Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

And although Sacred Scripture says nothing distinctly about the first sin of the demons, yet from it the Princes of Theology have taken the occasion for establishing various opinions on this matter. For there are more sins that can be

thought possible, which the utterly hostile Angels could have committed from the beginning of their rebellion; for instance, the sin of presumption regarding their own powers and excellences; of envy toward men; of hatred of God; likewise a certain disordered desire of beatitude, insofar as it is precisely a certain delightful good; and finally of excessive complacency in their own perfections, which the Subtle Doctor calls the sin of luxury; just as, he says, the sin by which someone takes disordered delight in the speculation of a Geometrical conclusion is reduced to luxury.

But which of all these was the primary and capital one, the Authors disagree among themselves; indeed they are split chiefly into two parties, of whom some will, with our Alensis, 2. part q. 98. membr. 2., S. Bonaventure in 2. dist. 5. art. 1. q. 1., and S. Thomas 1. p. q. 63. art. 1., that the first sin of the Angels was nothing other than pride properly so called. But others contend, with the Subtle Doctor, that the first sin of the Angel was disordered love of self, and a certain pride of luxury improperly so called, or rather spiritual, by which the Angels, taking excessive complacency in their gifts, disorderedly coveted the delightful spiritual good, namely their natural beatitude. For just as disordered desire of a bodily delightful good constitutes the species of luxury; so a disordered appetite of a spiritual good supremely delightful effects the species of spiritual luxury. Which of these opinions, then, is the truer is to be resolved here.

Note 2. The holy Fathers held various views on the first sin of the devil; for a fourfold diversity of their opinion on this matter can be distinguished. First, all those who thought the Angels endowed with bodies judge that their sin was of such a kind, that when they had been set over the governing of this world by God, captivated by the beauty of women, they had intercourse with them in lust, and on account of their impurity and crime were cast out from Heaven and the fellowship of God; for so they thought that passage of Genesis 6. was to be interpreted: The Sons of God, or as other codices have it, the Angels of God, seeing the daughters of men that they were beautiful, took to themselves wives from all whom they chose. Thus in the first place judged Justin in the Apologeticus, praised by us at the beginning of the present Article. Clement of Alexandria subscribed in the fifth book of the Stromata, where he says that the Angels, captivated by the beauty of women, disclosed to them certain secret and hidden things: Those Angels, he says, to whom the heavenly lot had fallen, having slipped down into pleasures, announced secrets to women, and whatever came to their knowledge, etc. The same Tertullian taught in the book De idololatria cap. 9., affirming that the demons, deserters of God, lovers of women, taught men the vain curiosity of astrology. And in the book De habitu muliebri, he asserts that the demons were the teachers and inventors of all those things which women proudly assume for their adornment: Properly, he says, and as it were peculiarly they furnished that instrument of womanly glory; the gleam of gemstones with which necklaces are varied, and rings of gold with which the arms are bound: and dyes of rouge with which faces are crowned: and that very black powder with which the beginnings of the eyes are drawn out. Hence in the book De Virginibus velandis, he admonishes that the heads of women are to be veiled, as the Apostle teaches 1. ad Corinth. 11., on account of the Angels: Whom, he says, we read fell from God and from Heaven on account of their desire for women... Therefore so dangerous a face must be veiled, so long as it hurls scandal even toward Heaven. But what is marvelous, holy Ambrose went over into the same opinion, who in lib. 1.¹ De Virginibus says: How glorious, he says, that Angels on account of their intemperance fell from Heaven into the world, while a Virgin on account of her chastity passed from the world into Heaven! — Nor are they lacking who think the Angels first fell through envy; which they indeed explain threefold, for some will that he envied man, because he had been made and fashioned to the image of God. Thus Gregory of Nyssa in the Catechesis cap. 6.: Now man, he says, was that animal in which the beauty of the divine intelligible nature was tempered with a certain inexplicable power; which the daemon bore unworthily, nor did he judge tolerable that he who had received the care of earthly things, that a substance should be fashioned out of the nature subject to him, which would be fashioned to the likeness of that most excellent dignity. The same holds Cyprian in the book De zelo, et livore, and also August. in the book De Genesi ad litteram, cap. 11. But Lactantius thought the daemon envied the Son of God, whom the Father had brought forth as a Spirit like himself, endowed with the virtues of God the Father. Finally Bernard in Sermon 17. on the Canticles, thinks he envied the incarnation of the Word, and the God-man, as we have already declared once and again from that very source. — There are also very many who think the first and capital sin of the daemon was pride; these indeed we shall cite and refute in the objections; but the rest teach that that sin was nothing other than excessive love of self, and disordered complacency in their own gifts. Therefore it is established that the opinion of the SS. Fathers is not concordant on this matter; and so it is lawful for us to embrace either party.

Note 3. With the Subtle Doctor in 2. dist. 6. quaest. 2., all acts of the will are adequately divided into nolition and volition; so that there is no act of the will, neither good nor evil, except the act by which it pursues the fitting or good, which act is called volition, or to will; or the act by which it flees the unfitting, or evil, which act is called nolition, or to not will. The Doctor notes besides that between each act there is this order, that nolition cannot first be had before volition; for I flee from nothing, he says, except because it cannot stand together with something which I accept as fitting; which words are not to be so used, as if no nolition whatever could be had absolutely without a prior act of volition; for it does not appear why someone could not refuse a molestation or torment proposed to him without any formal volition whatever of the delight, or of the fitting good opposed; but the Doctor only wills that no one can refuse the unfitting under the formal reason of the unfitting, and insofar as it is opposed to the fitting good and impedes its attainment, unless because he first wills that fitting good. — He admonishes besides that the act of volition is distinguished into love of friendship, by which we love someone for himself; and of concupiscence, by which we will something for someone, or as he himself says: Twofold is the willing, which can be named of friendship, and of concupiscence; and the willing of friendship may be said to be of that object to which I will the good; and the willing of concupiscence of that object which I will to someone beloved. Which indeed is not to be taken thus, as if the love of friendship were precisely the volition by which one loves a person without willing a good to him; while the other, namely of concupiscence, were the volition by which one wills only the good of the beloved person; for the love of friendship is also the act by which I will the good of the person whom I love; for I would not truly love her if I did not wish a good to her; but by the love of friendship the Doctor understands that by which one wills a good to someone on account of his love, dilection alone, without being moved to it by the love of another; but the love of concupiscence is the volition by which one wills a good to someone on account of the love he has toward another: thus e. g. while one loves his neighbor because he loves God, who commands the love of the neighbor and commands that good be done to him, that volition by which he wills a good to the neighbor can be called love of concupiscence; since he does not will the good to him precisely because he loves him, but only on account of the love he has toward God, who commands that the good be procured for the neighbor.

Finally the Doctor observes in the same place. that the love of concupiscence of these two presupposes the love of friendship: For since, he says, the beloved is with respect to the coveted as the end, to which I will the good; for on account of the beloved I covet for him the good which I will to him; and since the end of the will has the first reason of the object willed; it is evident that the willing of friendship precedes the willing of concupiscence.

These things thus prenoted, three things remain to be determined in this Question: First, whether the primary and capital sin of the Angel was disordered love of friendship of self; Second, what he desired by disordered love of concupiscence; Third, whether each of those loves, of friendship and of concupiscence, was pride properly so called, or rather spiritual luxury.

