Scotus Academicus, Tomus nonus: De Sacramentis in genere

NOTED 1. There were certain ancient heretics called Paulicians, who eliminated all matter from the Sacraments, asserting that their power consisted solely in the words of Christ the Lord. Hence they said that those who received the Gospel were to be baptized, because the Lord had said in the Gospel: ὁ πιστεύσας καὶ βαπτισθῇ σωθήσεται: thus among them, as Peter the Sicilian in the Bibliotheca of the Holy Fathers and Euthymius in part 2 of the Panoplia, title 21, report, those who held the priestly order were called not Priests but Votaries. Diametrically opposed to them are certain more recent heretics, especially Lutherans and Calvinists, who think that all, or at least the principal, efficacy of the sacraments is to be placed in the matter. But avoiding both of these vicious extremes, Catholic Doctors affirm that the Sacraments of the New Law truly consist of things as matter and words as form, though they do not all agree on what is properly to be understood by “things” and “words.” For some wish these terms to be taken strictly and according to the propriety of the words, so that by “thing” something material would be understood, which could be touched and seen; while by “word” would be understood what is expressed through the vocal organs and perceived by hearing. The principal advocate of this opinion appears to be Durandus in 4 dist. 1 q. 3, where, although he grants that all the Sacraments have some matter, he nevertheless denies that all have sensible things as their matter, especially Penance and Matrimony. Other Theologians, however, think that by the name “thing” one should understand what signifies the same grace more confusedly, whether that thing is properly so called or not; while by the name “words” one should understand what signifies the same grace more distinctly. The Subtle Doctor especially supports this opinion in 4 dist. 3 q. 2 n. 3, where, after he had said: "It must be noted that, properly speaking of form, insofar as it is another part of a composite, the form of the sacrament is the very relation of sign, by which it is formally such a sacrament, and the matter is the whole foundation of that relation." He immediately adds: "Nevertheless, if there are several things in this foundation, from which one Sacrament is in some way made, which are not related equally, but one is as it were prior and determinable, the other as it were posterior, and the determination of the preceding one, the first can be called as it were matter, by a certain likeness to matter, and the other form: for it belongs to matter to precede according to origin and to be determined; to form, however, to govern and determine. Likewise, what is more principal and more actual can be called form with respect to what is more potential; likewise, what is spiritual can be called form with respect to what is less spiritual." Thus the Doctor.

From these things it follows that in the Sacraments, where two things occur jointly signifying the same reality, that which signifies less perfectly and less distinctly is said to signify as a thing, whether meanwhile it is a sensible or properly visible thing or not; but that which signifies more perfectly and distinctly is said to signify as a word, whether it is properly a word or not.

NOTED 2. Although God could at will designate any sensible things, indeed even spiritual things, as the matter of a Sacrament, leaving it to human freedom to use whatever sign they wished for obtaining the promised grace by applying some outward sign assumed and applied for that purpose, nevertheless in his wise ordering he decreed that definite and determined things be used for confecting and administering the Sacrament. Hence this determination of sacramental things can be conceived as made in two ways: either confusedly, or less distinctly, so that it was determined by divine authority that some sign in general be assumed, while no sign in particular was designated; or more distinctly, if it was determined in particular that such and such a thing be assumed for confecting the Sacrament. This in turn can happen in two ways, either according to genus, for example if water were determined as the matter of Baptism, but the ultimate species of water were not designated, whether rose-water, artificial, or natural; or according to the lowest species, for example if not water in general but natural water were designated as the matter of Baptism. Again, matter determined in species can be considered in a twofold distinction: one kind is purely physical, such as the matter of the Sacraments that have some physical and natural thing, as Baptism water, Confirmation chrism from oil and balsam, the Eucharist wheat bread and grape wine, and Extreme Unction oil. Others, however, essentially include in their matter something moral dependent upon human institution, so that this moral element is the foundation and reason why such sensible and physical matter is assumed for confecting the Sacrament. Therefore it is asked whether the matter of the Sacraments of the New Law was so distinctly determined in particular by Christ the Lord that no one is permitted to change it. So that this may be perceived more distinctly,

