Scotus Academicus, Tomus nonus: De Sacramentis in genere

Since the nature of corporeal and sensible things seems to consist in a twofold nature, namely physical and metaphysical, so man, considered metaphysically, is constituted from genus and difference, but physically is composed of matter and form, namely soul and body; hence the Sacrament likewise is customarily considered by

Theologians according to its constitution, either metaphysical, insofar as it consists of genus and difference, or physical, insofar as it is integrated from matter and form suited to one another. The discussion of the former institution of the Sacrament will be in the present Question, but the latter will be debated in the following one.

NOTE 1. Theologians agree among themselves that a sacrament has the character of a sign; but since the character and division of a sign are varied and manifold, they do not agree which of these fits the Sacrament. So that what should more truly be judged with the Subtle Doctor may become evident, we must repeat from Philosophy that a sign in general is that which represents something to a cognitive power; or, as Saint Augustine says, book 2, On Christian Doctrine, chapter 1, “A sign is a thing which, besides the appearance it presents to the senses, causes something else to come into cognition.” This definition equally fits words, actions, and things; for words, or sounds, sometimes signify something else: thus groans and sobs are signs of pain. Actions likewise are signs; for, says the same Saint Augustine, chapter 3, “Actors give certain signs to those who understand through the movements of all their limbs, and as it were converse with their eyes.” Finally, things themselves sometimes acquire the character of a sign; for smoke signifies a hidden fire, and so on.

NOTE 2. A sign is manifold; one is formal and another instrumental. A formal sign is that which, although unknown, produces cognition of another: thus intelligible and sensible species, although unknown, lead to cognition of objects that are sensed or understood. An instrumental sign is that which, having first been known, leads to cognition of another, as speech, which must first be known before the concept expressed through it is made known. Hence the Apostle,

1. Corinthians 14, “If I do not know the power of the voice, I shall be a barbarian to the one to whom I speak, and the one who speaks to me a barbarian.” — The instrumental is divided into natural and arbitrary. The first has by its nature, independently of human institution, the power of signifying the same thing among all nations; thus groans are signs of hidden pain, laughter a sign of joy. The second has the power of signifying something solely by human institution; thus the ringing of a bell is a sign of an approaching lesson, prayer, dinner, and so on. Third, a sign is divided into practical and speculative. The first has the power of producing what it signifies; thus a heavy and dark cloud is a sign of the rain which it pours out. The second signifies a thing but does not produce it; thus light is a sign of the Sun’s presence. Moreover, each is divided into demonstrative, rememorative, and prognostic. The first indicates a present thing, the second a past thing, the third a future thing; thus the adorable sacrament of the Eucharist embraces all three, as the Church sings of it: first, the memory of Christ’s Passion is recalled; second, nourishing grace, signified through the species of bread and wine, is fulfilled; third, a pledge of future glory is given.

NOTE 3. It is certain that a sacrament is not a formal sign: since it necessarily must be sensible, as we shall soon say, it must also first be known before it leads us to knowledge of another, and consequently it cannot be a formal sign, which makes something else known while itself unknown. — It is likewise certain that it is not a natural sign: first, because the grace which this sign represents belongs to the supernatural order, while a natural thing, considered according to its bare condition, cannot represent a supernatural thing; secondly, because if a sacrament were a natural sign, its signification would be known to everyone, but it is plainly evident that the signification of a sacrament is not known to everyone; finally, because a natural sign has some natural conjunction with the thing signified, as smoke with fire, a ray with the sun, a footprint with a foot, whereas a sacrament has no natural order to the grace it signifies, since this is neither its effect nor its natural property. Yet it has some analogy and likeness to the effect it represents. For, says Saint Augustine, Letter 23, “If sacraments did not have some likeness to the things of which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all.”

It remains, therefore, to determine: first, whether sacraments are signs; second, whether they are sensible; third, whether they are merely speculative or practical; fourth, whether a sacrament can be defined, and what the genuine definition of a sacrament is; these matters we shall examine in the following Conclusions.

First Conclusion. — A SACRAMENT IS FORMALLY A SIGN.

Proof first from the Holy Fathers, who unanimously call a sacrament a sign and symbol. Saint Dionysius, book On the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 2, says that sensible sacraments are images of intelligible things, to which they lead by the hand and for which they prepare the way. Likewise Saint Augustine, Letter 5, to Marcellinus: Signs, he says, when they pertain to divine things, are called Sacraments. Saint Bernard explains this truth, Sermon 1, On the Lord's Supper, no. 2: a sacrament is called a sacred sign, or a sacred secret; many things are done solely for their own sake, while others designate other things, and these are signs. To take an example from ordinary things, a ring is given simply for the ring, and there is no signification; it is given to invest someone with an inheritance, and it is a sign, so that the recipient can now say: the ring is worth nothing, but it is the inheritance I was seeking. In this way, as the Lord approached His Passion, He took care to invest His own with His grace, so that invisible grace might be prepared through some visible sign; for this purpose the sacraments were instituted.

This truth can also be confirmed by enumeration: there is no Sacrament to which the character of a sign does not belong. Circumcision, Genesis 17, is called a sign of the covenant between God and Abraham, and Romans 4 calls it the seal of the justice of faith. In Romans 6 Baptism signifies Christ’s death, burial, and Resurrection: “All of us who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into His death. We were buried with Him through Baptism into death, so that, just as Christ rose from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in newness of life.” Likewise the Eucharist is celebrated as a rememorative sign of Christ’s Passion, according to Luke 22: “Do this in remembrance of me.” The same must be said of the others, and so on.