First conclusion. — The first sin of the Angel was disordered love of friendship of himself. So the Subtle Doctor in the place praised above, num. 4., where he says, that absolutely the first disordered act of the will of the Angel was the first willing of friendship of his will, which willed the good:

but this object was not God, because he could not love God disorderedly from intention with the love of friendship; for God is such an amable, that from the sole reason of himself, as object, he gives the complete reason of goodness to the act perfectly intense; nor is it likely that he loved something other than himself too intensely with the actual love of friendship; both because the natural inclination inclined more to himself, than to any other created thing to be so loved; and because it does not seem that he so understood any other created thing as himself; therefore the first disordered act was the act of friendship with respect to himself.

These things the Doctor, by which he openly indicates the first sin of the Angel to have been disordered love of friendship of himself; which indeed thus

He proves: The first sin of the Angel was disordered love of self: but it was not love of concupiscence, insofar as that is distinguished from love of friendship: therefore it was truly disordered love of friendship. The minor stands; for the love by which the Angel loved himself was not that by which he loved himself on account of the love of another, since it is not likely that he loved any other creature either before, or more, than himself. Nor did he love himself on account of God; for that love would not have been disordered: but that love by which he loved himself, and not on account of the love of another, is truly love of friendship; and consequently that love by which the Angel disorderedly loved himself was not love of concupiscence, insofar as that is distinguished from love of friendship.

But the Doctor proves the minor. First indeed by the authority of S. Augustine lib. 12. De Civit. c. 6., where, having said that the cause of the beatitude of the holy Angels is that they adhere to him who is supreme, he adds: But when the cause of the misery of the evil Angels is sought, it deservedly occurs that, averted from him who is supreme, they turned to themselves. But this adhesion, or conversion, is made primarily through love; and therefore he judges S. Augustine that the first sin of the Angel was disordered love of self. He repeats the same, and explains it more evidently, lib. 14. cap. ult., where he asserts that two loves made two cities: The city of God, the love of God even to contempt of self; the city of the devil, the love of self even to contempt of God. Therefore the first root of the city of the devil, says the Doctor, was disordered love of friendship of self, which root germinated even to contempt of God, in which that malice was consummated. He teaches the same besides lib. 11. De Genesi ad litteram cap. 15., where he says: The Angel sinned by loving, not money, but his own power; and therefore perverted love of self deprived the swollen spirit of holy fellowship.

— The Doctor confirms the same major by reason: the first sin of the Angel was either volition or nolition: if volition, chiefly either that by which he took disordered complacency in himself, or that by which he willed some good undue to himself: if the first, it plainly stands that that volition was disordered love of self. If the second, either that volition presupposed another, by which he took disordered complacency in himself; for no one wills a good to another, unless he first loves him, and thus that first volition of complacency in himself was necessarily the first sin: or it did not presuppose, and thus the volition itself was disordered love of self; since the volition by which one wills a good to himself, and not on account of the love of another person, is either love of his own, or presupposes love of his own. If it be said that it was nolition, which however no one has hitherto affirmed, since all teach that the first sin of the Angel was of commission, and not of omission alone; nevertheless even if there had been some nolition, it must necessarily have presupposed volition, or must not have presupposed: if it presupposed, that presupposed volition would have been disordered love of his own; if it did not presuppose, that nolition was love of his own either formally or equivalently: because when one does not will evil to himself, and that not on account of the love of another person, he is doubtless to be judged to will that evil not to himself on account of the love of himself.

• Therefore the demons, elated and inflated from the contemplation of their own excellence, their will began to swell with disordered love of self, and with a perverse affectation of loftiness they began to abandon and turn away from God, to whom they ought to have been subject and to adhere, indeed even to struggle against him and to rival his supreme divinity and majesty. For if there is so great a force of flattery, that it persuades even things most manifestly false and incredible, in him who offers himself to be deceived; of what virtue must that be thought, by which from the very heart or intellect it fabricates for each one an unbelievable false persuasion, when the same one is to himself both orator and judge, and both deceiver and deceived? But from this disordered love pride issued forth: this in turn gave birth to envy in them. For, as S. Augustine rightly notes lib. 2. De Genesi ad litt., envy follows pride, it does not precede it. For envy is not the cause of pride, but pride the cause of envying. Since therefore pride is love of one's own excellence: but envy hatred of the happiness of another, what is born from thence is sufficiently in view. For each one, loving his own excellence, envies either equals, that they be made equal to him: or inferiors, lest they be made equal to him: or superiors, that he not be made equal to them. Therefore by priding one is envious, not by envying is each one proud. The progress of which the same one describes excellently in the commentary on Ps. 121:

He who willed to have from himself the same thing, that as it were he might be the same to himself, fell. The Angel fell and became a devil. He proffered pride to man: envy cast down with him him who stood. They willed to be the same thing to themselves; they willed to rule themselves, to lord over themselves. Averted therefore from him who is supreme, they turned to themselves and willed to become for themselves a principle.

Therefore from unexpected, from disordered complacency in their own gifts and prerogatives the will began to deviate, and to effervesce into pride; whence, aspiring to the divine equality, it emulated that dominion of his over men, which that it might obtain, he set about to cast them down from the received sanctity and innocence. *

You will say. Love of friendship is that by which the Angel does not covet any good distinct from himself: but he takes complacency only in his intrinsic perfections: but that love cannot have any malice joined to itself: therefore it could not be the first sin of the Angel. The major stands: the minor is proved: that love cannot be evil whose object is not evil; nor does it have any circumstance by which it be deordered or infected: but that love, by which the Angel loved himself, had a good object, namely the gifts of the Angel, as well natural as supernatural; nor does it seem to have had any infecting or deordering circumstance. For if any could be assigned, chiefly some greater intensio of the love itself than ought to be: but whenever an act according to its substance is good, and has a good object, its intensio does not seem able to be evil: therefore such love could not be evil, nor consequently could it be the first sin of the Angel.

I answer 1. by denying the major: for love of friendship according to the Subtle Doctor, as we declared in the third Notable, is not only that by which one wills to himself some intrinsic good, but also that by which one can will some extrinsic good distinct from himself, not on account of the love of another, but on account of the love of self. Hence although the Angel could not sin by taking too much complacency in his intrinsic perfections, and loving them most intensely; it would not follow thence that his love of friendship could not be disordered; since by this love he could will to himself some extrinsic goods which he ought not to will: but this love, since it did not presuppose another love, it would not follow thence that it was not love of friendship; since according to the Subtle Doctor, love of friendship is not distinguished from love of concupiscence in this, that by the former the Angel wills only an intrinsic good to himself, while by the latter he covets an extrinsic good for himself, as not so rightly interpreted it Suarez lib. 1. num. 9. cap. 14. For according to the opinion of the Doctor, by the love of friendship the Angel could also will to himself some external good, distinct from himself.

I answer 2. by denying the minor; for it is false that love of intrinsic perfections cannot be evil, and disordered, by reason of a greater intensio than it ought to have; for each one is held to love God above himself, and more than all things; and consequently he can sin as often as he can elicit a greater love toward himself than toward God: but someone also, without coveting to himself external and distinct goods, can elicit a greater love toward himself than toward God; and therefore that love of himself can be evil.

But it is more likely, that the first sin of the Angel was the very disordered love of himself, not by which he willed some extrinsic goods to himself; for the Doctor in num. 15. seems to suppose, that the Angel sinned by love of concupiscence, desiring those extrinsic goods; and straightway he indicates that the love of friendship, by which he first sinned, was some disordered love by which he took too much complacency in himself: and this appears consonant to reason; both because the Angel had no less perfect knowledge of himself than of other things; and therefore it is likely that the very knowledge of his perfections led his will to excessive complacency in himself: and because from thence it is easily conceived how that disordered love of himself stimulated him to commit the other sins: and finally because S. Augustine, praised by us above, seems plainly to feel this very thing, affirming that the Angel was therefore segregated from the fellowship of the Saints because, loving his own power, he took complacency in himself with perverted love.

