Scotus Academicus, Tomus nonus: De Sacramentis in genere

The name sacrament is derived from sacred, on account of the relation it bears to a sacred thing; for this reason it has various meanings among both sacred and profane authors, but chiefly four, which fit our Sacraments admirably. — First, then, sacrament signifies the pledge customarily deposited by litigants in a sacred place before the Pontiff, so that the one who won when the lawsuit was finished might recover the pledge, while the one who lost the case would be punished by the loss of his money, which would pass into the public treasury as a penalty for unjust litigation. Thus Varro observes, book 4, On the Latin Language. This meaning certainly fits our sacraments extremely well; for they are pledges by which we bind and devote ourselves to the worship and service of God, while God in turn bestows and pledges to us his grace. — Second, sacrament is sometimes used for an oath, because in an oath the authority of a sacred thing is invoked, and we call upon God as witness to the truth affirmed; thus Tertullian uses sacrament, book On Idolatry, chapter 19, where, after asking whether a believer can turn to military service and whether military service can be admitted to the faith, he replies: The divine oath does not accord with the human oath, the sign of Christ with the sign of the devil, the camps of light with the camps of darkness: one soul cannot be owed to two, to God and Caesar, etc. He alludes to the oath by which soldiers promised that they would obey their commanders in all things and faithfully perform military service. In the same way sacrament is used in Law, canon 22, question 1, chapter Parvuli. Moreover, this meaning agrees excellently with our Sacraments: for they are like seals by which God promises salvation to man, and man promises the religion of God; through them, as through a solemn adjuration, we devote ourselves to God, and in turn somehow hold God as our debtor. — Third, in Sacred Scripture sacrament usually signifies a hidden and secret thing. Thus in Tobit 12: It is good to conceal the King's sacrament; that is, the King's hidden and secret matter; in this sense sacrament is the same as mystery. Hence in Apocalypse 12, where it is said of the woman sitting upon the beast: And on her forehead a name was written, Mystery; the Angel immediately adds, addressing John: I will tell you the sacrament of the woman and of the beast; that is, the hidden and secret matter which the woman and the beast signify. This meaning likewise properly fits our Sacraments; for beneath the covering of bodily things they conceal spiritual gifts, since sacraments are signs of a sacred thing, namely, sanctifying and divinely infused grace. — Finally, fourth, the name sacrament signifies a ceremony by which people are initiated into sacred things, or some sensible sign containing a sanctification instituted by God; in this sense the word sacrament is customarily used not only by theologians but also by the holy Fathers. Thus Saint Cyprian uses the word sacrament in several places, especially in the Epistle to Stephen, where he says: Then at last they can be fully sanctified and be sons of God, if they are born through both sacraments. He calls baptism and the laying on of hands, which is Confirmation, the two sacraments. Saint Dionysius had preceded him, in the book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and Tertullian, in the book On the Prescriptions chapter 16, where he says: The devil also imitates the very things of the divine sacraments in the mysteries of idols: he too baptizes some, he marks his soldiers on their foreheads. By these words he signifies Baptism and Confirmation, which he uses as a sacred and sanctifying ceremony. The other holy Fathers have the same understanding of the name sacrament. Indeed, whatever Zwingli and Carolostadius may protest, this word, as it is used here, is scriptural, that is, derived from the sacred writings: for when the Apostle, in Ephesians 5, had spoken of the joining of husband and wife through marriage, he immediately adds: This is a great sacrament, I speak in Christ and in the Church. This is certainly most true of a marriage contracted between Christians; for if you refer it to others, sacrament in this sense will not signify a sacred ceremony, but a hidden and mystical thing. For the rest, we shall use this word only in this last, fourth meaning, especially in the present disputation, which, according to our purpose and order, we shall divide into three Articles: the first will explain the essence, necessity or existence, and number of the Sacraments; the second, their causes, virtue, and effects; the third, their subject, preceding dispositions, and excellences.

Although the order of doctrine requires—and we have hitherto religiously observed this—that it first be resolved whether a thing exists, before what it is, and that its existence appear prior to its essence; nevertheless, since the necessity and existence of a sacrament can scarcely be established unless its essential nature first comes to light, the leading theologians rightly inquire into the essence of a sacrament before they disclose and establish its existence, or necessity. To comply with them, we shall begin the present Article by investigating the essence of a sacrament, and afterward proceed step by step to disclose its existence and establish the number of the sacraments.

Since the nature of corporeal and sensible things seems to consist in a twofold nature, namely physical and metaphysical, so man, considered metaphysically, is constituted from genus and difference, but physically is composed of matter and form, namely soul and body; hence the Sacrament likewise is customarily considered by

Theologians according to its constitution, either metaphysical, insofar as it consists of genus and difference, or physical, insofar as it is integrated from matter and form suited to one another. The discussion of the former institution of the Sacrament will be in the present Question, but the latter will be debated in the following one.

NOTE 1. Theologians agree among themselves that a sacrament has the character of a sign; but since the character and division of a sign are varied and manifold, they do not agree which of these fits the Sacrament. So that what should more truly be judged with the Subtle Doctor may become evident, we must repeat from Philosophy that a sign in general is that which represents something to a cognitive power; or, as Saint Augustine says, book 2, On Christian Doctrine, chapter 1, “A sign is a thing which, besides the appearance it presents to the senses, causes something else to come into cognition.” This definition equally fits words, actions, and things; for words, or sounds, sometimes signify something else: thus groans and sobs are signs of pain. Actions likewise are signs; for, says the same Saint Augustine, chapter 3, “Actors give certain signs to those who understand through the movements of all their limbs, and as it were converse with their eyes.” Finally, things themselves sometimes acquire the character of a sign; for smoke signifies a hidden fire, and so on.

NOTE 2. A sign is manifold; one is formal and another instrumental. A formal sign is that which, although unknown, produces cognition of another: thus intelligible and sensible species, although unknown, lead to cognition of objects that are sensed or understood. An instrumental sign is that which, having first been known, leads to cognition of another, as speech, which must first be known before the concept expressed through it is made known. Hence the Apostle,

1. Corinthians 14, “If I do not know the power of the voice, I shall be a barbarian to the one to whom I speak, and the one who speaks to me a barbarian.” — The instrumental is divided into natural and arbitrary. The first has by its nature, independently of human institution, the power of signifying the same thing among all nations; thus groans are signs of hidden pain, laughter a sign of joy. The second has the power of signifying something solely by human institution; thus the ringing of a bell is a sign of an approaching lesson, prayer, dinner, and so on. Third, a sign is divided into practical and speculative. The first has the power of producing what it signifies; thus a heavy and dark cloud is a sign of the rain which it pours out. The second signifies a thing but does not produce it; thus light is a sign of the Sun’s presence. Moreover, each is divided into demonstrative, rememorative, and prognostic. The first indicates a present thing, the second a past thing, the third a future thing; thus the adorable sacrament of the Eucharist embraces all three, as the Church sings of it: first, the memory of Christ’s Passion is recalled; second, nourishing grace, signified through the species of bread and wine, is fulfilled; third, a pledge of future glory is given.

NOTE 3. It is certain that a sacrament is not a formal sign: since it necessarily must be sensible, as we shall soon say, it must also first be known before it leads us to knowledge of another, and consequently it cannot be a formal sign, which makes something else known while itself unknown. — It is likewise certain that it is not a natural sign: first, because the grace which this sign represents belongs to the supernatural order, while a natural thing, considered according to its bare condition, cannot represent a supernatural thing; secondly, because if a sacrament were a natural sign, its signification would be known to everyone, but it is plainly evident that the signification of a sacrament is not known to everyone; finally, because a natural sign has some natural conjunction with the thing signified, as smoke with fire, a ray with the sun, a footprint with a foot, whereas a sacrament has no natural order to the grace it signifies, since this is neither its effect nor its natural property. Yet it has some analogy and likeness to the effect it represents. For, says Saint Augustine, Letter 23, “If sacraments did not have some likeness to the things of which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all.”

It remains, therefore, to determine: first, whether sacraments are signs; second, whether they are sensible; third, whether they are merely speculative or practical; fourth, whether a sacrament can be defined, and what the genuine definition of a sacrament is; these matters we shall examine in the following Conclusions.

First Conclusion. — A SACRAMENT IS FORMALLY A SIGN.

Proof first from the Holy Fathers, who unanimously call a sacrament a sign and symbol. Saint Dionysius, book On the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 2, says that sensible sacraments are images of intelligible things, to which they lead by the hand and for which they prepare the way. Likewise Saint Augustine, Letter 5, to Marcellinus: Signs, he says, when they pertain to divine things, are called Sacraments. Saint Bernard explains this truth, Sermon 1, On the Lord's Supper, no. 2: a sacrament is called a sacred sign, or a sacred secret; many things are done solely for their own sake, while others designate other things, and these are signs. To take an example from ordinary things, a ring is given simply for the ring, and there is no signification; it is given to invest someone with an inheritance, and it is a sign, so that the recipient can now say: the ring is worth nothing, but it is the inheritance I was seeking. In this way, as the Lord approached His Passion, He took care to invest His own with His grace, so that invisible grace might be prepared through some visible sign; for this purpose the sacraments were instituted.

This truth can also be confirmed by enumeration: there is no Sacrament to which the character of a sign does not belong. Circumcision, Genesis 17, is called a sign of the covenant between God and Abraham, and Romans 4 calls it the seal of the justice of faith. In Romans 6 Baptism signifies Christ’s death, burial, and Resurrection: “All of us who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into His death. We were buried with Him through Baptism into death, so that, just as Christ rose from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in newness of life.” Likewise the Eucharist is celebrated as a rememorative sign of Christ’s Passion, according to Luke 22: “Do this in remembrance of me.” The same must be said of the others, and so on.

You will say 1. What has the character of a true cause with respect to some effect cannot have the character of a sign with respect to that same effect; but the sacraments have the character of a cause with respect to sanctity, of which they would be signs; therefore, and so on. The major is clear. The minor is proved: sacrament is derived from sacring, just as medicine is derived from healing; but medicine has the character of a cause with respect to health, which it produces, not of a sign; therefore so does sacrament.

I distinguish the minor: they have the character of a physical cause, I deny; of a moral cause, I concede. Hence I deny the parity: medicine is derived from healing, which has the character of an efficient cause of health, so medicine implies physical causality; but sanctity, from which the Sacrament is named, has the character of a formal or final cause, not a physical efficient cause. It is the form of a sacred thing, a sanctifying form, and makes a man sacred and holy, while the sacraments of the new law are the end of all the Sacraments of the ancient law. Therefore the Sacrament has rather the character of a sign than of a cause.

You will insist: Sacraments are named from what most pertains to their quiddity and generic character; but the character of a cause pertains more to the quiddity and generic character of a sacrament than the character of a sign. For what is more perfect in it pertains more to its quiddity and generic character; but to be the cause of grace is more perfect than merely to be its sign; therefore to be the cause of grace belongs to the essence and generic character of a sacrament rather than to be its sign.

I answer: granting the major, I deny the minor; and for its proof I deny the major. In a just man sanctifying grace is what is most perfect in him, since no created thing can equal that supernatural quality in excellence and dignity; yet a just man is not constituted essentially by grace, since grace is an accident of him. Add that the sacraments of the ancient law did not have true causality with respect to sanctifying grace: they did not cause it, but merely conferred a certain legal sanctity; true sanctity they only signified and prefigured, to be conferred through the sacraments of the new law.

You will say 2: A sacrament signifies something hidden, Ephesians 3: “What is the dispensation of the sacrament hidden from the ages in God”; but being hidden is contrary to the character of a sign, because according to Saint Augustine a sign causes something to come into cognition besides the appearance it presents to the senses.

I distinguish the major: if taken broadly, as identical with a sacred mystery, I concede, because the Ancients called sacred, holy, or most holy those things which it was not permitted to violate, such as city walls, magistrates, persons established in dignities, letters of Emperors, and similar things; if taken properly, as here by us, I deny.

You will say 3: An oath is sometimes called a Sacrament. 2. 2, question 3, chapter Parvuli: “Let him who has once sworn falsely be neither a witness afterward nor approach a Sacrament,” that is, an oath; but an oath is not in the genus of sign, for it is a confirmation of truth, or an attestation through something sacred.

I deny the minor: an oath has some relation to sacred things, though different from that of the sacraments of which we speak. Hence sacrament is not predicated univocally of a sacred mystery, an oath, and a rite or sign of a sacred thing; yet neither equivocally, but analogically, because it signifies the proportion which those three have to one form of sanctity, according to different respects.

You will say 4: Genus and species, for example animal and man, are in the same category; but the species of the sacraments, such as Baptism and Confirmation, are not in the same category as sign, for sign is something relative, while Baptism and Confirmation are actions or passions; Baptism is an ablution, and Confirmation an anointing; therefore, and so on.

I distinguish the minor: according to their natural substances and entities, I concede; according to the character of their form, I deny. Their form, insofar as they are sacraments, is to signify grace with certain effects; hence they are in the genus of sign. A statue according to its natural substance is in the genus of substance, for it is wood or stone; according to its artificial form, it is in the genus of quality, for it is a figure or image; but according to representation and likeness, it is in the genus of relatives. Add that the formal character of a sign, since it is a relation of reason, is not placed in a category.

You will say 5: If sign belongs to the integrity of a sacrament, then what does not signify is not a sacrament, and what does not signify to this person is not a sacrament for him; but the sacrament of Baptism signifies nothing to an infant; therefore it is not a Sacrament for the infant; therefore when an infant receives Baptism, he does not receive a sacrament; but this is absurd; therefore sign does not belong to the integrity of a sacrament.

The Seraphic Doctor answers in book 3, distinction 1, question 2. To the claim that a Sacrament does not signify to an infant, it must be said that a sign has a twofold relation: to that which it signifies, and to the one for whom it signifies; the first is essential and always actual, while the second it has in habit; and it is called a sign from the first, not from the second. Hence a circle above an inn is always a sign, even if no one looks at it. So a sacrament is always a sign, although no one knows it; but although it is a sign, it does not signify to this person. Therefore it must be said that, just as another’s faith suffices for an infant, so it suffices that it be signified to the infant; hence, although it does not signify to him in himself, it nevertheless signifies in another.

Second Conclusion. — A SACRAMENT IS A VISIBLE SIGN, OR OPEN TO THE SENSES, WHETHER IN ITSELF OR BY REASON OF SOMETHING JOINED TO IT.

This is likewise common among Theologians, and Proof: first from the decree of Eugenius at the end of the Council of Florence, which decrees that sacraments consist of things and words as matter and form, namely bodily things and words perceptible to the senses. The same is clear from the Council of Trent, all of Session VII. The Holy Fathers teach the same, especially Saint Dionysius, book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 1: our sacraments are a symbolic rite requiring sensible signs, for our elevation through them to intelligible things. Saint Chrysostom likewise says, especially Homily 60, to the people of Antioch, speaking of the Eucharist: Since the word says, “This is my body,” let us assent, believe, and behold it with intellectual eyes. Christ handed nothing insensible over to us, but sensible things, while all is intelligible. The same holds in Baptism: through a thing, namely sensible water, the gift is conferred; but the intelligible reality perfected is generation and renewal. If you were incorporeal, He would have given you mute and incorporeal gifts; but since the soul is joined to the body, He provides intelligible things to you through sensible ones. Saint Augustine teaches the same, tractate 80, on John: “The word is added to the element, and so the Sacrament is made:” that element is the sensible water of Baptism; therefore, and so on.

This is also supported by many arguments. First, the sacraments are ceremonies of Religion, or sacred rites, through which men coalescing into one mystical body are united for the worship and service of God; but according to Saint Augustine, book 19, Against Faustus, chapter 11, men cannot be joined in the name of any religion, true or false, unless bound by some fellowship of sacraments or visible signs. As William of Paris adds, how will they be partners if they do not know that they are partners, and how will they know this except through visible communion or a sign which can only be visible? Therefore sacraments must be sensible. Second, what leads man to cognition of intelligible and spiritual things is sensible; God provides for man according to his condition, and it is connatural to man to arrive at intelligible and spiritual knowledge through sensible things. Hence spiritual matters are described in Scripture through sensible likenesses, while Sacraments lead man to knowledge of spiritual things, namely sanctifying grace; therefore they ought to be sensible signs. Third, instruments ought to be proportionate to the principal cause; the principal and universal cause of our salvation is the Incarnate Word, and the instruments through which its power reaches us are the Sacraments; therefore it was fitting that they should be visible signs under which divine power would work our salvation. Fourth, the Seraphic Doctor says in the Breviloquy, part 6, chapter 1:

A sick man is not only spirit, nor only flesh, but spirit in mortal flesh. The disease is original sin, which infects the mind through ignorance and the flesh through concupiscence. Though its origin was principally from the consent of reason, it took its occasion from the flesh. Therefore the corresponding medicine had to be not only spiritual but also have sensible signs, so that as these sensible things occasioned the soul’s fall, they might occasion its rising again. Since sensible signs of themselves have no efficacious order to grace, though by nature they have a distant representation of it, they had to be instituted by the Author of grace for signifying and blessed for sanctifying, so as to represent through natural likeness, signify through institution, sanctify through blessing, and prepare for grace, through which our soul would be cured. But since healing grace is not given to the proud, unbelieving, and disdainful, these signs had to be divinely given, so that they would not only sanctify and confer grace, and thereby heal, but also instruct through signification, humble through reception, and exercise through their diversity. Thus exercise would exclude sloth from the concupiscible power, instruction ignorance from the rational power, and humiliation pride from the irascible power; and the whole soul would become curable by the grace of the Holy Spirit, which reforms us according to these three powers, in the image of the Trinity and of Christ.

You will say 1: The Sacraments are ordered to the worship of God and the kingdom, for they were instituted so that man might worship God and obtain His glory; but sensible things do not pertain to the worship of God and the kingdom, for John 4 says, “God is spirit,” and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth, while Romans 14 says, “The kingdom of God is not food and drink.” Therefore a sacramental sign is not suitably said to be sensible.

I distinguish the minor: sensible things do not pertain to the worship of God and the kingdom if considered merely according to their nature, as they are in themselves, I concede; if considered insofar as ordered to signify spiritual things, in which God’s worship and kingdom consist, I deny. Bodily exercise is useful for a little if it has no order to the spiritual. What benefit are fasting and abstinence if considered merely as exercising the body? They contribute little to salvation, but serve it greatly insofar as ordered to a spiritual end. The Apostle says, Romans 12, “I appeal to you, brothers, through God’s mercy, to present your bodies as a living, holy sacrifice pleasing to God, your rational service.” Hence Tertullian sets forth the services rendered to God by Christian bodily discipline and their benefits for the soul, book On the Resurrection of the Flesh, chapter 8.

Let us consider the proper form of the Christian name, he says, and how great a prerogative this frivolous and sordid substance has before God. No soul could attain salvation unless it believed while in the flesh, so truly is the flesh the hinge of salvation: when the soul is bound to God through it, the flesh makes that binding possible. The flesh is washed so that the soul may be cleansed; anointed so that the soul may be consecrated; signed so that the soul may be fortified; overshadowed by the imposition of hands so that the soul may be illumined by the spirit; fed with Christ’s body and blood so that the soul may be enriched with God. They cannot be separated in reward, which action joins together: the flesh offers God sacrifices, namely the soul’s struggles, fasts, vigils, dry foods, and the accessories of this service, through its own hardship. Virginity, widowhood, modest concealment of marriage, and even the knowledge of it are offered to God from the goods of the flesh.

It is therefore certain that sensible and corporeal things serve greatly to restore salvation; consequently the Lord Christ rightly instituted the Sacraments in sensible things, so that they would be signs of invisible grace. The Abbot Ogier of Lyon explains this truth, Sermon 1, On the Lord’s Supper, among the works of Saint Bernard, no. 2.

A sacrament is called a sacred sign, or a sacred secret; many things are done solely for their own sake, while others designate other things, and these are signs. A ring is given simply for the ring, and there is no signification; it is given to invest someone with an inheritance, and it is a sign, so that the recipient can say: the ring is worth nothing, but it is the inheritance I was seeking. In this way, as the Lord approached His Passion, He took care to invest His own with His grace, so that invisible grace might be bestowed through some visible sign; for this purpose all the Sacraments were instituted, and so on.

You will say 2: Saint Augustine, book 2, On Free Choice of the Will, chapter 11, says: “The species of any bodies, without which one can live rightly, are the least goods.” But the Sacraments are not the least goods, and one cannot live rightly without them; therefore they are not species of bodies, or sensible things.

I answer, Saint Augustine means that the species of bodies, as they are in their nature or according to its powers and properties, are the least goods, I concede; as assumed to signify spiritual things and serve the attainment of the greatest goods, I deny. You will say 3: Pope Nicholas decreed that according to law consent alone suffices for marriage; but consent is not sensible; therefore something sensible is not required for the Sacrament of Matrimony.

I distinguish the major: the sole consent of the contracting parties, declared through an external sign, suffices for Matrimony even without parental consent, carnal intercourse, or anything similar, I concede; consent alone declared through no sensible sign, I deny. Once the minor is distinguished, the consequence is denied. Marriage requires the contracting parties’ consent to be manifested by an external sign, such as sensible words, actions, or gestures, as is clear from chapter Cum quondam, and On betrothals. The Pontiff meant only to exclude the necessity of carnal intercourse:

because, he says, consent to cohabitation and to maintaining an undivided common life makes the spouses.

You will say 4: Contrition is part of the Sacrament of Penance, and Christ’s body makes the Sacrament of the Eucharist; but these are not sensible; therefore a Sacrament need not necessarily be sensible.

I distinguish the minor: these are not sensible in themselves, I concede; through another, I deny. Contrition is declared through accusation of sins, striking the breast, tears and groans, and similar externals, just as Christ’s body is manifested through the consecrated Eucharistic species; consequently the consequence is denied. Three things must be distinguished in a Sacrament: the thing alone, the sacrament alone, and the thing and sacrament together. The thing alone is signified and does not signify, so it can be insensible while manifested through sensible things. The sign alone makes another thing known and necessarily must be sensible. From these two the complete sacrament is formed, not by the integrity of signification, which pertains only to the sensible matter and form, but by the integrity of perfection, because the sign does not have complete and perfect signification when the thing signified is absent.

I do not deny that God could have established something purely spiritual, such as a mental meditation on Christ’s Passion, a pious thought, affection of mind toward God, or inward detestation of sins, as a remedy for sin and an efficacious sign of grace. But these would not properly be Sacraments; they are not only remedies for sin, but also ceremonies of Religion, proofs of divine love toward us, and pledges of our worship toward God. Our discussion is not of means God could have instituted for imparting grace to Angels, but of means prescribed by God for restoring and conferring grace upon men.

Third Conclusion. — A SACRAMENT IS A PRACTICAL SIGN OF SANCTITY, NOT LEGAL AND EXTERNAL BUT INTERNAL: NOT FUTURE, BUT PRESENT, AND IN THE ONE RECEIVING IT.

This Conclusion has three parts,

The first is common among Theologians: a Sacrament is a practical, that is, effective, sign—morally or physically—of the grace it signifies. It is defined in the Council of Florence, in the decree of union, which distinguishes the sacraments of the ancient and new law: the former did not cause grace, but merely figured it as to be given through Christ’s Passion; our sacraments both contain grace and confer it upon worthy recipients. The Council of Trent likewise decrees, Session 7, Canon 6:

If anyone says that the sacraments of the new law do not contain the grace which they signify, and do not confer that grace upon those who place no obstacle, as though they were merely external signs of justice received through faith, or marks of Christian profession by which the faithful are distinguished from unbelievers among men, let him be anathema.

This truth is confirmed by Sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers, which frequently assert that a Sacrament of the new Law causes grace and remits sins. In John 3 Christ says: “Unless someone is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God.” Spiritual regeneration through grace is attributed to Baptism and the Holy Spirit as causes: to the Holy Spirit as principal cause, and Baptism as instrumental cause. Hence Saint Augustine, Tractate 80, on John: “What power is there in water, that it touches the body and washes the heart?” Saint Leo agrees, Sermon 1, On the Nativity: for every person reborn, the water of Baptism is like a virginal womb, filled by the same Spirit who filled the Virgin; the sacred Conception abolished sin there, while here the washing removes it. The same must be said of the other Sacraments, as we shall prove below.

The second part, namely that a Sacrament properly speaking must confer internal sanctity, is proved against certain Theologians: either those who deny, with Cino in his relection On the Sacraments part 1, that it belongs to the character of a Sacrament to confer internal sanctity, holding that it suffices for it to confer some sanctity, namely either legal and external or Evangelical and internal; or those who assert, with Suarez, disputation 1, section 2, that for the character of a Sacrament it is required that it confer at least some legal sanctity and signify true Evangelical justice. I say it is proved first because the character of a Sacrament requires a signification by which it is distinguished from everything that is not a Sacrament; but legal and imperfect sanctity does not distinguish a Sacrament from everything that is not a Sacrament; therefore a Sacrament cannot signify legal and external sanctity. The major is evident: a Sacrament must differ essentially from those things with which it agrees in signifying a sacred thing, though they are not Sacraments. The minor is proved: in the Old Law there were many things that caused and signified legal sanctification, yet were not Sacraments, as is gathered from the Hebrews 9, where the Apostle, speaking of the Old Law, says: “According to which gifts and sacrifices are offered that cannot perfect the worshipper according to conscience, only in foods and drinks, and various washings, and carnal justices until the time of correction:” no one would say that all those ceremonies, washings, and carnal justices were Sacraments; and consequently the character of a Sacrament cannot consist in the mere signification of legal sanctity. Secondly, even in the law of grace there are many things that have the character of a sacred ceremony, yet are not Sacraments. Indeed, first tonsure is a sacred ceremony by which a man is devoted to divine worship, and therefore confers and signifies some sanctity, yet is not a Sacrament. Likewise holy water and the sign of the cross, being sacred ceremonies, confer some sanctity on the recipient, for they erase venial sins and serve to drive demonic temptations from the soul; yet they are not Sacraments. Therefore, for the formal character of a Sacrament it does not suffice that it signify and confer some sanctity in general; it is required that it confer some internal sanctity in the one who receives the Sacrament. Hence

The third part is proved against certain Thomists who teach that for the character of a Sacrament it suffices that it signify some sanctity actually conferred through the Sacrament, provided it pre-signify and prefigure true sanctity to be conferred through another. On this basis they contend that the sacraments of the Old Law truly had the character of Sacrament and agreed univocally with the sacraments of the New Law, because those former sacraments signified grace to be conferred through Christ. I say it is proved first (Gonet says) from Saint Thomas, question 50, article 2, who teaches that a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing insofar as it sanctifies men, namely those receiving the Sacrament, as is gathered from the reply to the second objection. Therefore he holds that it belongs to the character of a Sacrament to signify perfect sanctity to be received in the actual use and reception of the Sacrament. Hence, in book 4, distinction 1, question 1, article 1, question 1, reply to the third objection, he teaches that the bronze serpent raised by Moses in the desert at God's command was not a Sacrament, and gives this reason: “Although the bronze serpent was a sign of a sacred thing that sanctifies, it was not so insofar as sanctifying is an act, because it was not employed so that someone might receive an effect of sanctification.” It is proved secondly from various definitions that the Holy Fathers and sacred Doctors give of Sacraments. For Saint Isidore, book 6 of the Etymologies, defines a sacrament thus: “A sacrament is that through which, under the covering of bodily things, divine power works salvation more secretly.” Gratian, in 1, question 1, chapter Multi secularium, and so on, attributes this definition to Saint Gregory; Saint Thomas, however, in book 4, distinction 1, attributes it to Saint Augustine: in reality it may be said to belong to both, although as to the wording it is Saint Isidore’s. But divine power, pouring itself out and applying itself through Sacraments, does not work salvation except insofar as these truly signify sanctifying grace; therefore, and so on. The same is clear from the definition given by Hugh of Saint Victor, book 1, On the Sacraments, part 1, chapter 2, where he says:

A sacrament is a bodily element outwardly presented to the senses, representing through likeness, signifying through institution, and containing invisible and spiritual grace through sanctification, and so on.

The same is expressed by the Master’s definition in book 1, distinction 1: a sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace, bearing the likeness of that grace and existing as its cause. Hence he concludes that Sacraments were instituted not merely for signifying but also for sanctifying; things instituted merely for signifying are only signs, not sacraments, as were the carnal sacrifices and ceremonial observances of the Old Law, which could never make their offerers just, because, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 9:

The blood of goats and bulls, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkled upon the defiled, sanctified for the cleansing of the flesh, not of the soul,

Finally this is clear from the Catechism of Saint Pius V: a sacrament is a visible sign of invisible grace instituted for our justification. It is therefore clear that a Sacrament must formally signify true sanctity in the recipient; true sanctity is that which is conferred through grace; therefore, and so on.

Moreover, Hiquaeus says in his Commentary on the cited passage of the Doctor: everything in the Old Law signified grace to be conferred through Christ, because 1 Corinthians 10 says all those things happened in figure, and Colossians 2 says the law was a shadow of future things; but they were not Sacraments. Therefore signifying sanctity to be conferred through another is not the constitutive character of a Sacrament. It is confirmed. The Paschal Lamb and manna signified the Eucharist; the crossing of the Red Sea was a figure of baptismal grace; the bronze serpent was a figure of Christ’s Passion and human Redemption. “All,” says the Apostle, “were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all ate the same spiritual food.” All the sacrifices, offerings, and expiations of the law likewise signified sacramental grace to be conferred through Christ, as Florence teaches in the decree of union and Trent in Session 7, On Sacraments in General, yet they were not Sacraments. The sacrifices of Abel, Abraham, and Melchizedek, the marriage of our first parents, the dove sent over Christ at His Baptism, and the fire descending upon the Apostles likewise signified the Holy Spirit. The same is evident of the cross and many other new-law ceremonies, which are not Sacraments.

You will reply 1. It suffices for a Sacrament that it be instituted for Religion’s worship and signify true sanctity.

Against this, first, the sacrifices of the natural law had all this, yet were not Sacraments. Abel’s sacrifice, which pleased God, was a figure of Christ’s sacrifice, just as Abel represented Christ; the same is clear of Isaac’s offering and the ram God substituted, in which Christ’s Passion was figured. Secondly, the Cross and many new-law ceremonies, such as exorcism and exsufflations, signify grace conferred through Christ and victory over the demon, and are instituted for worship; therefore the special character of a Sacrament does not consist in these two together. Third, a Sacrament, insofar as it pertains to divine worship, is the use of a material and external thing assumed for the effect of that worship which it signifies; but that effect is the sanctification of man; therefore, and so on.

The major is clear. The minor is proved: there are three general uses of a material thing assumed to signify an effect of divine worship. The first is when it is offered to God in attestation of His excellence and the creature’s subjection, as offerings, sacrifices, temples, altars, tithes, and similar things. The second is when something divine is assumed for our use, in which man subjects himself to God; thus in an oath the name of God is assumed to confirm truth, and man is subjected to God as the first rule of truth. The third occurs when something divine is assumed for our sanctification, so that man may be made more disposed and suitable to serve Him; this is the use of the Sacraments. Therefore Sacraments fall under Religion’s use insofar as they sanctify man; but they would not sanctify him unless they caused sanctity in him. Causing this therefore belongs to the essence of a Sacrament insofar as by institution it falls under religious worship, and this alone is its distinctive use, distinguishing it from sacrifice and other things instituted for worship.

You will reply 2. It belongs to a Sacrament that it signify true sanctity simply speaking and at least cause sanctity in a qualified sense, namely legal sanctity.

Against this, legal sanctity is merely external bodily sanctity, conferred by the legal rites so that the sanctified could enter the temple and be admitted to sacrifice. As the Master observes from Saint Augustine: “By defilement, when the law cleanses, I understand nothing other than contact with a dead man; the one who touched him was unclean for seven days, but was purified according to the law on the third and seventh days, and thus was clean to enter the temple.” The character of a sacrament is therefore not taken in relation to such legal sanctity. From its etymology sacrament means as if sacring the mind, or consecrating the mind; but the sacrifices of the Old Law did not consecrate the mind, merely cleanse the body, as Saint Paul teaches in Hebrews 9:

If the blood of goats and the ashes of a heifer sprinkled upon the defiled sanctify for the cleansing of the flesh, how much more will the blood of Christ, who through the Holy Spirit offered Himself unblemished to God, cleanse our conscience from dead works?

and so on. The Apostle distinguishes the Sacraments of the old and new Law: the former conferred only bodily sanctity, the latter sanctity upon the soul. Hence legal uncleanness had no other effect than that of excommunication and other irregularities, by which someone is excluded from receiving or administering Sacraments, entering the Church, and so on; consequently absolution from them is not a true Sacrament.

You will say 1: The Councils of Florence and Trent, and many Holy Fathers, call the sacraments of the Old Law Sacraments without limitation or distinction; therefore they suppose these truly had the character of Sacrament and agree univocally with the new-law Sacraments.

I deny the antecedent: the Holy Fathers and Councils sufficiently declare the limitation when they say that the sacraments of the Old Law do not cause sanctifying grace. Thus they make clear that those Sacraments did not have the true character of sacrament, nor agree univocally but only equivocally with ours.

You will say 2: There are many practical signs of grace which are not Sacraments; therefore a Sacrament has no distinctive feature in being a practical sign of grace. The antecedent is proved: the tree of life in Paradise signified grace; for Saint Augustine says, book 2, On the Merits of Sins, chapter 21, that it mystically demonstrated what would be conferred through wisdom, whose figure it bore, upon the rational soul, so that, refreshed by its nourishment, it would not fall into the ruin and death of wickedness. But the tree of life was not a Sacrament properly speaking. Likewise Isaac’s immolation signified Christ’s Passion. Similarly, the dove descending upon Christ’s head signified the presence of the Holy Spirit; yet these were not Sacraments. Therefore that which is a practical sign of grace should not be considered a Sacrament.

I deny the consequence: the difference of a properly speaking Sacrament is not any signification of sanctifying grace, but sanctifying grace applied to men while the external sign is used. The aforesaid signs were not such: they signified grace as to be applied to any men through the use of the external sign, not to one person alone.

You will insist: There are also practical signs of grace signifying it as present through the use of an applied sign, yet they are not Sacraments; therefore, and so on. The antecedent is clear from Christ’s words to Magdalene, Luke 7: “Your sins are forgiven you,” and to the Apostles, John 20: “Receive the Holy Spirit,” and so on. Those words signified present grace, conferred by the force of their signification.

I answer, denying the antecedent: those words signified grace not practically but demonstratively, especially Christ’s address to Magdalene. They were demonstrative signs of grace caused by penance and perfect love, so producing her grace required no extraordinary means beyond faith and penance, as the following words indicate: “Her many sins are forgiven, because she loved much,” and so on. Hence Saint Gregory, Homily 25, on the Gospels, says:

By loving the truth, she washed away the stains of sin with tears, and the voice of truth is fulfilled: Her many sins are forgiven, because she loved much, and so on.

To the second I say that when Christ spoke those words in John 20, the Holy Spirit was indeed granted to the Apostles; nevertheless the words were not sacramental. It does not suffice that a Sacrament signify grace practically with respect only to some persons and transiently; it must signify it permanently with respect to the whole community and society for whose sacred confederation it was instituted, and its use must be carried out by a determinate minister in that society. This does not fit those words: they were spoken only once, only by Christ, and directed to the Apostles alone.

Fourth Conclusion. — A Sacrament is rightly defined as a sensible sign of God’s grace, or a gratuitous effect of God, efficaciously signifying through divine institution, ordered to the salvation of the wayfarer. Thus the Doctor, book 3, distinction 1, question 2, no. 61. The truth of this definition appears from its parts. First it says sign, in which it agrees with sacrifices and with all things determined to signify something else. Secondly, sensible is added, that is, instituted in sensible matter, for the reasons assigned in the Second Conclusion. It follows that it is from divine institution: since the things used for a Sacrament are not natural signs and have no natural connection with the grace they signify, they must be used by one who can produce grace at the placing and presence of those signs, namely God alone, or God-man Christ. It adds, efficaciously signifying, excluding from the true character of Sacrament not only sacramentals, such as sacred ceremonies and holy water, but also the Sacraments of the Old Law, which did not confer grace on their recipients but merely figured it. It adds, or a gratuitous effect of God, so that the sacred Eucharist may be included among the Sacraments. The Eucharist agrees with the others as a sign of a sacred thing, or invisible grace, signifying a good added to nature and instituted for human salvation or sanctification; but it differs in its principal signified reality, since the other Sacraments signify accidental grace inhering in the soul, whereas this signifies substantial grace and the Author and source of all graces. Moreover, the other Sacraments consist in use, while the Eucharist, even when not actually received, retains the character of a Sacrament, as Trent teaches, Session 13, chapter 3: “This is common to the most holy Eucharist and the other Sacraments: to be a symbol of a sacred thing and the visible form of invisible grace. Yet this singular excellence is found in it: the other Sacraments have sanctifying power only when someone uses them, whereas in the Eucharist the Author of sanctity Himself is present before use.” — I admit that “gratuitous effect” may be omitted without harming the definition, since grace can mean both accidental and substantial grace, although the Subtle Doctor expressed both distinctly for clarity, because Theologians ordinarily use grace for accidental grace. — Finally it is ordered to the salvation of the wayfarer. Sacraments are medicines: medicine is useless to the dead, superfluous for the healthy, and necessary for the sick; likewise Sacraments benefit the damned in no way, since no salvation remains to hope for them, and in hell there is no protection of redemption. They would be superfluous for the blessed, who have no weakness to cure or fear; but they are necessary for all wayfarers, none clean from stain and none, while alive, not ordered to eternal beatitude.

You will say: The Sacrament of the Eucharist can be received and the sacrifice of the Mass celebrated for the dead. — I distinguish: by way of suffrage, I concede; by way of sacrament, I deny. Through the Mass and Eucharist a wayfarer can compensate for the injury done to God by a dead person during life, pay his debt for him, and free him from punishments; nevertheless no one can administer Sacraments to the dead. If administered to a soul in an assumed apparent body, they would do nothing, since the dead are at the term and incapable of further meritorious work, such as reception of the Sacraments, as the Lord says: “Where the tree falls, there it will remain.” Although they are not at the term of state, they are at the term of merit and demerit through death, as the Lord says: “Work while you have gain, that is, life; the night is coming to you, death, in which no one can work.”

You will say 1: That cannot be defined which is not one in itself; but a Sacrament is not one in itself, but accidentally; therefore it cannot be defined. — I distinguish the major: that which is not one in itself physically, metaphysically, or logically—that is, constituted neither from matter and form nor from genus and difference, nor containing something conceived as genus and difference—I concede; otherwise, I deny. To the minor I say that a Sacrament is not one in itself physically or metaphysically, but only logically. As the Doctor says, just as a relation is definable though it involves a foundation and term, so a Sacrament is definable though it expresses the relation of sign to signified: “This concept is one in itself in the intellect, ‘an efficacious arbitrary sign,’ just as the concept of paternity is; and just as paternity could be defined despite the non-unity of its subject, if paternity were in two subjects and those subjects were placed in the definition as additions, its correlative would also be placed, so it is here.” He adds: “Restricting the definition to what is properly said outside the mind, it does not express what the Sacrament is and cannot be a definition as the account of a complete being outside the mind. But insofar as a definition expresses one concept in the intellect, whether of a thing outside the mind or of reason, it can rightly be defined; in this way all logical intentions are defined. They do not signify quiddities outside the mind, but concepts in the soul, one in themselves. Having a definition thus suffices for science properly speaking; otherwise Logic would not be a science. Genus, difference, and property are found in such definitions in the logician’s sense, since there is a predicate in what, essential quality, and convertible accidental quality. Thus sign is genus, instituted and efficacious difference, sensible the foundation of the relation, and grace or a gratuitous effect of God the correlative.” The Doctor therefore admits that a Sacrament cannot be properly defined by a real physical or metaphysical definition presupposing one real being in itself composed of matter and form or genus and difference; in this respect a Sacrament is not one. It can be defined only by an intentional or logical definition through something having the manner of genus and difference. — Or I distinguish the minor otherwise: a Sacrament is not one in itself if considered physically, according to natural entity and materially, I concede; if morally, as a divine artificial instrument and supernatural means instituted by God for sanctifying men, I deny. Though materially composed of many parts of different genera, it is formally one in itself because it has one form, the signification of sanctifying grace. A house likewise is materially composed of stones, iron, and wood, yet is one artifact because it has one form, a shape suitable for habitation; the same applies to a family, commonwealth, city, and similar things.

You will say 2: What is not real is not properly defined. A Sacrament according to its form is not real, since its form is merely a signification instituted by agreement, a relation of reason, as the Doctor teaches. — I distinguish the major: if it is not real fundamentally, I concede; if it is not real formally, I deny. Though a city lacks a real form, it does not cease to be the thing that can be defined, because its foundation is real. Say the same of a Sacrament: though its relation of sign to signified is not real because it is a sign by institution, the things and words of which it consists are real, and so it can be defined.

You will say 3: What can be defined is placed in some category; but no category can be assigned for a Sacrament; therefore, and so on. — I answer, distinguishing the major: if it is a being in itself, namely a substance or another absolute, I concede; if it is an accidental being, I subdistinguish: an accidental being composed of subject and accident, let it pass, for Philosophers dispute this; an artificial accidental being constituted from diverse beings united either really or only intentionally, I deny. Once the minor is conceded, the consequence must be denied, because a Sacrament is an artificial being constituted from several beings united only intentionally.

Corollary. — From these things it is evident that all definitions which heretics customarily hand down and defend are empty and must be rejected, especially those of the Sacramentarians, Lutherans, Anabaptists, and Calvinists. The Sacramentarians, whose leader seems to have been Carolostadius, Archdeacon of Wittenberg, from whom Luther had received his doctoral laurels, at first defended Luther’s party and doctrine but, impatiently bearing that Luther was preferred to him, withdrew completely from him. He wishes the Sacraments to be nothing but signs and marks of Christian profession, distinguishing us from Jews and Pagans, as the toga once distinguished Romans from Greeks in cloaks; various clothing now distinguishes nations and orders of Citizens and Religious, as badges and banners distinguish soldiers. — They are refuted because this is a secondary, not primary, effect of the Sacraments. Scripture does not assign to the Eucharist, Baptism, or other Sacraments the effect of distinguishing Christians, but that of justifying, cleansing, saving, and bestowing eternal and immortal life. If Sacraments were merely marks distinguishing Christians, human institution would suffice and Christ’s Passion would not be necessary; but it was necessary. The Fathers say they flowed from Christ’s pierced side under the figure of blood and water. Saint Augustine, Tractate 126 on John, observes that the Evangelist expressed this piercing not without mystery:

Christ’s side being pierced not without mystery: “One of the soldiers struck His side with a lance.” Saint Augustine says the Evangelist used a vigilant word, saying not “struck,” “wounded,” or anything else, but “opened,” so that the door of life might in a certain way be opened, from which the Sacraments of the Church flowed, without which one does not enter eternal life. Finally, if Sacraments were merely signs distinguishing us from unbelievers, the Symbol of faith could be called a Sacrament, since by that profession we are distinguished from Jews and Pagans.

The Lutherans and their book On the Babylonian Captivity, final chapter, say that a sacrament is a divine promise attached to an external sign; or, as they say in the Augsburg Confession, article 13, Sacraments are called signs of God’s will toward us for arousing faith in recipients, so that they believe the promises presented through the sacraments. — Both definitions are rejected: the first because, according to the Holy Fathers, Sacraments are signs and symbols of an effect conferred through such signs; one who receives a Sacrament is said to receive a sign, not God’s promise. Therefore Sacraments are not God’s promises themselves, or things promised by God, but rather external signs having a promise of grace attached. Further, if the character of a Sacrament were constituted in that promise attached to an external sign, both Baptism and Eucharist would be excluded from the character of Sacrament: for in the words “I baptize you,” and so on, there is no promise of grace, just as there is none in the words “This is my body.” The second is likewise rejected: for if Sacraments are signs required to arouse faith in recipients, so that they believe the promises presented through the sacraments, it follows that infants and mentally incapable persons would be baptized in vain, because they cannot produce an act of faith; yet Lutherans defend the baptism of infants against the Anabaptists.

Melanchthon’s definition is also rejected. In the examination of those things heard before the rite of public ordination, under the heading On Sacraments, he says: A sacrament in the New Testament, as the Church speaks, is a rite divinely instituted and added to the promise delivered in the Gospel, so that it may be a testimony and pledge of the promise of grace exhibited and applied; or, as he defines it more briefly in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, sacraments are rites that have God’s command and to which a promise of grace has been added. I say this definition is refuted. First, because Melanchthon wants God’s command to be considered necessary for Sacraments in Scripture; but that is false, because Circumcision, Baptism, and Eucharist, which heretics admit to be true Sacraments, were instituted long before they were commanded in writing. Further, if a Sacrament necessarily had to be a testimony and pledge of an exhibited and applied promise of grace, it would follow that such testimonies are often false: for someone could approach Baptism deceitfully and receive Christ’s Body unworthily, in which cases the promise of grace cannot be said to have been applied to that person. Moreover, Lutherans teach that these testimonies are given to confirm or arouse faith; but it is clear that, although infants are capable of Sacraments, they still cannot use any testimonies so that their faith may be aroused or confirmed.

The Anabaptists contend that Sacraments are nothing but allegories, likenesses, and figures of the virtues and good works of Christian life and spiritual discipline. Baptism, they say, is only a figure signifying that Christians ought to endure hardships for Christ, as though immersion signified only death to sin and the world, while emergence signified the Resurrection, since through the Holy Spirit we must rise to a new life. The Eucharist merely reminds us to preserve concord among the faithful, according to 1 Corinthians 10: “We are one body, we who share in one bread.” — This definition is refuted. That use of the Sacraments is not principal or primary and can proceed from human institution. If Sacraments were only figures of good works and morals, they would signify only future things, not past and present things; but this is false. Baptism signifies Christ’s past death, burial, and Resurrection, as Romans 6 says, and the present washing away of sins, according to Acts 22: “Be baptized and wash away your sins.” Likewise Eucharist is a rememorative sign of Christ’s Passion, according to 1 Corinthians 11: “Do this in remembrance of me.” It is also a demonstrative sign of Christ’s spiritual indwelling in us: “The one who eats my flesh and drinks my blood remains in me, and I in him.”

