Scotus Academicus, Tomus nonus: De Sacramentis in genere

NOTE 1. According to the Doctor in 4. dist. 26, q. 3, n. 7, by the name of character here is signified some sign by which those marked with such a sign are mutually assimilated and distinguished from other people: for χάραξ in Greek is called in Latin a form, figure, or image, a mark, or some sign distinguishing some from others. Hence in Heb. 1 the Son of God is called in Greek χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, that is, the figure and image of the substance of the Father himself; and in Apoc. 13 some are said to have the character of the beast, or a figure on their foreheads and hands, signifying that they belong to the beast's household. That figure by which cattle are marked with a branding iron, so that they bear the mark of their master and can be distinguished from the cattle of another master, is commonly called a character. In this way too, says the Doctor, we call the characters or figures with which letters are written characters; for which reason certain figures drawn in incantations are also usually called characters. Thus, by the name character theologians properly signify a certain spiritual sign impressed by God upon one receiving a non-repeatable Sacrament.

NOTE 2. From the same source, two principal properties and two effects of this character are distinguished: one physical, the other moral. The physical property is that the subject possessing the character is assimilated to another that possesses a similar form, and is distinguished from another not so marked. The moral property is that it is a commemorative sign of the Sacrament received, conformative to Christ, whose Sacrament is received, and obliging the recipient to observe the law and faith, whose initiation it is; finally, that through this sign the recipient of the Sacrament is deputed to some office, just as in former times people were enrolled in military service by some distinctive mark. From this the Doctor concludes that the character is distinguished from another effect of the Sacrament, namely grace, and also from the infused virtues, faith, hope, and charity; “because,” he says, “such virtues are not always imprinted on the recipient of a non-repeatable Sacrament, as on the recipient of Orders or Confirmation: but the character is always imprinted. This is also clear from another condition commonly attributed to the character, namely, that it is indelible: but these virtues are erasable, as is evident in one who sins mortally, in whom these virtues do not remain.”

NOTE 3. More recent heretics try to call into doubt that such a character is impressed upon recipients through the Sacraments of the New Law. Thus John Wycliffe, book 1 of The Trialogue, chapter 15, says: Some multiply characters from the Sacraments in Orders; but I find neither their foundation nor their fruit in Sacred Scripture or in reason. Luther too, in the book On the Babylonian Captivity, chapter On Orders, mocks the character in this way: They have fabricated, he says, characters which they attributed to this Sacrament of theirs, to be impressed upon those ordained: whence, then, do such ideas arise, by what authority, by what reasoning are they established? Calvin likewise, in the Institutes, Canon 1 of Session 7 of the Council of Trent: What, he says, they chatter about the indelible character comes from the same workshop; for it was wholly unknown among the ancients, and is more akin to magical incantations than to the sound doctrine of the Gospel; therefore it will be rejected with the same ease with which it was devised.

With these premises established, four principal points must be determined in this Question: first, that a character is truly impressed through only certain Sacraments; second, that it is neither some relation of reason, as Durandus held, nor merely real, as some wrongly pretend the Subtle Doctor asserted, but a certain spiritual quality; third, whether that character is immediately subjected in the substance of the soul or in one of its faculties; fourth, finally, whether it is altogether indelible and irremovable.

First conclusion. — THE THREE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW, NAMELY BAPTISM, CONFIRMATION, AND ORDERS, IMPRESS A SPIRITUAL CHARACTER. This is of faith, determined in the Councils, especially at Florence in the Decree of Eugene, where we read: Among these Sacraments of the New Law there are three, Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders, which impress upon the soul a character, that is, a spiritual sign distinguishing it from the rest, an indelible sign; hence they are not repeated in the same person. The remaining four do not impress a character and admit repetition. The Council of Trent defines the same in Session 7, Canon 1, in these words: If anyone says that in the three Sacraments, namely Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders, a character is not impressed upon the soul, that is, a certain spiritual and indelible sign, so that they cannot be repeated, let him be anathema. Innocent III also clearly expressed this same truth, received by perpetual tradition from the beginning of the Church, as reported in the chapter Maiores, On Baptism. When it was asked there whether the character of the Sacrament is impressed in Baptism upon sleepers and the insane, so that once awakened from sleep or illness they should not be baptized again, he replied: “There are those who say that Baptism and Orders are conferred not only upon sleepers and the insane, but also upon the unwilling and resisting, though not as to the thing, yet as to the character. Others distinguish, not absurdly, that he who is violently drawn by terrors and punishments, lest he incur harm, receives the Sacrament of Baptism, as one who approaches Baptism in faith receives the character of Christianity impressed upon him. But he who wholly resists and never consents receives neither the thing nor the character of the Sacrament. Sleepers and the insane, however, if before they fell into insanity or sleep they persisted in refusal, do not receive the character of the Sacrament even if they were immersed in this condition; but otherwise if they had previously been catechumens and had intended to be baptized. The sacramental operation therefore impresses the character when it finds no obstacle of a contrary will resisting it.” By these words Innocent presupposes that the doctrine concerning the sacramental character is established in the Church and received from the Fathers, as the Subtle Doctor excellently notes in the cited question 3, n. 11. There he observes that although it could perhaps be said that the words of this authority consequently use the name character to signify Baptism, nevertheless, he says, in the later words, where it says that the sacramental operation impresses a character, it seems expressly to speak of the character as something impressed upon the soul itself, as we are speaking here.

There are also testimonies of Scripture supporting this truth. First of all, that passage of 2 Cor. 1 may be brought forward: The God who anointed us, who also sealed us and gave the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts. In these words the Apostle distinguishes three effects of Confirmation. The first is grace, by which we are anointed and strengthened like oil; the second is the character, by which we are consecrated to God and sealed as with the sign of Christ for divine worship and some office; the third is the Holy Spirit, who bears witness to us of a good conscience and is in us like a pledge of future glory. I nevertheless confess that from this and similar Scriptural authority the impression of such a sacramental character cannot be concluded clearly and explicitly. Someone could reply, by explaining such Scriptural texts, that they concern sanctifying grace, just as the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7, calls it the Spirit of the promise, saying: The merciful God, the efficacious cause of justification, who freely washes and sanctifies, sealing and anointing with the promised Holy Spirit, who is the pledge of our inheritance. Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and others understand the Apostle's passage in 2 Cor. 1 in this sense. Although not everyone receives it in the reception of the Sacrament, nevertheless the Sacrament itself, insofar as it is from itself, is ordered to confer it; and that is sufficient.

Many authorities of the holy Fathers are also brought forward as intimating the same truth. First, Cyril of Jerusalem, in the preface to his Catecheses, says: Great indeed is the proposed Baptism: liberation from captivity, remission of sins, death of sin, regeneration of the soul, a garment of brightness, a holy and indelible seal. But Baptism is not indelible by reason of sanctifying grace, for this is lost through any mortal sin; therefore it is called such by reason of the seal remaining in the baptized person, and nothing else can it be except the character. Likewise Saint Basil, Homily 13, says: Do you wish the devil to see the seal upon you, so that he may fight for you or rescue you from enemies? How, you will say, am I God's, when I do not show God's sign? Or do you not know how the destroyer passed over the marked houses in Egypt, but slew the firstborn in those not marked? An unsealed treasure is easily exposed to thieves; a thing without a mark is immediately vulnerable to ambushes. Saint Gregory Nazianzen likewise, Oration 1, Baptism, says: Baptism is a seal, because it is preservation and a signification of lordship; for it signifies whose possession we are. And later: What is sealed beforehand is not easily attacked by ambushes; what is not sealed is easily seized by thieves. Saint Chrysostom, Homily 2 on the Epistle to the Ephesians, says: The Israelites were sealed, but with the mark of circumcision, like cattle; we, as sons, for the day of redemption. Hence in Homily 11 he says: He made us a royal flock. Other holy Fathers say the same, such as Jerome on Eph. 1: God impresses upon the soul the seal of the Holy Spirit. And Saint Ambrose, book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 6: We are sealed with the Spirit, so that we may retain his brightness, image, and grace, which is the spiritual seal. But Saint Augustine most excellently supports this truth in many places, especially book 6 of On Baptism, chapter 1, writing:

A sheep that was wandering outside fled from the pastors of the Church, and had received outside from deceitful predators the Lord's character, suitable for the salvation of Christian unity; it is corrected from error and healed from its wound, yet the Lord's character in it is recognized rather than rejected.