• But that an axe be laid to the forest of objections which the Thomists elicit and germinate from the premise, I compose this syllogism: he who constitutes his beatitude in a creature, by finally enjoying it in willing it, sins gravely; but the Angel thus willed to enjoy himself: for, having seen his own natural excellence, he so loved it that he altogether wished to enjoy it, and to be finally delighted in it, as if he himself were sufficient to himself for beatitude. Therefore he sinned gravely; for this act of complacency is perverse and depraved, and contrary to right reason, and offensive to God, who is the last end of all, and in whose fruition alone beatitude consists. *

Second conclusion. — The Angel sinned by love of concupiscence, chiefly by disorderedly desiring supernatural beatitude.

So the Doctor in the same qu. 2. num. 5. It seems, he says, to be said, that they first immoderately coveted beatitude for themselves. But although he does not openly explain of which beatitude, whether natural or supernatural, he speaks, yet I judge it must more truly be said that he is to be understood of the supernatural: both because that is what is accustomed to be called absolutely, simply beatitude by the Scholastics: and because the Doctor there speaks of the beatitude which the Angel did not have: but he did not lack natural beatitude, and straightway he did not chiefly sin by disorderedly desiring it, although nevertheless he could have sinned in desiring it disorderedly, namely by desiring it with independence from God, or by making so much of it that he would not tend to supernatural beatitude, although he knew himself to have been created and ordered by God for procuring it.

But the Doctor proves the Conclusion: first indeed by a reason drawn from S. Anselm De casu diaboli cap. 4. The first disordered act of concupiscence of the Angel either proceeded from the affect of justice, or from the affect of the advantageous, that is, it proceeded from the will, either according as it has an inclination to the honest good, which can justly, and according to the dictate of right reason, be desired and acquired: or according as it has an inclination to the advantageous good. Not the first: for what is loved and coveted justly and according to reason is not disorderedly loved: Therefore the second. But it is likely that the will acting, and desiring something from the affect of the advantageous against the prescription of justice, is first exercised about the greatest advantageous good of all those which are manifested to it: but this greatest advantageous good is supernatural beatitude itself: therefore the first disordered concupiscence of the angelic will, the advantageous goods not being had, was chiefly exercised about supernatural beatitude. The major stands, the minor is proved: as often as the will in desiring the advantageous good follows no other rule than the impulse of the disordered appetite of the same advantageous good; since that appetite is natural; and a natural agent bursts forth into its act with its whole striving, and with all its forces; the consequence is, that that immoderate appetite of the angelic will stimulated it with all its forces to willing, and desiring the advantageous good; and straightway impelled it to the greatest advantageous good among those which were proposed and manifested to it; but such advantageous and greatest good was supernatural beatitude: therefore, etc.

Some Thomists reply. that this reason proves nothing; because, they say, the first appetite of the advantageous in the Angel could be about some particular delightful thing: but it is not necessary that it be exercised about the supremely delightful, or advantageous.

On the contrary. the will of the Angel was not regulated except by the disordered and immoderate appetite of the advantageous: but, as such, it tended with all its forces, and with the highest affect, to that which seemed to itself most advantageous: for the appetite impels with all its forces to the advantageous good, and therefore impels to the greatest advantageous good; for natural agents, such as that appetite of the advantageous was, burst forth with their whole impetus into acts, unless impeded; but there was nothing there impeding: for if anything could have repressed that impulse, chiefly the affect of justice, and the dictate of right reason; but neither was present there, and therefore there was nothing by which that impulse was restrained; and consequently it was borne with its whole striving to the advantageous good proposed to it, and straightway it desired the greatest advantageous good, which is supernatural beatitude.

He proves secondly. The first disordered concupiscence of the Angel was some act of volition: therefore it was exercised about an honest, useful, or delightful good. Not about the honest, otherwise it would be honest and ordered: nor about the useful, because concupiscence, and love of the useful good, presupposes concupiscence, and love of the good for the sake of which that seems useful to be attained: therefore that volition was exercised about a delightful good: but it is more likely that it was exercised about the greatest delightful good, such as beatitude; for although that is also an honest good, and can be desired honestly, nevertheless because it is also a most delightful good, it could be desired disorderedly: namely, either by desiring it with such ardor, that there was grief that it would not be so quickly conferred by God, and therefore he wished to possess it otherwise than God had ordained: or also he wished to possess it independently of God.

He proves thirdly. Every appetite most desires that which is proposed to it as most fitting and delightful; for thus the appetite, which is borne to the visible, most desires that which is perceived by the eye as the visible more delighting: therefore since the will of the Angel has no sensitive appetite, by which it is moved to desire sensible things, it most desires that which is proposed by the intellect as the supreme delightful good: but such is supernatural beatitude: therefore the angelic appetite tends most to it: but it is likely that the disordered appetite of the Angel was borne about that which it most desired: therefore it was borne about supernatural beatitude.

He proves fourthly. That is first desired by a will not regulated by the affect of justice, but of the advantageous, which would be desired although other desirable things were not, and which, if the others were absent, would be desired no less: but such is the delightful object: therefore it is borne by its first appetite to the delightful object: but if it be borne to the delightful object by its first appetite, it is likely that it is borne to the greatest delightful good: therefore, etc. The major seems manifest, because the will, destitute of the affect, and rule of justice, altogether follows its advantageous, and wills no disadvantage: since we will and desire the disadvantageous only by the affect of justice, as is evident in martyrs, and penitents. The minor also appears true; for a good however excellent, if it were saddening and not delightful, it is certain that it would not be desired by the appetite of the advantageous.

Finally the Conclusion is proved. It is most certain that the Angel had some act about supernatural beatitude: for he knew it as possible to himself, and knew the means by which he could attain it; otherwise he would not have been a perfect wayfarer: therefore either that act was ordered, and thus he did not sin, but merited; or it was a neutral act, that is, neither good nor evil, neither ordered nor disordered, which no Theologian admits; or it was disordered: but it was not ordered, nor neutral; therefore it is necessary that it was disordered; and consequently that it was sin. But that it was the first sin stands from this, that since that object was most delightful, and the power was led and impelled by the natural appetite to the good, it necessarily seems to follow that the first act of concupiscence of that will was about supernatural beatitude.

The aforesaid reasons are confirmed and explained by the same Doctor num. 6. where he admonishes that it is to be observed, that every cognitive power has an appetite corresponding to itself: whence since the soul has a cognitive power, namely the intellect, it has also an appetite corresponding to itself, which resides in the will; which, although it be free, nevertheless is most conformed to the natural appetite in acting; and therefore, says the Doctor, in men according to the diversity of complexions, there is the dominion of the sensitive appetites, and since every cognitive power has its own appetite, then according to the diversity of complexions there is a diversity of dominion in the diverse cognoscitives, and in their appetitives: in each one, I say, the will according to the dominion of the sensitive appetite is most inclined to its act. And therefore some, following the first inclination without the rule of justice, are first inclined to luxury, some first to pride: therefore the will in acting follows the natural appetite for the most part. But although the will separated from all sense, and sensitive appetite, cannot be inclined to some sensible object; nevertheless since it is a natural power, it has a natural inclination to the object most fitting to itself, insofar as it is a natural power; but that is beatitude; because the same is the object of the appetitive, and cognitive faculty. Since therefore beatitude is the greatest object of the intellective virtue, it will also be the supreme, and most motive object of the intellective appetite, which is the will; and consequently although the will be a free power, nevertheless since in acting it follows the natural appetite, unless it be regulated and restrained by the affect of justice, and the dictate of reason, the consequence is, that with its whole conatus it first covets the first delightful object, not orderly; therefore disorderedly; and straightway the first disordered affect of that angelic will desiring was about beatitude. So the Doctor.