You will say 1. What has the character of a true cause with respect to some effect cannot have the character of a sign with respect to that same effect; but the sacraments have the character of a cause with respect to sanctity, of which they would be signs; therefore, and so on. The major is clear. The minor is proved: sacrament is derived from sacring, just as medicine is derived from healing; but medicine has the character of a cause with respect to health, which it produces, not of a sign; therefore so does sacrament.

I distinguish the minor: they have the character of a physical cause, I deny; of a moral cause, I concede. Hence I deny the parity: medicine is derived from healing, which has the character of an efficient cause of health, so medicine implies physical causality; but sanctity, from which the Sacrament is named, has the character of a formal or final cause, not a physical efficient cause. It is the form of a sacred thing, a sanctifying form, and makes a man sacred and holy, while the sacraments of the new law are the end of all the Sacraments of the ancient law. Therefore the Sacrament has rather the character of a sign than of a cause.

You will insist: Sacraments are named from what most pertains to their quiddity and generic character; but the character of a cause pertains more to the quiddity and generic character of a sacrament than the character of a sign. For what is more perfect in it pertains more to its quiddity and generic character; but to be the cause of grace is more perfect than merely to be its sign; therefore to be the cause of grace belongs to the essence and generic character of a sacrament rather than to be its sign.

I answer: granting the major, I deny the minor; and for its proof I deny the major. In a just man sanctifying grace is what is most perfect in him, since no created thing can equal that supernatural quality in excellence and dignity; yet a just man is not constituted essentially by grace, since grace is an accident of him. Add that the sacraments of the ancient law did not have true causality with respect to sanctifying grace: they did not cause it, but merely conferred a certain legal sanctity; true sanctity they only signified and prefigured, to be conferred through the sacraments of the new law.

You will say 2: A sacrament signifies something hidden, Ephesians 3: “What is the dispensation of the sacrament hidden from the ages in God”; but being hidden is contrary to the character of a sign, because according to Saint Augustine a sign causes something to come into cognition besides the appearance it presents to the senses.

I distinguish the major: if taken broadly, as identical with a sacred mystery, I concede, because the Ancients called sacred, holy, or most holy those things which it was not permitted to violate, such as city walls, magistrates, persons established in dignities, letters of Emperors, and similar things; if taken properly, as here by us, I deny.

You will say 3: An oath is sometimes called a Sacrament. 2. 2, question 3, chapter Parvuli: “Let him who has once sworn falsely be neither a witness afterward nor approach a Sacrament,” that is, an oath; but an oath is not in the genus of sign, for it is a confirmation of truth, or an attestation through something sacred.

I deny the minor: an oath has some relation to sacred things, though different from that of the sacraments of which we speak. Hence sacrament is not predicated univocally of a sacred mystery, an oath, and a rite or sign of a sacred thing; yet neither equivocally, but analogically, because it signifies the proportion which those three have to one form of sanctity, according to different respects.

You will say 4: Genus and species, for example animal and man, are in the same category; but the species of the sacraments, such as Baptism and Confirmation, are not in the same category as sign, for sign is something relative, while Baptism and Confirmation are actions or passions; Baptism is an ablution, and Confirmation an anointing; therefore, and so on.

I distinguish the minor: according to their natural substances and entities, I concede; according to the character of their form, I deny. Their form, insofar as they are sacraments, is to signify grace with certain effects; hence they are in the genus of sign. A statue according to its natural substance is in the genus of substance, for it is wood or stone; according to its artificial form, it is in the genus of quality, for it is a figure or image; but according to representation and likeness, it is in the genus of relatives. Add that the formal character of a sign, since it is a relation of reason, is not placed in a category.

You will say 5: If sign belongs to the integrity of a sacrament, then what does not signify is not a sacrament, and what does not signify to this person is not a sacrament for him; but the sacrament of Baptism signifies nothing to an infant; therefore it is not a Sacrament for the infant; therefore when an infant receives Baptism, he does not receive a sacrament; but this is absurd; therefore sign does not belong to the integrity of a sacrament.

The Seraphic Doctor answers in book 3, distinction 1, question 2. To the claim that a Sacrament does not signify to an infant, it must be said that a sign has a twofold relation: to that which it signifies, and to the one for whom it signifies; the first is essential and always actual, while the second it has in habit; and it is called a sign from the first, not from the second. Hence a circle above an inn is always a sign, even if no one looks at it. So a sacrament is always a sign, although no one knows it; but although it is a sign, it does not signify to this person. Therefore it must be said that, just as another’s faith suffices for an infant, so it suffices that it be signified to the infant; hence, although it does not signify to him in himself, it nevertheless signifies in another.

Second Conclusion. — A SACRAMENT IS A VISIBLE SIGN, OR OPEN TO THE SENSES, WHETHER IN ITSELF OR BY REASON OF SOMETHING JOINED TO IT.

This is likewise common among Theologians, and Proof: first from the decree of Eugenius at the end of the Council of Florence, which decrees that sacraments consist of things and words as matter and form, namely bodily things and words perceptible to the senses. The same is clear from the Council of Trent, all of Session VII. The Holy Fathers teach the same, especially Saint Dionysius, book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 1: our sacraments are a symbolic rite requiring sensible signs, for our elevation through them to intelligible things. Saint Chrysostom likewise says, especially Homily 60, to the people of Antioch, speaking of the Eucharist: Since the word says, “This is my body,” let us assent, believe, and behold it with intellectual eyes. Christ handed nothing insensible over to us, but sensible things, while all is intelligible. The same holds in Baptism: through a thing, namely sensible water, the gift is conferred; but the intelligible reality perfected is generation and renewal. If you were incorporeal, He would have given you mute and incorporeal gifts; but since the soul is joined to the body, He provides intelligible things to you through sensible ones. Saint Augustine teaches the same, tractate 80, on John: “The word is added to the element, and so the Sacrament is made:” that element is the sensible water of Baptism; therefore, and so on.