But that Lord's character is either God's grace itself, or the Sacrament itself, or some indelible seal impressed upon the soul. But it is not grace itself, for this is not impressed upon wolves, that is, wicked people remaining in their wickedness, nor is it recognized in a sheep wandering outside among heretics. Nor is it the Sacrament itself, because the character mentioned by Saint Augustine is impressed upon wolves; but an external Sacrament cannot be said to be impressed, since it is a passing action. Therefore it is necessary that he speak of a character impressed upon the soul.

It should nevertheless be noted, as the Doctor observes, n. 11, that this authority can be understood of Baptism itself, but not of Baptism's effect. Hence I confess that neither this authority nor the others mentioned above by us would suffice to establish this sacramental character unless the Church's definition intervened. Hence the Doctor there excellently concludes: Therefore, solely on the authority of the Church, insofar as the matter presently requires, it must be held that a character is impressed. Thus Suarez excellently, Disputation 11, section 1, after reviewing various testimonies of the holy Fathers for the impression of the sacramental character, adds: “Since, however, all these testimonies do not seem compelling, therefore Scotus, d. 6, q. 1, says that Baptism itself, for example, can tacitly be explained as being the character, and therefore concludes that solely by the authority of the Church are we compelled to posit a character. But although it is true that the Church's authority has the principal role in this matter, nevertheless, that being presupposed, we understand the Saints' intention to have been to speak of the character in the same signification; and without doubt many things said by the Saints will be better understood in the aforesaid way.” In these words he excellently touched upon the Doctor's aim and the meaning explained by us.

Nevertheless, the Doctor offers three congruences for asserting such a character, n. 1, where he writes: “First, it is fitting that some disposition be posited for a perfect form; but grace is a supernatural and perfect form; therefore it is fitting that there be some preceding supernatural disposition toward it; such is the character. Second, it is fitting that God did not institute vain Sacraments, at least for the New Law, which is perfect; therefore it is fitting that no one truly receive his Sacraments without their having some effect. But they do not always have grace, as in the case of a pretender; therefore they have some other effect. Third, it is fitting that one received into Christ's household be distinguished from one not received by something intrinsic to him. Although Christ could distinguish without such an intrinsic thing, nevertheless it is more perfect both in itself and in comparison with the whole Church, militant and triumphant, if this occurs through some remaining intrinsic form than if it does not. The distinguishing mark of one who receives the Sacrament by which one enters Christ's household, as opposed to one who has not received it, is placed in the recipient as something remaining: this is the character.” He adds that the third of these congruences is more reasonable, because it is also particular to Baptism; while the other two have this probability, that if a character is posited, it will be posited in the way touched upon by those congruences. Hence he concludes: Thus let the conclusion briefly be held, on account of the Church's authority brought forward above; and the two congruences, one concerning reception into Christ's household and the other concerning a disposition to be conferred, are probable.

From this it is evident that the Subtle Doctor does not call into doubt the truth and existence of the sacramental character, as some wrongly impute to him, but only that this truth cannot be proved by express and evident statements of Sacred Scripture or of the holy Fathers, nor demonstrated by any efficacious reasoning, but merely that it is established by the authority of the Church, whose tradition and definition are supported both by Scripture and by the utterances of the holy Fathers.

The Author of the sermon on the Supper preserved by Saint Cyprian supplies another congruence for this truth. For, treating of the washing of the feet, he openly signifies that Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders cannot be repeated because they impress a character. Ecclesiastical rules forbid Baptism to be repeated, namely in Apostolic Canons 16 and 18: and once people have been sanctified, no later hand presumes to approach to consecrate another. No one renews sacred Orders once given; nor does he anoint again those anointed with the sacred oil, but preserves them; no one by the imposition of hands or by ministry diminishes the priesthood, because it would be an insult to the Holy Spirit if it could be taken away, though he sanctifies.

The Heretics reply 1. Baptism is not repeated because it is entry into the Church. — Against this: it would follow that when someone has departed from the Church through apostasy, on approaching it again he ought to be baptized again; this conflicts with the doctrine of the Fathers mentioned above and with the ancient doctrine of the Councils.

They reply 2. It is not repeated for this reason, because it is a spiritual regeneration cleansing the soul from original sin. — Against this: when someone is baptized while the effect of mortal sin is present, he is neither spiritually regenerated nor freed from original sin; nevertheless, when he later repents of this, he is not baptized again. Further, spiritual regeneration also occurs through contrition aroused by the preaching of the Gospel, as is said in Apoc. 1 and 1 Cor.: Through the Gospel I begot you. Nevertheless those thus begotten are baptized. Finally, a person is regenerated as many times as he recovers the spiritual life he has lost; yet he is not baptized that many times.

They reply 3. In proving the existence of the character, a vicious circle is made: for we say that the three Sacraments impress a character because they cannot be repeated, and they cannot be repeated because they impress a character. But this reasoning is invalid, as is clear from Aristotle, book of the Prior Analytics; therefore, and so on.

I deny the major. For a vicious circle occurs when it is made in the same genus of cause; here it is otherwise. The impression of the character is the cause why the Sacrament is not repeated, and non-repetition is the effect of that character. Just as the rational is not proved posteriorly through the risible, while the risible is demonstrated a priori through the rational, so too the character is rightly inferred through the negation of repetition, and repetition through the impression of the character.

You will say 1: No sufficient reason appears why the sacramental character should be admitted; therefore it is asserted in vain. Proof of the antecedent: it would either be admitted as a disposition toward grace, which cannot be affirmed, because a Sacrament received in desire confers grace independently of the character; moreover, as the Doctor says, n. 16, since grace is conferred in every Sacrament, an impression of some character would be required in every one as a preceding disposition for such grace to be conferred, which is false. Or it would be admitted in order to distinguish the baptized from the unbaptized; but this also seems useless: with respect to God, who without any sign whatever knows people and what sort they are; with respect to the blessed and angels, who see and discern the baptized from the unbaptized most clearly in the divine essence; with respect to us, because, since that sign is spiritual, it cannot be perceived by us through the senses; with respect to demons and the damned, since, because this sign is of the supernatural order, it follows that it cannot be known by an intellect operating solely through the powers of nature; and finally with respect to the offices and ministries to which those receiving such Sacraments are deputed, since that deputation can be made by an extrinsic denomination alone, just as judges are deputed to render justice to each person.

I answer, the character can be regarded as conferred upon people through the Sacraments for all the assigned ends. For God claims for himself by a special right the person marked with a character; the blessed take wayfarers into special custody and associate them with the fellowship of faith and the Sacraments, and although the character is not in itself sensible, nevertheless through its cause, or through the Sacrament once conferred, it distinguishes one who has received such a Sacrament from one who has not. “The blessed also,” says the Doctor, n. 1, “and the damned can recognize a person marked with a character whom they would not recognize in that way if he were not marked by such a character; for the character subsists in blessedness for greater glory, and in damnation for greater confusion.” Finally, just as those deputed to different offices in the household of some Prince are accustomed to be marked with certain signs by which their duties are known, so people who through Baptism are received into Christ's household, through Confirmation are designated as soldiers for professing the faith, and through Orders are given some power concerning Christ's true and mystical body. It was fitting, I say, that they be designated for these same offices by a special sacramental character.

You will say 2: The holy Fathers understand by the name character and the mystical sign or seal of Christ nothing other than the Sacrament of Baptism itself; therefore the sacramental character is not some effect of the Sacrament. —

I distinguish the antecedent: They understand nothing else than the Sacrament of Baptism, which is a seal causally and efficiently, as regeneration of the soul, death and remission of sin, and order: formally and in itself, I deny it. For that seal is said to be imprinted or impressed upon believers and carried by them, yet always remaining; but the outward sign employed is not of this kind, but rather the effect of Baptism. For Cyril says, The Holy Spirit seals souls in Baptism. From Ambrose, book 1, On the Holy Spirit: We are sealed in the body, yet in truth we are sealed in the heart, so that the Holy Spirit may imprint in us the likeness of the heavenly image, so that we may know that this is more the seal of our heart than of our body. Therefore that seal in the heart is something internal and distinct from the Sacrament.