You will say 1. From St. Augustine lib. 13. De Trinitate, cap. 5. beatitude is desired by all; but what is desired by all uniformly is natural; therefore beatitude is desired naturally: but natural desire is always right, because it is from God: hence the will, conformable to natural desire, is always right; for what is conformable to what is right is right: therefore in desiring beatitude no one can sin; and so the first sin of the angel's love of concupiscence was not a disordered desire of beatitude.

The Subtle Doctor denies this, n. 10. Since indeed volition is free, and can have the character of evil, even though it were consonant with a natural inclination, that is, with the volition of such an object toward which there would be a natural inclination, it follows from that, that although the will may tend toward an object toward which it tends naturally, its affection can nonetheless be disordered no less; for inclination toward anything delectable, e.g., is natural, and yet it is certain that desires for many delectables are disordered and evil: it is not true, then, that an elicited act of will conformed to a right natural inclination is always right and ordered: because the will, as it is free and elicits an act concerning its object, is bound to conform itself to justice, and to the higher rule, which commands and ordains that that natural desire be regulated and moderated according to the dictate of right reason, and the precepts of the rule of justice.

You will say 2. No intellect errs about first principles: therefore neither can the will err about the last end, such as beatitude. The antecedent is Aristotle's, Metaphysics book 2, text 1. The consequence is proved from the same author, Physics book 2, text 5, where he says: As the principle stands in speculative matters, so the end stands in practical, or operative matters.

The Doctor answers, n. 11, denying the consequence; and he offers the reason for the disparity, namely that first principles determine the intellect toward a right act; but the end does not always determine the will toward a right act: rather the will of itself can have either an evil or a good act concerning the end, at its own choice; since indeed the intellect is a natural power, and operates naturally, therefore it cannot fail to assent to the principles proposed to it, but it assents to them insofar as their truth is manifested to it more and more: it is otherwise, however, with the will, since indeed it is free, and therefore can moderate its own desire lest it dominate it, and prevail in eliciting its acts — nay more, lest the act be elicited absolutely; for it can turn the intellect away from thinking about that delectable object concerning which it itself is occupied.

You will say 3. If the angels who fell from friendship sinned out of appetite and affection for the advantageous, namely by desiring beatitude inasmuch as it was a good advantageous to them; it follows also that the obedient angels sinned in the same way; but that consequent is absurd: therefore also that whence it follows. The sequel of the major is clear, seeing that according to St. Anselm, book De Concordia, chaps. 26 and 13, the will cannot not will what is advantageous: therefore since all, both good and bad, had the affection for the advantageous, and especially for the highest advantage, such as beatitude; it follows that if sin be in that affection, even the good angels sinned.

The Doctor answers, n. 12, denying the sequel; because although the good had as great a natural inclination toward beatitude inasmuch as it is an advantageous good as the bad had — nay, perhaps a greater, namely they had a more excellent nature; because that inclination, says the Doctor, is according to natural perfection: nevertheless, because the good acted from an affection of justice in desiring beatitude, they also tempered their affection concerning it, and regulated it according to the dictate of reason and the rules of the Superior, whence they desired it in an honest and due manner: For, says the Doctor, they did not use the will according to its imperfect character, insofar namely as it is merely an intellectual appetite, acting, namely, in such manner as befitted an intellectual appetite to act; but they used the will according to its perfect character, which is liberty, willing, namely, with the will in that manner in which it befits one to act freely insofar as he acts freely: but this was according to the rule of the superior will determining, and this justly. — But to the proof of the sequel, I deny that the will cannot not will an advantageous good; for daily it happens that we do not will advantageous goods, for the reason that we know them to be forbidden us. Or I say, that although perhaps the will could not not will an advantageous good, especially the highest, such as beatitude, nevertheless the angel's will could will it inordinately, or orderly; orderly, namely, if it willed to obtain it only when, and how God had ordained, or if it desired to have it only so that it might love God with a more excellent love.

— Now it could desire it inordinately:

and that in three ways, says the Doctor, n. 9.: either as to intensity, for instance by willing it with a greater effort than befits it; or as to acceleration, for instance by willing it for himself sooner than befits him; or as to cause, for instance by willing it for himself otherwise than suits him; e.g., without merits, or perhaps in other ways, concerning all of which it is not necessary to take care here.

In some one of these modes it is probable that his will transgressed, namely either by desiring for himself beatitude inasmuch as it is a good for him more than by loving that good in itself: or by desiring that good, that the beatific object be his own good as good for him, more than by desiring it to belong to another, namely to his God: and herein is the supreme perversity of the will, which is to use things to be enjoyed, and to enjoy things to be used, according to St. Augustine, book 83 Questions, q. 30. Or secondly he could desire to have it at once, whereas God wills it to be had after a brief delay of the way. Or thirdly, by desiring to have it from natural resources, not having it graciously, whereas God wills it to be had from merits. Therefore free will ought to have moderated the affection as to those circumstances which right reason shows forth: because beatitude ought to be less desired for oneself than for God, and it ought to be desired for the time for which God willed: and from merits, for which God willed it to be desired: therefore if in any of these modes he followed the affection for the advantageous, not moderating it through justice — that is, through infused justice, if he had it, or acquired, or innate, whether natural, which is liberty itself — he sinned.

But what the objects of the angels' appetites were will be resolved at the end of this Question. Whether, however, each of those disordered loves of the angel, both of friendship and of concupiscence, is pride properly so called, or rather should be reduced to spiritual lust, will be opened up

Third conclusion. — The disordered love of the angel, both of friendship and of concupiscence, was pride: not formally, and properly so called. But radically, and improperly so called.

This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor in the aforesaid q. 2, n. 14, where, having premised the opinion of St. Thomas and others who say that that disordered love of the angel was pride properly so called, he concludes: Therefore I say that his first sin was not pride properly so called: but on account of the deformity which they import, they seem rather to be reduced to lust: as the sin whereby anyone takes disordered pleasure in speculation upon a geometrical conclusion is called calumny.

In which words two things are especially to be noted: First, that the Doctor does not absolutely deny that love to be pride, according to some extension of the term pride, but only that it is not pride properly so called. Second, that he did not say that love was formally lust, but that if it must be referred to any one of the seven capital crimes, it is more fittingly referred to lust than to pride. That however that disordered angelic love was not pride properly so called.

It is proved 1. The first sin of the angel was immoderate complacency in his own perfections: but pride properly so called is not such immoderate complacency, says St. Augustine, lib. 11, cap. 15. For what is pride, but the appetite of perverse height? Now the appetite of height is not formally love of self, but follows from it: because no one can desire immoderately his own excellence and beatitude except because he loves himself inordinately: therefore the first sin of the angel was not formally pride. Next, disordered love of friendship toward self is not formally pride: therefore neither disordered love of self: for the same account seems to hold. Finally, pride properly so called is the disordered appetite of excellence with respect to others: whence St. Augustine lib. 19. De Civit. Dei, cap. 12. says: Pride imitates God perversely: for he hates equality with his fellows under him, but he wishes to impose his dominion upon his fellows in place of him: by which words he signifies that the formal character of pride consists in the appetite of excellence, as bearing a relation of dominion over others: but that affection of dominion cannot be the primary sin of the angel: for it was because he wished to dominate above the others that he inordinately loved himself; which disordered love was indeed the root and origin of pride, but not pride itself formally: therefore, etc.

