Scotus Academicus, Tomus quintus: De Creaturarum Corporalium et de Homine

It is established that the first man possessed various supernatural gifts of innocence, each surpassing the rest; for, as says the Royal Psalmist, God had crowned him with glory and honor, and had set him over the works of His hands. Glory, I say, that is, He had illumined him with all the charisms of divine wisdom; but honor, because He had imbued him with all virtues, and with graces freely given and sanctifying: lastly, He had set him over the works of His hands, granting him supreme dominion over all living creatures and over every worldly thing. So that wisdom had fashioned him a doctor, grace a just man, and dominion a monarch of the whole world. This state Saint Bernard delineates thus in his First Sermon on the Annunciation:

I seem to myself to see, most beloved, man here clothed at the very beginning of his creation with four virtues, and, as the Prophet recalls, clad in the garment of salvation. For in these four lies that integrity of salvation; nor can salvation stand without all of them: especially since neither can there be virtues if they are separated from one another. Man, therefore, had received Mercy, namely as guardian and handmaid, so that she might go before him, she might follow him, and she might everywhere protect and preserve him. You see what kind of nurse God bestowed upon His little one, what kind of handmaid He gave to man newly born.

But there was need for him also of a teacher, as being a noble and rational creature, that he might be brought up not like some beast of burden, but educated like a little child. And surely no master could be found more fit for this task than Truth itself, which would one day lead him on to the knowledge of the highest truth. In the meantime, however, lest he be found wise unto doing evil, and sin become to him as to one knowing the good and not doing it, he received also Justice, whereby he might be governed. And still further, for the peace whereby he was cherished and delighted, the most benign hand of the Creator added Peace, assuredly twofold, so that there was neither struggle within nor fears without, that is, neither did flesh lust against spirit, nor was any creature a terror to him: for he freely imposed names upon all the beasts, and the serpent itself, which presumed not upon violence, assailed him rather by fraud. What was wanting to him whom Mercy guarded, Truth taught, Justice governed, Peace cherished?

He adds, moreover, how man by sin was despoiled of these. "Man lost," he says, "Justice when with Eve Adam obeyed the voice of the serpent, rather than the woman's the divine... He lost mercy also, when Eve so burned in her concupiscence that she spared neither herself, nor her husband, nor her children yet unborn, devoting them all together to a terrible malediction and to the necessity of death. Adam likewise cast the woman, for whose sake he had sinned, before the divine indignation: as though wishing to turn aside behind her back the arrow... The woman also was deprived of truth: first indeed evilly perverting what she had heard, thou shalt die the death, and saying, lest perhaps we die: finally believing the serpent, who altogether denied it, saying: No, ye shall not die. Adam too was deprived of truth, where he blushed to confess it, holding forth leaves, that is, coverings of excuses... Straightway also they lost peace, because there is no peace to the wicked, saith the Lord. For had they not found a contrary law in their members, who had begun newly to be ashamed of their nakedness? I feared, he says, because I was naked. Not so, wretched man, not so didst thou fear a little while before! thou soughtest not leaves, though naked in body even as now."

These things premised, three points above all come forward for discussion in this Article: First, what original Justice was, and of what kind: Second, what grace was granted to Adam and Eve, and of what kind: Third, what was their dominion over corporeal things, and especially over those endowed with life.

Note 1. That among the princes of theology there are various opinions concerning original Justice. For Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 6, qu. 11, teaches that original Justice was a certain natural rectitude infused into the human will, by which the will itself could dominate the sensitive appetite and bend it at its nod whithersoever it would: to which rectitude is opposed the natural curvature and proneness to evil inflicted upon the will on account of sin. This he explains by the example of a rod, which is first straight, then is bent and curved. And he confirms it from this, that if original Justice were not something purely natural, it does not appear how man was wounded in his natural endowments through sin; for he would only be said to have been despoiled of gratuitous gifts, if original Justice, which he lost through sin, had been something supernatural. — But the Doctor rejects and impugns this opinion as false and improbable in 2 dist. 29 n. 3; whence the other theologians agree with the Subtle Doctor himself that original Justice was something supernatural. Yet they differ among themselves in explaining it. First, indeed, very many Thomists, with Soto, lib. 1 De Virtute et Gratia c. 5, judge that original Justice was sanctifying grace itself granted to the first Parents, and they strive to draw Saint Thomas, 1 part qu. 95 art. 1, and in 2 dist. 20 art. 1, over to their side. An entirely opposite opinion is maintained by Saint Bonaventure in 2 dist. 29 art. 2 qu. 2, and Alexander of Hales, 2 part qu. 90, as well as Cajetan, expounding Saint Thomas conformably in 1 part qu. 95. For these affirm that original Justice is a certain supernatural charity entirely distinct from charity and sanctifying grace. The other theologians, however, contend that original Justice is neither charity and sanctifying grace, nor something one and distinct from them, but something aggregated out of charity together with other gratuitous gifts bestowed upon the first Parents, by which namely their will was subjected most perfectly to God, and the sensitive appetite to the will, nor did it rebel against it.

Note 2. That it is most certain that the first Parents, so long as their innocence lasted, did not experience that rebellion of the interior part against the superior, which is customarily named concupiscence, or the fuel of sin. And this is gathered, First, from that text Ecclesiasticus 7: God made man right. Second, from the Apostle to the Romans 7, ascribing the repugnance of flesh against spirit, and of concupiscence against reason, to the precept as their cause. Third, a posteriori, because Adam and Eve before sin were naked and were not ashamed; but after sin they knew themselves to be naked and immediately covered themselves, on account namely of the inordinate motions which they then felt, from which they were before immune. Fourth, by the authority of Saint Augustine and of the other Fathers, who everywhere set down concupiscence as an effect of original sin. This doctrine is also that of many Councils, and especially of the Council of Trent, session 5, in the decree on sin, where it says that Concupiscence is indeed called sin, not because it is truly and properly sin, but because it comes from sin and inclines to sin. — Now this gift is called Justice, because it was the natural perfection of the whole man and of all his faculties, and the best disposition and affection of all the powers of the soul, both among themselves and in order to their proper acts, by which namely God is said to have made man right. Moreover it is called original, both because the first Parents had it from their origin, and because it was to be transmitted through original generation from Adam to his posterity; not indeed by the power of natural propagation and seed, or of any purely natural cause, but proximately from God, no otherwise than the natural soul itself is created by Him immediately as the organic body is capable of receiving it.

Note 3. That five effects of original Justice can above all be distinguished. First, for it made human nature entire; that is, equipped in its faculties for acting, and complete and perfect in all things that naturally belong to it. Second, it constituted it right, namely with that natural rectitude from which arose man's vehement and prompt moral propensity to every good, and his alienation and aversion from every evil; by the defect of which rectitude, which happened through sin, man took on a certain curvature and obliquity of soul, so often named and upbraided in the divine letters; which is nothing else than a certain natural inclination of the soul toward created and fleeting goods, and aversion from goods eternal and divine. Third, it so perfected in orderly fashion all the powers of our nature that the inferior were most perfectly subjected to and obedient of the superior, and their actions in no wise impeded or retarded them, but rather assisted them; while the superior suffered no sadness in ruling and moderating the inferior. Fourth, it made man not only most greedy of knowing every truth, but also rendered him capable of attaining perfect knowledge and science of all things that can naturally be known, as well as strong and constant for performing every moral good and for declining every evil and vice. Fifth and last, it secured for man every felicity naturally desirable: so that, as Saint Augustine says, lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 10, No good would be lacking to man which a right will could wish; nor any evil present which would offend the flesh or the soul of man living happily.

These things briefly premised, it must be determined: First, what original Justice was, namely whether something supernatural, or truly purely natural. Second, whether it was some supernatural quality distinct from charity and sanctifying grace. Third, in what subject it was placed, whether in the body or in the soul.

First Conclusion. — Original Justice was truly something supernatural. This is against Henry, whose opinion the Doctor impugns in this manner as false and improbable in the place cited. First indeed: if, as Henry wills, it is necessary that the naturally rectifying quality be taken away through sin, inasmuch as it is doubtless the difference between sinful man and man constituted in pure natural conditions: if, I say, this were necessary, it would follow that the will could not sin unless it previously had that natural rectitude: because according to him sin is the corruption of that rectitude itself: but this is absurd: both because the will of itself is free to conform itself rightly to reason or not to conform; and because in fact it sins thereafter even when it is already stained by sin; and therefore while it has not that rectitude: ergo for sinning it is not necessary that the rectifying quality be taken away. — Confirmation 1. If God were to create a will without that rectitude (as He truly can; for this quality, as Henry confesses, is separable from the will, as being really distinct from it), that will could doubtless, being free, elicit an act congruent or discrepant with right reason and the divine law; and consequently could sin: for if the first man could sin, even though furnished with original Justice, much more could he sin if he had it not; nor indeed did it compel him to disobedience, nay rather it stimulated and assisted him unto obedience: but in such a case he would not be deprived of that natural rectitude through the sin he committed: ergo for sinning it is not necessary that man be deprived of such a naturally rectifying quality. — Confirmation 2. If the rectifying quality ought necessarily to be removed by the first sin, it ought also to be removed by the second sin: but this is false, because it cannot be removed by the second, since it was already removed by the first; but what does not exist cannot be removed: ergo neither ought it be removed by the first. If, therefore, the first sin corrupted that rectitude, as Henry wills, the second and third also ought to corrupt it; which is certainly impossible, since it is supposed to have been taken away by the first sin.

