Scotus Academicus, Tomus nonus: De Sacramentis in genere

NOTANDA 1. From the Doctor in dist. 6, q. 5, n. 2: in administering a Sacrament, two things can be considered—the Sacrament itself, a sensible sign of a sacred thing ordered to man’s sanctification, and what follows it, namely the end a minister may propose in conferring it, such as profit, grace, or overcoming temptations. Thus one intention regards confecting and validly administering the Sacrament, while another regards an end attained through it. That end is principal and remote, that the baptized become a child of the kingdom, and proximate and less principal, that he become a Christian or member of the Church militant; either may be intended universally or particularly. The question is which intention is required for valid confection and administration.

NOTANDA 2. Since a Sacrament may be considered materially, as composed of sensible things and words physically regarded, or formally and morally, as a sign of a sacred thing ordered to sanctification, so the Minister’s intention is interior or exterior. Exterior intends only to administer the Sacrament materially, employing its things and words without attention to their signification and moral efficacy. Interior intends to administer it formally, under the formal aspect of a Sacrament, knowing that the thing and words employed are ordered to man’s sanctification and salvation.

Interior intention is furthermore direct or indirect. Indirect does not intend the thing in itself but by reason of another, as homicide intended by a drunken man who directly intends only generous drinking while foreseeing the homicide; some call this interpretative. Direct intends a thing in itself and directly, as homicide intended by a man possessing mind and reason.

NOTANDA 3. Direct intention is customarily habitual, virtual, or actual. Habitual is the Minister’s facility, readiness, and inclination toward confecting the Sacrament acquired through frequent administration. Virtual is acting by virtue of a prior intention formed and neither retracted nor changed, although one does not actually attend to or think about the Sacrament. Actual is intending in fact to confect it while confecting or administering it. Actual and virtual intention may be absolute or conditional: absolute intends efficaciously to confer the Sacrament and its effect; conditional intends it under a condition concerning the future, past, or present, for example that a penitent confessed properly, truly repented with firm purpose not to sin, or would not sin thereafter. Absolute intention is determined either to present matter and subject abstractly, or to this particular subject and matter.

With these premises, it must be resolved whether and what intention is required for administering a Sacrament. Luther, Calvin, and their followers deny any necessity on the Minister’s part. Luther, in the Assertion of the Articles, says that even if a penitent were not contrite, or a Priest absolved in jest, yet if the person believed himself absolved he would truly be absolved, since the Sacrament was instituted only to arouse faith apprehending the divine promise. Calvin, in the Antidote, likewise says: However much the Sophists chatter about the intention of conferring, it was revealed by no promised reason; for if the Minister’s intention were necessary, no one among us could make his baptism certain, etc. He adds that even if an Epicurean scoffingly administered a supper according to Christ’s command, God’s rule, and lawful rite, the bread and chalice would be pledges of Christ’s body and blood, dismissing the alleged necessity of doing what the Church does.

First conclusion. — IN FACT, FOR THE CONFECTION AND VALID ADMINISTRATION OF A SACRAMENT, THE MINISTER REQUIRES THE INTENTION OF DOING A SACRED THING. This is of faith, determined at Florence: All the Sacraments of the evangelical law are perfected by three things: things as matter, words as form, and the person of the Minister conferring the sacrament with the intention of doing what the Church does; if any is lacking, the Sacrament is not perfected. Trent likewise anathematizes whoever denies at least this intention, and teaches that a penitent cannot be absolved by faith alone when contrition or the Priest’s serious intention is absent, nor is priestly absolution merely a declaration valid whether serious or in jest. Martin V’s Bull against Hussite and Wycliffite errors likewise asks whether an evil Priest with proper matter, form, and the intention of doing what the Church does truly confects, baptizes, absolves, and confers the other Sacraments.*

The Doctor proves this in dist. 6, q. 5, first because every act indifferent in itself to signifying sacred or profane things must be determined to be sacred. Sacramental actions are indifferent to many offices and ends: Baptism’s washing might serve bodily cleanliness, health, play, and the like. Nothing determines it to one sacramental effect except the minister’s intention. The determinate form of words determines the material action to its proper effect, but the sacramental form itself must be determined by the Minister’s intention; otherwise I baptize you would not order the washing to sanctification and would not be the form. The baptizer’s intention is signified by I baptize you, and likewise in the other Sacraments by their forms.

He proves it secondly, n. 3, because every sacramental action must be a human act, or one deliberated by judgment:

for, as he says, intention is required in every person acting on something not fortuitously, or exercising any human act, properly speaking of human acts caused in man by intellect and will; but the act which the Minister must exercise must be human in him, not casual or fortuitous, because obligation does not fall upon fortuitous things; the obligation itself is that a person intend that to which he is obliged.