NOTED 3. A twofold change in the matter of the Sacraments can be distinguished: one substantial and essential, which would occur if, in place of one physical thing designated by Christ the Lord as the matter of the Sacrament, someone assumed another matter distinct in genus or species—namely, if, from the fact that Christ the Lord instituted Baptism to be performed by way of washing in natural water, someone on this occasion presumed to assume any other liquid that could serve for washing, as the Aquarians once taught, who used only water, not wine, in the Sacrament of the altar; just as Beza too, in Epistle 2 to Tillius, contends that, if bread or wine is lacking, whatever by common usage and the circumstances of the time has the character of bread and wine may be assumed for celebrating the Supper. Likewise, if the matter customarily used were so altered that by common usage and manner of speaking it would no longer be considered the same or called by the same name—for example, if wine became so sour that it would no longer be considered and called wine but vinegar. The second change is called accidental, namely when the substance of the matter designated by Christ is indeed assumed, but not with the same accidents which that matter would have according to Christ’s right intention—for example, if someone were to assume natural water for baptizing, but not clear and limpid water, rather turbid and muddy water.

With these points premised, three things are to be determined here: first, whether the Sacraments of the New Law must consist of matter and form; second, whether the matter of the Sacraments was designated and determined by Christ the Lord in species; third, whether it is ever permitted to assume a substantial matter other than that which Christ designated.

First Conclusion. — The Sacraments of the New Law truly must consist of and be perfected by matter and form. This is common among Catholics, and

It is proved first from a decree of the Council of Florence, where it is held that the Sacraments of the New Law are perfected by three things, namely, things as matter, words as form, and the person of the minister confecting the Sacrament with the intention of doing what the Church does; if any one of these is lacking, the Sacrament is not perfected. The only basis of this truth is the will of Christ the Lord, who, just as he is the source of all graces and the stream that pours them abundantly into all, also willed that the grace of the New Testament should be made known to all through the most perfect signs. There are no more perfect signs than things that are seen and words that are heard, for sight and hearing are the senses most serviceable to understanding and knowledge. Hence Christ the Lord fittingly willed to lead us by the hand to perceive spiritual things through the reception of bodily things having some likeness to those spiritual things; for, as Saint Augustine teaches splendidly, Letter 118, chapter 11: The movement of the soul itself, so long as it is still entangled in earthly things, is kindled more sluggishly; but if it is carried to bodily likenesses, and from these is carried to the spiritual things figured by those likenesses, it is warmed by that very passage, as it were, and, like fire stirred in a torch, is set aflame, and bursts forth in more ardent love toward rest and quiet. — That visible things have the character of matter, while words chiefly have the character of form, is tacitly proved as follows: what is determinable has the character of matter; what determines has the character of form. But in the Sacraments visible things are determinable and of themselves indifferent to various significations; through words, however, they are determined to the effect which they ought to signify; therefore, etc. The major is evident: just as wood, stones, and so on are called the matter from which an architect or any other craftsman makes houses, statues, or other things, while the figure, or arrangement of parts by which the artifact is constituted, is the form of the art; and just as in logic genus is said to correspond to matter and difference to form, because genus is indifferent to several differences and species, while difference determines it to a species; so in the Sacraments the things assumed are indifferent to various significations and effects. For water is indifferent and indeterminate to moistening, cooling, and drinking, and oil to soothing pain, healing a wound, and fostering and strengthening powers; they also signify various effects of grace only indistinctly and confusedly. But through words they are determined to one or another effect of grace. For before the word the element is indifferent to being a Sacrament; but the word approaches the element, and it becomes a Sacrament, says Saint Augustine, Tractate 80 on John; therefore the determination of the Sacraments is chiefly made by the word. For, as the same Saint Augustine says, explaining the saying of John, Now you are clean, but not all: Since water has such great power that it stains the body and washes the heart, unless the word effects it? Hence the exterior washing of the body, apart from the words, signifies the washing of the soul only incipiently and remotely; but it is perfected by the words, I baptize you, so that it signifies it proximately and distinctly. The words themselves signify the washing of the soul more distinctly and expressly, but not perfectly unless they are joined to the bodily washing, because separately either of them is false. For the perfect and complete signification of grace is indivisible with respect to the matter and form of the Sacrament, since neither matter, or sensible things, can signify any degree of grace proximately and completely without the word, nor the word, or form, without the things themselves. Yet imperfect signification is divisible in regard to the subject, because things apart from the word signify grace indistinctly, while the word apart from the things signifies it more distinctly.