You will insist. The character of which we speak is an internal spiritual seal indelibly impressed upon the soul; but the character of which the holy Fathers speak, especially Saint Augustine, is not of this kind, and is nothing other than the invocation of the most holy Trinity, as is clear from his sermon on the proceedings against Emeritus, Bishop of the Donatists at Caesarea: Therefore, he says, when I come to my brother and correct my erring brother, I attend to faith in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. This is the character of my Emperor, who commands his soldiers, or rather commands them together with his soldiers to impress it upon those whom they gathered into his camp, saying: Go, baptize the nations. —

It is confirmed, because Saint Augustine teaches in the same place that if Donatus or Paul had baptized in his own name, he would have impressed his own character. Therefore by the name of the character impressed in Baptism Saint Augustine understands nothing other than the invocation of the most holy Trinity, in whose name and power the Sacrament of Baptism is conferred. The antecedent is clear, for he says there: What is it that I say? A deserter does not bear his own character. Donatus did not baptize in the name of Donatus; for if Donatus, when he made the schism, had baptized in the name of Donatus, he would have impressed the character of a deserter. And again below he says that Paul rightly prohibited those who said, “I am of Paul,” because they had not been baptized in his name and had another character, namely that of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit: What do you wish to be mine, he says, and not rather his whose I am? Recognize and consider your character: were you baptized in the name of Paul?

I answer, by attacking the major and distinguishing the minor: Baptism is an impressing character, I concede; an impressed character, I deny. For, just as the same image of the king and the same character are in the seal and in the wax, but in the seal it is impressing and in the wax it is impressed, so the Sacrament of Baptism, especially its form, is the impressing character; for its spiritual mark is impressed upon the soul, and by that mark it is called the impressed character. Hence Saint Augustine himself, Letter 23, says: The Sacrament of Baptism among heretics is effective for preservation, not for participation in eternal life. By preservation he does not mean sanctifying grace, since this is participation in eternal life; nor Baptism, which has passed away. Therefore it is necessary that he mean the character. Hence in Treatise 1 on the First Epistle of John he says: See: whoever is baptized, if he has charity, and then he says, I have been born from God; but if he does not have it, he has the character imposed. But that character is not the Sacrament itself, since it does not remain; nor grace, since grace is not acquired without charity; therefore, and so on. In confirmation I will say that the meaning of Saint Augustine's words is that if Donatus or Paul had baptized in his own name, the invocation of their names would have presented the appearance of an impressing character, but in reality it would not have been an impressing character, because it would have been the character of a deserter, not of the Emperor, and would consequently have produced one effect. Hence he says that he would delete, cast away, and anathematize it if he found such a character in a person approaching unity. Therefore, just as in monetary matters, when silver or gold is marked with the image of a Prince, the impressing character in the iron seal must be distinguished from the impressed character in the silver or gold, so too in sacramental matters, when a soul is marked with a character in some Sacrament, the impressing character in the invocation of the most holy Trinity must be distinguished from the character impressed in the soul of the recipient of the Sacrament.

You will say 3: Every character is a sign; but no sign can be in the soul, since every sign must be sensible; therefore there can be no character in the soul. —

I distinguish the major: it is a sign analogically and through some likeness, insofar as whatever configures and assimilates something to another, or distinguishes it from another, is called an image, figure, and sign, just as the Son is called the character and figure of the Father's substance, I concede. For the Sacraments bind the faithful to one another, configure them to Christ, and distinguish them from unbelievers. It is a sign properly so called, I distinguish again: by reason of itself and in itself, I deny, for in that way it is something insensible; by reason of the sensible Sacrament which he received, I concede. For we know and can assert that someone is marked with the baptismal character because we know for certain that he was washed with water in the name of the most holy Trinity.

You will ask: Why are there only three Sacraments that impress a character?

The Subtle Doctor answers in 4. dist. 6, q. 10, n. 12, that the number of characters is best gathered and explained from the proportion which the state of the evangelical law bears to political government, according to which certain special degrees of dignity are maintained in a Prince's household that do not belong to everyone. The first is association into the household, which belongs to all the Prince's servants and by which they are distinguished from others; the second is military service, or the soldiers deputed to guard the Prince and protect the kingdom; the third is that of ministers and dispensers, according to their various degrees. Maintaining this proportion, Baptism is that by which someone is received into the household, Confirmation into military service, and Orders into ministry and administration. The other Sacraments can be common to all the others existing in the Christian household. To make this clear and more evident, I gladly append the Doctor's words: “I say that this can be made clear by a similar case in these worldly political communities. No one has a determinate rank in the king's household because he eats or drinks, nor because after an offense his lord is reconciled to him, nor because he multiplies persons in this political community; for these acts can be common to everyone at whatever rank. But someone has one rank when he is received into his lord's household, another when he advances further and is appointed a soldier to defend the commonwealth, another when he is appointed as the highest subordinate to the lord, to appoint others to determinate ranks in his household, such as a general seneschal immediately beneath the lord, to whom universal authority is entrusted to receive some into the lord's household. Therefore, if a name had been imposed signifying a rank in the household or a bailiwick, one would not say that someone had that rank because he ate, or because he returned to grace after an offense; one would say only that he had the rank of one taken from the people into the lord's household, and a further rank of one appointed in the household as a superior to receive some into the dignity of the household, because he approached the table or because he reconciled and appointed inferiors to be appointed. So in the present case, the three Sacraments, namely the Eucharist for spiritual nourishment, Matrimony for bodily procreation, and Penance for annual reconciliation, establish no one in any determinate rank in the Church; indeed they can be common to every member of the Church, at whatever rank. But the first rank of the Church, and the most universal, is to be received into Christ's household, which occurs in Baptism. The second is the special rank of military service for the defense of the Christian faith, which occurs in Confirmation. The third is to be established as father and shepherd for introducing others into the Church and directing and instructing them, which occurs in Orders. And just as in that political community it is not fitting to repeat those three dignities, namely reception into the household, promotion to military service, and elevation to teaching, though nourishment, procreation, and reconciliation can be repeated, so in the present case the three Sacraments ought not to be repeated, while the others are repeated. In the non-repeatable ones a non-repeatable rank is acquired, and it is called a character; in the repeatable ones, it is not.” —

The Tridentine Catechism agrees with this, question On the Sacraments in General, n. 80, where it says: “Now the character has this effect, both that we are made suitable to receive or perform something sacred, and that one person may be recognized from another by some mark. By the character of Baptism we obtain both: we are made fit to receive the other Sacraments, and, besides, the faithful people are distinguished by it from the Gentiles who do not keep the faith. The same can be recognized in the character of Confirmation and of holy Orders. By the one we are armed and equipped as a soldier of Christ for public confession and defense of his name, and against the enemy implanted in us and the spiritual forces of wickedness in the heavens; at the same time we are distinguished from those who have recently been baptized and are like newborn infants. By the other, it both carries the power associated with confecting and administering the Sacraments, and displays the distinction of those endowed with such power from the rest of the faithful.”

Second conclusion. — THE SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER IS NEITHER A RELATION OF REASON NOR A REAL RELATION, BUT A REAL ABSOLUTE FORM. This appears to be the more probable opinion of the Subtle Doctor, whatever some less honorably and wrongly attribute to him. To make this more evident, it is useful to transcribe the Doctor's words in 4. dist. 6, q. 10, n. 18. He says: “To the question it can be said that, just as it cannot be proved that some real form distinct from grace and the virtues is impressed in the reception of Baptism, either by natural reason or by evident reasoning from manifest articles of faith, so it cannot be proved that the character, if posited as a real form, is an absolute real form or a relative one, since either can be maintained: namely, that it is a relative form, as was already shown, or that it is an absolute real form. If it is posited, it cannot be evidently disproved. For certain things can be reasonably granted concerning the character, if it is posited as existing: for example, that it is a spiritual form impressed by God upon anyone receiving a non-repeatable Sacrament; that by divine institution it effectively signifies that grace of the Sacrament and disposes toward it, as was explained in the preceding question, because it is in the same recipient, from the same agent, and is a prior and less perfect form; and because it is indelible, since it has no meritorious cause of corruption. It is also a commemorative sign with respect to reception of the Sacrament, which has passed, and a configurative sign, that is, signifying the soul's obligation to Christ. It is also an assimilative form to another receiving the Sacrament, and distinguishing from another who does not receive it.”

