so that either the woman believed the serpent to have said those things: or the man preferred his wife's will to God's commandment, and thought himself a venial transgressor of the precept, if he did not desert the companion of his life in the fellowship of sin. Therefore that evil work, that is, that transgression, was not done, that they might grow by eating the forbidden food, except by those who were already evil." In which words St. Augustine observes three things especially: First indeed, that the eating of the forbidden fruit was not the primary sin of Eve and Adam, but that they were vitiated interiorly before they leaped into open crime. Which he confirms moreover, writing:

Manifestly therefore, in the open sin, where was done what God had forbidden to be done, the devil had not caught man, unless he had already begun to be pleased with himself: hence he delighted in that which was said, you shall be as Gods.

Second, that that interior depravation was wrought through an internal complacency in his own perfections. Third, that from that complacency there leaped forth into affection the pride, and it came to pass that Eve emulated divine knowledge: hence followed the eating of the forbidden fruit, and the open transgression of the imposed law.

This conclusion the Doctor proves in book 2, distinction 21, qu. 2, num. 20, showing namely that the first mortal sin, both of Eve and of Adam, was not the formal act of pride: for if that desire, whereby Eve appetited the similitude of God, had been pride, it would above all have been that species of pride which is called presumption: but this is false, for presumption is the love of concupiscence, whereby one covets to excel others and to preside over them: but this love is preceded by a disordered complacency in one's own perfections; for no one desires to preside over others, save because he esteems himself worthier and excelling: therefore, etc. — It is confirmed: because according to all, pride properly so called is the love of one's own excellence, whereby one covets or wills some preeminence either above oneself or above others. Above oneself indeed, if he desire that his perfections be accounted more excellent than they really are; or if he refuse to hold that subjection to another which he is bound to hold. Above others truly, if he covet to surpass others beyond his due state. But it is certain that the primary sin of Eve had none of these affections; for she first took disordered complacency in her own proper perfections, before she concupisced that similitude of divine science, and strove after an undue perfection for herself: therefore truly her first sin was not the formal act of pride, but an excessive complacency in her perfections, and a disordered love of herself; whence, as from a vitiated root, pride germinated. This the following will set forth more evidently.

Second Conclusion. — THE FIRST MORTAL SIN OF ADAM WAS A DISORDERED LOVE OF HIS WIFE. This is the Doctor's doctrine in book 2, distinction 21, qu. 2, num. 2. And he proves it, because the first sin of Adam was not the love of concupiscence, since this presupposes the love of friendship; and indeed a disordered one, if the love of concupiscence was disordered: therefore the first sin of Adam was the love of friendship, either of himself or of another. Of himself alone: but that sin was not from an immoderate love of self, as was the first sin of the Angel: for the Angel, since by his essence he understands himself first, thence comes to know and love himself before other things: but man, since he understands other things before himself, because he understands nothing save dependently on phantasms; thence loves other things before himself with the love of friendship. I confess nevertheless that this proof presses but little according to the Doctor's principles; for the Doctor contends that man in the state of innocence would not depend in knowing upon phantasms: and thus he could understand both himself first and other objects. Then, although Adam had known other things before himself, it is certain that he also knew himself: but he need not have sinned when he first knew other things; nor is it likely that he sinned by disorderly loving Eve as soon as he knew her: therefore since he could know himself before he disorderly loved Eve, he could likewise before that disorderly love himself. Finally, even if this reasoning had any force, it would not prove that Eve had previously sinned by a disordered love of another, which militates against the Doctor himself. — I should say therefore with Poncius, that the Doctor's mind is, that the first sin of Adam was a disordered love of his wife: not because it could not also be a disordered love of self: but because since he could have disorderly loved another object, nor is it established that he so first loved himself, it is to be inferred that he first disorderly loved another object rather than himself.