He impugns, secondly: that rebellion of appetite against reason would equally and in like manner have existed in man created in pure natural conditions: ergo it did not happen through the privation of any natural rectitude. The antecedent is proved: it is natural for every appetite to be borne toward its proper object: and if it is an appetite not free, it is natural to it to be borne toward it supremely, and as much as it can; for such an appetite is drawn by its natural weight, and as it is not in its power to act or not act, so neither can the intensity of its act be greater or less; but it acts as much as it can. Since, therefore, the sensitive appetite of man, even in pure natural conditions, would have its own delightful object, it would tend toward it with all its force, and for that reason would impede the act of reason: for these powers, since they are in one and the same soul, impede one another mutually in their intense acts on account of that unity. Wherefore reason would then have to repress and curb that impulse of appetite: which could not be done without some difficulty and sadness on its part. Wherefore there would be rebellion there: for this is nothing else than the inclination of the inferior power toward its delightful object, and the difficulty of the superior power in restraining that appetite.

You will say 1. Mortality, and the rebellion of the sensitive part against reason, are effects and penalties of sin: ergo if nature stood in pure natural conditions without any supernatural gift and without sin, neither mortality nor rebellion would exist: and consequently immortality would be had, and concord of the sensitive part with reason: and therefore on account of that immortality and concord no supernatural gift is to be posited, and consequently original Justice, which confers these effects of immortality and concord, does not signify any supernatural gift. — I distinguish the antecedent. The Doctor [says]: they are penalties in fact, supposing the conferral of the gift by which they would be excluded, from which gift man was deprived on account of sin; [in this sense] he grants the antecedent: absolutely and simply, or considering nature itself precisely in itself, without gratuitous gifts superadded, he denies the antecedent: for thus considered, nature's condition would be to be subject to death and to suffer that rebellion, no less than it is the natural condition of a dog to die, and of a stone to descend downward.

You will say 2. If original Justice were a supernatural gift: ergo original sin would be merely the privation of that supernatural gift, since it is merely the privation of original Justice: but this is absurd; because then one constituted in pure natural conditions would be of equal condition with one having original sin, seeing that each would lack every supernatural gift: but it is absurd that they should be of equal condition: for thus each would be liable to punishment. — The Doctor answers in the same place: whatever may be said of the first consequence, denying the assumption with its proof; because although each would be equal as regards all positive natural perfections, and as regards the lack of every supernatural gift; nevertheless they would differ in this, that he who would have original sin would have the debt of death founded in the divine pact made with the first man concerning the having of original Justice; but one constituted in pure natural conditions would not have such a debt; whence in the latter the lack of the supernatural gift, in which original Justice consisted, would be a privation; in the former, however, it would not be a privation, but a simple absence of some form which he was not bound to have.

You will say 3. The will in pure natural conditions is right; for no curvature seems to belong to its nature, because such would be refunded into God, who is its author: ergo if it were produced without anything supernatural, it would have original rectitude; and consequently original Justice: ergo original Justice does not involve anything supernatural. — I answer 1., with the Doctor, that in the will, or in man, a twofold rectitude and original Justice can be considered: one which is nothing else than the faculty of free choice for acting well, without any derangement of actual or habitual sin: another which is some gift bringing with it the effects of concord of the inferior sensitive power with the superior rational, and of immortality, which he supposes the first Parents in fact had from the origin, and their successors would have had had they not sinned. The argument proceeds from the prior rectitude, not from the posterior; wherefore, granting the whole, it makes nothing to the point. I answer 2., with the same Doctor, by distinguishing the antecedent: rectitude excluding any sin whatever, I grant the antecedent; rectitude excluding rebellion and mortality, I deny the antecedent. Similarly I distinguish the consequence: original rectitude and justice excluding the curvature of sin, I grant the consequence; excluding rebellion and mortality of sin, I deny the consequence. I distinguish also the final consequent: ergo original Justice, that is, the rectitude of nature excluding sin, I grant the consequence; that is, that which removes rebellion and mortality, I deny the consequence.

You will say 4. According to the opinion of all theologians, man on account of the sin of Adam is not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts, but also wounded in his natural endowments: ergo he lost not only supernatural rectitude, but also that natural rectitude infused in him; otherwise he would only be said to be despoiled of gratuitous gifts. — I answer. That man is said to be wounded in his natural endowments is not with respect to human nature considered in pure natural conditions, but as it was created by God with original Justice, by which it had the power of rectifying and perfecting all natural things in order to every good connatural to man: which justice being lost through sin, that perfection of the natural powers also perished, and for that cause man is said to be wounded in his natural endowments. But if anyone were created in pure natural conditions, he would not be of equal condition with man infected by original sin; for because the latter is debtor to original Justice, which he received in Adam, whereas the former is not at all, therefore the latter is guilty, the former not at all: and the loss of the vision of God, contingently incumbent upon both, is in the one a privation and penalty on account of sin; in the other a mere negation of dignity arising from the condition of nature.

Second Conclusion. — Original Justice was really distinct from and different from sanctifying grace.

This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor in 2 dist. 29 num. 1, where he says: What if original Justice were some supernatural gift? It does not follow, however, that it must be a principle of meriting. For it stands related to grace, which is the principle of merit, as the exceeding to the exceeded: exceeding indeed, because it joins the will more firmly to the ultimate end than grace does: for thus it joins according to some, that no venial sin was thought to be compatible with it; but Charity suffereth together. And according to the premises, at least it joined in such sort that it was easier and more delightful for him to suffer from some sadness of the inferior than to acquiesce in some inferior delight, withdrawing from the delight of the end. This faculty grace had not, together with which remains proneness to evil and difficulty in good. But it exceeds grace in this, that it joins to the end as to a supernatural good, and supernaturally by meriting the attainment of such a good: not so this gift, but it joined only to that good as fitting and delightful.

Secondly, sanctifying grace perfects man in order to the supernatural end, but not in order to the natural end, nor to the natural integrity and perfection of man: but this original Justice secured; they were therefore gifts diverse and pertaining to diverse ends and states of man. And as by original Justice man was not perfected supernaturally, because it was a gift of nature given to complete its integrity and perfection; so sanctifying grace, because it is of the supernatural order and directed to the supernatural state and end of man, had not the power of perfecting man naturally and in those things that pertain to the completeness of human nature: and since we can feign in our mind and conceive in thought some man perfect according to the whole integrity of nature and of its powers and their natural rectitude without supernatural sanctifying grace; for the natural order is diverse, nor does it depend essentially on the supernatural; it is consistent besides that original Justice was a thing distinct from sanctifying grace, and that it does not contradict its being able to be separated from it.

Lastly, thirdly, if original Justice were not distinct from sanctifying grace, it would follow that original justice ought to have been restored to Adam by penance, and to us by baptism: for Adam through penance recovered the grace he had lost through sin; and the same is given through the Sacrament of baptism also to the baptized: but the consequent is false: ergo also that from which it follows.

You will say. The effect of original Justice was to subject the sensitive appetite to the rational, and the soul to God: but this very thing sanctifying grace secures, and accordingly it seems not to be a diverse habit. — I distinguish the minor. That sanctifying grace secures the same with the same facility as original Justice, I deny; with some repugnance on the part of either appetite, I grant: and thus original Justice not only subjected the soul to God and the body to the soul; but it also secured this subjection without any reluctance, nay with the greatest complacency and delight of either subject part. Otherwise it happens in the subjection wrought by sanctifying grace: since this subjection is fulfilled only with the greatest difficulty; for although the Apostle had been illumined by sanctifying grace, and that preeminently, nevertheless he cried out groaning: I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind.

Third Conclusion. — Original Justice, adequately taken, was not one and a simple habit: but a manifold gift of God, by which the whole man would become upright and perfect: and therefore it desired not a single, but a various subject. Thus the Doctor in the place cited n. 1, where, after he had proved it necessary for man to have some supernatural gift whereby he might easily withdraw himself from sensible delights and moderate the sensitive appetite; he affirms again that other gifts were necessary in the inferior appetites, whereby they might be moved delightfully by the will according to right reason, even when they would abandon their own delights. "If it be said," he says, "that the inferior power of itself obeys reason delightfully, then it seems that something must be posited in the inferior power, whereby it is thus delightfully borne toward the delight of the will; for it does not seem that from the nature of that power it would be delightfully torn away from its delight; nor was it of its nature, inasmuch as it is inferior to the will, that it be delightfully torn from its delight by the will itself, because this essential order remains now, and yet now there is not such delight." For it would be necessary to posit in each inferior appetitive power individual gifts, so that each might be moved delightfully by the will through its own gift, and the will itself through its gift might move itself delightfully toward the inferior powers; and if there were such many gifts, nevertheless original Justice, which was in the will, was the chiefest. — By which it is evident how perversely certain Recent writers affirm

that the Doctor asserts original Justice to have been one single and simple habit, to be placed in the will alone. Original Justice, therefore, was the complex of all habits by which man became fitted to exercise expediently and perfectly all the actions befitting his nature. That it was not a single and simple habit is evident from this, that the faculties of our soul are some incorporeal and immortal, as mind and will: others mortal and corporeal, as those belonging to the sentient and nutritive soul: but how could it come about that one numerical habit should perfect so many powers distinguished not only in number and species but even in genus, especially since habit is distinguished by acts, and acts by objects? For in what power, I beseech, would that single habit of original Justice have been? If in the intellect, how would it have perfected the will? And even if it had been in both faculties, how nevertheless could it have made the powers of the sentient soul expedite and perfect for acting suitably to the judgment and command of reason? Therefore original Justice was not one habit, but contained all the habits that are needed for the completion of the integrity and rectitude of man and of all his faculties. — And so in the speculative intellect it contained all the speculative sciences of all things that can naturally be known by man, as Metaphysics, Physics, and all Mathematical disciplines. — In the practical intellect, concerning those things that man must do both privately and publicly, it had most exquisite prudence; also those arts which have an ingenuous and liberal use and honest delectation, as Agriculture, Music, Architecture, the art of painting and of sculpting. — In the will there were two habits: one toward God, namely of Religion, which renders worship and honor to God as the supreme principle of all things and their natural end, both by interior veneration of mind and by external rites and ceremonies: the other toward one's neighbor, namely of Justice, which is divided into distributive and commutative. — In the sensitive appetite, which is twofold, irascible and concupiscible, there were the moral virtues, by which they are gifted and rendered obedient to reason, namely Temperance and Fortitude: for it is natural that powers be perfected through their habits: and this is the natural mode whereby each several power is perfected, that it may be fit to perform its functions as it ought. And all the aforesaid habits original Justice contained in the most perfect, and, as they call it, heroic degree.