This is also supported by many arguments. First, the sacraments are ceremonies of Religion, or sacred rites, through which men coalescing into one mystical body are united for the worship and service of God; but according to Saint Augustine, book 19, Against Faustus, chapter 11, men cannot be joined in the name of any religion, true or false, unless bound by some fellowship of sacraments or visible signs. As William of Paris adds, how will they be partners if they do not know that they are partners, and how will they know this except through visible communion or a sign which can only be visible? Therefore sacraments must be sensible. Second, what leads man to cognition of intelligible and spiritual things is sensible; God provides for man according to his condition, and it is connatural to man to arrive at intelligible and spiritual knowledge through sensible things. Hence spiritual matters are described in Scripture through sensible likenesses, while Sacraments lead man to knowledge of spiritual things, namely sanctifying grace; therefore they ought to be sensible signs. Third, instruments ought to be proportionate to the principal cause; the principal and universal cause of our salvation is the Incarnate Word, and the instruments through which its power reaches us are the Sacraments; therefore it was fitting that they should be visible signs under which divine power would work our salvation. Fourth, the Seraphic Doctor says in the Breviloquy, part 6, chapter 1:

A sick man is not only spirit, nor only flesh, but spirit in mortal flesh. The disease is original sin, which infects the mind through ignorance and the flesh through concupiscence. Though its origin was principally from the consent of reason, it took its occasion from the flesh. Therefore the corresponding medicine had to be not only spiritual but also have sensible signs, so that as these sensible things occasioned the soul’s fall, they might occasion its rising again. Since sensible signs of themselves have no efficacious order to grace, though by nature they have a distant representation of it, they had to be instituted by the Author of grace for signifying and blessed for sanctifying, so as to represent through natural likeness, signify through institution, sanctify through blessing, and prepare for grace, through which our soul would be cured. But since healing grace is not given to the proud, unbelieving, and disdainful, these signs had to be divinely given, so that they would not only sanctify and confer grace, and thereby heal, but also instruct through signification, humble through reception, and exercise through their diversity. Thus exercise would exclude sloth from the concupiscible power, instruction ignorance from the rational power, and humiliation pride from the irascible power; and the whole soul would become curable by the grace of the Holy Spirit, which reforms us according to these three powers, in the image of the Trinity and of Christ.

You will say 1: The Sacraments are ordered to the worship of God and the kingdom, for they were instituted so that man might worship God and obtain His glory; but sensible things do not pertain to the worship of God and the kingdom, for John 4 says, “God is spirit,” and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth, while Romans 14 says, “The kingdom of God is not food and drink.” Therefore a sacramental sign is not suitably said to be sensible.

I distinguish the minor: sensible things do not pertain to the worship of God and the kingdom if considered merely according to their nature, as they are in themselves, I concede; if considered insofar as ordered to signify spiritual things, in which God’s worship and kingdom consist, I deny. Bodily exercise is useful for a little if it has no order to the spiritual. What benefit are fasting and abstinence if considered merely as exercising the body? They contribute little to salvation, but serve it greatly insofar as ordered to a spiritual end. The Apostle says, Romans 12, “I appeal to you, brothers, through God’s mercy, to present your bodies as a living, holy sacrifice pleasing to God, your rational service.” Hence Tertullian sets forth the services rendered to God by Christian bodily discipline and their benefits for the soul, book On the Resurrection of the Flesh, chapter 8.

Let us consider the proper form of the Christian name, he says, and how great a prerogative this frivolous and sordid substance has before God. No soul could attain salvation unless it believed while in the flesh, so truly is the flesh the hinge of salvation: when the soul is bound to God through it, the flesh makes that binding possible. The flesh is washed so that the soul may be cleansed; anointed so that the soul may be consecrated; signed so that the soul may be fortified; overshadowed by the imposition of hands so that the soul may be illumined by the spirit; fed with Christ’s body and blood so that the soul may be enriched with God. They cannot be separated in reward, which action joins together: the flesh offers God sacrifices, namely the soul’s struggles, fasts, vigils, dry foods, and the accessories of this service, through its own hardship. Virginity, widowhood, modest concealment of marriage, and even the knowledge of it are offered to God from the goods of the flesh.

It is therefore certain that sensible and corporeal things serve greatly to restore salvation; consequently the Lord Christ rightly instituted the Sacraments in sensible things, so that they would be signs of invisible grace. The Abbot Ogier of Lyon explains this truth, Sermon 1, On the Lord’s Supper, among the works of Saint Bernard, no. 2.

A sacrament is called a sacred sign, or a sacred secret; many things are done solely for their own sake, while others designate other things, and these are signs. A ring is given simply for the ring, and there is no signification; it is given to invest someone with an inheritance, and it is a sign, so that the recipient can say: the ring is worth nothing, but it is the inheritance I was seeking. In this way, as the Lord approached His Passion, He took care to invest His own with His grace, so that invisible grace might be bestowed through some visible sign; for this purpose all the Sacraments were instituted, and so on.

You will say 2: Saint Augustine, book 2, On Free Choice of the Will, chapter 11, says: “The species of any bodies, without which one can live rightly, are the least goods.” But the Sacraments are not the least goods, and one cannot live rightly without them; therefore they are not species of bodies, or sensible things.

I answer, Saint Augustine means that the species of bodies, as they are in their nature or according to its powers and properties, are the least goods, I concede; as assumed to signify spiritual things and serve the attainment of the greatest goods, I deny. You will say 3: Pope Nicholas decreed that according to law consent alone suffices for marriage; but consent is not sensible; therefore something sensible is not required for the Sacrament of Matrimony.