Thus the Doctor: administering Sacraments necessarily entails the Minister’s intention because it is a human act entrusted by Christ to Ministers and dispensers of the Church’s goods. A human act needs intention directing it to its proper effect; without it things are casual and cannot be deliberate or human. Since the Minister is delegated by Christ, he must intend what was delegated and commanded; a commanded action must be intentional, because obligation does not fall upon fortuitous things: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. If intention were required, it would be because God conferred the Sacrament’s effect only according to the minister’s intention. But God often gives graces beyond the intention of the Minister or instrument, as Isaac blessed Jacob while intending Esau, and God ratified the blessing. Therefore a recipient could obtain the effect even when the Minister conferred the Sacrament contrary to his intention.

I deny the minor; the example opposes the adversaries, since Isaac intended to bless one of his sons and establish him as firstborn, though he erred about the person. Thus, although a sacramental Minister err about the person, if he truly intends to confer the Sacrament the recipient will obtain its effect.

You will say 2. Intention is no more required in administering a Sacrament than in preaching the Gospel, since Christ delegates the Apostles alike to baptize and preach: Go, teach all nations, baptizing them, etc. He did not command intention in teaching, since preaching even insincerely and from envy profits, as the Apostle says: Some preach Christ out of envy and contention, some out of good will, some out of charity; some announce Christ not sincerely, yet so long as Christ is announced I rejoice and shall rejoice. Therefore intention is not required in administering Sacraments.

I deny the antecedent; the power to baptize and preach was delegated only according to a certain comparison: Baptism was directed to all, even infants, preaching only to adults. Though both ministries are commanded, they are not commanded in the same way, but suitably to the matter and recipients. The Gospel word proposes things to be believed but does not make them believed and is speculative on the minister’s part; the sacramental word is practical and efficacious and must be determined by the minister to its ordered effect.

You will say 3. St. Augustine remains doubtful and defines nothing certainly about the Minister’s intention, so its necessity was not always settled in the Church. In On Baptism 1, 53, while asking whether one who baptizes in feigned purpose, jest, or play truly baptizes, he says: It is safe not to advance rashly where no Catholic regional or plenary council has determined the matter; but we confidently assert what the universal Church’s consent has strengthened under Christ’s governance. He adds that, if pressed to say what he thought, he would not doubt that those have Baptism who received it with evangelical words, without their own pretense and with some faith, though without charity it would not profit them spiritually. Thus he seems to hold Baptism valid without the baptizer’s intention, goodness, or end.

I deny the antecedent: Augustine was doubtful because no general Council had defined the matter. Now the necessity of intention has been defined at Constance, Florence, and Trent, and he would have accepted the definition. Saying that Baptism consecrated with evangelical words is valid means only that it is valid whether conferred by heretics or Catholics, not that validity requires washing and the form’s words while excluding the Minister’s intention.

You will insist. Augustine judges heretical Baptism valid, yet heretics cannot have legitimate sacramental intention; therefore he does not judge intention necessary. The major follows; the minor follows from his preface to Psalm 82, where legitimate intention is directed by faith, which heretics cannot have.

I deny the minor, for Augustine there speaks not of intention required to confect and administer a Sacrament but of that desired to complete a meritorious good work; he says:

Let no one count his works before faith: where faith was not, there was no good work; for intention makes a good work, faith directs intention. Do not attend too closely to what a man does, but to what he looks toward when he does it, toward what goal he directs the efforts of the best governance.

You will urge: in Tractate 5 on John Augustine says he does not fear an adulterous, drunken, or murderous Minister baptizing, but looks to Christ, whose name and power give Baptism: I do not fear the adulterer, drunkard, or murderer, because I look to the dove, through which it is said: this is he who baptizes. But a drunk man cannot have determinate intention, being without mind and reason.

The Doctor responds, no. 10. Augustine speaks of an ebriosus, a man accustomed and prone to drunkenness, not of one deprived of reason. A habitual drunkard, like an adulterer, can have a right intention of baptizing despite his vicious disposition. Augustine intended nothing else, for he is discussing Sacraments conferred by a wicked Minister, which he declares valid.

You will say 4. The Fathers teach that in administering Sacraments one attends not to the giver’s conscience but only to Christ’s power, in whose name and authority the Sacrament is conferred; otherwise salvation would be uncertain. The same uncertainty would arise if intention were required. Therefore, as goodness is not required in the Minister, neither is intention.

I respond, granting the major and denying the minor. Some uncertainty exists, but far less than if the Minister’s goodness were required for validity. Someone so wicked as not to intend conferring the Sacrament can scarcely be found, while Ministers in mortal sin are common. Since intention is easy to have and its absence would entail grave malice, not easily suspected in a Church Minister, we should be morally certain he had it, as we are certain of less evident facts such as our parentage. Nor would certainty be greater if only matter and form were required, since who can know that natural water and the complete form were used in his Baptism?

