Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Note 1. From the Seraphic Doctor, book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 11:

Merit is the efficacy of a good work for obtaining what is not had, or for having more justly what is had: hence through merit something not owed becomes owed, and the very debt becomes more deeply owed. Just as a King gives a horse which the soldier has not merited; but by his use of the horse he merits that same horse already given. Now merit in general is distinguished threefold, namely, of congruity, of dignity, and of condignity. The merit of congruity is that by which the subject is disposed so as to be able to receive grace according to the standard of divine Justice; this is called the disposition of the matter, namely when someone does what is in him. The merit of dignity denotes the fitness of the agent for attaining what he merits. The merit of condignity denotes an equality of merit to the reward: I say equality, however, not arithmetical, but geometrical, that is, not of quantity, but of proportion; and this is evident, because God always remunerates above merit, just as he punishes short of what sin deserves. Hence there is not between merit and reward an equal quantity, but a proportion, because with God there is no commutative justice, justice of the marketplace, whereby one loaf of bread is given for one denarius, or a cubit of cloth for a solidus; distributive justice, however, is the principle by which gifts are distributed according to proportion to merits, and that is what obtains with God. Hence the Apostle, first to the Corinthians 3: Every one shall receive his own reward according to his own labor. Whence the Seraphic Doctor infers that no one merits for himself first grace by the merit of dignity or by the merit of condignity, but only by the merit of congruity. Similarly, one existing in charity cannot merit for another first grace by the merit of condignity, but by the merit of dignity and by the merit of congruity. But one existing in grace can merit for himself an increase of grace from condignity, and consequently by the merit of dignity, and by the merit of congruity.

Note 2. From the same author, there, chapter 13:

that meritorious works are wholly from grace, and wholly from free will, though principally from grace, because grace is compared to free will as the rider to the horse: for just as the rider directs the horse, so grace directs free will in the exercise of the virtues: for we can do evil by ourselves, but not good. Moreover, toward the efficacy of meriting, three things avail. First is the difficulty of the work, which appears in martyrdom. Second, the promptness of the will; for, says the Apostle, second to the Corinthians 5: God loves a cheerful giver. Third is the magnitude of charity, for charity itself is the weight of the sanctuary, according to which all things that were in the temple were weighed: as we read in Leviticus 27. — Again, for any work to be meritorious, three things are required. First, that the work itself be done in charity, because works done outside charity are dead, like an extinguished coal. Second, that it be done from charity: for many things are done in charity which nevertheless are not meritorious, from the fact that they are not done from charity, that is, because they are not referred to their due end. Third, that the work itself be referable to a good: for evil deeds cannot be done with a good intention, otherwise there would follow the absurdity that the same work would be meritorious and demeritorious.

— Finally, three things are attended to in merit on the part of man, namely the subject, that is, the soul; the principle, that is, free will; and the intention of the end: to which three things correspond on the part of God, namely grace, virtue, and charity: grace indeed makes the subject pleasing to God: virtue enables free will: but charity directs the intention to the due end.

Note 3. From the same author, there, chapter 15:

that good works are meritorious of three things, namely eternal life, increase of grace, remission of punishment. The first corresponds to the root of the work, namely charity, and this is the substantial reward of eternal life; the accidental reward, however, corresponds to the genus of the work, as does also increase of grace, because for works that are excellent and supererogatory we merit a greater increase of grace than for other works; remission of punishment, however, corresponds to the painfulness of the work, because the more painful works are, the more they are meritorious of remission of punishment.

So the Seraphic Doctor.

But it must be known, that I am not here instituting a discussion about the merit of remission of punishment, since indeed God did not spare the Angels who sinned, nor granted them time for repenting and the grace of pardon; therefore only the following remains here to be examined. First, whether the Angels disposed themselves by their own works, with actual grace, to receiving sanctifying grace. Second, whether the holy Angels truly merited their beatitude by their good works. Third, by which virtues above all they attained it.