Finally Calvin, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 11, section 1, defines a Sacrament in two ways: first, more broadly, as follows: A Sacrament is an external symbol by which the Lord seals in our consciences his promises of his benevolence toward us, in order to sustain the weakness of our faith; and by which we in turn testify to our piety toward God, both before him and the Angels, and among human beings. But he soon adds a briefer definition, when he says: A Sacrament is a testimony of divine grace toward us, confirmed by an external sign, together with a mutual testimony of our piety toward him. — Yet both these definitions are refuted: First, because it would follow from them that a minister of the Church could baptize no one without danger of profaning Baptism: for no one can apply the seal of God's promises unless he is certain to whom those promises were made, just as no one can affirm anything by an oath unless he is certain of it; but ministers of the Church cannot be certain to whom the promises of eternal predestination were made, whose seal Calvin says the Sacrament is, for no one can be certain, without a special revelation, of his own or another's predestination. Second, Calvin admits legitimate Baptism in the Roman Church, in which nevertheless he denies that there are any predestined. Moreover, that assertion of Calvin rests upon several false propositions: first, that by the promised grace is understood the grace of predestination: both because it is false that this grace of predestination is promised to anyone in the Scriptures, since no one knows whether he is worthy of love or hatred; and because it would follow that the Sacrament is never received as regards grace except by the elect, although it is most certain that many just persons fall from the grace received in the Sacraments and are damned. Next, it is false that such grace of predestination is apprehended through faith: for it would follow that little children are never justified in Baptism, since they cannot have the faith by which they might apprehend such a promise of grace. Finally, it is false that the effects of the Sacraments take place only in the elect. For it is certain that even the reprobate are sometimes justified through reception of the Sacraments.

I judge it superfluous here to refute the other similar definitions of the Heretics and to refute them, since they can sufficiently be overthrown by what has been said.

NOTED 1. There were certain ancient heretics called Paulicians, who eliminated all matter from the Sacraments, asserting that their power consisted solely in the words of Christ the Lord. Hence they said that those who received the Gospel were to be baptized, because the Lord had said in the Gospel: ὁ πιστεύσας καὶ βαπτισθῇ σωθήσεται: thus among them, as Peter the Sicilian in the Bibliotheca of the Holy Fathers and Euthymius in part 2 of the Panoplia, title 21, report, those who held the priestly order were called not Priests but Votaries. Diametrically opposed to them are certain more recent heretics, especially Lutherans and Calvinists, who think that all, or at least the principal, efficacy of the sacraments is to be placed in the matter. But avoiding both of these vicious extremes, Catholic Doctors affirm that the Sacraments of the New Law truly consist of things as matter and words as form, though they do not all agree on what is properly to be understood by “things” and “words.” For some wish these terms to be taken strictly and according to the propriety of the words, so that by “thing” something material would be understood, which could be touched and seen; while by “word” would be understood what is expressed through the vocal organs and perceived by hearing. The principal advocate of this opinion appears to be Durandus in 4 dist. 1 q. 3, where, although he grants that all the Sacraments have some matter, he nevertheless denies that all have sensible things as their matter, especially Penance and Matrimony. Other Theologians, however, think that by the name “thing” one should understand what signifies the same grace more confusedly, whether that thing is properly so called or not; while by the name “words” one should understand what signifies the same grace more distinctly. The Subtle Doctor especially supports this opinion in 4 dist. 3 q. 2 n. 3, where, after he had said: "It must be noted that, properly speaking of form, insofar as it is another part of a composite, the form of the sacrament is the very relation of sign, by which it is formally such a sacrament, and the matter is the whole foundation of that relation." He immediately adds: "Nevertheless, if there are several things in this foundation, from which one Sacrament is in some way made, which are not related equally, but one is as it were prior and determinable, the other as it were posterior, and the determination of the preceding one, the first can be called as it were matter, by a certain likeness to matter, and the other form: for it belongs to matter to precede according to origin and to be determined; to form, however, to govern and determine. Likewise, what is more principal and more actual can be called form with respect to what is more potential; likewise, what is spiritual can be called form with respect to what is less spiritual." Thus the Doctor.

From these things it follows that in the Sacraments, where two things occur jointly signifying the same reality, that which signifies less perfectly and less distinctly is said to signify as a thing, whether meanwhile it is a sensible or properly visible thing or not; but that which signifies more perfectly and distinctly is said to signify as a word, whether it is properly a word or not.

NOTED 2. Although God could at will designate any sensible things, indeed even spiritual things, as the matter of a Sacrament, leaving it to human freedom to use whatever sign they wished for obtaining the promised grace by applying some outward sign assumed and applied for that purpose, nevertheless in his wise ordering he decreed that definite and determined things be used for confecting and administering the Sacrament. Hence this determination of sacramental things can be conceived as made in two ways: either confusedly, or less distinctly, so that it was determined by divine authority that some sign in general be assumed, while no sign in particular was designated; or more distinctly, if it was determined in particular that such and such a thing be assumed for confecting the Sacrament. This in turn can happen in two ways, either according to genus, for example if water were determined as the matter of Baptism, but the ultimate species of water were not designated, whether rose-water, artificial, or natural; or according to the lowest species, for example if not water in general but natural water were designated as the matter of Baptism. Again, matter determined in species can be considered in a twofold distinction: one kind is purely physical, such as the matter of the Sacraments that have some physical and natural thing, as Baptism water, Confirmation chrism from oil and balsam, the Eucharist wheat bread and grape wine, and Extreme Unction oil. Others, however, essentially include in their matter something moral dependent upon human institution, so that this moral element is the foundation and reason why such sensible and physical matter is assumed for confecting the Sacrament. Therefore it is asked whether the matter of the Sacraments of the New Law was so distinctly determined in particular by Christ the Lord that no one is permitted to change it. So that this may be perceived more distinctly,

NOTED 3. A twofold change in the matter of the Sacraments can be distinguished: one substantial and essential, which would occur if, in place of one physical thing designated by Christ the Lord as the matter of the Sacrament, someone assumed another matter distinct in genus or species—namely, if, from the fact that Christ the Lord instituted Baptism to be performed by way of washing in natural water, someone on this occasion presumed to assume any other liquid that could serve for washing, as the Aquarians once taught, who used only water, not wine, in the Sacrament of the altar; just as Beza too, in Epistle 2 to Tillius, contends that, if bread or wine is lacking, whatever by common usage and the circumstances of the time has the character of bread and wine may be assumed for celebrating the Supper. Likewise, if the matter customarily used were so altered that by common usage and manner of speaking it would no longer be considered the same or called by the same name—for example, if wine became so sour that it would no longer be considered and called wine but vinegar. The second change is called accidental, namely when the substance of the matter designated by Christ is indeed assumed, but not with the same accidents which that matter would have according to Christ’s right intention—for example, if someone were to assume natural water for baptizing, but not clear and limpid water, rather turbid and muddy water.

With these points premised, three things are to be determined here: first, whether the Sacraments of the New Law must consist of matter and form; second, whether the matter of the Sacraments was designated and determined by Christ the Lord in species; third, whether it is ever permitted to assume a substantial matter other than that which Christ designated.

First Conclusion. — The Sacraments of the New Law truly must consist of and be perfected by matter and form. This is common among Catholics, and

It is proved first from a decree of the Council of Florence, where it is held that the Sacraments of the New Law are perfected by three things, namely, things as matter, words as form, and the person of the minister confecting the Sacrament with the intention of doing what the Church does; if any one of these is lacking, the Sacrament is not perfected. The only basis of this truth is the will of Christ the Lord, who, just as he is the source of all graces and the stream that pours them abundantly into all, also willed that the grace of the New Testament should be made known to all through the most perfect signs. There are no more perfect signs than things that are seen and words that are heard, for sight and hearing are the senses most serviceable to understanding and knowledge. Hence Christ the Lord fittingly willed to lead us by the hand to perceive spiritual things through the reception of bodily things having some likeness to those spiritual things; for, as Saint Augustine teaches splendidly, Letter 118, chapter 11: The movement of the soul itself, so long as it is still entangled in earthly things, is kindled more sluggishly; but if it is carried to bodily likenesses, and from these is carried to the spiritual things figured by those likenesses, it is warmed by that very passage, as it were, and, like fire stirred in a torch, is set aflame, and bursts forth in more ardent love toward rest and quiet. — That visible things have the character of matter, while words chiefly have the character of form, is tacitly proved as follows: what is determinable has the character of matter; what determines has the character of form. But in the Sacraments visible things are determinable and of themselves indifferent to various significations; through words, however, they are determined to the effect which they ought to signify; therefore, etc. The major is evident: just as wood, stones, and so on are called the matter from which an architect or any other craftsman makes houses, statues, or other things, while the figure, or arrangement of parts by which the artifact is constituted, is the form of the art; and just as in logic genus is said to correspond to matter and difference to form, because genus is indifferent to several differences and species, while difference determines it to a species; so in the Sacraments the things assumed are indifferent to various significations and effects. For water is indifferent and indeterminate to moistening, cooling, and drinking, and oil to soothing pain, healing a wound, and fostering and strengthening powers; they also signify various effects of grace only indistinctly and confusedly. But through words they are determined to one or another effect of grace. For before the word the element is indifferent to being a Sacrament; but the word approaches the element, and it becomes a Sacrament, says Saint Augustine, Tractate 80 on John; therefore the determination of the Sacraments is chiefly made by the word. For, as the same Saint Augustine says, explaining the saying of John, Now you are clean, but not all: Since water has such great power that it stains the body and washes the heart, unless the word effects it? Hence the exterior washing of the body, apart from the words, signifies the washing of the soul only incipiently and remotely; but it is perfected by the words, I baptize you, so that it signifies it proximately and distinctly. The words themselves signify the washing of the soul more distinctly and expressly, but not perfectly unless they are joined to the bodily washing, because separately either of them is false. For the perfect and complete signification of grace is indivisible with respect to the matter and form of the Sacrament, since neither matter, or sensible things, can signify any degree of grace proximately and completely without the word, nor the word, or form, without the things themselves. Yet imperfect signification is divisible in regard to the subject, because things apart from the word signify grace indistinctly, while the word apart from the things signifies it more distinctly.

You will say 1: One and the same thing cannot have several forms; but the signification of grace proper to each Sacrament is the form of the Sacrament, for it is the habit or perfection constituting the thing in the character of a sign, and the form of a sign is signification; therefore the Sacraments do not consist of words as forms. — I answer. “Sacrament” is taken in two ways, namely materially or formally. Materially, it is a moral being consisting of things and words; formally, it is a sign of grace. With this presupposed, I distinguish the minor: signification is the form of the Sacrament taken formally and as it is a sign, I concede; taken materially, I deny: for in this way the Sacrament consists of sensible matter and words as form. Add that, as Saint Augustine teaches, book 2 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 3, words have obtained the primacy of signifying among human beings; and consequently, although things and words signify together, the chief power of signifying is attributed to words.

You will say 2: Matter and form in the same composite are of the same genus; but sensible things and the words of the Sacrament are not of the same genus, as is clear; therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: matter and form are of the same genus in a physical and natural composite, I concede; in a moral and artificial composite, I deny. To the minor I say that the Sacraments are composed not physically but morally and artificially.

You will say 3: The Eucharist remains a Sacrament after the words of consecration have been spoken; therefore it does not consist of words as form. — I distinguish the consequent: if it is considered in the state of being made, or with respect to its permanent being, I concede; if in the process of being made, I deny. It differs from the other Sacraments in that they exist only in a transient action and use, as Baptism in the washing, and do not have permanent being; but the Eucharist has permanent being from its production, or consecration, distinct from the use of those who receive it.

You will say 4: The Sacrament of Penance consists solely of words, namely vocal confession and the form of absolution; therefore it does not consist of things as matter. — I deny the antecedent. The sins themselves declared by the penitent through external signs, contrition for sins manifested to the Priest by a gesture, word, or another external sign, and also vocal confession, are things, or at least the matter about which absolution is concerned, insofar as “thing” is opposed to “word.” For these signify the grace proper to the Sacrament of Penance, which remits sin, less distinctly; the word of absolution more expressly and distinctly. Hence it is called the form of Penance, even though it is not altogether simultaneous with the sensible thing, namely the penitent’s contrition and confession, as when absolution is deferred, because the Sacrament of Penance is an artificial composite, or a physical-moral one: hence it is enough if the form is morally simultaneous with the matter; and this does occur. For although confession physically ceases when absolution is pronounced, it remains morally and is still present, at least in the Priest’s memory, because things that are little distant are morally regarded as not distant.

You will say 5: Matrimony can be contracted by gestures and letters alone, without spoken words; therefore it does not consist of words as form. — I distinguish the consequent: that it does not consist of words taken formally and properly, I concede; that it does not consist of words taken analogically and equivalently, I deny: for letters, gestures, and other signs of the mind’s thoughts and affections, by which the betrothed signify their mutual consent to one another, are certain words. For, as Saint Augustine says, book 2 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 3, signs by which human beings communicate their thoughts, even if they belong to the sense of sight or to other senses, are called words; and the movements of the limbs by which actors converse, as it were, with their eyes, and military banners and standards, which through the eyes convey the will of commanders, and gestures by which we signify to the eyes of those looking what we wish, are as it were certain visible words, because words belonging to the ears have obtained the primacy of signifying among human beings. Nevertheless, the Sacrament of Matrimony is not perfected by the vocal or analogical words alone by which the contracting parties express their consent; for their bodies and persons are sensible things and the matter of the Sacrament; indeed, the signs of consent expressed by gestures, letters, or words are called matter insofar as they indicate the handing over of bodies and persons, as imperfect and, so to speak, suspended before it is accepted; but insofar as they signify the mutual acceptance of the spouses, which perfects and completes that handing over, they are the form of Matrimony.

You will say 6: Matter and form must be together in things composed from them; but in the Sacraments of the New Law things and words need not necessarily be together, since in the Sacrament of Baptism the washing can sometimes occur before the words are spoken. — I distinguish the major: they must be together either by physical or by moral simultaneity, I concede; by physical simultaneity always, I deny. I likewise distinguish the minor: in the Sacraments of the New Law things and words need not necessarily be together by physical simultaneity, I concede; by moral simultaneity, I deny. Moreover, this moral simultaneity suffices for the validity of the Sacrament, as happens in many other successive and artificial things; for a proposition is composed of subject and predicate as of matter and form, yet these are not together so as to be uttered at the same moment of time, but because the predicate follows the subject immediately in the proposition.

Second Conclusion. — IT WAS FITTING THAT THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW SHOULD HAVE DISTINCTLY DETERMINED THINGS; YET IT WAS NOT NECESSARY THAT IN EACH SACRAMENT THE THINGS BE DETERMINED BY CHRIST THE LORD IN THE LOWEST SPECIES. This Conclusion consists of two parts; the first of which is proved: A Sacrament is a sensible sign assumed by human beings so that grace may certainly be signified and produced; but no creature can certainly signify produced grace except through divine institution and determination; therefore it was fitting that those things which serve in the Sacraments should be determined by God. It is confirmed because two things can be considered in the Sacraments of the New Law, namely divine worship and our sanctification: the first of these belongs to man in comparison with God; the second, however, concerns God in relation to human beings. Although human beings could have determined the matters of the Sacraments insofar as they are things determined for divine worship, because the worship of God is in human power, they could not do so insofar as the Sacraments are ordered to sanctification; for just as God alone can sanctify, so it belongs to God alone to determine the things by which human beings can be sanctified.

The second part is also clear: for the Sacraments are of two kinds: some consist of physical things, while others consist of moral things and depend upon human acts freely elicited by human beings, such as Matrimony, which must consist of and be perfected by the mutual consent of the contracting parties. Now those made from physical things have things determined by Christ the Lord, at least in a common species, and some in the lowest species; but those which arise from human acts and concern morals, it is probable that God willed the determination of their matter to depend also upon human institution.

You will say: Any matter can be sufficiently determined by words; therefore it was not necessary that it be designated by Christ. The antecedent is clear, because the effect of the Sacrament can be expressly declared and signified by words alone: for it makes no difference, for signifying that someone is truly cleansed from sins through Baptism, whether the baptizer uses water or any other liquid, provided that, immersing the liquid, he pronounces the words required for Baptism. — I deny the antecedent. For although, as we said above, the chief power of signifying resides in words, nevertheless it is fitting that matter have some analogy and likeness to the effect for signifying and effecting which the Sacrament is assumed. For, says Saint Augustine, Epistle 119, chapter 11, For nourishing and in some way inflaming that very fire of love, by which as by a weight we are borne upward or inward toward rest, all these things that are assumed figuratively belong here; they move and kindle love more than if they were set forth bare and without any sacramental likenesses. It is difficult to state the reason for this; but nevertheless it is so, and something suggested through allegorical signification moves more, delights more, and is honored more than if it were stated most openly in proper words.

You will say: The wisest agent ought to institute nothing without a reason; but no legitimate reason occurs why God should have determined things in the lowest species in some Sacraments rather than in others; therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: he cannot do anything without a reason known to him, I concede; without a reason that is always known to us, I deny: for, as Saint Augustine says in Epistle 3, addressed to Volusianus, God can do something which we admit we cannot investigate; in such matters the whole reason for the deed is the power of the one doing it. Or the minor can be denied: for, as we just said, God willed that the Sacraments which depend upon the moral and free acts of human beings have their matter designated by human beings themselves rather than by him.

Third Conclusion. — ESSENTIAL CHANGE OF DETERMINED THINGS RENDERS THE SACRAMENT INVALID, BUT ACCIDENTAL CHANGE DOES NOT; IT NEVERTHELESS SOMETIMES MAKES IT ILLICIT. This Conclusion has three parts, the first of which

Proof: A Sacrament cannot be valid unless the thing as determined by God is used, since all the power of the Sacraments, whether in signifying or in producing, depends upon God’s institution; but if the change is essential, the same thing ordained by God will not be used; therefore, just as a change in the matter of a human being makes him cease to be a human being, so if someone in baptizing were to use non-natural but rose-water, the Baptism would be invalid. This will certainly become clearer and be more effectively confirmed when treating the immutability of each Sacrament in particular.

The second part is also evident, namely that accidental change does not render the Sacrament invalid: the Sacrament is valid when it is perfected by the things instituted by God; but although the change is accidental, the things instituted by God nevertheless remain, just as, when a human being’s heat is changed by illness, the same human being is nevertheless considered to remain; therefore, etc.

The third part is finally plainly gathered from the practice of the Church: every minister of the Church is bound to conduct himself according to the common practice and usage received in the Church; but accidental change is sometimes contrary to the common practice and usage received in the Church: for example, since the priests of the Latin Church customarily consecrate with unleavened bread, one of them would consecrate illicitly with leavened bread. Hence, in the chapter Litteras on the consecration of Masses, the supreme Pontiff Honorius commands the Bishop of Oria to deprive forever of office and benefice the Priest who had presumed to celebrate with leavened bread. I said “sometimes”: for it can happen that accidental change is not illicit, namely when it is not done in contempt or to introduce a usage opposed to the Church’s common practice; hence someone would not baptize illicitly if, in the severe cold of winter, he used warm water, which is not customary.

You will say 1: The Church in fact changed the matter of the Sacrament of Matrimony at the Council of Trent, Session 24, chapter 1, On Reformation. For before the Council’s decree, the consent of man and woman sensibly expressed by words or gestures, whether it occurred publicly or secretly, was sufficient and proximate matter of the Sacrament; but the Council established that those who should attempt to contract Matrimony otherwise than in the presence of the parish priest, or with the permission of the Ordinary, and two or three witnesses, are rendered wholly incapable by the holy Synod of contracting in that way, and decreed such contracts to be invalid and null, just as by the present decree it makes them invalid and annuls them; therefore an essential change of the matter of the Sacrament can occur without the Sacrament being considered invalid. — I answer, distinguishing the major: that it changed the matter according to its substance, so that it substituted for the matter designated by Christ another wholly distinct in species, I deny; that it changed it according to some of its circumstances, I concede. And, with the minor similarly distinguished, I deny the consequence. For it is certain that, since Matrimony is a certain civil contract made through the consent of both spouses, when Christ consecrated this contract by elevating it to the dignity of a Sacrament, he determined no other matter of this contract than that mutual consent, without determining that it be expressed in this or that way; nor did he take away from the commonwealth the power it had over such a contract, but left it to its disposition so that, according to the diversity of times and circumstances, it could add certain conditions without which it would be null and consequently would not be the matter of the Sacrament. Hence, when it established the aforesaid decree, it did not change the matter of Matrimony as determined by Christ according to substance, because legitimate consent is always the matter of Matrimony; it changed it only materially and accidentally, namely by making it so that even expressed consent would no longer be legitimate for contracting, because the conditions of the time required this on account of the various inconveniences arising from clandestine marriages.

You will say 2: In the beginnings of the nascent Church, the Sacrament of Order, especially Priesthood, was conferred only through the imposition of hands as legitimate matter; this is also now in use among the Greeks, not only schismatics but also Catholics and those in communion with Rome; but the Latin Church confers the same Order through the handing over of bread on a paten and wine in a chalice, in which it holds the matter of this Sacrament to consist; therefore a change of the essential matter of the Sacrament can licitly be made. — I answer, that this difficulty should be discussed more fully in the Disputation on the Sacrament of Order; meanwhile I answer briefly, first, either that Christ the Lord did not determine the matter and form of the Sacrament of Order in the individual, but only willed that Order be conferred through some sensible sign declarative and significative of the power being handed over, and through words expressing this same thing, whatever that sign might finally be, leaving its determination to the authority of the Church. Thus teaches Ruardus Tapper, article 17 against Luther, and Peter Noto, in Institution of Priests, section four, On the Sacrament of Order. Or I say, secondly, with Estius in 4 dist. 24, that since in ordination physical contact with the matter is not necessary but moral contact suffices—that is, its presentation or showing while the power to consecrate is handed over—it follows that the same matter is handed to a Latin and a Greek Priest in receiving Order, with this distinction, however, that the Greek Priest to be initiated touches that matter only morally and mediately, namely while he touches the altar, whereas the Latin touches it physically and immediately. That Greek Presbyters touch the altar when they are initiated is proved from the Greek Euchologion, where it says: «The one who has been ordained, leaning upon the sacred altar, bends both knees; and when the Deacon says in a loud voice, “Let us attend,” immediately the Pontiff, laying on one hand together with the omophorion, declares in a clear voice: “The divine grace, which always heals the infirm and supplies what is lacking, advances N., the venerable Deacon, to Priesthood,”» etc.; by these words it signifies that when the hand of the Priest being initiated is laid upon him by the Pontiff, that Priest touches the altar.

Three things chiefly arise here to be established: First, whether determinate words are so necessarily required in the confection of the Sacraments that, without prejudice to the Sacrament, other words cannot be substituted for the Sacrament’s validity. Second, what alteration of the words would make the Sacrament null. Third, finally, what sort these words are, whether preaching, promissory, or consecratory.

NOTED 1. A twofold determination can be conceived in words: one can be material and according to the sound of the voice, as if, in the confection of the Sacraments, Hebrew or Latin words had to be assumed and French words could not be used, although they had the same sense. The other is formal, which is according to the signification of the words, whatever language they may be uttered in. Moreover, three significations can be considered in words: the first is drawn from the property of the words, namely, when they are used to signify the things for which they were instituted, as by the name “Superior” one who is above others is signified; the second is found from common usage, namely, when they are employed to signify something other than that for which they had been imposed by their primary institution, as by the name “tyrant” there is now signified an unjust ruler, although originally it was an honorable name; the third, finally, is that which is drawn from the accommodation of common usage, when words that signified nothing by their first institution are afterward employed by the custom of received usage, as if, in baptizing a King, someone used these words: I baptize Your Majesty, etc. For from the accommodation of usage, the royal person would be sufficiently understood by the name “Majesty.”

NOTED 2. An alteration of words in the Sacraments can be distinguished in a twofold way, as can an alteration of things: one is substantial, namely, when words signifying something wholly opposite to what Christ the Lord intended in instituting the Sacraments are used, as if, in baptizing someone, a person used other names than those which signify the three divine Persons; the other is accidental, namely, when the words are uttered otherwise than they ought to be uttered according to the custom of the Church. Moreover, each of these alterations can occur in various ways, but especially in the following eight. First, by changing the language of one tongue into another, for example, Greek into Latin, or Latin into Greek. Second, by changing one word for another, for instance, if “I wash” is said in place of the word “I baptize.” Third, by transposing one word or several, for example, if one says: “In the name of the Father I baptize you.” Fourth, by interpolating or interrupting the words, either by remaining silent for some time without uttering the other words of the form, whether one says something else in the meantime or not, as if, after these words “I baptize you,” someone remained silent for a while and then added the other words, “In the name of the Father,” etc. Fifth, by changing the words into writing, as if, in baptizing someone, a person did not utter the Gospel words but wrote them while pouring the water. Sixth, by adding one word or several, for example, if, in baptizing someone, a person added the name of the Blessed Virgin to the three divine Persons. Seventh, by omitting one word or several, as if, in baptizing someone, a person omitted I baptize you. Eighth, finally, by corrupting one word or several, as if, through a defect in Latin, a person said in baptizing someone, I baptize you in the name of the Father, the Daughter.

NOTED 3. Three kinds of words can be distinguished in the Sacraments: promissory, preaching, and consecratory. A promissory word is one that expresses and declares a promise of divine grace; a preaching word is one by which both the person receiving the Sacrament and those standing by are taught and instructed about the promise of divine grace; a consecratory word, finally, is one by which the matter of the Sacrament is blessed and consecrated by a sacred rite. Calvin asserts, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 14, §1, that the sacramental word is not consecratory: By “words,” he says, we must understand not that what is whispered with understanding and faith has, by mere sound, as though by a magical incantation, the power of consecrating the element; but that, when preached, it makes us understand what the visible sign means. Hence he adds in the same place: We conclude that the sacramental word is a promise which, preached by the minister in a clear voice, leads the people by the hand where the sign tends, as it directs us. By these words he means that the sacramental word is indeed promissory and preaching, but not consecratory.

Very many Lutherans agree with him, especially Chemnitz in his Examination of the second part of the decrees of the Council of Trent. Nevertheless, as he observes there, the Lutherans in this matter are divided into three opinions, especially concerning the confection of the Eucharist. Some merely give a sermon or instruction beforehand, but do not utter the consecratory words; others utter the words of institution, but not in order to consecrate, rather in the manner of a historical account, so that those standing by may be taught; finally, some utter the words of institution with the intention of consecrating, and Chemnitz himself commends this opinion as his own: The ancient Church, he says, although it also used other exhortations and prayers in administering the Eucharist, nevertheless simply and rightly held that the blessing or consecration of the Eucharist is effected through Christ’s discourse, that is, through the words of divine institution.

First Conclusion. — THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW ARE PERFECTED BY WORDS TAKEN PROPERLY OR IMPROPERLY, AND BY DETERMINATE WORDS. This Conclusion consists chiefly of two parts, of which

The first is proved, first from Sacred Scripture, which expressly signifies that words are required in three Sacraments, namely, Baptism, the Eucharist, and Extreme Unction. In Baptism indeed, for in Matthew 28, Christ, sending the Apostles throughout the world, says: Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, etc. Hence the Apostle says in Ephesians 5: Christ, he says, loved the Church and handed himself over for her, that he might sanctify her, cleansing her by the washing of water in the word of life. This means, in the sacramental word, as Saint Augustine interprets it. The same is evident concerning the Eucharist, for in Matthew 26, Mark 14, Luke 22, and 1 Corinthians 11, we read that Jesus took bread, blessed it, and broke it, saying: This is my body. The bread is the thing, or matter; what he said are the words, or form. Likewise, concerning Extreme Unction it is written in James 5: Is anyone among you sick? Let him bring in the priests of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith will save the sick person.

The anointing is the thing, while the prayer is the words. Consequently, the Sacraments of the New Law must consist of things and words. The same is clear from the decree of Eugene at the Council of Florence, where it is decreed that all the Sacraments consist of three things: things as matter, words as form, and the person of the minister.

This truth is also clear from the authority of the holy Fathers, who with unanimous agreement require things and words in the confection of the Sacraments. Thus Saint Ambrose, book On the Mysteries, chapter 9, where he treats of the Eucharist: If, he says, human blessing had such power that it changed nature, what shall we say of the divine consecration itself, where the very words of the Lord the Savior operate? For this Sacrament which you receive is confected by Christ’s word; and if Elijah’s word had such power as to bring down fire from heaven, will Christ’s word not have power to change the species of the elements? Likewise, in chapter 1 of the First Epistle to Timothy, he says: The laying on of hands are mystical words, by which the Priest receives authority, so that he may dare to offer the sacrifice of the Lord’s life to God. Tertullian had preceded him, chapter 2, On Baptism: A man, he says, is lowered into the water and dipped amid a few words, etc. There are many other testimonies of the Fathers that would be cited in the course of this work, by which it is declared that the Sacraments of the New Law are perfected by things and words.

This assertion is also commonly proved by a theological argument, because the Sacraments are employed for the sanctification of human beings insofar as they are signs. It was fitting, therefore, that words should be used together with sensible things ordered to constitute a Sacrament; for sacramental signs can be considered in three ways: first, on the part of the sanctifying cause; second, on the part of the human being who is sanctified; third, finally, on the part of the sacramental signification itself. But from this threefold consideration it was most fitting that words be joined to things in the Sacraments. First, on the part of the sanctifying cause, namely, the Incarnate Word, because the Sacrament ought in some way to be conformed to him. Hence, just as Christ consists of the spiritual Word and visible flesh, so it was fitting that the Sacraments be made through sensible things and words that are in a certain way spiritual, insofar as they proceed from reason and signify the concepts of mind and reason. — Likewise, the same was fitting on the part of the human being who is sanctified: the Sacraments are medicine and effect medicinal grace, and consequently it was fitting that they be proportioned to the sick person. But a human being consists of body and soul; therefore, for the Sacrament to be proportioned to a human being, it was fitting that it be made from things that touch the body and words that the soul believes and perceives. Hence Saint Augustine, explaining those words in chapter 15 of John, Now you are clean because of the word, etc., says: « Whence is there such power in water that it touches the body and washes the heart, unless through the word, not because it is said, but because it is believed? » — Third, finally, on the part of sacramental signification itself: according to Saint Augustine, book 2 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 3, words have obtained primacy in signifying among human beings. Therefore, since the Sacraments of the New Law ought perfectly or distinctly to signify sanctifying grace, for this reason they ought to consist of words, especially since matter in itself is indifferent to signifying many things. For baptismal water, for example, can signify both the washing of the soul because of its moisture and the cooling of the soul because of its coldness. Hence, for it to be determined to signify the cleansing of the soul from sins, it had to be determined to this by these words: I baptize you.

You will object. According to Saint Augustine, book 10 of Against Faustus, chapter 16: Some sacraments even of bodies are nothing but certain visible words; but it is superfluous to add words to words; therefore, the Sacraments ought not to consist of words. — I distinguish the major: they are words improperly and analogically, I concede; properly and univocally, I deny. For the visible things of the Sacraments are indeed called words analogically, because of a certain similarity which is found principally in words; hence words are not superimposed on the things themselves so that their signification may be more determinate.

You will insist. According to the same author in the same place, the Sacraments of the New Law succeeded the Sacraments of the Old Law; once the latter were removed, others were instituted. But words were not necessary in the Sacraments of the Old Law; therefore neither are they necessary in the Sacraments of the New Law. — I distinguish the major: they succeeded with respect to some things, I concede; with respect to all things, I deny. For according to Saint Augustine in the same place, some Sacraments ought to be of a present reality and others of a future reality, since we manifest a present reality more clearly than a future one. But the Sacraments of the Old Law foretold Christ who was to come; therefore they did not signify Christ as distinctly as the new ones, which were instituted by Christ himself. Hence, even though there had been no words in the ancient Sacraments, it does not follow that words ought not also to be found in the new ones. For, as Saint Paul says in Hebrews 1: In many ways and by many means God formerly spoke to the fathers through the Prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us in the Son. Prophetic speech is more obscure than the revelation which occurs through the Son, who is called the light of the world and the true light that enlightens every human being. Hence the Sacraments of the Old Law muttered, as it were, under a shadow what our Sacraments distinctly manifest.

From these things the second part is gathered, namely, that the Sacraments must consist of determinate words: both because Christ the Lord uttered determinate words in the consecration of the Eucharist, saying, This is my body, and commanded the disciples to baptize under a determinate form of words; hence Saint Augustine, book 6 of On Baptism against the Donatists, chapter 29, says: Those certain Gospel words, without which Baptism cannot be consecrated, have such power that through them those things called precious which are spoken against this rule of cursing are so tormented that demons are expelled by the name of Christ. And because the Church has always held Baptism invalid if it was not administered with the words designated by Christ, it rejected the Baptism of the Cataphrygians at the Council of Laodicea, canon 8; that of the Paulianists at Nicaea, canon 19, and at the First Council of Arles, canon 8. Arians returning to the Church are ordered to be asked by what form they were baptized, so that it may be known whether they received Baptism in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

You will say 1. The Sacraments are the same among all nations; but the same voices and the same words are not determinate among all nations for signifying the same thing; therefore determinate words are not required in the Sacraments. — I distinguish the minor: they are not determinate by moral determination, with respect to the external sound of syllables and letters, from which different languages and different speech arise, I concede; they are not determinate by formal determination, that is, with respect to the signification and sense which Christ ordained and which the Church has in practice, I deny. Hence, whatever language the form of the Sacrament is uttered in, the Sacrament is truly perfected. For, as we said above from Saint Augustine, the word operates in the Sacraments, not because it is said, but because it is believed; that is, not according to the external sound of the voice uttered by the lips, but according to the sense held by faith.

You will say 2. Determinate words would seem to be required in the Sacraments for this reason: they ought properly to signify the effect of the Sacrament. But this is not so. Determinate words seem to be required in Baptism so that they signify the soul’s being washed from sins; but the word “I baptize” does not properly signify “I wash”; for someone who said baptize a napkin would speak barbarously and improperly. Therefore, etc. — I deny the minor, and in proof of it I say that, indeed, the word baptizein does not signify in Latin the same as I wash. It is a Greek word which the Latin Church adopted to signify sacramental washing. Hence nearly all nations, although the term is expressed in different languages, use this word so that the unity of faith may be signified, which is especially declared and preserved through the unity of Baptism, according to the Apostle’s saying in Ephesians 4: One Lord, one faith, one baptism. The Church used the Greek term for declaring this rather than a Latin or other term because the Greek language was very widely prevalent when the Gospel began to be proclaimed.

You will say 3. The Sacraments must not be confected and administered otherwise than Christ both instituted and commanded them to be administered. But, in instituting the Sacraments, Christ did not command that words be added; for when he instituted the Eucharist he did not say, Say what I said, but, Do this in remembrance of me. Likewise, when he sent the Apostles to baptize, he did not command them, when baptizing, to say: I baptize you in the name of the Father, etc. Therefore, determinate words are not required in the Sacraments. — I distinguish the major: he commanded them to be administered implicitly or explicitly, I concede; explicitly only, I deny. To the minor I say that when Christ said, Do this, etc., he referred this to the whole action that he was performing, including the words. The same must be said of Baptism: for at least implicitly he signified that, in conferring Baptism, an invocation of the most holy Trinity was to be added when he said: Baptizing them in the name of the Father, etc. — I nevertheless admit that this divine command of Christ concerning the use of formulas of words in administering the Sacraments cannot be effectively elicited from Christ the Lord’s own utterances unless the tradition and practice of the Church are brought in. For the Lord did not say: when you baptize, say, “I baptize you.” Hence it could seem sufficient for Baptism to someone if, while pouring the water, he merely said: “In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit”; indeed, it could even seem to him that there was no need to utter any words, but only to apply the water. For just as, when it is said in the last chapter of Mark, In my name they will cast out demons, Christ does not command the disciples, when casting out demons, to say, “I cast you out in the name of Christ,” but only to look to Christ in faith and attend to his efficacy, so someone could think that it is enough for Baptism that, while pouring the water, one apprehend by faith Christ’s efficacy and power in remitting sins. Hence I rightly said that sacramental words were designated by Christ only implicitly; explicitly, however, they are to be drawn from the tradition and practice of the Church, which has used such words in confecting the Sacraments by a perpetual and unvarying rite.

You will say fourth. If the words were determinate in confecting the Sacraments, it would follow that their variation and alteration would make the Sacrament null and void. But this is not so; otherwise the Sacraments would scarcely be validly confected by those who suffer from a speech impediment or ignorance of Latin, such as stammerers and some less-educated priests. Therefore, determinate words are not required in the Sacraments. — I distinguish the major: if that alteration and variation of speech overturns the sense, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But when this variation wholly overturns the sense, and when it does not, will be explained

Second Conclusion. — A SACRAMENT DOES NOT BECOME NULL AND INVALID THROUGH EVERY ALTERATION OF THE WORDS, BUT ONLY THROUGH ONE THAT VARIES THE SENSE AND MAKES IT SOMETHING ELSE. The truth of this Conclusion will be clear when we examine individually those modes assigned in the second Note by which an alteration of words in the Sacraments can occur.

First, then, a change of language does not bring about a substantial change in the sense of the Sacrament, because the Sacrament is rendered invalid when the sense of the words is changed. But when the language is changed, the sense of the words is not changed, only the sound; otherwise it would follow that all ministers of the Sacraments would have to use Hebrew or Syriac, since Christ the Lord used one or the other of these languages in instituting the Sacraments.

Second, a change of one word or several that produces an entirely different sense makes the Sacrament invalid; but not so if synonymous words are used. For a Sacrament is judged invalid or valid insofar as its form is changed or preserved intact. But when words are changed into others producing a different signification, the form of the Sacrament, namely, the signification of the words, does not remain intact; the contrary occurs when that signification persists. Hence Saint Irenaeus, book 1, chapter 18, reports that the Baptism of the Gnostics was rejected for this reason: they baptized in the name of the Father of all, in the name of the Mother of all, and in the name of Jesus descending for the anointing, redemption, or communion of powers. On the other hand, the Church approves the Baptism of the Greeks, in the decree of Eugene, with these words of the baptizers: Let N. be baptized by my hands in the name of the Father, etc. Therefore Baptism would be invalid if, while pouring water over the person to be baptized, someone used this form: I cool you in the name of the Father, etc. But it would be valid if, in baptizing, someone said: I wash you, or I cleanse you in the name of the Father, etc.

Third, when a transposition does not vary the sense of the words, it does not make the Sacrament null; but when it varies it, it makes it invalid. This truth is clear from what has just been said. Hence Baptism conferred with this form would be valid: I baptize you in the name of the Son, and of the Father, and of the Holy Spirit, because there is a sufficient designation of the person baptized and an invocation of the Most Holy Trinity. But it would be invalid if someone uttered the words in this inverted order: In the name of the Father I baptize you of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, because this transposition of the words would produce either no sense or one wholly alien to the sacramental sense.

Fourth, the interpolation or interruption of words, when it is so great that in ordinary judgment the utterance is not considered one sentence, then makes the Sacrament null. Thus, if a priest celebrating Mass privately, after he had already uttered these words of consecration, This is, remembered that he had not recited that part of the breviary which he ought to have recited before celebrating the sacred rite, and, having uttered only those two words of consecration, completed it and afterward pronounced the rest of the words of consecration, namely, my body, etc., the Sacrament would certainly be null, because the signification of its sacramental form would not be the same. The contrary would occur if the interruption varied neither the intention of the speaker nor the sense of the words, as when, after the priest has said, This is, he sneezes, coughs, or suffers a brief wandering and distraction of mind, and then adds my body. The Sacrament does not cease to be valid, because the utterance and its sense are always judged to be the same and one.

Fifth, changing the words into other signs that would represent the same thing would not make the Sacrament of Matrimony or of Penance invalid; but the contrary holds concerning the other Sacraments. The first part is clear. For in the Sacrament of Matrimony it is especially required that the consent of the spouses be expressed; but this can be declared by gestures, writing, or words. Consequently, changing the words into other signs declaring consent does not injure the Sacrament of Matrimony. The same must be said of the Sacrament of Penance, especially as regards the matter about which sacramental absolution is concerned, namely, the act of the penitent. For a speechless and mute penitent can, by gestures or writing, so openly declare and express to the priest present his sins and the sorrow conceived for them that the priest may easily judge whether or not he is worthy of absolution.

That a similar change is not admissible in the other Sacraments is sufficiently clear from the practice of the universal Church, which has always used it in the confection of those Sacraments.

Sixth, the addition of words in the form of a Sacrament can occur in two ways. First, intrinsically, when a word is mixed into the form of the Sacraments which seems to be like a predicate or property of the words ordinarily used in the form of the Sacrament, as if someone, in baptizing, said: I baptize you in the name of the almighty Father, and of the Son of wisdom, and of the Holy Spirit of divine love, and of the Paraclete. Second, extrinsically, when this addition is outside the form of the Sacrament and is joined to it after it has been completely uttered. Each addition can again be twofold, namely, true, when it states something true, as in the consecration of bread, when, after the consecratory words have been uttered, one adds, Which will be delivered for you; or false, when it states something false. The latter is again twofold: for some false addition corrupts the form of the Sacrament and changes its sense, such as the addition of certain Arians who baptized: I baptize you in the name of the greater Father, of the lesser Son, formed from things that do not exist, etc.; another does not corrupt the form of the Sacrament or overturn its legitimate sense, as when a Greek, consecrating the Eucharist, says: This is my body consecrated in leavened bread. Although this is false, because Christ consecrated not in leavened but in unleavened bread, it nevertheless does not destroy the sense.

I say, however, that when the false addition corrupts the form of the Sacrament, then it makes the Sacrament null, because it is not a legitimate form which signifies something other than that for which Christ instituted it. But when the sense is changed and falsified, the form no longer signifies that for which Christ the Lord instituted it. Therefore a corrupting addition to the form makes the Sacrament invalid. Hence the Marcionists’ consecration of the Eucharist was null when they said: This is my phantom body, because a phantom body is not Christ’s body, to which the consecration must be terminated.

It must be observed, however, that a false addition of words can sometimes be inferred only from the intention of the minister, especially when the addition is external. For example, if someone used this form: I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, and of the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, such Baptism could be valid or invalid according to the minister’s differing intention. It would be invalid if the minister intended to baptize in the name—that is, by the authority—of the Blessed Virgin, just as he baptizes in the name and authority of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This would certainly be erroneous, for we cannot baptize in the name of a mere creature. Hence Saint Paul says in 1 Corinthians 1: Was Paul crucified for you, or were you baptized in the name of Paul? Saint Augustine therefore aptly observes, book 5 of On Baptism, chapter 11: We find the Apostle saying: “And my glory, and my ministry, and my prudence, and my Gospel”; but no apostle would say, “my baptism.” Nevertheless, the same Baptism could be valid if, by the added words just mentioned, the minister intended that the intercession of the Blessed Virgin benefit the baptized person in preserving baptismal grace. For, given that intention, the form of Baptism has its whole essential signification complete before those words just mentioned are added.

You say: The minister’s error or wickedness does not harm the recipient of the Sacrament when the Gospel words are pronounced, because, as Saint Augustine says in book 2 of Against the Letter of Petilianus, the believer is born not from the barrenness of the minister, but from the fecundity of the truth. — I respond that a purely internal evil intention of the minister does not impair the Sacrament; it is otherwise, however, if it were declared externally, as occurs in the hypothesis just mentioned, because in that case words are added which destroy the form instituted by Christ the Lord.

Seventh, the omission of an essential word in the form of the Sacrament makes the Sacrament null, because the sacramental form is overturned. Hence, if someone, says Didymus, book 2 of On the Holy Spirit, which is among the works of Saint Jerome, should attempt to baptize in such a way as to omit one of the aforesaid names of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, he would baptize without completing the rite. The contrary occurs if the omitted word does not overturn the signification of the form, as when, in the form of the Eucharist, For this is my body, the particle “for” is omitted. The consecration will nevertheless take place, because the word “for” does not remove the essence of the Sacrament: it is not of the substance of the form and does not change its sense.

Eighth, finally, a corruption of the words that does not remove the sense of the utterance and does not intend to introduce error does not detract from the integrity of the Sacrament. For although the sensible sound is changed, the same sense and the same signification remain. Thus Pope Zacharias, as is read in chapter Retulerunt, distinction 1, On Consecration, writes: « Your messengers reported that in the same province there was a Priest who was completely ignorant of the Latin language and, when he baptized, ignorant of Latin speech, dipping his tongue, said: “I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Daughter, and of the Holy Spirit”; on account of this your reverend fraternity considered that he ought to rebaptize. But, most holy brother, if the one who baptized, introducing neither error nor heresy, but merely through ignorance of Roman speech, while dipping his tongue, had said, as we have acknowledged above, “baptize,” we cannot consent that he be rebaptized. » For Zacharias judged that this ignorant Priest had changed nothing in the form of Baptism, because with corrupted words he signified the same thing that others ordinarily signify with intact ones.

For although those words, uttered separately and in themselves, do not signify the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, nevertheless, when joined with the action of Baptism and with these words “in the name,” they signify the same thing by the accommodation of usage; otherwise they would signify nothing. Since it is credible that he wished to signify something—namely, what the Church intends—that Baptism was rightly judged valid.