You will say 5. Sacraments relate to the Minister as medicines to the physician: they are remedies of the soul as medicines are of the body. Bodily medicines do not need the physician’s intention for their effects; therefore Sacraments do not need the Minister’s intention.

I deny the major: conferral of Sacraments is truly a human act, operating only from divine intention. Therefore they cannot exist without the agent’s intention or operate ex opere operato, since the Minister’s intention is contained in that opus operatum, which is a human work.

You will say 6. Sacraments are sensible signs and therefore must consist of sensible things; the Minister’s intention is not sensible, so it contributes nothing to validity or integrity.

I distinguish the major: that they are sensible signs signifying speculatively, I deny; practically, I concede. Practical signification requires the intention of the agent and Minister, because sacramental action must be human and therefore deliberate. Or, with the Doctor, q. 5, n. 7: if sensible things have the character of matter and form, I concede; if they determine matter and form to sacramental being, I deny. Or, as the Doctor speaks,

I say that some things pertain to Baptism as intrinsic and some as extrinsic; nothing intrinsically pertains to it or its foundation unless sensible. Nevertheless, just as an efficient cause is necessarily required for it > as an extrinsic cause, so also that which is as it were the principle of such a cause’s action. The ultimate principle determining an intellectual agent to act is intention, because by the command of the will it moves the other powers subject to that command. Thus the claim that nothing belongs to the Sacrament unless it is something of the Sacrament or its reality is true of what is intrinsic to it or its signified reality; intention is intrinsic in neither way, though required on the agent’s part.

This is the Doctor’s statement: matter and form, which intrinsically constitute the Sacrament, must be sensible; the same is not true of what is extrinsic and belongs to the agent confecting and conferring it.

Second conclusion. — EXTERIOR INTENTION ALONE DOES NOT SUFFICE FOR VALIDITY; INTERIOR INTENTION IS ALSO REQUIRED, EITHER OF DOING WHAT THE CHURCH DOES, WHAT CHRISTIANS CUSTOMARILY DO, OR WHAT CHRIST COMMANDED, OR AT LEAST OF DOING A CHRISTIAN THING IN THE BAPTIZED. Thus the Doctor, n. 1:

I say, therefore, that intention of the ultimate end is in no way required in one baptizing, because Pagans do not intend to order the baptized to eternal life. Intention regarding the proximate end is required, either particularly or generally: particularly, if he intends this person to enter the law observed by Christians; generally, if he intends to do toward him what Christians customarily do toward their own.

The Conclusion is proved by the same considerations as the preceding one. The cited Councils plainly teach that validity requires the Minister’s intention of doing what the Church does; this is not exterior only but interior.

It is confirmed: if only exterior intention were required, one who baptized or absolved in play or jest would confer validly. This is false and contradicts Trent, Session 14, chapter 6: The penitent ought not flatter himself concerning his faith so that, even without contrition or the Priest’s serious intention of truly absolving, he should believe himself absolved. It adds: Nor would he be anything but negligent of salvation if he recognized a Priest releasing him in jest and did not diligently seek another acting seriously.

Nor is it valid to reply that the Council speaks only of exterior mockery, not merely of interior mockery unexpressed by external signs.

— The contrary appears. First, exterior intention to observe the Church’s rites can coexist with exterior mockery just as with interior mockery. Second, someone can truly be baptized amid exterior mockery if the Minister has interior intention to baptize; exterior mockery therefore hinders the Sacrament only because of interior mockery. If the latter does not harm it, neither can the former.

Secondly, the required intention is that by which the Minister conforms to the principal agent and determines otherwise-indifferent things and words to sacramental being. Intention to do what the Church or Christians do conforms him to Christ and determines the matter and form to the Sacrament. Someone could wash a child for health in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, invoking them to restore health; though the matter and form were those used in Baptism, it would not be a Sacrament because he lacked intention to do what the Church does or what Christ instituted for Baptism: therefore, etc.

You will say 7. The Minister is an instrument of Christ and God, not the principal agent of the Sacrament’s effect. An action is perfected by the principal agent’s intention, not the instrument’s; therefore a Sacrament can be valid without the Minister’s interior intention.

The Doctor responds, in the cited question, n. 9, concerning the major,

that the Minister is a secondary cause with respect to the washing, not only as washing but as sacramental, and therefore has his own intention, being voluntary rather than natural, namely the intention belonging to a knowing agent. Regarding Baptism’s principal effect, grace, he may be called an instrument with respect to God, as a dispositive agent is an instrument with respect to the perfecting agent. Such an agent intends not the principal agent’s term but its own. Thus it is not necessary for the baptizer to intend Baptism’s ultimate end, but he must intend Baptism.