I distinguish the major: the sole consent of the contracting parties, declared through an external sign, suffices for Matrimony even without parental consent, carnal intercourse, or anything similar, I concede; consent alone declared through no sensible sign, I deny. Once the minor is distinguished, the consequence is denied. Marriage requires the contracting parties’ consent to be manifested by an external sign, such as sensible words, actions, or gestures, as is clear from chapter Cum quondam, and On betrothals. The Pontiff meant only to exclude the necessity of carnal intercourse:

because, he says, consent to cohabitation and to maintaining an undivided common life makes the spouses.

You will say 4: Contrition is part of the Sacrament of Penance, and Christ’s body makes the Sacrament of the Eucharist; but these are not sensible; therefore a Sacrament need not necessarily be sensible.

I distinguish the minor: these are not sensible in themselves, I concede; through another, I deny. Contrition is declared through accusation of sins, striking the breast, tears and groans, and similar externals, just as Christ’s body is manifested through the consecrated Eucharistic species; consequently the consequence is denied. Three things must be distinguished in a Sacrament: the thing alone, the sacrament alone, and the thing and sacrament together. The thing alone is signified and does not signify, so it can be insensible while manifested through sensible things. The sign alone makes another thing known and necessarily must be sensible. From these two the complete sacrament is formed, not by the integrity of signification, which pertains only to the sensible matter and form, but by the integrity of perfection, because the sign does not have complete and perfect signification when the thing signified is absent.

I do not deny that God could have established something purely spiritual, such as a mental meditation on Christ’s Passion, a pious thought, affection of mind toward God, or inward detestation of sins, as a remedy for sin and an efficacious sign of grace. But these would not properly be Sacraments; they are not only remedies for sin, but also ceremonies of Religion, proofs of divine love toward us, and pledges of our worship toward God. Our discussion is not of means God could have instituted for imparting grace to Angels, but of means prescribed by God for restoring and conferring grace upon men.

Third Conclusion. — A SACRAMENT IS A PRACTICAL SIGN OF SANCTITY, NOT LEGAL AND EXTERNAL BUT INTERNAL: NOT FUTURE, BUT PRESENT, AND IN THE ONE RECEIVING IT.

This Conclusion has three parts,

The first is common among Theologians: a Sacrament is a practical, that is, effective, sign—morally or physically—of the grace it signifies. It is defined in the Council of Florence, in the decree of union, which distinguishes the sacraments of the ancient and new law: the former did not cause grace, but merely figured it as to be given through Christ’s Passion; our sacraments both contain grace and confer it upon worthy recipients. The Council of Trent likewise decrees, Session 7, Canon 6:

If anyone says that the sacraments of the new law do not contain the grace which they signify, and do not confer that grace upon those who place no obstacle, as though they were merely external signs of justice received through faith, or marks of Christian profession by which the faithful are distinguished from unbelievers among men, let him be anathema.

This truth is confirmed by Sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers, which frequently assert that a Sacrament of the new Law causes grace and remits sins. In John 3 Christ says: “Unless someone is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God.” Spiritual regeneration through grace is attributed to Baptism and the Holy Spirit as causes: to the Holy Spirit as principal cause, and Baptism as instrumental cause. Hence Saint Augustine, Tractate 80, on John: “What power is there in water, that it touches the body and washes the heart?” Saint Leo agrees, Sermon 1, On the Nativity: for every person reborn, the water of Baptism is like a virginal womb, filled by the same Spirit who filled the Virgin; the sacred Conception abolished sin there, while here the washing removes it. The same must be said of the other Sacraments, as we shall prove below.

The second part, namely that a Sacrament properly speaking must confer internal sanctity, is proved against certain Theologians: either those who deny, with Cino in his relection On the Sacraments part 1, that it belongs to the character of a Sacrament to confer internal sanctity, holding that it suffices for it to confer some sanctity, namely either legal and external or Evangelical and internal; or those who assert, with Suarez, disputation 1, section 2, that for the character of a Sacrament it is required that it confer at least some legal sanctity and signify true Evangelical justice. I say it is proved first because the character of a Sacrament requires a signification by which it is distinguished from everything that is not a Sacrament; but legal and imperfect sanctity does not distinguish a Sacrament from everything that is not a Sacrament; therefore a Sacrament cannot signify legal and external sanctity. The major is evident: a Sacrament must differ essentially from those things with which it agrees in signifying a sacred thing, though they are not Sacraments. The minor is proved: in the Old Law there were many things that caused and signified legal sanctification, yet were not Sacraments, as is gathered from the Hebrews 9, where the Apostle, speaking of the Old Law, says: “According to which gifts and sacrifices are offered that cannot perfect the worshipper according to conscience, only in foods and drinks, and various washings, and carnal justices until the time of correction:” no one would say that all those ceremonies, washings, and carnal justices were Sacraments; and consequently the character of a Sacrament cannot consist in the mere signification of legal sanctity. Secondly, even in the law of grace there are many things that have the character of a sacred ceremony, yet are not Sacraments. Indeed, first tonsure is a sacred ceremony by which a man is devoted to divine worship, and therefore confers and signifies some sanctity, yet is not a Sacrament. Likewise holy water and the sign of the cross, being sacred ceremonies, confer some sanctity on the recipient, for they erase venial sins and serve to drive demonic temptations from the soul; yet they are not Sacraments. Therefore, for the formal character of a Sacrament it does not suffice that it signify and confer some sanctity in general; it is required that it confer some internal sanctity in the one who receives the Sacrament. Hence