From this it is evident how rashly some, with Vasquez, 3. d. 151, c. 2, object to the Subtle Doctor and accuse him of rashness for saying that the character is a relation of reason. Those who wish him to have asserted that the character is a real relation depart no less, and indeed far less, from his opinion. For if the Doctor is examined thoroughly as a sound evaluator and judge of things, it will appear that he merely taught what could indeed be defended by the opinion affirming that the character is a real relation; yet he judges more probable the opinion which contends that the character itself is an absolute form of the genus of quality. He assigns and defends this opinion, as his own, in the final place, as is his custom. It is also defended by his more celebrated disciples, Bassolius, in this question 3; Mayronius, d. 1, q. 5, art. 10; Rubionensis, q. 2, art. 2; Torillon, q. 3, d. 3, conclusion 1, to say nothing of all the Moderns who, with the most learned commentator Cavello, uphold the same assertion.

Proof: The essence of the character should be established in whatever more conduces to its dignity and efficacy; but this is true of the opinion affirming that it consists in some absolute real form; therefore, and so on.

The major is evident: the effects of the Sacraments should be celebrated with as much commendation as possible, without any contradiction or repugnance. For this greatly contributes to the dignity of the Christian religion and to celebrating God's goodness toward human beings.

The minor is proved: an absolute real form is much more perfect than any relative form, as the philosophers know. Relations have a more slender and tenuous being and are more dependent than absolute accidental forms, since the latter depend only upon the subject in which they inhere, whereas the former depend not only upon a subject but also upon a foundation and a term. —

Furthermore, a relation is not produced in itself, but results from the production of something else, like the likeness between two white walls. But the character is produced primarily in itself, as was said in the preceding conclusion, where it was proved that certain Sacraments produce and impress a character immediately in one who receives validly, though with a pretense, some Sacrament that impresses a character. No other term or effect of that Sacrament can be assigned than the character itself, since in that case sacramental grace is not produced. Therefore the character is some absolute real form. —

Finally, if it were a relation, it would be either a relation of reason or a real relation; but neither can rightly be affirmed. Not the first: both because the Councils and holy Fathers assert that the character is a spiritual sign impressed upon the soul, whereas this cannot be verified of a being of reason, since it is not impressed upon the soul but exists only objectively in the intellect; and because God is the principal author of the sacramental character, but God is not the author of beings of reason—for let us not say that God conceives a thing on the side of reality otherwise than it is. Also, a person is marked by the character and truly distinguished from another who is not marked by such a character; but he cannot be so marked by a being of reason. For how could that relation of reason and extrinsic denomination be a sign by which one is deputed before another to sacred actions and given the ability to perform them, when it places nothing in the person and is not knowable in itself? Finally, the character is indelible, but a being of reason cannot be called indelible, since it exists only through a fiction of the intellect that very easily vanishes. Therefore the character cannot be regarded as a relation of reason.

It is likewise more probable that it is not a real relation, for it would be either intrinsic or extrinsically added. Not the first: this requires a proximate foundation and a really existing term; but the character of Baptism and Orders, for example, impressed upon the Apostles, did not at some time have an actually existing term, as during the three days of Christ's death, when Christ was not present. Nor can anything be assigned as its proximate foundation. If there were such a thing, it would especially be the actual reception of the Sacrament; but this cannot be considered the proximate foundation of the character, because it is impossible for a relation actually to subsist when its proximate foundation no longer subsists. Yet the character subsists, since it is indelible, even after the actual reception of the Sacrament has passed. Therefore that reception cannot be considered the proximate foundation of the character. It must therefore be concluded that the character is an absolute form. —

Nor is it an extrinsically added relation: although in a baptized, ordained, or confirmed person, from the sacramental action by which he was baptized, confirmed, or ordained, there remains an extrinsically added relation of the person to the minister of such Sacraments, this relation cannot be called the character. Otherwise it would follow that a character is also impressed by the action of the other Sacraments, since such a relation arises from that action. This is proved because the relation remaining from the application of Baptism, for example, is nothing other than the denomination “baptized”; but a similar relation, or denomination, “nourished,” “absolved,” “healed,” and “married,” remains from the application of the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony. Therefore, and so on.

You will ask: To which species of quality does the character belong?

The Doctor answers, in the passage cited above, n. 15, that it can be reduced to the first or second species of quality, namely either to habit or to power. For the Doctor says: I answer therefore that, if the character is posited as an absolute accident, it can be posited in the second species of quality, or also in the first; neither of these can be evidently disproved. He proves this as follows:

If the character could not be reduced to the second species, this would be chiefly because only those things that have the character of a natural power belong to that species; and consequently, since the character is a supernatural quality, it could not belong to it. But this reasoning is invalid, because, says the Doctor, although the Philosopher included under this heading only qualities naturally active, nevertheless a supernatural power, if it is absolute, non-accidental, and spiritual, can well belong to the same intermediate genus as a natural habit. Likewise, if it is reduced to the first species, namely habit, because it is difficult to remove, it cannot be disproved. For if anything prevented the character from being reduced to habit, it would chiefly be because a habit is given for operating easily, whereas the character, since it is supernatural, is given for operating simply; or because the character is a disposition toward grace and therefore is not a habit; or because a habit is determined to one mode of acting, good or evil, since we cannot use habits indifferently: no one can use the habit of virtue badly, and no one can use the habit of vice well. But the character is indifferent to either, namely to acting well or badly: some use the sacramental character well, religiously, and piously, while others use it badly, sacrilegiously, and impiously. But these reasons are invalid. Not the first, because, says the Doctor, n. 16, a supernatural habit, as a supernatural form difficult to remove, can be a principle of acting or resisting corruption, and thus have the character of a supernatural power. Hence, although a natural habit signifies only facility and not power, nevertheless a supernatural habit, insofar as it is an immovable spiritual form, can have the character of a habit; but insofar as it is a principle by which we can elicit a supernatural act, it can be called a power. Nor the second, because, says the Doctor in the same place, one habit can well be a disposition toward another, just as, according to those who distinguish the habit of principles from the habit of conclusions, the habit of principles disposes toward the habit of conclusions. Yet it does not follow that it is a disposition insofar as this is distinguished from habit in the first species of quality; for this disposition is a quality easy to remove, and as such is distinguished from habit insofar as habit is a quality difficult for the subject to lose, such as the character. Nor the third, because, he says in the same place, an act can be indifferent. Just as from frequently repeated acts of acting well a habit inclining one to act well is acquired, and from frequent acts of acting badly a habit inclining one to act badly is acquired, so from frequent acts of acting absolutely a capacity for eliciting an act that is neither good nor bad is acquired. He proves this with the example that someone who frequently considers geometry can acquire great facility for considering a conclusion in that science; yet there is no good or bad habit there, just as there is no good or bad act from which it was generated. The same can occur in a supernatural habit.

Third conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE CHARACTER IS IMMEDIATELY AND FORMALLY IN THE WILL, BUT MEDIATELY AND REALLY IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL. This is the Doctor's opinion in 4. d. 6, q. 10, n. 1, where he says: I answer the question, presupposing ... concerning grace, which is the same as charity, and consequently is first in a power, namely in the will; and further, that this disposition toward the form is in the same recipient as the form, while the character, if it is posited as inhering, is suitably posited as a disposition toward sacramental grace: therefore it is fitting to posit the character formally in the will. Thus the Doctor; and in these words he notably says that it is fitting. For the reasons he offers to prove this assertion do not establish absolute necessity, but only a certain greater fittingness. He proves first: It is more fitting that a disposition be established in the same proximate subject in which the form toward which it disposes is received; but the character is at least a moral disposition toward grace, which formally and immediately resides in the will, as was proved in the preceding Treatise; therefore, and so on. The major appears evident from physics: since a disposition must remove obstacles that would hinder the introduction of the form and must prepare the subject for receiving the form, it must be found in the same subject in which the form is to be received. The Doctor presupposes the minor as proved in q. 9, n. 18, where, inquiring about the character and objecting to himself that a disposition can be on the side of the patient or the agent, he answers: “Not on the side of the agent,” he says, “as though it were some intermediate agent between the first agent and the patient. For I do not posit that the character has any active power with respect to causing grace, but while it assists grace as an incisive sign for causing grace, when it marks, once the impediment or inherent obstacle has withdrawn. Therefore it is a disposition on the side of the recipient, because it is the prior form under which the later form is received, not simply necessarily, but necessarily in comparison with the ordinary power of the agent causing both forms.” By this the Doctor signifies that although character and grace have no necessary connection with one another from the nature of things, they nevertheless have one in moral estimation, because the character is ordered toward the conferral of grace both through the Sacrament by which it is impressed and through other Sacraments, especially if we speak of the baptismal character, since through it we are made capable of the other Sacraments. For there would be no reason why the character should be indelible and make the Sacrament non-repeatable unless it were subordinated to grace as a prior form; nor can the configuration of the soul and of the image, which is principally made through grace, properly subsist in the character alone unless it expressed some order toward grace; nor can the obligation following upon such configuration to Christ abstract from the means by which it must be fulfilled, namely actual or habitual grace. Therefore it must have at least a moral connection with the grace toward which it is a disposition. He proves secondly: Every obligation to a moral work belongs to the will; but the baptismal character, for example, induces an obligation of the soul toward Christ, so that it observes the Christian law. This obligation is a moral necessity of acting, and consequently a certain inclination toward the action itself, just as a law, precept, or vow is said to incline toward action insofar as it opposes the freedom to act or not to act and to do this or that. Likewise, the character of Confirmation induces the obligation of military service and confession of faith; the character of Orders is also a principle of acting, for it is an active power. But every moral obligation belongs especially to the will; therefore