This is the Doctor’s statement: the Minister is a secondary cause with respect to the Sacrament, but only a dispositive instrument with respect to grace. The one conferring Baptism need not intend to produce grace; it suffices to intend what the Church or Christians do. I distinguish the minor: an inanimate irrational instrument, such as a brush moved only by the painter’s intention, does not need its own intention, I concede; but an animate rational instrument, such as a household servant or a royal prefect and judge administering justice, does, I deny. The King leaves particular actions to their judgment, so they need prudence, intention, and deliberation. The sacramental Minister is such an instrument: not merely moved by God and Christ, but also in some way moving and acting himself, since Christ entrusts determinate sacramental administration to his prudence. Ministers are dispensers of God’s mysteries, and 1 Corinthians 4 requires a dispenser to be faithful; therefore he needs deliberation and intention to fulfill his ministry.

You will urge. Even a rational instrument does not require a special intention for the principal cause to perform properly the action for which it is employed; therefore the Minister’s intention is not needed for sacramental validity. Someone can by another’s commission buy or sell, contract marriage with an absent bride, or serve as interpreter for another’s confession before a Priest. Whatever his attitude—whether he approves or disapproves, is inwardly willing or unwilling—the action is considered valid: therefore, etc.

I respond, something can be done through a minister in two ways: first, so that he merely carries the mind and will of the man who, since he cannot take part in the matter to be done, assumes and appoints him as a delegate, intermediary, and interpreter; second, so that the delegate sustains and acts in the person of his master, yet fulfills the ministry entrusted to him by his own judgment, as a steward or dispenser of the affairs of a household. Thus I distinguish the antecedent: an instrument endowed with reason can validly do something without intention when it does not execute the matter by its own judgment, nor does that matter depend on its will, but it has merely the role of an intermediary or interpreter, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But the minister of a sacrament has a part in the making of the sacraments, of which he is the steward and dispenser, and he dispenses and administers them by his own decision and judgment: therefore the consequence must be denied.

You say 8. An interior intention of doing what the Church does is not required if a baptism conferred in jest and play is considered valid; but this is so; therefore, and so on. The major is clear: for one who acts merely mimetically and in play has no other intention than to play and to give others laughter and pleasure. But the minor is proved by the case of St. Genesius, Roman Martyr; for, as Ado testifies in his Martyrology on August 25: when Genesius was acting a mime in the theater before Diocletian, to provide entertainment for the emperor, he pretended to be ill and proposed to be baptized. Therefore two other mimes were summoned, who, taking the part of a presbyter and an exorcist, washed him with water. When asked by them whether he believed, he replied that he believed from his heart; and immediately he saw a hand coming from heaven above, and angels of God shining around him, who washed away all his sins in that very water. Thus wonderfully strengthened by the vision, he freely and steadfastly professed before the emperor that he was a Christian and began to curse the worship of idols. Therefore, torn by various tortures, he finally underwent a glorious martyrdom by beheading.

I deny the minor, and in proving it I say, first, that St. Genesius can be said to have been baptized not by the ministry of a man, but by that of one of the angels who stood around him. Second, when he was suddenly changed and seriously requested baptism, he could have taught the pseudo-presbyter the legitimate rite of administering baptism; and so, although such an action appeared to the spectators in the theater as mockery, it could nevertheless truly be considered baptism conferred seriously. Hence in the Roman Martyrology we read: while Genesius was mocking the mysteries of the Christians, inspired by God he was suddenly converted to the faith and baptized. Finally, it could be said that it was perhaps not true baptism: for although Genesius was not baptized again, he could nevertheless have been justified by that faith formed by charity, with which he courageously professed the Catholic religion and underwent martyrdom; and so perhaps he was baptized only insofar as he was baptized by the baptism of man, but truly flooded by the baptism of desire and of blood.

You will insist. In fact, baptism conferred in jest and play, without any true intention, was approved by the Church; therefore the solution just given is worthless. The antecedent is proved: for the baptism conferred for amusement by Athanasius, while still a boy, on other boys was regarded as genuine and valid by Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, and by a council of priests it was judged that those boys were not to be rebaptized, as is clear from Rufinus, book 1 of Ecclesiastical History, chapter 14. Alexander, he says, is reported to have decided, after conferring with a council of clerics, that for those upon whom water had been poured with complete questions and answers, baptism ought not to be repeated, but that what is customarily administered by priests should be completed. Socrates, book 1, chapter 11; Sozomen, book 2, chapter 14; and Nicephorus, book 3, chapter 14, testify to the same. That this baptism was conferred with only an exterior intention is clear: what other intention could there have been in a boy playing with boys and pretending to be a bishop? Therefore, and so on.