You ask: whether in the state of Innocence the sensitive appetite was so subjected to reason that it would never rise against its prescription, neither resisting it nor anticipating it?

The Doctor answers in 2 dist. 29 num. 1 that nothing certain can be determined in this matter: "For it can be said," he says, "that if original Justice in the soul had that effect, namely to make perfect tranquillity in the soul as regards all powers, so that the inferior nature would not incline against the judgment of the superior, or if it inclined as far as in it lies, it could yet be regulated and ordered by the superior without difficulty of the superior and without sadness of the inferior: since the fluctuating power had not this in pure natural conditions, it is necessary to posit in it a supernatural gift, whereby that tranquillity may be in the soul. Then it is asked: but is never by this removed all rebellion, so that the inferior power delightfully withdraws itself from its own proper delight?" "I answer," he says, "if the will delightfully abstains by condelighting with the inferior power, the whole man delightfully abstains from the delight of the inferior sensitive appetite: but not the whole man abstains without sadness if that inferior itself abstains with sadness: for this belongs to man simply, that it belongs to him according to his superior power, nor is it denied to him on that account, even though it does not belong to him according to his inferior power." He adds, moreover: nor perhaps is it necessary to posit that any sense of appetite could then be saddened, and hearing hear a shameful delectable thing, and either could offend the sensitive appetite, as a fitting sensible could delight; but the will would then have used well those sadnesses and delights of the inferior appetites, so that it would not have been immoderately saddened by the inferior appetites, as it would have used well their delights, not immoderately condelighting. By which the Doctor leaves it in doubt what is to be held concerning the proposed question. — Nevertheless I should believe it more probable that in that happy state of original Justice the motions of the sensitive appetite were so subject to reason that they never resisted it nor outran it: otherwise there would seem to be no difference between the state of innocence and of integral nature, and between the state of fallen nature repaired by the grace of Christ. And the Apostle proves this opinion, Romans 7, where he affirms that the rebellion of flesh against spirit arose chiefly from sin. Saint Augustine also teaches, lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 19, where he says: The motions of the appetite before sin in Paradise were not vicious. For they were not moved against right will toward anything: whence it would be necessary for them to be restrained by reason governing as with bridle-reins. For that now they are so moved, and in those who live temperately, and justly, and piously, are modified by restraining and bridling them, some more easily, some with more difficulty, is assuredly not health from nature, but languor from guilt.

You ask: How would it have come about that in that state the rational will, naturally conjoined to the sensitive appetite, would not be allured and affected by its delights, and would abstain from them of itself, without any difficulty or molestation? — The Doctor answers in the same place, that this happened because the will was held with a far greater delight about its object than was sensible delight: for it was more delightful to it to adhere to its ultimate end, and to those things ordered to that end, than to enjoy the pleasures of the senses.

This question, celebrated among Theologians as well, comprises for us three principal difficulties: First, it is debated whether Adam, at his first rising, and from the very instant of his creation, possessed sanctifying grace, or rather received it afterwards. Second, whether his grace was so great that it would exclude every sin whatsoever, even venial. Third, whether, had Adam always remained innocent, all his posterity would have been born confirmed in grace.

Notandum 1. From the Seraphic Doctor, in 2. dist. 21. art. 1. qu. 1. ad 3.

That grace is said to be a perfection of nature, not only because it assists, but also because it excludes its defect: whence in every nature of a rational creature there is some natural defect which by grace is to be excluded, however perfect that nature may be in the genus of creature: and therefore it does not follow that if something befits anyone by grace, it befits him by nature. And if it be objected that God could have given to nature what He gave to grace, it must be said that nature was not apt to receive it: for as the nature of a moral work is one thing, and of a natural work another, and the property of a moral work cannot befit a natural work unless it would cease to be natural: for praise and blame, which is the property of a moral work as such, cannot belong to a natural work as such: so, in like manner, neither can the property of grace befit nature.

Such are his words. Now all Princes of Theology agree that Adam had sanctifying grace before his fall: for thus the greater number of holy Fathers judge, whom the Master of the Sentences reports in 2. dist. 29, and the Councils of Orange and of Trent define the truth well: for the latter in Session 5, in the decree On original sin, Canon 1, has thus: if anyone shall not confess that the first man, when he had transgressed the commandment of the Lord in Paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted, etc.: let him be anathema. It is clear, therefore, that Adam had holiness and justice before the fall: for no one loses what he has not. But Theologists contend among themselves in resolving whether Adam was created with sanctifying grace, or whether he received it after his creation. The former part Saint Thomas defends, p. 1. qu. 95; the latter, however, Hugh of Saint Victor upholds, lib. 1. De Sacramentis. p. 6. Alexander of Hales, p. 2. q. 91. Saint Bonaventure, in 2. dist. 29. art. 2. qu. 2, and likewise the Subtle Doctor, the same distinction, num. 7.

Notandum 2. From the same, there, art. 3. q. 2.

That the efficacy of merit comes principally from three things, namely from the difficulty of the work, from the promptitude of the will, and from the greatness of charity. The difficulty of the work contributes much to merit: and so much so that a man who is of far less charity than an Angel can merit so as to arrive at angelic sublimity, as is gathered from what is said of John the Baptist. He that is lesser in the kingdom of Heaven is greater than he. For it is not to be doubted that John was exalted to the orders of the excellent Angels. And yet according to the state of the way he was of less charity than any of them. Promptitude of the will also contributes very much, but a will is prompt for merit according to that which it has accepted: however great the grace in a man may be, unless the will be consonant with grace, it will never elicit meritorious works: and the more the will is subject to grace and conformed to it, the more is man exercised in meritorious works. The greatness of charity is more principal among all things that contribute to merit, because according to its quantity the recompense of substantial reward is measured. For the weight of love is that which gives value to meritorious works. If, therefore, a comparison of the efficacy of meriting in gratuitous gifts be made according to the state after the fall, and according to the state before the fall, it can be answered that as to the first condition, namely as to difficulty, the virtues now are more efficacious than they were then.

For now virtue is assailed more, and by being assailed is proved and examined, than then, as appears in the holy Martyrs.

Notandum 3. Three genera of venial sin can be distinguished: one indeed befalls a man by the surreption of sensuality: another arises from some sudden and undeliberate movement of reason, as is the first movement of infidelity or of despair: these two genera of venial sin certainly could not have fallen in the state of innocence, since in it sensuality was so subject to reason that it neither overstepped its command nor refused its moderation. Reason itself, moreover, was so disposed, and so confirmed by divine gift, that nothing went forth into act except perfected by the counsel, deliberation, and election of man. But besides these two genera of venial sin there is a certain third, which from its genus is venial by reason of the imperfection of the act and the levity of the matter; such is an idle word, and a lie either jocular or officious: which genus of venial sin the Doctor contends could be admitted in the state of innocence, in 2. dist. 21. lib. 3. But Alexander of Hales protests against it, 2. par. collat. 2. On sins; Saint Thomas, 1. 2. qu. 89. art. 9.; Saint Bonaventure, the same distinction, art. 3. qu. 1, although he does not deny that the contrary opinion is probable; he affirms, however, that it is commonly not approved by the Doctors. And indeed, he says, that opinion has an improbability, if one attends to the perfection of the state and the rule of rectitude in which Adam was: from which he could not have departed, since he had nothing impelling him, except by contemning divine justice, and violating his innocence, and corrupting his nature: all which things make the first fault of Adam not venial but mortal, nor could it have been otherwise. And this is the common opinion which the Doctors today approve, that the first sin of Adam ought to have been not venial but mortal.

First Conclusion. — It is more probable that Adam was not created with sanctifying grace, but received it after his creation as a gift. Thus the aforesaid Doctors, and especially the Subtle One, who teaches that sanctifying grace was distinct from original justice, and stood to it as the exceeding to the exceeded. For original justice exceeded grace itself in things: for original justice not only subjected reason to God, but also sense to reason, and body to soul: moreover, it joined the mind to God more promptly, more delightfully, and more firmly: then, it admitted no sin, not only mortal, but not even venial: finally, it made man perform every moral good promptly and pleasantly and without any interior molestation. But sanctifying grace conquers and excels original justice in this, that it joins man to God more excellently, namely as to an end and supernatural good, and makes man truly pleasing and a friend of God, and His son, and heir of eternal life; and such that he can merit even de condigno eternal life.