The character induces a moral obligation to act, and should therefore be in the will immediately rather than in the substance of the soul itself, which is not operative in itself, or in the intellect, which of itself does not seize upon moral action. Further, the character is a power, or sign of the power, of receiving or drawing forth those things that pertain to divine worship; but it belongs to the virtue of religion, which is in the will, to expend and perform those things that pertain to divine worship. Therefore the sign of such power should also be placed in the will. This is confirmed because the Sacraments belong to religion; therefore that effect which deputes a person to divine worship, such as the character, must also belong to religion. It must therefore be concluded that the character is immediately and formally in the will, but really in the substance of the soul itself, with which the will is really identical. In the same way, grace and charity inhere in the will as forms affecting and perfecting it in relation to operation; but really they inhere in the substance of the soul itself, with which the will is really indistinct.

You will say 1. The character is not ordered toward acting, but only toward perfecting and marking the soul; therefore it ought to inhere in the substance of the soul rather than in some faculty. — I distinguish the antecedent: it is not ordered per se and effectively, I concede; through another and dispositively, namely by reason of operative grace toward which it disposes, or of the ministry and office to whose fulfillment it obliges, I deny.

You will say 2. The substance of the soul is the subject of power, in which the faculties of the soul inhere; but a power cannot be the subject of another power. Yet, as we have said, the character can be reduced to the second species of quality, which is power; therefore it cannot exist in some faculty or power of the soul. — I distinguish the first part of the major: the substance of the soul is the subject of a natural power flowing from it, like a property connatural to it and really identified with it, I concede; of a power that is a supernatural accident really distinct from it, I deny. I likewise distinguish the other part of the same major: a power is not the subject of another power of substantiality and really identified with it, I concede; of an accidental power really distinct from it, I deny. And with the minor thus distinguished, the consequence must be denied; otherwise it would follow that no habit of virtue should be placed in the will itself.

You will say 3. The character is a certain spiritual light; but every light belongs to the intellect; therefore the character does too. The major is established by Saint Dionysius, book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 2, where he says:

Divine blessedness receives and admits the human being brought to Baptism into its participation or communication, and makes him a participant in its own light, as in a kind of sign, making him intimate with God and a sharer in the gifts of the sacred order, whose sacred token is that of the High Priest, a seal given to the one approaching, and so on.

But this seal is nothing other than the character, which he calls light and illumination; therefore, and so on. — I distinguish the major: the character is a spiritual light ordered toward the proper illumination of the one possessing the character, I deny; toward the illumination of others, so that through the character they know that I am deputed as a member of the household, or soldier, or minister of Christ, I concede. Such a light need not be in the intellect. Thus the characters and insignia of servants enlighten others, or lead them to know that they are servants of such and such a master, yet those marks and characters of servitude need not be in the intellect.

Fourth conclusion. — THE SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER IS INDELIBLE AND IRREMOVABLE. The Doctor proves this truth in d. 6, q. 9, n. 20, where he says:

Although indelibility of the character is spoken of in many ways, and it is not very useful to recount them, I say briefly that no form can be in the soul, other than the soul, which God could not delete by absolute power, just as something later can be removed a priori, since no contradiction can be found in this. But the character, if posited, is indelible in this way and cannot be deleted in this way, because it cannot be deleted by the power of any creature. This is clear because it is a supernatural form. Nor can it be deleted by divine power according to the ordered power, because God has ordained that no supernatural form be deleted except on account of some demerit inhering in the soul; but with respect to the character being deleted, no demeritorious cause can exist, since when it is impressed in the act of mortal sinning, nothing can merit its being taken away.

By this the Doctor clearly signifies that in the ordinary course the sacramental character is indelible. This truth is clearly handed down by the Councils of Florence and Trent, as is clear from their decrees cited in the first conclusion, by which it is signified that the character inheres indelibly in the soul. It is likewise clear from the holy Fathers, who call this seal indissoluble, especially Saint Augustine, book 2 of Against Parmenian, chapter 13, where he says: The Christian Sacraments adhere no less than the mark of bodily military service, which was once impressed upon the flesh ... and the holiness of the Sacraments remains inviolable and undefiled in the good for reward, in the wicked for judgment. A fitting reason also supports it: it was fitting that the character be altogether indelible and could not be annulled by any sin. Indeed, if the power of Orders signified by the character could be lost through some sin, it would follow that people would often be uncertain whether they validly received the Sacraments, since they have no indication whether the priests from whom they receive the Sacraments are in a state of grace or not; and this would truly tend to the great detriment of the faithful.

You will say 1. If some character were indelible, it would be especially the character of Orders; but that can be deleted by sins and wicked crimes; therefore, and so on. The major is clear. The minor is proved: the character of Orders is the power of administering and performing those things that specially pertain to divine worship, the administration of the Sacraments, and the public government of the Christian commonwealth; but that authority is lost through sin, so that whatever is done by wicked ministers is rejected by the Church as invalid and null; therefore, and so on. The minor is proved by many acts and examples, especially those of Photius, Bishop of the See of Constantinople, Maximus the Cynic, bishop of the same city, Proculus, Bishop of Marseille, and Ebbo, Archbishop of Rheims, whose ordinations and ecclesiastical offices were declared entirely invalid and null. First, the invalidity and nullity of the authority of a wicked minister of the Church is clear from the example of Photius, whose ordinations and ecclesiastical offices were rejected and annulled. For when, through the schemes of the eunuch Barda, he had been consecrated Patriarch of Constantinople by Gregory, the excommunicated Bishop of Syracuse, after the legitimate Bishop Ignatius had first been imprisoned and then driven into exile, a Roman synod was convened by Nicholas I, Supreme Pontiff, in which this sentence was passed against Photius: let him be foreign to every honor and name of the priesthood, and deprived of every office of the clergy. The same Pontiff also issued this sentence against him: Those whom Photius, a neophyte and intruder into the See of Constantinople, promoted to any ecclesiastical order, we deprive of every clerical office. Similar statements are found in the same Supreme Pontiff's first letter and in Letter 1 to the Emperor Michael, where he writes that Photius received nothing from Gregory except as much as Gregory had; but he had nothing and gave nothing. Adrian II, Supreme Pontiff, likewise decreed this, as we read in Act 3 of the Eighth Ecumenical Synod, where it says concerning those ordained by Photius: Whatever Photius is thought to have ordained in any rank, we rightly remove from the number and dignity of the bishops, which he usurped and falsely conferred. He adds three reasons: first, that Photius is like Maximus the Cynic, who, as we shall soon say, possessed no episcopal authority; second, that this had been decreed by his predecessor Nicholas; third, that he was ordained by an excommunicated man, who had nothing and gave nothing, except perhaps the condemnation he poured out upon his followers. Hence the following is found in Canon 1 of the Fourth Council of Constantinople:

Cutting out by the roots the love of primacy, as a kind of evil root of scandals arising in the Church, we condemn by a just decree the man who rashly, transgressively, and irregularly, like a great wolf, leapt into Christ's fold, namely Photius, who filled the world with a thousand tumults and disturbances. We proclaim that he was neither previously nor now a bishop, and that those consecrated or promoted by him in any priestly rank do not remain in the rank to which they were advanced. Moreover, we restrain from such patronage those who received from him the customary prayers for promotion to a prelacy; and we decree that the churches which Photius and those consecrated by him are thought to have dedicated, or in which they set up moved altars, be dedicated, enthroned, and established again, with everything done in him and by him for receiving a priestly rank or for condemnation made void.