All these matters, which we have explained at somewhat greater length, the Doctor summarizes more briefly in distinction 3, question 2, number 7, where, speaking of the alteration of the form of the Sacraments, he says: « For understanding this, it must be observed that, according to the Philosopher, Physics V, there are four kinds of change: according to substance, quality, quantity, and where. Accordingly, in these words there can be a fourfold variation: according to substance, by putting other words in place of these, or another word in place of this one; according to quantity, by adding or subtracting, and thus by adding before, after, or in between; according to quality, namely, by removing some termination required for proper speech; according to where, by transposing. Concerning any of these variations I say that, if the baptizer intends to use the words he uses as the form of the Church, he does not baptize precisely because he lacks the intention of using words that are in some way varied as the precise form of Baptism. »

Third Conclusion. — THE SACRAMENTAL WORD IS NOT PROMISSORY OR PREACHING, BUT CONSECRATORY. This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which

The first is proved, first from the Council of Trent, Session 7, Canon 6, where anathema is pronounced against those who assert that the Sacraments of the New Law do not contain the grace they signify, or that they do not confer grace upon those who place no obstacle to it, as though they were merely external signs of grace or justice received through faith, etc. It is also clear from what we said in question 1, page 24, namely, that the constitutive difference of a Sacrament of the New Law is not the sealing of God’s promise. For, as was said, the essential word of a Sacrament of the New Law, its constitutive and distinguishing element from the other Sacraments, must be found in each of the Sacraments of the New Law. But there are Sacraments of the New Law which do not of themselves exhibit a promise of grace, as is clear not only in Matrimony and Orders, but also in Baptism and the Eucharist, which even the heretics themselves do not deny to be true Sacraments of the New Law. For in Baptism the word “I baptize,” which is essential to its form, is not the same as “I signify” or “I indicate.” Likewise, in the Eucharist, the words of the consecration of the species of bread, namely, This is my body, and of the consecration of the wine, namely, This is the chalice of my blood, do not signify a promise, but indicate the thing that is effected, namely, the very actual consecration, as the Apostle signifies in 1 Corinthians 10, saying: The chalice of blessing which we bless, etc.

You will say 1. The sacramental words of the Eucharist are not only those we have mentioned, but also those which precede and follow them. Indeed, Christ the Lord says: Take and eat; this is my body, which will be delivered for you. But the promised delivery of Christ’s body accidentally exhibits grace, or the remission of sins, which Christ merited for us by his Passion. — I answer first that the sacramental word by which the Eucharist is confected is none other than the aforesaid This is my body. For the other words are not absolutely required for the constitution of the Sacrament, as will be proved in the Disputation on the Eucharist. Second, I say that, even if those words, both preceding and following, pertained to the essence of the form, nevertheless they would not exhibit the promise of grace to be applied to us in the very use of the Sacrament, but would merely designate it as prepared in its cause, namely, in Christ’s Passion.

You will say 2. The Sacraments are called marks and seals by the holy Fathers; but they are called this only because they are merely seals of the promises of God’s grace. Therefore they are promissory. — I deny the minor, for they are called marks for other reasons. First, because through such signs Christians are judged to belong to God in a special way and to be under his protection, just as certain marks are impressed by a shepherd on sheep, by a master on servants, and by a commander on soldiers, so that they may be distinguished. This is especially true of the Sacraments, which imprint a character. Second, they can be called marks because they close and conceal sacred things. Thus Baptism is called by Tertullian, book On Penance, the seal and sign of faith. Third, they are called marks because through receiving them we give public testimony of our profession of faith; for this reason Baptism is often called by the holy Fathers the mark of the righteousness of faith.

The second part is proved, namely, that the sacramental word is not preaching, because, as the heretics maintain, this preaching word is not necessary either for the essence or for the fruit of the Sacrament. First, because Scripture makes no mention of such a sermon in the institution either of the Eucharist or of Baptism, the two Sacraments admitted by the adversaries. It is true that at the Last Supper Christ gave a splendid sermon to the disciples, which can be read in John 15 and 16. But he gave it only after the institution and administration of the Eucharist; before it he gave no sermon to the disciples. It is true that he washed their feet and said to them: You are clean, but not all. But these words were not preaching words, because according to Calvin, cited in the third Note, chapter 14, section 1, that word is preaching by which the sacramental signification is explained to the recipient, or which, when preached, makes the recipient understand what the visible sign indicates. But Christ did not then precede the rite with any such word. — The same is clear concerning the institution of Baptism. Although Christ the Lord said to the Apostles in the last chapter of Matthew: Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, etc., nevertheless by those words he intended to signify nothing other than that adults ought not to be baptized before they had been instructed in the faith. This is entirely certain, for, as Saint Basil teaches, book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 12, faith and Baptism are two related and inseparable ways of attaining salvation: just as faith is perfected through Baptism, so Baptism rests upon the foundation of faith. But it does not follow from this that the preaching word which must precede their instruction is the same as the sacramental word by which Baptism is perfected. It is confirmed because, if the preaching word were necessary, it would be necessary chiefly with respect to the minister, those standing by, or the recipient. But this is not so with respect to the minister, for no one needs to be taught by himself; nor with respect to those standing by, for Baptism is validly conferred even when no one except the minister and recipient is present; nor finally with respect to the recipient, for infants, the delirious, and the insane are validly baptized, although they are incapable of instruction and of a preaching word. Add that those heretics do not reject Baptism conferred in the Roman Church, nor rebaptize those who leave the bosom of the Church for their rebellious camps, even if preaching did not precede. Therefore, etc.

They will object 1. That passage of Matthew: Teach all nations, baptizing them. Hence the Apostles in Acts always first teach and instruct before they baptize. Therefore Saint Jerome, explaining that passage of Ephesians 6, Cleansing her by the washing of water in the word of life, understands “word of life” as doctrine. Therefore the preaching word is necessary for the Sacrament. — I distinguish the consequent: it is required as a necessary disposition for adults to receive Baptism fruitfully, I concede. For the justification of adults requires faith; faith requires hearing the word of God; that hearing requires preaching. For how will they believe without a preacher? as the Apostle says. As an essential part of Baptism, I deny, because whether instruction precedes or is joined to Baptism, it takes nothing away from Baptism’s validity or efficacy. Hence Christ did not command the Apostles, while baptizing, to teach all nations the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which he should have done if the word of instruction were to teach the peoples while they were baptized in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For these words, “In the name of the Father,” etc., refer to the act of baptizing, not of teaching; they signify an invocation of the Trinity over the washing with water, not an explanation of the mystery to those standing by. In other passages of Scripture, the particle “in the name” signifies nothing other than invocation. Thus, in the last chapter of Mark: In my name they will cast out demons. In Acts 3: In the name of Jesus Christ, rise and walk. — Concerning Saint Jerome I say that he explained the aforesaid passage in a mystical sense and not a literal one, as he himself indicates at the beginning of his explanation of the context. For he begins thus: Because through tropology we had said that men, souls, and wives signified bodies, etc. Nor did Saint Jerome certainly understand anything else, for, explaining the aforesaid words, Go, teach, baptizing, he says: « He commanded the Apostles first to teach all nations, then to dip them in the Sacrament, and after faith and Baptism to prescribe what was to be observed. He adds: for it cannot happen that the body receives the Sacrament of Baptism unless the soul has first received the truth of faith. » By this he signifies that adults must first be instructed in the articles of faith before they approach Baptism. He therefore distinguishes the Sacrament of Baptism from that prior instruction and doctrine.

They will object 2. Saint Ambrose, book On the Mysteries, chapter 1, where he calls the word by which Baptism is perfected the preaching of the Lord’s cross, says: Mara was a very bitter spring; Moses sent wood into it, and it became sweet. For water without the preaching of the divine cross is useful for no purpose of future salvation. Therefore, just as Moses sent wood into that spring, so the priest sends the preaching of the Lord’s cross into this font, and the water becomes sweet for grace. But in Saint Ambrose’s mind the preaching of the cross is a preaching word. Therefore, according to Saint Ambrose’s mind, water cannot benefit the person baptized unless it is enlightened by doctrine and preaching. — I deny the minor: for the preaching of the cross can occur in two ways, either through words or through deeds. For not only does the person preach the cross who reports and explains Christ’s Passion and torments, but also the one who lives according to the rule of the Gospel and crucifies his flesh with its vices and desires. Hence in the administration of Baptism it can be said that the Lord’s cross is preached through the very rite of Baptism; for the Apostle says in Romans 6: All of us who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death. Saint Ambrose uses the preaching of the cross in this latter way, because there he says that the Priest sends this word—which he calls the preaching of the cross—into the very font. But a word of instruction is not sent into an insensible thing, such as water, but into a rational creature. Therefore by the preaching of the cross he understands the rite by which Baptism is confected and administered, representing Christ’s death and consecrating the waters through the sacramental word. Hence he says that the word is sent to the font in the way Saint Augustine said that the word comes to the element and becomes a Sacrament. — This explanation is certainly confirmed by Saint Ambrose himself, for at the beginning of the chapter, addressing the one who has entered the baptistery, he says:

What did you see? Certainly waters, but not waters alone. Levites ministering there, a Priest questioning and consecrating; and he consecrates with no other instrument than the word of the form of Baptism. Then he writes: Mara was a very bitter spring, and Moses sent wood into it, and it became sweet by contact. Thus water without the preaching of the Lord’s cross is useful for no purpose of salvation; but when it has been consecrated by the mystery of the cross, then it is tempered for the use of spiritual washing and the saving cup, and becomes sweet for grace. That preaching is the invocation of the Most Holy Trinity; for when it is applied to Baptism, it commends the efficacy of the cross and, by applying its effect, makes it present as it were.

— That Saint Ambrose truly judged Baptism to be perfected by consecratory words is also declared, besides what has just been said, by this passage in book 2 of On the Sacraments, chapter 5. In place of what he says here, namely, that the Priest sends the preaching of the cross into the font of water, he says: The Priest speaks a prayer at the font; he invokes the name of the Father, the presence of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit; he uses heavenly words. What are the heavenly words? That we baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

He objects 3. That passage of Saint Augustine, Tractate 80 on John, where he says: What is the great power of water, that it touches the body and washes the heart, unless through the word doing this, not because it is said, but because it is believed? For in the word itself one thing is the passing sound, another the abiding power. This is the word of faith which we preach, by which hearts are cleansed and Baptism is consecrated. But the word that is believed is a preaching word, or a word of preaching and doctrine; for it cannot be believed unless it has first been heard and preached. Hence he calls it there the word of faith. And after he declared that infants are cleansed by the sacramental word, in order to declare this word to be preaching, he concludes: All this takes place through the word of which the Lord says: Now you are clean because of the word which I have spoken to you. Therefore, etc. — I deny the minor: for this is not Saint Augustine’s meaning. He intends only to prove from the aforesaid words of Christ, Now you are clean because of the word which I have spoken to you, that all cleansing of a human being is derived from the word of God, which is called the word of faith because it is the object of faith, and not merely from water. For he asks there why Christ the Lord did not say: You are clean because of the Baptism with which you have been washed, but said: Because of the word which I have spoken to you. He answers: because the word also cleanses in water: Whence is there such power in water that it touches the body and washes the heart, unless through the sanctifying word, not because it is said, but because it is believed? As if he were saying: no one ought to wonder why Christ said, You are clean because of the word which I have spoken to you, and not because of Baptism, because Baptism itself is consecrated through the word which he spoke. It is consecrated through the Lord’s words, which ought to be considered not as common words but as words which the Lord spoke, in which there is a certain abiding and operative power; and this power is received only under faith. Hence he immediately adds: For in the word itself one thing is the passing sound, another the abiding power. The testimonies that follow, drawn from Scripture, are added to prove generally that the power of cleansing arises from the word of faith, which, as I said, he had undertaken to prove at the outset. Hence he rightly concludes that the word by which infants are cleansed is also the word of which the Lord says: Now you are clean because of the word, etc. Since, then, Saint Augustine holds that infants are justified through the word about which he is speaking, it is certain that he does not understand a preaching word, since infants cannot believe unto justification or confess with their mouth unto salvation.

The third part is finally proved, namely, that the sacramental word is consecratory. I prove it, I say, because the words by which the Sacraments are confected are called sanctification, blessing, consecration, and invocation of the name of God. Thus Saint Paul in 1 Corinthians 10 calls the words by which the Eucharist is confected a blessing: The chalice of blessing, he says, which we bless, is it not a participation in the blood of Christ? — The holy Fathers give them similar names. For Saint Dionysius, book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 3, says: Moreover, when the Bishop has unveiled the most holy gifts of God, he consecrates the most divine mysteries. And in the last chapter he calls the sacramental words consecratory invocations. Likewise Saint Justin, Apology 2: Over the one who has determined that he must be reborn through Baptism, he says, the name of God of all things is named by the one praying, and we invoke him as we lead this person to the washing. Likewise Saint Ambrose, in the aforesaid book 2 of On the Sacraments, chapter 5, and in book 4, chapter 4, of On the Sacraments, speaking of the confection of the Eucharist, says: This bread is bread before the words of the Sacraments; when the consecration has come, from bread it becomes Christ’s flesh. How can bread be Christ’s body? By consecration. By what words is consecration made, and whose speeches? Those of the Lord Jesus. Likewise Saint Augustine, book 6 of Against the Donatists, chapter 27: God, he says, is present to his Gospel words, without which Christ’s Baptism cannot be consecrated, and he himself sanctifies his Sacrament. The other Fathers have the same teaching, but it would be tedious to list them here.

Calvin objects: The consecratory words seem superstitious and like a magical incantation, since they are muttered by the minister over a mute and lifeless element, without any understanding or faith on the part of those standing by, and since they are supposed to be uttered in an unknown language, namely Latin, before the unlearned. Therefore, etc. — I deny the antecedent: for words uttered over a mute and lifeless element, especially when this occurs by divine ordinance, in no way savor of or resemble magic. For in Numbers 5, in the sacrifice of jealousy, the Priest heaped many words of cursing upon the water appointed for this purpose, and when the adulterous women drank it, it killed them, while it did no harm to the innocent. Moreover, magicians use not only words but also things in their tricks; yet the heretics recognize nothing magical in the matter of the Sacraments. Therefore neither ought they to recognize anything magical in the words. Finally, magical incantation consists in this: that certain things, figures, and voices, otherwise ineffective in themselves, have power to effect something by an implicit or explicit pact with the demon. But the consecratory words of the Sacraments do not have the power to effect anything from a pact with the demon, but from Christ’s institution. Hence in the administration of the Sacraments there are some words that ought to be understood by everyone, such as those uttered to arouse the faith and piety of the recipients and those standing by; these ought usually to be in the vernacular, unless the recipients and those standing by understand Latin. There are others for effecting something, as when Joshua spoke to the Sun, which had no hearing, and Christ commanded the winds. Whatever their language, such words are suitable; and such are the consecratory words of the Sacraments.

NOTANDUM 1. In Christian morality, as far as the present matter is concerned, a twofold necessity is customarily distinguished: the first is called necessity of means, the second necessity of precept. Necessity of means is that by which something is considered so necessary for obtaining some end that it cannot be obtained without its help; necessity of precept, however, is that by which something, from its intrinsic nature, is neither ordered nor conducive to attaining an end, but is required only by the ordinance and precept of a superior. Moreover, necessity of means is divided into intrinsic and extrinsic: intrinsic arises from the intimate connection of the means with the end, and is customarily called necessity simply speaking, by which it comes about that the end cannot be obtained when such means are excluded; extrinsic, however, arises not from the nature of the thing but from divine institution and ordinance, and is called necessity for a better state, or rather is a fittingness than a true necessity. — It is certain, however, that the Sacraments are not necessary by intrinsic and simple necessity; for it is clear that, absolutely speaking, God could have effected human salvation without such sensible signs. Furthermore, there is no intrinsic and essential reason why the Sacraments should have the power to produce grace and confer all those effects which God infallibly produces upon the application of those signs to properly disposed subjects. Here, therefore, we inquire only whether, once God’s ordinance is presupposed, the Sacraments were necessary in every state of human beings.

NOTANDUM 2. Three states of human nature can generally be distinguished: the first is that of the most perfect nature, such as the state of beatitude; the second, that of innocent nature, such as existed before Adam’s fall; the third is that same nature corrupted by Adam’s sin. This latter is again divided into three other states: one is the state of man under the law of nature, that is, before the written law, namely from Adam to Moses. Another is under the written law, from the time when the law was prescribed by God to the Jewish people through the ministry of Moses, until the preaching of the Gospel by Christ the Lord. The third is under the law of grace, which will endure from Christ the Lord to the end of the world. Saint Augustine, Epistle 19, calls these three states before the law, under the law, and under grace. It is certain, however, that the Sacraments are in no way necessary in the state of the most perfect nature: for where truth is open, every shadow of signs is removed. Hence Saint Augustine says admirably, book On Catechizing, chapter 1: The lamb is eaten after the death of this age, so that when that morning comes which will have no hope, the sacrifice of the image of the Lamb may no longer be removed, but we may attend to the very Lamb whom we immolate and eat daily, and whose blood we drink, that perfect Priest who is known to have been slain there for our salvation. Hence the Doctor says in 1. dist. 1, question 3, number 7: It appears that in the state of the homeland no sacrament is fitting, because then one does not need sensible things in order to know intelligible things pertaining to one’s state; nor does one then need to be stirred up to seek what pertains to salvation, because one has perfectly attained salvation. Therefore the difficulty remains concerning the four other states of human nature, namely innocence, the law of nature, the written law, and grace.

NOTANDUM 3. The Sacraments can be considered instituted and ordered for a threefold end, according to their threefold consideration. Indeed, they can be regarded either insofar as they are sacred ceremonies and solemn rites by which people united in the same religion render obedience and worship to their God as the supreme Father and Governor of all things—for, as Saint Augustine very beautifully observes, book 19 Against Faustus, chapter 16: People cannot be united under any name of religion, true or false, unless they are joined by some fellowship of visible tokens or sacraments. Secondly, they are considered insofar as they are medicine, or remedies for repairing, preserving, or increasing human salvation. Thirdly, insofar as they are means conducive to increasing human perfection through the increase of illuminating and sanctifying grace.

Conclusion one. — THE SACRAMENTS DID NOT EXIST IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE, EITHER AS REMEDIES OR AS PERFECTIONS OF THE SOUL, BUT AS SACRED RITES; INDEED, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE EXISTED EVEN IF THAT STATE HAD LONG ENDURED.

The conclusion consists of four parts, the first of which is common among theologians, and the Doctor approves it in the place cited above, where he says: In the state of innocence it was not fitting for a Sacrament to be instituted as after the fall: for although man could then know intelligible things from sensible things, nevertheless no sensible thing was necessary as contributing to salvation by removing some impediment to salvation, so that it could properly be called medicine. Proof: where there is no disease, no medicine is required; but during the first innocence there was no disease; therefore, etc. The major is clear from Matthew 9: Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. Hence Saint Augustine says beautifully: Remove diseases, remove sins, and there will be no cause for medicine. The minor is also evident from what we said in volume 2, On the happy state of innocence.

You will say: The sacrament of Matrimony is a remedy for concupiscence; but it was contracted between Adam and Eve during the state of innocence; therefore in that state there were Sacraments as remedies. The major is clear from Saint Augustine in the book On Marriage, etc. The minor is proved from the Apostle’s statement in Ephesians 5, where, speaking of the marriage of Adam and Eve, he says: This is a great sacrament; but I speak of Christ and the Church. — I answer, distinguishing the minor: that marriage was a sacrament according to the broader signification, and insofar as a Sacrament is merely a sign of a sacred thing, but not of a sanctifying subject in which such a sign exists, I concede; insofar as Sacrament is taken in the stricter signification for a sign of a sacred thing sanctifying, I deny. To the proof I say that the Apostle calls the marriage of Adam and Eve a Sacrament insofar as it prefigured the union of Christ with his bride, the Church. But that it was not then properly called a Sacrament is sufficiently determined by the Council of Trent when it says, Session 24, Canon 1: if anyone says that Matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven Sacraments of the law of the Gospel instituted by Christ the Lord, let him be anathema.

Proof of the second part, namely that in the state of innocence the Sacraments were not necessary for the perfection of the soul: in that happy state higher things dominated lower things—the soul the body, reason the senses, intellectual powers the sensitive and natural powers. Original justice effected this, so that, just as the soul was perfectly subject to God, so the lower natural and sensitive powers of the soul were subject to reason; and therefore it was not fitting for the soul to borrow sanctity from bodily things: therefore, etc.

You will say: Sacraments are necessary for man to obtain, perfect, and preserve grace against the resisting movements of temptations; but in the state of innocence they could have been useful for all these things. For in that state man had to acquire for himself a new degree of grace each day and protect it against persistent temptations; therefore, etc. — I deny the minor: for he could have received an increase of grace by another way than through bodily signs, namely through the exercise of the virtues, especially divine love, toward which increase original justice moved him, since by enlightening the mind it also inclined and invigorated the will toward every good.

You will say 2: Sacraments benefit the enlightenment of the mind; but in the state of innocence the human mind ought to have been enlightened; therefore Sacraments were necessary for this. — I distinguish the minor: through other signs, I concede; through Sacraments, I deny. For the perfection of the human mind in that state would have come from the influx of the divine power, not from phantasms but from species. Nevertheless, in that state the soul used phantasms, but as it used a body subject to itself: for it would have had the perfection of knowledge from infused light. It also used phantasms because experience of things whose knowledge we possess is pleasurable. Thus it would have experienced the powers and actions of nature, so that it might perceive by experimental knowledge those supernatural things it knew, and natural things through the knowledge innate in it. It would also have confessed the faith necessary for salvation with its mouth, and by exterior signs would have shown worship to God in thanksgiving, testimony of piety, and acknowledgment of supreme power; but those signs would not have been Sacraments.

You will say 2: From Saint Dionysius, book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 1: God presents divine mysteries to heavenly and blessed minds without sensible figures, because they are immaterial; but he had to transmit them to us through sensible symbols, because we consist of material nature. But Adam and Eve in the state of innocence consisted of material nature; therefore they needed bodily signs and means by which they could attain illuminating grace. — I answer, distinguishing the major: people consisting of material nature ought to have bodily means by which they may be enlightened as long as the higher part does not have the lower part wholly subject to it, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But in that state the interior part wholly obeyed the higher, and apart from the benefit of the senses it possessed everything conducive to the enlightenment of its mind. For, as Saint Bernard says in the sermon On the Annunciation: Mercy guarded him, truth taught him, justice ruled him, and protected him.

Proof of the third part, namely that the Sacraments were not in that state as rites and sacred ceremonies: first, because this acceptance of Sacraments is merely improper; secondly, because sacrifices, oblations, and other external acts of worship were abundantly sufficient for man to render due worship to God.

You will say: In the state of innocence there would have been sacrifices, as we concede, because they are the principal acts of public religion. Hence theologians teach that sacrifice pertains to the law of nature, because it proceeds from natural reason that man should acknowledge through sensible things his subjection to God and God’s supreme dominion over all things. But sacrifices are Sacraments, for they are signs of grace; therefore, etc. — I answer first, the major can be denied: since the state of innocence lasted for a very short time, it does not seem that the first Parents offered any sacrifice; indeed, some not unreasonably conjecture that God permitted Adam to fall into sin because he appeared ungrateful toward so generous a benefactor, whom he had honored with no sacrifice as a memorial of gratitude. I answer second, denying the minor: sacrifices are signs of grace by way of merit when they are offered in the state of sanctifying grace, but not by way of a sign instituted by God to confer grace efficaciously.

Proof, finally, of the fourth part, namely that even if that happy state of innocence had endured, no Sacrament in the proper sense would have been instituted: first, because Sacraments would have been useless in that state. For they are chiefly ordered to three things, namely either to receive grace, to preserve it, or to increase it; but in the state of innocence people would have needed Sacraments for none of these three. Not for the first, because just as God produces the soul through natural generation, so he would have produced sanctifying grace in the soul, as a sacred inheritance propagated from the first parent. Not for the second, because in that most happy state they would have been shaken by no internal or external temptations, or at least would not have succumbed to them. Not, finally, for the third, because an increase of grace must occur in a manner fitting to the state; but it would not have been fitting to that state for man to receive grace through bodily means; therefore neither would it have been fitting for him to increase it through the same means.

You will say: In the state of innocence people could have sinned; therefore it was fitting that Sacraments be instituted for wiping away sin and restoring grace. The antecedent is clear: Adam’s descendants would not have been of a better lot than Adam himself; but he sinned notwithstanding all the graces and gifts with which he had been endowed; therefore they too could have sinned. The consequence is likewise proved, because a prudent physician not only supplies remedies for present diseases but also prepares antidotes or preventives for imminent and future ones. But God is the most prudent physician of souls, sins are diseases, and Sacraments are antidotes and remedies; therefore, etc. — I answer first, the antecedent can be denied: for, as we said in volume 5, treatise 8, disputation 2, article 3, question 1, conclusion 3, if innocent Adam had remained, his descendants would have been confirmed in sanctifying grace—not indeed from the beginning of their birth, but once they had overcome the temptation that first assailed them. I answer second, denying the consequence, and I distinguish its proof: if diseases occur frequently and for the most part, I concede; if rarely, I deny. For although, if the state of innocence had endured, some people might perhaps have fallen into sin, this would have happened rarely and to few. It would not have been fitting to institute Sacraments for those very few people, especially since they could have recovered lost grace through other means, namely acts of contrition and love of God, which they could have elicited far more easily and perfectly than we can, because their sensuality would have been less resistant and their aids more excellent and efficacious. — Nevertheless, I would not deny (as a hypothesis) that if Adam had not remained and Christ had come, those Sacraments would then have had to be instituted for which sin was not the occasion of institution, especially the Eucharist: first, so that he might communicate the benefit of the Incarnation to other human beings—for the Eucharist is a kind of extension of the Incarnation; secondly, for increasing grace, since it is ordered primarily and in itself to that increase; thirdly, so that it might be the most excellent pledge of future glory; and finally, so that it might provide human beings with a perfect sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving. Indeed, the state of the way, more perfect than the others with respect to grace, fittingly requires the institution of those means by which grace may be increased in a more perfect manner; but the state of innocence would have been most perfect, and consequently it would have been fitting for people in that state to have had the most perfect means by which they could obtain an increase of grace. No means, however, is more excellent than the very Mediator of God and human beings, who is received in the Eucharist. Furthermore, it is probable that God would have loved innocent human beings no less than those corrupted by sin, and consequently would not have heaped a lesser benefit upon them. But no benefit granted by God to human beings after the Incarnation is more excellent than the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which, says the Council of Trent, Session 13, chapter 2, he poured out the riches of his divine love toward human beings; therefore it is likely that human beings in the state of innocence would have been endowed with this most excellent benefit. Finally, it is more perfect to have an increase of grace from the work worked and the work of the worker together than from the work of the worker alone, as is clear in adults, who receive more abundant grace when they are baptized with due preparation than infants, who, receiving Baptism without such prior disposition, are endowed with a lesser irrigation of graces. In the state of innocence, grace would have been bestowed upon human beings in the most excellent manner of all; consequently, it is probable that in that state there would have been some Sacraments through which human beings could attain grace from the work worked as well as from the work of the worker.

Conclusion two. — IN THE LAW OF NATURE THERE WAS SOME DETERMINATE REMEDY AND SACRAMENT, ESPECIALLY FOR WIPING AWAY ORIGINAL SIN. This conclusion consists of three parts: first, that there was some remedy; second, that it was determinate; third, that it was a true Sacrament.

The first part is common among theologians, and the Subtle Doctor expressly teaches it in 4. dist. 1, question 7, where he says:

At no time did God leave his worshipers without a remedy necessary for salvation; but at every time after the fall the deletion of original sin was necessary for salvation; therefore at every time some efficacious remedy existed for this. Although in adults it could be deleted through an intrinsic good movement, nevertheless in infants, in whom such a movement is impossible, it could not be deleted through their own act; therefore through some act of others concerning them or referred to them.

No sane person can deny this truth. For, as Innocent III says, cited in the chapter Maiores, on Baptism: far be it that all infants should perish, of whom such a great multitude dies daily, without the merciful God, who wills no one to perish, having provided some remedy for salvation even for them. — The same is taught by the author, whoever he may be, of On the Cardinal Works of Christ, cited by Saint Cyprian: original sin, he says, which flowed from the first parents into the whole succession of the human race, ought at every time to be expiated by some remedies, although they did not possess the full power of signifying it until the reality itself was reached, which had been covered by the veil of figures. Nor does it matter that Scripture does not mention that remedy; for it does not follow from this that the remedy was not ordained. Otherwise, by the same reasoning, one would have to say that among the Israelites the female sex lacked every remedy and means by which they might be cleansed from original sin and marked as part of God’s people, since they were incapable of Circumcision. Yet this is most absurd: they belonged to Abraham’s covenant just as males did, and little girls were to be offered in the temple before the use of reason. But they could not have participated in the Sacraments and ceremonies of the law, and it does not seem credible that God would have commanded their offering in the temple if they were not true daughters of nature like the others; therefore, etc.

You will say: Although an innumerable multitude of infants is killed in their mothers’ wombs, no remedy for original sin was provided for them by God, and all those infants who were thus killed, whether under the Law of nature, of Moses, or of Christ, were damned; therefore it is not fittingly inferred from the innumerable multitude of infants otherwise destined to perish that a remedy was divinely instituted. — I deny the consequence: for the parity is not the same. First, infants dying in the womb are very few in comparison with the others; but it is not fitting for God to institute a Sacrament for very few people. Secondly, those who die in the womb are incapable of receiving the remedy, because it cannot be applied to them by human beings in a human manner, since they do not fall under human knowledge and administration, as those who are born do. Hence, although God could deny them a remedy for original sin without injustice, nevertheless it was an act of his goodness and providence to grant it under every Law.

Proof of the second and third parts, namely that this remedy was some determinate sensible sign and productive of sanctifying grace ex opere operato. Proof, I say, first from the authority of Saint Augustine, book 5 Against Julian, chapter 9, where he says: Nor should it therefore be believed that before Circumcision was given, God’s servants, since they had faith in the Mediator who was to come in the flesh, did not assist their little ones by any Sacrament of his, although Scripture may have wished, for some necessary reason, to conceal what that was. The Doctor approves and follows this opinion in the place cited above, where he adds:

It could not be certain that an act of another referred to an infant would suffice for the infant unless this had been instituted by God; for no one can be certain that through something he reaches salvation unless he is certain that God accepted it as sufficient for such an end. Since, therefore, God provided not only adult worshipers with remedies necessary for salvation but also their infants—and this with a remedy about which the parents can be certain on behalf of their infants—it follows that at the time of that Law of nature some remedy or certain and efficacious sign for the deletion of original sin had been instituted by God. And it is more probable that this occurred through some sensible sign than through merely an intelligible sign, because throughout the entire state of fallen nature sensible signs with respect to spiritual things are fitting for man; therefore it is reasonable that there was some Sacrament, at least against original sin, in the time of the Law of nature.

The Doctor teaches three things here: first, that this remedy was some determinate sign; second, that it was sensible; third, that it was efficacious. These three are precisely the three characters of a perfect Sacrament. That it was a sign determined by God is clear, because no one but God can determine practical signs of grace: since he alone is the author of grace, he alone can determine with certainty the production of its sign upon the presence of some subject. — Moreover, if that sign remitting original sin had been left to human determination, the condition of infants with respect to salvation would have been better under the Law of nature than under the Law of grace, since they would have had a more general and easier means than Baptism. That this remedy had to be sensible is proved as follows: if this remedy had not been some sensible sign, it would most of all have been—as some hold—an interior act of faith. But this is not so. First, charity is far more excellent and efficacious than faith, yet no one can be justified by another’s act of charity; therefore much less by another’s act of faith. Nor should you say that faith therefore justifies more than charity, because faith regards the Mediator more as the cause of salvation for another than charity does. For this answer would be entirely futile. In whatever way the act of faith is terminated upon the Mediator, in that same way an act of charity would justify, because it too would be terminated upon the Mediator. Therefore, since no one has said that another’s act of charity was sufficient for the justification of infants, one ought not to think the same of an act of faith. Add that an act of faith contributes no more to another’s sanctification than to one’s own; but in the Law of nature an act of faith was not sufficient for one’s own justification, because someone could have unformed faith, that is, faith not perfected by charity, which is the form of the virtues. Furthermore, if the sole interior act of faith had been sufficient in infants for wiping away original sin under the Law of nature, infants could have been justified by that same act not only after birth but also when conceived and existing within the maternal womb; and not only when present but also when absent. Indeed, in a case of necessity that act could have sufficed for the justification of all the infants in the whole world, even those existing in the womb, because a purely interior and intentional act of the mind can be directed equally toward children in the womb, absent outside the womb, and present, toward many and toward one. Thus this remedy would have been far more efficacious than Baptism, which opponents cannot concede because it would redound to the injury of the Law of grace; consequently, they ought not admit what yields that consequence. Finally, that by which infants became members of the Church must be external and sensible: for union with a sensible body, such as the Church, must be sensible. But this remedy, by which original sin was wiped away, made infants members of the Church, just as Circumcision did under the Mosaic law and Baptism under the Evangelical law; therefore, etc.

You will say: Many Doctors of the Church testify that internal faith alone was a sufficient remedy under the Law of nature for the remission of original sin in infants; therefore it is so. The antecedent is proved from Tertullian, book On Baptism, chapter 13: Formerly salvation was through bare faith before the Lord’s passion and resurrection; when faith was increased by believing in his birth, passion, and resurrection, an enlargement of the sacrament was added, the assigning of Baptism, as it were the clothing of faith, which formerly was naked; nor can it now exist without its law; the law of washing is imperfect, and the prescribed form. Also from Saint Gregory, book 1 Moral, chapter 3: What the water of Baptism accomplishes among us was accomplished among the ancients either by faith alone for infants, or by the power of sacrifice for adults, or by the mystery of Circumcision for those who came forth from Abraham’s stock. From Saint Bernard, Epistle 77, To the Nations: We believe that all the faithful who have been found, adults indeed by faith and sacrifices, were expiated; but we believe that for infants faith alone was useful, indeed sufficient. Bede agrees in his commentary on Luke, chapter 8, saying: Those who, whether before the time of Circumcision or after Circumcision was given, came from outside and were faithful, such as Job, his friends, and his children, saved themselves and theirs from original sin either by victims of sacrifices or certainly by faith alone. — I answer, all these authorities of the Fathers must be resolved and explained in the manner in which the Subtle Doctor resolves the authority of Saint Gregory in the place cited above, number 3, saying: Saint Gregory does not understand faith alone as the habit alone, nor perhaps merely as an interior act, but as an exterior sensible act professing faith; and that act could sufficiently have the character of a Sacrament. In this sense Saint Augustine also uses justifying faith, book 2 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 11, writing:

From the time Circumcision was instituted among God’s people, which was then the seal of the justice of faith for signifying purification, it availed infants for original and former sin, just as Baptism began from the time it was instituted to avail for the renewal of man—not because before Circumcision there was no justice of faith, for while he was still in uncircumcision Abraham himself, the father of the nations that were to follow his faith, was justified by faith; but in earlier times the Sacrament of justification from faith was wholly hidden. Nevertheless, the same faith in the Mediator commanded the ancients, little and great, to be saved.

By these words Saint Augustine calls that justifying faith the Sacrament of faith, and therefore considers that it was not merely an interior act but was also declared by some external and sensible sign. What that sensible sign was—whether some sacrifice offered for wiping away original sin, or the offering itself of the child to be cleansed before God—cannot be defined with certainty, since Sacred Scripture has kept this silent.

Conclusion three. — IN THE WRITTEN OR MOSAIC LAW, BESIDES CIRCUMCISION, MOST OTHER RITES WERE SACRAMENTS. This too is common. It is gathered from the Council of Florence, in the decree of Eugene, where, after enumerating the seven Sacraments of the Law, it adds:

These differ greatly from the Sacraments of the ancient law: for those did not cause grace, but figured it as to be given through the Passion of Christ; whereas these, our Sacraments, both contain grace and confer it upon those who worthily receive them.

Also from the Council of Trent, Session 7, Canon 2: If anyone says that these very Sacraments of the new law differ from the Sacraments of the ancient Law only because their ceremonies and external rites are different, let him be anathema.

Proof is also drawn from the authority of the holy Fathers, especially Saint Augustine, book On True Religion, chapter 16, and book 19 Against Faustus, chapter 17, where he says:

The Sacraments of the old Law have been abolished because they were fulfilled, and others have been instituted, greater in power, better in usefulness, easier in practice, and fewer in number.

Reason also supports this, because from what has been said a Sacrament is a sensible and permanent sign instituted by God’s ordinance to signify some grace and sanctity; but besides Circumcision there were in the old Law many rites and ceremonies to which this definition applies; therefore, etc. The major is clear. The minor is proved: for signs of this kind were of three sorts—some consecratory, some eucharistic, and some purificatory. Of the first sort were all the inaugurations of pontiffs and priests and the sacred rites by which certain men were appointed and initiated so that they might render due worship to God, such as priests and Levites, whose consecration rites are recalled in Exodus 28 and 29. Of the second sort was the Paschal Lamb, which was eaten in memory of God’s benefits, especially liberation from Egyptian captivity. Of the third sort were all purifications and expiations, which were chiefly of two kinds: some were expiations from external and legal uncleannesses, performed by the sprinkling of water or by some sacrifice ordered to remove the sin by which that uncleanness had been contracted. Expiations from sins, however, were performed by sacrifices offered either for the whole people or for particular persons. — Moreover, all these Sacraments of both the Law of nature and the written Law were figures and images of the truth and grace that was to overflow more abundantly through the Sacraments of the new Law, with this distinction, as Hugh of Saint Victor notes, part II, chapter 6: The first sacraments of the law of nature were, so to speak, the shadow of truth; those in the time of Moses’ law were certain images of truth; but those that follow most truly under grace are no longer a shadow, but images, indeed the very body of truth. — It should also be noted that some of all the Sacraments of the written Law corresponded to ours: Circumcision was a figure of Baptism; the eating of the Paschal Lamb and of the loaves of proposition, of the Eucharist; purifications, Penance, and the consecrations of priests, of the Sacrament of Orders. There were no figures of Confirmation, Extreme Unction, or Matrimony. Not of Confirmation, because this is the Sacrament of the fullness of grace, which had not then been derived to human beings, for the law brings nothing to perfection. Nor of Extreme Unction, because it is an immediate preparation for attaining eternal glory, whose possession and entrance had not yet been opened under the old Law, since the price of our redemption had not yet been paid. Nor, finally, of Matrimony: for although marriage was then true marriage, it was not yet a true Sacrament insofar as it confers grace, because the union of the divine Word with humanity had not yet taken place; consequently it was not a sign of Christ’s indissoluble union with the Church. Hence Saint Paul, speaking of Matrimony signifying the union of Christ with the Church, does not say “it was a great sacrament,” but “it is a great sacrament,” so as to denote the present time, not the past.

You will insist: Did Circumcision have the power and efficacy to remit original sin and confer sanctifying grace ex opere operato? The Doctor affirms this in 4. dist. 1, question 6, number 2, where he says: This must be presupposed as certain: through Circumcision original sin was wiped away, as is clear from the authorities of the holy Fathers, etc. These authorities proving the truth are chiefly taken from Saint Augustine, who openly teaches in many places that Circumcision had the power to remit sin, and often uses its necessity as a most efficacious means against the Pelagians to prove the truth and existence of original sin, especially in book 4 On Baptism, chapter 24, where he says: We can firmly infer what the sacrament of Baptism accomplishes in infants from the circumcision of the flesh, which the people formerly received. And further: Why, then, was Abraham commanded to cut away and circumcise every male infant on the eighth day, who could not yet believe with the heart so that it might be reckoned to him for justice, unless the sacrament itself greatly helped him? In book 3 Against Julian, chapter 15, he challenges him: Answer, if you can, why Isaac himself would have perished from his people’s soul unless he had been circumcised on the eighth day by the sign of Christ’s Baptism. Explain, if you can, such a punishment, by which he would rightly have been punished unless he were freed from it by that Sacrament. And in book 16 On the City of God, chapter 27: since Circumcision was a sign of regeneration, it was not without reason that generation would destroy an infant on account of original sin, by which God’s first covenant was broken, unless regeneration freed him. Finally, in book 2 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 11, he says: When Circumcision was instituted among God’s people, which was then the seal of the justification of faith for signifying purification, it availed infants for the remission of original and other sin, just as Baptism began from the time it was instituted to avail for the renewal of man.

Many of the holy Fathers agree, especially Saint Gregory, book 4 Moral, chapter 2: What the water of Baptism accomplishes among us was accomplished among the ancients either by faith alone for infants, by the power of sacrifice for adults, or by the mystery of Circumcision for those who came from Abraham’s stock. Likewise Saint Bernard, Epistle 77, addressed to Hugh of Saint Victor: Since other remedies against original sin besides Baptism were not lacking for the ancients, Circumcision was divinely given to Abraham and his seed for this very purpose; among the nations, we believe that all the faithful who were found, adults indeed by faith and sacrifices, were expiated, and that for infants even the faith of their parents could avail, indeed was sufficient. And in Sermon 2 On the Assumption: In Baptism grace alone washes this stain which formerly the stone of Circumcision scraped away. — Saint Prosper teaches the same in his eighth Epistle, cited by Saint Ambrose, and Bede on Luke’s words, When the eight days were completed for circumcising the child, where he writes: Your brotherhood should know that Circumcision in the Law worked the same help of saving healing against the wound of original sin that Baptism now customarily works in the time of revealed grace, except that they could not yet enter the door of the heavenly kingdom until he who gave the Law came and gave the blessing. —

Innocent III also taught this truth very clearly, as it is reported in chapter Maiores on Baptism. After saying that Baptism succeeded Circumcision and proving the equal necessity of both from Genesis 17, The male whose foreskin, etc., just as from John 3, Unless one is reborn, etc., he finally assigns their difference, saying: Although original guilt was remitted through the mystery of Circumcision and the danger of damnation was avoided, nevertheless the kingdom of heaven was not reached, etc.

The Doctor proves the same truth in this way:

There is a fitting reason for this, he says: God at no time left the human race without a remedy for salvation, especially those to whom he himself gave the Law so that by observing it they might attain salvation. For such a law would have been given in vain without a remedy; therefore at the time of the Mosaic law he gave some such remedy to those observing that law. But they cannot attain salvation without the deletion of original guilt; therefore in that law he instituted some remedy against that guilt. No other remedy seems to have been instituted there as such a remedy against it, according to Genesis 17: The male whose foreskin has not been circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people, because he has broken my covenant.

The Doctor’s reasoning could thus be stated in formal form: the Mosaic Law truly supplied human beings who were bound to observe it with the means necessary for salvation, and consequently for the remission of original sin; but for the remission of that sin there was then no remedy other than Circumcision.

The major is clear: no one polluted by original or actual sin can attain eternal life in the state of that sin, because nothing defiled will enter the kingdom of heaven. The Doctor proves the minor from Genesis, chapter 17, The male whose foreskin, etc. Saint Augustine likewise relies especially on this oracle, as appears from what was said, particularly in book 16 On the City of God, chapter 27, where he writes: He cannot die otherwise, as it could be understood that what is said there—“The male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin on the eighth day, that soul shall perish from his people, because he has broken my covenant”—was meant. Since this is so great a fault of the infant whose soul you say will perish, although he himself had not broken God’s covenant, but the elders who had failed to have him circumcised, unless even infants, not according to the peculiarity of their own life but according to the common origin of the human race, all broke God’s covenant in that one in whom all sinned… But these divine words must be understood as though it had been said: “He who has not been regenerated shall perish from his race,” as though he broke my covenant when, in Adam, he also sinned with all.

I answer: Those words on the eighth day occur neither in the Hebrew nor in the Vulgate text; therefore, since Saint Augustine’s and the Doctor’s argument rests chiefly on those words, it is weak and invalid.

Furthermore, those words, or that divine threat, are directed to one capable of a precept and punishment. But an infant is not capable of fulfilling a precept; consequently the threat is directed not to the infant but to the adult, who ought to be punished with temporal death because he neglected either to be circumcised or to circumcise his son. This is confirmed because the Hebrew, Greek, and even Chaldean texts read: The male who does not circumcise the flesh, etc., where the verb “circumcise” is used actively, not passively, as Saint Ambrose also reads it.

Moreover, in the same chapter, where the circumcision of an eight-day-old infant is commanded, no punishment is imposed on one who has not been circumcised; rather, it is stated absolutely: An infant of eight days shall be circumcised among you.

Finally, Saint Augustine does not seem to infer correctly that the covenant for whose violation the person is to be cut off from God’s people was the divine covenant made with Abraham. For this covenant is none other than that which had been mentioned earlier in these words: This is my covenant, which shall be observed between me and you and your seed after you. But this covenant is nothing other than the precept of practicing Circumcision, for immediately it is added: Every male among you shall be circumcised; therefore the aforesaid argument proves nothing. —

I answer: none of all these things proves anything at all against the truth of our assertion: first, for the words “on the eighth day” are found in the Seventy Interpreters even after the emendation of Sixtus V. Origen also has this reading, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, book 2, chapter 2; Ambrose, Epistle 33; and so on. Further, whether the words “on the eighth day” are added or not, that general proposition—the male whose flesh of his foreskin—also extends to infants, of whom there had been mention shortly before, in these words: “An infant of eight days shall be circumcised among you, every male throughout your generations”; hence I think that the words on the eighth day were added by the Seventy Interpreters for the sake of clarity, since they otherwise knew that this was the sense of that divine threat and divine command. For in Genesis 21 Abraham circumcised his son Isaac “on the eighth day,” just as the Lord had commanded him. And in Leviticus 12: “On the eighth day the little infant shall be circumcised.” — Hence, since these words must already have been received in the time of St. Augustine—for at that time, when he was pressing the Pelagians most forcefully, who denied original sin, he could easily have blunted his argument by saying that he was arguing from an interpolated authority—I cannot sufficiently wonder with what disposition Lugo dared to write, Disputation 5, section 1, that St. Augustine understood those words of Genesis as imposing the necessity of circumcision for that effect, but that he relies on a false reading of that text, with the words on the eighth day added, although they are not found in the true text. For although the Vulgate edition alone is now of undoubted authority, it does not follow that every other reading not at all contrary to it is false.