You will say 1: One and the same thing cannot have several forms; but the signification of grace proper to each Sacrament is the form of the Sacrament, for it is the habit or perfection constituting the thing in the character of a sign, and the form of a sign is signification; therefore the Sacraments do not consist of words as forms. — I answer. “Sacrament” is taken in two ways, namely materially or formally. Materially, it is a moral being consisting of things and words; formally, it is a sign of grace. With this presupposed, I distinguish the minor: signification is the form of the Sacrament taken formally and as it is a sign, I concede; taken materially, I deny: for in this way the Sacrament consists of sensible matter and words as form. Add that, as Saint Augustine teaches, book 2 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 3, words have obtained the primacy of signifying among human beings; and consequently, although things and words signify together, the chief power of signifying is attributed to words.

You will say 2: Matter and form in the same composite are of the same genus; but sensible things and the words of the Sacrament are not of the same genus, as is clear; therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: matter and form are of the same genus in a physical and natural composite, I concede; in a moral and artificial composite, I deny. To the minor I say that the Sacraments are composed not physically but morally and artificially.

You will say 3: The Eucharist remains a Sacrament after the words of consecration have been spoken; therefore it does not consist of words as form. — I distinguish the consequent: if it is considered in the state of being made, or with respect to its permanent being, I concede; if in the process of being made, I deny. It differs from the other Sacraments in that they exist only in a transient action and use, as Baptism in the washing, and do not have permanent being; but the Eucharist has permanent being from its production, or consecration, distinct from the use of those who receive it.

You will say 4: The Sacrament of Penance consists solely of words, namely vocal confession and the form of absolution; therefore it does not consist of things as matter. — I deny the antecedent. The sins themselves declared by the penitent through external signs, contrition for sins manifested to the Priest by a gesture, word, or another external sign, and also vocal confession, are things, or at least the matter about which absolution is concerned, insofar as “thing” is opposed to “word.” For these signify the grace proper to the Sacrament of Penance, which remits sin, less distinctly; the word of absolution more expressly and distinctly. Hence it is called the form of Penance, even though it is not altogether simultaneous with the sensible thing, namely the penitent’s contrition and confession, as when absolution is deferred, because the Sacrament of Penance is an artificial composite, or a physical-moral one: hence it is enough if the form is morally simultaneous with the matter; and this does occur. For although confession physically ceases when absolution is pronounced, it remains morally and is still present, at least in the Priest’s memory, because things that are little distant are morally regarded as not distant.

You will say 5: Matrimony can be contracted by gestures and letters alone, without spoken words; therefore it does not consist of words as form. — I distinguish the consequent: that it does not consist of words taken formally and properly, I concede; that it does not consist of words taken analogically and equivalently, I deny: for letters, gestures, and other signs of the mind’s thoughts and affections, by which the betrothed signify their mutual consent to one another, are certain words. For, as Saint Augustine says, book 2 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 3, signs by which human beings communicate their thoughts, even if they belong to the sense of sight or to other senses, are called words; and the movements of the limbs by which actors converse, as it were, with their eyes, and military banners and standards, which through the eyes convey the will of commanders, and gestures by which we signify to the eyes of those looking what we wish, are as it were certain visible words, because words belonging to the ears have obtained the primacy of signifying among human beings. Nevertheless, the Sacrament of Matrimony is not perfected by the vocal or analogical words alone by which the contracting parties express their consent; for their bodies and persons are sensible things and the matter of the Sacrament; indeed, the signs of consent expressed by gestures, letters, or words are called matter insofar as they indicate the handing over of bodies and persons, as imperfect and, so to speak, suspended before it is accepted; but insofar as they signify the mutual acceptance of the spouses, which perfects and completes that handing over, they are the form of Matrimony.

You will say 6: Matter and form must be together in things composed from them; but in the Sacraments of the New Law things and words need not necessarily be together, since in the Sacrament of Baptism the washing can sometimes occur before the words are spoken. — I distinguish the major: they must be together either by physical or by moral simultaneity, I concede; by physical simultaneity always, I deny. I likewise distinguish the minor: in the Sacraments of the New Law things and words need not necessarily be together by physical simultaneity, I concede; by moral simultaneity, I deny. Moreover, this moral simultaneity suffices for the validity of the Sacrament, as happens in many other successive and artificial things; for a proposition is composed of subject and predicate as of matter and form, yet these are not together so as to be uttered at the same moment of time, but because the predicate follows the subject immediately in the proposition.