The Council has spoken. But if Photius is not considered a bishop because he was ordained by an excommunicated Gregory, and if everything done by Photius is invalid because he had intruded into the See of Constantinople and was afterward excommunicated, it follows that the episcopal character and authority cease in a notorious and excommunicated person; therefore, and so on. The same is clear from the example of Maximus the Cynic. After he had been made Bishop of Constantinople by certain Egyptian bishops corrupted with money, through a clandestine election, the First Council of Constantinople pronounced concerning him and his ordinations in Canon 6, in these words:

Concerning Maximus the Cynic philosopher, because of his undisciplined teaching which arose in Constantinople, it was decreed that Maximus neither was nor should be considered a bishop, nor should those ordained by him possess any clerical rank, everything done around him or by him being revoked as invalid. —

Photius, a man exceedingly desirous of glory, was transformed from a layman into a Patriarch in six days: on the first day he was made a monk from a layman, on the second he became a Reader, on the third a Subdeacon, on the fourth a Deacon, on the fifth a Priest, and on the sixth finally a Patriarch. He ascended the throne and announced peace to the people while thinking of nothing worthy of peace. He was consecrated by Gregory of Syracuse, Bishop of Ignatius's rebel and excommunicated enemy, who had been driven from the throne; but he used as ministers Peter, Bishop of Sardinia, called “the wretched,” and Eulalius, Bishop of Apamea. These facts indicate that Photius's episcopal consecration was illicit, not invalid.

Therefore, although those ordained by him could never licitly exercise the duties of the Order received, since they were suspended from its exercise because they had received the Order from one who had imposed hands in another diocese, not his own, without the consent of that place's bishop, nevertheless they were validly ordained and received the character of the Order. That Photius's ordination was valid is clear from the letter of John VIII, Supreme Pontiff, to the emperors Basil and Alexander, in which he approves Photius's restoration to the See of Constantinople after Ignatius's death: Without prejudicing the Apostolic statutes or dissolving the rules of the blessed Fathers, we receive and hold the same Photius, who, after seeking mercy before the synod according to custom, as a brother in the love of charity, as a fellow minister in pontifical office and a fellow shepherd in pastoral teaching, for the peace and benefit of the Church of God, restoring him to the throne against Christ's will— and so on. He proves that this can be done by the examples of the Donatists and Bonosians, who were received into their honors and offices without any reordination. Nor does it matter that John is reproached by many for having been so accommodating toward Photius's restoration, since afterward Photius became the most intense enemy of the Roman Church and the author of the schism and defection of the Greeks from the Latins. No one has ever thought him blameworthy for judging that Photius should be received without reordination. The same must be said of the ordinations he performed. For Pope Formosus, writing to Stylianus, Bishop of Neocaesarea in the province of Euphratesia, says among other things: Dealing mercifully with those ordained by Photius, we have decreed that, after submitting petitions, they confess that they have sinned and ask pardon through penance, promising that they will never do anything of the kind again. By this he approves their reception, with penance indeed, but without a new ordination. The same must be said regarding the example of Maximus the Cynic, since Adrian, in his second letter to Ignatius, writes that Photius's ordination is entirely similar to Maximus's, since both were illicit though valid. Nor does it matter that both are called not bishops. For this is said for the common understanding of the people, not with doctrinal precision, almost as true priests are called wicked and violators of the priesthood by their actions—not because they do not possess the dignity, gravity, authority, state, and perfection of the priesthood when they stain their consciences with shameful crimes, but because they do not observe the laws of the priesthood. In the common way, consuls who do not care for the commonwealth are denied to be consuls, physicians who do not heal others are denied to be physicians, doctors who make no effort to teach others are denied to be doctors, and kings who scorn the duties of a king are denied to be kings. No one will deny that these and similar, even harsher, phrases can be used to attack vices. Concerning the example of Proculus of Marseille, I say that Zosimus calls him not a bishop not because he truly lacked the episcopal character and authority, but because he illicitly and against the Canons aspired to the metropolitan office. That he was truly always a bishop is plainly clear from Saint Jerome, Letter 1 to Rusticus, where he writes: You have there the holy and most learned Bishop Chromatius, who surpasses our little writings with living and present speech and directs your journey by daily discourses, and so on. Moreover, he is found signing together with Saint Ambrose at the Council of Aquileia in 381. Therefore, when Proculus is said not to be a bishop, or those ordained by him are removed from any ecclesiastical rank, or are said to lack the priesthood, all this is to be understood not as deprivation of the character in the one conferring Orders or in those receiving them, but as deprivation of the goods of ranks and offices. The same truth appears thirdly from Proculus of Marseille. When the Council of Turin, held in the year 397, had declared in its first canon that Proculus, Bishop of Marseille, acted as metropolitan over the churches appearing to be situated in the Second Province of Narbonne, Pope Zosimus, about twenty years later, annulled that synodal judgment, as is clear from various letters, especially Letter 6 to the Bishop of Carthage, where he declares invalid the ordinations of two bishops, Universus and Terentius, made by Proculus. In Letter 1 to the Bishop of Arles he condemns Proculus for undertaking such things. When Proculus still did not yield, he wrote Letter 11 to the people of Marseille, in which among other things he says: Since Proculus is no longer a bishop, he performs what belongs to bishops, and, as a generous human benefactor, says he can bestow on others what he could not justly retain as something once given to himself, and so on. But if a condemned bishop ceases to be a bishop, and priests ordained by him lack the priesthood, it follows that his character and authority cease and consequently are not indelible. The fourth example is Ebbo, formerly Archbishop of Rheims. In the year 835, under Pope Gregory IV, at a gathering of bishops held at Thionville, he had resigned the episcopate on account of certain crimes of which he was accused, especially that he had promoted the deposition of Emperor Louis the Pious. Nevertheless, after his deposition, while Louis's son Lothair reigned, he was restored to his see by a synod of provincial bishops and ordained several clerics in that church. Finally, with the support of King Charles, he was removed and deposed by the bishops of Gaul, and Hincmar was substituted for him while he was still alive. When Hincmar after Ebbo's death refused to admit the priests and clerics whom he had ordained, the bishops of Gaul held the Council of Soissons in 853, under Pope Leo, in which they condemned all ordinations made by Ebbo after his deposition and declared them invalid and null, as Flodoard reports in book 3 of the History of Rheims, chapter 11, where he recounts the entire proceedings of this Council. Therefore, all these things establish that the episcopal character and authority are not indelible and irremovable, since they cease through the crimes or deposition of a bishop. I deny the consequence, and concerning the first example I say that the ordinations made by Photius were indeed valid, though not licit, because Photius had been ordained against the Church's Canons. For, as Nicetas says in Baronius under the year 857: Concerning the fourth example I say that everything determined by the Council of Soissons, instigated by Hincmar, against the clerics ordained by Ebbo was condemned and rejected by the Apostolic See, as appears from Letters 16 and 17 of Nicholas, Supreme Pontiff. It is clear from these that when Hincmar acted through repeated embassies before Leo IV to obtain confirmation of this Council and obtained nothing from him, he induced Benedict, Leo's successor, by false accounts to obtain the Council's confirmation surreptitiously, but only conditionally, in this form: “if it is so,” and so on. Pope Nicholas reports there that when Pope Benedict had not fully satisfied Hincmar's wishes in his letter, Hincmar added some things to that letter and removed others at his own discretion. Hence Nicholas, at the end of Letter 16, declares that even if everything alleged against Ebbo were true, nevertheless the clerics ordained by him, if they showed humility and obedience, were to be received with their honors, because Ebbo, whatever he had been, had caused them no obstacle at all. He confirms this by the example of Maximus, who, although a neophyte and improperly ordained, Saint Leo nevertheless did not wish to remove from episcopal dignity. And from the letter of Anastasius II, who, writing to the Emperor Anastasius, says that wicked men, while administering good things, harm only themselves and do not stain the Sacraments of the Church. Finally, from the acts of the Council of Soissons itself and from what was afterward done for those clerics ordained by Ebbo, it is evident that such clerics were only expelled from their ranks and suspended from the administration of their Orders. This is clear, I say, from the Council of Soissons, for it confirms what had previously been done by Hincmar; what that was appears from the petition of those clerics, who say in a petition submitted to that Council: We ask that mercy be shown to us by your fatherhood concerning the administration of the ecclesiastical Orders to which we were once advanced by Lord Ebbo, but from which we have been suspended by your authority. It is equally clear from the acts concerning their restoration. For Nicholas, Supreme Pontiff, commands Hincmar and the other bishops of Gaul nothing else than that such clerics be restored to their ranks. Therefore, when it is said in the same Council, in its fifth session, that whatever Ebbo had done in ecclesiastical ordinations after his condemnation, except holy Baptism, was to be considered canceled and invalid, this must be understood as concerning the honor and rank from which those clerics ordained by Ebbo were considered suspended. The same interpretation must be given to what follows after the sixth session concerning Alduin, who is said to have received the priesthood by a leap from Lupus, Bishop of Châlons, because he had previously received the diaconate from Ebbo. The Council's intention is not that Alduin was not truly a deacon, but that by receiving the character of the diaconate he could not receive the rank and honor of that Order; hence he was treated with respect to the exercise of ministry as though he had truly been promoted by a leap.