You will object 1. Various texts of Scripture seem to signify, first, that no one is justified by the works of the Law. Thus Romans 3: “Through the Law comes only knowledge of sin; for by works of the Law no flesh will be justified before him,” and so forth. Second, that circumcision is of no benefit and has no efficacy. Thus Galatians: “Neither circumcision counts for anything.” And 1 Corinthians 7: “Circumcision is nothing.” Third, the same Apostle, in Romans 3, when listing all the benefits and prerogatives of circumcision, makes no mention of its efficacy for blotting out original sin and conferring sanctifying grace. Fourth, the sacraments of the Old Law are called by the same Apostle in Galatians 3 “weak and beggarly elements”: therefore they contained grace neither in themselves nor did they confer it. —

I answer the first: in the Old Law there were three kinds of works, namely moral, ceremonial, and judicial. The moral works were the same as those in the Gospel law, such as the Ten Commandments of the Decalogue; the judicial works, however, were entirely abrogated, as were the ceremonial works. But the moral works were meritorious, and therefore conferred grace by the power of the work of the one performing it, when they were done from faith in Christ who was to come. Hence the Apostle, after the words proposed in the objection, adds in Romans 3: But the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ upon all and over all who believe in him; for there is no distinction (supply: of persons, whether Jews or Greeks, and so forth), and the reason is: for all have sinned and lack the glory of God. Justified not by merit, namely, of nature, or of circumcision, or of works, through the redemption which is in Christ, whom God set forth as a propitiation through faith in his blood, for the showing of his justice (supply: of grace, which is understood as the justice by which we are justified) because of the remission of former sins, so that he himself is just and justifies the one who is of the faith of Jesus Christ. He concludes: Where, then, is your boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of faith: for it removes human boasting, whether through the Law or through the works of nature, so that no flesh may glory in his sight; and he adds the reason: For we hold that man is justified by faith without the works of the law. Or is he the God of the Jews only? Indeed, of the Gentiles also. Since there is one God who justifies circumcision by faith and the uncircumcised through faith. Do we then destroy the Law through faith? By no means: but the law we establish. — Second, I say that the Apostle intends nothing other than that, through Christ’s Passion, all the power of the sacraments and sacrifices of the Old Law was emptied out, and therefore circumcision no longer has any power or efficacy under the Gospel law. But that circumcision had very great benefit and efficacy is signified by the Apostle himself in Romans 2, where he says: Circumcision indeed profits, if you observe the law. And in chapter 3: What benefit is there in circumcision? Much in every way. — To the third I say that the argument is taken from a negative authority, from which nothing can be concluded. Add that the Apostle may not have judged it necessary to mention this prerogative of circumcision, since it was already plainly evident from Genesis, chapter 17, nor was it relevant to the purpose he intended. For his aim was to blunt the Jews’ vain boasting and pride, by which they wanted to place themselves above Gentiles converted to the faith because the oracles and mysteries had been entrusted to them. For he says there: What then? Are we superior? Not at all. For we have charged that Jews and Greeks alike are all under sin. Hence he concludes: Is he the God of the Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles? Indeed, of the Gentiles also: since there is one God who justifies circumcision by faith and the uncircumcised through faith. — To the fourth I say that by “weak and beggarly elements” the Apostle there understands not the sacraments of the Old Law, but the idols of the Gentiles: for in the preceding verse he says: At that time, not knowing God, you served those who by nature are not gods. Hence, after the words cited in the objection, he adds: To which you wish to be enslaved again, you observe days, and months, and seasons, and years. All these things the Gentiles were accustomed to do.

You will urge: If circumcision had the power of justifying, this was especially so with respect to Abraham, to whom it was first commanded by God; but this is not so. For the Apostle writes in Romans 4: “For we say, was it reckoned to Abraham in circumcision or in uncircumcision? Not in circumcision, but in uncircumcision; and he received the sign of circumcision, the seal of the righteousness of faith which he had in uncircumcision,” and so forth. — The Doctor answers, no. 11, that circumcision did indeed confer grace upon him:

Because, he says, Abraham had already reached, or gone beyond, that degree to which circumcision had been determined. And I understand that it conferred nothing inwardly upon him by way of a sacrament, or by the power of the work performed; but I believe that it conferred something upon him by way of merit, or by the power of the work of the one performing it, because I believe that the act of circumcising himself, proceeding from obedience to God and from charity, was meritorious for him, just as was the sacrifice of Isaac.

You will insist: Therefore it follows that circumcision did not confer grace by the power of the work performed. — The Doctor answers, denying the consequence:

for it signified with certainty that grace either was to be made, if no obstacle were present, or was already present. Thus, if the Blessed Virgin had been at the conception of her Son in the fullness of grace to which God had disposed her to attain, and if she had afterward been baptized, she would have received no new grace there; nevertheless Baptism would not have been in her a false or uncertain sign, because it would signify that grace was either then being made or had previously been given and was then present.

You will object 2. Various authorities of the holy Fathers insinuate that circumcision had no power or usefulness for conferring righteousness and sanctifying grace. Thus Irenaeus, book 1, chapter 3, asserts that circumcision was given not as the completion of righteousness, but so that the lineage of Abraham might remain recognizable. St. Jerome likewise affirms this in chapter 2 of his commentary on Galatians; Damascene, book 1 of The Orthodox Faith, chapter 26; Chrysostom, Homily 27 on Genesis. Some explicitly say that it did not avail for righteousness: thus Tertullian, book Against the Jews, chapter 2; Cyril, book 10 Against Julian; Theodoret, question 7 on Genesis. To these may be added Cyprian, book 1 Against the Jews, chapter 2, and Ambrose, Epistle 72. Therefore our assertion militates against the teaching of the holy Fathers. —

I deny the consequence, and to both points the Doctor answers, question 6, no. 11, saying that the holy Fathers deny that circumcision and the other sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace:

Either because, he says, circumcision conferred little grace in comparison with Baptism; or because it did not confer grace as an immediate disposition to glory, since it did not open the gate; but this was not because of a defect in it, but because it took place at a time when the price had not been paid; or because it was not for everyone indiscriminately who received it. By its institution it was determined with certainty for a certain degree of grace, so that it could not go beyond that degree, either by intending or by producing it; and thus, if it found only that degree in the recipient, it would confer nothing upon him.

Therefore, so that the holy Fathers may not be set against one another and some contradict others, they must be explained in one or another of the three ways assigned by the Doctor; and rightly so. For some, such as Irenaeus, Tertullian, Jerome, and Cyprian, say that circumcision was given as a sign and not for righteousness, because they explain the explicit and better-known effect of circumcision: through it the lineage of Abraham was distinguished from the other Gentiles. Others, such as Cyril, Basil, book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 11, and Epiphanius, Heresies 8, speak generally of the legal observances in relation to the sacraments of the New Law. Thus, in comparison with Baptism, circumcision was almost nothing, just as a figure and shadow is regarded as nothing in relation to the truth it signifies, although in reality it is something in itself.

You will object 3. The Council of Florence, in the decree of Eugenius, declares: “The sacraments of the New Law differ greatly from the sacraments of the Old Law; for those did not cause grace, but only signified it as destined to come through Christ’s Passion, whereas these, our sacraments, both contain grace and confer it upon those who worthily receive them.” This teaching is confirmed by Trent, Session 7, Canon 2, On the Sacraments in General: “If anyone says that the very sacraments of the New Law differ from the sacraments of the Old Law only because they have different external ceremonies and other external rites, let him be anathema.” —

I answer first, that neither of those authorities excludes the power and efficacy of circumcision, which cannot be included under the sacraments of the Old Law, since it was instituted a hundred years before the Law. Hence Christ the Lord, addressing the Jews in John 7, says: Moses gave you circumcision, not because it is from Moses, but from the fathers. This answer should certainly carry greater weight because it is not likely that the Councils intended to decree anything against the teaching of Saint Augustine and the other holy Fathers, or against the opinion of the more celebrated Doctors of Theology. Therefore it must be admitted that those Councils speak in the style and words of Saint Augustine himself, who says in Psalm 73: The sacraments of the Old Testament give salvation, he says, The sacraments of the Old Testament promised the Savior, and so on. In Epistle 19 to Saint Jerome: Why should I not say that those commandments and the other sacraments are not good, because men are not justified by them? For they are the only ones announcing the grace by which we are justified*. Item, book 19 Against Faustus, chapter 18, he has similar things. Therefore, just as Saint Augustine himself speaks of the sacraments of the Old Law without including circumcision, so Trent and Florence also deal with those that were proper to the Old Law. Otherwise circumcision was not rightly included under them, since it also benefited other descendants of Abraham living outside Judea, such as the Idumaeans, and therefore was not properly a sacrament of the Old Law.

You will object 1. The remedy for original sin, like the other means, must be common to males and females; circumcision was not such a remedy; therefore, and so forth. Further, circumcision was omitted in the desert for ten years, as is recorded in Joshua 5; but it is not likely that Moses permitted the Jews for so long to lack a means conducive to the remission of original sin. Finally, the remedy for original sin ought to have been applied at every time, especially when necessity presses; but circumcision could not be applied before the eighth day; therefore, and so forth. —

I answer the first point, that not all means of salvation need to be common to males and females. For the sacrament of Orders, which is a means of salvation, although not a necessary one, was instituted for males alone. Hence circumcision was necessary only for the men for whom it had been prescribed; for women, however, as also for infants before the eighth day and for the Jews during their wandering in the desert, the remedy of the Law of nature provided assistance.

It is related that the Jews held Adam to have been produced circumcised: in the Yalkut on Genesis it is said that Adam was first created circumcised. But, they say, he afterward drew forward his foreskin, so that the skin of his private part might be extended and the uncovered head of the glans might again be extended. Hence they think that among certain Jews, transgressors of the Law even today, the custom arose of striving by every art to restore the skin amputated in circumcision. In this sense they think these words of book 1 of Maccabees, chapter 1, verse 15, are to be understood: “And they built a gymnasium in Jerusalem according to the customs of the nations, and made foreskins for themselves,” and so forth. They are also mentioned by Josephus, book 12 of the Antiquities, chapter 6: Menelaus and the sons of Tobias asked Antiochus to allow them to build a gymnasium in Jerusalem; having obtained this, they drew forward foreskins for themselves so that they would no longer be unlike the Greeks. Thus also, after the destruction of the second Temple, many among the Jews tried to erase their circumcision. But afterward this new foreskin was again amputated, and they were circumcised once more. This is clear from the Jerusalem Talmud, where it says: Rabbi Jose said to him: “Many with a drawn-forward foreskin in the days of Ben Cosiba, all of whom were circumcised again, and lived, and afterward fathered sons and daughters.” These things are found in the Talmud, tractate Yebamot.

The Apostle indicates that this custom had also become prevalent among the Jews in his time when he writes in 1 Corinthians 7:18: “Was someone called while circumcised? Let him not draw forward the foreskin.” For when certain Jews embraced the Gospel, as though they were ashamed of their former condition, they took great care to erase its remnants and every trace of it, so that their conversion to Christianity might appear firmer and more sincere. Therefore they did not spare even the more delicate parts; they especially tried to erase circumcision and wanted to be regarded by everyone as uncircumcised, like the Gentiles. What St. Epiphanius writes about Symmachus, the author of the third Greek edition of the Bible, helps confirm this truth and illuminate the apostolic text:

In the time of the Emperor Severus, Symmachus the Samaritan passed over to the Jews and, professing himself among the proselytes, was circumcised a second time. Lest you perhaps wonder at this, I want you to know that it was customary that those who passed from the Samaritans to the Jews, and conversely the Jews to the Samaritans, should receive a new circumcision. Indeed, what is more troublesome, after circumcision they again advance toward the foreskin; for by a certain medical art, with what they call a spathister, they draw forward the skin of the glans, sew it, bind it around with glue, and thus recover a foreskin.

What we say can be confirmed by the Apostle’s testimony, when he uses these words: Was anyone called circumcised? Let him not draw forward the foreskin. Was anyone called with the foreskin? Let him not be circumcised. They relate that this wicked or detestable artifice was discovered by Esau, the brother of Jacob, so that he might more easily renounce God and erase the mark received from his ancestors. Hence they think that this word of God arose: Esau I hated, but Jacob I loved. It was indeed the opinion of the leading authorities in medicine that a foreskin once cut off could not be restored by any method or art. Thus Hippocrates, section 6, aphorism 19: After a bone that has been completely cut, or cartilage, or a nerve, or a cheek, or something thin, or the foreskin, neither grows nor becomes what it was. But although this cannot be done by the powers of nature alone, experience teaches that the foreskin can nevertheless be restored by the skill and industry of physicians and surgeons and by the benefit of remedies. For Dioscorides says, book 2, chapter 101: Honey, he says, restores to its entirety the glans of a boy, or of one circumcised, which has been exposed without circumcision, if the foreskin is softened with honey, especially from Calne, for thirty days. In book 3, chapter 52: Aloe, he says, glues together the torn foreskins of boys. And in book 1, chapter 157, where he treats of thapsia: The juice of thapsia, he says, is useful for restoring the glans of the penis, provided it has been exposed for a cause other than circumcision. For it raises a swelling which, softened by the application of oils and fats, repairs the loss of the foreskin. From these things it is clear that the foreskin can be so repaired by these juices and fatty remedies that the softened skin is extended and becomes longer, so that the whole glans, prepared again by that art, can be wrapped and covered, provided circumcision has not previously intervened—that is, these remedies are milder, so that by them a remedy can be applied to a wound inflicted by circumcision. And in fact, when they wanted to draw forward the foreskin after circumcision, stronger instruments were needed, by which the skin could be pulled and made to occupy the place of the former skin, as is clear from the passage of Saint Epiphanius cited above. The Jews used to restore the foreskin either so that they would not be recognized as Jews and could be entirely freed from the tribute and tax that the Jews paid and that was transferred to the Capitol, or so that they could exercise with the ethnic and Gentile peoples in gymnasia and wrestling schools and, with circumcision thus concealed, would not be distinguished from others by their private parts, or so that they might signify by this custom that they had departed from Judaism, or so that they might lessen the disgrace of their Judaism. For Jews were hateful to everyone, and when they were discovered they were exposed to everyone’s mockery and insults. Therefore the strictest inquiry was made concerning them, as can be seen in Suetonius, who records that a ninety-year-old Jew came out in public and was exposed to everyone as circumcised. Thus, to avoid this hatred, very many Jews arranged for the skin of the glans to be restored, so that at last they might deceive the sharper eyes of the inquisitors. Perhaps Jews turning to Christianity used this precaution out of hatred for Judaism; for just as those who became Samaritans from Jews again drew forward, nourished, and extended their foreskin, so conversely those who became Jews from Samaritans did so out of hatred for their former order and religion. Thus, out of hatred for their former Judaism, many proselytes who embraced the Gospel drew forward their foreskin. Hence the Apostle says: Let the circumcised person not put on the foreskin over it and not draw it forward again, for circumcision takes nothing away from the salvation of a proselyte.

Besides the Jews, circumcision was customary among many peoples: namely, Egyptians, Colchians, Ethiopians, Phoenicians, Syrians, Arabians, and Troglodytes, as Herodotus, Diodorus, Ambrose, Jerome, and others write. Peter Martyr also recorded that some Americans of the province of Yucatán restored the foreskin, Decade 4. Concerning the Egyptian priests who were circumcised, see Origen, book 2 of his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans; and also Hetius, pages 12 and 13, in his observations on Origen’s commentaries.

Origen, in his commentary on Genesis, observes that the Jews ought to be circumcised on the eighth day, whereas the Ishmaelites were not circumcised until their thirteenth year. But St. Ambrose, book 2, On Abraham, chapter 11:

The Egyptians circumcise males in their fourteenth year, and they report that females are circumcised in that same year, because it is evidently from that year that the male passion begins to burn and the menstrual periods of females take their beginning.

And Strabo, book 17: They are also especially concerned that they nourish every infant born, and circumcise those same infants, but excise the females. He is speaking of the Egyptians; yet, when he adds the same point, he says that it was customary among the Jews. Origen likewise agrees with this, Homily 5 on Jeremiah: They are circumcised, I say, according to what is sensible, not only those who are circumcised according to the law of Moses, but also many others. The idolatrous priests of the Egyptians are circumcised.

Now, since Strabo and Ambrose have mentioned female Circumcision, we shall explain its practice. It is performed by removing the νύμφη, a part which, especially among the women of southern regions, grows so excessively that it must be restrained with a knife. This is reported by eminent physicians, Paul of Aegina, book 5, chapter 70, and Aëtius, Tetrabiblos 1, Sermon 4, chapter 103. The latter continues as follows:

Therefore it seemed good to the Egyptians that, before it grows excessively, that bodily part should be amputated, especially when marriageable maidens are to be given in marriage.

Origen touches on the matter when he says, in his Homily on Exodus:

Against males its power is in the loins; against females its power is in the navel of the belly. And see how honorably Scripture has named the genital organs of man and woman under veiled names, lest by those words which are readily available it signify something shameful. If the example we brought forward from Job has been understood, understand this from me: just as the foreskin is circumcised in a man, so in a woman the navel is amputated.

What, then, was first introduced by necessity was afterward taken up as a religious practice; and some have held the same regarding male Circumcision, as we shall say later. Moreover, those who have traveled through those regions report that the custom of circumcising women is still retained by the Egyptians today, and that fire is applied to restrain the luxuriance of this part. Bellonius writes that women in Persia and the Copts in Ethiopia, although professing the name of Christ, preserve this custom. Leo Africanus, book 8, relates that it is prescribed by the law of Muhammad, although it prevails only in Egypt and Syria, and that the task is performed by certain old women who sell their services throughout the streets of Cairo.

Fourth Conclusion. — It was fitting that, under the Evangelical Law, some Sacraments should be instituted by Christ the Lord, through which he might communicate his grace to human beings.

This is proved for four reasons: first, from the side of God instituting the Sacraments; second, from the side of the human being receiving them; third, from the time of their institution; finally, from the side of the Sacraments themselves.

First, then, this was fitting from the side of God, lest God should seem to command the ancient Sacraments or sacrifices as though they were useful or pleasing to him; for this reason he rejected all those things as useless and less pleasing to him, as Saint Paul teaches in Hebrews 1 and 10. Saint Augustine offers this reason, book The City of God, chapter 5: They had to be changed at the proper and already certain time, lest God himself, already desirable, and certainly things perceptible in us, should be believed to be no longer rather what these things signified.

From the side, however, of the human being, who, having received new powers through the grace of the Evangelical Law and, after casting off the condition of servitude, having been adopted as a son of God, ought also to be initiated into more perfect Sacraments. Hence Saint Augustine says admirably, book On True Religion, chapter 17: A most just master of a household commands one thing to those for whom he judges a harsher servitude useful, and another to the devout, whom he deigns to adopt into the rank of sons. And in the same place: Thus, through his ministers, he commanded the weaker, and, through himself, the stronger. Does it follow, he says again in the title on Psalm 51, that because certain childish things suited to a child are given to a boy, by which the boy grows during those years, they are therefore not taken from his hands as he grows up, so that he may handle something more useful?

Third, from the time of institution, because the Sacraments of the old law promised only that Christ would come, whereas the new ones present him as already here: different signs ought to denote future things and present things. Hence Saint Augustine says admirably, Letter 7: Let no one expect us to give the reasons for this change, which you yourself know, since it is a lengthy matter; nevertheless, it can be stated briefly that, just as it would have been enough for an adult to have Christ announced by one set of Sacraments when he was going to come, and by another when he had come, so, when we now speak of the same matter, the difference of things compelled us also to change the words.

Finally, it was fitting to institute other Sacraments from the side of the Sacraments themselves, since the Sacraments of the old Law were needy and empty elements, and a shadow of future things. Therefore, when the fullness of grace and truth arrived, it was fitting that they should cease. Saint Augustine says in Psalm 39: The signs promising have been taken away, since the promised truth has been exhibited. For since the law was empty, Christ came to fulfill it; and he fulfilled it by giving charity through the new Sacraments: for the fullness of the law is charity. Hence Tertullian says admirably, book On Prayer, chapter 1: By the new grace of God he renewed everything from carnal things into spiritual things, the whole former antiquity having been cancelled.

You will say 1: Those Sacraments ought not to have been changed which were instituted to last forever; but such are the Sacraments of the old Law. For the same reasoning applies to the others as to the Paschal Lamb and the Aaronic Priesthood; yet these were instituted so that they might subsist forever. For concerning the Paschal Lamb, Leviticus 12 commands: Keep this legal observance for yourself and for your sons forever; concerning the Aaronic Priesthood, chapter 14: and of his sons he shall proceed into an everlasting Priesthood. —

I distinguish the major: if they were instituted to last forever both by reason of themselves and by reason of what they signified, I concede; if only by reason of what they signified, I deny. And likewise distinguishing the minor, I argue against the consequence: the eating of the Paschal Lamb was a figure of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, and the Aaronic Priesthood was an image and shadow of the Priesthood of the new Law, which is to be preserved forever.

You will say 2: When grace and truth arrive, the figure and shadow ought to cease; but grace and truth came to be through Jesus Christ; therefore, since the Sacraments are the shadow of truth and figures of grace, none ought to be admitted by his followers after Christ. —

I distinguish the minor: if the truth is already exhibited as it will be in future glory, I concede; if only imperfectly and abstractively, as in this life, even under the new Law, I deny. For, as Saint Dionysius beautifully observes, book The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 5, since the state of the new Law lies midway between the state of the old Law, whose figures are fulfilled in the new, and the state of glory, where all truth is manifested nakedly and openly, there will then be no Sacraments; but now, as long as we know through a mirror and in an enigma, it is necessary that we obtain spiritual grace through sensible Sacraments. Indeed, the figures that foreshadowed Christ as one who was to come ought to cease; but the signs commemorating his Passion and announcing beforehand the glory prepared for the elect ought not to cease. Hence Eusebius Emissenus, in the Homily On the Transfiguration, from Hebrews 9, admirably distinguishes three tabernacles: the first is the Synagogue in shadow and figure; the second is the Church in figure and truth; the third is heaven in truth alone. In the first life is shown; in the second it is given; in the third it is possessed.

You will say 3: With God there is no change, nor shadow of alteration, as Saint James says, chapter 1; but there would be some change if he supplied other Sacraments, by which human beings would be sanctified differently after Christ’s coming than before it; therefore, etc. —

Saint Augustine responds, Letter 5, that:

just as a human being is not therefore changeable because in the morning one thing is done and in the evening another; this month one thing and another in a different month; this year not the same as in that year; so God is not therefore changeable because, in the earlier volume of the whole age, he commanded one thing to be offered to him, and another in the later volume, so that he might fittingly arrange, through changing times and without any change in himself, the meanings belonging to the most salutary instruction in Religion:

He had previously confirmed this authority with examples, writing:

Does not summer succeed winter by a gradual addition of warmth? Do not the hours of day turn into night? How often do our ages change? Childhood yields to adolescence, never to return; youth succeeds adolescence, not destined to remain; old age, bringing youth to an end, succeeds; and old age is ended by death. All these things change, yet the plan of divine providence by which these things are changed does not change. Does not, I think, the plan of agriculture change when the farmer orders one thing in summer than he had ordered in winter; and when he rises in the morning, he who rested that night, has he not changed the plan of his life? Did the teacher not impose one thing on the adolescent that he used to impose on the child? Therefore a constant doctrine, when the precept is changed, does not change the instruction.

Remark 1. All Catholics agree among themselves that there are seven Sacraments of the New Law, namely Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Order, and Matrimony; but all the more recent heretics oppose this septenary number of the Sacraments. In assigning the number of the Sacraments of the New Law, they not only quarrel among themselves, but are tossed about with such instability of mind that the author of each sect does not agree even with himself. For Luther, who at the beginning of his book On the Babylonian Captivity had said that only three were to be admitted, namely Baptism, Penance, and Bread, adds that, if we wish to speak according to the usage of Scripture, we shall profess only one Sacrament and three sacramental signs: for, he says, the Eucharist and Penance are commemorative of the Passion and of the adoption of Baptism. Finally, near the end of the book he asserts that, properly speaking, only two Sacraments are to be admitted, namely Baptism and Bread. Hence it follows that the Lutherans do not agree among themselves about the number of the Sacraments: some admit only two, namely Baptism and the Eucharist, while others admit three, adding Penance to these two. Calvin, however, does acknowledge three, namely Baptism, the Supper, and the laying on of hands by which the Ministers of the Church are initiated; for although in book 4 of the Institutes, chapter 18, §19, he says that there are only two, namely Baptism and the Supper, nevertheless in chapter 11, §20, he says:

Two Sacraments were instituted which the Christian Church now uses, Baptism and the Lord’s Supper. I speak, however, of those which were instituted for the use of the whole Church; for the laying on of hands by which the Ministers of the Church are initiated into their office, although I would reluctantly allow it to be numbered as a Sacrament, I do not therefore number among the ordinary Sacraments.

Melanchthon, however, appears altogether uncertain in this matter. At first he admitted only two with Luther, later three; but finally, in the Theological Places published in the year 1502, he adds ordination, or the calling to the ministry of the Gospel. Then, in the Places published in 1758, he inclines to admit Matrimony among the Sacraments; for he maintains that it is a sign of a sacred thing, having a divine command and an attached promise:

Yet one thing is lacking for it to be a Sacrament, namely that it was instituted before Christ’s Incarnation. But how slight this reason is, no one can fail to see: for what prevents the Lord Christ from having been able to promote an already existing thing, which was a sign and prophecy of His future Incarnation, to the dignity of a Sacrament?

Remark 2. Three things above all are required for the nature of a Sacrament of the New Law: namely, that it be a sign divinely instituted, ordered to conferring internal sanctification upon man; further, that it have the power and efficacy of conferring justifying grace; and finally, that there be a divine command and divine institution of frequenting this sign, so that the effect signified by it may be obtained. Hence there are many signs of a sacred thing which, although called Sacraments by the Holy Fathers, do not properly claim this name for themselves, but only improperly and in a broader signification. Thus Saint Augustine, in book 1 of Against Faustus, chapter 11, calls the sign of the cross a Sacrament; and in On the Creed, chapter 2, he calls the ceremonies of Baptism, exorcisms, and similar rites Sacraments. And in book 2 of On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 26, he calls the blessed bread customarily given to Catechumens a sacrament—not properly and strictly, but, as I said, broadly and improperly—because the Sacraments properly so called of the New Law have the promise and efficacy of grace, as well as institution from Christ; whereas the aforesaid things are not of this kind. Here, moreover, the discussion is only of Sacraments properly so called.

Remark 3. Three principal matters arise for examination in this question: first, whether the Lord Christ truly designated and instituted seven sensible signs effectively productive of sanctifying grace, and whether their septenary number can clearly be gathered from the written or handed-down word of God; second, whether these signs are fewer than seven, as the heretics of our time deny, as was mentioned in the first remark; finally, whether those sacred signs are more than seven, as some of the Holy Fathers seem to have taught, when some appear to attribute the power and efficacy, and the name, of a Sacrament to the washing of feet, others to blessed water, and some to eulogiae, or blessed bread. Although these three matters indeed converge upon one and the same point, nevertheless, for greater clarity and a more evident dissertation and discussion, I shall examine them under three distinct conclusions.

First conclusion. — There are truly seven Sacraments of the New Law.

This Conclusion is gathered from Sacred Scripture, as follows: a Sacrament is a sacred sign, or sacred rite divinely instituted, to which a promise of grace and a power of sanctifying implanted by God are attached; but from Sacred Scripture it is not obscurely gathered that there are seven such sacred rites, in which a promise of power for conferring grace has been implanted; therefore, etc. The major is clear. The minor is proved, first, concerning Baptism. For in the last chapter of Mark, the Lord Christ, sending the Apostles to convert the nations and spread the Gospel, says: Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, etc. He adds: Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved. Hence Saint Paul, in Ephesians 5, considering the greatness of the Lord Christ’s love for His Church, says: Christ loved the Church and delivered Himself for her, that He might sanctify her, cleansing her with the washing of water in the word of life. — The same is gathered concerning Confirmation from Acts 8, verses 17 and following verse 19, where we read that the Holy Spirit was infallibly conferred through the laying on of the Apostles’ hands. This effect would certainly not have been infallible through the application of such a sign unless the Lord Christ had so ordained; nor would the Apostles have consistently used this sign for that effect if they had not been so taught by their most loving Teacher and Master. — The rite of the Eucharist is clearly handed down in Matthew 17 and 1 Corinthians 11: Taking bread and giving thanks, He broke it and said: Take, etc. The promise of grace is in John 6: Whoever eats this bread will live forever. — The rite of Penance and the power of conferring sanctifying grace are found in John 20, where Christ addresses the Disciples and says: Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them, etc. — Saint James opens up the rite of Extreme Unction and its power of conferring grace in chapter 5, when he says: Is anyone among you sick? Let him bring in the presbyters of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith will save the sick man; and if he is in sins, they will be forgiven him.

Saint Paul hands down the institution, rite, and power of conferring grace of the Sacrament of Order in 1 Timothy 4, in these words: Do not neglect the grace that is in you, which was given to you through prophecy with the laying on of the hands of the presbyterate. And in 2 Timothy 1: I remind you to rekindle the grace that is in you through the laying on of my hands.

Finally, the rite of Matrimony is found in Matthew 19 in these words: What God has joined, let no man separate. The promise of grace, however, is gathered from Ephesians 5, where the Apostle, speaking of Matrimony, says: This is a great Sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. By these words he signifies that Matrimony is a great Sacrament in Christ and in the Church, insofar as the union of man and woman signifies the union of Christ with the Church, and consequently the grace that is bestowed in its presence. Christ has a twofold union with the Church: one according to nature, which was effected through the Incarnation, by which Christ, as Head of the Church, is assimilated in nature to the other members; the second through grace and charity, by reason of which He is called the Bridegroom of the Church. Matrimony signifies both unions: the first insofar as it is a natural union between man and woman; the second insofar as it is the spiritual union of man and woman through grace and charity, which is contracted in Matrimony.

The same truth is gathered from the unwritten word, or from Tradition, by which we know that this septenary number of the Sacraments has flowed down to us from divine institution and Apostolic teaching through an everywhere perpetual and uninterrupted observance. Since it cannot be shown when these sacred rites first began to be frequented in the Church after the Apostles, it must necessarily be admitted that they were derived from the Lord Christ and the Apostles, according to this rule of Saint Augustine, book 1 of On Baptism, chapter 24: What the whole Church holds, and was not instituted by Councils but has always been retained, is rightly believed to have been handed down by no authority other than Apostolic. The Councils explicitly define this truth, especially the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugenius, where, among external matters, number 5 states: There are seven Sacraments of the New Law, namely Baptism, etc., which differ greatly from the Sacraments of the Old Law. For those did not cause grace, but only figured that it was to be given through the Passion of Christ; whereas these of ours both contain grace and confer it upon those who worthily receive them. Likewise the Council of Trent, Session VII, Canon 1, in these words: If anyone says that the Sacraments of the New Law were not instituted by our Lord Jesus Christ, or that there are more or fewer than seven, namely Baptism, etc., or that any one of these seven is not truly and properly a Sacrament: let him be anathema.

The Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church hand down the same doctrine. Although most of them perhaps did not expressly mention the seven Sacraments of the Church, because no necessity pressed and no present occasion existed for numbering these seven Sacraments, nevertheless some of the earlier Fathers do mention several such Sacraments. First, Saint Dionysius, in book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, besides Baptism and the Eucharist, about which he speaks extensively in scattered places, also mentions the Sacrament of Order. And in his Letter to Demophilus he also declares the Sacrament of Penance. Tertullian likewise clearly appears, in book On Prescriptions, chapter 40, where, reporting how the devil imitates even the realities of the divine Sacraments in the mysteries of idols, he says: He too dips certain believers and his own faithful; he promises an expiation of sins from the washing, by which Baptism and Penance are signified. He also celebrates the offering of bread, to imitate the Eucharist. He also establishes the Supreme Pontiff in a single marriage, by which he denotes an imitation of the Sacrament of Order, whose highest degree is the Pontificate, or Episcopate; to this monogamy is prescribed by the Apostle Paul in 1 Timothy 3, in these words: The husband of one wife must be. He also mentions marriages, or Matrimony. He adds the treatment of fields, by which he denotes Extreme Unction. — But lest I prolong the discussion by reporting the opinions of the ancient Doctors on this matter, Saint Augustine alone will suffice in place of the others. For in book 5 of On Baptism, chapter 20, he says: If what was said in the Gospel still holds, that Sacraments are not celebrated by a sinner, how does He hear a murderer praying, whether over the water of Baptism, or over the oil, or over the Eucharist, or over the heads of those upon whom hands are imposed, namely, through reconciliation? And in book Against the Letters of Petilian, chapter 104, he declares Confirmation in these words: Petilian wishes to interpret the Sacrament of Chrism in this unguent, which indeed in the class of visible signs is most holy, just as Baptism itself. And in book 2 of Against the Letters of Parmenian, chapter 13, he speaks in the same way of Order as of Baptism: Both are a Sacrament, and each is given to a man through a certain consecration: the former when he is baptized, the latter when he is ordained. And shortly afterward: For if each is a Sacrament, which no one doubts, why is the former not admitted and the latter admitted? Injury must be done to neither Sacrament. Finally, in books On the Good of Marriage, chapters 18 and 11, and in On Marriage, chapter 10, he plainly teaches that Matrimony is a Sacrament in the New Law.

You will say: If there truly were seven Sacraments, Scripture would have designated that number; but this is not so; therefore seven Sacraments should not be asserted. — I distinguish the major: it would have designated that number explicitly or implicitly, I concede; explicitly only, I deny. And likewise I distinguish the minor, I deny the consequence. For although Sacred Scripture does not indicate in express words that there are seven Sacraments of the New Law, nevertheless it signifies this at least implicitly, since it expresses seven sacred rites to which a promise of grace is attached, as was said above. Furthermore, by equal reasoning it would follow that there are neither two Sacraments, nor three, nor four, nor any definite number at all, because Sacred Scripture did not express that definite number. Likewise, this does not follow: Scripture nowhere says that there are four Gospels, or fourteen Epistles of Paul, or seven words uttered by the Lord on the cross; therefore there are not that many. For it is enough that the things themselves be handed down as numbered in Scripture; it is not required that their number be determinately expressed. Finally, even if the testimonies of Scripture were unavailable, the authority of the Church would still be entirely sufficient for this, as Saint Jerome teaches in book Against the Luciferians, where, discussing the laying on of hands, he says: *You ask where it is written? In the Acts of the Apostles; and even if the authority of sound Scripture were not present, the agreement of the whole world on this point would have the force of a precept.

You will say 2: In Revelation 17 the Angel promises John that he will reserve for him the Sacrament of the beast, which has seven heads. This figure signifies, says Chemnitz, that the septenary number of the Sacraments belongs to the beast, that is, to the Roman Church, in which Antichrist sits. — I deny the minor; for it is blasphemous that the Sacraments of Christ should be designated by the very heads of the beast. Among them are Baptism and the Eucharist, which even the heretics themselves do not deny to be true Sacraments. Hence those seven heads of the beast mystically signify nothing other than seven kings, or seven mountains, in which unbelief is especially to exercise its tyranny over Christ’s faithful. — But if someone wished to gather the seven Sacraments of the New Law from the septenary number mentioned by Scripture, there are very many testimonies, both in the New and in the Old Testament, supporting this assertion. Just as God made the world in the course of seven days, so the Lord Christ willed to work the mystery of recreation and renewal through the order of seven Sacraments. Hence the more excellent works of God are comprehended in Scripture under the number seven. For He commanded unleavened bread to be eaten for seven days; there were seven lamps in the Sanctuary, Numbers 8; He instituted seven trumpets of the Jubilee, Joshua 6; Samson’s strength was set in seven locks of hair, Judges 16; Eliseus commanded Naaman the Syrian to wash seven times in the Jordan, and he was cleansed, 4 Kings; Wisdom hewed out seven pillars for herself, Proverbs 9; Christ fed four thousand people with seven loaves. And, not to go farther, Saint John himself in Revelation 1 saw seven golden lampstands, and there seven stars in the right hand of the Son of Man; and in chapter 5, seven seals with which the book held in the right hand of Him who sits upon the throne was sealed within and without. By all these things the seven Sacraments of the New Law could not incongruously be designated.

You say 3: The holy Fathers nowhere assert that there are seven Sacraments; indeed, they commonly enumerate fewer. For Saint Dionysius the Areopagite, in The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, where he expressly discusses the mysteries, that is, the Sacraments of the Church, treats no more than five, omitting Extreme Unction and Matrimony. Similarly, Saint Justin, in the second Apology, mentions only the Eucharist and Baptism. Irenaeus likewise mentions the Eucharist in book 1, chapter 9, and Baptism in chapter 13. Cyprian, in his Sermon on the washing of feet, numbers only the Eucharist, Chrism, Penance, and Ordination. Cyril of Jerusalem, although in his mystagogical Catecheses he expressly treats of the mysteries or Sacraments, nevertheless mentions no others than Baptism, Chrism, and the Eucharist. Nor are more enumerated by Saint Gregory, as is related in question 1, canon Many of the secular, etc. Isidore agrees with this in book 6 of the Etymologies, chapter 19. Finally, Saint Ambrose, in On the Sacraments, mentions only Baptism, the Eucharist, and Confirmation. And Saint Augustine teaches in many places that the Sacraments of the New Law are very few in number, especially in book 3 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 6. Therefore, it was not established among the ancients that there were seven Sacraments of the New Law. — I deny the consequence: For neither do the holy Fathers say that there are only two, three, four, or five Sacraments, nor do they likewise deny that there are seven in number; rather, they mention two, three, or fewer according to the reason of the argument they were treating, as will be clear from the response to their authorities cited above. First, Saint Dionysius in that work does not expressly treat of the Sacraments of the Church, but of sacred offices, or anointings, which either bishops or priests performed in administering and confecting the mysteries, with a certain consecration. Wherefore it was not incumbent upon him to discuss either Matrimony or the Anointing of the Sick, although he mentions Penance or reconciliation incidentally. Concerning Saint Justin I say that he mentions only two Sacraments there for this reason: he is responding to pagans who accused Christians of being atheists and of worshipping no gods, and who alleged that they committed many impious acts in their rites, for example, that they devoured human flesh, and therefore admitted only their own people to those rites. Justin replies that Christians are not atheists, since they confess one God in essence and three in persons; but only Christians were admitted to the Synaxis because this was granted only to the baptized. He explains what took place in the Synaxis on Sundays, namely, in order to lift the accusation by which Christians were attacked, that in their rites they devoured tiny pieces of flesh. He does not touch on the other Sacraments because they were unknown to pagans and therefore were not involved in their calumnies. Concerning Saint Irenaeus I say that he did not institute a special disputation about the Sacraments, but, as occasion arose, mentioned now one and now another. Thus in book 1, chapter 2, he speaks of Penance; in chapter 9 he mentions the Eucharist because he exposes the ravings of a certain Marcus concerning the Eucharist. Similarly, in chapter 18 he mentions Baptism because he exposes the errors of several heretics concerning the administration of Baptism; then in book 3, chapter 12, he reports Confession, and in book 4, chapter 32, again mentions the Sacrament and sacrifice of the Eucharist, because there he treats of the sacrifices of the ancient and the New Law. Concerning Saint Cyril of Jerusalem I say that he mentions those three Sacraments for this reason: he was instructing catechumens and newly faithful people about the things customarily done at the time of Baptism. Three Sacraments were conferred on the same day, namely Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist, as is clear from Amphilochius, who writes this in the life of Saint Basil: Maximus the Bishop baptized Basil and Eubulus, and, anointing them with the holy Chrism, gave them the life-giving communion. The same is the response concerning Isidore, or rather Gregory, who is presented under Isidore’s name. Concerning the authority cited from Cyprian I say that this sermon is not Saint Cyprian’s, but that of some later author. Whoever he may be, I say that it does not treat of all the Sacraments, but only of those that could be referred to Christ’s cardinal works; for that is the title the author gave the work of sermons. Concerning Saint Ambrose I say that in those books he does not treat of all the Sacraments, but only of those about which the faithful who had recently been baptized and confirmed, and had already been admitted to the sacred Synaxis, were to be instructed. For new faithful were initiated in that order, as he himself testifies in book 3 of On the Sacraments, chapter 2. Hence in that work he was to treat only of those three Sacraments, and at the end of the work he says that they had received them most fully. Concerning Saint Augustine I say that in On Christian Doctrine he did not say that there are only two Sacraments, but, treating there of the Sacraments of the New Law, he speaks as follows: The Lord himself handed down from the apostolic discipline certain very few things in place of many, and those very easy and most august in understanding, such as the Sacrament of Baptism and the celebration of the Lord’s Body and Blood. These words plainly do not enumerate all the Sacraments, but merely offer some examples. That Saint Augustine recognized more than two Sacraments is clear from Sermon 1 on Psalm 13, where he says that in Baptism, the Eucharist, and the other Sacraments of the Church there are gifts. Hence, in his Letter to Januarius, where he said that we have very few Sacraments in number, excellent in their signification, and easy in their observance, he adds: such as Baptism and the communion of the Lord’s Body and Blood, and whatever else is commended in the divine writings. Here the particle if is not a mark of doubt; for, among the several more certain testimonies just recited, namely, the Passion, Ascension, and Resurrection of the Lord and the coming of the Holy Spirit, he adds: And if anything else of this kind occurs that is followed by the universal Church. It is certain, however, that in Augustine’s time the feasts of the Nativity, the Lord’s Epiphany, and the like were customarily celebrated.

You will say 4: The Greek Church recognizes no Sacraments other than two, namely the Eucharist and Baptism; therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved: for Cyril Lucaris, Patriarch of Constantinople, in his Confession of Faith, first published in Latin and then in Greek in the year 1633, chapter 15, says this about the Sacraments: We believe the evangelical Sacraments to be those which the Lord instituted in the Gospel, and that they are two, namely Baptism and the Eucharist; we have no larger number of Sacraments. Therefore the Institutor did not establish more. — I answer: I concede the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For this Cyril wholly departed from the opinions of the other Greek Churches in order to embrace Calvinian doctrines, which the adversaries do not deny. Casaubon, who arranged for such a Confession to be examined at London in 1675, with both its edition and that of Cyril of Beroea and Parthenius, Patriarch of Constantinople, says in his preface to the Reader: Yet it was not the confession of the Greek Churches, or of the East. This is most firmly evident not only from the Holy Fathers of the Eastern Church and from all the Euchologia and Rituals, but also from the censure of Cyril of Beroea, who succeeded the aforesaid Cyril in the Patriarchate of Constantinople and condemned him in September 1638 with this Synodal sentence: To Cyrillus, who dogmatizes and believes that there are not seven Sacraments of the Church, that is, Baptism, Chrism, Penance, the Eucharist, the Ordination of Priests, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, according to Christ’s constitution, the tradition of the Apostles, and the custom of the Church, but who falsely says that only Baptism and the Eucharist were handed down by Christ in the Gospel: anathema. The Synodal censure of Parthenius, issued in 1642 against the same Cyril, says the same: He denies the five Sacraments of the Church, the Priesthood, holy Unction, holy Oil, Confession with Penance, and honorable Nuptials, all of which ancient Tradition handed down to us as Sacraments and conferrers of divine grace. We have good recent Greek witnesses to this agreement of the Greeks with the Latins concerning the septenary number of the Sacraments, not only orthodox but also schismatic: Gregory, Protosyncellus of the Patriarch of Constantinople, in his Apology against Warenus of Ephesus; Simon, Archbishop of Thessalonica, in the book On the Seven Sacraments of the Church; Jeremias, Patriarch of Constantinople, in his threefold response against the Wittenbergers and the Augsburg Confession; Emmanuel Calecas, in book On Faith and the Principles of Catholic Faith, chapter 6; Gabriel, Bishop of Philadelphia, in the treatise On the Sacred Mysteries; and many others whom Arcudius reports in book 1, chapter 2.

Second conclusion. — The seven Sacraments of the New Law were instituted with a fitting reason and order, and not fewer. The truth of this Conclusion is defended a priori by no other reason than the will of the Lord Christ, which, being most right and most orderly, establishes and prescribes nothing except what is fitting and expedient. Nevertheless, some fitting reasons for such an institution can be offered a posteriori. The first is supplied by the Council of Florence cited above, which, after saying that there are seven Sacraments of the New Law, adds:

The first five are ordered to the spiritual perfection of each individual person in himself; the last two to the governance and multiplication of the whole Church. Through Baptism we are spiritually reborn. Through Confirmation we increase in grace and are strengthened in faith. Once reborn and strengthened, we are nourished by the divine food of the Eucharist. If through sin we incur sickness of soul, we are spiritually healed through Penance; spiritually and also bodily, insofar as it is expedient for the soul, through Extreme Unction. Through Order the Church is spiritually governed and multiplied. Through Matrimony it is increased bodily.

The Subtle Doctor examines the same reason splendidly in book 1, distinction 2, question 1, number 3, where, explaining the perfection of the Sacraments of the New Law, especially as regards their extension or the effect to which they are ordered, he says:

Just as in natural life there is first generation, then nourishment, strengthening, and the restoration of lost health—and these four pertain to each individual person—besides this, something pertaining to the community is required, by which someone is established in the degree necessary for an act necessary to the community; so spiritually, for complete perfection extensively, there ought to be some aid pertaining to spiritual generation, secondly something pertaining to nourishment, thirdly something pertaining to strengthening, fourthly something pertaining to restoration after a fall. Besides this, fifthly something is required by which one departing is finally prepared, because this spiritual life is a kind of journey ordered so that one who lives well in it may pass from it without impediment to another life, for which he is prepared. These five, therefore, are required as necessary aids for each person on his own behalf. For the good of the community observing this law there is carnal multiplication, since this is presupposed to spiritual good as nature is to grace, and there is the spiritual multiplication of some persons under this law. Thus it was fitting that seven aids be conferred upon those observing the evangelical law, in which there would be perfection not only intensive but also extensive, sufficient for everything necessary for observing this law. These are, as the Master says in the text: Baptism, pertaining to spiritual generation; the Eucharist, necessary for nourishment; Confirmation, for strengthening; Penance, for restoring one who has fallen; Extreme Unction, for final preparation; Matrimony, for multiplication in the being of > nature, or carnally; and Order, for multiplication in the being of grace, or spiritually.