I respond first that the antecedent and its proof can be denied; for that story does not appear so certain. First, it was committed to writing by Rufinus; but he holds it as doubtful, as something circulated through the report of others, and so, when relating it, he says: “There were,” and so on. Second, the authors who relate the aforesaid story do not agree with one another: Socrates says that Alexander, passing by, saw Athanasius playing; Sozomen says that he noticed it while waiting for clerical guests; but Nicephorus says that, seated in a higher place, he observed this game. Third, Socrates himself, in telling this childish game, omits what concerns baptism and makes no mention at all of any boys baptized by Athanasius.

Nevertheless, since Rufinus says that he received that story from those who lived with Athanasius himself, therefore, so as not to deny credence to so many and such great authors, supposing the truth of the matter itself, one must respond that Athanasius, in baptizing, had the intention of doing what the Church does. This can certainly be inferred both from the fact that although Athanasius is called a boy at that time, he was nevertheless not of so immature an age that he could not have an interior legitimate intention, and because Sozomen specifically relates of Athanasius that Alexander not long afterward made him his fellow student and secretary. Nicephorus adds that not much later he raised him to the order of deacons. Socrates agrees with this, for he writes: when Athanasius had already endured [this], Alexander ordained him deacon and took him with him to Nicaea, so that he might assist him in disputation at the council. Hence it follows that Athanasius was at least twelve years old when he performed this baptism: for Alexander left him as his successor in the Alexandrian episcopate. Baronius testifies that he died in the year of the Lord 326. But, as Rufinus relates, that game occurred in the year 311; and consequently Athanasius was at least a twelve-year-old boy. Since he was also endowed with outstanding keenness of intellect and ability, he could easily understand what was necessary for baptism. This is confirmed by the fact that Rufinus says in the same place that the boys baptized by Athanasius were

catechumens, and therefore already instructed in matters of faith: so much more did Athanasius himself know them. Moreover, the same Rufinus relates:

the boys were summoned, and he asked what their game was, what they had done, and how; at first, frightened, as is natural at that age, they denied it; then they disclosed the matter in order and confessed that some catechumens had been baptized by Athanasius, who had pretended to be a bishop in a childish game: Alexander carefully asked those who were said to have been baptized what questions had been put to them and what they had answered; and likewise he asked the one who had questioned them. When he saw that everything conformed to the rite of our religion, he decided with the council of clerics that baptism should not be repeated for those upon whom water had been poured, but that what priests customarily do should be completed.

This is Rufinus.

But Alexander undertook this examination only to determine whether the baptizer had had the intention of doing what he had seen done in the Church by the bishop who was baptizing: therefore, and so on. Nor does it stand in the way that that baptism was conferred in play: for play and jest can be distinguished in two ways. One is that in which no serious thing is intended, but only a pretense—namely, pretending to do what in reality is not done, as when in a comedy someone pretends to eat and weep, though in reality he neither eats nor weeps. The other is that in which the game is intended as an extrinsic end of the action, while nevertheless what is done is done seriously, just as actors sometimes set up a dinner in theaters to celebrate a wedding, where they really drink and eat, although they do so to entertain the spectators. Athanasius baptized while playing in this latter way: for he directed his intention of baptizing toward recreation and play, just as avaricious ministers perform the sacraments for the sake of obtaining money. The same solution answers the case related by Nicephorus, book 3, final chapter, where he writes:

a Hebrew boy, he says, was familiar with the children of Christians, and when a desire to swim arose in them as they played at the sea, a Jew followed them. Then, in play, the boys baptized the naked boy standing at the sea, initially not unwilling. After they had named the third invocation of the divine name and at the same time performed the third immersion, they tore the edge of the texture of his garment and, touching his head with an imaginary covering, sketched a secret and mystical helmet. Then, arming his right hand with a slender piece of wood instead of a candle, they completed all the mysteries that belong to the sacred rite. Finally, singing, they walked around the neighboring temple, and even entered the true temple and received the holy offering. The same thing was done by the boy who had thus been initiated into baptism. When the one who presided over the sacred rites there learned of this through careful inquiry, he reported it to the Church of Constantinople. The boy was also summoned, although certain Jews made great efforts to prevent it. There too it was decreed that only what was lacking according to the execution of the mystery should be completed by him. And so it was done; when the boy reached the proper age, he was admitted to the order of priests and made sacristan, or keeper, of the great temple, where he still lives.

The same solution, I say, recurs here as in the preceding case: for from this account it is gathered that these boys were already grown, since they were engaged in swimming, and moreover that the recipient had the intention of truly receiving baptism; for he is said to have received it willingly. Consequently that baptism was valid, since neither matter nor intention was lacking in the recipient or the conferer.

You say 3. If an interior intention of doing what the Church does were required in the minister of a sacrament, that intention would especially have to be directed toward what the true Church does. But baptism conferred by one who does not intend to do what the true Church does is nevertheless valid; therefore such an intention is not required for the validity of a sacrament. The major is clear. The minor is proved: heretics baptize validly, but they do not intend to do what the Roman Church does, which alone is the true Church. Calvinists, for example, intend only to do what is customarily done in their sect and assembly, which is not the true Church but rather the synagogue of Satan; therefore, and so on.