You will urge. The Supreme Pontiffs themselves sometimes rejected ordinations made by their predecessors and judged that those ordained by them ought to be ordained again; therefore they did not think that the Sacrament of Orders impressed an indelible character. Proof of the antecedent: first, the example of Pope Stephen IV, who in 769, having convened at Rome a Council of the select bishops of Gaul, Germany, and Italy, declared all ordinations made by his predecessor Constantine invalid. The Council confirmed this invalidation, as is read in its acts, also reported by Anastasius the Librarian, who, speaking of that Roman Council, says:

In that same Council it was promulgated that those bishops who had been ordained from priests or deacons by him should return to their first rank of honor; even if this had pleased all the people of their city, after a new decree of election they were to return, according to custom, with clergy and people to the Apostolic See, so that from Saint Stephen the Pope they might receive consecration by apostolic blessing.

He adds that the same was decreed concerning priests and deacons, and immediately continues: Those bishops, returning at once to their first rank of honor, elected again by clergy and people and proceeding to the Apostolic See with the customary decree, were consecrated by that most holy Pope. Finally he concludes: For it was thus decreed in that same Council, that everything which that Constantine had done in ecclesiastical Sacraments and divine worship should be repeated, except holy Baptism and holy Chrism.

— The second example is Stephen VI. When his predecessor Formosus had ordained several bishops and priests, Stephen, having convened a Council at Rome, not only deposed them all but also ordained them again, as Luitprand reports in book 1, chapter 8, writing: All whom he had ordained, after being deposed from their proper rank, he ordained again. This was because Formosus had previously been excommunicated by John VIII, and because, contrary to the Canons, after abandoning his own wife, that is, the episcopate, he had been made Roman Pontiff from Bishop of Porto. This decree was approved not only by that Council but also by Sergius III. Concerning him the same Luitprand writes: Sergius secretly entered Rome and entered upon the papacy, appointed as a terror to the Roman name, so that they held all Formosus's ordinations invalid. — Finally the same is established by the example of John XII, who likewise convened a Council at Rome in 964 and anathematized the election of Leo, commonly called Leo VIII, as Supreme Pontiff. Concerning those ordained by him, this was decreed in Act 3 of that Council:

Those whom Leo, a neophyte and invader of the Holy Catholic and Roman Church, promoted in any ecclesiastical Order, we recall to their first rank by Apostolic and canonical authority and by synodal decree, because the one who ordained them had nothing for himself and gave them nothing, just as long ago our predecessor, Pope Stephen of blessed memory, pronounced judgment concerning those ordained by a certain Constantine, a neophyte and invader of the Apostolic See, and afterward consecrated some of them, priests or deacons, who were pleasing to him.

Therefore from all this it is clear that the Supreme Pontiffs thought pontifical and episcopal authority could be lost, and consequently that its character was not indelible.

I deny the antecedent, and concerning its first proof I answer with Baronius under the year 769, n. 6, that the bishops said to have been consecrated by Stephen IV should not be considered to have received Orders again. They are called consecrated because they received, according to ancient custom, the pontifical blessing and all the rites customarily observed in reconciling schismatics or heretics. Such reconciliation was necessary for those ordained by Constantine, since he was a pseudo-pontiff who, the brother of the Duke of Tortona of the city of Nethina, relying on his brother's power, invaded the Apostolic See and almost in a moment, observing no intervals, emerged like an actor from the stage as Roman Pontiff. After sitting for a year he ordained many deacons, priests, and bishops. Since they supported his party, they were rightly suspended by the Council and by Stephen, the legitimate Supreme Pontiff, from their offices and ministries until, after a new election, or rather approval, by the people and clergy, they received the Apostolic blessing and were restored to their ranks, honors, and ministries. Nor does it matter that Auxilius, book 2, chapter 1, saying that Stephen IV ordained again those ordained by Constantine, excuses the action only by saying that an example should not be taken from wicked men; both Supreme Pontiffs, Constantine and Stephen V, were wicked men. Constantine was an invader of the Roman See; Stephen, because by his command and approval his followers deprived the captured and fleeing Constantine, who had been left half alive after many blows, of his eyes. Auxilius says that this was not an apostolic but an apostate deed. This does not stand, I say, because it is false that the bloody cruelty against Constantine occurred under Stephen's command. Anastasius the Librarian, who flourished in the same century as Auxilius, attributes Constantine's blinding not to Stephen but to a certain Gratiosus, who, without Stephen's knowledge, surrounded by a band of soldiers, inflicted this cruelty upon Constantine. Hence Anastasius accuses Stephen of no crime, indeed celebrates him with many praises, as well as the bishops who had assembled with him in the Roman Council. If we nevertheless prefer to follow Auxilius's opinion and consider the consecration performed by Stephen a true reordination, I answer that it does not follow that Stephen judged either that the character was not impressed through the Sacrament of Orders or that it was removable, but only that he erred in fact, thinking Constantine was not a valid bishop, just as he was an illegitimate pontiff. Thus he could think all Constantine's pontifical acts altogether invalid. Indeed, he did not even consider everything invalid, for, as the same Anastasius reports, he approved not only the Baptism conferred by Constantine but also the chrismation, namely Confirmation, which is ordinarily conferred only by a true bishop.

I answer secondly with Baronius under the year 897: first, that Stephen can rightly be excluded from the number of the Roman Pontiffs, as can Sergius, since in those most perilous times of the Church they were driven from the Roman See by the faction of the Tusculan Marquises, intruders being expelled by intruders. I would not dare, says Baronius, n. 6, to number Stephen among the Roman Pontiffs unless I had received this as having been done by the Fathers. And rightly so: that Stephen was infamous for so many and such great crimes that he is altogether unworthy of the name and title of Roman Pontiff. Among his grave and horrible deeds, he ordered his predecessor Formosus to be dragged from the tomb and placed, dressed in priestly vestments, upon the chair of the Roman Pontificate; then, after stripping him and cutting off three fingers with which he used to bless the people, he ordered his mutilated body to be thrown into the Tiber, as Luitprand narrates in book 1, chapter 8, in these words:

After Formosus had died and Arnulf had returned to his own country, the one appointed after Formosus's death, namely Bonus, was expelled, and Pope Sergius (so I should have written) was set up by Adalbert. Once set up, as an impious man ignorant of holy doctrine, he ordered Formosus to be dragged from the tomb and placed, dressed in priestly vestments, upon the pontifical chair, and said to him: Since you were Bishop of Porto, why did you usurp the universal Roman See in the spirit of ambition? Having finished this, he ordered him stripped of the consecrated vestments and, after three fingers had been cut off, thrown into the Tiber; and he ordained again all whom he had ordained, after deposing them from their proper rank. You can perceive, most holy Father, how badly you acted, since those who received from Judas, the betrayer of our Lord Jesus Christ, before the proof of salvation or apostolic blessing, were not deprived after that betrayal of the suspension of their own bodies, except those whom shameful crimes had perhaps defiled¹. For the blessing bestowed upon Christ's ministers is not poured out through the one who appears to be a priest. For neither the one who waters is anything nor the one who plants, but God who gives the growth. How great Formosus's authority and religion were we can gather from this: when he was afterward found by fishermen and carried to the Church of blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, certain images of the Saints in the shrine saluted him reverently as he lay there. I have often heard this from the most religious men of the city of Rome.