First the Thomists object various contexts of Scripture, by which they contend it is signified that the first sin of the angel was pride formally so called. Above all that of Isaiah 11, where the sin of the prince of the demons is described allegorically in the person of the King of the Assyrians in these words: Thy pride has been cast down to hell: how have you fallen from Heaven, Lucifer, who said in your heart: I shall ascend into Heaven? etc., which words are manifest indications of pride. Second, that of Ezekiel 28, where under the person of the King of Tyre the sin of the devil is described, and among other things it is said of him: Iniquity was found in you. And what that iniquity was he declares, saying: Your heart was lifted up in your beauty, etc. Now elevation of heart is pride, or an effect of pride properly so called. They add that of Ecclesiasticus 10, Pride is the beginning of every sin. Whence St. Augustine lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 13. adds: What else could the beginning of an evil will have been but pride?

— They confirm it from Tobias, where Tobias the father says to his son: Never permit pride to rule in your mind, or in your word, for in it all perdition took its beginning: now all perdition of men, indeed even of angels, took its beginning from the sin of the prince of the demons: therefore that one's sin was pride.

— They strive to prove this same thing by various oracles of the holy Fathers: above all St. Ambrose, or another Author, Epistle to Demetrias, Epist. 33.

This pride, he says, took its origin from the devil; who, since he had received his life from the Creator, pleased himself in his power, and dignity, and compared this with the glory of his Author, and together with the angels whom he had drawn into consent to his impiety he was cast down from heavenly sublimity. Therefore accordingly, both in the fall of the devil and in the transgression of man, the beginning of sin is pride, which is fittingly also called avarice, because both appellations signify that appetite which both covets to exceed its own measure; and does not deign to be rich unless from his own goods. As though he possessed this likeness to God, that he himself should be to himself the fountain of his goods, himself the abundance for himself.

— St. Athanasius consents in his Oration on Virginity; Satan, he says, was not cast down from heaven on account of fornication or adultery or theft: but pride precipitated him into the lower parts of the abyss. Jerome subscribes on chapter 16 of Ezekiel, where he calls pride the proper, and first sin of the devil.

St. Augustine teaches this same thing in many places, especially lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, cap. 13. where he says:

Of an evil will, what could it be but pride? Pride is the beginning of every sin: but what is pride, but the appetite of perverse height? For perverse height is, the principle which he ought to adhere to being deserted, to become and be in some sort a principle for oneself. This happens when one pleases himself too much: but he so pleases himself when he falls short of that unchangeable good, which ought to please him more than he pleases himself.

Fulgentius subscribes, lib. ad Monimum, cap. 17.

If the beginning of sin is sought, he says, nothing else is found but pride: for Scripture says, Pride is the beginning of every sin; which therefore then took its beginning, when the Angel, elated against God, and prostrated by that very elation through concupiscence, which is the root of all evils, wishing to usurp what was not given to him by God, departed from God, and fell, in which, had he stood, he would not have fallen.

Finally Bernard, lib. De modo bene vivendi, serm. 37. Pride, he says, is the root of all evils. It cast down the angels, laid low the mighty, hurled down the proud. Hence pride is commonly called the sin of the demons, and Job 41² calls Lucifer king over all the children of pride. It is established, therefore, both from Scripture and from the oracles of the holy Fathers, that pride was the first, and capital sin of the demons.

The Doctor denies the consequence, n. 17, and in answer to the authorities of Scripture and the holy Fathers replies, that presumption was simply the first sin of the angel, not inasmuch, he says, as it is the first species of pride properly taken: but inasmuch as it signifies excessive complacency, and disordered love of self, the sin of complacency, and presumption, which was the root of pride, as St. Augustine explains, and opens up more clearly, lib. De Genesi ad litteram, chap. 15³ where he says: That the Devil loved his own power, and by a perverted love of himself, turgid spirit deprived of holy fellowship. And chap. 23. certainly he immediately turned himself away from the light of truth, swollen with pride, and corrupted by delight in his own power.

Therefore the aforesaid authorities both of Scripture and of the holy Fathers can be explained thus: First, that they signify the first sin of the devil to have been pride, not formal, and properly so called, but radical and effective, namely inasmuch as that disordered love of himself led the Angel to presume of himself, to affect divine preeminence and dominion, and finally to despise being subject to God. Or that the pride of the devil was the cause of the whole sin, which the devil derived from the first Parent upon the whole human race, as St. Augustine explains on Psalm 121: The Angel, he says, fell, and became the devil: he offered pride to man: he cast down with himself by envy him who stood: these wished not to be the same, but wished to dominate.

Finally I say with the Seraphic Doctor, in 2 dist. 5, art. 1, q. 1, that the sin of the devil must be considered as to a threefold state: namely, as to its initiation, consummation, and confirmation: it was initiated in complacency and presumption; for as soon as he saw his own beauty, he presumed: it was consummated in ambition, because presuming of himself, he desired what was wholly above him, and to which he could not attain: but it was confirmed in envy, and the aversion of hatred: because from the moment he could not obtain what he desired, therefore he began to envy, and to go against it with an affection of hatred, and herein it was confirmed, because this wholly separated him from God, and set up a perfect obstacle, just as charity perfectly joins to God.

You will say 2. According to St. John, all that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life: but the first sin of the angel was not the concupiscence of the flesh, or of the eyes: therefore it was the pride of life.

The Doctor denies the consequence, because that division comprehends only the ordinary sins of men, not indeed those of angels. But if the sin of angels must be reduced to some one of those three members, it is rather to be referred to the concupiscence of the eyes than to the other two members: for as, says the Doctor, in us immoderate appetites of some visible beautiful thing pertain to the concupiscence of the eyes: so also in angels the immoderate appetite of the delectable must pertain to the concupiscence of the eyes.

You will say 3. The sin of the angels must be reduced to some one of the seven capital vices: but it can be conveniently referred to none other than to pride: therefore it must be pride properly so called.

The Doctor answers first, n. 17, denying the major: for that division of sins into seven genera is neither adequate, nor even congruous: which he proves best; because if the division of sins is made according to the number of evil habits opposed to the seven virtues, namely the three Theological and four Moral virtues, certainly it is not good, because seven distinct sins separate from those seven would have to be assigned; for infidelity, and presumption would have to be numbered among them, and some others of those seven omitted. But if the division of sins is not taken thus, but as they oppose good acts, by which the ten precepts of the decalogue are observed, there would have to be ten sins. Whence he concludes, that that division ought not to be admitted as adequate, nor as comprehending all genera of sins, nor even perhaps all roots of sins; since, he says, infidelity, and despair are opposed to hope, and are graver sins than the sin of gluttony, or sloth, yet they are not comprehended properly, and directly under those members: hence he infers, that this division is of sins which occur ordinarily, and which are the roots, and occasions of many sins.

He answers secondly by denying the consequence, because that division is not adequate; nor must every sin be some one of those formally and properly: for there are many sins which belong to those seven only reductively.

He answers thirdly by denying the minor; for if the sin of the angels is traced back reductively to one of those seven, it will rather belong to lust than to pride; just as, says the Doctor, every disordered appetite for a pleasurable good is traced back to the concupiscence of the eyes.

You will insist. The disordered affection for pleasure is found not only in lust but also in gluttony and other similar vices of intemperance: therefore, given that the first sin of the angel consisted in a disordered affection of pleasure concerning his own excellence, it should be called spiritual gluttony no less than spiritual lust.