The conclusion is proved thus: Adam could pursue his wife with disordered love before himself, and as far as can be gathered from Scripture, he de facto disorderly loved his wife before himself: therefore it must be said that his first sin was a disordered love of his wife. The antecedent is proved as to the second part: for it stands from Scripture that Adam did not transgress the divine commandment prescribed to him before Eve enticed him to eat of the forbidden fruit: but it is altogether likely that he would not have admitted so great a wickedness, save on account of a disordered love of his wife: therefore, etc. — It is confirmed from St. Augustine, lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 11. "It must be believed," he says, "that this befell through the woman's own error, that the one believed the one, the man the woman, the spouse the spouse, when credence was given to the transgressor against the law of God, not as believing one speaking truth, but as obeying social fellowship." He adds in book 11, On Genesis according to the Letter, chap. 12: "Adam would not sadden Eve, whom he believed able to pine away without his solace, if she were alienated from his nourishment of soul, and utterly to perish through that discord: not indeed overcome by concupiscence of the flesh, which he had not yet felt in his members, but by a certain friendly benevolence, which often comes to pass that God may be offended, lest man be the friend of a mimic: which, though he ought not to have done, the most just issue of the divine sentence declared." — It stands therefore from St. Augustine that the first sin of Adam was a disordered love of his wife, not indeed concupiscence, which had not yet been excited in his members, but friendship or conjugal benevolence: for he loved her with supreme love: 1. because she was supremely lovable on account of the excellent ornaments of body and mind: 2. because she was the only woman in the whole world: 3. because she was his wife, of whom he was to receive offspring, and propagate the whole human race: 3. because she had been given to him by God as companion: finally, 4. because she was his, formed out of his flesh and bones. Wherefore, that he might not sadden his darling, he made light of the precept of God, and ate of the fruit of the forbidden tree, which Eve had offered to him.

Repugnance of the Thomist. From those sayings of St. Augustine it is rightly inferred indeed, that Adam before he ate had disorderly loved his wife: not however that the first sin was that love: since in other places he more often affirms that Adam sinned by pride, namely in appetiting Divinity. Thus treating of Psalm 64, on those words, which I have not taken away, then shall I blush, he says: "the first Parents broke by worshipping Divinity, and lost felicity." The same Bernard teaches, sermon 1 On Advent, in these words: "You have heard, Fathers, what was read last night in Isaias, the Lord saying: thy princes are faithless, or as the other rendering has it, disobedient, companions of thieves. Truly our princes, Adam and Eve, the beginnings of our progeny, disobedient and companions of the thief, attempted to steal by the counsel of the serpent, nay of the devil's serpent, that which belongs to the Son of God." — On the contrary, by the same reason by which they expound the foresaid contexts of St. Augustine praised by us, by the same reason we can reply that from the sayings of St. Augustine adduced by them it can be gathered that Adam did commit the sin of pride before eating: although that sin was not his first sin, but the disordered love, once admitted, whereby he was afterwards able to be proud. Which certainly suits the opinion of St. Augustine himself: otherwise he would not aptly enough say that Adam sinned compelled not by carnal concupiscence, but by friendly benevolence. For although together with pride this benevolence concurred to induce him, nevertheless if pride preceded, his fall ought rather to be assigned to pride than to that benevolence: wherefore he ought to make mention of pride rather than of that benevolence. Whence because he first made mention of this, assigning the cause of the transgression, it is more likely that Augustine judged the first sin to have been that disordered love of benevolence toward his wife. Whence when either Augustine himself, or the other holy Fathers affirm that Adam sinned by pride, it does not follow that his first sin was pride: nay, as I said, since it is not admitted that he sinned by pride before the matter had been proposed to him by the woman, and since the devil himself did not dare to tempt him before he deceived the woman: it is a sign that he could not even be induced by the woman to sin from that motive, unless he had first sinned by disorderly loving her; which sin once committed, other sins could easily be persuaded. — The Seraphic Doctor confirms this in book 2, dist. 21, art. 1, qu. 2: if Adam had first sinned by pride, above all because he appetited the similitude of God: but it is not so: for if, he says, Adam appetited to be as God: then either suggesting by the woman, or suggesting by the serpent. Not suggesting by the serpent, because Adam himself complains not of the serpent, but of the woman: The woman whom thou gavest me, etc. If suggesting by the woman: therefore as the woman was deceived by the serpent, so the man by the woman. Thus therefore the woman said: The serpent seduced me: so the man would have said: The woman deceived me: but this he did not say, but said: The woman gave me, etc. But if you say that it was so although Scripture does not express it, this appears simply improbable: for if the woman had said: Eat, for you shall be as God, whereas she herself had eaten... and without doubt was not as God, no reason seems probable why the man should have believed her.