The third part is proved against certain Thomists who teach that for the character of a Sacrament it suffices that it signify some sanctity actually conferred through the Sacrament, provided it pre-signify and prefigure true sanctity to be conferred through another. On this basis they contend that the sacraments of the Old Law truly had the character of Sacrament and agreed univocally with the sacraments of the New Law, because those former sacraments signified grace to be conferred through Christ. I say it is proved first (Gonet says) from Saint Thomas, question 50, article 2, who teaches that a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing insofar as it sanctifies men, namely those receiving the Sacrament, as is gathered from the reply to the second objection. Therefore he holds that it belongs to the character of a Sacrament to signify perfect sanctity to be received in the actual use and reception of the Sacrament. Hence, in book 4, distinction 1, question 1, article 1, question 1, reply to the third objection, he teaches that the bronze serpent raised by Moses in the desert at God's command was not a Sacrament, and gives this reason: “Although the bronze serpent was a sign of a sacred thing that sanctifies, it was not so insofar as sanctifying is an act, because it was not employed so that someone might receive an effect of sanctification.” It is proved secondly from various definitions that the Holy Fathers and sacred Doctors give of Sacraments. For Saint Isidore, book 6 of the Etymologies, defines a sacrament thus: “A sacrament is that through which, under the covering of bodily things, divine power works salvation more secretly.” Gratian, in 1, question 1, chapter Multi secularium, and so on, attributes this definition to Saint Gregory; Saint Thomas, however, in book 4, distinction 1, attributes it to Saint Augustine: in reality it may be said to belong to both, although as to the wording it is Saint Isidore’s. But divine power, pouring itself out and applying itself through Sacraments, does not work salvation except insofar as these truly signify sanctifying grace; therefore, and so on. The same is clear from the definition given by Hugh of Saint Victor, book 1, On the Sacraments, part 1, chapter 2, where he says:

A sacrament is a bodily element outwardly presented to the senses, representing through likeness, signifying through institution, and containing invisible and spiritual grace through sanctification, and so on.

The same is expressed by the Master’s definition in book 1, distinction 1: a sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace, bearing the likeness of that grace and existing as its cause. Hence he concludes that Sacraments were instituted not merely for signifying but also for sanctifying; things instituted merely for signifying are only signs, not sacraments, as were the carnal sacrifices and ceremonial observances of the Old Law, which could never make their offerers just, because, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 9:

The blood of goats and bulls, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkled upon the defiled, sanctified for the cleansing of the flesh, not of the soul,

Finally this is clear from the Catechism of Saint Pius V: a sacrament is a visible sign of invisible grace instituted for our justification. It is therefore clear that a Sacrament must formally signify true sanctity in the recipient; true sanctity is that which is conferred through grace; therefore, and so on.

Moreover, Hiquaeus says in his Commentary on the cited passage of the Doctor: everything in the Old Law signified grace to be conferred through Christ, because 1 Corinthians 10 says all those things happened in figure, and Colossians 2 says the law was a shadow of future things; but they were not Sacraments. Therefore signifying sanctity to be conferred through another is not the constitutive character of a Sacrament. It is confirmed. The Paschal Lamb and manna signified the Eucharist; the crossing of the Red Sea was a figure of baptismal grace; the bronze serpent was a figure of Christ’s Passion and human Redemption. “All,” says the Apostle, “were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all ate the same spiritual food.” All the sacrifices, offerings, and expiations of the law likewise signified sacramental grace to be conferred through Christ, as Florence teaches in the decree of union and Trent in Session 7, On Sacraments in General, yet they were not Sacraments. The sacrifices of Abel, Abraham, and Melchizedek, the marriage of our first parents, the dove sent over Christ at His Baptism, and the fire descending upon the Apostles likewise signified the Holy Spirit. The same is evident of the cross and many other new-law ceremonies, which are not Sacraments.

You will reply 1. It suffices for a Sacrament that it be instituted for Religion’s worship and signify true sanctity.

Against this, first, the sacrifices of the natural law had all this, yet were not Sacraments. Abel’s sacrifice, which pleased God, was a figure of Christ’s sacrifice, just as Abel represented Christ; the same is clear of Isaac’s offering and the ram God substituted, in which Christ’s Passion was figured. Secondly, the Cross and many new-law ceremonies, such as exorcism and exsufflations, signify grace conferred through Christ and victory over the demon, and are instituted for worship; therefore the special character of a Sacrament does not consist in these two together. Third, a Sacrament, insofar as it pertains to divine worship, is the use of a material and external thing assumed for the effect of that worship which it signifies; but that effect is the sanctification of man; therefore, and so on.

The major is clear. The minor is proved: there are three general uses of a material thing assumed to signify an effect of divine worship. The first is when it is offered to God in attestation of His excellence and the creature’s subjection, as offerings, sacrifices, temples, altars, tithes, and similar things. The second is when something divine is assumed for our use, in which man subjects himself to God; thus in an oath the name of God is assumed to confirm truth, and man is subjected to God as the first rule of truth. The third occurs when something divine is assumed for our sanctification, so that man may be made more disposed and suitable to serve Him; this is the use of the Sacraments. Therefore Sacraments fall under Religion’s use insofar as they sanctify man; but they would not sanctify him unless they caused sanctity in him. Causing this therefore belongs to the essence of a Sacrament insofar as by institution it falls under religious worship, and this alone is its distinctive use, distinguishing it from sacrifice and other things instituted for worship.

You will reply 2. It belongs to a Sacrament that it signify true sanctity simply speaking and at least cause sanctity in a qualified sense, namely legal sanctity.