I deny the minor, and distinguish its proof: Calvinists do not have the intention of doing what the true Roman Church does with respect to the effect of the sacrament, namely, the imprinting of the character, the infusion of sanctifying grace, and the real remission of sins. I concede this: for they do not think that all these things occur and are conferred through baptism; they do not intend to do what the true Church does. — I distinguish the major: that the true Church intends this primarily and formally, I deny; for in this way it intends only the sacred work, act, and sacramental rite instituted by Christ, which the true Church administers and celebrates, I deny. For although Calvinists do not believe the Roman Church to be the true Church, nor intend in administering baptism to do what it performs, and consequently have an intention materially opposed to the intention of the true Church, they nevertheless have an intention formally conformed to it. For they intend to do what Christ instituted and commanded to be done; but this is precisely what the Roman Church intends in administering baptism. Therefore Calvinists, or other heretics, wish to do formally what the true Church does: they wish to do what the Church of Christ does, although they err in thinking that this Church of Christ is none other than their own assembly.

You will object: The true Church intends not only the act of baptism but also its effect, namely the remission of sin and the infusion of sanctifying grace; but heretics do not intend this, as has been conceded; therefore they do not intend to do what the true Church does.

I distinguish the major: that the true Church intends this primarily and formally, I deny; for in this way it intends only the sacred work, act, and sacramental rite. That it intends it materially, consequently, or secondarily, I concede. And with the minor distinguished in the same way, the consequence must be denied: it is not necessary that the ministers of the Church intend to do directly everything that the Church intends, although this is praiseworthy. Hence baptism conferred by the Pelagians was accepted by the Church, although in conferring baptism they did not intend the remission of original sin, which they did not acknowledge.

Third conclusion. — HABITUAL INTENTION IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE VALID ADMINISTRATION OF A SACRAMENT, WHEREAS VIRTUAL INTENTION IS SUFFICIENT, AND ACTUAL INTENTION IS THE MOST PERFECT. This is common among theologians; and the Subtle Doctor teaches it in book 4, distinction 6, number 3, where he says:

I say that habitual intention alone does not suffice in baptism, since because of it the act is not said to be his, although, conformed to that habit, it is a human act. For if someone has a habit inclining him to a desire for health, and is healed while in no way intending health but only play, he is not said to obtain health through any human act, but casually or fortuitously, no more than if he had had no intention toward health. Therefore habitual intention alone does not suffice with respect to the end of a human act, insofar as it is human. Nor is actual intention always required in the baptizer, because God has not obliged man to what is impossible or excessively difficult, such as not being distracted; for, according to Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, book 3, it is not in our power not to be touched by laughter. Nor did he oblige the minister to anything more in that act than in performing the acts of the other sacraments. In consecrating the Eucharist, however, which is the most excellent sacrament, he did not oblige a man not to be distracted, because if he first intends to celebrate, although he is distracted while uttering the sacramental words, he nevertheless truly consecrates. From these things I conclude that virtual intention suffices in the baptizer—that is, that at some time he had an actual intention, from which the act of baptizing then truly proceeds, whether in that act he has an actual intention, or one descending from it, or not. I understand, however, that this act proceeds without any contrary movement of the will intervening. Thus, if someone, while dressing for Mass and intending to celebrate according to the usage of the Roman Church, proceeds continuously, perhaps according to some habit left in the imagination, with great distraction, he truly does those things necessary for that sacramental act, which is consecration.

The conclusion is proved as follows: as we have said, the minister in the sacraments must act in a human manner, that is, with deliberation and judgment. But something done with merely habitual intention is not always done with deliberation and judgment, for a drunk or madman can execute many things from a habit acquired elsewhere. Moreover, habitual intention is indifferent to this or that effect, and cannot be determined to one rather than another unless some actual attention of mind and deliberation of will is added. For if someone endowed with the habit of mercy, thinking nothing about almsgiving, throws money which a poor person receives, that throwing and taking up of the money is not considered an act of mercy, because it is done without the attention of reason and deliberation of will. Hence it follows that if someone, asleep or insane from an acquired habit, were to baptize or utter the consecratory words over due matter, there would be neither baptism nor consecration, since he would be acting rather from impulse and operating like nature, not in a human and voluntary manner.

You say 1. Habitual intention suffices for receiving a sacrament; therefore it also suffices for conferring one. The antecedent is proved: if a furious or insane person requests baptism during a lucid interval and is then seized by fury or insanity, baptism not only can but ought to be conferred on him, because he is considered to have the habitual intention of receiving baptism; therefore, and so on.