I add, however, that Stephen's act of reordaining those already ordained by Formosus was tyrannical in fact, not an error in faith. For everything done by Stephen VII and Sergius III was carried out only through threats and terrors, with the good protesting and the wicked terrified by their deed. Hence, after Stephen had been removed from this life by an unhappy end—for in the year 900 he was thrust into prison and strangled there by a noose—the three Supreme Pontiffs who succeeded him, namely Romanus, Theodore, and John IX, entirely rescinded his acts, as Luitprand reports concerning Romanus and Auxilius concerning Theodore. John, moreover, after celebrating two Councils, condemned in the first, held in 901, the pseudo-synod convened by Stephen, in these words:

The bishops, priests, and deacons, as well as the subdeacons and the rest of every other order of the Holy Apostolic See, who were canonically consecrated by that revered Pope Formosus and rashly cast down from their own orders and ranks at the pleasure of certain persons, we restore, by the common judgment of the Synod, to their own ranks, and by God's authority we decree that they be established with perpetual force and canonical censure,

etc. In that same year John also held another Synod at Ravenna, which Sigebert mentions in these words: He also, to confirm the Order of Formosus, whom Pope Stephen had deposed, held a synod of 74 bishops at Ravenna in the presence of the Frankish archbishops and the king, and before them the synod which Stephen had held for the condemnation of Formosus was burned. Therefore, with Bellarmine, book 1 of On the Supreme Pontiff, chapter 12, we must conclude

that Stephen and Sergius issued no decree by which they determined that those ordained by a degraded bishop, or specifically by Formosus as degraded, should be ordained again, but only ordered in fact that they be ordained again. This order proceeded not from ignorance or heresy but from hatred of Formosus, and could be carried out only through force and tyranny. Nor does it matter that Stephen's decree was approved by the Roman Council he celebrated in the year of the Lord 897, for all of this was done through tyranny and fear imposed upon the good bishops who were present. Hence all who took part in that pseudo-synod begged pardon for their offense in the Roman Council under John IX. Thus we read in it: The bishops and priests, and the remaining clergy, who took part in that Synod, because, compelled by fear and dread of terror, they confessed that they had attended while asking pardon, we have forgiven them at the request of the holy Synod. — Finally, concerning the third example I answer that nothing else was done in that Roman Council against those ordained by Leo except that they were expelled from the rank to which Leo had raised them and recalled to their former rank. For Sigebert, who appears to have read the synodal acts of this Council, summarized them in his Chronicle as follows:

John, having gathered a Synod, deposed Leo and canceled his acts. It was also established by the public judgment of all that the Synod held by Leo—indeed, it was not to be called a Synod but “the raging brothel of the adulterer” (thus he called Leo, because he had invaded the Roman Church betrothed to another)—and all who had been condemned by Leo's ordination were ordered to present their own proscription in writing, containing these words: My father had nothing for himself; he gave me nothing. Thus they remained deposed in the ranks they had held, not ordained by Leo. But if some were judged worthy to be ordained without a prior consecration being received, the same decree was imposed upon them as upon the one condemned by Constantine the Neophyte.

This is Sigebert. Nor should those words move us: My father had nothing for himself; he gave me nothing, and so on. They are to be understood with respect to honor, rank, and ministry, just as was said concerning those ordained by Constantine the Neophyte, since Sigebert asserts that Constantine's decree had been intimated to them.

You will object 3. There are various Canons of Councils by which ordinations made either by those who do not ordain their subjects, or by those who are excommunicated, suspended, or degraded, are declared invalid. First, Canon 16 of the Council of Nicaea: If anyone should attempt to invade another parish and ordain in his own Church without the consent of the bishop from whom the one called by the rule has departed, let such an ordination be declared invalid. Concerning the ordinations of excommunicated persons, the Council of Quedlinburg, held in 1085 under Pope Gregory VII, says: In that Synod the ordination of Benilo of Mainz, the intruder, and of Siegfried of Augsburg and Norbert of Chur was judged invalid; indeed all ordinations and consecrations of the excommunicated were judged wholly invalid, according to the decrees of the holy Fathers Innocent, Leo I, Pelagius, and his successor Gregory I. The same is decreed concerning the ordinations of simoniacs in the Council of Piacenza under Urban II, where it is established: If anything in holy Orders and ecclesiastical matters appears to have been acquired simoniacally by money given or promised, let it be considered invalid. Therefore the authority once acquired to confer holy

Orders can be lost; and consequently the character is not irremovable. —

I deny the consequence, and concerning the aforesaid Canons I answer that such ordinations are called invalid not with respect to the impression of the character, but with respect to the suspension of the ministry and of the Order received. This is defined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 5, On Reform, where it is established: Let no bishop be permitted, under pretext of any privilege, to exercise pontificals in another diocese except with the express permission of the local Ordinary, and only over persons subject to that Ordinary. If anything is done otherwise, the bishop is suspended by the law itself from the exercise of pontificals, and those thus ordained from the execution of Orders. That nothing else is intended in the aforesaid Canons, especially the Quedlinburg Canon, is evident, since it brings forward the authority of Innocent, Leo I, Pelagius, and Gregory the Great, whom it is certain approved ordinations performed by neophytes, heretics, and excommunicated persons, as we shall see when treating of the minister of the Sacraments.

You will ask: Does that character also subsist after death, both in the blessed and in the damned?

I answer. This appears certain, since the Councils and holy Fathers absolutely pronounce that this character is indelible. Although it was not their intention to determine whether it subsisted even after death, because no controversy concerning this question was being conducted with the heretics, nevertheless this appears constant from the practice of the Church, which does not customarily baptize, confirm, or ordain again one raised from the dead; yet it permits him to receive and administer the Sacraments as he did while alive and before death. To assert that God reproduces the character in him anew, just as he reproduces life, is to admit a miracle without any necessity or sufficient reason. Therefore it must be inferred that the Church's mind is that the character subsists in him.

This is further supported by a common argument. If the character perished with life, it would do so chiefly either through corruption of the subject, opposition of a contrary, or lack of conservation; but it cannot be erased in any of these three ways. Not through corruption of the subject, since the soul, which is its subject, cannot be corrupted; not through opposition of a contrary, since it has nothing contrary to it; nor through lack of conservation, since God conserves it in the blessed for adornment, and in the damned for punishment and disgrace. For when something is conserved by God, God does not interrupt his conserving influx unless some urgent and efficacious reason advises it; but the character perseveres until death, and no reason appears why it should perish in death or why God should deny it conserving concurrence, since it is spiritual and independent of the body.

You will say: When the end ceases, those things ordered to the end cease, otherwise they would remain in vain. Hence Matrimony will not subsist after generation, because generation, toward which it is ordered, will cease. But the end of the character will also cease in death, namely external worship of God, since there will be no such worship in hell, nor will there be any in heaven; for in heaven nothing will be done in figure or under a veil, but in open and naked truth. —

I answer by distinguishing the major: if the end ceases altogether, I concede; if it ceases only in some respect, I deny. I likewise distinguish the minor: external worship will cease in heaven with respect to its external matter, I concede; with respect to its end, I deny. And likewise I deny the consequence. For two things can be considered in divine worship: the matter of worship, namely certain external works, and the end of worship, namely the honor and glory of God presented to him through those external works. Those external works will indeed cease in heaven, but the end, namely God's honor and glory, will remain; and consequently the character itself will also persevere, in the good for glory and in the wicked for disgrace, just as a military character perseveres in soldiers after victory has been won: in those who conquered for glory, but in those who were conquered for punishment.

You will insist: The damned are unworthy of every supernatural gift, as Saint Dionysius testifies in book On the Divine Names, chapter 4, where he says that demons lack all divine gifts both according to habit and according to operation; but the character is some supernatural gift; therefore it does not remain in the damned.

I answer, that although the damned are unworthy of every supernatural gift that could contribute to their consolation, nevertheless they are not unworthy—in fact, they are supremely worthy—of everything that can contribute to their punishment and suffering. Such, without doubt, are the characters with which they have been divinely marked. For just as in the civil commonwealth it is the greatest dishonor and reproach for a soldier to become a traitor or deserter, for a steward of entrusted goods to become their squanderer and defrauder, and for a son or servant to become degenerate and rebellious against his father or master, so in the ecclesiastical commonwealth it is the greatest dishonor for Christ's faithful person, soldier, and dispenser to be condemned as a rebel, traitor, and squanderer. Therefore those three characters—the sonship acquired through Baptism, the military service obtained through Confirmation, and the dispensation of Christ's goods entrusted through Orders—will remain in the damned as punishment for their rebellion and defection.