The Seraphic Doctor offers other similar fitting reasons in several places, especially in part 3 of the Centiloquium, section 17, where he says:

The sufficiency of the Sacraments is understood in this way: the Sacraments are medicines against diseases; but disease is twofold, namely the disease of guilt and the disease of punishment. The disease of guilt is twofold, namely original guilt, against which there is Baptism, and actual guilt, against which there is Penance; there is also a certain actual venial guilt, against which there is Extreme Unction. The disease of punishment is fourfold, namely ignorance, against which there is Order; malice, against which there is Confirmation; concupiscence, against which there is Matrimony. The Sacraments are also aids, because they aid the seven virtues. Baptism is an aid to faith. Extreme Unction is an aid to hope. The Eucharist is an aid to charity. Order is an aid to prudence. Matrimony is an aid to temperance. Confirmation is an aid to fortitude. Penance is an aid to justice. The Sacraments are also the armor of the Church militant, which is called in the Canticle, Terrible as an army set in array. Terrible indeed, because strong and fortified through the Sacrament of Confirmation. An army, because joined and united through the Sacrament of the Eucharist; set in array through Order. Some are withdrawn from this army through death; for restoring these there is Matrimony. Some are struck down through guilt; for raising these there is Penance. Some enter this army to fight, and this occurs through Baptism. Some go out to be crowned, and this occurs through Extreme Unction.

Others, with Saint Thomas, add that this septenary number of the Sacraments is rightly gathered from the supernatural life of the soul, which is to be acquired and brought to perfection, with a likeness and analogy to bodily life. In bodily life someone is perfected in two ways: first, as regards his own person; second, as regards the community of society in which he lives, for man is an animal born for society. As regards himself, man is perfected in bodily life in two ways: first, by acquiring some perfection of life in himself; second, accidentally, by removing all impediments to life, namely diseases or their remnants. Bodily life is first perfected as regards its being through generation, by which man begins to be and to live. To this in spiritual life corresponds Baptism, which the Apostle calls in Titus 3 the washing of regeneration; hence the Lord Christ said in John 3: Unless someone is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, etc. Next, spiritual life is perfected through increase, by which it is brought to perfect quantity and strength. To this Confirmation is likened, in which the Holy Spirit is given for strength and constancy of soul. Therefore Christ said to His baptized Disciples: Sit here until you are clothed with power from on high. Third, bodily life must be nourished and sustained by daily food lest it perish; in spiritual life the Sacrament of the Eucharist fulfills this role. For the Lord Christ says in John 6: Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, you will not have life in you ... for My flesh is truly food and My blood is truly drink. But just as man’s temporal life is subject to many miseries and infirmities, and therefore needs two remedies—one medicine to recover health, and another to remove the weakness caused by infirmity, which is done through diet and exercise—so in spiritual life these two must proportionally be found: one as a spiritual medicine, namely Penance, which restores health and eliminates the disease of sin; and another to remove the remnants of the disease and its weakness, which is done through Extreme Unction, which removes the remnants of sins. Moreover, because man is ordered to society and is perfected in relation to it in two ways, namely either by receiving the power to administer certain offices in the commonwealth, or by multiplying the commonwealth, the former corresponds to the Sacrament of Order, while the latter corresponds to the Sacrament of Matrimony, for this is at once an office of nature and a benefit and sign of grace.

You will say 1: There are as many Sacraments as there are defects of sin, for they are ordered against defects of sin; but there are only two defects of sin, guilt and punishment. — I deny the minor: because guilt and punishment have diversity both according to species, since the species of guilt and punishment are diverse, and according to the different states of men and their different dispositions. Hence the Sacraments had to be multiplied.

You will say 2: There are as many Sacraments as there are actions of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, because according to Saint Dionysius the Sacraments pertain to those actions; but there are only three actions of the Hierarchy: purification, illumination, and perfection. — I deny the major: because three things are considered in hierarchical actions: agents, recipients, and actions. The agents are the Ministers of the Church, to whom Order pertains. The recipients are those who approach the Sacraments, who are produced through Matrimony. The actions are purification, illumination, and perfection. Purification alone is not a Sacrament of the New Law conferring grace, but rather pertains to the Sacramentals, which are Catechism and Exorcism. Purification and illumination together pertain to the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy through Baptism, and, by way of remedy, to Penance and Extreme Unction. Perfection, as regards virtue, in which it is as it were formal perfection, pertains to Confirmation; as regards attainment of the end, to the Eucharist.

Third conclusion. — There are not more Sacraments than seven. This is sufficiently clear from the preceding Conclusions, and is proved as follows: if there were any Sacraments of the New Law besides the seven mentioned, they would most especially be some of those which are called Sacraments by the Holy Fathers, namely the washing of feet, blessed water, eulogiae, and martyrdom; but none of these can be inserted among Sacraments properly so called; therefore, etc. The major is clear. The minor, however, may be made clearer by being proved under four distinct headings.

1. — THE WASHING OF FEET IS NOT A SACRAMENT PROPERLY SO CALLED. — It is proved first because no Councils, no ecclesiastical institutions, no prayers, and no catechetical teachings—in which Apostolic Tradition is contained and declared above all—number such a ceremony among the evangelical Sacraments. It is proved secondly: a Sacrament of the New Law must be a certain sign, divinely instituted, to which a promise of sanctifying grace and the power of conferring it through divine institution, for observance by the universal Church, are attached; but none of these things belong to the washing of feet. First, it does not have a certain promise of grace, for that promise is nowhere read in Scripture or Tradition. Second, it does not have efficacy for conferring grace, for it was instituted by Christ as a sign of the purification to be made before the institution of the Eucharist and as a sign of Christ’s humility, not for conferring grace. Finally, it does not have a command or institution to use this rite. Hence it was never practiced by the universal Church, as Saint Ambrose observes in book 3 of On the Sacraments, chapter 1. Saint Augustine also says this in Letter 119, chapter 18, On the Observance of Days: When the Lord had commended the form of humility, which He had come to teach, as He subsequently explained it, the question arose when so great a thing should especially be taught by being done. The time arrived when that commendation would adhere more religiously; but lest it seem to pertain to the very Sacrament of Baptism, many did not wish to prescribe this as a custom. Some also did not hesitate to remove it from custom; others, in order to commend it at a more sacred time and distinguish it from the Sacrament of Baptism, chose either the third day of the octave, because the ternary number is especially eminent in many Sacraments, or even the eighth day, to do this.

You will say: Three things are desired for a perfect Sacrament: first, that it be a sensible sign ordered by Christ and signifying sanctifying grace; second, that it truly confer the signified sanctifying grace upon its recipients; finally, that its frequentation and reception be commanded. But these three things occur in the washing of feet performed by Christ. First, it was a sensible sign, since the Lord Christ put water into a basin and washed the Disciples’ feet, and this washing was no less sensible than that by which Baptism is performed. Second, it signified grace and interior cleansing, for there the Lord Christ says: He who has been washed does not need except to wash his feet, but is entirely clean. By these words He signifies that the washing of feet is necessary for the expiation of what, according to Saint Augustine, are like the dirt adhering to the feet, that is, to human affections, because of human intercourse and contact with sensible goods, just as earthly dust adheres to our bodily feet through touching and trampling. Finally, there certainly seems to be an obligation, and the same command, to frequent this washing as Baptism. Just as Christ said of Baptism, Unless someone is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he will not enter the kingdom of heaven, so He said to Peter, who rejected this washing: If I do not wash you, you will have no part with Me. — I deny the minor, for Christ did not wash their feet for the purpose that the washing should be an efficacious sign of conferring grace, but to offer an example of humility, to exhort them to interior purity of soul, and to make the Apostles worthy participants in His Body in the Eucharist that was soon to be instituted. Nor did He say to Peter, but you will know afterward, in order to assert that he would receive grace through the washing of feet; rather, He signified beforehand what He was going to do by instituting and giving the Eucharist to Peter. For when Peter received Christ’s Body and Blood from His hand, he then understood the mystery of this washing and of the fitting preparation for the Eucharist signified by it. Likewise, when He said, you will have no part with Me, He did not wish to express that the washing was necessary for salvation, but either to

move Peter to due obedience by His threat, and to warn him that on account of obstinate disobedience he would be excluded from eternal blessedness, as Saint Basil interprets it in the shorter-disputed Rules, responses 60 and 33; or to signify that he would have no part in His table and prepared supper, nor in His Body, which He was about to consecrate at that supper and distribute to the others. Since it was customary among the Jews not to approach the table before washing hands and feet, Christ wished this same ceremony to be observed by the Disciples; and He Himself wished to observe it by washing their feet, so as to offer them the counsel and example of profound humility. For this reason He said there: Do you know what I have done for you? You call Me Master and Lord, and you speak rightly, for so I am. If I, the Lord and Master, have washed your feet, you also ought to wash one another’s feet; for I have given you an example, so that as I have done, you also should do.

You will object: This response works against the Holy Fathers. For Saint Cyprian, or another author of the sermon on the washing of feet preserved among his works, says at the beginning: So that nothing might be lacking for the completion of the teaching, he placed a distinction between fixed and immovable precepts and those that can be changed and repeated, so that, once the others had been established immutably—namely Baptism, Confirmation, and Order, which he later says are not repeatable—the final kind of washing, adapted to daily expiations, might be commended to the faithful. And just as the law required its own sacrifices for each offense, one remedy of Christian faith was figured, to which a person might run whenever he recognized that he had offended. Around the middle he says: The Lord says: Unless I wash you, you will have no part with Me. Little by little the necessity of this mystery is declared, which the proposed condition makes unquestionable; and if we cannot have a part with Christ unless He Himself washes our feet, since consent is thus constrained, let Him wash and wipe, and explain to us the power of this Sacrament. Above we say that those washed in Baptism do not need the same washing; but this washing was instituted for daily transgressions. — I answer: Whoever that author may be, he called this washing a Sacrament because it bears the figure of the washing of Penance. It is sufficiently clear that he confuses it either with the Sacrament of Penance by way of accommodation or in power, both from the preceding words, in which, after asserting that Baptism is not repeatable, he had said: God’s wrath again burns against those who, having despised the indulgence of Baptism, use their own judgment and are driven by their will, not by necessity. He now adds: God does not immediately avenge contempt; nor does the wrath of the Judge run through each offense; nor has He closed the doors of mercy and its many passages; rather, He resists those who flee and compels the despairing to return, showing them Penance, than which no broader remedy is found, and giving those who return the benefit of being able once more to profit from the Sacraments they had injured; without Penance they could in no way afterward experience their effect. Therefore, most gracious Lord, You wash the feet of the Disciples, because after Baptism, which Your reverence does not permit to be repeated, You provided another washing that must never be omitted. Then he adds the aforesaid words set forth in the objection, for he says: *But this washing was instituted for daily transgressions, and its continual review, reaching to the very last things, ought to examine all works, each thought, and the affections running through the rites, raising, correcting, and washing the fragile and unstable soul in every respect, and omitting nothing in life that has not been expiated with groans and sighs.

You will press: Saint Ambrose, in book 3 of On the Sacraments, confirms the aforesaid opinion by his own judgment. For after prefacing these words of Christ to Peter, Unless I wash you, you will have no part with Me, he adds: We are not unaware that the Roman Church does not have this custom, whose type and form we follow in all things. Yet it does not have the custom of washing feet. But take care lest faith decline because of the multitude. There are nevertheless some who say, and try to excuse it, that this is not to be done as a mystery, that is, as a Sacrament, not in Baptism, not in regeneration, but as feet are washed for a guest. One thing belongs to humility, another to sanctification. Finally hear that sanctification is a mystery: Unless I wash you, you will have no part with Me. I say this not to reprehend others, but to commend my own duties; in all things I desire to follow the Roman Church. Yet we too are human beings and have understanding; therefore what is more rightly observed there, we also rightly preserve. We follow the Apostle Peter himself and cling to his devotion. What answer does this give to the Roman Church? Surely the author of this assertion is the Apostle Peter, who was a Priest of the Roman Church. Peter himself says: Lord, not only my feet, but also my hands and head. — I answer: It does not follow from this that Saint Ambrose absolutely teaches this washing to be a Sacrament, since he admits that it is not the faith of the Roman Church, which he professes to follow in all things. Rather, he wishes the washing of feet, omitted at Rome, to be preserved in his own Church, both to observe the practice according to the example of Christ and Peter, and to obtain grace not by reason of the washing but through the virtue of humility and imitation of Christ. Therefore he says that the custom more rightly observed in the Roman Church, of not washing feet, is also rightly preserved in the Milanese Church, where they are washed, because of the example of Christ and Peter.

You will press again: Saint Bernard, Sermon 1 on the Lord’s Supper, defends the aforesaid opinion still more clearly in these words: Let us have no doubt whatever about the remission of daily sins; we have its Sacrament, the washing of feet. Perhaps you ask how I know that it is the Sacrament of this remission. Shortly afterward he answers: But do we not know that it was done as a Sacrament, not merely as an example? Attend to what was said to Peter: if I do not wash you, etc. Therefore something lies hidden here that is necessary for salvation, since without it Peter himself would not have a part in the kingdom of Christ and God. A little later: And how do we know that this washing pertains to washing away sins which are not unto death, and from which we cannot completely guard ourselves before death? Clearly from the fact that the answer given to the one offering the gift and the head alike for washing was: He who has been washed needs only to wash his feet. He is washed who has no grave sins, whose head, that is, intention, and hands, that is, work, and way of life are clean. But the feet, which are the soul’s affections, while we walk in this dust, cannot be entirely clean; for at one time the mind yields more than it ought to vanity, at another to pleasure, or to curiosity. — I answer: Saint Bernard must be understood as speaking of a Sacrament named generally and improperly, insofar as it is some sacred sign signifying something, not of a Sacrament properly so called, that is, a sign effectively signifying grace. For Bernard knew that in the Roman Church only seven Sacraments were received and believed; why, then, would he have taught the contrary?

It is irrelevant that he asserts this washing of feet to be necessary for salvation and remissive of sins that are venial. He does not consider this necessity absolute, otherwise he would contradict himself, since he teaches that it was instituted only to expiate venial sins, for the sake of which alone it is most certainly true that no one is to be excluded from the kingdom of Christ and God. He says that it wipes away venial sins because it is an act of humility and charity, and therefore meritorious and remissive of venial sins.

II. — BLESSED WATER IS ALSO NOT A SACRAMENT PROPERLY SO CALLED. — It is proved because the Church does not have the power and authority to institute any sign or certain and determined ceremony that would have an infallible power of conferring sanctifying grace and granting remission of sins, since this belongs to God alone. But the consecration and use of blessed water derives its institution not from the Lord Christ but from the Church; therefore, etc. The major is clear: for if the Church could do this, it would confer the same power upon many other ceremonies, which would therefore have to be admitted to bestow grace ex opere operato; yet no theologian or Holy Father admits this. Moreover, if blessed water were effective ex opere operato for bestowing sanctifying grace and remitting venial sins, by similar reasoning it would be effective for the other effects to which it is ordered and consecrated, namely driving away demons, repelling their temptations, and averting other harms inflicted by them—and all the more because these effects are expressed in its blessing, whereas no mention is made of the remission of venial sins, nor of the bestowal of grace. The minor is also clear: for the institution of this sacred rite is traced back to Alexander I, Supreme Pontiff, who is said to be the author of this sacred ceremony. This Supreme Pontiff, the second after Saint Peter, speaking of such blessed water, says: When we bless the people sprinkled with salt, so that all who are sprinkled may be sanctified and cleansed, which we also command all priests to do: for if the ashes of a heifer sprinkled with blood sanctified and cleansed the people, much more does water sprinkled with salt and consecrated by divine prayers sanctify and cleanse the people. And if the barrenness of water was healed through salt sprinkled by the prophet Eliseus, how much more does salt consecrated by divine prayers remove the barrenness of human things, sanctify and cleanse the defiled, purge them, multiply the remaining fruits, avert the devil’s snares, and protect people from the persecution of phantoms? In these words he enumerates the chief effects of blessed water. Nor does it stand in the way that he attributes to it the power of sanctifying: this sanctification and cleansing do not belong to it in itself ex opere operato, but only by reason of the act and disposition of the person using such water. Hence it is indeed counted among the Sacramentals, but it ought not to be numbered among the Sacraments.

III. — MARTYRDOM DOES HAVE THE POWER AND EFFICACY OF A SACRAMENT, BUT IT IS NOT A SACRAMENT PROPERLY SO CALLED. — The first part is established: for it is most certainly true that martyrdom suffered and completed for Christ’s name has the power of destroying sin and conferring sanctifying grace. This will indeed be proved in question 2 of the following Disputation, Conclusion 2, where we declared that martyrdom supplies the place of Baptism by water both in children and in adults. — The second part of the same assertion is evident. A Sacrament properly so called must be a certain and efficacious sign of grace to be conferred, and have determined matter and form with the due intention of the Minister. But martyrdom is neither a sign of grace to be conferred, determined and instituted by the Lord Christ for that purpose. For who would say that an action harmful on the part of the agent, such as the action by which force is inflicted upon a martyr, is a sign divinely ordered to conferring grace? Nor does it have determined matter and form, since there are innumerable kinds of torture devised by the devil and tyrants for tormenting and killing Martyrs. Nor does it have a suitable Minister designated by the Lord Christ. For who would say that the Lord Christ instituted executioners as ministers of grace, especially those whose action cannot occur without the gravest mortal sin, since it is the killing of an innocent person out of hatred for God and the Christian Religion? The Seraphic Doctor adds in book 4, distinction 4, part 2, question 3: Baptism of blood is not a sacrament, since all those things that belong to the integrity of a sacrament are lacking in it, namely representation and likeness, signification and institution, sanctification through the utterance of the word; each of these is lacking, as was touched upon in the objection and will be clear upon inspection. And therefore it is not a Sacrament.

IV. — BLESSED BREAD AND EULOGIAE ARE NOT SACRAMENTS PROPERLY SO CALLED. It seems that Pope Melchiades was the first to mention blessed bread, customarily given to the faithful as a symbol of Catholic communion. He held the Pontifical See from the year of our Lord 311 to 314. As is reported in the book On the Roman Pontiffs, he arranged that consecrated offerings should be sent through the Churches by consecrated Bishops; this is called the fermentum. Similar things are reported of Siricius, who administered the Supreme Pontificate from 384 to 399. He established that no Priest should celebrate Masses throughout the week unless he received what had been preserved from the designated local Bishop, which is called the fermentum. Likewise Innocent I, who sat from 402 to 419, responding to the questions of Decentius, Bishop of Gubbio, says this in Letter 1, chapter 5, On the Fermentum, etc.:

You wished to consult us above about what we send on Sunday through the Titles. Since all our Churches are established within the City, and their Presbyters cannot meet with us on that day because of the people entrusted to them, they therefore receive from us through the deacons the fermentum we have made, so that especially on that day they may judge themselves separated from our communion. I do not think this ought to be done through the parishes, because the Sacraments are not to be carried far, nor do we send them through the various cemeteries to Presbyters established there, so that their Presbyters may have the right and permission to confect them.

Finally, the same appears from the ancient Roman Ritual, in which these words are found: On the fifth Sunday in Lent the fermentum is given in the Lateran Consistory. Moreover, that by the name fermentum nothing else is signified than the bread customarily blessed by Bishops or Priests, which was divided among the faithful who did not approach the sacred Eucharist, so that participation in such fermentum and eulogiae might be a symbol of Catholic communion, appears clearly enough from the ancient Canon inscribed under the title of Pope and Martyr Pius, which is found in the first volume of the Councils in these words:

So that from the offerings offered to the people and from the consecrations that remain, or from the breads which the faithful bring to the Church, or at least from their own, the Presbyter may suitably have cut portions in a clean and suitable vessel, so that after the solemnities of the Mass those who have not been prepared to communicate may thereafter receive eulogiae on Sunday and on the greater feasts, which he should first prepare with a blessing.

Such bread was called fermentum either by accommodation to that Gospel parable in which our Lord Jesus Christ in Matthew 13 compares the kingdom of heaven to leaven which a woman took and hid in three measures of flour until the whole was leavened. The kingdom of Christ in the present time is defined as that which is bound together by Catholic communion in the cohesion of one mass. Hence the person who received blessed bread signified by that symbol that he was joined with the other faithful of Christ in faith and charity; or rather, it was called fermentum to distinguish it from the Eucharist, which was confected in unleavened bread. — This symbol of Catholic communion was practiced not only at Rome and in the Western Church, but also in the Eastern Church, as seems to be declared in the Council of Laodicea, chapter 29, where it says: The holy offerings should not be sent to other parishes in place of Eulogiae throughout the Paschal feast, for no other reason, I think, than that on that day all the faithful approached Holy Communion and therefore had no need of another symbol of communion and unity in faith. On the other Sundays and feast days it was permitted to administer eulogiae, indeed also on other weekdays except during Lent, lest the fast be broken, as is gathered from the same Synod, chapter 19, where it is decreed: Bread ought not to be offered in Lent except on Saturday and Sunday.

For the fast was not observed in the Eastern Church on Saturday, just as it was not observed in the Western Church on Thursday, as Pope Melchiades had established. For we read of him in the book of the Roman Pontiffs: He established that no one should in any way solemnly fast on Sunday or Thursday, because on those days they celebrated what was, as it were, the sacred fast of the Lamb.

The eulogiae were of two kinds: some public, namely those distributed in the public ministry of the Church; others private, which friends were accustomed to give and receive among themselves back and forth. Public eulogiae were commonly distributed to those who, because of some impediment, were not prepared to communicate on weekdays and Sundays, according to the decree of Pope Pius reported by Burchard, book 5, chapter 27, and according to the Council of Nantes, chapter 9. They were also distributed to Catechumens themselves, who had no right to receive the Eucharist; for them this took the place of a Sacrament, or even was a kind of Sacrament, as Saint Augustine calls it in book 2 of On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 26, namely in the broader sense of Sacrament, because that bread was sanctified by prayers. That this was a supplement to the Eucharist is gathered from the report that blessed bread was made on Easter Day, because, as we have already said, all Christians were bound to receive the Body of Christ on that day. The eulogiae were distributed by the priest after Mass. Pope Leo I says in On Pastoral Care that eulogiae were distributed to the people after Mass on feast days. They were received with the greatest submission of spirit and reverence from the priest’s hand, after first greeting them with a kiss of the mouth, as Cabasilas testifies. For, says Saint Augustine in book 2 of On the Remission of Sins, chapter 20, although this bread is not the Body of Christ, it is nevertheless holy and a holier food by which we are nourished. Hence Pachymeres calls it θεῖος ἄρτος, divine bread, in book 5 of his History, chapter 8. Accordingly, just as the Eucharist was eaten by those fasting, if someone received it without fasting he handed it to a neighbor to eat; Allatius, in book 3 of On the Agreement of the Eastern and Western Churches, chapters 9 and 1, and Goar in his notes on the Euchologion report that this is still observed in the Greek Church. Balsamon seems to ascribe the first institution of eulogiae to the Antiochene Synod held under Constantius, in his commentary on Canon 2. The very ancient use of private eulogiae is proved by many examples. Among others, Saint Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, writes to Severus in Letter 1: We have sent you Campanian bread from our cell as an eulogia. And in his Letter to Saint Augustine: We ask you, in receiving it, to bless the single loaf which we mixed for your charity as a sign of unanimity. Saint Augustine himself, sending eulogiae to the same Paulinus in Letter 31, writes: May the bread we sent become a more abundant blessing through the love of your benevolent recipient. Several others mention those eulogiae, especially Saint Basil in the Rule, chapter 138; Saint Paulinus of Nola in his Letters to Alpius and Romanianus; Saint Fructuosus in the Rule, chapter 20; the Rule of Saint Columban, chapter 10, and of the Master, chapter 76; Gregory of Tours, book 1 of his History, chapter 16, and elsewhere; and Fortunatus, book 11 of the Poems, §12.

From all this it is clear that, although such eulogiae are called sacraments, they did not have the power and signification of a perfect Sacrament; they were merely given the name of Sacrament because participation in such eulogiae was a symbol of the Catholic communion of the faithful among themselves, so that those who had not communicated in the most sacred Eucharist might at least by another sign of communion be regarded as faithful. Therefore the Council of Laodicea, chapter 31, decrees: One ought not to receive eulogiae from heretics, because they are curses rather than blessings. Nor is it an objection that Pope Melchiades, and likewise Siricius, call that fermentum, or leavened bread, consecrated offerings sent through the Churches from the consecrated Bishop. For among them consecration is the same as blessing, and consecrated fermentum the same as blessed fermentum. They were called offerings because, as we noted from the Canon of Saint Pius, such breads were offered by the people so that, after receiving the Episcopal or Priestly blessing, they might be distributed piece by piece to the faithful.

From all these things, therefore, it is clear that the fermentum was nothing other than blessed leavened bread, which all the Parish Priests received from the Bishop as a symbol of communion and distributed in turn to the faithful established under them. The bread itself was called by various names: fermentum, to distinguish it from unleavened bread, from which the Eucharist was customarily confected; it was called a Sacrament because it was a sign of a sacred thing, namely Catholic union, and was marked by a blessing. For that reason it was likewise accustomed to be called a blessing and eulogiae.

Once the essence of the Sacraments has been explained and their number asserted, their origin, firmness, and effect must now be investigated, in which their dignity and excellence shine forth in a most marvelous manner. For what can be considered more illustrious, nobler and more splendid for their commendation, than that God alone is asserted to be the author and institutor of these aids to our salvation, and that the most excellent power of any creature whatsoever cannot contribute anything to their institution and ordination? What could be judged more worthy of human wonder than that such signs, however meager in appearance, should possess such great power that they not only cleanse a man hideously disfigured by sins, but also suffuse him with the light and beauty of sanctifying grace from heaven; and, what is still more astonishing, consecrate him as a son of God, and establish him as an heir and sharer? Hence Tertullian rightly said, in book On Baptism, chapter 1:

There is nothing that so hardens the minds of men as the simplicity of divine works, which is apparent in the act, and the magnificence that is promised in the effect. Thus faith too is deemed incredible because, with such simplicity, without pomp, without any new apparatus, and finally without expense, a man is lowered into water and immersed amid a few words, then rises no cleaner, or no cleaner at all; the attainment of eternity is deemed incredible, etc.

Thus three things are to be determined here: first, whether it belongs to God alone to institute the Sacraments; second, what their efficacy is with respect to producing grace; third, which Sacraments produce a character.

Note 1. Concerning the institution of the Sacraments, two powers can be distinguished: one indeed of authority, the other of ministry. The power of authority is called that which is independent of any other and, by its own virtue, chooses certain signs and confers upon them the power and efficacy of producing grace. The power of ministry, however, is that delegated virtue from the principal cause for either the confection or the administration of the Sacraments. Moreover, the power of ministry is established as twofold: one indeed principal of excellence, the other common. The principal power of excellence is that which belongs to someone with a singular prerogative above the other causes that can concur either in the designation or in the confection of the Sacraments. The power of ministry, commonly so called, is that which belongs to any minister insofar as he is merely a minister of the Sacraments, that is, an administrator and dispenser. Hence a twofold difficulty arises: first, whether God alone can confer upon some creature the power of authority to institute Sacraments, for example upon Christ's humanity; or whether the Lord Christ, insofar as he is man, possessed from his own virtue the principal power of excellence.

Note 2. From the Doctor in distinction 1, question 3, number 1: that it is one thing to institute a practical sign for producing grace, and another to render that sign certain and efficacious for producing the same grace.

For it is possible, says the Doctor, for someone at times who is not truthful to use that sign: for it has its signification from institution; but that it be certain it has only from the determination of some cause operating upon that sign in order to cause the thing signified; for example, if some legislator should institute in his polity the touching of hands, or something of the sort, as a sign of peace, although from this imposition that sign has the property of practically signifying peace, nevertheless, if another who is not truthful can use this sign, that sign is not certain from the legislator's imposition, but remains equivocal: at one time true, namely when it has the thing signified accompanying it, at another false; for the false person uses this sign, or thing signified, just as he would use a speculative sign, or thing signified, saying, “I grant you my affection,” while having something else, namely the opposite, in his heart.

These are the Doctor's words, by which he indicates that two things must be distinguished in the institution of the Sacraments: first, the designation of a sensible sign for signifying and conferring grace; second, the virtue and efficacy of that sign, by reason of which it is said to signify and confer grace certainly and infallibly, insofar as it is in itself. The first, however, is related only incompletely and imperfectly to the institution of a Sacrament, since it belongs to its very nature not merely to be a sign of sanctifying grace, but to be a certain and efficacious sign of it; and this it cannot obtain except from him who has the physical power of producing grace and attaching that production to this sign.

Note 3. Sacraments can be considered instituted by God in two ways, namely either immediately by himself, or mediately through some Angel or man. Immediately, for example, if God designated some sensible sign, at whose application he would certainly and infallibly produce and confer grace. This can indeed happen in two ways: either immediately by God as God, or by God insofar as he is God-man, that is, insofar as the divine person who immediately instituted those Sacraments subsists in assumed humanity. This again can be conceived in two ways: first, so that the whole designation of the Sacramental sign, and the power attached to it of producing grace, is referred back to the divine person, while only its manifestation would take place through the assumed humanity; or so that the assumed humanity itself has received from the divine person the communicated power of instituting signs of this sort effectively, as though it were proper to it, so that it is considered the principal cause of this institution. Likewise, God can be conceived as instituting Sacraments mediately in two ways: namely either incompletely, if he were to grant some creature the faculty of designating and assuming some sensible sign, at whose presence and placement he himself would certainly and infallibly produce grace; or completely, if he were also to grant the creature to whom he grants the faculty of instituting a sign the power and efficacy of producing grace.

With these preliminaries, three things remain to be established: first, that God alone has the power of authority and the principal power of instituting Sacraments properly so called, so proper and peculiar to himself that he cannot delegate it to any creature; second, that the Lord Christ, insofar as he is man, is not the principal and physical cause, but the moral cause, of the institution of the Sacraments; third, that he instituted all the Sacraments immediately insofar as he is God.

First conclusion. — GOD ALONE CAN COMPLETELY AND PROPERLY INSTITUTE SACRAMENTS. This is the Doctor's position in the passage praised above, number 5, where he says:

As regards signification, it would be possible for a Sacrament to be instituted by some creature, because just as a man could impose a speculative sign of God's effect, as is clear from this proposition, “God causes grace in the soul,” so he could impose a sign that would practically signify God acting invisibly; but he could not give that sign what would make it regularly certain: for he cannot give certainty to any practical sign unless it is in his power to be able to cause the thing signified by that sign; but God alone can determine himself to cause an effect proper to himself: therefore God alone can give certainty to the practical sign of his effect. Thus it is clear that a Sacrament can be instituted by God alone, as regards a certain sign.

And below, number 6, there:

if this certain sign belongs to the nature of a Sacrament, as seems to follow from that expression, efficacious, it follows that, according to its properly speaking nature, it can be instituted by God alone. But if it belongs to its nature, etc.

By these words the Doctor teaches quite openly that God alone can institute a Sacrament, since he alone has the power to produce grace infallibly upon the application and placement of some sign, although he could entrust to a pure creature the designation of some practical sign, at whose presence he himself would confer sanctifying grace. This designation, however, as we said, would be merely an imperfect Sacrament on the part of the one designating it; for whoever determined such a sign would not have from himself the power to make that sign efficacious and practical, but this would necessarily have to be supplied by God, and consequently God alone can institute Sacraments authoritatively. — The argument can indeed be formed as follows: only he can institute Sacraments authoritatively who can confer virtue upon a Sacrament and produce through it the effect signified; but God alone can confer virtue upon a Sacrament and produce its effect, namely sanctifying grace and remission of sin; therefore, etc. The major is evident. The minor is proved by all those texts of Scripture in which God is asserted to be the sole author of sanctifying grace and justification. Thus Job 14: “Who can make clean what was conceived from unclean seed? Is it not you, who alone are?” And Psalm 83: “The Lord will give grace and glory,” etc.

You will say 1: The Sacraments of the law of nature were signs to be assumed at will by faithful men as a protestation of their faith; but the Sacraments of the written law, like the Mosaic law itself, had been delivered through Angels: therefore Sacraments can be instituted by creatures. — I answer the first, that from this it follows only that the determination of Sacramental signs was from the human will, not that the institution of the Sacraments depended upon it: for God willed and immediately by himself instituted that, in the time of the law of nature, men should assume sensible signs for their sanctification, at whose placement he himself would produce grace, but not that men should attribute to those signs the power of producing grace. To the second I say that the law and the Sacraments of the Mosaic law are said to have been delivered through Angels, not because they established that law or instituted those Sacraments by their own authority, but only because they were their promulgators.

You will say 2: Whoever can produce the effect of a Sacrament can also institute a Sacrament; but the Ministers of the Church can produce the effects of the Sacraments: therefore, etc.

The major is evident from what was said. The minor is proved as follows: the effect of the Sacraments is that man is cleansed from sins, enlightened, and perfected through grace; but cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting belong to the Ministers of the Church, as Saint Dionysius teaches in book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 5: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor, and I distinguish its proof: cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting per se and immediately is the effect of the Sacraments, I concede; merely mediately, I deny. Likewise, with the minor distinguished, the consequence must be denied: for the cleansing attributed to the Ministers of the Church is not immediate; they are said to cleanse for this reason, that they cast out unclean spirits from the assembly of the faithful and dispose them to receive the Sacraments through catechisms and sacred admonitions. Likewise they enlighten God's people, not by enlightening the souls of individuals per se or infusing grace, but by preaching the things of God and administering the Sacraments.

You will say 3: From Saint Augustine, Tractate 6 on John, about the middle: John's Baptism was the baptism of a man; but John's Baptism was a true Sacrament: therefore man can institute a true Sacrament. The major is Saint Augustine's own; for he says:

It is one thing, he says, to baptize through ministry, another through power; for a baptism is such as he is in whose power it is given, not such as he is through whose ministry it is given. Such was John's baptism, such as John was: nevertheless, the baptism of a just man, but one who received from God such grace that he was worthy to go before the Judge; but such was the Lord's baptism as the Lord was, etc.

— I answer by denying the minor: for John's Baptism did not have the power of conferring sanctifying grace or remitting sins, as we shall prove when treating of Baptism.

You will say finally: A creature can designate some sign at whose presence God would infallibly produce grace; but this suffices for the nature of a Sacrament: therefore a creature can institute a Sacrament.

The major is proved by the authority of Saint Augustine in the passage praised above, where he says:

Now our Lord Jesus Christ could, if he wished to give some servant of his the power to give his baptism as though it were that servant's, and to transfer from himself the power of baptizing, and establish it in some servant of his, and give baptism, transferred to the servant, as much power as the baptism given by the Lord himself would have, etc.

— I answer the minor with the Doctor in the passage praised above, number 6: if these things suffice for the nature of a Sacrament, then indeed a pure creature could, by God's commission, institute Sacraments; and in this way the Doctor's position could be reconciled with the opinion of the Angelic and Seraphic Doctors, who assert that God can entrust a creature the virtue and faculty of instituting Sacraments, if this institution is taken precisely only as the designation of sensible form and matter, and as abstracting from certainty and efficacy with respect to the effect. This is indeed clear, because some thus hold that the remedy of the law of nature was instituted so that it would be in anyone's power to assume any thing as a protestation of faith. Thus Christ instituted the Sacraments by the power of excellence, as man; and just as the power of instituting the rites and solemnities of the Sacraments was given to the Church, so the power of designating the matter and form could have been entrusted to it. Yet certainty and efficacy would not follow from this for the instituted sign, but from God's decree by which he determined to concur infallibly in producing the signified effect. Therefore signs instituted in this way would indeed have their designation from a pure creature, but their effect from God; and thus the creature would be the author of the institution of the sign, while God would be the author of the signified effect. — Nor did Saint Augustine certainly intend anything else by the words cited in the objection, as is clear from what follows; for he says:

He did not want the hope of those to be in him who were being baptized, from whom they recognized themselves as baptized. Therefore he wanted the servant to place hope in the servant. For this reason the Apostle cried out when he saw people, in their worship, placing hope in himself: “Was Paul crucified for you, or were you baptized in the name of Paul?” Therefore he baptized as a minister, not as power itself. But the Lord baptized as power.

From these words it is clear that Saint Augustine did not want that primary and absolute power of sanctifying inwardly through the Sacraments to have been communicable to a servant. Indeed, if such power were granted, nothing absurd at all would follow if someone placed his hope in him. Thus he wanted only the Sacramental power of confecting and administering in the proper name of the one conferring, for example, I baptize you in the name of Claudius, or I confer my baptism upon you, to be able indeed to be conferred upon a servant, but not to be suitable, lest the servant, deceived by the very words, should place his hope in the baptizer rather than in God, the principal cause.

Second conclusion. — THE LORD CHRIST, INSOFAR AS HE IS MAN, WAS ONLY THE MORAL AND MERITORIOUS CAUSE OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENTS.

Proof: The Lord Christ had some causality concerning the institution of the Sacraments; but he did not have physical causality; therefore, moral causality.

The major is clear because, as will be proved in the following conclusion, he himself instituted all the Sacraments. The minor is proved: physical causality is either principal or instrumental; but he had neither. Not principal, indeed: first, because God alone is the principal cause of justification, as is gathered from these texts of Scripture, Job 14: “Who can make clean what was conceived from unclean seed? Is it not you, who alone are?” Isaiah 43 and Hosea 13: “There is no savior besides you.” Nor is it resolved by saying that those texts merely imply that God is the first cause of justification; for although God is the first cause of heating, it would nevertheless be absurd to say, “Who can make heat? Is it not you, who alone are?” when fire likewise concurs in forming heat. Second, because if Christ's humanity were the principal cause of the grace produced through the Sacraments, this would be either from its innate virtue or from a virtue divinely infused.

Not the first: since his humanity is of the same species and natural order as the others, whereas grace is of the supernatural order and exceeds the powers of every nature. Nor the second: for it would have this either from habitual grace or from the hypostatic union. Not the first; otherwise every just person could have such firmness, since he has Christ's grace, graciously similar in species. Nor does the greater intensity of Christ's grace stand in the way, because it does not change the nature and power of causing; for a more intense form has only this, that it can produce a more intense effect, which a less intense form would not produce because of greater resistance in the subject, and this has no place in the present case. Nor the second, because through that union the nature is not substantially changed and consequently receives no physical power that it would not have from itself; rather, by reason of the union God merely assists it, and through that divine assistance and union it comes about that the humanity is the moral, meritorious, and impetratory cause of a grace that another just person could not impetrate and obtain by reason of his works and his grace. This moral causality ought not to change Christ's humanity physically; it suffices that God, through an extrinsic relation, makes it worthy to obtain what it requests, just as royal dignity does not physically change the nature of a queen, who obtains something from the law by reason of such dignity that would not be granted to another, for example Esther. Thus Christ was heard because of his reverence, says the Apostle; but for him to be a secondary and physical efficient cause by reason of the hypostatic union, something real and physical would have to flow into it from the union itself; otherwise, remaining physically unchanged, he would obtain no physical activity from the union.

You will say 1: That is the principal cause to which the effect must be assimilated per se; but our justification consists in this, that it assimilates us to Christ's humanity, according to Romans 8: “He predestined us to be conformed to the image” (that is, to the humanity) “of his Son.” Therefore, etc. — I deny the major; for God can use the grace of one just person as an instrument for producing grace in another just person; and then the effect would be similar to that moral cause, and that cause would not be principal.

You will say 2: Whatever is the universal principle of our justification is its principal cause; but Christ is such a principle, for from his fullness we have all received. — I deny the major; and to the minor I say that Christ is called the universal cause of justification in the sense that, as man, he merited every grace which, as God, he produces.

You will insist: From this several absurdities follow: first, it follows that Christ does not differ from the other ministers, who are also instrumental causes; second, if he were only a moral instrument, he would not first have to be just and pleasing to God—for an instrument ought not to have the form that it produces in another—with the result that even a Priest, although he is in mortal sin, confers grace and absolves from sins, because he is merely an instrument; third, it would follow that our grace is more perfect than Christ's grace and justification, for the effect is always nobler than the instrument by which it is produced. — I deny all these consequences.

The first, indeed, because although they do not differ through instrumental virtue, he nevertheless differs because by true merit of condignity he impetrates grace from God; the others, however, produce grace through no merit of their own, but through the virtue of the Sacrament. The second likewise, because grace and holiness are truly prerequired in Christ for him to impetrate truly; otherwise, if he ministered merely as a Priest those things through whose conferral grace is infallibly conferred. The third, finally, because this is true of physical instruments, not of moral and impetratory ones: since the Most High does not approve the gifts of the wicked, nor hear sinners, it follows that whoever is to receive what he asks from God must be just and pleasing to him.

You will say 3: Christ is just by essence, for he has holiness from what is his own, not through participation; but what is such by essence is the principal cause of other things that are such through participation. — I distinguish the major: insofar as the God-man has holiness from himself, not begged from another, I concede; as though his humanity had justice from itself and not borrowed from the divinity, I deny. Likewise the major must be distinguished: things that are such by their own nature, I concede; things that are so only from another, I deny. Christ's humanity, however, is not holy by its own nature, but through internal habitual grace and through the external assistance of God flowing from the union; these do not change it physically and consequently do not confer any physical efficacy upon it.

Nor is it a physical instrumental cause: first, because, as was said, the humanity has no physical activity toward grace; second, because, as will be said more fully below, no creature can have natural efficacy toward grace and things that are of the supernatural order. — It remains therefore to infer that Christ is only a moral and meritorious cause. Meritorious, I say, since, as the Doctor says in distinction 2 of book 4, question 1, number 7, he is the meritorious cause of the Sacraments who, through signs instituted by himself, merited the efficacy of producing grace; but Christ, as man, merited this. Proof: God, offended by men, had decreed not to pardon such an offense, nor to grant any help for expiating it, unless divine honor were first repaired and satisfaction had been made to divine justice by the offering of someone who gave God as much honor as human sin had taken away; but Christ did this, offering himself to redeem us from all iniquity; indeed, so that where sin abounded, grace might abound more, so that redemption might be plentiful with him: therefore, etc. — It is confirmed, for all the efficacy of the Sacraments comes from Christ's Passion: therefore it is their meritorious cause. The antecedent is proved: the Sacraments have their efficacy from him from whom they have it that grace is regularly and infallibly produced upon their conferral; but they have this meritoriously from Christ's Passion. The major is evident, since the efficacy of the Sacraments is nothing else. The minor is proved: all grace to be conferred upon men is conferred solely in view of and through the virtue of Christ's merits. Hence Saint John: Grace and truth through Jesus Christ, and again: From whose fullness we have all received: therefore especially by reason of Christ's completed merits; but Christ's merits were not complete except through his death and Passion, which was not only the fitting terminus of his passibility, but also the seal and completion of his merit. Although the name Jesus was imposed upon him at the Circumcision and foretold by the Angel before he was born, nevertheless it was in his Passion alone that he attained the perfect power of that name, according to the Apostle: Christ humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; for which reason, etc. Since, therefore, he attained the name of Savior perfectly only through death, it must be inferred that from his death the means of our salvation, such as the Sacraments, derived their power and origin. The same is indicated by all those sacred passages in which Christ is said to have washed us from our sins in his Blood and to have redeemed us not with corruptible gold or silver, but with most precious Blood, etc.

You will say 1: An effect in act comes only from a cause in act, according to Aristotle, Metaphysics 5, chapter 2; but Christ's Passion is not in act: therefore it cannot confer the efficacy that the Sacraments actually possess. — The Doctor distinguishes the major: an efficient and physical cause, I concede; a moral and meritorious cause, I deny; for we have actually conferred many benefits because of past services, whose memory alone endures.

You will say 2: The Sacraments would have that efficacy from Christ's Passion either as past or as future. Not the first, otherwise Baptism and the Eucharist would not have that efficacy, since they were instituted before the Passion. Nor the second, otherwise the Sacraments of the Old Law could have had equal efficacy. Therefore, etc. — The Doctor answers that they had it from the Passion exhibited not indeed in an external act, but in an interior one, by which Christ from the moment of his Conception adjudged himself to the cross and death, according to: In the head of the book it is written, etc. And: I have a baptism with which I must be baptized, and how constrained I am until it is completed! I answer 2 that if they had been administered while Christ was alive, they would have had less efficacy, both because they would not have opened heaven to those receiving them, and because, if from the whole of Christ's life one offering for our redemption was contracted and integrated, from which our Sacraments drew their efficacy, it is most certain that it was not so fruitful from the incomplete offering as it was from the offering completed through the Passion.

You say 3: If the Sacraments had that efficacy from Christ’s Passion, chiefly either as from a meritorious cause or as from a principal cause. Not in the second way, because nothing can be the principal and efficient cause of the Sacraments unless it can be the cause of the effect signified through the Sacraments; but only God can be the efficient and principal cause of grace. Nor in the first way either, because grace has no meritorious cause: for if it were from merits, it would no longer be grace, as Paul argues in Romans 9. Hence St. Augustine speaks mystically, and by a certain likeness between the things that flowed from Christ’s side and the Sacraments. For blood is likened to the species of wine in the Eucharist, and the water that flowed forth is likened to baptismal water; hence St. Augustine says that these two Sacraments flowed from Christ’s side.

Third conclusion. — ALL THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW WERE INSTITUTED IMMEDIATELY BY THE LORD CHRIST. This seems to be a matter of faith determined in the Council of Trent, Session 7, Canon 1, in these words: If anyone should say that the Sacraments of the New Law were not all instituted by Christ, let him be anathema. Although the particle “immediately” is not explicitly present there, it is nevertheless plainly gathered that the Canon must be understood of immediate institution. First, because otherwise the Council would not have issued this Canon if it concerned only mediate institution; for everyone readily admits that, since it is certain that the Church prescribes nothing, especially in matters concerning the confection and administration of the Sacraments, except through the authority delegated to it by the Lord Christ. Second, because this Canon was added especially against the Lutherans, who contended that only the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist were instituted by the Lord Christ, and consequently affirmed that the others were indeed sacred rites ordered by the Church, but denied that they were Sacraments properly so called. Third, because in Session 21, chapter 2, the Holy Synod declares that this power has perpetually been in the Church, so that in the dispensation of the Sacraments, with their substance preserved, it might establish or change those things that it judged more expedient for the benefit of those receiving them or for the veneration of the Sacraments themselves, according to the variety of things, times, and places. But this exception, “with their substance preserved,” would be added in vain if they had been instituted not by Christ but by the Church; for if the Church had instituted them, it could also change their substance, since the same power belongs both to establish the laws of an earthly commonwealth and to approve them. Fourth and finally, if there were difficulty concerning the immediate institution of some Sacrament by the Lord Christ, it would especially concern Extreme Unction, which some contend was instituted by Saint James from chapter 5 of his Canonical Epistle. But the Council of Trent, Session 14, Canon 1, On the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, decreed: If anyone should say that Extreme Unction is not truly and properly a Sacrament instituted by our Lord Christ and promulgated by Blessed James, but only a rite received from the Fathers or a human invention, let him be anathema.