First conclusion. — It is more probable that all the Angels received sanctifying grace through the cooperation, and as it were disposition, of their own will. This is the more common view among Theologians, and S. Thomas plainly teaches it in the first part, question 62, article 2, as do all his disciples. And although the Subtle Doctor determines nothing expressly about that truth, he nevertheless sufficiently indicates it, dist. 5, question 1, number 5, where, referring various modes of speaking about the duration and state of the way of the Angels, he says: That four periods can be assigned: in the first all the Angels were in natural things: in the second all in grace: in the third the good stood firm, and merited in grace, while the wicked fell away, in the fourth both these and those were in the term. Although he does not judge that assertion the more probable, as he explains below, judging truer that the Angels were all created in sanctifying grace: nevertheless he does not disapprove it, but esteems it probable.

The conclusion is urged, first: sanctified angels were sanctified in a nobler manner, such as befitted a rational creature: but sanctification which takes place through one's own disposition is far nobler and more excellent than that which takes place through the pure mercy and liberality of God: because, other things being equal, it is always of its kind more perfect to have something from oneself than from another alone, and to be at least in part the cause of one's own perfection, than to be utterly dependent on another for it: but whoever prepares himself for habitual grace by his own act is at least in part the cause of his own sanctification, since he concurs with the actual aid toward receiving that habitual and sanctifying grace. Hence Theologians commonly distinguish a twofold sanctification; one of adults, who are sanctified according to their own act: the other of infants, who are not sanctified by their own act of faith, but according to the faith of parents, or of the Church: and they confess the first sanctification to be more perfect than the second, for the reason that act is more perfect than habit: for habit is ordered to act; and therefore it was more perfect in the Angels to be sanctified through their own disposition than through the simple concession of God.

Add, that whoever disposes himself to habitual, or sanctifying, grace obtains it from God, and merits it at least de congruo, and somewhat stirs up and allures God to confer that grace upon him, and thereby is in some manner the cause of his own sanctifying grace, for he concurs with the actual supernatural aid toward thus earning it.

Second, adult men do not receive sanctifying grace except through their own disposition mediating, because they have the use of liberty, which infants lack, in whom that preceding disposition is not required: but the Angels were created with the perfect use of free will: For, says S. Basil on Psalm 32, they were not created in an infantile stature and then gradually exercised; but from the beginning of their production they were endowed with perfect knowledge and liberty: therefore it is more likely that they did not receive sanctifying grace otherwise than through their own disposition and consent. — It is confirmed, because free causes can no less act as soon as they have everything required for acting than natural or necessary causes can: but a natural cause which in the first instant of its formation has everything required for acting acts in that same instant, as is clear of the Sun, and of any other luminous body, which illuminates immediately upon existing: therefore by equal reason a free cause can act in the first instant in which it is, if in that instant it has everything required for acting freely. Yet the Angels could have had everything necessary for acting in the first instant of their formation, both on the part of God and on their own part. On the part of God, namely the actual supernatural aid, by which their will would be moved toward God and would tend toward him with an affection of piety: on their own part, namely full knowledge and the complete power of the will, by which they could concur with the divine aid offered to them either to elicit a supernatural act or not to elicit it: therefore from the beginning they had everything necessary by which they could freely dispose themselves to receiving sanctifying grace.

Third, finally, through the reception of sanctifying grace friendship is entered into between God and the creature, indeed even a certain spiritual marriage is contracted: but friendship is founded on the consent of those who love, and for contracting marriage the consent of each party is required: therefore sanctifying grace is not communicated to an intellectual creature possessing the use of liberty unless its consent be present.

Add, that it is fitting that God should not advance to that supernatural state those whom he adopts as sons, once they are adults and free, except as free, that is, willingly and freely consenting, and this is more consonant with rational and free nature, and with the entering of friendship, which it is fitting be entered into by mutual consent of the parties: in which manner too God conducts himself with men already adult and free, according to that saying, Turn to me, and I will turn to you: which law with respect to us is certain and universal, according to the Tridentine Council, session 6, chapter 5.

You will say 1. Christ the Lord, according to his humanity, was made a little lower than the angels: but to him was given the habit of grace from the instant of his conception, without his own disposition, and from that habit came forth the first act elicited by him: therefore the same judgment must be made about the Angels.

I deny the parity, for the first habitual grace of Christ was as it were resulting from the grace of union, and thus he had it in a nobler manner than through his own disposition. Moreover, the Grace of Christ was consummated from the beginning, and its first acts were vision and beatific enjoyment, which could not be dispositions to grace, but rather its fruits.