You ask 1. Whether the first Parents, having fallen also into heresy, suffered the loss of faith?

I answer. Many of the holy Fathers affirm the same. Above all Tertullian, book 2 Against Marcion, chap. 12, constantly asserts: "Who will doubt to pronounce this very thing of delinquency heresy, when he admitted his election rather than the divine sentence? Unless because he never said to his son: thou hast not prudently defined me: he confessed the seduction, he did not conceal the seductress: rudely admonished, he was a heretic." This same St. Ambrose indicates, Epistle 33 to Marcellina his sister, in which he introduces God thus addressing the Arian: "thou knowest that thou wast born, because thou hast lost the good garments of faith." To them assents St. Augustine, book 11 Of the City of God, chap. 17: "This therefore they knew," he says, "which it would have been happier for them not to know, if believing God and obeying Him, they had not committed that which would compel you to experience infidelity and disobedience, whereby ye die," etc. Finally this same St. Prosper expressly affirms in the Chapters of the Ungrateful, dub. 3: "What is it," he says, "that nature would not have its faith snatched away, since unless Adam had omitted the first, he would lack none of the other goods? For Adam believing the devil, did not believe God." And shortly after: "How should faith lost in Adam be found in any of his sons, unless the same Spirit, who worketh all in all, infused it?" And in the book Against the Collator, chap. 9: "Adam lost faith, lost continence, lost charity."

To all these subscribes St. Fulgentius, book 2 On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, c. 22, where speaking of Adam he says: "He lost faith, losing faith he lost life boldly(?), for it is written: He that believeth not God shall not be protected by Him."

This answer is confirmed by all those holy Fathers who affirm that Adam was deceived. So St. Ignatius Martyr in the Epistle to the Trallians: "The devil," he says, "seduced Adam, the father of our race, through Eve." Irenaeus, book 3 Against Heresies, chap. 36: "By the other," he says, "he was seduced under pretense of immortality, immediately seized with fear, he hid himself," etc. Hilary, Canon 3 on Matthew: "The serpent had enticed Adam, and by deceiving had led him into error." Epiphanius Against Heresies, num. 50, disputing: "the devil himself," he says, "by a lie deceived Eve and Adam, saying one thing for another, and showing friendship with the Creator, when he said: you shall be as Gods, and you shall by no means die." Augustine explaining Psalm 68, on those words: what I took not away, I then paid again: "Who," he says, "took away? That one. Who took away first? That very one who seduced Adam. How did the devil take away? I will set my seat in the North, and I shall be like the Most High. He coveted to be that which he had not received, and with the chalice of his own pride he offered drink to him whom he wished to deceive: Taste, he says, and you shall be as Gods: they coveted Divinity, they lost felicity." St. Leo subscribes, in the sermon On the Prophecy of the Lord: "The devil boasted," he says, "that man, deceived by his fraud, had lacked the divine gifts: and stripped of the dower of immortality had undergone the hard sentence of death." And in sermon 4: "The first man, because he believed rashly and unhappily the envious deceiver, and acquiescing in the counsels of pride preferred to seize the increase of the proposed honor rather than to merit it."