This truth is likewise gathered from Sacred Scripture; for Saint Paul says in 1 Corinthians 4: “Let a man regard us as Ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God,” that is, of the Sacraments; but if the Apostles had instituted some Sacraments, they would not be merely dispensers, but also authors and institutors of God's mysteries: therefore, etc. Further, in Acts 1 the Lord Christ is said after the Resurrection to have appeared to the disciples for forty days, conversing and speaking with them about the kingdom of God, that is, about the Church to be built and administered; but the Sacraments pertain above all to the building and administration of the Church. Hence Saint Leo writes splendidly in Sermon 1, On the Ascension of the Lord:

Those days that flowed between the Lord's Resurrection and Ascen> sion did not pass in an idle course, but great Sacraments were contained in them, great mysteries were revealed. This same point the Subtle Doctor clearly confirms in distinction 2 of book 4, question 1, number 1, where he says:

All the Sacraments were instituted by Christ, or by God, for the time of this Law. I briefly show this here, because each will appear more fully in its proper place. Of Baptism it is clear that it was instituted by Christ while he was living, because the disciples baptized, as is clear in John 3, and it was commanded that it be preached publicly, Matthew, last chapter: “Go, teach all nations, baptizing them,” etc. — Of the Eucharist its widespread preaching is clear in John 6, but its institution was at the Supper, Matthew 26. — Of Confirmation its institution is clear in John 20: “Receive the Holy Spirit,” etc., or on the day of Pentecost, Acts 2. — Of Penance it is said that it was instituted in James 5: “Confess to one another,” etc. But this does not seem probable from the progress of the text, because it immediately follows: “Pray for one another,” etc. For it is manifest that by what follows he did not intend to institute or promulgate any Sacrament; nor did James have the authority to institute any Sacrament, as will be touched upon below in the argument to be given for this conclusion. It is better, therefore, to say that it was instituted in John 20: “Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you forgive,” etc., and promised in Matthew 16: “I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Whatever you bind,” etc. For this power was not principally that of forgiving sins, which is proper to God, but of judging concerning the remission of sin, with a judgment approved by God; and to judge in this way is, in the forum of Penance, to loose or bind. — Of Extreme Unction it is said in James 5: “Is anyone among you sick?” etc. But although he promulgated the Sacrament there, it is better to say that it was instituted by Christ. For we read in Mark 6 that the Apostles anointed many sick people with oil, and they were healed; but it is clear that they did this only in the virtue of Christ, who had instituted that efficacious anointing. — Of Matrimony it appears in Matthew 19: “Have you not read” (Christ says) “that he made them male and female?” namely, God, and said, namely, through the mouth of Adam: “For this reason a man will leave,” etc.; where Christ approves and ratifies what God, in the state of innocence, published through Adam's mouth. — Of Order, Matthew 26: “Do this in remembrance of me.” And John 20: “Whose sins you forgive,” etc. For these two things pertain to the Priestly Order, namely, power with respect to the true Body of Christ and power with respect to Christ's mystical body, as will be said in the treatment of Order. — That all these were instituted by God alone is clear from what was touched upon generally concerning the institution of a Sacrament. No one is competent to institute a practical sign except either with respect to some act of his own or with respect to someone subject to him as regards that act; but a Sacrament is a practical sign properly with respect to God's effect, and God cannot be subject to another in an act proper to himself: therefore, etc. These are the Doctor's words.

The Holy Fathers teach the same truth, especially Saint Dionysius, who says in Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 1: The Apostles received the forms of the Sacraments; they did not invent them; but they could not have received them from elsewhere than from Christ: therefore, etc. — Likewise Saint Ambrose says in book 4, On the Sacraments, chapter 4: Who is the author of the Sacraments, except the Lord Jesus! And

Saint Augustine, book On True Religion, chapter 17: Where, he says, will be the time of grace, where the very wisdom of God, having assumed man, through whom we were created for freedom, established certain most salutary Sacraments, etc. This is also urged by three arguments, or fittingnesses. For it was fitting that all the Sacraments, which are efficacious means for attaining salvation, should derive their origin from him who is truly the Mediator of God and men, lest men place their hope in anyone other than the Mediator himself. Second, lest division and schism arise in the Church because of different Sacraments instituted by different persons: for if a contention had arisen among the faithful because those who had been baptized by the Apostles considered themselves preferable to those who had received Baptism merely from the disciples, as the Apostle observes in 1 Corinthians 1, rebuking them for saying, I indeed am of Paul, but I am of Apollos, and I of Cephas, although all had been baptized in Christ's baptism, how much more would they have been divided from one another if they had received different baptisms from different persons? Finally, since it belongs to the head of a commonwealth to enact fundamental laws, and laws that have force throughout the commonwealth, such as sacramental laws, by the very fact that there were several institutors of the Sacraments, there would also be several heads in the Church, which would certainly be absurd and dangerous.

You will say 1: Addressing the disciples in John 20, the Lord Christ says: As the Father sent me, so I send you. But he was sent by the Father in such a way that he had the power of instituting Sacraments: therefore he delegated the same power to the Apostles. — I distinguish the major: as regards something, namely the office of reconciling men and extending the remission of sins, I concede, because, as Saint Paul said, “We act as ambassadors for Christ”; as regards the complete fullness of authority, I deny. Otherwise it would follow that, just as the Lord Christ could remit sins without any intervention of the Sacraments, so the Apostles too could remit sins in that way.

You will say 2: Whoever the author of the Sermon at the Supper is, in Saint Cyprian, treating of the washing of feet, says: “He himself, the supreme Priest, is the institutor and author of his Sacrament. In the others, men had the Holy Spirit as teacher; and just as the dignity of the Holy Spirit and Christ is equal, so authority and power are equal in their institutions. What the Apostles handed down at the dictation of the Holy Spirit is no less ratified than what the Lord himself handed down and commanded to be done in his memory.” Therefore he judges that the Lord Christ instituted only the Eucharist immediately. — I answer first, denying the consequence: Christ is called the institutor and author of the Eucharist above the other Sacraments because he celebrated it first; he not only instituted it, but also exhibited and received it; the other Sacraments were not so. For the Apostles conferred and received these, already instituted by Christ. I answer second: that author understands by Christ's Sacrament not only the Eucharist, but also the other Sacraments; and by “in the others” he understands the ceremonial rites, which were instituted not immediately by Christ but by the Church, as Bellarmine, Gravina, and others explain. I add that the authority cited above does not favor the heretics, since they teach that not only the Eucharist but also Baptism was instituted immediately by Christ.

You will say 3: From Saint Augustine, Letter 115: Christ sustained us with his easy yoke and light burden; hence with very few Sacraments, easiest in observance, most excellent in signification, he bound together the society of the new people, such as Baptism, communion of his Body and Blood, and whatever is commended in the canonical Scriptures. But those things that we preserve not written but handed down, which are observed throughout the whole world, are to be understood as commended and established either by the Apostles themselves or by plenary Councils, whose authority in the Church is most salutary, and are to be retained as established. Therefore Christ instituted immediately only those Sacraments that are commended in Scripture; the others were instituted by the Apostles. — I deny the consequence, for all the Sacraments are commended in Scripture, at least implicitly. Second, Christ immediately handed on to the Apostles, and they to their Successors, many things concerning the matter and forms of the Sacraments that they did not wish to write down, lest they be cheapened among the unlearned and profane. For, from Saint Augustine, Letter 57: “You know in what sacrifice it is said: Let us give thanks to the Lord our God.” From Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 3: See that you do not number the Holy of Holies, but rather revere it; and do not hand on less perfect things, but communicate them only to those who are sacred. And chapter 7: It is sacrilegious to interpret the consecrated invocations by themselves and to bring into public their secret meaning and the rites through which God secretly works in them. Therefore the things that Saint Augustine says are preserved as established by the Apostles or Councils are ecclesiastical ceremonies, for example that the Lord's Passion, Resurrection, Ascension into heaven, and the coming of the Holy Spirit from heaven be celebrated with an annual solemnity, and whatever else the universal Church observes.

You will insist: The same Saint Augustine, book 3 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 19, says:

After the manifest sign of our freedom shone forth in Christ's Resurrection, we are not burdened even with those signs whose operation we now understand as a heavy burden, but, in place of many, the Lord himself and Apostolic discipline handed on to us a few signs, easy in faith, most august in understanding, and most chaste in observance.

Therefore, in his view, not only Christ but also the Apostles handed on and instituted Sacraments. — I distinguish the major: “the Lord himself and Apostolic discipline handed on,” namely the Lord by instituting, but Apostolic discipline by commending and dispensing what Christ instituted, I concede; as though Christ himself instituted only certain Sacraments, while Apostolic discipline instituted the rest, I deny. And likewise, with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence.

You will say 4: There are many Catholic Doctors who expressly assert that some Sacraments were instituted either by the Apostles or in Councils. For Hugh of Saint Victor, book 2 of On the Sacraments, part 1, chapter 5, says in express terms: The Sacrament of Extreme Unction of the sick is read as having been instituted by the Apostles; for the Apostle James, writing in his Epistle, says: Is anyone among you sick? etc. Saint Bonaventure likewise holds this concerning the Sacrament of Confession, in distinction 17 of book 4, article 1, question 3:

Confession, he says, was suggested by the Lord and instituted by the Apostles, promulgated by Saint James, Bishop of Jerusalem, in his Epistle, chapter 5, where he says: Confess your sins to one another.

He proves this assertion as follows:

Because, he says, confession is a purely human work; hence the virtue of the Sacrament was not given to Confession itself, but to Absolution; therefore the institution was rightly reserved to pure men.

From what has been said, four reasons can be drawn why the Lo> rd did not immediately and expressly institute Confession: first, because it was not necessary; second, because he taught that in this it ought to be voluntary; third, because it is the Sacrament of those who relapse; fourth, because in itself it is a human work. Hence I believe that he did not institute it per se, although he is said to have instituted it; this is to be understood as suggesting it and giving authority.

Moreover, our Alensis says in the question On the Sacrament of Confirmation, member 1:

Some say that this Sacrament was instituted and conferred by the Lord, for example when he placed his hands upon children, Matthew 19. But since in that imposition of hands nothing is expressed concerning the form of the words or the matter through which this Sacrament would be exercised, it is clear that it was not instituted by the Lord. Others say that this Sacrament was instituted, conferred, and administered by the Apostles; this is not true, and it is clear from the fact that the Apostles confirmed by the mere imposition of hands, without anointing and without the form of words used by the Church. For this reason it must be said, without prejudice, that the Lord neither instituted this Sacrament as a Sacrament, nor dispensed it, nor did the Apostles. It must therefore be understood that after the Lord's Ascension it was fitting that the Apostles be confirmed and that the Holy Spirit be given to them for strength; hence the Holy Spirit had not yet been given, because Jesus had not yet been glorified. I say, not in fullness or for strength; but he was given on the day of Pentecost. Hence the Apostles were confirmed immediately by the Holy Spirit without a mystery and Sacrament, and they themselves afterward confirmed without a Sacrament. Why this? It is clear within. But after the Apostles, who were the foundations of the Church, who had been appointed by the Lord and confirmed by the Holy Spirit, had failed, this Sacrament was instituted by the impulse of the Holy Spirit in the Council of Meaux, as regards the form of words and the elemental matter, and the Holy Spirit also conferred upon it the power of sanctifying.

Saint Bonaventure teaches the same in distinction 7 of book 4. — I answer first, that those authors understood by the name “institution of the Sacraments” their promulgation and administration. But what some, together with Alensis, judged concerning Confirmation, namely that it was instituted in the Council of Meaux celebrated in the year 844, can be confirmed by no reason, since not even a single word of institution or promulgation is found in the Canons of that Council. If we look at the Acts of the Council as they are reported in volume 3 of the Councils of Gaul, there are only Canons concerning Chrism, namely 4 and 16. In the first it is forbidden that anyone receive any gift on account of the sacred chrism; in the second, that anyone presume to make sacred chrism except on Holy Thursday of Holy Week. But if we attend to the chapter That Bishops, cited by Gratian from the Council of Meaux in On Consecration, distinction 5, it is merely prescribed that Bishops, fasting, should give the Holy Spirit through the imposition of hands. No mention is made of institution. I answer second, as Saint Augustine once answered the Donatists when they objected with Saint Cyprian's authority concerning the invalidity of Baptism conferred by heretics, book 2 against Cresconius, chapter 30: I do not accept, he says, what Blessed Cyprian thought concerning the baptism of heretics and schismatics, because the Church for which Blessed Cyprian shed his blood does not accept it.

Note 1. Both ancient and more recent heretics have fallen into various errors concerning the efficacy of the Sacraments and the power of producing [their effects]. For St. Augustine reports, in book 16 of On Heresies, that the Manichaeans denied the Sacraments the power of justifying: baptism, he says, in which they assert that they bring no salvation at all to anyone, nor do they think that any of those whom they deceive has been baptized. The Paulicians too, according to Epiphanius, book 2 of the Panarion, chapter 21, taught that Baptism benefited the soul in no way, although it brought some benefit to the body: they sometimes wish, he says, their children to be washed by the Presbyters of the Church with salutary baptism: for they think that water and Baptism benefit the body; yet they do not think that it reaches the purification of the soul, nor that it brings any other benefit. Likewise the Massalians, or Messalians, according to St. John of Damascus, near the end of book On One Hundred Heresies, said that the amendment of the soul was brought about by prayers alone; and that Baptism did not perfect a man, nor did the divine Sacraments cleanse the stains of the spirit, but that only the prayers poured forth by man contributed to this. Hence the Euchites, that is, “prayers,” were so called, because, according to Theodoret, book 1 of Heretical Fables, chapter 11, they attributed the perfection of salvation to prayers alone: for they said that Baptism removed sins only like a razor, but not the roots of sins, which, they asserted, were uprooted completely by prayer alone; and that the evil demon assigned to each person from the beginning was entirely expelled from the soul. They were also called Enthusiasts, because they admitted into themselves the power of some demon, which they called the presence of the Holy Spirit. Finally, the Armenians, distinguishing between the remission of sins and grace, taught that sins were remitted through the Sacraments, but denied that grace, or anything else justifying, was conferred through them, as Guido the Carmelite asserts in book On Heresies, chapter 16. — As for the more recent heretics, their opinion concerning the efficacy of the Sacraments was not one and the same, but multiple: for the Sacramentarians and Anabaptists deny them every production of grace. As for Luther and Calvin, if you look to their words, they sometimes seem to agree with us and sometimes to disagree; yet in reality they differ from us altogether, for they assert no other causality in the Sacraments than that of sealing or recalling, not that of truly producing grace; so that they do indeed wish faith to be aroused and nourished through the Sacraments, by which man grasps the divine promises and, by the benefit of this apprehension, is justified through faith. Hence Melanchthon, in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, concerning articles 4 and 13, boldly declares:

We condemn the entire body of Scholastic Doctors who teach that the Sacraments confer grace, by the work worked, upon those who place no obstacle, without a good movement on the part of the user. This opinion has simply been judged to be that we are justified by ceremonies without a good movement of the heart, that is, without faith; and yet this impious and pernicious opinion is taught with great authority throughout the papal realm.

To refute these errors and vindicate Catholic Doctrine from this impious accusation and calumny of the heretics, three points must here be established: first, that the Sacraments produce sanctifying grace by the work worked; second, how they produce it, whether through physical activity or only through moral activity; third, what kind of grace they produce and confer. To make these points clearer,

Note 2. When it is said that grace is produced ex opere operato, nothing else is signified than that it is produced by the power of the external work elicited: for a human work can be distinguished as twofold, namely external and internal. The external work, however, is situated as it were passively, because it is commanded by the internal work, and obtains from it its value and merit. Hence theologians took occasion to distinguish a twofold mode of operating, namely ex opere operantis and ex opere operato. Someone is then said to act ex opere operantis when he produces an effect by the force and efficacy of an interior work, for example when someone obtains sanctifying grace by the power of contrition or of another disposition. He is said to act ex opere operato, however, when he performs some external act by whose power grace is produced, even if there were no efficacious disposition in the recipient for receiving grace, provided that there is no obstacle on his part. Thus, to confer grace ex opere operato is to confer it by reason of the external work, or the conferral of the Sacrament, and not by reason of the interior act of the recipient or minister; or, which is the same, to confer it not by reason of merit, but beyond the merit of the recipient, and solely by reason of the external work received. This does not mean that we wish the Sacraments to confer grace on adults without any disposition of theirs, as Melanchthon and Calvin wrongly charge us, book 4 of the Institutes, chapter 11, where he pretends that the meaning of this controversy is: Whether the Sacraments confer grace without faith, or a good movement of the heart, or the disposition of the recipient. For the Council of Trent openly teaches the contrary, Session 6, where it teaches that faith, repentance, devotion, etc. are required beforehand in adults for receiving sacramental grace. — Nor is there reason for Calvin, in the same place, section 11, to mock these words ex opere operato and call them monsters of words and new inventions: for, if Horace is witness, in The Art of Poetry,

Many words will be reborn that have already fallen, and will fall, those now in honor, if usage so wills;

and Cicero writing in the Tusculans: Usage has invented many words, and made obsolete those it invented: certainly usage has prescribed this term for more than a hundred years. For we find it used by Innocent III in book 3 of On the Mystery of the Mass, chapter 5, where he writes: Therefore the wickedness of the Priest does not impede the office of the Sacrament, just as the weakness of the physician does not corrupt the power of the medicine: although, therefore, the operating work may be unclean in some respect, nevertheless the work operated is always clean. Nor is it unusual or unheard-of to coin new words and, against the rules of Grammar, change a deponent verb into the passive; for we have the foundation of this practice in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 3, in these words: God is said to approve such sacrifices, where the deponent verb promeretur is taken passively. Thus, in a similar case, St. Augustine in Psalm 138 preferred to say ossum ossi rather than os ossis, so that it might be more easily understood by the people: For it is better, he says, that grammarians should reproach us than that the people should not understand.

Note 3. A productive cause of something can be distinguished as twofold: one physical, the other moral. A physical cause is one that by a real action reaches the entity and production of the thing itself. A moral cause, however, does not reach the effect through its action, but either by applying active things to passive things, as a physician is called the cause of health; or by inducing an agent to act through prayers, counsels, commands, prohibitions, a proposed reward, and the like. Again, either cause is twofold, namely principal and instrumental. A principal physical cause is one that reaches the effect through itself and independently of the influx of another cause, although it admits another into cooperation in producing the effect. A principal moral cause is called that which moves more principally and efficaciously toward the production of the effect: for example, a prince who orders the prefect of the treasury to give someone a hundred gold pieces is called the principal cause of such a gift. An instrumental physical cause is one that does not operate through the power of a form existing in it, but only through the motion by which it is moved by the principal agent. An instrumental moral cause is an instrument that the principal cause uses to produce the effect; for example, a letter written by the king's hand to the prefect of the treasury ordering him to give a hundred gold pieces is an instrumental moral cause of such a donation, because it is the instrument the prince uses for such an effect; the principal moral cause, however, is the prince's will. The question is how the Sacraments produce grace: whether, that is, through the mode of a physical or moral cause, principal or instrumental. Since the Sacraments are diverse, and some are more excellent than others, it must also be established whether they produce greater or equal grace in subjects equally disposed.

First Conclusion. — THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW PRODUCE GRACE BY THE WORK WORKED, OR BY THE FORCE OF THEIR INSTRUMENTAL CAUSALITY. This has been determined as a matter of faith in the Councils: first in the Council of Nicaea, rendered into Latin by Alphonsus Pisano, where book 3 of the Constitution on Holy Baptism reads as follows:

Our Baptism, he says, is not to be considered with bodily eyes, but with the eyes of the mind: you see water; consider the power of God hidden in the waters. The one who is baptized descends guilty of sins and rises freed from this servitude and sin, made a son of God and heir of his grace.

The Florentine Council likewise expressly teaches this in the Decree of Eugene, where it is decreed that there are seven Sacraments of the New Law, which differ greatly from the Sacraments of the old law; for those did not contain grace, but only signified that it was to be given through the Passion; whereas these, our Sacraments, both contain grace and confer it on those who worthily receive them. — But most clearly of all the Council of Trent, Session 7, Canon 6, On the Sacraments: If anyone says that the Sacraments of the New Law do not contain the grace which they signify, or that they do not confer that grace on those who place no obstacle, as though they were merely external signs of grace and justification received through faith, and certain marks of Christian perfection by which the faithful are distinguished from unbelievers among men: let him be anathema. And Canon 8: If anyone says that grace is not always given through these Sacraments, and to all, so far as concerns God’s part, even if they receive them rightly, but only sometimes and to some: let him be anathema. And Canon 9: *If anyone says that through the Sacraments of the New Law grace is not conferred ex opere operato, but that faith alone in the divine promise is sufficient for conferring grace: let him be anathema. The same is gathered from the Constantinopolitan and Nicene Creed, where it is defined: We confess one Baptism for the remission of sins.

This truth is proved first from all those texts of Scripture in which grace is declared to be conferred, or to have been conferred, through the Sacraments. First, this is clear concerning Baptism. For it is written in John 3: Unless someone is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, and so forth. In these words regeneration and spiritual birth are attributed to the Holy Spirit as principal cause, but to water as instrumental cause. For water is joined with the Holy Spirit as the cause of this regeneration, which is especially signified by the conjunction “and”; for, as grammarians know, it indicates some causality.

Calvin responds, book 4 of the Institutes, chapter 16, no. 27, that by water the Holy Spirit is signified:

I therefore simply take water and Spirit for the Spirit who is water. Nor is this a new expression, for it entirely agrees with that found in Matthew, chapter 3: the one who follows me is the one who baptizes in the Holy Spirit and fire. Therefore, just as to baptize with the Holy Spirit and fire is to confer the Holy Spirit, who in regeneration has the function and nature of fire, so to be reborn of water and the Spirit is nothing other than to receive that power of the Spirit which does in the soul what water does in the body.

— But Hunnius the Lutheran, book On Baptism, chapter 10, rightly calls this interpretation of Calvin a thoroughly reckless act and a twisted gloss of the devil, since it directly conflicts with other texts of Scripture in which remission of sins and the justification of a person are attributed to Baptism itself. Thus in Acts 2: Let each of you be baptized in the name of Christ for the remission of sins: where the preposition “for” with the accusative case denotes for what end, and toward what effect, this washing is performed; and it further denotes Baptism as antecedent to justification, and consequently it is not merely its seal and connotative sign, as Calvin wishes. — Hence Ananias said to Paul in Acts 22: Be baptized; wash away your sins in his name. Then St. Paul himself, explaining the instrumental efficacy of Baptism in Ephesians 5, says: Christ loved the Church and gave himself for her, cleansing her with the washing of water in the word of life. And in Titus 3: He saved us through the washing of regeneration. In these passages cleansing and salvation are assigned as effects of the washing with water. — The same is clear concerning the Eucharist. For it is written in John 6: Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you will not have life in yourselves. But if the Eucharist were only a sign of grace and did not confer it, this expression would be no less absurd and ridiculous than if someone said: unless someone drinks from ivy, signifying wine for sale, he will not satisfy his thirst. Likewise in 1 Corinthians 10 the Apostle intends the faithful to be one in the unity of charity: because we, though many, are one bread and one body, all who partake of the one bread. But if participation in one bread is the constitutive reason for the unity of the body, it is manifest that this unity is the effect of such participation; and therefore charity, through which that bond is made, is attributed to the Sacrament of Christ's Body as the effect of its cause. — The same is clear concerning the other Sacraments.

We read the same concerning Penance: Whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven him. Concerning Orders, in 2 Timothy: Stir up the grace which is in you through the laying on of my hands. Concerning Extreme Unction, in James 5: The prayer of faith will save the sick person, and if he is in sins, they will be forgiven him. Concerning Matrimony, although the testimony is not so evident and clear, it is nevertheless gathered from Ephesians 5, where it is called a great Sacrament, so that it may be signified that its efficacy is the same as that of the other Sacraments.

The same truth can likewise be proved by various arguments drawn from the teaching of the holy Fathers. First, from their assertion that the nature and magnitude of the Sacraments' operation, by which it surpasses the natural weakness of the intellect, can be found and understood only through faith. “It is marvelous,” says Tertullian, book On Baptism, chapter 2, “that death is washed away in the washing; but it is all the more to be believed if, because it is marvelous, it is not believed. For what do they say divine works are, unless they are beyond all wonder? You yourselves also wonder, but because we believe.” Likewise St. Chrysostom, Homily 24 on John 1: Those things we see and touch every day, he says, need faith; how much more those hidden and spiritual things? Hence that well-known exclamation of St. Augustine, Tractate 80 on John: What a great power of water, that it touches the body and washes the heart! But unless baptismal water contributed to the production of grace, and a person were moved by faith merely toward its presence, there would be nothing marvelous in it and nothing worthy of exclamation. Therefore, and so forth.

Secondly, the same is persuaded by various likenesses which the holy Fathers use to explain the regeneration that takes place through the water of Baptism. For St. Chrysostom, Homily 25 on John, likens it to the maternal womb: What the womb is, he says, for the embryo, that the water of faith is: for in water it is begotten and formed. In the same place he compares Baptism to the waters which, at the beginning of the world, God commanded to produce creeping things: For first, he says, it was said: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life: but from the time Christ entered the channel of the Jordan, the waters produce no longer creeping things that are living souls, but rational and spiritual souls. But St. Leo, Sermon 5.4 On the Nativity of the Lord, compares Baptism to the womb of the Blessed Virgin:

For every person being reborn, he says, the water of Baptism is like a virginal womb, the same Spirit filling the font who filled the Virgin, so that the sacred Conception, which had removed sin there, may here remove it through mystical washing.

Hence some of the holy Fathers also say that, just as the Holy Spirit came upon the Virgin so that she might conceive Christ the Son of God, so mystically he came upon the waters of Baptism so that he might confer on them the power of producing adopted children of God. The spirit, says Tertullian, book On Baptism, chapter 10, came down from heaven immediately and floated over the waters, sanctifying them from himself; and thus sanctified, they absorb the power of sanctifying. St. Jerome teaches the same in the Dialogue against the Luciferians, not far from the beginning: First, he says, the water itself is washed by the Spirit, so that it may be able to wash others spiritually. And St. Cyril of Alexandria: Just as water heated by the powers implanted in fire burns no otherwise than fire itself, so water, which is sprinkled on the body of the baptized by the operation of the Holy Spirit, is transformed for divine virtue and power. Certainly all these and other similar expressions would be empty and void if the Sacrament of Baptism contributed in no way to producing grace.

Third, the same truth is plainly established by the fact that Baptism conferred on infants remits original sin, confers sanctifying grace on them, and, if they depart this life before attaining the use of reason, brings them to the kingdom of heaven, as St. Augustine teaches everywhere against the Pelagians. But these marvelous effects cannot be attributed to the efficacy of the infants' faith; and therefore they are attributed solely to the power of the Sacraments.

The Lutherans and Calvinists respond that, at the time when infants are baptized, the use of reason is divinely granted to them. — But this response is more worthy of ridicule than refutation: for who would believe that God works this miracle, when neither Scripture nor the holy Fathers mention it in any way?

Finally, the same truth appears from the splendid praises with which the holy Fathers commend the efficacy of Baptism. Thus St. Ambrose, book On Initiation, chapter 4: In that element of the world, he says, he was buried, dead to sin, and raised again to eternal life. Theodoret, in the Epitome of the Divine Decrees, chapter “On Baptism”:

The gift of Baptism gives not only remission of past sins, but also implants hope of promised goods, makes us participants in the Lord’s death and resurrection, grants participation in the gift of the Holy Spirit, and makes us children of God, heirs, and co-heirs of Christ; for it does not, as the insane Messalians think, merely imitate a razor by removing sins.

The Heretics respond that the holy Fathers speak of the efficacy of the Sacraments through the arousal of faith. — On the contrary, first, many of them write that the Sacraments of the Gospel flowed from Christ’s pierced side, and that Christ wished to be baptized so that, by the touch of his most pure flesh, he might give the waters the power of cleansing, as Ambrose says, book 2 on Luke. But if it influenced only by arousing faith, and not by eliciting grace, as a sermon or a picture does by representing the mysteries of faith, they would not rightly be said to have flowed from Christ’s side; just as neither a sermon nor a picture is said to have flowed from it. Nor would Christ be said to have given any power to the water by the touch of his flesh more than to sacred sermons. The Sacraments of the Gospel would also have nothing more than the Mosaic [Sacraments] in conferring grace, because the Mosaic [Sacraments] also aroused faith. But the Fathers distinguish our Sacraments from the ancient ones in that ours produce grace, which the ancient ones merely signified. The reason is that, according to the heretics, faith is truly a cause of salvation and grace; but in Scripture the Sacraments of the New Law are called a cause of grace in the same way as faith. For faith is described in Luke 7: Your faith has saved you. John 5: He who believes him who sent me has eternal life. Acts 15: Purifying their hearts by faith. Romans 4: We reckon that a man is justified by faith. Romans 9: Therefore, being justified by faith. Of the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist the same things are said in the same words: 1 Peter 3: Baptism saves you. John: He who eats my flesh has eternal life. Titus 3: He saved us through the bath of regeneration. John 3: Unless someone is born again of water, etc.

The Heretics object with various texts of Scripture by which they try to prove that man is not justified through received Sacraments, but through the faith and devotion of the recipient. First, because Habakkuk 2, Romans 1, and Hebrews 10 say: The just man lives by faith; but he does not live by the Sacraments; therefore the Sacraments cannot be said to justify. — I distinguish the major: the just man lives by faith, that is, through faith he awaits and expects the eternal life promised to him by God, and is not shaken, or, even if he sees it delayed, remains so because of the faith he has, I concede. Hence Habakkuk says: If he delays, wait for him, because coming he will come, and he will not delay. Behold, he who is unbelieving, his soul will not be right within him; but the just man will live by his faith. The Apostle likewise says in Hebrews 10: You have need of patience, so that, doing the will of God, we may receive the promise: for yet a little while, and he who is to come will come, and will not delay; but my just man lives by faith. That is: faith alone contributes to justice and life, and the Sacraments contribute nothing of themselves to it. — I deny: for it is false that faith produces sanctifying grace and contributes by itself alone to justification, as we said in the Disputation on Faith.

They object 7. Those who teach that the Sacraments produce grace not only distract people from Christ's merits, but as it were bind divine power to the Sacraments; for they make people resort to a bodily thing as the cause and source of their justification, as though God could not justify them except dependently on those external signs. But the consequence is absurd; therefore so is the antecedent. — I deny the major: rather, through these helps they advance people toward God and Christ, since they admit that the Sacraments have power only from Christ's merits and that the effect signified through them is produced efficiently by God alone, but morally by those Sacraments. Thus, just as those healed by Christ through touching his garment, such as the woman with the issue of blood, or through the mud placed on them by his divine hands, such as the man born blind, did not place their hope in those material things but rather in Christ the Lord himself, from whom, as from a fountain, this healing power flowed, so we do not place our hope in the Sacraments themselves but in God's efficiency and Christ's merits. This would not involve absurdity; otherwise God should not have healed the Israelites from the serpents' bite through looking at the bronze serpent, or cleansed Naaman the Syrian through the waters of the Jordan; nor should the Son of God have assumed flesh, lest people adhere more to a bodily thing than to God. Nor is God, justifying through the Sacraments, bound to the Sacraments themselves; rather the Sacraments are bound to God, because God can justify without the Sacraments, whereas the Sacraments cannot without God. Add that the heretics themselves want an adult to whom Christ's blood is applied not to be justified except through faith, yet they do not want God bound to faith or to Christ's blood; therefore the same must be said of the Sacraments.

They object 3. In the passage of 1 Peter where eight souls are said to have been saved through water: Which also, he says, now saves you by a like figure, Baptism—not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the appeal of a good conscience to God through the resurrection of Jesus Christ: but this appeal of conscience is nothing other than an exercise of faith in Christ’s Resurrection, which has the power of sanctifying; therefore salvation must be attributed not to the water of Baptism, but to the virtue of a good conscience and faith. — I distinguish the major: a good conscience’s appeal saves us insofar as it is a disposition and preparation for receiving the effect of Baptism fruitfully, I concede; as the sole productive cause of grace and salvation, I deny. To the minor I say that the appeal of conscience itself is nothing other than the interior cleansing of the mind, which is called the appeal of a good conscience to God through the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, namely by reason of its effect. For this appeal is the effect of the washing of the soul: the cleansing of the soul’s stains makes it possible for our conscience to be questioned and tested by God as sincere and good, and also to ask God and answer him, because it firmly believes in Christ’s Resurrection, so that we may walk in newness of life. For, as the Apostle says in Romans 4.¹ Christ rose for our justification.

They object 4. That passage of Luke 5: Who can forgive sins except God alone? Therefore man cannot contribute anything through the Sacraments toward the remission of sins. They confirm this from St. Jerome on the fourth chapter of Isaiah, where he says: Man provides the water, but God the Holy Spirit, by whom the stains are washed from the soul and sins are cleansed: therefore man contributes nothing at all to the bestowal of grace through the administration of the Sacraments. — I distinguish the antecedent: God alone remits sins as the principal cause, I concede: for Isaiah says, chapter 43: I am he who blots out iniquities: as ministerial and instrumental cause, I deny. Thus, for example, the Lord Christ restored sight to the man born blind as principal cause; nevertheless the water of Siloam, with which the blind man made use at Christ’s command, contributed to that restoration of sight as instrumental cause. Hence St. Augustine, book 3 of the Questions on Leviticus, question 81: And Moses, he says, sanctified, and the Lord: but Moses by visible Sacraments through his mystery, whereas the Lord by invisible grace through the Holy Spirit.

They object 1. They cite various authorities of St. Augustine, by which he seems to signify that men contribute to justification through the administration of the Sacraments in no other way than by praying and entreating. Thus he teaches especially in tractate 6 on John: He saw, he says, Simon Magus saw that the Holy Spirit was given through the laying on of hands, not because they themselves gave him, but because he was given while they were praying: he teaches the same lib. 15. De Trinitate, chapter 17: How great is God, who gives God: for none of his disciples gave the Holy Spirit; they were praying that he might come upon those on whom they laid hands, they themselves did not give him: and the Church also preserves this practice in its prelates: but if the Apostles did not confer the Holy Spirit through the laying on of hands, neither did they bestow grace; for, the Apostle says, The charity of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us. — I respond: St. Augustine means nothing other than that the Apostles did not give the Holy Spirit as a divine Person; nor did they bestow grace as principal cause, I concede; as the gift of the Holy Spirit, I deny. And so the consequence must be denied. For St. Augustine’s meaning is no different: there he proves Christ to be God from the fact that he gave the Holy Spirit on Pentecost; for he says: How is he not God, who gives the Holy Spirit? Indeed, how great is God, who gives God? None of his disciples gave the Holy Spirit, because properly he can be given only by him from whom he proceeds; but he does not proceed from the disciples, and consequently could not be personally given by them. Nevertheless, as ministers of Christ they gave the gift of the Holy Spirit himself; for we read in Acts 8 that the Holy Spirit was given through the laying on of hands.

They object 2. They cite other authorities of the same holy Doctor by which they try to prove that the Sacraments act only according to the faith and disposition of the recipient. Thus, Sermon 3 On the Words of the Lord: Baptism, which is once administered, cleanses through faith. And in the book Questions on the Old and New Testament, question 50, where he thinks Baptism consists in a bodily manner, he says: he is not spiritual and will not be able to obtain the heavenly gift, who believes that he is changed by water itself, not through faith; for water touches him, but he is cleansed by the Spirit working, so that faith may be in him. But if man is changed through faith, not through water, salvation must be attributed to faith, not to the Sacrament. — I respond to the first: Baptism cleanses through faith as a prior disposition, I concede; as the efficient cause of cleansing, which Baptism arouses and from which it has the power of cleansing, I deny. For St. Augustine explains that passage of Luke 11: Now you Pharisees cleanse what is outside the cup and the dish. But what is within you is full of plunder and iniquity. Hence Christ rebukes the Pharisees, who washed themselves with water every day before lunch as though that washing could be cleansing of the heart, and he warns the disciples not to think that justice consists in cleansing the body; for Baptism cleanses adults through faith as a subsequent disposition. Faith, however, is within, not outside, according to Acts 15: Cleansing their hearts by faith. But the Pharisees washed what is outside, while within they were stained by very many vices. To the second I respond first that this work is in no way St. Augustine’s, as Erasmus proves by several arguments in his censure of this book; nor is this treatise mentioned either in St. Augustine’s books of the Retractions or in the catalogue of Possidius. Among other things, this author conflicts with St. Augustine’s doctrine: for he teaches that by the Spirit of the Lord, which was borne over the waters at the world’s origin, the Holy Spirit is not understood, but the spirit of matter placed over all substances. Likewise, that Melchizedek was not a man, but was the Holy Spirit. And in question 69, which is brought against us, he explains these words of the Lord, John 3: The Spirit blows where it wills, etc., of the wind, not of the Holy Spirit. All of these things are wholly opposed to St. Augustine and to the truth.

Nor is it valid to say with some that the Sacrament produces grace for an undetermined time, or at a determined time before the Sacrament is completed; or with others that grace is produced at the same instant at which the Sacrament is completed. For every real and physical cause is presupposed, at least by priority of nature, to its effect; therefore it cannot produce before it exists. Moreover, while the form is completed and finished, only the final syllable remains in being, and that is not the Sacrament.

Objection 6. If the Sacraments of the New Law truly concurred in producing grace, they would have a different efficacy and power from the Sacraments of the Old Law: but Saint Augustine teaches the contrary: therefore, etc. The major is clear from what has been said. Calvin proves the minor, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 11, no. 26, from Saint Augustine, Homily 26 on John, where the holy Doctor says:

The sacraments of the Jews were different in their signs, equal in the thing signified: different in visible species, equal in spiritual power. And in Homily 45: In different signs, the same faith; in different signs, just as in different words: for words change their sounds with the times, and words are certainly nothing other than signs. The Fathers drank the same spiritual drink, not the same bodily drink. See, therefore: while the faith remained, the signs changed. There the rock was Christ; for us, Christ is what is placed on the altar. And they drank flowing water from the rock as a great sacrament; what we drink, the faithful know. If you attend to the visible appearance, it is something else; if to the intelligible signification, they drank the same spiritual drink. In Psalm 78, book 19 Against Faustus, chapter 13: The food and drink of those people was the same as ours in mystery; but the same in signification, not in species: for the very same Christ was figured for them in the rock and manifested for us in the flesh. Although we also concede that in this respect there is some difference. For both testify that God's benevolence in Christ and the graces of the Holy Spirit are offered to us by the Father; but ours do so more illustriously and clearly. In both there is the presentation of Christ; but in these it is fuller and more abundant, namely according to what we discussed above concerning the distinction between the Old and New Testaments. And this is what Augustine himself intended (whom, as the best of all antiquity and the most trustworthy witness, we cite so often) when he teaches that, after Christ was revealed, the Sacraments were instituted fewer in number, more exalted in signification, and superior in power. Thus Calvin.

I answer first, that Calvin has falsely and corruptly produced the first authority; for nowhere did Saint Augustine say that the Sacraments of the Old and New Law are equal in spiritual power, but that they signify the same thing by spiritual power. For he says: Those sacraments are different in their signs, but equal in the thing signified. Hear the Apostle: For I do not want you to be ignorant, brothers, that all our fathers were under the cloud.... and all ate the same spiritual food: certainly the same spiritual food; for the bodily food was different, because they had one and we another; but the spiritual food was the same as ours. And he adds: All drank the same spiritual drink; they had one and we another, but visibly different, while signifying the same thing by spiritual power. From this it is clear that Saint Augustine means nothing other than that the Sacraments of the Old and New Law agree in power—not indeed in producing grace, but in signifying it—with this distinction, that those signified only speculatively the grace that was to come, while these signify it as present and practically.

I answer second, that the Sacraments of the New Law have two offices: one, to instruct; the other, to heal. They instruct when they signify grace; they heal when they confer it. In the first office they are protestative signs of faith; in the second, operative signs of salvation, as Saint Chrysostom observes, Homily 82 on Matthew: Through this most sacred table, he says, he both saves and attracts. In the former office they agree with the Sacraments of the Old Law, which commended and taught the same faith, and differ from them only in this: the Sacraments of the Old Law regarded and signified the future object of faith, while the Sacraments of the New Law represent the past, namely Christ's Incarnation, life, death, and his other mysteries. In the latter office, however, the Sacraments of the New Law differ entirely from those of the Old Law: for although the latter signified the same grace, they neither contained nor conferred it; they were needy and empty, Saint Paul says, and if they possessed any fullness, they were filled only with shadows and figures; for everything happened to them in figure. Saint Augustine did not distinctly note this distinction in the places cited above for two reasons: first, because he was in Africa, where the heresy of the Manichaeans was spreading, and they condemned the Old Law; hence it was more fitting to express the harmony of the Sacraments of the Old and New Law than to proclaim their difference; second, because the Treatises on John and the expositions of the Psalms are homilies and discourses to the people, among whom were catechumens and many unbelievers, to whom it was not permitted to reveal the mysteries of the Church. Hence Saint Augustine also frequently says in those sermons: as the faithful know.

Objection 7. Those who teach that the Sacraments produce grace not only draw people away from Christ's merits, but also, as it were, bind divine power to the Sacraments; for they make people resort to a bodily thing as the cause and source of their justification, as though God could not justify them except dependently upon those outward signs. But the consequent is absurd: therefore, so is the antecedent. — I deny the major: rather, through these aids they advance people toward God and Christ; for they acknowledge that the Sacraments have power only from Christ's merits, and that the effect signified through them is efficiently produced by God alone, but morally by those Sacraments. Thus, just as those who were healed by Christ through touching his garment, like the woman with the flow of blood, or through mud placed by his divine hands, like the man born blind, did not place their hope in such material things but rather in the Lord Christ himself, from whom, as from a fountain, this healing power flowed, so we do not place our hope in the Sacraments themselves, but place it in God's efficiency and Christ's merits. This certainly involves no absurdity; otherwise God should not have healed the Israelites from the serpent's bite through looking at the bronze serpent, nor cleansed Naaman the Syrian through the waters of the Jordan; nor should the Son of God have assumed flesh, lest people cling more to a bodily thing than to God. Nor is God, when justifying through the Sacraments, bound to the Sacraments themselves; rather, the Sacraments are bound to God, because God can justify without the Sacraments, whereas the Sacraments cannot without God. Add that the heretics themselves want an adult to whom Christ's blood is applied to be justified only through faith, yet they do not want God bound to faith or to Christ's blood: therefore the same must be said of the Sacraments.

The last objection is: A bodily creature cannot produce a spiritual and supernatural thing: but a Sacrament is a bodily creature, while grace is a supernatural thing: therefore, etc. — I answer, distinguishing the major: it cannot produce it as a principal cause, I concede; as an instrumental cause, I distinguish: physically, I concede; morally, I deny. Then, having conceded the minor, I likewise distinguish the consequent. Whether they produce grace physically or morally, it is sufficient to stop the mouths of the adversaries speaking wickedly.

I answer that these points have no force: first, because it is certain that through these prayers the water does not receive the power of sanctifying, since any other unblessed water would suffice for Baptism; moreover, that power would have to belong not to the water alone but also to the words, since the Sacrament is constituted from matter and form. Second, because those words can be understood only of moral efficacy, which water or oil does not have from its nature, but from divine ordinance. Just as a king can accomplish through royal authority many things which he could not accomplish according to his natural and physical powers, while that royal authority nevertheless establishes nothing physical in him, so the Sacraments can do many things by divine ordinance and through moral efficacy which they could not accomplish according to natural power, as the Catechism says.

To the first question, therefore, I say that since the necessity of things ordered to an end is taken from the end, and according to all who speak about the Sacraments the end of a Sacrament is grace, or some invisible effect of God disposing a person toward salvation, and since this end can sufficiently be obtained in the way it is obtained through a Sacrament without saying that the Sacrament has any properly so-called action, either with respect to grace, which it cannot reach because grace is created, or with respect to the prior supernatural disposition, because that too would be created, it follows that such an action should not be posited, since neither are these additional things necessary nor can they manifestly be posited.

Saint Bonaventure in the same place, article 1, question 1, Alensis, part 3, question 5, member 3, article 5, Aureolus, question 1, article 4, Durandus, question 1, and Vazquez, distinction 132, chapter 5, incline to the same opinion. The Doctor proves it because the necessity of something is inferred from the end; but the end of the institution of the Sacraments is sanctifying grace, or some invisible supernatural effect; and this effect can be obtained through the Sacrament without that physical influx: therefore, etc. The Doctor's argument is indeed most effective, based on the presupposed refutation of the affirmative opinion, which we shall present below.

The Conclusion is therefore proved. First, by the authority of the holy Fathers, who deny true physical efficiency to the Sacraments of the New Law. Thus Saint Cyprian, Sermon On the Baptism of Christ: Remission, he says, whether it is given through baptism or through other Sacraments, belongs properly to the Holy Spirit, and the privilege of this efficiency remains with him alone: the solemnity of the words, the invocation of the sacred name, and the signs of institution entrusted to the priestly ministries of the Apostles visibly celebrate the Sacrament; but the Holy Spirit forms and effects the reality of the Sacrament. — Basil agrees, book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 15, where he says: The Lord who dispenses the rite established the covenant of baptism for us: the water fulfilling the image of death, while the pledge of life proceeds beforehand through the Spirit. Therefore he thinks baptism is a covenant or sign of a covenant, upon which God has established that he himself immediately infuses grace. Ambrose also agrees, book 7 On the Sacraments, chapter 5: One thing is the element, another the consecration; one thing the work, another its operation; the water is the work, the operation is that of the Holy Spirit. Finally Saint Augustine, Letter 23: It, he says, exhibits outwardly the sacrament of grace, while the Spirit inwardly works the benefit of grace: dissolving the bond of guilt, reconciling the good of nature, regenerating the human being in the one Christ. From these passages it appears how the holy Fathers deny physical, but not moral, efficiency to the Sacraments; for elsewhere they affirm that the Sacraments produce grace. Therefore, to reconcile them with one another, moral causality must be established and physical causality denied. In ordinary speech we both attribute and deny an effect to one and the same cause; for example, when the craftsmanship of a palace is praised, the prince is said not to have built it, but the craftsman; but if its magnificence is praised, then the prince, not the craftsman. Likewise, when the Fathers explain in the Sacraments what power physically produces grace, they attribute it to God alone; but when they explain what the Sacraments can do by reason of their institution and Christ's merits, they teach that they cause grace.