Alexander of Hales proves this conclusion for us in the place cited, from this, that from it the majesty of power, the beauty of wisdom, and the order of divine goodness appear more manifestly;

so that, he says, by reason of the first He might be praised, by reason of the second revered, by reason of the third loved. To the praise of majesty it contributes that man was first created according to nature, then informed by grace, that he might know in himself that grace was the gift of God, and distinguish it from natural things, and, distinguishing, attribute it not to his own nature, but to God his Creator: and from this render thanks due to God: and thus the divine succor would not be made void, but would be spent upon the glory of the Helper. And this is what Augustine wills, De gratia et natura, saying: Better is the mercy of God by which He is assisted, when both Creator and Savior are known, than when the creature, as if sound and whole in its powers, is made void by the succor of the Savior. The beauty also of wisdom is manifested by this, that man is led to perfection gradually, and according to the progress of times: for it belongs to the wise to distinguish each thing according to the opportunity of time. Whence, since God could produce creatures into being, distinguish, and order them at once, He willed them first to be produced into being, and afterwards distinguished, and thirdly created, for the manifestation of His wisdom: so, although He could give to man nature, grace, and glory at once, that the beauty of order might be preserved, He willed first to make man in the state of a well-instituted nature; and afterwards to add the gift of grace; then to superadd the complement of glory. The order also of goodness is manifested in this: because divine goodness so communicates its goodness to the rational creature, as to grant it not only the effect of good, but also in a certain manner the power of cooperating, that so it may communicate itself more perfectly to such a creature. And therefore as He would not give glory to man unless there preceded in man in a certain manner the merit of condignity by the use of grace — for the work of charity merits all things ex condigno — so He would not give grace, except with a preceding merit of congruity through the good use of nature, that so man might be made more glorious and more praiseworthy.

Saint Bonaventure proves this same point in nearly the same manner. The reason, he says, why the Lord willed to give grace after natural things, when He could give both at once, is taken from a threefold order, namely from the order of wisdom, of goodness, and of justice. The order of wisdom required this, that as gratuitous being is of another genus than natural being, so it would be conferred on man at different times: and as the elements of the world were first created and distinguished in time before they were adorned, for the sake of commending the order of wisdom, so also it would be done concerning man, who is a lesser world. To the order of goodness also this was fitting, for by this order something is said to be ordered to its end; therefore grace is given to man in an ordered way when it is given to him as more useful and more fruitful: but the grace of God is the more useful and fruitful to us, the more pleasing to God we are on account of it; and therefore, as it ought to be given so that from the very order of giving it might be known that gift to be gratuitous, therefore it was not infused from the creation, but upon a nature already perfect and constituted: it was superinfused. The order also of justice required this; for God according to the common law requires some disposition and preparation on our part in order that He may infuse grace into anyone, either in him into whom He infuses it, as in an adult; or in another assisting, as happens in the case of an infant: and therefore grace was not created with man, but was deferred until man should in some manner dispose himself by act and use of reason to receive it, that so that word of Augustine (De verbis Apostoli, after the middle) might be verified in the first man, who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee. It is clear, therefore, that a manifold order required this, that man should first be made in natural things before > he should be adorned with gratuitous gifts.

It confirms 1. Grace agrees more with glory than nature with grace: but in man grace precedes glory: therefore by equal reason, indeed by much stronger reason, nature preceded in time the good of grace. — It confirms 2. By grace the marriage between God and the soul is made: but the law of marriage is that it be not made without mutual consent: therefore it seems that grace ought not to be given to any adult unless consent precede: if, therefore, Adam was first, before his nature could consent: therefore he had not nature and grace together. — It confirms 3. The gift of grace is fruitless unless it be foreknown of God: for no one can preserve grace in himself unless he be pleasing to God for it: therefore, since that which is superadded to naturals holds more the character of the gratuitous than what is naturally infused, and the gift of grace is merely gratuitous: therefore it seems that not from the very creation, but afterwards, the gift of grace was conferred on man.

Objection 1. That of Ecclesiasticus 7. God made man right: but the rectitude of man as to the soul, of which Scripture speaks, is measured by conversion to the last end simply, which is the effect of grace and charity. Likewise to the Ephesians 1. Paul speaks thus: Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth; that is, of true [holiness], according to the Hebrew phrase. By which words, according to the common exposition of the holy Fathers and Interpreters, the Apostle teaches that we are renewed by the merits of Christ to that justice and supernatural holiness in which we were at the beginning in Adam. The Council of Trent is also clear, in the Canon 3 of the place cited. — I answer. These and similar authorities are to be understood thus: not that God, as soon as He created man, at once endowed him with virtue and adorned him; but because He then made him disposed to receive grace and the virtues, as Alexander of Hales and the Seraphic Doctor say.

Objection 2. God made man perfect as to age, and as to knowledge from the beginning of his condition: therefore by equal reason it seems He made him perfect as to the rectitude of the will: but the rectitude of the will consists in the gift of grace; therefore it seems he had the gift of grace at the beginning of his condition. It is confirmed: God created the other corporeal creatures in a perfect state, and trees, for example, He created in that magnitude in which they could produce their proper natural fruits: therefore equally it was fitting that He create man in that state and perfection in which he could produce the meritorious fruits of eternal life, to which He had destined him; and presently that He adorn him with sanctifying grace, which is the root and principle of the merit of eternal life. — Alexander of Hales and the Seraphic Doctor answer, that it is not the same concerning the perfection of age and knowledge, as concerning the perfection of virtue: for the perfection of age and knowledge is not so far removed from the perfection of nature as is the perfection of grace; for man by the power of nature infused into him can arrive at perfect age, and can advance in knowledge: but never can man of himself acquire the perfection of grace; indeed it is necessarily required that it be infused by the Lord. To the confirmation they say, that there was not a like reason in the other creatures and in man; for of these there was not, nor ought to have been, but one perfection, namely the natural: but of man, as to the soul, a threefold one, namely natural, of grace, and of glory: which ought to have been distinguished according to the opportunity of time and of state.

You will say 3: God created man to His own image and likeness: but, as Saint Augustine expounds, the image is in natural things, the likeness in gratuitous things: therefore man was created both in natural things and in gratuitous things. — The same answer, that the likeness is there understood in graces freely given: or it must be said that God is said to have made man to His image and likeness, not because when He at once gave the image, He also at the same time gave the likeness, but because He gave the one, namely the image, and made him apt for the other, namely for the likeness, which afterwards He gave him according to place and time; whence as far as the force of the words goes, it cannot be concluded that the image of God and the likeness were in man at once and together.

Second Conclusion. — While the state of innocence persevered, man could have sinned venially: and therefore the first sin of Adam could have been not mortal. Thus the Subtle Doctor in the place cited: and he proves this truth thus, num. 1. The rectitude of innocence more repugns mortal sin than venial: for if, notwithstanding his rectitude, he could have sinned mortally: therefore much more could he have sinned venially, even while it remained in the state of innocence: otherwise venial sin would less repugn the rectitude of innocence than mortal, if it would corrupt it entirely. — Second, from one extreme to the other there is no passage except through a mean: but venial sin is a mean between justice and mortal sin: therefore, etc. — Third, if man could not have sinned venially in the state of innocence, it would be chiefly because he had some intrinsic gift incompatible with venial sin: but this is false: therefore. The minor is proved: because no intrinsic gift can be assigned in that state more incompatible with venial sin than the gifts of faith, hope, charity, and the moral virtues infused per se, if such moral virtues be given, and those acquired are incompatible with it: but these gifts are not incompatible with venial sin, as appears in the most holy men, who without doubt can sin venially even without the loss of those gifts: therefore the state of innocence, as to all the intrinsic gifts it included, could be compatible with venial sin. Moreover, original justice did not unite man to God more than the most excellent sanctifying grace, which is granted to wayfarers: but sanctifying grace, however small, can be found and subsist with venial sin, as it was in the Apostles: therefore likewise original justice could subsist with venial sin in Adam.

Pontius confirms it from this, in the same place: When, he says, it is said that venial sin would take away the state of innocence and its supreme rectitude, either this is understood of the innocence and rectitude as to all things that state included, or as to some things, which being subsequently taken away, the rectitude and innocence which existed antecedently would not remain integral. But the first is manifestly false, because venial sin ought not to take away faith, hope, or charity, nor sanctifying grace, which without doubt are involved in the state of innocence. The second likewise can by no means stand: for that which venial sin would take away would be either a negative thing or an absolute thing: if they were certain negations, certainly none other than the negation of venial sin itself, which without doubt can be of the reason of innocence and rectitude; for he is more innocent and more right who has no sin than he who has some: but although venial sin would take away this part of innocence and rectitude, Adam would not on that account cease to be simply just and innocent; nor would it follow that it would be mortal sin, if he lost this part of his innocence and rectitude: therefore, etc. If it had taken away something positive, especially something of the intensity of some habit or act of virtue, which he would elicit if he had not committed venial sin, and with which venial sin would not be compatible: but either it would not diminish anything of any habit of virtue: or, if it did diminish, it would not be mortal sin to diminish it, as neither is it mortal sin in us to diminish something of the intensity of a virtuous habit, if we do so by losing [grace] venially. Therefore venial sin would not overthrow the state of innocence.