They will say. He is not to be accounted an unbeliever and heretic, who does not pertinaciously in spirit resist by sinning the truth divinely revealed to him: but neither Adam nor Eve resisted pertinaciously by sinning the truth divinely revealed to them: therefore, etc. The major is evident, for heresy is an error of faith contrary, together with pertinacity. Whence St. Augustine, Epistle 162, says: "If any defend a false and perverse opinion with no pertinacious animosity, and are ready to be corrected, and seek the truth with all solicitude, they are not to be reckoned among heretics." And book 1 On Baptism against the Donatists, chap. 16, assigning the difference between two men believing the same error, but with this discrimination, that one be in the Church, the other outside the Church, and baptized by heretics, speaks thus: "Let us constitute two persons in this manner: e.g. let one of them think of Christ as Photinus opined, and be baptized in his heresy outside the communion of the Catholic Church; but let the other think this same thing, yet be baptized in the Catholic Church, thinking it itself to be the Catholic faith: him I call not yet a heretic, unless he shall prefer to resist when the doctrine of the Catholic faith has been manifested to him:" but neither Adam nor Eve were pertinacious in sin, nor rebels against the divine reprehension; nay each excused his own deed, he accusing his true companion, she accusing the serpent as the instigator of the perpetrated crime: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. If one does not resist the truth with pertinacity, when the truth to which he resists is not known to him, nor is he certain that it has been revealed by God, he is not to be accounted a heretic — I concede: otherwise — I deny. But to the first Parents of mankind it stood most openly known that God had threatened them with death if they should eat of the fruit of the forbidden tree: therefore giving faith to the devil saying: By no means shall ye die, etc., it follows that they denied it to Him who had said: From the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat; for in whatsoever hour thou shalt eat, thou shalt die the death.

Truly I do not deny these things to be true of the woman: but I cannot be induced to believe that Adam suffered loss of faith; for he neither heard the serpent falsely promising, nor was he seduced, as St. Paul testifies, as will stand within. Nay the Seraphic Doctor in book 2, dist. 22, qu. 1 denies even Eve to have fallen into heresy: for answering to the first argument he says: "it is not to be conceded that the woman sinned the sin of infidelity, unless infidelity be taken very largely." Therefore what is objected, that the woman said: perhaps, it can be said that perhaps is there a note of event, not of doubting: but because the Master expressly says that it is a note of doubting, therefore it can otherwise be said, that truly the woman did not doubt that what the Lord had said was true: but she doubted about this, namely how the Lord understood it; whether namely he understood it of bodily death, or spiritual, or in any other manner whatever: and that doubting was neither punishment nor fault; but a certain nescience, which afforded a way to the tempting devil.

You ask 2. How is that saying of St. Paul to be understood, 1 Timothy, chap. 2: Adam first was formed, then Eve: and Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression?

I answer. There are various interpretations of this saying. For some state the first with St. Jerome, book 1 Against Jovinian, and Chrysostom in the exposition of that passage. Adam is said by Paul not to have been deceived, because he was not seduced by the serpent as Eve was: for Adam did not sin seduced by the serpent, but indulging the will and desire of Eve. "It is not of Adam and Eve," says Chrysostom, "he was seduced by the woman, who had been given to him by God, and joined to him by fellowship of nature: but she was deceived by the beast, which had been devoted to the servitude of man. Paul therefore, in comparison with the woman, says Adam was not deceived: for she was seduced by an irrational creature: but he by a free woman." Several teach with St. Augustine, book 11 On Genesis according to the Letter, last chapter, that Adam was said not to have been seduced because he was not the cause why the woman sinned. "Nor is it in vain," says St. Augustine, "that the Apostle says, Adam first was formed, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression, that is, that through her the man might transgress. For he calls him also the transgressor, where he says: in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is a figure of him to come: yet he denies that he was seduced. For being interrogated, he did not say, the woman whom thou gavest me seduced me, and I did eat; but she gave me, he says, of the tree, and I did eat: but she said, the serpent seduced me. So must Solomon, of such great wisdom, be believed to have thought there was any utility in the worship of idols? But he could not resist the love of women drawing him to that evil, doing what he knew ought not to be done, lest he should sadden those mortal delights to which he was bound, and in which he melted away. So also Adam, after the seduced woman had eaten of the prohibited tree, and given to him, that they might eat together, would not sadden her, whom he believed able to pine away without his solace, if she were alienated from his mind, and utterly to perish through that discord."