Second Conclusion. — IT WAS FITTING THAT THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW SHOULD HAVE DISTINCTLY DETERMINED THINGS; YET IT WAS NOT NECESSARY THAT IN EACH SACRAMENT THE THINGS BE DETERMINED BY CHRIST THE LORD IN THE LOWEST SPECIES. This Conclusion consists of two parts; the first of which is proved: A Sacrament is a sensible sign assumed by human beings so that grace may certainly be signified and produced; but no creature can certainly signify produced grace except through divine institution and determination; therefore it was fitting that those things which serve in the Sacraments should be determined by God. It is confirmed because two things can be considered in the Sacraments of the New Law, namely divine worship and our sanctification: the first of these belongs to man in comparison with God; the second, however, concerns God in relation to human beings. Although human beings could have determined the matters of the Sacraments insofar as they are things determined for divine worship, because the worship of God is in human power, they could not do so insofar as the Sacraments are ordered to sanctification; for just as God alone can sanctify, so it belongs to God alone to determine the things by which human beings can be sanctified.

The second part is also clear: for the Sacraments are of two kinds: some consist of physical things, while others consist of moral things and depend upon human acts freely elicited by human beings, such as Matrimony, which must consist of and be perfected by the mutual consent of the contracting parties. Now those made from physical things have things determined by Christ the Lord, at least in a common species, and some in the lowest species; but those which arise from human acts and concern morals, it is probable that God willed the determination of their matter to depend also upon human institution.

You will say: Any matter can be sufficiently determined by words; therefore it was not necessary that it be designated by Christ. The antecedent is clear, because the effect of the Sacrament can be expressly declared and signified by words alone: for it makes no difference, for signifying that someone is truly cleansed from sins through Baptism, whether the baptizer uses water or any other liquid, provided that, immersing the liquid, he pronounces the words required for Baptism. — I deny the antecedent. For although, as we said above, the chief power of signifying resides in words, nevertheless it is fitting that matter have some analogy and likeness to the effect for signifying and effecting which the Sacrament is assumed. For, says Saint Augustine, Epistle 119, chapter 11, For nourishing and in some way inflaming that very fire of love, by which as by a weight we are borne upward or inward toward rest, all these things that are assumed figuratively belong here; they move and kindle love more than if they were set forth bare and without any sacramental likenesses. It is difficult to state the reason for this; but nevertheless it is so, and something suggested through allegorical signification moves more, delights more, and is honored more than if it were stated most openly in proper words.

You will say: The wisest agent ought to institute nothing without a reason; but no legitimate reason occurs why God should have determined things in the lowest species in some Sacraments rather than in others; therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: he cannot do anything without a reason known to him, I concede; without a reason that is always known to us, I deny: for, as Saint Augustine says in Epistle 3, addressed to Volusianus, God can do something which we admit we cannot investigate; in such matters the whole reason for the deed is the power of the one doing it. Or the minor can be denied: for, as we just said, God willed that the Sacraments which depend upon the moral and free acts of human beings have their matter designated by human beings themselves rather than by him.

Third Conclusion. — ESSENTIAL CHANGE OF DETERMINED THINGS RENDERS THE SACRAMENT INVALID, BUT ACCIDENTAL CHANGE DOES NOT; IT NEVERTHELESS SOMETIMES MAKES IT ILLICIT. This Conclusion has three parts, the first of which

Proof: A Sacrament cannot be valid unless the thing as determined by God is used, since all the power of the Sacraments, whether in signifying or in producing, depends upon God’s institution; but if the change is essential, the same thing ordained by God will not be used; therefore, just as a change in the matter of a human being makes him cease to be a human being, so if someone in baptizing were to use non-natural but rose-water, the Baptism would be invalid. This will certainly become clearer and be more effectively confirmed when treating the immutability of each Sacrament in particular.

The second part is also evident, namely that accidental change does not render the Sacrament invalid: the Sacrament is valid when it is perfected by the things instituted by God; but although the change is accidental, the things instituted by God nevertheless remain, just as, when a human being’s heat is changed by illness, the same human being is nevertheless considered to remain; therefore, etc.