Against this, legal sanctity is merely external bodily sanctity, conferred by the legal rites so that the sanctified could enter the temple and be admitted to sacrifice. As the Master observes from Saint Augustine: “By defilement, when the law cleanses, I understand nothing other than contact with a dead man; the one who touched him was unclean for seven days, but was purified according to the law on the third and seventh days, and thus was clean to enter the temple.” The character of a sacrament is therefore not taken in relation to such legal sanctity. From its etymology sacrament means as if sacring the mind, or consecrating the mind; but the sacrifices of the Old Law did not consecrate the mind, merely cleanse the body, as Saint Paul teaches in Hebrews 9:

If the blood of goats and the ashes of a heifer sprinkled upon the defiled sanctify for the cleansing of the flesh, how much more will the blood of Christ, who through the Holy Spirit offered Himself unblemished to God, cleanse our conscience from dead works?

and so on. The Apostle distinguishes the Sacraments of the old and new Law: the former conferred only bodily sanctity, the latter sanctity upon the soul. Hence legal uncleanness had no other effect than that of excommunication and other irregularities, by which someone is excluded from receiving or administering Sacraments, entering the Church, and so on; consequently absolution from them is not a true Sacrament.

You will say 1: The Councils of Florence and Trent, and many Holy Fathers, call the sacraments of the Old Law Sacraments without limitation or distinction; therefore they suppose these truly had the character of Sacrament and agree univocally with the new-law Sacraments.

I deny the antecedent: the Holy Fathers and Councils sufficiently declare the limitation when they say that the sacraments of the Old Law do not cause sanctifying grace. Thus they make clear that those Sacraments did not have the true character of sacrament, nor agree univocally but only equivocally with ours.

You will say 2: There are many practical signs of grace which are not Sacraments; therefore a Sacrament has no distinctive feature in being a practical sign of grace. The antecedent is proved: the tree of life in Paradise signified grace; for Saint Augustine says, book 2, On the Merits of Sins, chapter 21, that it mystically demonstrated what would be conferred through wisdom, whose figure it bore, upon the rational soul, so that, refreshed by its nourishment, it would not fall into the ruin and death of wickedness. But the tree of life was not a Sacrament properly speaking. Likewise Isaac’s immolation signified Christ’s Passion. Similarly, the dove descending upon Christ’s head signified the presence of the Holy Spirit; yet these were not Sacraments. Therefore that which is a practical sign of grace should not be considered a Sacrament.

I deny the consequence: the difference of a properly speaking Sacrament is not any signification of sanctifying grace, but sanctifying grace applied to men while the external sign is used. The aforesaid signs were not such: they signified grace as to be applied to any men through the use of the external sign, not to one person alone.

You will insist: There are also practical signs of grace signifying it as present through the use of an applied sign, yet they are not Sacraments; therefore, and so on. The antecedent is clear from Christ’s words to Magdalene, Luke 7: “Your sins are forgiven you,” and to the Apostles, John 20: “Receive the Holy Spirit,” and so on. Those words signified present grace, conferred by the force of their signification.

I answer, denying the antecedent: those words signified grace not practically but demonstratively, especially Christ’s address to Magdalene. They were demonstrative signs of grace caused by penance and perfect love, so producing her grace required no extraordinary means beyond faith and penance, as the following words indicate: “Her many sins are forgiven, because she loved much,” and so on. Hence Saint Gregory, Homily 25, on the Gospels, says:

By loving the truth, she washed away the stains of sin with tears, and the voice of truth is fulfilled: Her many sins are forgiven, because she loved much, and so on.

To the second I say that when Christ spoke those words in John 20, the Holy Spirit was indeed granted to the Apostles; nevertheless the words were not sacramental. It does not suffice that a Sacrament signify grace practically with respect only to some persons and transiently; it must signify it permanently with respect to the whole community and society for whose sacred confederation it was instituted, and its use must be carried out by a determinate minister in that society. This does not fit those words: they were spoken only once, only by Christ, and directed to the Apostles alone.

Fourth Conclusion. — A Sacrament is rightly defined as a sensible sign of God’s grace, or a gratuitous effect of God, efficaciously signifying through divine institution, ordered to the salvation of the wayfarer. Thus the Doctor, book 3, distinction 1, question 2, no. 61. The truth of this definition appears from its parts. First it says sign, in which it agrees with sacrifices and with all things determined to signify something else. Secondly, sensible is added, that is, instituted in sensible matter, for the reasons assigned in the Second Conclusion. It follows that it is from divine institution: since the things used for a Sacrament are not natural signs and have no natural connection with the grace they signify, they must be used by one who can produce grace at the placing and presence of those signs, namely God alone, or God-man Christ. It adds, efficaciously signifying, excluding from the true character of Sacrament not only sacramentals, such as sacred ceremonies and holy water, but also the Sacraments of the Old Law, which did not confer grace on their recipients but merely figured it. It adds, or a gratuitous effect of God, so that the sacred Eucharist may be included among the Sacraments. The Eucharist agrees with the others as a sign of a sacred thing, or invisible grace, signifying a good added to nature and instituted for human salvation or sanctification; but it differs in its principal signified reality, since the other Sacraments signify accidental grace inhering in the soul, whereas this signifies substantial grace and the Author and source of all graces. Moreover, the other Sacraments consist in use, while the Eucharist, even when not actually received, retains the character of a Sacrament, as Trent teaches, Session 13, chapter 3: “This is common to the most holy Eucharist and the other Sacraments: to be a symbol of a sacred thing and the visible form of invisible grace. Yet this singular excellence is found in it: the other Sacraments have sanctifying power only when someone uses them, whereas in the Eucharist the Author of sanctity Himself is present before use.” — I admit that “gratuitous effect” may be omitted without harming the definition, since grace can mean both accidental and substantial grace, although the Subtle Doctor expressed both distinctly for clarity, because Theologians ordinarily use grace for accidental grace. — Finally it is ordered to the salvation of the wayfarer. Sacraments are medicines: medicine is useless to the dead, superfluous for the healthy, and necessary for the sick; likewise Sacraments benefit the damned in no way, since no salvation remains to hope for them, and in hell there is no protection of redemption. They would be superfluous for the blessed, who have no weakness to cure or fear; but they are necessary for all wayfarers, none clean from stain and none, while alive, not ordered to eternal beatitude.