He answers 1. That even if the consequence were true, it would not conflict with the Doctor's opinion: for the Doctor does not contend that the angel's disordered complacency should be traced rather to lust than to gluttony; but that it could be traced rather to lust than to pride.

He answers 2. Yet it is to be traced more fittingly to lust than to any other sin; for since lust is concerned with an object more pleasurable than gluttony, and that pleasure conceived disorderly by the angel concerning his own excellence and perfection was supreme—otherwise it would not have moved the angel to commit so many grave sins—it follows that it ought to be reduced to lust more than to other sins, inasmuch as he had a greater proportion of excess in pleasure with lust than with any other sin whatsoever.

• Hence the Subtle Doctor rightly reduces this excessive complacency of the prevaricating angel in his own gifts and preeminences to the species of spiritual lust, and explains it by the example of the pleasure of a geometrical demonstration devised by some mathematician; yet with this difference: that the pleasure from the discovery of a new geometrical demonstration is neither unclean, nor darkens the mind, nor dulls reason, as spiritual or sensual lust does when in that complacency someone places his beatitude therein.

You will ask. Whether the demons truly desired equality with God, that is, to be gods?

I answer. Truly they desired equality with God considered in itself. So the Doctor in dist. 6, q. 1, n. 2, where, after attacking the opinion and arguments of St. Thomas, who teaches that the excellent object desired by the angel when he first sinned through the love of concupiscence was not every kind of equality with God in nature, the Doctor concludes: the question can be answered otherwise: namely, that the angel could desire the equality of God; and he proves this by a fourfold argument. But first our answer must be established here by the authority both of Scripture and of the holy Fathers.

For first, from Scripture it is deduced that Lucifer in fact desired this equality: therefore he truly could desire it. The antecedent is proved from Isaiah 14, where Lucifer says: I will ascend above the height of the clouds, I will be like the Most High; for although the words there concern likeness, which can be less than equality, nevertheless likeness without perfect equality is not. Add that if the preceding words be considered, they seem to denote and demand perfect similitude.

• Ezekiel too sings of him, chapter 28, verse 2, where under the type and inscription of the king of Tyre he represents the pride and fall of Lucifer and of his allied enemy angels: Your heart was lifted up, and you said: I am God; and verse 12: You are the seal of similitude, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty, etc.; and verse 17: Your heart was lifted up in your beauty, namely even to the desire for divinity.

Hence Michael, who first of the faithful angels resisted the proud Lucifer, is so called—that is, Who is like God?—because, reproaching Lucifer's audacity, he hurled those words against him like thunderbolts.

To this also pertains what St. Paul said of Christ the Lord, Philippians 2: He did not think it robbery to be equal with God, as if to say that he wished to claim divinity and the same equality and majesty with the eternal Father not by theft or arrogance, as Lucifer and his proud companions attempted, but he vindicated it to himself by the right of his eternal nativity and procession from the Father.

Nor slight evidence of this desire for divinity appears in the character of that temptation which Satan employed to ensnare the primeval woman when he said: You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil, Gen. 3, v. 5. For if, as St. James rightly infers, chapter 1, v. 13, God, being incapable of tempting to evils, himself tempts no one, it is a sign of one who wishes to entice another to some sin either that he has fallen into that sin or that he is prone to it; we may gather that Satan was already guilty before that sin—the one into whose fellowship he strove to draw the first men—namely of affecting similitude with God.

Hence the Master of the Sentences, dist. 6, citing Isidore:

Lucifer, he says, after he was created, weighing the eminence of his nature and the depth of his knowledge, grew proud against his Creator to such a degree that he even willed to make himself equal with God, as is said in Isaiah: I will exalt my throne above the stars of God, and I will be like the Most High.

Indeed he wished to be like God, not by imitation, but by equality of power. *

The holy Fathers teach the same: above all St. Ambrose, epistle 33, where he says: Because he was pleased with the power and dignity he had received, and compared himself with the author of his glory, he was cast down from celestial sublimity. The Author of Scholia on Psalm 118 indicates this more clearly: He, he says, so exalted himself that he wished to be made equal to the Most High. St. Chrysostom subscribes, homily 3 On the Words of Isaiah: He hoped for, he says, the equality of God, a thing which expelled him from heaven. St. Augustine concedes it in De Civitate Dei, book 14, chapter 11, where he says that Lucifer rejoiced, as it were, with a kind of tyrannical haughtiness in having subjects rather than chose to be subject. As if to say that Lucifer coveted equality with God in authority and power, since he wished to preside over all others and to be subject to none.

Nazianzen clearly indicates the matter, oration 17, where he expounds the elation of Lucifer in these words: He said, he declares, that it was unworthy and intolerable for him, since he was divine, not also to be thought God; which he elegantly expressed in verse in the poem On things endowed with mind, where among other things he writes:

Wherefore Lucifer first, his sound mind swelling (for the surpassing honor he enjoyed gave hope of God's own regal throne and glory) fell, losing all his splendor, vile and wretched; while craving to be God, engulfed entire in earth's dark gloom he sank.

But the Doctor proves this answer. First indeed: the will, according to the act of the love of friendship and the act of the love of concupiscence, has all being for its object, such that just as it can love any being whatever with the love of friendship, so it can pursue it with the love of concupiscence: but the equality of God according to essence is some good desirable in itself: therefore, since the angel could love himself with the love of concupiscence, he could desire for himself every desirable good, and consequently could desire the equality of God.

He proves secondly, and confirms the former argument: if anything impeded the angel from being able to affect that equality, it would be above all because it is not only impossible in itself but also apprehended by the angel as impossible—for it is absurd to assert that he was so blinded by malice that he did not recognize that divine equality to be altogether impossible for a creature; yet that impossibility does not prevent the angel from having been able to desire the Divinity itself: therefore, etc. The Adversaries concede the major; but the Doctor proves the minor, first indeed by the authority of Aristotle, book 3, Ethics, chapter 2, who says: Choice indeed is not of impossibles. But will is of impossibles, for instance immortality. Moreover, the damned hate God, according to Psalm 73: The pride of those who hate you ascends always; but one who hates wills the object of his hatred not to exist: therefore the damned wish God not to exist: but this is impossible: therefore something impossible can be desired.

• The Doctor confirms these points in the same place, number 2; because, he says, the willing sin can will God not to exist; indeed it can even will the eminence of divinity to be in another. Therefore it can will it to be in itself as in another, and thus it can will for itself the eminence of God or divinity.

To these is added the most ardent ardor of the love of God and charity with which the holiest men sometimes burn, and which St. Augustine himself expressed in these words: Lord, if you were Augustine, and I could be God, I would rather have you than myself be God. Moreover, the just often wish that it were better to love God with an infinite love, and penitents desire that they had never sinned: but these things, as is evident, are impossible: therefore the will can will what the intellect judges impossible.

The Thomists distinguish a twofold impossible: one indeed per se and absolute; the other per accidens and ex suppositione. The first is that which from its very terms involves contradiction, as that man should be a stone: for this is deservedly said to be impossible absolutely and simply, because it is not so with respect to this or that place, time, or cause, but with respect to all things absolutely. The second, however, is that which involves contradiction not from its very terms or from the nature of the thing, but from some hypothesis only: as, for example, that Peter has not sinned. For this does not conflict absolutely, since Peter could have not sinned; but it conflicts now by hypothesis, that he has sinned, because by reason of time it is impossible that he did not sin after he sinned.