The Doctor himself confirms 2. this truth in the same place: There is given some act which from its genus, that is, from the side of light matter about which it is occupied, is only venial sin, when namely no prescription of a superior intervenes, by which it is prohibited under mortal [sin]; for example a light lie and an idle word: but God did not prohibit all acts of this kind to Adam under mortal sin, for such a prohibition cannot be found: therefore if Adam had done such an act, as in truth he could have; for he could have said an idle word and jested with his wife: therefore in that state he could sin venially.

You will say 1: Every sin is a certain disorder of man: but any disorder whatever repugned the supreme rectitude, in which man innocent was constituted according to all his parts and faculties, both of soul and of body: therefore in that state venial sin also repugned. The major is evident; the minor is proved: that repugns rectitude which destroys it: but the disorder of sin of any kind destroys rectitude: therefore, etc. — The Doctor denies the minor in the same place, n. 1. For not, he says, would any sin whatever have corrupted that rectitude, whether actual or habitual, which man would have had in the state of innocence, and which would concern that state, either as its essence, or as its property, or accident; for mortal sin far more repugns innocence and rectitude than any venial sin whatever: but this would not be true, if any venial sin whatever excluded that rectitude equally with mortal. And as with habitual knowledge an actual opinion can stand, because these two do not repugn one another, so with the supreme habitual rectitude of the state of innocence an actual venial sin could consist. Moreover, as with a preeminent meritorious act venial sin of vainglory can subsist, and this would not take away the merit of that act, so it seems that with the supreme actual rectitude venial sin could stand.

You will urge: Here, if these things were true, it would follow that venial sin could also stand with the state of beatitude; since from the aforesaid answer, venial sin could subsist with an act of the most preeminent charity, such as is in the Blessed: but the consequent seems erroneous: therefore also the antecedent from which it follows. — The Doctor answers, that although the Blessed perhaps could sin on account of his liberty, speaking of physical power; yet that act would not be venial sin, because indeed the Blessed has the precept of continuing always the act beatific, and of loving God as much as he can; nor would he be judged to love Him thus if he should offend Him even lightly in any way. It can also be answered otherwise, by denying the consequence: because indeed the Blessed has something by which he is morally determined not to sin venially, namely the very vision and beatific love, by which he is borne so sweetly and with all his powers into God, that nothing repugnant and displeasing to God can adhere; but an innocent man would not have similar things: therefore there is no parity.

You will say 2. If man in the state of innocence could have committed some venial sin, either he would have grieved for it, or he would have grieved not at all: if he had grieved, that grief and sadness would have been a punishment of the soul, contrary to the joy with which man in that state enjoyed fullness everywhere; if he had grieved not at all, this very thing would have aggravated his fault, and made him worse and worthy of graver punishment. It is confirmed: venial sin is evil per se, for the avoiding of which, namely, however small a punishment of the body it is right to undergo: hence when it has been committed, conscience doubles the remorse, and penitence has necessarily annexed to it; but these repugn the most felicitous state of innocence: For there was nothing, as Augustine writes, lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 10. that would offend the flesh or mind of man living felicitously in that state.

For there was in him a tranquil security from sin, which remaining, there was no evil at all that could sadden him from any quarter. And in the same book, cap. 26. The sum, he says, was in the flesh health, in the mind entire tranquillity: as in Paradise there was no heat or cold: so in its inhabitant there approached no offense of good will from cupidity or fear, nothing at all sad, nothing was vainly glad: for joy was made perpetual from God, into whom charity burned from a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith unfeigned.

All which things, as is evident, repugn the state of innocence; therefore venial sin equally repugned it. — I answer, that if an innocent man had committed a venial sin, he could indeed have grieved for it, with that grief, namely, which would not overthrow the happiness of the state, but only somewhat diminish it. For as he could by venial sin somewhat diminish the fervor of charity and the purity of innocence, so equally could he by his own will shake the pleasantness and felicity of his state. Therefore I confess that in that felicitous state there was nothing at all that would offend the soul and flesh of man, except insofar as he himself freely willed this to be in him. There would equally be in his soul the supreme tranquillity, so long as he himself did not disturb it by sinning lightly: nor finally was any vain joy in him, which would be mortal; yet some joy vain venially could well be in him, which he could admit at his pleasure. By which things it easily becomes sufficient for the authority of Saint Augustine. Add that Saint Augustine speaks only of that which in fact happened: for it is likely that Adam in fact admitted no venial sin before his mortal transgression: but Saint Augustine does not speak of what would have happened, if that felicitous state of innocence had long persevered.

You will urge. Any fault, even the lightest, repugns more the felicity of the state of innocence than any punishment or bodily infirmity whatever; since the former is a greater evil and greater misery: but from Saint Augustine man in the state of innocence would suffer no infirmity, no molestation of body: For neither, says Saint Augustine, would he hunger nor thirst, nor would any molestations in or from his body be inflicted on any of his senses: whence as the divine providence looked to directing creatures for that state so that none would harm man, so it looked to the same to preserve him from venial sin, which would be a far greater evil. — I distinguish the antecedent. It equally repugned on the part of the state, I concede: on the part of man freely acting, I deny. I confess, therefore, that on the part of the state of innocence the offense and sadness of the soul repugned as much as the molestation of the body, if indeed man, as endowed with supreme liberty, had always most faithfully adhered to his author by love and contemplation: but since by his liberty he could have voluntarily exceed or fail lightly in some things, he could also sin lightly, and therefore freely incur a light molestation and offense of body and soul. Whence in form I distinguish the minor: man in that state would not feel any molestation of body except such as he himself would freely procure for himself, I concede: he would not feel any which he would voluntarily and at his pleasure procure for himself, I deny. Whence to Saint Augustine I say, that in that state man would not hunger, nor suffer other molestations of body, except light ones, which indeed he himself would wish to experience and suffer according to his will. Hence the divine providence looked to keeping those molestations from innocent man which he himself would not wish to incur from his liberty; but not those which at his pleasure he would wish to experience: wherefore the consequence must be denied: for as the providence of God did not look to removing from him bodily molestations which at his pleasure he would wish to assume, so neither did it look to that preventing, lest an innocent man some venial sin a... [truncated]

You will say 3. For the sin of the innocent first man a punishment is due, certainly none other than death: but death is not due for venial sin, but for mortal: therefore the first sin of innocent man necessarily ought to have been mortal, and therefore could not have been venial. — The Doctor denies the major; for to that sin committed there could correspond not some punishment of the body, but a displeasure of the mind at its admission: also that venial sin could be expunged by a more fervent act of charity, and a greater effort applied in fulfilling the divine service. Or finally, if some corporeal punishment had to be inflicted, there was no need that it be death: for the separation of the soul from the body fell as punishment on account of the separation of the soul itself from God by mortal sin. Since, therefore, by venial sin the soul would not have been severed from God, neither was it to be punished with bodily death, but only with some light punishment of soul or body, which would not repugn that most felicitous state.

You will say 4. In that felicitous state the superior faculties would be perfectly ordered to God: therefore there would be no obliquity in the inferior: but by venial sin obliquity is made: therefore this would not be admitted in that state. The first consequence is proved: obliquity cannot be in the inferior unless it has first been in the superior: but no obliquity can be in the superior, so long as they are perfectly ordered: therefore, etc. — The Doctor answers, num. 4. That not every disorder in the superior power is mortal sin: a light movement made by surreption concerning some opinion about the articles is a disorder in the portion or in the superior power, for it can be about such an object as cannot be considered except by the superior powers, as that God is three and one, and yet not every light movement there is mortal sin: although sin in the superior power is graver than in the inferior: by which he understands by the superior portion the will and intellect, insofar as they are borne to God; by the inferior, indeed, the same faculties as they regard other things.

It will be objected. by the Thomists, by our Haedus: In venial sin, either it would be by surreption, or by suggestion, or by deliberation, or by passion: by none of these would it be: therefore there would be none. The major is clear from the division of the parts. The minor is thus proved through the parts: First, it would not be by surreption, because surreption arises from the tumult of appetite and sense, which there would be none in that state. Second, it would not be by suggestion, because the devil would not suggest by temptation what he knew could stand with the integrity of that state in the opinion of Scotus, but that which could not stand with it: and accordingly he would suggest mortal sin, not venial. It would not be by deliberation, because since the will would be right and joined to the last end, it would not admit a light disorder from it, which it could easily avoid, since the intellect would represent it as incompossible: nor could he propose it as useful or delectable, since only a vehement delectation, which would induce mortal fault, could turn that will right and adhering to God. It could not be by passion, since since there would be no struggle nor dissension between the parts of the soul, there was not whence passion or perturbation would exist. From which enumeration it comes about that every venial sin would be excluded from that state. Such are his words. — He himself answers that in truth indeed in that state it could not have been sinned venially by the suggestion of concupiscence, but well by the suggestion of the devil, who could have tempted man lightly and induced him into something that would not be altogether conformable to the divine ordination. He could also have sinned venially by deliberation, for example from a light delectation which he would have perceived in laughing at a beautiful thing, hearing a pleasing sound, tasting sweet food, lightly pleasing himself in his own perfection, and not referring these to God as last end: for from the levity of the matter that sin, grave from elsewhere, could have been venial. Certainly whoever shall have seriously attended how easily venial sin is admitted, will not there deny that it could creep in in many ways.