I deny the consequence: for more is required for conferring a sacrament than for receiving one, because the recipient has the character of a patient, not of an agent; therefore what is required in him is only that he not place an obstacle through resistance of the will. But the one who administers the sacrament has the character of an agent, and therefore is bound to administer the sacrament through a human operation and to determine its matter and form to the being of a sacrament. This cannot be done unless there is in him an act of will joined to the sacramental action, by which he wills, implicitly or explicitly, to do what the true Church does; and consequently it is necessary that his action either have that intention attached to it or at least proceed from its power.

You say 2. If a drunk person, from habit, strikes someone, his intention suffices for the act to be attributed to him as a sin and for him to be subjected to punishment; therefore, by equal reasoning, that habitual intention will suffice for performing some good work and consequently for the valid conferral of a sacrament.

I deny the consequence: for that striking does not become a vice, nor is it imputed as guilt, during the time when the drunk or mad person produces it in madness or drunkenness, but only because of the evil habit and voluntary custom and pleasure. These things cannot be said of a sacramental action, for it must be evaluated from the time at which it is elicited, since its matter and form, indifferent in themselves, must be determined to the being of a sacrament by the intention of the conferer.

The second part is proved, namely, that actual intention is the most sufficient and the best of all: every intention sufficient for the reality of a sacrament is founded on the actual intention and receives its force from it. Therefore the minister should strive to have it while administering, since he ought to aim at the perfection of his ministry. Nevertheless, it is not altogether necessary; for God is more just than to oblige anyone to impossibilities. But it is impossible for the minister always to have an actual intention in the administration of a sacrament, since wandering of mind cannot be prevented; for the human intellect is so slippery and inconstant that it cannot long retain its thought on one thing. It is not in our power, moreover, not to be affected from time to time by various sensible objects and not to be drawn toward different phantasms.

Finally, the third part is established, namely, that virtual intention suffices. For an action to be sacramental in the proper manner, it is sufficient that it be done with the deliberation required for an action to be moral and human. Virtual intention is sufficient for this, as all admit, and consequently it also suffices for the legitimate administration of a sacrament. The Doctor proves this truth in the same distinction 6, question 6, number 2, where he says:

If someone intends at the beginning of Mass to celebrate Mass, and afterward is distracted, he does not have actual intention when he is distracted; this is clear, because he does not then understand it in act, and therefore he does not will it in act. Nor does he have merely habitual intention, since a sleeping person has that. Therefore he is disposed in an intermediate way; and I call this disposition virtual intention, because by virtue of an intention previously actually had, he does everything he does from it as from a root. Thus that actual intention was an ordered principle for all these acts, and it contains virtually the proper intention for each of these acts, just as the intention of an end contains virtually the proper intention of everything ordered to the end. As long as the intention of whatever is ordered to the end remains, this first actual intention remains virtually in all these things. In this way, one intending to go to St. James orders many other things necessary for that end from the intention of this end. In carrying out those ordered things, however, he does not always think of St. James or of reverence for him. Nevertheless, he is said always to merit, because either he has the intention of those things which are directed to the end, of which the first intention is the intention, or he has certain acts following from those intentions, although with those acts there concur some distracting acts, both from that first intention and from the proper intentions of the things directed to that end. This was explained in book 2, distinction 11, and book 3, distinction 15, where it was said that perhaps the martyrs, in the act of enduring martyrdom, had no intention except this virtual one, because the immensity of the sufferings perhaps absorbed the use of reason. Nevertheless, this endurance of sufferings was a certain effect derived from the intention of preserving the faith of God; and therefore, while the passion lasted, that intention always lasted virtually, as an affection.

It follows from this that, for the validity of a Sacrament, a direct intention is required in the Minister, by which he wills to perform and celebrate the sacramental action and the sacred and religious rite; for the Minister in the Sacraments must act in a human manner, and consequently with deliberation and judgment. But that which is done with merely indirect intention is not considered to be done in a human manner. Therefore, one who intended only a sacramental action in another thing—for example, Baptism in a larger drink of wine, because he has discovered by experience that he is moved to baptize as often as he drinks more generously—would not baptize.

It follows secondly that some sacraments can be validly administered under a condition concerning the present or the past. For canon law decrees, in chapter 2, On Baptism, that conditional baptism is valid: those about whom there is doubt whether they have been baptized are baptized with these words prefixed: If you have been baptized, I do not baptize you; but if you have not yet been baptized, I baptize you, and so on. The reason for this assertion is that a condition concerning the present or the past passes into an absolute condition, according to the statement in the Institutes, On Verbal Obligations, section Conditions that refer to the present or the past either immediately invalidate the obligation or do not differ from it at all. For example: If Titius was consul, or if Saint Naevius is alive, do you promise to give? For if these things are not so, the stipulation is worth nothing; but if they are so, it is valid immediately. For things that are certain by the nature of things do not change the obligation, although they are uncertain to us. So it is with the civil law used by the Church, unless it contradicts the sacred canons, in chapter 1, On the Notification of a New Work, where it says: For just as laws do not disdain to imitate the sacred canons, so the statutes of the sacred canons are also strengthened by the constitutions of princes.