Second, it is proved by reason. The causal efficacy of the other Sacraments is the same as that of Baptism: if Baptism does not have true physical causality and efficacy with respect to producing grace, then neither do the other Sacraments. The minor is established: a more perfect power of causing grace and justification does not belong to Baptism than to the humanity of the Lord Christ; but the humanity of the Lord Christ had only moral and meritorious efficacy with respect to producing grace; therefore physical causality, which is more perfect, does not belong to Baptism. The major is clear: Baptism and the other Sacraments borrow all their efficacy from Christ's meritorious works, which are present in them and applied through them, as Saint Augustine teaches in the Enchiridion, chapter 52, and Origen and Anselm, from Saint Paul's saying to the Romans 6: Whoever has been baptized in Christ has been baptized into his death. The minor is proved from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7, where, speaking of the causes of justification, it says:

The causes of this justification are: the final cause, indeed, the glory of God and of Christ, and eternal life; the efficient cause, the merciful God, who freely washes and sanctifies, sealing and anointing with the Holy Spirit of promise; the meritorious cause, his most beloved only-begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, by his most holy Passion on the wood of the cross merited justification for us and made satisfaction for us to the Father; the instrumental cause, the Sacrament of Baptism, which is the Sacrament of faith, etc.

By these words the Council attributes two kinds of causality to Christ, namely final and meritorious causality; but the causality of an efficient cause, insofar as it is distinguished from the instrumental and meritorious, it attributes to God alone, and without any qualification. By this manner of speaking it denotes physical efficiency, which is efficiency without qualification; therefore the Council's meaning is that such efficiency belongs neither to the Sacrament nor to Christ. The consequence is proved because the Council declares that Christ's merit must be referred chiefly to his Passion, through which he paid the due satisfaction to God the Father for us; but this merit cannot have true physical efficiency, since operation follows being, and consequently what does not really and physically exist cannot physically and really influence the production of anything; but the Passion of the Lord Christ and his merits exist neither in themselves nor in any effect of theirs really, but only in divine acceptance; therefore they cannot have physical efficiency. Add that the Council attributes causality to Christ's Passion only insofar as it had the character of satisfaction and merit; but in this respect it had no other kind of causality than moral. This is proved because Christ's Passion influences those justified no differently as something offered than as something to be offered: for Christ was the Redeemer and head of all, both those who preceded and those who followed, according to Paul's saying: All drank from the spiritual rock following them, and the rock was Christ. But Christ's Passion did not have the character of a physically influencing cause with respect to those who preceded his Incarnation, since it did not yet exist; therefore neither does it now act physically.

Third, the preceding argument is confirmed. What physically concurs in the production of something must really exist while the thing is produced and must have some activity by which it can physically act and produce; but the Sacraments neither really exist while grace is produced nor have any physical activity by which they can concur in its production; therefore, etc. The major is clear as to the first member: what does not really exist cannot produce anything more really than a possible or dead man can in fact and in act speak or walk; for to operate follows being, and consequently what is not actual and real cannot act actually and really. It is likewise clear as to the second member: for if it has any activity in first act with respect to something, it can never produce that thing more than blackness can whiten, etc. The minor is therefore proved as to its first part. A Sacrament, for example Baptism, does not really exist—neither in its entirety, nor according to any part of itself, nor according to anything produced by it—while grace is being produced. I prove it: a Sacrament does not operate and cannot produce grace unless it is perfect and complete both according to the matter and according to the form. For if, for example, in baptizing someone, through malice, ignorance, or the death of the person baptized, someone were to say only, I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Spirit, but did not add the final word, holy, there would be no Baptism and consequently it would produce no grace, because the Sacrament would be imperfect, as everyone admits. If someone denied this, he could be convicted by the fact that, if omission of one word of the form did not invalidate the Sacrament, neither would omission of two invalidate it, nor three, and so on; for the penultimate word is no less of the essence and integrity than the final one. Thus, by omitting the words Holy Spirit, Baptism would nevertheless be valid, which the Councils proscribe as heretical. Therefore Baptism does not produce grace until it is completed by the utterance of the final syllable of the form. But that final syllable of the form is not the Sacrament either: first, because otherwise it alone would suffice to produce grace; second, because grace is produced only in the instant in which the complete utterance of the necessary words is formally completed, and in which it is true to say: now that form is no longer complete, though immediately before it was. Therefore, in the instant in which grace is produced, the Sacrament is not real either in its entirety or according to any part of itself. Nor does it remain according to anything produced by it through which it could produce grace, because the same difficulty that was raised concerning the production of grace would recur; besides, no other effect to be produced is assigned, apart from the Sacraments that do not imprint a character, except sanctifying grace and certain aids of grace.

The Lutherans and Calvinists reply that, for the time during which infants are baptized, the use of reason is divinely granted to them. — But this reply is more worthy of laughter than refutation: for who would believe that God performs this miracle, when neither Scripture nor the holy Fathers mention it in any way?

Nor is it valid to reply likewise that, through obediential power, God elevates that last part of the Sacrament, whether through some supernatural quality, as the intellect is elevated by the light of glory to see God and the will by charity to love, or through an extraordinary concurrence by which a creature, by reason of obediential power, is elevated in activity to produce the effect. I say that the reply is not valid: first, because that part, thus elevated and physically causing, is not the Sacrament of Baptism, since to produce grace through the Sacrament of Baptism the utterance of the other words and the outward washing are required, and they do not then exist in act; second, because if they exist, they do so only morally. Therefore, if the earlier words can morally move God to elevate that syllable so that grace may be physically produced, why will the complete words not sufficiently move God to produce grace?

You will reply that the real existence of the whole cause is not required for it to act physically, but that it is enough for one part to remain after the other parts have passed away, and for that part to produce the effect in place of the whole; for example, alteration, although successive, concurs as a whole in the production of heat, although only one part of it exists while heat is produced. — On the contrary, it is impossible for something to be said to produce anything physically according to a part that does not exist, unless that part, while it existed, produced something conducive to the production of the effect; otherwise it would be a cause and not a cause. Nor can one part produce by the power of the other parts unless the earlier parts produced something which, through the last part, could be carried out, though that last part by itself could not carry it out. Nor does the example of alteration press the point: either heat is produced in the instant after the motion, and then it is not said to be produced by alteration except insofar as alteration removes obstacles and prepares the subject; or it is produced through successive alteration, and then each part of the motion produces each part of the heat. Hence that example contributes nothing to the matter.

For the earlier words do not produce a part of grace, both because they do not have the character of a Sacrament and because, if the others were not uttered, a person would nevertheless be said to be justified—which is impossible and all deny it. Nor do they remove an impediment or prepare the soul, because the soul of itself is sufficiently disposed to receive grace, and there can be no other impediment than the person's obstinate will in sin, which can be changed not by the earlier words of the form, but by exciting and cooperating grace: therefore, etc.

Objection 1. All the authorities of the Councils and the holy Fathers praised in the first Conclusion, in which true causality with respect to grace is attributed to the Sacraments of the New Law. — Vasquez replies, that this causality is preserved more suitably and better by moral causality than by physical causality: first, because it is easier to understand and involves fewer difficulties requiring solution; second, because in this same way the Fathers, the Councils, and Scripture testify that Christ's death, blood, and Passion cleanse and sanctify us, etc., just as they assert this of the Sacraments; yet it is certain that Christ's death does not sanctify us physically, but only morally and meritoriously; finally, because the Fathers speak in the same way of the efficacy of a Sacrament when it has long been completed and when it is being administered, as in the case proposed concerning baptismal grace. For Saint Augustine, book 3 On Baptism, chapter 3: Then, he says, the same Baptism begins to be effective for the remission of sins, when they have come to the peace of the Church—not so that sins already remitted may not be retained, nor so that that baptism might be rejected as foreign or another, nor so that another might be given, but so that it might be that very same baptism, etc.

Objection 1. 1. The prayers of the Church in the blessing of baptismal water, among which are found these and similar words: Bless these simple waters with your mouth, so that, beyond the natural cleansing for which they can be used to treat bodies, they may also be effective for purifying minds. And when the candle is immersed, these words are said: Let the power of the Holy Spirit descend into this fullness of the font. And while breathing upon the water: May he make the whole substance of this water fruitful with the effect of regeneration. — 2. The prayers which the Bishop uses on Holy Thursday at the Lord's Supper in consecrating oil: We humbly ask your mercy that, by bestowing spiritual grace upon this ointment, you pour into it the fullness of sanctification. — 3. The words of the Catechism of the Council of Trent, part 2, chapter 1, no. 27, where, explaining the manner in which grace is produced, it says:

But how such a great and admirable thing is effected through the Sacrament, so that, as Saint Augustine's celebrated saying has it, water touches the body and washes the heart—this indeed cannot be grasped by human reason or understanding. For it must be established that no sensible thing is endowed by its nature with such power that it can penetrate into the soul; but by the light of faith we know that the power of almighty God is present in the Sacraments, by which they effect what natural things cannot accomplish by their own power.

I answer that these things prove nothing: first, because it is certain that through these prayers the water does not receive the power of sanctifying, since any other unblessed water would suffice for Baptism; moreover, that power would have to belong not only to the water but also to the words, since the Sacrament is constituted from matter and form. Second, because by these words only moral efficacy can be understood: water or oil does not have it from its own nature, but from divine ordinance. Just as a king can accomplish many things through royal authority which he could not execute according to natural and physical powers, while royal authority itself establishes nothing physical in him, so the Sacraments can accomplish many things by divine ordinance and through moral efficacy which they could not accomplish according to natural power, as the Catechism says.

You will object: The Catechism says that this manner of operating is admirable and ineffable. And Saint Cyril, book 1 on Saint John, chapter 11, speaking of Christ's Flesh, after saying that he used not only signs and wonders as God, but also employed his flesh as a kind of co-worker in all things, so that he might show in reality that his flesh too, because it is united to him, is life-giving, says in chapter 21, treating of the efficacy of that same flesh in the Eucharist: We cannot understand with the mind or express with the tongue how this happens; but we receive it in silence and with firm faith. But if he had thought that this happened through moral efficacy, he would not say that it was ineffable. For what is easier to conceive than that moral efficacy? — I answer, that moral efficacy is indeed far easier to conceive than physical efficacy; nevertheless it is very admirable that, upon the application of such signs even by the most unworthy person, God infallibly produces grace.

You will object 1: Saint Ambrose, book 4 On the Sacraments, chapter 1, compares the words of consecration and transubstantiation with the words of creation; but the latter had physical efficacy: therefore so do the former. — I distinguish the antecedent: he compares them with respect to the truth of the effect on the part of the speaker, I concede; with respect to the efficacy of the utterance and of the words, I deny. Saint Ambrose intends only that, just as God was able to create all things from nothing by a word, so much more could he change created things by a word. Whether those words meanwhile have physical efficacy or moral efficacy is immaterial, provided that the effect follows.

You will object 2: It would follow from this that the Sacraments have no greater efficacy than the words of sorcerers for producing marvels through the aid of demons. — I deny: because the Sacraments have infallible efficacy, incapable of being impeded by any cause, with respect to producing grace in a disposed subject. The case is otherwise with sorcery, etc.

Third conclusion. — THE SACRAMENTS CONFER EQUAL GRACE ON SUBJECTS EQUALLY DISPOSED, AND UNEQUAL GRACE ON THOSE UNEQUALLY PREPARED. Thus the Council of Trent expressly teaches, Session 6, chapter 7, where it attributes the inequality of grace not only to God's will but also to the differing disposition of those who receive it, in these words: We are truly called righteous and are [righteous], receiving righteousness in ourselves, each his own, according to the measure that the Holy Spirit apportions to each as he wills, and according to each one's proper disposition and cooperation. It should be noted, however, that by the words as he wills the Council does not intend that the Holy Spirit sometimes confer unequal grace on two persons disposed in the same way: otherwise it would add and according to each one's proper disposition in vain. Rather, it understands the measure on God's part to be his will, by which he apportions gifts to each universally as he wills, whether in the Sacraments or outside the Sacraments.

The Sacraments of the Jews were different in signs, equal in the thing signified: different in visible species, equal in spiritual power. And in Homily 45: In different signs there was the same faith; in different signs, just as in different words, because words change their sounds through the ages, and words are certainly nothing other than signs. The Fathers drank the same spiritual drink, not the same bodily drink. See, therefore: while faith remained, the signs changed. There the rock was Christ; for us Christ is what is placed on the altar. And they drank, as a great Sacrament, water flowing from the rock; what we drink the faithful know. If you attend to visible appearance, it is different; if to intelligible signification, they drank the same spiritual drink. In Psalm 78, book 19 of Against Faustus, chapter 13: Their food and drink were the same in mystery as ours, but the same in signification, not in species, because the very same Christ was figured for them in the rock and manifested for us in the flesh. Although we also concede that there is some difference in part. Both testify that the Father's benevolence in Christ and the graces of the Holy Spirit are offered to us, but ours more illustriously and splendidly. In both there is the presentation of Christ, but in these it is fuller and more abundant, according to the distinction between the Old and New Testament discussed above. This is what Augustine himself intended when he taught that, once Christ was revealed, the Sacraments were instituted fewer in number, more august in signification, and more excellent in power. Thus Calvin.

Manna, which in Exodus 16 was gathered by each person without distinction of sex or age according to the measure of a gomor; the seed which in the Gospel is sown equally; the denarius which in Matthew 20 is distributed equally by the master of the household through his steward. To these he adds: the Holy Spirit is not given by measure, but is poured out whole upon believers. For if the day rises equally for all, and if the sun spreads over all an equal and identical light, how much more does Christ, the true sun and day, bestow in his Church the light of eternal life with equal equality?

Nor should you say that from this it follows that Saint Cyprian wants grace always to be communicated equally through the Sacraments, notwithstanding the different disposition of those who receive them. For I answer that there he is speaking only of the Sacrament of Baptism considered in itself, whether it is conferred by washing or by sprinkling, and he contends that both are valid and confer equal grace insofar as the Sacrament is considered according to its efficacy, but not with respect to the subject. A Sacrament can be considered in three ways. First, by comparison with another different in species, for example by comparing Baptism with the Eucharist, etc.; and since one is more excellent than another, as the Council of Trent decrees, Session 7, Canon 3: If anyone says that these seven Sacraments are so equal in power that in no respect is one more worthy than another, let him be anathema; it is certain that the more excellent one likewise produces more excellent grace. Second, it can be considered in itself alone and according to that proper effect for which it was determinate instituted by Christ. Third, by its relation to the subject to which it is applied. In the first way, one Sacrament produces more excellent grace than another, notwithstanding equal disposition. In the second way, it has the power to confer its own grace in this and that determinate degree, and not in a greater or lesser one. For example, when Baptism is conferred on infants, since it finds in them no positive disposition but only mere non-repugnance, which is equal in all, it also has in all of them an equal degree, because it has nothing else except what Christ willed to correspond to the Sacrament's work performed, without relation to the disposition of the subject. In the third way, it produces grace equally or unequally according to the different disposition of those who receive it, and this by the work performed: first, according to Christ's ordinance, which is made known to us through the Council of Trent praised above; second, according to the analogy that the Sacraments have with natural causes, which produce an equal or unequal effect according to the varying disposition of the subject; finally, according to the fitting and gentle providence and ordinance by which greater grace should be conferred on one better disposed, so that the hope of that greater fruit may stir us to receive the Sacraments with greater disposition and reverence. In this way all the objections from the authorities of the Fathers are to be solved. — That Saint Cyprian intended this is clear from the examples he uses. Although the sun's light is the same, it nevertheless becomes greater or lesser by reason of the greater or lesser transparency of the subject. Although manna was the same, it nevertheless had different sweetnesses according to the different disposition and desire of those eating it. Indeed, when expressly pressing the example of the seed, he says:

In the Gospel the Lord's seed is sown equally; but according to the depth of the soil, one part is absorbed, while another is counted as abounding in manifold plenty and in the fruit of thirtyfold or sixtyfold yield.

Nevertheless, the Subtle Doctor does not contradict this assertion, as some falsely attribute to him, claiming that he teaches that in fact greater grace is given by virtue of the Sacrament to the predestined than to the reprobate, and indeed that among the predestined more abundant grace is conferred through Baptism on the one predestined to greater glory. On the contrary, he plainly teaches the opposite, although he holds this to be possible. To make this clear, I transcribe his words from book 1, distinction 4, question 1, no. 3, where he says:

I answer that, since God is the principal cause, Christ's Passion the meritorious cause, and the person receiving Baptism also concurs in its effect, namely grace, equality or inequality could be considered on the part of any of these. As regards God determining himself to cooperate with this sign through the signified effect and instituting it as a certain sign, there can in some way be a difference and in some way not. For he has regularly determined to confer some grace with this sign, so that he gives no one less; thus it can be said to be conferred by virtue of Baptism, by virtue of the truth of this sign. As that universal determination is uniform as regards this degree, so the effect is equal.

Here we have our conclusion in precise terms. — Again: because God predestined different Elect to different degrees of glory, and did so before determining this sign, greater grace may reasonably be conferred according to the ordinance toward greater glory. God can therefore arrange, in determining the truth or certainty of this sign, that one recipient receive precisely the grace required for the sign's certainty and another receive more, whom he predestined to greater glory. But that further degree would not be conferred by virtue of Baptism, but from a special divine benevolence. Hence it can be said that, on the part of the principal cause, the effect regularly is simply equal when given by virtue of Baptism, because it is presupposed that by the common law the first grace is not given greater without some difference outside the principal cause.

What could be clearer? He asserts the possibility of inequality on the part of the principal cause but denies the effect under the common law. — He speaks in the same way in no. 1 of inequality on the part of the meritorious cause, saying:

Concerning the second, it can be said that the meritorious cause can work more efficaciously toward grace in one person than another, either because it is offered more specially for one than another as regards the intention of the offerer, or because it was offered in effect for one but for another only in divine foreknowledge. In the first way Christ is held commonly to know all things, because God knows by the knowledge of vision and consequently knows all the Elect and to what degree of glory they were chosen. He could therefore offer his Passion more fully for one predestined to greater glory, especially when he offered himself for the human race, so that divine predestination might be fulfilled in them. In the second way Christ's Passion cooperates more efficaciously for us, who are in the Evangelical Law, than for the Fathers under the Mosaic Law, because an obedience rendered for a greater good to be rewarded is more acceptable than a foreseen benefit. In this second way there is inequality in those receiving grace through Circumcision and Baptism, because the meritorious cause is unequally applied to them, and perhaps also in those baptized before and after the Passion. But if in the first way, namely because of a special obligation in Christ's will, there is inequality of grace in some now baptized, this is doubtful as a matter of fact; but its possibility has been shown.” Thus far the Doctor. Therefore no one should readily believe authors who cite the Doctor for some opinion without reading and weighing the text, lest what is said in Ecclesiasticus 19:1 prove true of him: He who is quick to believe is light of heart, and shall be diminished.

Question 1. Whether, besides sanctifying grace or its increase, the Sacraments confer any helps distinct from the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit?

I answer that this appears more probable, as theologians commonly teach: otherwise several distinct Sacraments would have been instituted in vain, since grace could be increased by frequent repetition of the same Sacrament, for example by Holy Communion; it is likely that more habitual grace is conferred by frequent Eucharist than by receiving the other Sacraments. Moreover, the holy Fathers teach that Matrimony and Orders were instituted so that their grace might enable ecclesiastical duties to be rightly fulfilled, the burdens of marriage to be borne with equanimity, mutual love and fidelity to be preserved, and children to be piously educated. They likewise teach that Confirmation was instituted to confer grace by which we may steadfastly profess the faith against all who attack it, even with loss of goods and danger to life. The same must be said of the other Sacraments. Since Baptism was instituted for spiritual generation and restoration of the life of grace, it is likely to confer special helps by which this new life is perfected and preserved. Penance confers a special help for detesting sins more efficaciously and making satisfaction for those committed. The Eucharist, instituted as spiritual nourishment, confers helps by which we are preserved from spiritual death, namely mortal sin. The same is clear of Extreme Unction, ordered to wiping away the remnants of sins and conferring strength in that crisis of life; it may rightly be believed to confer special helps for such effects. — Finally, things with different effects are distinct. But the effects of grace that makes pleasing and of sacramental grace are different: the former bestows some likeness to the divine nature, according to 2 Peter 1, That through these you may become partakers of the divine nature; the latter confers a remedy against the defects of sin. Such effects are undoubtedly different. The same is clear of sacramental grace in relation to virtues and gifts. Sacramental grace is related to the grace of the virtues and gifts as that grace is related to sanctifying grace generally. Sanctifying grace may be considered first generally, insofar as it makes a person pleasing to God and a partaker of the divine nature; second, as the grace of virtues and gifts adds helps by which a person is perfected and invigorated to elicit acts conformable to them, especially to believe, hope, and love God above all; and third, as sacramental grace perfects a person for the special effects of the Sacraments just designated. That sacramental grace truly adds something to the grace of the virtues and gifts, and also to habitual grace, is clear: otherwise the Sacraments would be conferred in vain on those possessing habitual grace and the virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, especially since that grace could be increased more easily by exercising the virtues and gifts than by the Sacraments.

You will say: Sacramental grace is ordered only to removing the soul's defects arising from sins. But the grace of the virtues and gifts suffices for this, since all sins are excluded by those virtues, because every sin is opposed to some virtue. Therefore, and so forth. — I distinguish the minor: it suffices generally, I concede; specifically, I deny. Habitual grace of the virtues and gifts removes the soul's general defect and the general wound of its powers, the privation of virtue and grace; but it does not remove particular defects, whose removal is the purpose of sacramental grace.

Question 2. What is that sacramental grace?

Paludanus replies that it is a special habit really distinct from habitual grace, the virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which he calls regenerative in Baptism, strengthening in Confirmation, and nourishing in the Eucharist. The same is to be said of the other Sacraments. But there is no need to admit such a habit: the acts to which sacramental grace helps are either common and ordinary acts elicited by deliberate will, or extraordinary acts exercised by the special motion of the Holy Spirit alone and not by one's own deliberation, as sometimes happens in holier persons. Habitual grace with the supernatural virtues suffices for the former; the gifts of the Holy Spirit suffice for the latter, making us readily mobile to follow the impulse of the divine Spirit.

Others think otherwise; but, setting their opinions aside, I think it should be said that sacramental grace adds to habitual grace and the virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit actual helps, such as a pious and holy thought or sudden movements of the will divinely implanted by God, for attaining the end of the Sacraments. The recipient has a right to these helps. For although every habitual grace requires helps, or prevenient graces, for resisting temptations and acting well—for God, says the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 11, does not abandon those once justified by his actual grace unless they first abandon him—the reason had been given:

By this, he says, the just ought to feel themselves all the more bound to walk in the way of justice, since, freed from sin and made servants and friends of God, they can advance by living soberly, justly, and piously through Jesus Christ, who loves those who love him, enriching them with special favors and helps by which, if they wish, they can more easily keep God's commandments. For this is consonant with the laws of friendship: that a friend should act according to the will of a friend.

Although every habitual grace claims the special helps necessary for its preservation, this especially suits sacramental grace, which fittingly calls for certain helps by which what Christ the Lord specially intended through the Sacrament may be obtained. It is like what happens among human beings: when a subject has earned his prince's friendship by his services in some place, he is especially worthy to be rewarded there; for example, after compelling a city on the enemy's side to surrender, he is worthy to be appointed its governor.

You will say. The same habit of grace does not suffice for specifically different acts. But the acts in the Sacraments are specifically different: Matrimony is ordered to preserving conjugal fidelity, Christian education of children, and bearing family burdens. Therefore another habit must contribute to eliciting these acts; but that other habit can be nothing but sacramental grace. Therefore sacramental grace is not an actual but a habitual help.

I deny the major. Sanctifying grace conferred in the state of innocence and under the Old Testament does not seem specifically different from that conferred on just persons under the Evangelical Law; nevertheless it produces specifically different effects. The grace of the state of innocence restrained the unbridled motions of the sensory part, subjecting the body to the soul and the senses to reason; sanctifying grace of the New Testament does not produce that effect. It is likewise much more efficacious than the grace of the Old Testament, since it opens to human beings the heaven previously closed.

You will ask further: Who have a right to those sacramental helps?

I answer, it seems more probable that only those claim this right for themselves who obtain sanctifying grace in receiving a Sacrament and preserve the grace obtained. Hence the person who does not receive God's grace together with the Sacrament of Matrimony does not acquire a right to the special aids that help holy spouses in educating children and bearing the other burdens of Matrimony; and the same applies in the other Sacraments. This is proved because the author of the sermon at the supper, in Saint Cyprian, chapter On the Washing of the Feet, says: God gives again through penance, so that the Sacraments that had been injured may again be useful to them; but if penance were not present, they could in no way afterward experience the effect. Hence the person who, after receiving the Sacrament of Confirmation, loses grace through mortal sin and returns again to God through penance undoubtedly receives more grace than one who, without having received Confirmation, approaches the Sacrament of Penance with an equal disposition. For the former is prepared with a more ready spirit to undergo every torment for defending the faith than one who, without having received the Sacrament of Confirmation, approached Penance in a similar way. But this strength of spirit is not conferred precisely through the Sacrament of Penance, because it confers grace according to the measure of the recipient's disposition. Therefore it must proceed from the power of the Confirmation received, whose grace comes to life again through penance insofar as penance removes the impediment, namely sin.

You will say: An actual help of grace does not require the state of sanctifying grace, since God sometimes grants it even to the most depraved, as is clear from St. Paul, Magdalene, and other sinners who, when the light of grace shone upon them, turned to good fruit. Therefore habitual sanctifying grace is not necessary for receiving helps through the Sacraments. — I distinguish the antecedent: if actual grace is given from sheer liberality and mercy, as it was given to St. Paul and other illustrious penitents, I concede; if it is given from some right or debt, as the helps due through the conferral of the Sacraments are given, I deny.

You will insist. Sacramental grace has no greater connection with sanctifying grace than the divinely infused virtues. But these can exist without sanctifying grace: faith and hope can exist in sinners in whom grace that makes pleasing does not reside. —

I distinguish the major: it has no greater connection than the virtues which flow from sanctifying grace itself, I concede; than the virtues required as dispositions for grace, I deny. And, with the minor distinguished in the same way, I deny the consequence. I admit that sacramental grace has no greater connection with sanctifying grace than charity, which flows from it and is really identical with it. But the case is otherwise with the virtues which do not flow from it, but rather are preliminary dispositions toward it, such as faith and hope.

NOTE 1. According to the Doctor in 4. dist. 26, q. 3, n. 7, by the name of character here is signified some sign by which those marked with such a sign are mutually assimilated and distinguished from other people: for χάραξ in Greek is called in Latin a form, figure, or image, a mark, or some sign distinguishing some from others. Hence in Heb. 1 the Son of God is called in Greek χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, that is, the figure and image of the substance of the Father himself; and in Apoc. 13 some are said to have the character of the beast, or a figure on their foreheads and hands, signifying that they belong to the beast's household. That figure by which cattle are marked with a branding iron, so that they bear the mark of their master and can be distinguished from the cattle of another master, is commonly called a character. In this way too, says the Doctor, we call the characters or figures with which letters are written characters; for which reason certain figures drawn in incantations are also usually called characters. Thus, by the name character theologians properly signify a certain spiritual sign impressed by God upon one receiving a non-repeatable Sacrament.

NOTE 2. From the same source, two principal properties and two effects of this character are distinguished: one physical, the other moral. The physical property is that the subject possessing the character is assimilated to another that possesses a similar form, and is distinguished from another not so marked. The moral property is that it is a commemorative sign of the Sacrament received, conformative to Christ, whose Sacrament is received, and obliging the recipient to observe the law and faith, whose initiation it is; finally, that through this sign the recipient of the Sacrament is deputed to some office, just as in former times people were enrolled in military service by some distinctive mark. From this the Doctor concludes that the character is distinguished from another effect of the Sacrament, namely grace, and also from the infused virtues, faith, hope, and charity; “because,” he says, “such virtues are not always imprinted on the recipient of a non-repeatable Sacrament, as on the recipient of Orders or Confirmation: but the character is always imprinted. This is also clear from another condition commonly attributed to the character, namely, that it is indelible: but these virtues are erasable, as is evident in one who sins mortally, in whom these virtues do not remain.”

NOTE 3. More recent heretics try to call into doubt that such a character is impressed upon recipients through the Sacraments of the New Law. Thus John Wycliffe, book 1 of The Trialogue, chapter 15, says: Some multiply characters from the Sacraments in Orders; but I find neither their foundation nor their fruit in Sacred Scripture or in reason. Luther too, in the book On the Babylonian Captivity, chapter On Orders, mocks the character in this way: They have fabricated, he says, characters which they attributed to this Sacrament of theirs, to be impressed upon those ordained: whence, then, do such ideas arise, by what authority, by what reasoning are they established? Calvin likewise, in the Institutes, Canon 1 of Session 7 of the Council of Trent: What, he says, they chatter about the indelible character comes from the same workshop; for it was wholly unknown among the ancients, and is more akin to magical incantations than to the sound doctrine of the Gospel; therefore it will be rejected with the same ease with which it was devised.

With these premises established, four principal points must be determined in this Question: first, that a character is truly impressed through only certain Sacraments; second, that it is neither some relation of reason, as Durandus held, nor merely real, as some wrongly pretend the Subtle Doctor asserted, but a certain spiritual quality; third, whether that character is immediately subjected in the substance of the soul or in one of its faculties; fourth, finally, whether it is altogether indelible and irremovable.

First conclusion. — THE THREE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW, NAMELY BAPTISM, CONFIRMATION, AND ORDERS, IMPRESS A SPIRITUAL CHARACTER. This is of faith, determined in the Councils, especially at Florence in the Decree of Eugene, where we read: Among these Sacraments of the New Law there are three, Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders, which impress upon the soul a character, that is, a spiritual sign distinguishing it from the rest, an indelible sign; hence they are not repeated in the same person. The remaining four do not impress a character and admit repetition. The Council of Trent defines the same in Session 7, Canon 1, in these words: If anyone says that in the three Sacraments, namely Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders, a character is not impressed upon the soul, that is, a certain spiritual and indelible sign, so that they cannot be repeated, let him be anathema. Innocent III also clearly expressed this same truth, received by perpetual tradition from the beginning of the Church, as reported in the chapter Maiores, On Baptism. When it was asked there whether the character of the Sacrament is impressed in Baptism upon sleepers and the insane, so that once awakened from sleep or illness they should not be baptized again, he replied: “There are those who say that Baptism and Orders are conferred not only upon sleepers and the insane, but also upon the unwilling and resisting, though not as to the thing, yet as to the character. Others distinguish, not absurdly, that he who is violently drawn by terrors and punishments, lest he incur harm, receives the Sacrament of Baptism, as one who approaches Baptism in faith receives the character of Christianity impressed upon him. But he who wholly resists and never consents receives neither the thing nor the character of the Sacrament. Sleepers and the insane, however, if before they fell into insanity or sleep they persisted in refusal, do not receive the character of the Sacrament even if they were immersed in this condition; but otherwise if they had previously been catechumens and had intended to be baptized. The sacramental operation therefore impresses the character when it finds no obstacle of a contrary will resisting it.” By these words Innocent presupposes that the doctrine concerning the sacramental character is established in the Church and received from the Fathers, as the Subtle Doctor excellently notes in the cited question 3, n. 11. There he observes that although it could perhaps be said that the words of this authority consequently use the name character to signify Baptism, nevertheless, he says, in the later words, where it says that the sacramental operation impresses a character, it seems expressly to speak of the character as something impressed upon the soul itself, as we are speaking here.

There are also testimonies of Scripture supporting this truth. First of all, that passage of 2 Cor. 1 may be brought forward: The God who anointed us, who also sealed us and gave the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts. In these words the Apostle distinguishes three effects of Confirmation. The first is grace, by which we are anointed and strengthened like oil; the second is the character, by which we are consecrated to God and sealed as with the sign of Christ for divine worship and some office; the third is the Holy Spirit, who bears witness to us of a good conscience and is in us like a pledge of future glory. I nevertheless confess that from this and similar Scriptural authority the impression of such a sacramental character cannot be concluded clearly and explicitly. Someone could reply, by explaining such Scriptural texts, that they concern sanctifying grace, just as the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7, calls it the Spirit of the promise, saying: The merciful God, the efficacious cause of justification, who freely washes and sanctifies, sealing and anointing with the promised Holy Spirit, who is the pledge of our inheritance. Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and others understand the Apostle's passage in 2 Cor. 1 in this sense. Although not everyone receives it in the reception of the Sacrament, nevertheless the Sacrament itself, insofar as it is from itself, is ordered to confer it; and that is sufficient.

Many authorities of the holy Fathers are also brought forward as intimating the same truth. First, Cyril of Jerusalem, in the preface to his Catecheses, says: Great indeed is the proposed Baptism: liberation from captivity, remission of sins, death of sin, regeneration of the soul, a garment of brightness, a holy and indelible seal. But Baptism is not indelible by reason of sanctifying grace, for this is lost through any mortal sin; therefore it is called such by reason of the seal remaining in the baptized person, and nothing else can it be except the character. Likewise Saint Basil, Homily 13, says: Do you wish the devil to see the seal upon you, so that he may fight for you or rescue you from enemies? How, you will say, am I God's, when I do not show God's sign? Or do you not know how the destroyer passed over the marked houses in Egypt, but slew the firstborn in those not marked? An unsealed treasure is easily exposed to thieves; a thing without a mark is immediately vulnerable to ambushes. Saint Gregory Nazianzen likewise, Oration 1, Baptism, says: Baptism is a seal, because it is preservation and a signification of lordship; for it signifies whose possession we are. And later: What is sealed beforehand is not easily attacked by ambushes; what is not sealed is easily seized by thieves. Saint Chrysostom, Homily 2 on the Epistle to the Ephesians, says: The Israelites were sealed, but with the mark of circumcision, like cattle; we, as sons, for the day of redemption. Hence in Homily 11 he says: He made us a royal flock. Other holy Fathers say the same, such as Jerome on Eph. 1: God impresses upon the soul the seal of the Holy Spirit. And Saint Ambrose, book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 6: We are sealed with the Spirit, so that we may retain his brightness, image, and grace, which is the spiritual seal. But Saint Augustine most excellently supports this truth in many places, especially book 6 of On Baptism, chapter 1, writing:

A sheep that was wandering outside fled from the pastors of the Church, and had received outside from deceitful predators the Lord's character, suitable for the salvation of Christian unity; it is corrected from error and healed from its wound, yet the Lord's character in it is recognized rather than rejected.

But that Lord's character is either God's grace itself, or the Sacrament itself, or some indelible seal impressed upon the soul. But it is not grace itself, for this is not impressed upon wolves, that is, wicked people remaining in their wickedness, nor is it recognized in a sheep wandering outside among heretics. Nor is it the Sacrament itself, because the character mentioned by Saint Augustine is impressed upon wolves; but an external Sacrament cannot be said to be impressed, since it is a passing action. Therefore it is necessary that he speak of a character impressed upon the soul.

It should nevertheless be noted, as the Doctor observes, n. 11, that this authority can be understood of Baptism itself, but not of Baptism's effect. Hence I confess that neither this authority nor the others mentioned above by us would suffice to establish this sacramental character unless the Church's definition intervened. Hence the Doctor there excellently concludes: Therefore, solely on the authority of the Church, insofar as the matter presently requires, it must be held that a character is impressed. Thus Suarez excellently, Disputation 11, section 1, after reviewing various testimonies of the holy Fathers for the impression of the sacramental character, adds: “Since, however, all these testimonies do not seem compelling, therefore Scotus, d. 6, q. 1, says that Baptism itself, for example, can tacitly be explained as being the character, and therefore concludes that solely by the authority of the Church are we compelled to posit a character. But although it is true that the Church's authority has the principal role in this matter, nevertheless, that being presupposed, we understand the Saints' intention to have been to speak of the character in the same signification; and without doubt many things said by the Saints will be better understood in the aforesaid way.” In these words he excellently touched upon the Doctor's aim and the meaning explained by us.

Nevertheless, the Doctor offers three congruences for asserting such a character, n. 1, where he writes: “First, it is fitting that some disposition be posited for a perfect form; but grace is a supernatural and perfect form; therefore it is fitting that there be some preceding supernatural disposition toward it; such is the character. Second, it is fitting that God did not institute vain Sacraments, at least for the New Law, which is perfect; therefore it is fitting that no one truly receive his Sacraments without their having some effect. But they do not always have grace, as in the case of a pretender; therefore they have some other effect. Third, it is fitting that one received into Christ's household be distinguished from one not received by something intrinsic to him. Although Christ could distinguish without such an intrinsic thing, nevertheless it is more perfect both in itself and in comparison with the whole Church, militant and triumphant, if this occurs through some remaining intrinsic form than if it does not. The distinguishing mark of one who receives the Sacrament by which one enters Christ's household, as opposed to one who has not received it, is placed in the recipient as something remaining: this is the character.” He adds that the third of these congruences is more reasonable, because it is also particular to Baptism; while the other two have this probability, that if a character is posited, it will be posited in the way touched upon by those congruences. Hence he concludes: Thus let the conclusion briefly be held, on account of the Church's authority brought forward above; and the two congruences, one concerning reception into Christ's household and the other concerning a disposition to be conferred, are probable.

From this it is evident that the Subtle Doctor does not call into doubt the truth and existence of the sacramental character, as some wrongly impute to him, but only that this truth cannot be proved by express and evident statements of Sacred Scripture or of the holy Fathers, nor demonstrated by any efficacious reasoning, but merely that it is established by the authority of the Church, whose tradition and definition are supported both by Scripture and by the utterances of the holy Fathers.

The Author of the sermon on the Supper preserved by Saint Cyprian supplies another congruence for this truth. For, treating of the washing of the feet, he openly signifies that Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders cannot be repeated because they impress a character. Ecclesiastical rules forbid Baptism to be repeated, namely in Apostolic Canons 16 and 18: and once people have been sanctified, no later hand presumes to approach to consecrate another. No one renews sacred Orders once given; nor does he anoint again those anointed with the sacred oil, but preserves them; no one by the imposition of hands or by ministry diminishes the priesthood, because it would be an insult to the Holy Spirit if it could be taken away, though he sanctifies.

The Heretics reply 1. Baptism is not repeated because it is entry into the Church. — Against this: it would follow that when someone has departed from the Church through apostasy, on approaching it again he ought to be baptized again; this conflicts with the doctrine of the Fathers mentioned above and with the ancient doctrine of the Councils.

They reply 2. It is not repeated for this reason, because it is a spiritual regeneration cleansing the soul from original sin. — Against this: when someone is baptized while the effect of mortal sin is present, he is neither spiritually regenerated nor freed from original sin; nevertheless, when he later repents of this, he is not baptized again. Further, spiritual regeneration also occurs through contrition aroused by the preaching of the Gospel, as is said in Apoc. 1 and 1 Cor.: Through the Gospel I begot you. Nevertheless those thus begotten are baptized. Finally, a person is regenerated as many times as he recovers the spiritual life he has lost; yet he is not baptized that many times.

They reply 3. In proving the existence of the character, a vicious circle is made: for we say that the three Sacraments impress a character because they cannot be repeated, and they cannot be repeated because they impress a character. But this reasoning is invalid, as is clear from Aristotle, book of the Prior Analytics; therefore, and so on.

I deny the major. For a vicious circle occurs when it is made in the same genus of cause; here it is otherwise. The impression of the character is the cause why the Sacrament is not repeated, and non-repetition is the effect of that character. Just as the rational is not proved posteriorly through the risible, while the risible is demonstrated a priori through the rational, so too the character is rightly inferred through the negation of repetition, and repetition through the impression of the character.

You will say 1: No sufficient reason appears why the sacramental character should be admitted; therefore it is asserted in vain. Proof of the antecedent: it would either be admitted as a disposition toward grace, which cannot be affirmed, because a Sacrament received in desire confers grace independently of the character; moreover, as the Doctor says, n. 16, since grace is conferred in every Sacrament, an impression of some character would be required in every one as a preceding disposition for such grace to be conferred, which is false. Or it would be admitted in order to distinguish the baptized from the unbaptized; but this also seems useless: with respect to God, who without any sign whatever knows people and what sort they are; with respect to the blessed and angels, who see and discern the baptized from the unbaptized most clearly in the divine essence; with respect to us, because, since that sign is spiritual, it cannot be perceived by us through the senses; with respect to demons and the damned, since, because this sign is of the supernatural order, it follows that it cannot be known by an intellect operating solely through the powers of nature; and finally with respect to the offices and ministries to which those receiving such Sacraments are deputed, since that deputation can be made by an extrinsic denomination alone, just as judges are deputed to render justice to each person.

I answer, the character can be regarded as conferred upon people through the Sacraments for all the assigned ends. For God claims for himself by a special right the person marked with a character; the blessed take wayfarers into special custody and associate them with the fellowship of faith and the Sacraments, and although the character is not in itself sensible, nevertheless through its cause, or through the Sacrament once conferred, it distinguishes one who has received such a Sacrament from one who has not. “The blessed also,” says the Doctor, n. 1, “and the damned can recognize a person marked with a character whom they would not recognize in that way if he were not marked by such a character; for the character subsists in blessedness for greater glory, and in damnation for greater confusion.” Finally, just as those deputed to different offices in the household of some Prince are accustomed to be marked with certain signs by which their duties are known, so people who through Baptism are received into Christ's household, through Confirmation are designated as soldiers for professing the faith, and through Orders are given some power concerning Christ's true and mystical body. It was fitting, I say, that they be designated for these same offices by a special sacramental character.

You will say 2: The holy Fathers understand by the name character and the mystical sign or seal of Christ nothing other than the Sacrament of Baptism itself; therefore the sacramental character is not some effect of the Sacrament. —

I distinguish the antecedent: They understand nothing else than the Sacrament of Baptism, which is a seal causally and efficiently, as regeneration of the soul, death and remission of sin, and order: formally and in itself, I deny it. For that seal is said to be imprinted or impressed upon believers and carried by them, yet always remaining; but the outward sign employed is not of this kind, but rather the effect of Baptism. For Cyril says, The Holy Spirit seals souls in Baptism. From Ambrose, book 1, On the Holy Spirit: We are sealed in the body, yet in truth we are sealed in the heart, so that the Holy Spirit may imprint in us the likeness of the heavenly image, so that we may know that this is more the seal of our heart than of our body. Therefore that seal in the heart is something internal and distinct from the Sacrament.

You will insist. The character of which we speak is an internal spiritual seal indelibly impressed upon the soul; but the character of which the holy Fathers speak, especially Saint Augustine, is not of this kind, and is nothing other than the invocation of the most holy Trinity, as is clear from his sermon on the proceedings against Emeritus, Bishop of the Donatists at Caesarea: Therefore, he says, when I come to my brother and correct my erring brother, I attend to faith in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. This is the character of my Emperor, who commands his soldiers, or rather commands them together with his soldiers to impress it upon those whom they gathered into his camp, saying: Go, baptize the nations. —

It is confirmed, because Saint Augustine teaches in the same place that if Donatus or Paul had baptized in his own name, he would have impressed his own character. Therefore by the name of the character impressed in Baptism Saint Augustine understands nothing other than the invocation of the most holy Trinity, in whose name and power the Sacrament of Baptism is conferred. The antecedent is clear, for he says there: What is it that I say? A deserter does not bear his own character. Donatus did not baptize in the name of Donatus; for if Donatus, when he made the schism, had baptized in the name of Donatus, he would have impressed the character of a deserter. And again below he says that Paul rightly prohibited those who said, “I am of Paul,” because they had not been baptized in his name and had another character, namely that of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit: What do you wish to be mine, he says, and not rather his whose I am? Recognize and consider your character: were you baptized in the name of Paul?

I answer, by attacking the major and distinguishing the minor: Baptism is an impressing character, I concede; an impressed character, I deny. For, just as the same image of the king and the same character are in the seal and in the wax, but in the seal it is impressing and in the wax it is impressed, so the Sacrament of Baptism, especially its form, is the impressing character; for its spiritual mark is impressed upon the soul, and by that mark it is called the impressed character. Hence Saint Augustine himself, Letter 23, says: The Sacrament of Baptism among heretics is effective for preservation, not for participation in eternal life. By preservation he does not mean sanctifying grace, since this is participation in eternal life; nor Baptism, which has passed away. Therefore it is necessary that he mean the character. Hence in Treatise 1 on the First Epistle of John he says: See: whoever is baptized, if he has charity, and then he says, I have been born from God; but if he does not have it, he has the character imposed. But that character is not the Sacrament itself, since it does not remain; nor grace, since grace is not acquired without charity; therefore, and so on. In confirmation I will say that the meaning of Saint Augustine's words is that if Donatus or Paul had baptized in his own name, the invocation of their names would have presented the appearance of an impressing character, but in reality it would not have been an impressing character, because it would have been the character of a deserter, not of the Emperor, and would consequently have produced one effect. Hence he says that he would delete, cast away, and anathematize it if he found such a character in a person approaching unity. Therefore, just as in monetary matters, when silver or gold is marked with the image of a Prince, the impressing character in the iron seal must be distinguished from the impressed character in the silver or gold, so too in sacramental matters, when a soul is marked with a character in some Sacrament, the impressing character in the invocation of the most holy Trinity must be distinguished from the character impressed in the soul of the recipient of the Sacrament.

You will say 3: Every character is a sign; but no sign can be in the soul, since every sign must be sensible; therefore there can be no character in the soul. —

I distinguish the major: it is a sign analogically and through some likeness, insofar as whatever configures and assimilates something to another, or distinguishes it from another, is called an image, figure, and sign, just as the Son is called the character and figure of the Father's substance, I concede. For the Sacraments bind the faithful to one another, configure them to Christ, and distinguish them from unbelievers. It is a sign properly so called, I distinguish again: by reason of itself and in itself, I deny, for in that way it is something insensible; by reason of the sensible Sacrament which he received, I concede. For we know and can assert that someone is marked with the baptismal character because we know for certain that he was washed with water in the name of the most holy Trinity.