You will say 5. If man in the state of innocence could commit some venial sin, for example utter a jocose lie, it would follow that from that actual lie often repeated there could be generated a habit of lying: but a habit of this kind repugns the state of original justice: therefore also the potency to sin venially, whether from imperfect deliberation, or from the object, or from the smallness of the matter. The consequence of the major is evident; for if man can in original justice commit some venial sin once, he can also commit it again and again: for no reason of disparity can be assigned: for from repeated acts a habit is generated. But the minor is persuaded: a vicious habit, such as would be produced from the aforesaid acts, since from its nature it inclines the will to evil, and consequently infuses into it some difficulty in the avoidance of sin and the prosecution of good, evidently repugns the perfection and felicity of the state of innocence: therefore, etc. — I deny the consequence of the major; for man constituted in the state of innocence, even if he admitted some venial sin, nevertheless on account of the perfect charity by which he would burn toward God, would not only wash it away by a more ardent act of charity, but would also be so displeased with himself on account of that venial admission, that he would expend all care and all diligence that hereafter he would decline a similar fall: and therefore it would not be to be feared that from a venial sin once admitted, by repeated acts of the same, a vicious habit would be generated.

You will say 6. That venial sin in that state would be either remissible or irremissible: but neither can be said: therefore there would be none. The major is clear as to the second part; for there is no reason why sin venial from its nature should be judged unworthy of pardon and remission. The first part also is evident; for if it were remissible, especially by some remedy, for example by a sacrament, or sacrifice, or some good work. But in that state of innocence sacraments and sacrifices do not seem fitting, since they were instituted for the remedy of infirmity and the supplement of the defect of the creature: but in that state there would be no defect. Similarly good works are not expiatory of venial sin, except insofar as they are satisfactory: but in that state there would be no satisfaction, which is expended only on account of an injury inflicted; but this infliction of injury toward God would not be venial fault, but mortal. Therefore etc. — I answer: that sin would indeed be remissible by more fervent acts of charity, or by the sacraments to be instituted, not indeed for repairing, but for increasing grace; and also by the sacrifices which could have been instituted for the honor of God and His supreme and excellent worship. There accrues to the confirmation of these things that in truth Adam seems to have sinned venially before mortal sin, as Saint Augustine teaches in many places, especially lib. De Gen. ad litt., cap. 5.: Nor is it to be thought, he says, that which was about to cast down man, unless there had preceded in the soul of man a certain elation to be repressed. There the word "about to cast down" signifies that Adam had not yet fallen from the state of innocence or grace. But the word "elation" signifies a preceding swelling of mind in which some fault inhered, not indeed yet mortal, but venial; from which, however, the devil conjectured that if he were tempted, he would sin more gravely. Now therefore before Adam sinned mortally by the transgression of the precept, he had sinned by a light and venial fault of elation. But if you say this was mortal sin: against [this], the devil was not about to cast down man, since he himself was already cast down, nimi... [truncated]

Third Conclusion. — If Adam had remained innocent, his posterity would have been confirmed in sanctifying grace: not indeed

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THEIR NATIVITY, BUT WHEN THEY HAD VANQUISHED AND SURMOUNTED THE FIRST TEMPTATION ASSAILING THEM. This is the doctrine of the Doctor in 2. dist. 20. quaest. 1. where he distinguishes a twofold confirmation: One, by which the ability to sin, even venially, is taken away: the other, by which sinning de facto is taken away. — The first befits only the comprehensors and the blessed: For the inability to sin, he says, cannot befit a wayfarer, otherwise there would be a contradiction, because certitude of beatitude is the greatest part of beatitude; but the inability to sin would then be knowable by anyone, as now the ability to sin is certain to us. But this infallible certitude of beatitude can befit only a comprehensor. Moreover, the will of wayfaring man in the state of innocence would not be fully satiated by some sensible good; and therefore it would not be so determined to some object that it could not desire another, even a prohibited one; and presently it could sin, and thus it would not be confirmed in grace. Finally, as long as in the object of the will of the wayfarer there is a defect of good, the will of the wayfarer can fail from rectitude by willing it, not according to the due circumstance; but as long as man is a wayfarer, an object cannot be joined to his will in which is the reason of all good: therefore as long as he is a wayfarer, he can fail from rectitude: and consequently he could sin; and therefore no wayfarer can be so confirmed in grace that he excludes the infallible potency of sinning. — But the latter confirmation in grace could have befit men in the state of innocence; namely so that they would never have sinned, nor consequently have lost justice, on account of a special, namely, assistance of divine providence, which would ward off the occasions of sinning: I say, says the Doctor, n. 3., that if a mere wayfarer could be confirmed, and the sons in the state of innocence had been in justice thus confirmed, namely after they had vanquished the first temptation, as the first father would have been confirmed if he had resisted the first temptation in that justice, which he would then have received for his sons... because all would have had it... [truncated]

By which the Doctor teaches three things: First, that the posterity of Adam could have been confirmed in grace: Second, that they would not have been thus confirmed by reason of the state of innocence, nor by the hereditary transfusion of the justice of the fathers into the sons; Third, that in fact they would be confirmed in grace as soon as they had vanquished the first temptation. — The first is clear, and Saint Anselm teaches it openly, lib. 1. Cur Deus homo cap. 38. In that justice, he says, in which the first men were constituted, it seems that if they had vanquished so as not to sin when tempted, they would be confirmed with all their propagation, so that they could sin no further: just as because, vanquished, they sinned, so were they weakened that, as far as in them lies, they cannot be without sin. By reason also this same is clear: for God confirmed many even after the fall in grace, as is clear of the Apostles and other eminent Saints: therefore much more would He have confirmed the posterity of Adam if they had preserved justice; for it is easy for God, in every occasion in which they could sin, to grant them efficacious grace, through which they would not sin, although absolutely and simply they could sin in every such occasion. Moreover, it is easy for God so to order things by divine providence that no grave temptation would befall man which man could not vanquish, so that although he could sin, nevertheless de facto he would nowhere sin, on account of that divine assistance. — The second also is clear, namely that the sons of Adam would not have been confirmed in grace by reason of the state of innocence, nor by the right of inheritance; Since, says the Doctor, that justice is a supernatural gift, it would be given to the offspring from mere divine liberality, as it was given to the Parent, who, if he had resisted the first temptation, would have been confirmed in that justice, because he would nowhere have lost it by sinning. Finally, inquiring whether the son would have been confirmed from the beginning of his nativity? He answers: I say not, because the son would not have received a more perfect justice than the father: but the father could lose it, and did lose it: therefore also the son: nor indeed did that justice necessitate... [truncated]

You will say 7. If the state of innocence had persevered, none of the evil would have been reprobate, as the Doctor himself teaches, and also Saint Gregory, 1. Moralia: therefore none of his posterity could sin; and consequently all would be born confirmed in grace, not only before the first temptation vanquished, but even from the very beginning of their nativity. — The Doctor denies the first consequence: both because, although the posterity of Adam could sin, and perhaps also would in truth have sinned mortally, from this it would not follow that they would be reprobate: for they could recover lost grace by contrition, and God could from liberality and mercy institute remedies for expiating those sins, as indeed He instituted many after the fall; so that finally they would persevere finally in the state of innocence until they were translated into Heaven.

You will say 8. Good merit is far more efficacious and powerful than evil and sin: but the sin of Adam was the cause that his sons were born sinners: therefore his own good merit would be the cause that they be born just, and confirmed in grace. — The Doctor answers, first by distinguishing the major: good merit is more efficacious than evil, insofar as by a good conversion we are more efficaciously reconciled to God than many antecedent evils had been efficacious for impeding that reconciliation, he concedes the major: insofar as good could serve more for the justification of others than evil for their defilement, he denies. — He answers 2. by denying the consequence: because as the evil of Adam was not the cause why his posterity were confirmed in evil, but only why they be born evil: so his own good merit ought not to be the cause why they be born confirmed in good, but it would suffice that it be the cause why they be born good.

You will say 9. When one opposite is the cause of some effect similar to itself, the other opposite will likewise be the cause of the other effect similar to itself: but the injustice of Adam is the cause why the sons are born unjust: therefore his justice, if it had been present, would be the cause why the just be born. — The Doctor denies the major, if it be understood universally; for although by the sin of intemperance, for example, one could lose eternal beatitude, it does not from this follow that by the act of temperance one could attain that beatitude. Or, as the Doctor says, a corporeal quality can generate a corporeal quality, as heat heat; yet it does not from this follow that the incorporeal quality opposed to it can also produce an incorporeal quality; for an incorporeal quality is produced immediately by God alone.

You will say 10. The posterity of Adam before the first temptation surmounted would have had the same supernatural gift for repugning sin that would have been granted them after the temptation vanquished: therefore also before they would have been confirmed in grace. The consequence is clear: The antecedent is proved: the gift of confirmation, of which we speak, is nothing else than that divine benefaction by which sin could be guarded against, as often as the occasion of sinning should offer itself: but men would have had a gift of this kind before the first temptation vanquished, on the hypothesis that they had vanquished it; for they could not have vanquished it by the proper powers of nature; and therefore they had need of some supernatural gift, by which they would be made more vigorous for repugning the occasions of sin: therefore truly before the vanquished temptation they would have had the same gift of confirmation as afterwards. — I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say, that that gift of confirmation would not have been any divine benefaction whatever, by which sin could be guarded against: but it would have been that aid which from its nature would have the infallible power of morally removing the will from sin, although physically, on account of its innate liberty, it could have sinned. Which gift indeed was not granted to Adam himself from the instant of his formation; otherwise he would not have fallen: nor consequently would it be to be granted to his posterity, even if he had stood; for the condition of the sons ought not to be better than that of the parents. Whence although before sin Adam had some divine benefaction through which he could not sin: nevertheless that benefaction granted from heaven did not remove from itself infallibly his will from sinning; since in fact he succumbed to temptation: and therefore that divine benefaction was not the gift of confirmation, but only an aid sufficient for surmounting the temptation, which being vanquished there would have been conferred on him some supernatural gift more efficacious and more powerful, by which he could repugn sin.