You will say 2. God created other things perfect together with their fruits, e.g., trees, and without any disposition on the part of those things: therefore much more did he create the Angels together with their fruits, that is, with habitual grace and inherent justice, without their preceding disposition.

I answer. other things are not able, through dispositions of their own, to receive higher perfections, as Angels and adult men can.

You will say 3. A more perfect mode of acting ought to have been granted to the Angels from the beginning, for it is consonant with the divine operation and with angelic dignity: but it is nobler and more perfect to act from a supernatural habit than without its concurrence: therefore it was nobler for the Angels first to act from the habit of sanctifying grace than through actual aid, and therefore they could not dispose themselves to the reception of that habitual grace.

I distinguish the major. to act from a habit, other things being equal, is better and more connatural than to act without the concurrence of that habit, I concede: when other things are not equal, I deny: for it can happen that it is more fitting to act without a habit than with its concurrence: and so it is in the case at hand; for it was nobler for the Angels to dispose themselves to their own sanctification, and to be in some degree the cause of their own justice, and through their own consent to accept the friendship and espousal of God, than to receive this otherwise: therefore it must be judged that it was so done.

You will say 4. The Angels had sanctifying grace concreated with themselves: therefore they could not dispose themselves to it. The antecedent is clear from what was said in the previous Question: the consequence is proved: disposition precedes form, since it prepares the subject to receive it: but something concreated cannot presuppose anything prior in the subject that would be dispositional to its reception: therefore since sanctifying grace was concreated with the Angels, they could not dispose themselves to it.

I deny the consequence, and I distinguish the major of that proof: disposition precedes form, in the order of nature, I concede: of time, I deny: since, as is clear even in physical things, the last being of disposition is the first being of substantial form; and the act of contrition, which is a disposition to sanctifying grace, is simultaneous with the sanctifying grace itself, although in nature it precedes it: therefore by similarity the Angels, with the supernatural aid granted to them from the beginning, in the same instant in which they were created, could turn themselves to God by an act of love, by which they accepted, as it were by a certain disposition, all those things which were then shown to them by that magnificent Artificer of all things, both in natural and in supernatural matters: and they gave thanks to him for the immense benefits bestowed on them.

You will insist. If the Angels elicited some act, by the actual aid granted to them, by which they disposed themselves to habitual grace, it follows that simultaneously in time they had two acts, one indeed elicited by the will with the concurrence of that actual grace, the other truly with the concurrence of habitual grace: but one and the same faculty cannot elicit two acts simultaneously: therefore neither did the Angels have those two acts simultaneously. The sequela of the major is proved: First we assert that they elicited an act with the actual supernatural aid, by which they would dispose themselves to habitual grace; but they also ought to have elicited another act from that habitual grace concreated with them, otherwise that habit would have been idle in the Angels for some time, which appears absurd: therefore, etc.

I answer. granting the major, I distinguish the minor: one and the same faculty cannot elicit simultaneously two total acts, and non-subordinated ones, I concede: partial, and mutually subordinated ones, I deny: for just as the Sun, e.g., by the same illumination makes level both the Moon and, through her mediation, bathes the air with light at night: so the same will can tend simultaneously toward God by two acts, precisely when one stands in the manner of a disposition to the other.

Second conclusion. — The Angels in fact merited beatitude, and that earlier in time than they attained it. Thus

the Doctor, dist. 5, question 1, n. 3, where he reports and impugns the opinion of the Master, who says the Angels did not merit that beatitude before they received it, but after they received it: just as a soldier is said to merit a horse by works not yet done but to be done. Which opinion, says the Doctor, is absurd; for if anyone were said to merit because of foreseen works, it would follow that grace is not grace; for from the fact, he says, that someone is foreseen to use well a thing once received, he does not merit to receive it. For then man could merit first grace, because he is foreseen by God giving it to make good use of it, and then grace would not be grace, because it would be from merits, though not posited in effect, yet foreseen: therefore the Angel did not merit beatitude, if he had it only because of the foreseen good use of his in serving concerning the elect. Then he adds: Therefore he holds that the Angels merited their beatitude before they received it.