Between these two impossibles, however, they establish this difference: that the impossible per se, whatever supposition be made and condition added, has no entity or goodness from which it follows that it cannot be desired—not only by efficacious election tending to execution, but not even by simple willing, that is, by an inefficacious act of will, even under the condition: if it were possible. But the impossible per accidens, although, as it stands under that position of impossibility, and in the composite sense of it, is not possible, nor consequently has any aspect of good and fittingness; nevertheless taken in itself, and by purely precissive abstraction abstracted from such supposition and impossibility—or in the divided sense of it—has per se some possibility and goodness: and so considered, although it cannot be formally willed by an act of election, because election tends to execution, yet it can be willed by a simple act of will, which is called velleity: because, since this act does not tend to execution, it can terminate in the object in itself, abstracting from particular circumstances; hence for this reason a sinner ineffectually wills that he had not sinned, although by supposition that he has sinned, it is impossible. Thus Gonet after Cajetan.

With these things premised, they answer that the impossible per se and absolute can in no way be desired, but well indeed the impossible per accidens: therefore, they say, since divine equality is impossible for a creature, it can by no means be desired by an angel.

Against this. The impossible per accidens, according to them, can be desired: therefore also the impossible per se. The consequence is evident; for to desire an apprehended good as impossible it makes no difference whether it is impossible per se or per accidens, since the apprehender knows that neither can ever be obtained by himself: therefore, if the impossible per se is undesirable precisely because it can in no way be obtained by the desirer, by parity of reason the impossible per accidens will be undesirable, since the desirer knows he shall never attain such a good. Thus the penitent who wishes he had not sinned knows this to be impossible, even by divine power, since God is deprived of this alone, that things which have been done cannot become undone. Again, the damned, as has been said, desire God not to exist, and yet that he not exist is simply impossible.

Finally their very answer does not stand with the doctrine of St. Thomas: for he teaches, q. 16, De Malo, art. 3, ad primum, and I-II, q. 13, art. 5, ad primum, that there is a twofold act of will: one indeed efficacious and complete; the other inefficacious and incomplete. Whence he adds in the latter place:

Complete will is only of the possible, which is a good for the one willing; but incomplete will is of the impossible, which according to some is called velleity, namely because someone would will it if it were possible; but election names the act of will already determined to that which is here to be done, and therefore it is in no way except of possibles.

therefore St. Thomas admits that will also can be of impossibles.

It is confirmed. This attack, and the prior arguments of the Doctor, are again confirmed by the Doctor from St. Augustine, book 83 Questions, q. 30, where he teaches that the will can use things to be enjoyed, and enjoy things to be used: therefore created will can enjoy itself; but it cannot enjoy except the highest good: therefore it can covet for itself the highest good, wherein together with itself it may enjoy: but this highest good is equality with God: therefore created will can desire equality with God, not indeed by an efficacious desire, but at least by an inefficacious one. For, as the Doctor observes in the same place n. 8, there is a twofold act of willing, or volition: for, he says, one volition is efficacious, another is a volition of complacency; e.g., two sick men, one of whom hopes to have his health restored, while the other despairs, both long for and will health, but differently; for the first wills health because he hopes it will be restored, and therefore he seeks and applies means conducive to its restoration; but the second, because he does not hope to attain health, neither seeks nor applies such means. The first volition is called efficacious; the second is called inefficacious, or complacency merely. The first is concerned only with the possible; the second, however, is occupied also with the impossible. This, he says, suffices for merit and demerit, because although it be impossible, yet one can consent to it with full consent: and by that volition the angel could desire divine equality. But of the first volition, which is efficacious, I say that the angel could not desire it; yet by simple volition he could covet for himself so great a good, and with such desire as he would have coveted it, if it had been possible.

The Thomists object first, that the angel's sin was not from passion, nor from ignorance, because passion and ignorance are a punishment of sin; and therefore he sinned only from choice: but choice is not of impossible things: therefore he did not sin by desiring for himself a divine equality impossible to him.

The Doctor distinguishes the minor: the choice that is an efficacious willing, by which means are applied to the attainment of an end, he concedes; choice insofar as it means only complacency, and the appetite of the will, by which it would freely will something proposed to it under the aspect of good, whether impossible, cannot be directed toward an impossible good by one desiring it, he denies. For it was proven above that in truth an inefficacious will can be occupied with impossibles.

You will insist. the choice by which the angel sinned ought to have been demeritorious: but that inefficacious volition, or velleity, cannot be a merit, or demerit: therefore by this the angel could not sin.

I deny the minor. for who would deny that to be a meritorious act, and of the most perfect charity, by which St. Augustine, speaking with God, used to say: if I could be God, I would rather that you than I be God? yet this act is of simple complacency, and velleity, and is even about an impossible thing: therefore some velleity can be meritorious. Moreover, an act is meritorious when someone, after he has sinned, thinks of himself as if he had not sinned, and delights in this, and would will that he had in no way sinned, and were in the former state of innocence, that he might serve God with greater affection and acceptance; yet this act is of simple affection, which they call velleity. Similarly, in this simple affection there can be most grave sin: as if someone hating God not only wished that God did not exist, but also desired that some evil should befall him; in which kind of sin I do not doubt that the demons and the damned are occupied.

You will say 2. that the angel be equal to God is impossible, and therefore it is a non-being: but a non-being is not appetible, for something is appetible insofar as it is good, but a non-being cannot be good: nor consequently appetible: therefore the angel could not desire equality with God.

I answer first. that if anything proved this argument, it would also establish that the impossible per accidens cannot be desired, which the Thomists nevertheless deny, for both the impossible per se and the impossible per accidens are non-being.

He answers second by distinguishing the major: it is not some one being, having in itself a possible goodness, I concede; it is not some multiple being including two things, one of which is good absolutely, and would be good also respectively to the other, if it could be joined with it, I deny: and so although the angelic will cannot desire the equality of God with an absolute volition, by which it would be borne toward it as toward one possible object, because it is not proposed to it by the intellect: nevertheless it can with a comparative volition be borne toward that divine equality as to be desired, inasmuch as it would be good for it, if it could attain it.

You will say 3. The angelic will cannot desire the equality of God, unless it is proposed to it by the intellect: but it cannot be proposed by the intellect: for it would be proposed either by an erring intellect, or by a non-erring intellect. Not the first, because since he had not yet sinned, he had no error in the intellect, otherwise the punishment would have preceded the fault: for that error could not have been in the angel, except by way of an inflicted punishment. Nor the second, because a non-erring intellect cannot propose anything false to the will: but it is false that the angel can be equal to God: therefore, etc.

The Doctor denies the minor, toward whose proof he says that that equality can be proposed by a non-erring intellect: For the equality of God, he says, can be apprehended without error, because it is in someone without fault, because the Son of God is equal to the Father, and that can be apprehended. Then the angel could apprehend that equality to be good for him, if it were possible: and supposing such an apprehension, and judgment, the will could desire that equality: certainly we apprehend the equality of God without error, and also judge that if that equality were possible for the angel, as it is possible and in fact belongs to the Son of God, that in truth the angel would be far more perfect than he now is, however great a perfection he now has; therefore much more can the angel apprehend that equality, and form such a judgment.

They object 4. No one can desire his non-existence, from St. Augustine book 3 De libero arbitrio: but if the angel desired the equality of God, consequently he would desire himself not to be an angel, because the angel being God is his very not being an angel; for the angel to be is for the creature to be subject to God: therefore the angel cannot desire himself to be equal to God. It is confirmed from that passage of St. Anselm in the book De similitudinibus c. 6. where he says: For if anyone should wish to be like another in his own person, he would wish himself not to be, which he cannot will.