Note 1. Moses, after he had said that man was made to the image of God, immediately added: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth. By which words he indicates that dominion and empire over all living creatures was given to man: since it was most fitting that he whom God had made like unto Himself in the dignity of nature, He should also make like unto Himself in the authority and power of ruling; for dignity bereft of powerful protection, as it were unarmed and weak, gradually grows vile. Moreover, Moses by this one argument above all wished to declare that man was made to the image of God, namely that as God presides over and commands the whole world, so man, as it were the Vicar of God, presides over all animals and bears dominion over them. Hence all the holy Fathers and Doctors of Theology agree that the empire of man over the brute animals was universal: Theodoret alone seems to cry out against it, who in question 20 on Genesis judges that those huge fishes which we call Cete and whales were not made for the sake of man, nor are subject to his empire. It must be observed, he says, that not all animals were created for the sake of man, but only those over which he is said to rule: namely the fishes of the sea, the fowls of the air, and the cattle of the earth: perhaps also the creeping things of the earth, on account of the necessary use of the medicines which are compounded from them; yet those huge Cete and the wild beasts of the earth were not made for the sake of man... Man therefore does not rule over those huge Cete, nor over the beasts, which perhaps were not created from the beginning on his account. But this opinion of Theodoret, as being less true, the other holy Fathers reject.

Note 2. There are four ways by which it can be brought about that an animal, however savage and truculent, be reduced to the power and use of man: First indeed by certain secret means, which consist of certain fixed words and charms, and are called incantations, as happens especially in the case of Serpents; hence the royal psalmist praises the asp, that it stoppeth its ears, lest it hear the voice of one charming. Second, by changing the soil, and varying the customary food: for if Lions be transferred to very cold regions, and be nourished and fatted with softer and better food, they gradually relax their ferocity, lay down their strength and the ardor of their spirit, and become daily less vigorous. Third, by kindness: for animals cast off their rage and ferocity toward those by whom they are cared for, fed, and kindly treated, whom they not only do not harm, but with whom they even play familiarly, and whom they fawn upon: indeed they suffer themselves to be beaten by them; of which thing Pliny records very many and wondrous examples in book 8 concerning Lions and Elephants. Fourth and finally, by art and industry animals are not only compelled to obey man, but are also taught to comply with his words and every nod, and to do what is commanded: hence Magpies and Parrots learn to utter even human words, and many other birds learn to pour forth very many songs.

Note 3. The dominion of man over men is twofold: one indeed servile, the other however civil and liberal. The first is over slaves, subjected voluntarily and in hope of wages, or by compulsion and through violence to masters commanding; the other is over free men, who of their own accord chose one man or many, by whom, according to prescribed laws, they might be ruled and governed. Now between these two kinds of ruling one may observe a twofold distinction, since empire over slaves is compelled and violent, and therefore involuntary and bitter; but over free men it is voluntary and pleasant, inasmuch as it was voluntarily chosen and undertaken by them for the sake of their own good. Moreover, empire over slaves is wholly directed and referred to the good and profit of the one ruling; wherefore it cannot but be burdensome and odious to subjects: for it is against the natural appetite of man that whatsoever he does and labors at should redound not to his own, but to another's utility. But empire over free men is referred not to the good of the ruler, but of the subjects, or rather to the public and common good. Whether, then, one or the other, or both of those empires flourished in the state of innocence, is here to be determined.

First Conclusion. — Not only in the state of innocence did man have empire over all brute animals; but even after the Fall, although with lesser authority, he still retains it. This conclusion has two parts, of which

The first is openly delivered in holy Scripture, not only in those words of Genesis, chapter 1, verse 26, praised in the first Note, but also often elsewhere. Thus in Psalm 8: Glory and honor hast thou crowned him, and hast set him over the works of thy hands: all things hast thou subjected under his feet. And in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 17, where there is described of what sort man was when created by God, we read among other things: He gave him power of the things that are upon the earth, he laid the fear of him upon all flesh, and he had dominion over the beasts and fowls, etc. Which indeed God wished to confirm and prove when he brought all living creatures to Adam, that he might impose names upon all and each of them; by this act, as it were, handing over to Adam possession of that dominion which he had over the animals, and bringing it about that all living creatures, each receiving its own name from Adam, should in a manner pledge to him subjection, obedience, and servitude, as soldiers and slaves are wont to do: for as often as they subject themselves either to a Commander or to a Hero, they receive a name from him, whereby they may be distinguished from the other fellow-soldiers, so that by this appellation, being called forth, they may become more prompt in obedience.

This same thing also natural reason urges; for when the natural order is restored, the administration and ordination of the best divine providence requires that the things which are more imperfect be subjected to superiors, and that inferior things be ruled by superiors and depend upon them: thus the Elements and Mixts serve for the food of plants; plants are nourishment for animals, and both for men. Therefore since man excels the brutes, and these lack prudence and reason, it was fitting that they be ruled through men; and for this cause man was begotten by nature naked and unarmed, destitute of all things; wherefore both the animals and whatsoever corporeal things were created by God for his clothing, arming, furnishing, and adorning were subjected to him.

The second part is also proved, namely that this dominion over the animals persevered in man even after the Fall: since after the Flood, Genesis 9, God said to Noe and his sons: Let your fear and dread be upon all the beasts of the earth, and upon all the fowls of the air, with all things that move upon the earth: all the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand: whence St. Ambrose, book 6 of the Hexaemeron: It is written, he says, that nothing in nature is taller and stronger than the Elephant, nothing more terrible than the Lion, nothing more savage than the Tiger: yet these serve man, and lay aside their nature by human training: they forget what they were born to: they put on what they are bidden. What more? They are taught like little ones, they serve like domestics, they are harnessed like the weak, they are beaten as the timid, they are corrected as the unruly: they pass into our ways, since they have lost their own motions. I confess indeed that the empire of man over the animals after the Fall is far different from that which obtained in the state of innocence; for then the use of this dominion was most full and most ample, and by no means laborious or difficult: for neither, so far as man was concerned, was there any impediment or difficulty, nor any resistance in the animals. Hence some Theologians teach that in the state of innocence the animals were subject and obedient to man, just as in man himself the inferior part was subject to the superior; therefore as reason then ruled most fully and entirely over the senses and affections, so man ruled over the animals. — But after the Fall that empire was greatly diminished, as to its use and execution; for we can command but few animals, nor do we command even these without great labor. Hence Hugh of St. Victor, in his annotations on Genesis, expounding those words, let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, says: Man ought to have dominion over all: but by sin he lost dominion, both over the greatest and over the least: he nevertheless retained dominion over the middle sort for his consolation. Over the greatest, as over Lions, he lost dominion, that he might know that he had lost his proper dignity: over the least he lost it, as over Fleas and Flies, that he might know his own frailty. Nevertheless even after sin, the animals, however fierce and stupid, obeyed exactly those men conspicuous for innocence and holiness. For to Eliseus, 1 Kings chapter 2, the Bears submitted in vengeance upon the boys who had insolently called him bald: and Daniel, chapter 6, dwelt familiarly, nay harmlessly, with hungry Lions for many days. We also read of the Seraphic Father Francis, and of St. Antony of Padua, that they called to themselves the very fishes, birds, and certain other animals at their pleasure, and held them in attendance as long as they willed. But other men, although with some difficulty, nevertheless even after the Fall rule over each kind of animals, subduing the beasts to their governance by their industry and sagacity of mind, and use them for service and custom, as is evident of Lions, Wolves, and also Fishes, which are taken either by hunting or by fishing, and pass into the use of man. — This indeed St. Basil weighed in a wondrous manner, Homily 10 on Genesis, where, speaking of the power given to man over the fishes, he gathers it from this, that the fishes fear even the shadow of man, and that by fishing they pass into his use. By what reason at last shall we distinguish, he says, the empire over the fishes? He answers: if thou shalt have pondered with thyself how the waters were terrified by the shadow of thy body, when thou hast presented thyself to the swimmers in the pool, obscure to any seer. What Master so governs his household with such authority: that when affairs at home are sometimes in confusion, if the master approach, he bestows tranquility upon them with no trouble of his own, and restores all things to order according to the comeliness of each, and renews them by the presence of himself alone as ruler: so that at the mere sight of a man every aquatic creature changes itself into another figure and habit? So much does the reason of a freer life and of uprightness avail it: not so does it now dare to come forth even to the surface of the sea or of the standing pool by swimming, that in such nativities it may breathe forth a magnanimity largely worthy of any; but if it behold man standing nearer to it, fleeing it trembles and withdraws: then, subjoining the manner in which the Cete and the Whales are taken, he concludes: Man, opulent, endowed with the principate of reason in seeking all things, recalls to duty and obedience the lingering, as it were fugitive and ill-disposed slaves, who are curved to him by no placable tenacity; these his own necessity compels to serve him, and they serve their Emperor. By these arguments indeed it becomes clear that there was implanted by the Maker Himself in all, from the cradle, the instinct of commanding, and a prerogative conceded to man established in every place and nation.