Note 1. The gravity of a sin can be gathered either from the species of the sin itself: thus adultery is graver than simple fornication; or from the intention of the sinner's affection, as if one be seized with more vehement zeal and more intense affection for sinning; or from the effect of the sin, that is, from the harm which follows upon it; thus homicide is graver than theft: or from the various circumstances joined to the sin, which amplify its gravity, such as the quality of the person, place, time, and other things of that kind. Now it is certain that if the species of the sin of our first Parents be considered, it was not the most grievous of all; for it would have been graver had they sinned by blasphemy, infidelity, or by contempt or hatred of God. Nor should I hesitate to say that Judas, and all heresiarchs, such as Arius, Luther, Calvin, etc., according to the species of sin, sinned more gravely than Adam: for he sinned against a positive law; they, however, at once against both positive and natural law: he violated a precept concerning an indifferent thing; these, concerning things evil in themselves. Therefore the gravity of the sin of the first parents must be inquired into on another ground, whereby it may be judged the most grievous of all sins.

Note 2. From the Seraphic Doctor Bonaventure, book 2, distinction 21, article 3, question 3, one sin is said to be graver than another in three ways: either on account of greater concupiscence: or on account of greater ingratitude: or on account of greater corruption. If the first is considered, it is certain that Adam's sin was neither the greatest absolutely, nor the greatest of all human sins; for the devil sinned out of greater concupiscence; and also many sons of Adam sin out of greater concupiscence than did the first Parent. But if a sin is called greater in the second way, namely as regards ingratitude, then also Adam's sin was not the greatest absolutely; because the devil sinned out of greater ingratitude, since he perceived more good things in his creation, and fell from a more sublime state: it was nevertheless the greatest of all human sins, because he stood in a nobler and higher state than any of his descendants who fell into sin. There remains, therefore, to be seen whether Adam's sin was the greatest by reason of injury.

Note 3. That although Cajetan, expounding those words of Genesis chapter 3, The woman took of the fruit of the tree, and did eat, affirms Eve's first sin to have been the least, both from its root, that is, the affection of liberty; and from its reason for sinning, namely the appetite for divine similitude; and from the thing desired, which was the knowledge of good and evil; and from the species of the exterior act, which was to eat the fruit beautiful to the eyes and sweet to the taste; and from the cause of the sinning, namely the seduction of the serpent; and finally from the condition of the sinner, because she was a woman, and therefore of the weaker sex for resisting the devil: nevertheless, if the sins of both parents be compared with one another, it is certain that Eve's sin was by far graver in some respect than Adam's sin, as will appear.

Two things, therefore, must be resolved in this Question: First, whether and how the sin of each first Parent was the gravest of all human sins: Second, which of the two, Adam or Eve, sinned more gravely.

First Conclusion. — The sin of the first Parents was not the gravest of all human sins by reason of intrinsic malice, much less only by reason of injury and ingratitude.

This is common among Theologians, and the Subtle Doctor proves it thus in book 2, distinction 22, question 2, n. 3: the gravity of a sin is gathered either from its being opposed to a more intense or more perfect goodness, or from its being against a more necessary goodness, that is, against that which is commanded by more precepts: but from neither head was the sin of the first Parents graver than all human sins. Not indeed from its being opposed to a more perfect goodness: since the perfection of divine love is more excellent than obedience; for greater than all virtues is charity; therefore it is graver to hate God than not to obey Him. Nor yet from its being against a more necessary goodness, or one commanded by more precepts, because indeed they violated the single precept prescribed to them not to eat of the forbidden fruit: but sins, says the Doctor, which are committed by Adam's posterity against the ten precepts of the Decalogue, are sins against which are commanded more precepts, and which are to be observed by the law of nature: therefore that sin was not the gravest of all.

He proves, secondly: Adam's sin was chiefly an inordinate love of his wife: but that love of itself was not contrary to the precept of loving God, which is the greatest, except in the manner in which other sins are opposed to this precept: nor is it even against the second precept of loving one's neighbor so plainly as hatred of one's neighbor is: for who doubts that it is graver to hate one's neighbor than to love him with excess? Therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. Blasphemy is a graver sin as regards intrinsic species than the inordinate love wherewith Adam loved Eve, and than his eating of the forbidden fruit: since the former is against the precept of the natural law and of the first table, whereby God is commanded to be loved and honored: the latter is only against the positive precept of obedience and love of neighbor: therefore it follows that Adam's sin was less grave than very many sins of his posterity; and deservedly does the Doctor infer in the same place, that had Adam been damned for that sin, he would have suffered a lesser punishment than many who are damned.