You will ask: Why are there only three Sacraments that impress a character?

The Subtle Doctor answers in 4. dist. 6, q. 10, n. 12, that the number of characters is best gathered and explained from the proportion which the state of the evangelical law bears to political government, according to which certain special degrees of dignity are maintained in a Prince's household that do not belong to everyone. The first is association into the household, which belongs to all the Prince's servants and by which they are distinguished from others; the second is military service, or the soldiers deputed to guard the Prince and protect the kingdom; the third is that of ministers and dispensers, according to their various degrees. Maintaining this proportion, Baptism is that by which someone is received into the household, Confirmation into military service, and Orders into ministry and administration. The other Sacraments can be common to all the others existing in the Christian household. To make this clear and more evident, I gladly append the Doctor's words: “I say that this can be made clear by a similar case in these worldly political communities. No one has a determinate rank in the king's household because he eats or drinks, nor because after an offense his lord is reconciled to him, nor because he multiplies persons in this political community; for these acts can be common to everyone at whatever rank. But someone has one rank when he is received into his lord's household, another when he advances further and is appointed a soldier to defend the commonwealth, another when he is appointed as the highest subordinate to the lord, to appoint others to determinate ranks in his household, such as a general seneschal immediately beneath the lord, to whom universal authority is entrusted to receive some into the lord's household. Therefore, if a name had been imposed signifying a rank in the household or a bailiwick, one would not say that someone had that rank because he ate, or because he returned to grace after an offense; one would say only that he had the rank of one taken from the people into the lord's household, and a further rank of one appointed in the household as a superior to receive some into the dignity of the household, because he approached the table or because he reconciled and appointed inferiors to be appointed. So in the present case, the three Sacraments, namely the Eucharist for spiritual nourishment, Matrimony for bodily procreation, and Penance for annual reconciliation, establish no one in any determinate rank in the Church; indeed they can be common to every member of the Church, at whatever rank. But the first rank of the Church, and the most universal, is to be received into Christ's household, which occurs in Baptism. The second is the special rank of military service for the defense of the Christian faith, which occurs in Confirmation. The third is to be established as father and shepherd for introducing others into the Church and directing and instructing them, which occurs in Orders. And just as in that political community it is not fitting to repeat those three dignities, namely reception into the household, promotion to military service, and elevation to teaching, though nourishment, procreation, and reconciliation can be repeated, so in the present case the three Sacraments ought not to be repeated, while the others are repeated. In the non-repeatable ones a non-repeatable rank is acquired, and it is called a character; in the repeatable ones, it is not.” —

The Tridentine Catechism agrees with this, question On the Sacraments in General, n. 80, where it says: “Now the character has this effect, both that we are made suitable to receive or perform something sacred, and that one person may be recognized from another by some mark. By the character of Baptism we obtain both: we are made fit to receive the other Sacraments, and, besides, the faithful people are distinguished by it from the Gentiles who do not keep the faith. The same can be recognized in the character of Confirmation and of holy Orders. By the one we are armed and equipped as a soldier of Christ for public confession and defense of his name, and against the enemy implanted in us and the spiritual forces of wickedness in the heavens; at the same time we are distinguished from those who have recently been baptized and are like newborn infants. By the other, it both carries the power associated with confecting and administering the Sacraments, and displays the distinction of those endowed with such power from the rest of the faithful.”

Second conclusion. — THE SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER IS NEITHER A RELATION OF REASON NOR A REAL RELATION, BUT A REAL ABSOLUTE FORM. This appears to be the more probable opinion of the Subtle Doctor, whatever some less honorably and wrongly attribute to him. To make this more evident, it is useful to transcribe the Doctor's words in 4. dist. 6, q. 10, n. 18. He says: “To the question it can be said that, just as it cannot be proved that some real form distinct from grace and the virtues is impressed in the reception of Baptism, either by natural reason or by evident reasoning from manifest articles of faith, so it cannot be proved that the character, if posited as a real form, is an absolute real form or a relative one, since either can be maintained: namely, that it is a relative form, as was already shown, or that it is an absolute real form. If it is posited, it cannot be evidently disproved. For certain things can be reasonably granted concerning the character, if it is posited as existing: for example, that it is a spiritual form impressed by God upon anyone receiving a non-repeatable Sacrament; that by divine institution it effectively signifies that grace of the Sacrament and disposes toward it, as was explained in the preceding question, because it is in the same recipient, from the same agent, and is a prior and less perfect form; and because it is indelible, since it has no meritorious cause of corruption. It is also a commemorative sign with respect to reception of the Sacrament, which has passed, and a configurative sign, that is, signifying the soul's obligation to Christ. It is also an assimilative form to another receiving the Sacrament, and distinguishing from another who does not receive it.”

From this it is evident how rashly some, with Vasquez, 3. d. 151, c. 2, object to the Subtle Doctor and accuse him of rashness for saying that the character is a relation of reason. Those who wish him to have asserted that the character is a real relation depart no less, and indeed far less, from his opinion. For if the Doctor is examined thoroughly as a sound evaluator and judge of things, it will appear that he merely taught what could indeed be defended by the opinion affirming that the character is a real relation; yet he judges more probable the opinion which contends that the character itself is an absolute form of the genus of quality. He assigns and defends this opinion, as his own, in the final place, as is his custom. It is also defended by his more celebrated disciples, Bassolius, in this question 3; Mayronius, d. 1, q. 5, art. 10; Rubionensis, q. 2, art. 2; Torillon, q. 3, d. 3, conclusion 1, to say nothing of all the Moderns who, with the most learned commentator Cavello, uphold the same assertion.

Proof: The essence of the character should be established in whatever more conduces to its dignity and efficacy; but this is true of the opinion affirming that it consists in some absolute real form; therefore, and so on.

The major is evident: the effects of the Sacraments should be celebrated with as much commendation as possible, without any contradiction or repugnance. For this greatly contributes to the dignity of the Christian religion and to celebrating God's goodness toward human beings.

The minor is proved: an absolute real form is much more perfect than any relative form, as the philosophers know. Relations have a more slender and tenuous being and are more dependent than absolute accidental forms, since the latter depend only upon the subject in which they inhere, whereas the former depend not only upon a subject but also upon a foundation and a term. —

Furthermore, a relation is not produced in itself, but results from the production of something else, like the likeness between two white walls. But the character is produced primarily in itself, as was said in the preceding conclusion, where it was proved that certain Sacraments produce and impress a character immediately in one who receives validly, though with a pretense, some Sacrament that impresses a character. No other term or effect of that Sacrament can be assigned than the character itself, since in that case sacramental grace is not produced. Therefore the character is some absolute real form. —

Finally, if it were a relation, it would be either a relation of reason or a real relation; but neither can rightly be affirmed. Not the first: both because the Councils and holy Fathers assert that the character is a spiritual sign impressed upon the soul, whereas this cannot be verified of a being of reason, since it is not impressed upon the soul but exists only objectively in the intellect; and because God is the principal author of the sacramental character, but God is not the author of beings of reason—for let us not say that God conceives a thing on the side of reality otherwise than it is. Also, a person is marked by the character and truly distinguished from another who is not marked by such a character; but he cannot be so marked by a being of reason. For how could that relation of reason and extrinsic denomination be a sign by which one is deputed before another to sacred actions and given the ability to perform them, when it places nothing in the person and is not knowable in itself? Finally, the character is indelible, but a being of reason cannot be called indelible, since it exists only through a fiction of the intellect that very easily vanishes. Therefore the character cannot be regarded as a relation of reason.

It is likewise more probable that it is not a real relation, for it would be either intrinsic or extrinsically added. Not the first: this requires a proximate foundation and a really existing term; but the character of Baptism and Orders, for example, impressed upon the Apostles, did not at some time have an actually existing term, as during the three days of Christ's death, when Christ was not present. Nor can anything be assigned as its proximate foundation. If there were such a thing, it would especially be the actual reception of the Sacrament; but this cannot be considered the proximate foundation of the character, because it is impossible for a relation actually to subsist when its proximate foundation no longer subsists. Yet the character subsists, since it is indelible, even after the actual reception of the Sacrament has passed. Therefore that reception cannot be considered the proximate foundation of the character. It must therefore be concluded that the character is an absolute form. —

Nor is it an extrinsically added relation: although in a baptized, ordained, or confirmed person, from the sacramental action by which he was baptized, confirmed, or ordained, there remains an extrinsically added relation of the person to the minister of such Sacraments, this relation cannot be called the character. Otherwise it would follow that a character is also impressed by the action of the other Sacraments, since such a relation arises from that action. This is proved because the relation remaining from the application of Baptism, for example, is nothing other than the denomination “baptized”; but a similar relation, or denomination, “nourished,” “absolved,” “healed,” and “married,” remains from the application of the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony. Therefore, and so on.

You will ask: To which species of quality does the character belong?

The Doctor answers, in the passage cited above, n. 15, that it can be reduced to the first or second species of quality, namely either to habit or to power. For the Doctor says: I answer therefore that, if the character is posited as an absolute accident, it can be posited in the second species of quality, or also in the first; neither of these can be evidently disproved. He proves this as follows:

If the character could not be reduced to the second species, this would be chiefly because only those things that have the character of a natural power belong to that species; and consequently, since the character is a supernatural quality, it could not belong to it. But this reasoning is invalid, because, says the Doctor, although the Philosopher included under this heading only qualities naturally active, nevertheless a supernatural power, if it is absolute, non-accidental, and spiritual, can well belong to the same intermediate genus as a natural habit. Likewise, if it is reduced to the first species, namely habit, because it is difficult to remove, it cannot be disproved. For if anything prevented the character from being reduced to habit, it would chiefly be because a habit is given for operating easily, whereas the character, since it is supernatural, is given for operating simply; or because the character is a disposition toward grace and therefore is not a habit; or because a habit is determined to one mode of acting, good or evil, since we cannot use habits indifferently: no one can use the habit of virtue badly, and no one can use the habit of vice well. But the character is indifferent to either, namely to acting well or badly: some use the sacramental character well, religiously, and piously, while others use it badly, sacrilegiously, and impiously. But these reasons are invalid. Not the first, because, says the Doctor, n. 16, a supernatural habit, as a supernatural form difficult to remove, can be a principle of acting or resisting corruption, and thus have the character of a supernatural power. Hence, although a natural habit signifies only facility and not power, nevertheless a supernatural habit, insofar as it is an immovable spiritual form, can have the character of a habit; but insofar as it is a principle by which we can elicit a supernatural act, it can be called a power. Nor the second, because, says the Doctor in the same place, one habit can well be a disposition toward another, just as, according to those who distinguish the habit of principles from the habit of conclusions, the habit of principles disposes toward the habit of conclusions. Yet it does not follow that it is a disposition insofar as this is distinguished from habit in the first species of quality; for this disposition is a quality easy to remove, and as such is distinguished from habit insofar as habit is a quality difficult for the subject to lose, such as the character. Nor the third, because, he says in the same place, an act can be indifferent. Just as from frequently repeated acts of acting well a habit inclining one to act well is acquired, and from frequent acts of acting badly a habit inclining one to act badly is acquired, so from frequent acts of acting absolutely a capacity for eliciting an act that is neither good nor bad is acquired. He proves this with the example that someone who frequently considers geometry can acquire great facility for considering a conclusion in that science; yet there is no good or bad habit there, just as there is no good or bad act from which it was generated. The same can occur in a supernatural habit.

Third conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE CHARACTER IS IMMEDIATELY AND FORMALLY IN THE WILL, BUT MEDIATELY AND REALLY IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL. This is the Doctor's opinion in 4. d. 6, q. 10, n. 1, where he says: I answer the question, presupposing ... concerning grace, which is the same as charity, and consequently is first in a power, namely in the will; and further, that this disposition toward the form is in the same recipient as the form, while the character, if it is posited as inhering, is suitably posited as a disposition toward sacramental grace: therefore it is fitting to posit the character formally in the will. Thus the Doctor; and in these words he notably says that it is fitting. For the reasons he offers to prove this assertion do not establish absolute necessity, but only a certain greater fittingness. He proves first: It is more fitting that a disposition be established in the same proximate subject in which the form toward which it disposes is received; but the character is at least a moral disposition toward grace, which formally and immediately resides in the will, as was proved in the preceding Treatise; therefore, and so on. The major appears evident from physics: since a disposition must remove obstacles that would hinder the introduction of the form and must prepare the subject for receiving the form, it must be found in the same subject in which the form is to be received. The Doctor presupposes the minor as proved in q. 9, n. 18, where, inquiring about the character and objecting to himself that a disposition can be on the side of the patient or the agent, he answers: “Not on the side of the agent,” he says, “as though it were some intermediate agent between the first agent and the patient. For I do not posit that the character has any active power with respect to causing grace, but while it assists grace as an incisive sign for causing grace, when it marks, once the impediment or inherent obstacle has withdrawn. Therefore it is a disposition on the side of the recipient, because it is the prior form under which the later form is received, not simply necessarily, but necessarily in comparison with the ordinary power of the agent causing both forms.” By this the Doctor signifies that although character and grace have no necessary connection with one another from the nature of things, they nevertheless have one in moral estimation, because the character is ordered toward the conferral of grace both through the Sacrament by which it is impressed and through other Sacraments, especially if we speak of the baptismal character, since through it we are made capable of the other Sacraments. For there would be no reason why the character should be indelible and make the Sacrament non-repeatable unless it were subordinated to grace as a prior form; nor can the configuration of the soul and of the image, which is principally made through grace, properly subsist in the character alone unless it expressed some order toward grace; nor can the obligation following upon such configuration to Christ abstract from the means by which it must be fulfilled, namely actual or habitual grace. Therefore it must have at least a moral connection with the grace toward which it is a disposition. He proves secondly: Every obligation to a moral work belongs to the will; but the baptismal character, for example, induces an obligation of the soul toward Christ, so that it observes the Christian law. This obligation is a moral necessity of acting, and consequently a certain inclination toward the action itself, just as a law, precept, or vow is said to incline toward action insofar as it opposes the freedom to act or not to act and to do this or that. Likewise, the character of Confirmation induces the obligation of military service and confession of faith; the character of Orders is also a principle of acting, for it is an active power. But every moral obligation belongs especially to the will; therefore

The character induces a moral obligation to act, and should therefore be in the will immediately rather than in the substance of the soul itself, which is not operative in itself, or in the intellect, which of itself does not seize upon moral action. Further, the character is a power, or sign of the power, of receiving or drawing forth those things that pertain to divine worship; but it belongs to the virtue of religion, which is in the will, to expend and perform those things that pertain to divine worship. Therefore the sign of such power should also be placed in the will. This is confirmed because the Sacraments belong to religion; therefore that effect which deputes a person to divine worship, such as the character, must also belong to religion. It must therefore be concluded that the character is immediately and formally in the will, but really in the substance of the soul itself, with which the will is really identical. In the same way, grace and charity inhere in the will as forms affecting and perfecting it in relation to operation; but really they inhere in the substance of the soul itself, with which the will is really indistinct.

You will say 1. The character is not ordered toward acting, but only toward perfecting and marking the soul; therefore it ought to inhere in the substance of the soul rather than in some faculty. — I distinguish the antecedent: it is not ordered per se and effectively, I concede; through another and dispositively, namely by reason of operative grace toward which it disposes, or of the ministry and office to whose fulfillment it obliges, I deny.

You will say 2. The substance of the soul is the subject of power, in which the faculties of the soul inhere; but a power cannot be the subject of another power. Yet, as we have said, the character can be reduced to the second species of quality, which is power; therefore it cannot exist in some faculty or power of the soul. — I distinguish the first part of the major: the substance of the soul is the subject of a natural power flowing from it, like a property connatural to it and really identified with it, I concede; of a power that is a supernatural accident really distinct from it, I deny. I likewise distinguish the other part of the same major: a power is not the subject of another power of substantiality and really identified with it, I concede; of an accidental power really distinct from it, I deny. And with the minor thus distinguished, the consequence must be denied; otherwise it would follow that no habit of virtue should be placed in the will itself.

You will say 3. The character is a certain spiritual light; but every light belongs to the intellect; therefore the character does too. The major is established by Saint Dionysius, book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 2, where he says:

Divine blessedness receives and admits the human being brought to Baptism into its participation or communication, and makes him a participant in its own light, as in a kind of sign, making him intimate with God and a sharer in the gifts of the sacred order, whose sacred token is that of the High Priest, a seal given to the one approaching, and so on.

But this seal is nothing other than the character, which he calls light and illumination; therefore, and so on. — I distinguish the major: the character is a spiritual light ordered toward the proper illumination of the one possessing the character, I deny; toward the illumination of others, so that through the character they know that I am deputed as a member of the household, or soldier, or minister of Christ, I concede. Such a light need not be in the intellect. Thus the characters and insignia of servants enlighten others, or lead them to know that they are servants of such and such a master, yet those marks and characters of servitude need not be in the intellect.

Fourth conclusion. — THE SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER IS INDELIBLE AND IRREMOVABLE. The Doctor proves this truth in d. 6, q. 9, n. 20, where he says:

Although indelibility of the character is spoken of in many ways, and it is not very useful to recount them, I say briefly that no form can be in the soul, other than the soul, which God could not delete by absolute power, just as something later can be removed a priori, since no contradiction can be found in this. But the character, if posited, is indelible in this way and cannot be deleted in this way, because it cannot be deleted by the power of any creature. This is clear because it is a supernatural form. Nor can it be deleted by divine power according to the ordered power, because God has ordained that no supernatural form be deleted except on account of some demerit inhering in the soul; but with respect to the character being deleted, no demeritorious cause can exist, since when it is impressed in the act of mortal sinning, nothing can merit its being taken away.

By this the Doctor clearly signifies that in the ordinary course the sacramental character is indelible. This truth is clearly handed down by the Councils of Florence and Trent, as is clear from their decrees cited in the first conclusion, by which it is signified that the character inheres indelibly in the soul. It is likewise clear from the holy Fathers, who call this seal indissoluble, especially Saint Augustine, book 2 of Against Parmenian, chapter 13, where he says: The Christian Sacraments adhere no less than the mark of bodily military service, which was once impressed upon the flesh ... and the holiness of the Sacraments remains inviolable and undefiled in the good for reward, in the wicked for judgment. A fitting reason also supports it: it was fitting that the character be altogether indelible and could not be annulled by any sin. Indeed, if the power of Orders signified by the character could be lost through some sin, it would follow that people would often be uncertain whether they validly received the Sacraments, since they have no indication whether the priests from whom they receive the Sacraments are in a state of grace or not; and this would truly tend to the great detriment of the faithful.

You will say 1. If some character were indelible, it would be especially the character of Orders; but that can be deleted by sins and wicked crimes; therefore, and so on. The major is clear. The minor is proved: the character of Orders is the power of administering and performing those things that specially pertain to divine worship, the administration of the Sacraments, and the public government of the Christian commonwealth; but that authority is lost through sin, so that whatever is done by wicked ministers is rejected by the Church as invalid and null; therefore, and so on. The minor is proved by many acts and examples, especially those of Photius, Bishop of the See of Constantinople, Maximus the Cynic, bishop of the same city, Proculus, Bishop of Marseille, and Ebbo, Archbishop of Rheims, whose ordinations and ecclesiastical offices were declared entirely invalid and null. First, the invalidity and nullity of the authority of a wicked minister of the Church is clear from the example of Photius, whose ordinations and ecclesiastical offices were rejected and annulled. For when, through the schemes of the eunuch Barda, he had been consecrated Patriarch of Constantinople by Gregory, the excommunicated Bishop of Syracuse, after the legitimate Bishop Ignatius had first been imprisoned and then driven into exile, a Roman synod was convened by Nicholas I, Supreme Pontiff, in which this sentence was passed against Photius: let him be foreign to every honor and name of the priesthood, and deprived of every office of the clergy. The same Pontiff also issued this sentence against him: Those whom Photius, a neophyte and intruder into the See of Constantinople, promoted to any ecclesiastical order, we deprive of every clerical office. Similar statements are found in the same Supreme Pontiff's first letter and in Letter 1 to the Emperor Michael, where he writes that Photius received nothing from Gregory except as much as Gregory had; but he had nothing and gave nothing. Adrian II, Supreme Pontiff, likewise decreed this, as we read in Act 3 of the Eighth Ecumenical Synod, where it says concerning those ordained by Photius: Whatever Photius is thought to have ordained in any rank, we rightly remove from the number and dignity of the bishops, which he usurped and falsely conferred. He adds three reasons: first, that Photius is like Maximus the Cynic, who, as we shall soon say, possessed no episcopal authority; second, that this had been decreed by his predecessor Nicholas; third, that he was ordained by an excommunicated man, who had nothing and gave nothing, except perhaps the condemnation he poured out upon his followers. Hence the following is found in Canon 1 of the Fourth Council of Constantinople:

Cutting out by the roots the love of primacy, as a kind of evil root of scandals arising in the Church, we condemn by a just decree the man who rashly, transgressively, and irregularly, like a great wolf, leapt into Christ's fold, namely Photius, who filled the world with a thousand tumults and disturbances. We proclaim that he was neither previously nor now a bishop, and that those consecrated or promoted by him in any priestly rank do not remain in the rank to which they were advanced. Moreover, we restrain from such patronage those who received from him the customary prayers for promotion to a prelacy; and we decree that the churches which Photius and those consecrated by him are thought to have dedicated, or in which they set up moved altars, be dedicated, enthroned, and established again, with everything done in him and by him for receiving a priestly rank or for condemnation made void.

The Council has spoken. But if Photius is not considered a bishop because he was ordained by an excommunicated Gregory, and if everything done by Photius is invalid because he had intruded into the See of Constantinople and was afterward excommunicated, it follows that the episcopal character and authority cease in a notorious and excommunicated person; therefore, and so on. The same is clear from the example of Maximus the Cynic. After he had been made Bishop of Constantinople by certain Egyptian bishops corrupted with money, through a clandestine election, the First Council of Constantinople pronounced concerning him and his ordinations in Canon 6, in these words:

Concerning Maximus the Cynic philosopher, because of his undisciplined teaching which arose in Constantinople, it was decreed that Maximus neither was nor should be considered a bishop, nor should those ordained by him possess any clerical rank, everything done around him or by him being revoked as invalid. —

Photius, a man exceedingly desirous of glory, was transformed from a layman into a Patriarch in six days: on the first day he was made a monk from a layman, on the second he became a Reader, on the third a Subdeacon, on the fourth a Deacon, on the fifth a Priest, and on the sixth finally a Patriarch. He ascended the throne and announced peace to the people while thinking of nothing worthy of peace. He was consecrated by Gregory of Syracuse, Bishop of Ignatius's rebel and excommunicated enemy, who had been driven from the throne; but he used as ministers Peter, Bishop of Sardinia, called “the wretched,” and Eulalius, Bishop of Apamea. These facts indicate that Photius's episcopal consecration was illicit, not invalid.

Therefore, although those ordained by him could never licitly exercise the duties of the Order received, since they were suspended from its exercise because they had received the Order from one who had imposed hands in another diocese, not his own, without the consent of that place's bishop, nevertheless they were validly ordained and received the character of the Order. That Photius's ordination was valid is clear from the letter of John VIII, Supreme Pontiff, to the emperors Basil and Alexander, in which he approves Photius's restoration to the See of Constantinople after Ignatius's death: Without prejudicing the Apostolic statutes or dissolving the rules of the blessed Fathers, we receive and hold the same Photius, who, after seeking mercy before the synod according to custom, as a brother in the love of charity, as a fellow minister in pontifical office and a fellow shepherd in pastoral teaching, for the peace and benefit of the Church of God, restoring him to the throne against Christ's will— and so on. He proves that this can be done by the examples of the Donatists and Bonosians, who were received into their honors and offices without any reordination. Nor does it matter that John is reproached by many for having been so accommodating toward Photius's restoration, since afterward Photius became the most intense enemy of the Roman Church and the author of the schism and defection of the Greeks from the Latins. No one has ever thought him blameworthy for judging that Photius should be received without reordination. The same must be said of the ordinations he performed. For Pope Formosus, writing to Stylianus, Bishop of Neocaesarea in the province of Euphratesia, says among other things: Dealing mercifully with those ordained by Photius, we have decreed that, after submitting petitions, they confess that they have sinned and ask pardon through penance, promising that they will never do anything of the kind again. By this he approves their reception, with penance indeed, but without a new ordination. The same must be said regarding the example of Maximus the Cynic, since Adrian, in his second letter to Ignatius, writes that Photius's ordination is entirely similar to Maximus's, since both were illicit though valid. Nor does it matter that both are called not bishops. For this is said for the common understanding of the people, not with doctrinal precision, almost as true priests are called wicked and violators of the priesthood by their actions—not because they do not possess the dignity, gravity, authority, state, and perfection of the priesthood when they stain their consciences with shameful crimes, but because they do not observe the laws of the priesthood. In the common way, consuls who do not care for the commonwealth are denied to be consuls, physicians who do not heal others are denied to be physicians, doctors who make no effort to teach others are denied to be doctors, and kings who scorn the duties of a king are denied to be kings. No one will deny that these and similar, even harsher, phrases can be used to attack vices. Concerning the example of Proculus of Marseille, I say that Zosimus calls him not a bishop not because he truly lacked the episcopal character and authority, but because he illicitly and against the Canons aspired to the metropolitan office. That he was truly always a bishop is plainly clear from Saint Jerome, Letter 1 to Rusticus, where he writes: You have there the holy and most learned Bishop Chromatius, who surpasses our little writings with living and present speech and directs your journey by daily discourses, and so on. Moreover, he is found signing together with Saint Ambrose at the Council of Aquileia in 381. Therefore, when Proculus is said not to be a bishop, or those ordained by him are removed from any ecclesiastical rank, or are said to lack the priesthood, all this is to be understood not as deprivation of the character in the one conferring Orders or in those receiving them, but as deprivation of the goods of ranks and offices. The same truth appears thirdly from Proculus of Marseille. When the Council of Turin, held in the year 397, had declared in its first canon that Proculus, Bishop of Marseille, acted as metropolitan over the churches appearing to be situated in the Second Province of Narbonne, Pope Zosimus, about twenty years later, annulled that synodal judgment, as is clear from various letters, especially Letter 6 to the Bishop of Carthage, where he declares invalid the ordinations of two bishops, Universus and Terentius, made by Proculus. In Letter 1 to the Bishop of Arles he condemns Proculus for undertaking such things. When Proculus still did not yield, he wrote Letter 11 to the people of Marseille, in which among other things he says: Since Proculus is no longer a bishop, he performs what belongs to bishops, and, as a generous human benefactor, says he can bestow on others what he could not justly retain as something once given to himself, and so on. But if a condemned bishop ceases to be a bishop, and priests ordained by him lack the priesthood, it follows that his character and authority cease and consequently are not indelible. The fourth example is Ebbo, formerly Archbishop of Rheims. In the year 835, under Pope Gregory IV, at a gathering of bishops held at Thionville, he had resigned the episcopate on account of certain crimes of which he was accused, especially that he had promoted the deposition of Emperor Louis the Pious. Nevertheless, after his deposition, while Louis's son Lothair reigned, he was restored to his see by a synod of provincial bishops and ordained several clerics in that church. Finally, with the support of King Charles, he was removed and deposed by the bishops of Gaul, and Hincmar was substituted for him while he was still alive. When Hincmar after Ebbo's death refused to admit the priests and clerics whom he had ordained, the bishops of Gaul held the Council of Soissons in 853, under Pope Leo, in which they condemned all ordinations made by Ebbo after his deposition and declared them invalid and null, as Flodoard reports in book 3 of the History of Rheims, chapter 11, where he recounts the entire proceedings of this Council. Therefore, all these things establish that the episcopal character and authority are not indelible and irremovable, since they cease through the crimes or deposition of a bishop. I deny the consequence, and concerning the first example I say that the ordinations made by Photius were indeed valid, though not licit, because Photius had been ordained against the Church's Canons. For, as Nicetas says in Baronius under the year 857: Concerning the fourth example I say that everything determined by the Council of Soissons, instigated by Hincmar, against the clerics ordained by Ebbo was condemned and rejected by the Apostolic See, as appears from Letters 16 and 17 of Nicholas, Supreme Pontiff. It is clear from these that when Hincmar acted through repeated embassies before Leo IV to obtain confirmation of this Council and obtained nothing from him, he induced Benedict, Leo's successor, by false accounts to obtain the Council's confirmation surreptitiously, but only conditionally, in this form: “if it is so,” and so on. Pope Nicholas reports there that when Pope Benedict had not fully satisfied Hincmar's wishes in his letter, Hincmar added some things to that letter and removed others at his own discretion. Hence Nicholas, at the end of Letter 16, declares that even if everything alleged against Ebbo were true, nevertheless the clerics ordained by him, if they showed humility and obedience, were to be received with their honors, because Ebbo, whatever he had been, had caused them no obstacle at all. He confirms this by the example of Maximus, who, although a neophyte and improperly ordained, Saint Leo nevertheless did not wish to remove from episcopal dignity. And from the letter of Anastasius II, who, writing to the Emperor Anastasius, says that wicked men, while administering good things, harm only themselves and do not stain the Sacraments of the Church. Finally, from the acts of the Council of Soissons itself and from what was afterward done for those clerics ordained by Ebbo, it is evident that such clerics were only expelled from their ranks and suspended from the administration of their Orders. This is clear, I say, from the Council of Soissons, for it confirms what had previously been done by Hincmar; what that was appears from the petition of those clerics, who say in a petition submitted to that Council: We ask that mercy be shown to us by your fatherhood concerning the administration of the ecclesiastical Orders to which we were once advanced by Lord Ebbo, but from which we have been suspended by your authority. It is equally clear from the acts concerning their restoration. For Nicholas, Supreme Pontiff, commands Hincmar and the other bishops of Gaul nothing else than that such clerics be restored to their ranks. Therefore, when it is said in the same Council, in its fifth session, that whatever Ebbo had done in ecclesiastical ordinations after his condemnation, except holy Baptism, was to be considered canceled and invalid, this must be understood as concerning the honor and rank from which those clerics ordained by Ebbo were considered suspended. The same interpretation must be given to what follows after the sixth session concerning Alduin, who is said to have received the priesthood by a leap from Lupus, Bishop of Châlons, because he had previously received the diaconate from Ebbo. The Council's intention is not that Alduin was not truly a deacon, but that by receiving the character of the diaconate he could not receive the rank and honor of that Order; hence he was treated with respect to the exercise of ministry as though he had truly been promoted by a leap.

You will urge. The Supreme Pontiffs themselves sometimes rejected ordinations made by their predecessors and judged that those ordained by them ought to be ordained again; therefore they did not think that the Sacrament of Orders impressed an indelible character. Proof of the antecedent: first, the example of Pope Stephen IV, who in 769, having convened at Rome a Council of the select bishops of Gaul, Germany, and Italy, declared all ordinations made by his predecessor Constantine invalid. The Council confirmed this invalidation, as is read in its acts, also reported by Anastasius the Librarian, who, speaking of that Roman Council, says:

In that same Council it was promulgated that those bishops who had been ordained from priests or deacons by him should return to their first rank of honor; even if this had pleased all the people of their city, after a new decree of election they were to return, according to custom, with clergy and people to the Apostolic See, so that from Saint Stephen the Pope they might receive consecration by apostolic blessing.

He adds that the same was decreed concerning priests and deacons, and immediately continues: Those bishops, returning at once to their first rank of honor, elected again by clergy and people and proceeding to the Apostolic See with the customary decree, were consecrated by that most holy Pope. Finally he concludes: For it was thus decreed in that same Council, that everything which that Constantine had done in ecclesiastical Sacraments and divine worship should be repeated, except holy Baptism and holy Chrism.

— The second example is Stephen VI. When his predecessor Formosus had ordained several bishops and priests, Stephen, having convened a Council at Rome, not only deposed them all but also ordained them again, as Luitprand reports in book 1, chapter 8, writing: All whom he had ordained, after being deposed from their proper rank, he ordained again. This was because Formosus had previously been excommunicated by John VIII, and because, contrary to the Canons, after abandoning his own wife, that is, the episcopate, he had been made Roman Pontiff from Bishop of Porto. This decree was approved not only by that Council but also by Sergius III. Concerning him the same Luitprand writes: Sergius secretly entered Rome and entered upon the papacy, appointed as a terror to the Roman name, so that they held all Formosus's ordinations invalid. — Finally the same is established by the example of John XII, who likewise convened a Council at Rome in 964 and anathematized the election of Leo, commonly called Leo VIII, as Supreme Pontiff. Concerning those ordained by him, this was decreed in Act 3 of that Council:

Those whom Leo, a neophyte and invader of the Holy Catholic and Roman Church, promoted in any ecclesiastical Order, we recall to their first rank by Apostolic and canonical authority and by synodal decree, because the one who ordained them had nothing for himself and gave them nothing, just as long ago our predecessor, Pope Stephen of blessed memory, pronounced judgment concerning those ordained by a certain Constantine, a neophyte and invader of the Apostolic See, and afterward consecrated some of them, priests or deacons, who were pleasing to him.

Therefore from all this it is clear that the Supreme Pontiffs thought pontifical and episcopal authority could be lost, and consequently that its character was not indelible.

I deny the antecedent, and concerning its first proof I answer with Baronius under the year 769, n. 6, that the bishops said to have been consecrated by Stephen IV should not be considered to have received Orders again. They are called consecrated because they received, according to ancient custom, the pontifical blessing and all the rites customarily observed in reconciling schismatics or heretics. Such reconciliation was necessary for those ordained by Constantine, since he was a pseudo-pontiff who, the brother of the Duke of Tortona of the city of Nethina, relying on his brother's power, invaded the Apostolic See and almost in a moment, observing no intervals, emerged like an actor from the stage as Roman Pontiff. After sitting for a year he ordained many deacons, priests, and bishops. Since they supported his party, they were rightly suspended by the Council and by Stephen, the legitimate Supreme Pontiff, from their offices and ministries until, after a new election, or rather approval, by the people and clergy, they received the Apostolic blessing and were restored to their ranks, honors, and ministries. Nor does it matter that Auxilius, book 2, chapter 1, saying that Stephen IV ordained again those ordained by Constantine, excuses the action only by saying that an example should not be taken from wicked men; both Supreme Pontiffs, Constantine and Stephen V, were wicked men. Constantine was an invader of the Roman See; Stephen, because by his command and approval his followers deprived the captured and fleeing Constantine, who had been left half alive after many blows, of his eyes. Auxilius says that this was not an apostolic but an apostate deed. This does not stand, I say, because it is false that the bloody cruelty against Constantine occurred under Stephen's command. Anastasius the Librarian, who flourished in the same century as Auxilius, attributes Constantine's blinding not to Stephen but to a certain Gratiosus, who, without Stephen's knowledge, surrounded by a band of soldiers, inflicted this cruelty upon Constantine. Hence Anastasius accuses Stephen of no crime, indeed celebrates him with many praises, as well as the bishops who had assembled with him in the Roman Council. If we nevertheless prefer to follow Auxilius's opinion and consider the consecration performed by Stephen a true reordination, I answer that it does not follow that Stephen judged either that the character was not impressed through the Sacrament of Orders or that it was removable, but only that he erred in fact, thinking Constantine was not a valid bishop, just as he was an illegitimate pontiff. Thus he could think all Constantine's pontifical acts altogether invalid. Indeed, he did not even consider everything invalid, for, as the same Anastasius reports, he approved not only the Baptism conferred by Constantine but also the chrismation, namely Confirmation, which is ordinarily conferred only by a true bishop.

I answer secondly with Baronius under the year 897: first, that Stephen can rightly be excluded from the number of the Roman Pontiffs, as can Sergius, since in those most perilous times of the Church they were driven from the Roman See by the faction of the Tusculan Marquises, intruders being expelled by intruders. I would not dare, says Baronius, n. 6, to number Stephen among the Roman Pontiffs unless I had received this as having been done by the Fathers. And rightly so: that Stephen was infamous for so many and such great crimes that he is altogether unworthy of the name and title of Roman Pontiff. Among his grave and horrible deeds, he ordered his predecessor Formosus to be dragged from the tomb and placed, dressed in priestly vestments, upon the chair of the Roman Pontificate; then, after stripping him and cutting off three fingers with which he used to bless the people, he ordered his mutilated body to be thrown into the Tiber, as Luitprand narrates in book 1, chapter 8, in these words:

After Formosus had died and Arnulf had returned to his own country, the one appointed after Formosus's death, namely Bonus, was expelled, and Pope Sergius (so I should have written) was set up by Adalbert. Once set up, as an impious man ignorant of holy doctrine, he ordered Formosus to be dragged from the tomb and placed, dressed in priestly vestments, upon the pontifical chair, and said to him: Since you were Bishop of Porto, why did you usurp the universal Roman See in the spirit of ambition? Having finished this, he ordered him stripped of the consecrated vestments and, after three fingers had been cut off, thrown into the Tiber; and he ordained again all whom he had ordained, after deposing them from their proper rank. You can perceive, most holy Father, how badly you acted, since those who received from Judas, the betrayer of our Lord Jesus Christ, before the proof of salvation or apostolic blessing, were not deprived after that betrayal of the suspension of their own bodies, except those whom shameful crimes had perhaps defiled¹. For the blessing bestowed upon Christ's ministers is not poured out through the one who appears to be a priest. For neither the one who waters is anything nor the one who plants, but God who gives the growth. How great Formosus's authority and religion were we can gather from this: when he was afterward found by fishermen and carried to the Church of blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, certain images of the Saints in the shrine saluted him reverently as he lay there. I have often heard this from the most religious men of the city of Rome.

I add, however, that Stephen's act of reordaining those already ordained by Formosus was tyrannical in fact, not an error in faith. For everything done by Stephen VII and Sergius III was carried out only through threats and terrors, with the good protesting and the wicked terrified by their deed. Hence, after Stephen had been removed from this life by an unhappy end—for in the year 900 he was thrust into prison and strangled there by a noose—the three Supreme Pontiffs who succeeded him, namely Romanus, Theodore, and John IX, entirely rescinded his acts, as Luitprand reports concerning Romanus and Auxilius concerning Theodore. John, moreover, after celebrating two Councils, condemned in the first, held in 901, the pseudo-synod convened by Stephen, in these words:

The bishops, priests, and deacons, as well as the subdeacons and the rest of every other order of the Holy Apostolic See, who were canonically consecrated by that revered Pope Formosus and rashly cast down from their own orders and ranks at the pleasure of certain persons, we restore, by the common judgment of the Synod, to their own ranks, and by God's authority we decree that they be established with perpetual force and canonical censure,

etc. In that same year John also held another Synod at Ravenna, which Sigebert mentions in these words: He also, to confirm the Order of Formosus, whom Pope Stephen had deposed, held a synod of 74 bishops at Ravenna in the presence of the Frankish archbishops and the king, and before them the synod which Stephen had held for the condemnation of Formosus was burned. Therefore, with Bellarmine, book 1 of On the Supreme Pontiff, chapter 12, we must conclude

that Stephen and Sergius issued no decree by which they determined that those ordained by a degraded bishop, or specifically by Formosus as degraded, should be ordained again, but only ordered in fact that they be ordained again. This order proceeded not from ignorance or heresy but from hatred of Formosus, and could be carried out only through force and tyranny. Nor does it matter that Stephen's decree was approved by the Roman Council he celebrated in the year of the Lord 897, for all of this was done through tyranny and fear imposed upon the good bishops who were present. Hence all who took part in that pseudo-synod begged pardon for their offense in the Roman Council under John IX. Thus we read in it: The bishops and priests, and the remaining clergy, who took part in that Synod, because, compelled by fear and dread of terror, they confessed that they had attended while asking pardon, we have forgiven them at the request of the holy Synod. — Finally, concerning the third example I answer that nothing else was done in that Roman Council against those ordained by Leo except that they were expelled from the rank to which Leo had raised them and recalled to their former rank. For Sigebert, who appears to have read the synodal acts of this Council, summarized them in his Chronicle as follows:

John, having gathered a Synod, deposed Leo and canceled his acts. It was also established by the public judgment of all that the Synod held by Leo—indeed, it was not to be called a Synod but “the raging brothel of the adulterer” (thus he called Leo, because he had invaded the Roman Church betrothed to another)—and all who had been condemned by Leo's ordination were ordered to present their own proscription in writing, containing these words: My father had nothing for himself; he gave me nothing. Thus they remained deposed in the ranks they had held, not ordained by Leo. But if some were judged worthy to be ordained without a prior consecration being received, the same decree was imposed upon them as upon the one condemned by Constantine the Neophyte.

This is Sigebert. Nor should those words move us: My father had nothing for himself; he gave me nothing, and so on. They are to be understood with respect to honor, rank, and ministry, just as was said concerning those ordained by Constantine the Neophyte, since Sigebert asserts that Constantine's decree had been intimated to them.

You will object 3. There are various Canons of Councils by which ordinations made either by those who do not ordain their subjects, or by those who are excommunicated, suspended, or degraded, are declared invalid. First, Canon 16 of the Council of Nicaea: If anyone should attempt to invade another parish and ordain in his own Church without the consent of the bishop from whom the one called by the rule has departed, let such an ordination be declared invalid. Concerning the ordinations of excommunicated persons, the Council of Quedlinburg, held in 1085 under Pope Gregory VII, says: In that Synod the ordination of Benilo of Mainz, the intruder, and of Siegfried of Augsburg and Norbert of Chur was judged invalid; indeed all ordinations and consecrations of the excommunicated were judged wholly invalid, according to the decrees of the holy Fathers Innocent, Leo I, Pelagius, and his successor Gregory I. The same is decreed concerning the ordinations of simoniacs in the Council of Piacenza under Urban II, where it is established: If anything in holy Orders and ecclesiastical matters appears to have been acquired simoniacally by money given or promised, let it be considered invalid. Therefore the authority once acquired to confer holy

Orders can be lost; and consequently the character is not irremovable. —

I deny the consequence, and concerning the aforesaid Canons I answer that such ordinations are called invalid not with respect to the impression of the character, but with respect to the suspension of the ministry and of the Order received. This is defined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 5, On Reform, where it is established: Let no bishop be permitted, under pretext of any privilege, to exercise pontificals in another diocese except with the express permission of the local Ordinary, and only over persons subject to that Ordinary. If anything is done otherwise, the bishop is suspended by the law itself from the exercise of pontificals, and those thus ordained from the execution of Orders. That nothing else is intended in the aforesaid Canons, especially the Quedlinburg Canon, is evident, since it brings forward the authority of Innocent, Leo I, Pelagius, and Gregory the Great, whom it is certain approved ordinations performed by neophytes, heretics, and excommunicated persons, as we shall see when treating of the minister of the Sacraments.

You will ask: Does that character also subsist after death, both in the blessed and in the damned?

I answer. This appears certain, since the Councils and holy Fathers absolutely pronounce that this character is indelible. Although it was not their intention to determine whether it subsisted even after death, because no controversy concerning this question was being conducted with the heretics, nevertheless this appears constant from the practice of the Church, which does not customarily baptize, confirm, or ordain again one raised from the dead; yet it permits him to receive and administer the Sacraments as he did while alive and before death. To assert that God reproduces the character in him anew, just as he reproduces life, is to admit a miracle without any necessity or sufficient reason. Therefore it must be inferred that the Church's mind is that the character subsists in him.

This is further supported by a common argument. If the character perished with life, it would do so chiefly either through corruption of the subject, opposition of a contrary, or lack of conservation; but it cannot be erased in any of these three ways. Not through corruption of the subject, since the soul, which is its subject, cannot be corrupted; not through opposition of a contrary, since it has nothing contrary to it; nor through lack of conservation, since God conserves it in the blessed for adornment, and in the damned for punishment and disgrace. For when something is conserved by God, God does not interrupt his conserving influx unless some urgent and efficacious reason advises it; but the character perseveres until death, and no reason appears why it should perish in death or why God should deny it conserving concurrence, since it is spiritual and independent of the body.

You will say: When the end ceases, those things ordered to the end cease, otherwise they would remain in vain. Hence Matrimony will not subsist after generation, because generation, toward which it is ordered, will cease. But the end of the character will also cease in death, namely external worship of God, since there will be no such worship in hell, nor will there be any in heaven; for in heaven nothing will be done in figure or under a veil, but in open and naked truth. —

I answer by distinguishing the major: if the end ceases altogether, I concede; if it ceases only in some respect, I deny. I likewise distinguish the minor: external worship will cease in heaven with respect to its external matter, I concede; with respect to its end, I deny. And likewise I deny the consequence. For two things can be considered in divine worship: the matter of worship, namely certain external works, and the end of worship, namely the honor and glory of God presented to him through those external works. Those external works will indeed cease in heaven, but the end, namely God's honor and glory, will remain; and consequently the character itself will also persevere, in the good for glory and in the wicked for disgrace, just as a military character perseveres in soldiers after victory has been won: in those who conquered for glory, but in those who were conquered for punishment.

You will insist: The damned are unworthy of every supernatural gift, as Saint Dionysius testifies in book On the Divine Names, chapter 4, where he says that demons lack all divine gifts both according to habit and according to operation; but the character is some supernatural gift; therefore it does not remain in the damned.

I answer, that although the damned are unworthy of every supernatural gift that could contribute to their consolation, nevertheless they are not unworthy—in fact, they are supremely worthy—of everything that can contribute to their punishment and suffering. Such, without doubt, are the characters with which they have been divinely marked. For just as in the civil commonwealth it is the greatest dishonor and reproach for a soldier to become a traitor or deserter, for a steward of entrusted goods to become their squanderer and defrauder, and for a son or servant to become degenerate and rebellious against his father or master, so in the ecclesiastical commonwealth it is the greatest dishonor for Christ's faithful person, soldier, and dispenser to be condemned as a rebel, traitor, and squanderer. Therefore those three characters—the sonship acquired through Baptism, the military service obtained through Confirmation, and the dispensation of Christ's goods entrusted through Orders—will remain in the damned as punishment for their rebellion and defection.