You will say: The Sacrament of the Eucharist can be received and the sacrifice of the Mass celebrated for the dead. — I distinguish: by way of suffrage, I concede; by way of sacrament, I deny. Through the Mass and Eucharist a wayfarer can compensate for the injury done to God by a dead person during life, pay his debt for him, and free him from punishments; nevertheless no one can administer Sacraments to the dead. If administered to a soul in an assumed apparent body, they would do nothing, since the dead are at the term and incapable of further meritorious work, such as reception of the Sacraments, as the Lord says: “Where the tree falls, there it will remain.” Although they are not at the term of state, they are at the term of merit and demerit through death, as the Lord says: “Work while you have gain, that is, life; the night is coming to you, death, in which no one can work.”

You will say 1: That cannot be defined which is not one in itself; but a Sacrament is not one in itself, but accidentally; therefore it cannot be defined. — I distinguish the major: that which is not one in itself physically, metaphysically, or logically—that is, constituted neither from matter and form nor from genus and difference, nor containing something conceived as genus and difference—I concede; otherwise, I deny. To the minor I say that a Sacrament is not one in itself physically or metaphysically, but only logically. As the Doctor says, just as a relation is definable though it involves a foundation and term, so a Sacrament is definable though it expresses the relation of sign to signified: “This concept is one in itself in the intellect, ‘an efficacious arbitrary sign,’ just as the concept of paternity is; and just as paternity could be defined despite the non-unity of its subject, if paternity were in two subjects and those subjects were placed in the definition as additions, its correlative would also be placed, so it is here.” He adds: “Restricting the definition to what is properly said outside the mind, it does not express what the Sacrament is and cannot be a definition as the account of a complete being outside the mind. But insofar as a definition expresses one concept in the intellect, whether of a thing outside the mind or of reason, it can rightly be defined; in this way all logical intentions are defined. They do not signify quiddities outside the mind, but concepts in the soul, one in themselves. Having a definition thus suffices for science properly speaking; otherwise Logic would not be a science. Genus, difference, and property are found in such definitions in the logician’s sense, since there is a predicate in what, essential quality, and convertible accidental quality. Thus sign is genus, instituted and efficacious difference, sensible the foundation of the relation, and grace or a gratuitous effect of God the correlative.” The Doctor therefore admits that a Sacrament cannot be properly defined by a real physical or metaphysical definition presupposing one real being in itself composed of matter and form or genus and difference; in this respect a Sacrament is not one. It can be defined only by an intentional or logical definition through something having the manner of genus and difference. — Or I distinguish the minor otherwise: a Sacrament is not one in itself if considered physically, according to natural entity and materially, I concede; if morally, as a divine artificial instrument and supernatural means instituted by God for sanctifying men, I deny. Though materially composed of many parts of different genera, it is formally one in itself because it has one form, the signification of sanctifying grace. A house likewise is materially composed of stones, iron, and wood, yet is one artifact because it has one form, a shape suitable for habitation; the same applies to a family, commonwealth, city, and similar things.

You will say 2: What is not real is not properly defined. A Sacrament according to its form is not real, since its form is merely a signification instituted by agreement, a relation of reason, as the Doctor teaches. — I distinguish the major: if it is not real fundamentally, I concede; if it is not real formally, I deny. Though a city lacks a real form, it does not cease to be the thing that can be defined, because its foundation is real. Say the same of a Sacrament: though its relation of sign to signified is not real because it is a sign by institution, the things and words of which it consists are real, and so it can be defined.

You will say 3: What can be defined is placed in some category; but no category can be assigned for a Sacrament; therefore, and so on. — I answer, distinguishing the major: if it is a being in itself, namely a substance or another absolute, I concede; if it is an accidental being, I subdistinguish: an accidental being composed of subject and accident, let it pass, for Philosophers dispute this; an artificial accidental being constituted from diverse beings united either really or only intentionally, I deny. Once the minor is conceded, the consequence must be denied, because a Sacrament is an artificial being constituted from several beings united only intentionally.

Corollary. — From these things it is evident that all definitions which heretics customarily hand down and defend are empty and must be rejected, especially those of the Sacramentarians, Lutherans, Anabaptists, and Calvinists. The Sacramentarians, whose leader seems to have been Carolostadius, Archdeacon of Wittenberg, from whom Luther had received his doctoral laurels, at first defended Luther’s party and doctrine but, impatiently bearing that Luther was preferred to him, withdrew completely from him. He wishes the Sacraments to be nothing but signs and marks of Christian profession, distinguishing us from Jews and Pagans, as the toga once distinguished Romans from Greeks in cloaks; various clothing now distinguishes nations and orders of Citizens and Religious, as badges and banners distinguish soldiers. — They are refuted because this is a secondary, not primary, effect of the Sacraments. Scripture does not assign to the Eucharist, Baptism, or other Sacraments the effect of distinguishing Christians, but that of justifying, cleansing, saving, and bestowing eternal and immortal life. If Sacraments were merely marks distinguishing Christians, human institution would suffice and Christ’s Passion would not be necessary; but it was necessary. The Fathers say they flowed from Christ’s pierced side under the figure of blood and water. Saint Augustine, Tractate 126 on John, observes that the Evangelist expressed this piercing not without mystery:

Christ’s side being pierced not without mystery: “One of the soldiers struck His side with a lance.” Saint Augustine says the Evangelist used a vigilant word, saying not “struck,” “wounded,” or anything else, but “opened,” so that the door of life might in a certain way be opened, from which the Sacraments of the Church flowed, without which one does not enter eternal life. Finally, if Sacraments were merely signs distinguishing us from unbelievers, the Symbol of faith could be called a Sacrament, since by that profession we are distinguished from Jews and Pagans.