The Doctor answers first, that although perhaps someone cannot directly will his own non-existence, nevertheless he can will it indirectly, namely by willing something from which, once posited, his non-existence would follow: thus, he says, anyone sinning mortally wills something in which he does not will God to be underlying, and in this he wills consequentially his own non-existence, because he cannot be, unless God underlie him.

He answers second by denying the minor: because although the destruction of himself would follow from equality with God, nevertheless it is not necessary that one willing equality will formally, and explicitly his own non-being, or its own destruction: for it does not follow, he says, that if someone wills the antecedent, he wills also the consequent, when the consequent can be understood without the antecedent: just as, for example, someone can desire the episcopate, not willing the priesthood: but in the present case the consequent is not necessarily connected with the antecedent: for it does not follow absolutely, that if the angel wills equality with God, he also wills his own destruction; for he could desire equality with God on the supposition, impossible indeed, that that equality would not entail the destruction of the angel.

To St. Anselm the Doctor responds, that he is speaking of an ordered will; but no one, he says, can in an ordered way will himself not to be, because an ordered will is not willing something, and not willing that which necessarily follows upon it, whether that be intrinsic to it or not: but these things are not true of an inordinate will.

You will insist. The angel knew himself to be a created being, and by participation; he knew equally that no being by participation could be of the same nature with a being by essence, and therefore he knew perfectly that he could not wish for divine equality without wishing himself not to be.

I deny the consequence, for although the angel knew himself to be a being by participation, nevertheless he could apprehend that divine equality as some good appetible; and thereupon he could desire it for himself; not indeed with an efficacious appetite, but with an inefficacious one: whence he could be displeased that he was subject to God and inferior to him, and could wish for independence with respect to God, and superiority with respect to the other angels; which, as is apparent, is to will equality with God according to nature.

• You will press. That which wholly repugns and contradicts natural reason, and from which it utterly recoils, can in no way be desired: but for a creature to be equal to God wholly repugns to natural reason: therefore etc.

I answer. that in that hypothesis two things are to be distinguished, namely that which in that object seems unpleasing and worthy of horror, and that which is found in it amiable; for the good and its excellence is loved; but the disproportion with the one enjoying it, or coveting it, is abhorred. But this horror is tempered and taken away by the heat of the one desiring, for those burning and glowing with love toward the thing loved and coveted do not suffer themselves to be torn from it on any account: and against every dictate of reason they struggle, and they contrive and devise many things, even desiring base and obscene things, however much natural reason may protest: whence it happens that love, boiling over, scarcely retains judgment. Therefore the will of the demon, already exceeding the bounds of its inordinate self-love and complacency, and as it were raging madly, could desire divinity, however much natural reason suggested that it was repugnant to it.

You will insist again. That which involves a manifest contradiction cannot be represented as amiable nor desirable by any reason, even one exorbitant and deviant: but the equality of a creature with its Creator involves a contradiction: for it is the conjunction of a creature with a non-creature, namely with God: therefore etc.

I answer first, that the conjunction of a creature with the Creator does not repugn by means of the hypostatic union, as appears in the mystery of the Incarnation. Then I say that the angel in that simple desire of divinity did not attend to its impossibility or contradiction, but only to the excellence of the coveted good, which was represented as desirable, prescinding from whether it would be possible or impossible to acquire. For a spiritual creature is borne toward a good in one way by appetite, and in another by fruition. For that looks to the effect of the will, but this tends to the effect and to the application of the means conducing to the attainment of that good. The former is a simple complacency, inefficacious with respect to the fruition and attainment of the good, although in itself it is vehement and glowing: the latter is an efficacious application of the will toward the end to be obtained. The former can stand together with contradiction and the impossibility of attaining the object: the latter cannot, since it tends efficaciously to the attainment of the object by applying fitting means.

You will say at last. * Someone can desire to be God without any sin: therefore although the angel coveted divine equality, on that account he is not judged to have sinned. The antecedent is proved: someone could desire to become God, that is, that like God he might be immune from sin, and that he might love God as much as God is in himself lovable: but that appetite would not be sinful: nay truly it would be pious, and innocent: therefore the appetite for the equality of God is not culpable: nor therefore was it the first sin of the angel's concupiscent love.

I deny the antecedent, and I distinguish the minor of its proof: that appetite is not culpable, if it be hypothetical and conditional, I concede: if absolute, I deny. * Therefore a pious man could have this affection conditionally, namely if this were possible, and without any prejudice to the Divinity: but the angel who coveted the Divinity did not have a like affection; rather he affected it absolutely, as is to be gathered from the words both of Isaiah and of Ezekiel cited by us above.

You will ask 2. Whether also the angels coveted the hypostatic union, and in truth envied man for being assumed to it?

I answer 1. That in truth the angels sinned through envy, as St. Augustine admirably teaches in book 11 De Genesi ad litteram cap. 14.

Some, he says, say that he himself fell from his supernal seats because he envied man, who was made to the image of God. Moreover this envying follows pride, it does not precede it. For envying is not the cause of pride, but pride the cause of envying. Therefore since pride is the love of one's own excellence, but envy the hatred of another's happiness: what is born from that is sufficiently manifest. For by loving his own excellence, each one envies either equals, that they be made equal to him, or inferiors, lest they be made equal to himself, or superiors, that he is not made equal to them. Therefore each one is envious by being proud, not proud by being envious.

St. Bernard subscribes in sermon 17. Therefore in Heaven she conceived grief, and in Paradise she gave birth to iniquity, the offspring of malice, the mother of death, and the parent of all miseries, Pride.

I answer 2. That in fact the devil inordinately desired beatitude, and therefore envied human nature; as St. Bernard teaches in various places, especially in sermon 17. on the Canticles:

but it could have happened, he says, if it nevertheless not be thought incredible, that one full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty, could have foreknown that men would be future, and indeed would advance to an equal glory; but if he foreknew it, he without doubt saw it in the Word of God, and in his envy he envied it, and he schemed to have subjects, disdaining companions. They are weaker, he says, and inferior by nature: it is not fitting that they be partners, nor equals in glory. And below, addressing the devil himself, he says: You, wretched one, place your seat in the north, a cloudy and cold region, and behold there are raised up from the dust the needy, and from the dung the poor, that they may sit with Princes, and hold the throne of glory, and you grieve that this be fulfilled: The poor and needy shall praise your name.

Although there St. Bernard makes no express mention of the devil's envy toward the incarnation of Christ, nevertheless not a light foundation can be drawn from it a fortiori. For if from the fact that Lucifer foreknew that men were going to advance to an equal glory, St. Bernard gathers that it is credible that Lucifer grieved, and sinned through envy toward men; much more indeed can it be believed, if Lucifer foreknew that some man was going to be far more excellent than himself, not only in glory, but also in the grace of union, and in the majesty of the divine Person: that he was therefore indignant, and grieved vehemently, and wasted away with envy.

I answer 3. That it also seems probable, that he inordinately coveted the hypostatic union. For we are not accustomed to envy others goods, except those which we wish for ourselves, when we do not have them: and then it is not more to be believed of the malice of the devil, that he envied that dignity to men, than that he inordinately coveted it for himself. Whence as many of the Fathers, or Doctors as say that the devil envied man his dignity, can be cited for this assertion; because either they directly mean the dignity of the hypostatic union, or if they speak expressly of another, certainly from the fact that he envied any other dignity whatsoever, it is gathered as most verisimilar that he envied this one also, which is the greatest of all.