The Seraphic Doctor proves this truth with a fourfold argument. First, it is a lesser sin that is remissible than one irremissible: but that sin was remissible, as has been proven above: yet many sins are irremissible: therefore, etc. Secondly, graver is a sin which can by no means be excused, than one which admits some excuse: but the sin of the first Parents admits some excuse, in this that it was committed at another's instigation: but sin against the Holy Ghost admits no color of excuse: therefore that sin was not the most grievous sin. Thirdly, so much the graver is a sin, the more it proceeds from greater concupiscence: but in the first Parents there reigned the least concupiscence and perversity of will, since their nature was pure and sound: therefore it seems that that transgression arising from disobedience was not the greatest. Fourthly, graver is a sin which is against nature, and reason, and divine institution, than one which is only against a divine command: but the sin of the first Parents, which followed upon that temptation, was neither altogether against nature, nor against reason, but only against the divine institution: for neither did nature, nor reason, of itself dictate that of that tree one should not eat. Yet there are many sins which are against nature, and reason, and divine institution, which we call sins against nature: therefore it does not seem that that transgression of the first Parents was the greatest of all sins.

The second part is proven, namely that the sin of the first Parents was the gravest by reason of injury and harm, from what follows: for a greater injury, says the Seraphic Doctor, can be considered either intensively or extensively. Speaking intensively, Adam's sin was indeed not of the greatest injury; because it did not deprave his will as many sins do. But speaking extensively, that sin was of the greatest injury, because no sin exists which harmed so many persons, and passed through so many, as that sin which was committed: for from the primal temptation that harm was not proper to the sinners alone, but common to the whole human race: for those first Parents by their fall and ruin dragged down all their descendants, as many as were thereafter and ever shall be, into the destruction of sin and death. Wherefore St. Paul weighing this great harm in chapter 5 of Romans, says: By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. Gravest, therefore, was that sin, if you consider the harm consequent upon it, that is, the loss of so many goods never thereafter to be recovered, and the necessity of so many and such great evils, which that sin brought upon the whole human race.

There also aggravates Adam's sin, that he excelled in wisdom and in the grace of God, and had no inclination whatsoever toward evil: wherefore so much the greater was his iniquity in sinning, as greater was in him the facility of not sinning: whence St. Augustine lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 15. If anyone thinks the damnation of Adam too severe or unjust, he assuredly knows not how to measure how great was the iniquity in sinning, where so great was the facility of not sinning. Which indeed he elegantly declares by contraries, namely by comparison with the obedience of Christ the Lord: As, he says, the obedience of Christ was so much the more glorious because He became obedient unto death: so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable, because he became disobedient unto death. For then great is the punishment proposed for disobedience, and the thing commanded easy by the Creator: who shall sufficiently declare how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy matter, under so great an authority of command, and with so terrible a punishment threatening?

There accrues also to the gravity of the sin of each first parent, that the woman first, then the husband, rose up against God. For truly they exalted themselves against God when, not content with so great a dignity conferred upon them divinely, they desired to know more than was lawful, that they might be equal to God. There also they betrayed a monstrous ingratitude: they had been made to the image of God; this seemed little unless equality were added. Now there is no need that wicked and perverse men labor, not merely fruitlessly but perversely, in extenuating the sin of Adam and his wife. Nor indeed is it a light offense, but a detestable crime, that apostasy by which man withdraws himself from the dominion of his Creator, nay rejects and denies Him. Add that it was not a simple apostasy, but joined with atrocious insults and outrages against God Himself. Satan accuses God of lying, and of envy and malice: to so foul and execrable a calumny they subscribe. Finally, despising the command of God, they not only indulge their own lust, but enslave themselves to the devil. If anyone states the malice more briefly, unbelief opened the door to ambition. But ambition was the mother of contumacy, so that men, casting off the fear of God, might shake off His yoke. On this account St. teaches that by the disobedience of Adam sin entered into the world. It does not follow, however, from this that it was the gravest of all sins.