The Lutherans and their book On the Babylonian Captivity, final chapter, say that a sacrament is a divine promise attached to an external sign; or, as they say in the Augsburg Confession, article 13, Sacraments are called signs of God’s will toward us for arousing faith in recipients, so that they believe the promises presented through the sacraments. — Both definitions are rejected: the first because, according to the Holy Fathers, Sacraments are signs and symbols of an effect conferred through such signs; one who receives a Sacrament is said to receive a sign, not God’s promise. Therefore Sacraments are not God’s promises themselves, or things promised by God, but rather external signs having a promise of grace attached. Further, if the character of a Sacrament were constituted in that promise attached to an external sign, both Baptism and Eucharist would be excluded from the character of Sacrament: for in the words “I baptize you,” and so on, there is no promise of grace, just as there is none in the words “This is my body.” The second is likewise rejected: for if Sacraments are signs required to arouse faith in recipients, so that they believe the promises presented through the sacraments, it follows that infants and mentally incapable persons would be baptized in vain, because they cannot produce an act of faith; yet Lutherans defend the baptism of infants against the Anabaptists.

Melanchthon’s definition is also rejected. In the examination of those things heard before the rite of public ordination, under the heading On Sacraments, he says: A sacrament in the New Testament, as the Church speaks, is a rite divinely instituted and added to the promise delivered in the Gospel, so that it may be a testimony and pledge of the promise of grace exhibited and applied; or, as he defines it more briefly in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, sacraments are rites that have God’s command and to which a promise of grace has been added. I say this definition is refuted. First, because Melanchthon wants God’s command to be considered necessary for Sacraments in Scripture; but that is false, because Circumcision, Baptism, and Eucharist, which heretics admit to be true Sacraments, were instituted long before they were commanded in writing. Further, if a Sacrament necessarily had to be a testimony and pledge of an exhibited and applied promise of grace, it would follow that such testimonies are often false: for someone could approach Baptism deceitfully and receive Christ’s Body unworthily, in which cases the promise of grace cannot be said to have been applied to that person. Moreover, Lutherans teach that these testimonies are given to confirm or arouse faith; but it is clear that, although infants are capable of Sacraments, they still cannot use any testimonies so that their faith may be aroused or confirmed.

The Anabaptists contend that Sacraments are nothing but allegories, likenesses, and figures of the virtues and good works of Christian life and spiritual discipline. Baptism, they say, is only a figure signifying that Christians ought to endure hardships for Christ, as though immersion signified only death to sin and the world, while emergence signified the Resurrection, since through the Holy Spirit we must rise to a new life. The Eucharist merely reminds us to preserve concord among the faithful, according to 1 Corinthians 10: “We are one body, we who share in one bread.” — This definition is refuted. That use of the Sacraments is not principal or primary and can proceed from human institution. If Sacraments were only figures of good works and morals, they would signify only future things, not past and present things; but this is false. Baptism signifies Christ’s past death, burial, and Resurrection, as Romans 6 says, and the present washing away of sins, according to Acts 22: “Be baptized and wash away your sins.” Likewise Eucharist is a rememorative sign of Christ’s Passion, according to 1 Corinthians 11: “Do this in remembrance of me.” It is also a demonstrative sign of Christ’s spiritual indwelling in us: “The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood remains in me, and I in him.”

Finally Calvin, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 11, section 1, defines a Sacrament in two ways: first, more broadly, as follows: A Sacrament is an external symbol by which the Lord seals in our consciences his promises of his benevolence toward us, in order to sustain the weakness of our faith; and by which we in turn testify to our piety toward God, both before him and the Angels, and among human beings. But he soon adds a briefer definition, when he says: A Sacrament is a testimony of divine grace toward us, confirmed by an external sign, together with a mutual testimony of our piety toward him. — Yet both these definitions are refuted: First, because it would follow from them that a minister of the Church could baptize no one without danger of profaning Baptism: for no one can apply the seal of God's promises unless he is certain to whom those promises were made, just as no one can affirm anything by an oath unless he is certain of it; but ministers of the Church cannot be certain to whom the promises of eternal predestination were made, whose seal Calvin says the Sacrament is, for no one can be certain, without a special revelation, of his own or another's predestination. Second, Calvin admits legitimate Baptism in the Roman Church, in which nevertheless he denies that there are any predestined. Moreover, that assertion of Calvin rests upon several false propositions: first, that by the promised grace is understood the grace of predestination: both because it is false that this grace of predestination is promised to anyone in the Scriptures, since no one knows whether he is worthy of love or hatred; and because it would follow that the Sacrament is never received as regards grace except by the elect, although it is most certain that many just persons fall from the grace received in the Sacraments and are damned. Next, it is false that such grace of predestination is apprehended through faith: for it would follow that little children are never justified in Baptism, since they cannot have the faith by which they might apprehend such a promise of grace. Finally, it is false that the effects of the Sacraments take place only in the elect. For it is certain that even the reprobate are sometimes justified through reception of the Sacraments.

I judge it superfluous here to refute the other similar definitions of the Heretics and to refute them, since they can sufficiently be overthrown by what has been said.