But the case is different with a conditional intention concerning the future, especially with a condition that cannot be known in a human manner—for example, if a priest absolved a penitent on this condition: I absolve you if you are predestined, or if you will not sin again. For such conditions suspend the sacramental act: what, in order to exist, depends on the occurrence of some effect to be posited cannot be said to exist so long as the positing of that effect is suspended. But this is how it is with such a conditional intention concerning a contingent future; therefore, and so on. Nor does it matter that a condition concerning a contingent future is no less certain in itself than one concerning the past or present; for a condition concerning the future, whatever it may be, suspends the intention, and such a condition cannot be called efficacious so long as the effect is not posited. For according to the common way of conceiving things, a condition concerning the future is added to suspend the effect until it is fulfilled.

It follows thirdly that the minister’s intention must be determinate regarding the matter and the subject, at least in species. It is not required, however, that it be determined to the subject or person in particular, except in the case of the sacrament of marriage.

The first part is clear, because the sacramental action must proceed from the minister’s intention; but it would not proceed in this way unless it concerned determinate matter and a subject capable of receiving that sacramental action. Otherwise that action would be entirely vague and without deliberation or judgment.

I add that the forms of the sacraments designate some present subject, as is clear from these words: I baptize you, and so on; I absolve you, and so on; This is the Body, and so on. For the particles “you” and “this” point to some present person or thing. Hence if a priest has two formulas before him and intends to consecrate only one, without determining which one it is, he will consecrate neither, because the intention is not determinate but vague and indifferent. But if he thinks he has one before him while in reality he has two, provided he wishes to consecrate what he has before him, he will consecrate both.

The second part is also evident, because the nature of sacramental intention cannot be inferred better than from the forms of the sacraments. But from these it does not appear that the intention must be determined in the individual, since that form is valid with respect to any subject capable of receiving the sacrament. Hence if Paul approaches a priest to lay down his sins, and the priest thinks he is Peter, although the priest intends to absolve the one whom he thinks to be Peter, the absolution will nevertheless be valid.

Finally, the third part is apparent: since in marriage the spouses mutually hand over power over their bodies for an undivided partnership of life, the reason and equity of a human contract require that the determination of the intention be directed to the subject in particular. For it would be unjust for someone to be joined by the most binding bond of marriage, until his own death or that of his spouse, to a person whose affections and character he had in no way known.

You ask: whether those who approach the Bishop to be ordained with a legitimate impediment—for example, lack of the required prior examination, irregularity, dimissorial letters, patrimony, or a benefice, etc.—really receive Orders when, as most often happens, the Bishop publicly announces through the Minister that he does not intend to ordain them.

I respond that if that intention is not merely a threat but absolute, such persons do not receive orders, because the intention prerequired for the validity of the sacrament, namely actual or virtual intention, is absent here. It is not actual, because regarding them the bishop has a contrary intention, namely not to ordain them. Nor is it virtual, because this is founded on a preceding actual intention that has not been revoked; for a special intention determined in the individual overrides a general one. But the bishop’s intention concerning the ordination of those who are presented as candidates is merely general, whereas his intention not to ordain those rejected is special, and determines the bishop so that he specifically does not will this effect. Therefore their ordination is considered null.

Nor does it matter that the bishop performs the same act of ordination by laying on hands, presenting the instruments, and pronouncing the form both over the rejected and over the accepted: for he performs this only materially, not formally. It is like a priest who says the sacred rites of the Mass and pronounces the same consecratory words over due present matter, yet does not consecrate, because he does not pronounce them formally, that is, with the formal intention of consecrating. The same must be said, with still greater force, of the bishop regarding those whom he not only does not intend to ordain, but absolutely and positively does not wish to confer orders upon.

But you may ask from what it can be judged whether that episcopal declaration is merely threatening or absolute.

I respond that this must be considered above all by the bishop himself, if he is still alive. But if he has died, his intention must be gathered from the words by which he declared his mind. If his mind cannot be certainly gathered from them, the aforesaid ordination must be regarded as doubtful, and the ordained man must abstain from the office until he is ordained again conditionally.

I had intended here to resolve what the revival of the sacraments is, and what dispositions on the part of the recipient are desired for receiving a sacrament properly. But since the efficacy of the sacraments differs and they seem to require different dispositions, I judged it more suitable to defer the explanation of these questions to special disputations on each sacrament. Consequently, what has been said here about the sacraments in general will suffice.

IMPRIMATUR: Fr. ALBERTUS LEPIDI O. P. S. P. A. Magister. IMPRIMATUR: IOSEPH CEPPETELLI, Archbishop of Myrensis, Vicar General.