Objection 1. A sin is grave because it takes away a good: therefore that which takes away a more excellent good is graver: but Adam's sin took away a greater good than any other, inasmuch as it took away original justice from himself and his posterity: therefore it is the greatest sin.

I distinguish the first consequence with the Doctor: that it takes away more of a good from its intrinsic nature, I concede the consequence: that it takes away more of a good demeritoriously, I deny the consequence: and similarly I distinguish the assumption: that Adam's sin took away original justice from its intrinsic nature, I deny: demeritoriously, I concede; and I deny the second consequence. Therefore the gravity of a sin drawn from the good which is taken away by it must not be considered in whatever manner, because in fact all mortal sins take away habitual grace and the right to beatitude; and therefore by this argument sins would be equal: but those goods which are taken away by sin must be considered according to the special incompatibility which they have with the sins themselves, e.g., because hatred of God has from its particular reason an incompossibility with the love of God; but not with the love of creatures, nor with the love of temperance; and because intemperance from its particular reason has an incompossibility with the love of temperance: hence the gravity of hatred and of intemperance must be drawn from those goods to which they are opposed by their particular reason: and this being granted, since the love of God is a greater good than the love of temperance, therefore hatred of God must be judged of greater gravity than intemperance.

Objection 2. Punishment corresponds to fault: but against Adam's sin the greatest punishment was inflicted, namely his own death and that of his posterity: therefore it was the greatest.

I distinguish the major with the same Doctor: in such wise that no greater punishment may be inflicted than could deservedly be inflicted for a fault, I concede; in such wise that it could never happen that a greater punishment be inflicted for a sin not greater, I deny the major: and the minor being conceded, the consequence must be denied. Therefore the gravity of a sin can be gathered only from the gravity of punishment, when so great a punishment is inflicted for one sin as could not justly be inflicted for another: but so great a punishment was not inflicted for Adam's sin as could not be inflicted for certain sins which he himself could commit, and other men also. Or, as the Doctor speaks, that sin is greater to which a greater punishment is owed: provided that punishment be formally the punishment of that fault: but thus the greatest punishment was not owed to Adam's sin. Nay rather, had he himself been damned for that sin, he would not have been punished so severely for that sin as many others. And when you say that death was inflicted upon him for that sin, which is the greatest punishment; I say that he was not said before the fault to be immortal through anything intrinsic which would afterwards have been corrupted by sin: but through gratuitous gifts conferred upon him. We see, moreover, that sometimes for a small fault the greatest benefits are withdrawn, although no great punishment, indeed but a slight one, is inflicted for it.

Second Conclusion. — Eve's sin according to intrinsic species was graver than Adam's sin: but according to certain circumstances, Adam's sin was graver than Eve's sin.

This is common as regards both parts, against Cajetan above, and Bellarmine, book 3, De amissione gratiae. The first part St. Chrysostom establishes by his own judgment, Epistle 3 to Olympias, wherein he says: And indeed it is so much graver, namely Eve's sin, that compared with Adam's sin it is not even reckoned a sin, because it was not the man but the woman that was deceived, who, impelled into fraud, violated(?) the law of God, and tempered for herself and her husband the poisoned cup.

The Subtle Doctor proves this truth in book 2, distinction 21, question 1, n. 1, because Eve sinned by desiring some equality with God in the knowledge of good and evil: but thus Adam did not sin: but the sin of so great ambition was graver than the sin of an inordinate effect, whereby Adam loved his wife. Then Eve induced her husband to sin, which certainly was itself a most grave sin, which was not committed by Adam, nor any equivalent: therefore Eve sinned more gravely. But even had Adam likewise sought that equality with God, as Eve did, still by reason of the scandal committed by Eve it should be said simply that she sinned more gravely than Adam. For, as St. Ambrose says in the book De Paradiso, c. 21: The error, he says, of the woman entered first: for the man was the author of error to the woman, not the woman to the man. Whence Paul also says: Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression.