Second Conclusion. — In the state of innocence Some men were to have presided over others: not indeed by servile dominion, but civil: namely because it would have contained nothing violent, involuntary, or bitter mixed in.

It is proved first indeed, because this empire contributes most to the right and wise ordering of the human race; for all things are ordered more rightly where one obeys another, than where each fulfills his own will according to his own nod and judgment; hence quarrels, hence dissensions and contentions take their origin. Next, in the state of innocence the father would have had authority over his sons, and they would have obeyed their parents; and so civil and free empire was not repugnant to that state. Finally, if this civil dominion had been repugnant to the state of innocence, it would be chiefly on account of man's supreme integrity and liberty: but this did not conflict with civil empire itself; since there is no greater liberty, nor any more perfect rectitude, than in the blessed Angels: yet among them there is civil dominion itself: for superiors command inferiors: and so with better right could innocent men have commanded others, with that empire, namely, with which St. Augustine teaches that just men command others lib. 19. De Civit. Dei, cap. 15. For, he says, the just do not rule with a desire of domination, but with the duty of taking counsel for others: nor with the pride of presiding, but with the mercy of providing. This the natural order prescribes; so God made man.

You ask: Why therefore did God not say: Have dominion over men, as he said Have dominion over the fishes of the sea? etc. — I answer, it was fittingly so done, namely because dominion over the animals belongs to every man, since by reason of his being created to the image of God it accrues equally to all men: but truly the dominion of some men over other men does not belong to every man, but only to certain fixed men: nor does it accrue to them as they are men, but on account of their excellence of dignity, or prudence, or probity.

You will say: Woman was not reduced to the power of man except in punishment of sin; for God said, chapter 3 of Genesis, verse 16, denouncing punishment to the transgressing woman among other things: thou shalt be under the power of the husband, and he shall have dominion over thee: therefore in the state of innocence there was no dominion of the man over the woman, nor subjection of the woman to the man. — I answer, the subjection of the woman in the state of innocence was far different from that by which after the Fall she was reduced to the power of the man; for then that subjection would have been to the woman voluntary and pleasant, and wholly without molestation: both because the man would have commanded nothing of the woman except what was right and honest, and that with great equity and benevolence: and because the woman, since of her own accord she would have loved whatsoever was right and equitable, and whatsoever reason required to be done by her, would without doubt have willingly and gladly committed to execution whatsoever had been commanded her; then also because the woman, considering that she drew her origin from the man, and that she had been given to him by God for a helper, would with grateful mind have fulfilled all that had been entrusted to her by the man, that she might testify to him her gratitude and deference, and render the due assistance.

But it happened otherwise after the Fall; for this subjection of the woman under the power of the man is involuntary and bitter; and that for two causes: both because husbands often deal more harshly than is fitting with their wives, commanding them beyond what is good and equitable: then also because women, their nature corrupted and their will depraved, or on account of a certain natural lightness of wit and irascibility of mind, bear with difficulty being ruled by the man, and being subject to his empire. Moreover this depravity and perversity, both of the ruling man and of the obedient woman, was born of sin; and that molestation which subjection has annexed to it is truly a punishment of sin inflicted upon the woman: and so with merited right he said: Thou shalt be under the power of the husband, and he shall have dominion over thee. — All these things St. Augustine lucidly expounds, book 11 of De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 37, where he writes thus:

It must be judged, he says, in what manner properly that can be understood which was said to the woman: and thy turning shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee; for it is not fitting to believe that it was otherwise even before sin, than that the man should rule over the woman, and that she should be converted to him by serving him. Thus it can rightly be understood that this servitude is signified, which is of a certain condition rather than of love: so that even that servitude itself, which men afterwards began to serve the lusts of, may be found to have arisen from the punishment of sin. Paul indeed said: by charity serve one another, to the Galatians 5; but 1 Timothy 2: the Apostle permits not the woman to rule over the man: for the sentence of God gave this rather to the man, and he deserved to have the woman as his subject, not by nature, but by fault. Understand this of servile dominion; not of civil; for he said above that even before sin the woman was subject to the man, by love rather than by condition.

But Rupert observes, book 3 of De Operibus Trinitatis, chapter 21, that it is a heavier dominion for the wife to be subjected to the man as to a lord, than to be under the power of the man; For, he says, even according to the Roman laws, the woman is under the power of the man before she comes into the hand of the man: under the power of the man with impunity, yet again not as of a lord, but as of a tutor; so that without his authority it be not lawful for her to make a testament. But she who comes into the hand of the man, much more so long as the husband lives, shall not be permitted to make a testament without the man: whence the woman who comes into the hand of the man is said to be diminished in head. This law prevailed naturally also among the gentiles, Adam's law, who had neither read this scripture nor observed these sacred precepts of God, which the Lord of nature imposed, saying to the woman: thou shalt be under the power of the husband, and he shall have dominion over thee.

Corollary. — From all these things it becomes manifest that man was created good by God from the beginning; and consequently it is plainly and impiously a fiction of Saturninus and of other heretics thereafter, concerning two kinds of men, of whom some are by nature good, but others evil and perverse. Which error St. Irenaeus most vigorously assails in book 4 against heresies, chapter 12, and overthrows it from this, that God saw all the things that he had made, and approved them as very good. Moreover, if goodness and malice were inherent in men by nature, thence it would follow that neither the evil would deserve blame and punishment, nor the good praise and reward. Then the exhortations and counsels of the prophets, and likewise the precepts and promises of Christ the Lord, would be derisory and vain, unless it were free to every man to avoid evil, and to pursue and embrace good.

But if, says St. Irenaeus, some had by nature been made good, and others indeed evil; neither would these be praiseworthy because they are good, for such they had been made: nor would those be blameworthy, for they also had been so instituted. But since all are of the same nature, and able both to retain and to work good, and again able to lose it and not do it; justly also among sensible men, how much more with God, are some praised, and receive the worthy testimony of election of good and perseverance: but others accused, and receive worthy condemnation, in that they rejected the just and good? And therefore the prophets indeed exhorted men to do justice, and also to work good; because this takes place in us, and through much negligence we have fallen into forgetfulness, and have need of good counsel; wherefore also the good One will give good counsel through the prophets.

Then, subjoining very many oracles of Christ the Lord in the Gospel and admonitions of the Apostle, by which he exhorts men to good and deters them from evil, he concludes: If therefore it were not in us to do these things, or not to do them, what cause has the Apostle, and much earlier the Lord himself, to give counsel, that some things indeed be done, but certain others be abstained from! — On this matter Theodoret also is to be consulted, sermon 5, De natura hominis, where with very many texts of Scripture he lucidly proves that no men are evil by nature, but that it is free to every man to pursue good and to turn away from evil.

You will say: Those who are by nature children of wrath are also evil by nature; for God is angry with none but the perverse: but by the Apostle all men are by nature children of wrath; for he says to the Ephesians 2: we were by nature children of wrath even as the rest. — I answer first, those words do not favor the error of Saturninus; for there is not established a twofold kind of men, of which one is good, the other truly evil, but it signifies all as utterly hostile to God. — Secondly, I say that men are by nature children of wrath not from a perverse nature created by God, …mal by nature vitiated through the sin of the first parent and propagated through human generation, as St. Augustine lucidly expounds, sermon 11 De verbis Apostoli, where expounding these same words, he says: Nature is not accused, of which God is the author. Nature was instituted good by God: but the first will was conquered by the serpent. Therefore what was in Adam a vice, propagated to us, has been made of nature. The vice of nature, with which man is born, none releases, but he who was born without vice.

You insist. Those who are children of the devil are so by their nature, and not only through the propagation of hereditary evil: but certain men are children of the devil; therefore certain men are evil by nature. — I distinguish the major with St. Augustine in the same sermon 11 De verbis Apostoli, chapter 15: if they are children of the devil by reason of generation, I concede; if only by reason of imitation, I deny. Moreover impious men are called children of the devil only through imitation, not truly through origin. He is called, says St. Augustine, your father, whom in your manners you have imitated. He confirms this from the words of the Apostle: My little children, of whom I am in labor again, etc. But in what this birth consists, the same Apostle declares when he says: Brethren, be ye imitators of me. Whence St. Augustine adds: On account of this imitation it is said to the impious: you are of your father the devil. For it stands in the catholic faith that the devil neither begot our nature, nor created it: in him there is only the seduction of the one going before, the imitation of the one following.

You will object. He who is carried away by the impulse of nature into evil, even unwilling, is truly evil by nature, as the Apostle himself testifies, Romans VII. 15: For that which I work, I do not the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, that I do. But if I do that which I will not: it is now no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me: therefore etc. — I distinguish the major: he who is so carried away and induced into evil that he can in no way resist, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Moreover no one is so vehemently impelled into evil, whether from intrinsic concupiscence, or from external temptation, but that by liberty and by the help of God he can recoil from it. Whence the same Apostle, when he had subjoined: Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? answers: the grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord.

You will urge. The same Apostle immediately adds in the same place: I myself then with the mind serve the law of God: but with the flesh, the law of sin. Therefore there are certain men who by the impulse of the flesh, and consequently by nature, are carried into evil, even notwithstanding the divine help. — I answer, that evil, or law of sin of which the Apostle speaks, is not simply some evil; for that law of sin is nothing else than the irritation and stimulus of concupiscence, which from their nature and of themselves are not evil, nor formally sin, as has been sufficiently and more than sufficiently proved above.