The third part is finally plainly gathered from the practice of the Church: every minister of the Church is bound to conduct himself according to the common practice and usage received in the Church; but accidental change is sometimes contrary to the common practice and usage received in the Church: for example, since the priests of the Latin Church customarily consecrate with unleavened bread, one of them would consecrate illicitly with leavened bread. Hence, in the chapter Litteras on the consecration of Masses, the supreme Pontiff Honorius commands the Bishop of Oria to deprive forever of office and benefice the Priest who had presumed to celebrate with leavened bread. I said “sometimes”: for it can happen that accidental change is not illicit, namely when it is not done in contempt or to introduce a usage opposed to the Church’s common practice; hence someone would not baptize illicitly if, in the severe cold of winter, he used warm water, which is not customary.

You will say 1: The Church in fact changed the matter of the Sacrament of Matrimony at the Council of Trent, Session 24, chapter 1, On Reformation. For before the Council’s decree, the consent of man and woman sensibly expressed by words or gestures, whether it occurred publicly or secretly, was sufficient and proximate matter of the Sacrament; but the Council established that those who should attempt to contract Matrimony otherwise than in the presence of the parish priest, or with the permission of the Ordinary, and two or three witnesses, are rendered wholly incapable by the holy Synod of contracting in that way, and decreed such contracts to be invalid and null, just as by the present decree it makes them invalid and annuls them; therefore an essential change of the matter of the Sacrament can occur without the Sacrament being considered invalid. — I answer, distinguishing the major: that it changed the matter according to its substance, so that it substituted for the matter designated by Christ another wholly distinct in species, I deny; that it changed it according to some of its circumstances, I concede. And, with the minor similarly distinguished, I deny the consequence. For it is certain that, since Matrimony is a certain civil contract made through the consent of both spouses, when Christ consecrated this contract by elevating it to the dignity of a Sacrament, he determined no other matter of this contract than that mutual consent, without determining that it be expressed in this or that way; nor did he take away from the commonwealth the power it had over such a contract, but left it to its disposition so that, according to the diversity of times and circumstances, it could add certain conditions without which it would be null and consequently would not be the matter of the Sacrament. Hence, when it established the aforesaid decree, it did not change the matter of Matrimony as determined by Christ according to substance, because legitimate consent is always the matter of Matrimony; it changed it only materially and accidentally, namely by making it so that even expressed consent would no longer be legitimate for contracting, because the conditions of the time required this on account of the various inconveniences arising from clandestine marriages.

You will say 2: In the beginnings of the nascent Church, the Sacrament of Order, especially Priesthood, was conferred only through the imposition of hands as legitimate matter; this is also now in use among the Greeks, not only schismatics but also Catholics and those in communion with Rome; but the Latin Church confers the same Order through the handing over of bread on a paten and wine in a chalice, in which it holds the matter of this Sacrament to consist; therefore a change of the essential matter of the Sacrament can licitly be made. — I answer, that this difficulty should be discussed more fully in the Disputation on the Sacrament of Order; meanwhile I answer briefly, first, either that Christ the Lord did not determine the matter and form of the Sacrament of Order in the individual, but only willed that Order be conferred through some sensible sign declarative and significative of the power being handed over, and through words expressing this same thing, whatever that sign might finally be, leaving its determination to the authority of the Church. Thus teaches Ruardus Tapper, article 17 against Luther, and Peter Noto, in Institution of Priests, section four, On the Sacrament of Order. Or I say, secondly, with Estius in 4 dist. 24, that since in ordination physical contact with the matter is not necessary but moral contact suffices—that is, its presentation or showing while the power to consecrate is handed over—it follows that the same matter is handed to a Latin and a Greek Priest in receiving Order, with this distinction, however, that the Greek Priest to be initiated touches that matter only morally and mediately, namely while he touches the altar, whereas the Latin touches it physically and immediately. That Greek Presbyters touch the altar when they are initiated is proved from the Greek Euchologion, where it says: «The one who has been ordained, leaning upon the sacred altar, bends both knees; and when the Deacon says in a loud voice, “Let us attend,” immediately the Pontiff, laying on one hand together with the omophorion, declares in a clear voice: “The divine grace, which always heals the infirm and supplies what is lacking, advances N., the venerable Deacon, to Priesthood,”» etc.; by these words it signifies that when the hand of the Priest being initiated is laid upon him by the Pontiff, that Priest touches the altar.