But how Eve came to her husband and solicited him to eat of the forbidden fruit, Alcimus Avitus explains most beautifully, Poem 2:

Ignorant of what was done, returning from another part, Adam, spread wholly through the grasses of the field, Sought his wife's embraces and chaste kisses. The woman met him, in whose heart audacity then First blew the spirited fury of a woman's rage, And thus she began to speak, for she feared her groaning, Keeping the deadly apple for her wretched husband: Take food, sweet spouse, from the vital germ, Which perchance will make you like to the Thunderer supreme And equal to the gods. This gift is no mere food That I bear, but now taught by experience. The first taste Touched my vitals, loosing the pact by daring peril. Believe gladly; it is a crime unmanly to have doubted. Did you fear, perchance, that a woman could go before you? At least follow, and lift up your fallen courage. Why do you turn your eyes away? why delay your prosperous vows? And long defraud the honor that is to come? Having spoken these words she handed the food of a death about to live, While the soul perished and crimes fed destruction. The unhappy man receives the words of an ill-whispering murmur And casts down his bent senses backward to the depths. No care shaken by trembling panic seized him, Nor did the woman hesitate so much at her first taste, But swift he follows, and from his wretched wife's mouth Constantly seizes the fickle, deadly poison.

The Doctor proves the second part in the same place, namely that Adam's sin, according to certain circumstances, was graver than Eve's sin: for sin, he says, can be aggravated by an accidental circumstance, on account of the excellence of the person and his dignity, who ought on this account the more carefully to guard against sin. Likewise on account of strength, and the possibility of resisting. Therefore the Master says in the text, that because Adam, assailed by exterior temptation, fell, he was so much the more severely to be punished, as he was cast down by a lighter impulse. For the temptation of the flesh is overcome with more difficulty: because what is of ourselves is strengthened against us: since therefore Adam was more circumspect, and nobler, and stronger to resist, therefore accidentally his sin was greater. Finally, original justice was delivered to Adam as to one more worthy, and more circumspect, and stronger, so that if he lost it, he would lose it for himself and his whole posterity. But it was not thus delivered to the woman; therefore Adam's sin was accidentally graver than Eve's sin: nevertheless formally, in a per se manner, and precisely in itself, Eve's sin was graver.

This same thing the Seraphic Doctor proves in book 2, dist. 21, qu. 3:

Sin, he says, can be called graver than another in three ways: namely by ingratitude, concupiscence, and subsequent corruption. If therefore we speak of greater gravity as regards ingratitude, the man sinned more gravely than the woman: on account of his having received more abundant gifts; and the same man forgetful of benefits contemned and offended his Benefactor. he was more ungrateful, and in his ingratitude stood forth more culpable.

But if we speak of superiority as regards concupiscence, thus the woman sinned more than the man; on account of her having sinned with a more perverse will, while she coveted to be made like to God, and more ardently desired, believing she could obtain what the devil suggested to her; and the same woman on account of a more perverse will sinned out of greater concupiscence. and as regards this she was more culpable than the man. — But if we speak of superiority of fault as regards the corruption following, a distinction must be made; because something can be said to corrupt in two ways: either after the manner of a cause, or after the manner of an occasion. If after the manner of a cause, because the sin of the man was the cause of the transfusion of sin into posterity, and thus corrupted himself and others, a greater corruption followed from the sin of the man, and as regards this. the fault of the man is said to have been graver: but if after the manner of an occasion, because the sin of the woman was the occasion of the sin of the man, and consequently of all others, in this way the woman can be said to have corrupted the rest, not only her descendants, but also her husband. Whence she sinned not only in herself, but also against her neighbor; and as regards this it can be said that in the woman the sin was graver.

By means of this distinction answer can be made to the arguments brought forward for either part, inasmuch as they proceed according to different members of this distinction. — Otherwise it could be said, which amounts nearly to the same, that sin can be called graver than another, either weighing the conditions on the part of the sinner, or on the part of the sin. If we weigh the gravity on the part of the sinner, the man is said to have sinned more gravely than the woman, both on account of the excellence of his gifts, and on account of the presidency of his state: because he was in a manner set over the woman. But if the conditions on the part of the sin are weighed, the woman sinned more gravely than the man, both on account of impiety toward God; and on account of iniquity toward her neighbor: for by her ambition she dishonored God, and by her suggestion cast down her neighbor.