Now the Doctor proves the first part of the Conclusion thus: Every nature attains its perfection through its proper operation: but the perfection and end of every rational creature is beatitude, which is natural to God alone: therefore the Angel ought to attain it by his proper action. But an end to be attained through operation is either to be made through it, or to be earned through it, or, as the Doctor speaks, every operation leading into an end is either factive of the end, when namely the end does not exceed the power of the agent acting for the end, as medication with respect to health: or meritorious of the end, when namely the end exceeds the power of the agent acting for the end, and then the end is awaited from the gift of another: but beatitude exceeds every created nature: therefore both the Angel and man cannot attain it by an effective operation, but only by a meritorious one.

Proof 2. The angelic nature is as capable of meriting its beatitude as man: therefore by the reason that men do not attain beatitude except through their own merit, the Angels likewise ought to earn it. The consequence is clear: both because, other things being equal, the Angels are more apt for meriting with God than men; and because if glory is not given to men, whose nature is weaker and more infirm, without merit, by equal reason it does not seem it should be conceded to the Angels without merit; finally because Apoc. 21: The measure of a man, which is an angel: that is, as certain interpreters explain, it bears the same ratio toward men as it bore toward the Angels in their ordination to beatitude, because certainly in attaining beatitude men and angels are measured by the same measure or rule: therefore since in men the measure of attaining beatitude is merit, by equal reason it must be said that the Angels attained beatitude by their proper merit.

It is confirmed. This truth by the authority of the holy Fathers, especially S. Augustine, book On Correction and Grace chapter 11, where, speaking of the state of the first man, to whom God had granted an aid by which he could, if he willed, hold fast perseveringly to the good, he says:

but because he did not will to remain, it is certainly his fault, whereas it would have been his merit, had he willed to remain: as the holy angels did, who, while others fell through free will, through free will stood fast themselves, and merited to receive the reward of that abode, namely so great a fullness of beatitude that it is most certain to them that they will always remain in it.

Therefore S. Augustine confesses that the holy Angels truly earned their beatitude.

The Doctor also proves the second part, namely that the Angels merited glory earlier in time than they attained it: a will cannot be simultaneously and at once in that state in which it wills an object mutably and contingently, and also immutably and necessarily: but if the Angels received beatitude at the same time at which they merited it, it would follow that they willed the same object mutably and immutably, contingently and necessarily; therefore they cannot merit and obtain beatitude in the same instant of time. The major is clear: for two acts entirely opposed cannot proceed simultaneously from the same faculty. The minor is proved: in order to merit, one must be in such a state as not to be so determined to an act as to lack liberty not only essential, but of contradiction, of having such an act or not having it, or rather one must be indifferent to eliciting the act or not eliciting it: but when the will is in the beatific state it no longer has such indifference, since through the beatific vision it is so determined and drawn to loving God that it cannot cease from eliciting that act; therefore if in the same instant in which it merited it had beatitude, it would follow that it could simultaneously mutably and immutably, contingently and necessarily tend toward God by an act of love; which since it is absurd, it is likewise absurd that they should simultaneously merit beatitude and receive it.

Then, the state of beatitude excludes all merit, otherwise men could in fact merit in Heaven; nor would the state of the wayfarer necessarily be desired for meriting: but the consequent is against the common opinion of Theologians, who require the state of the way, not of the homeland, for merit: therefore merit cannot exist simultaneously with beatitude, and accordingly it must precede it in time.

Finally, the disposition to a form and the way to a term must be prior to the form and the term when, by their own special rationale they have a certain incompatibility on account of which they cannot subsist together: but the merit of the angels is a way and disposition to beatitude, which cannot subsist together with it; because the merit of the angels presupposes faith, and knowledge, and the state of the way: both of which beatitude excludes; therefore they cannot subsist together: and consequently merit must precede beatitude in time.

You will say 1. The angels merit something on account of the services rendered to men: but that merit exists together with its reward, otherwise they would await it; yet such expectation would disturb their happy state: for from Prov. 13. Hope that is deferred afflicts the soul: now what they merit can be nothing other than beatitude, and hence merit and beatitude can subsist together, and consequently the angels could at once merit beatitude and possess it.

The Doctor distinguishes the major. By those services the angels merit essential beatitude — he denies it; accidental beatitude — he concedes it; and although they did not previously have this accidental beatitude, and can desire and long for it, yet no distress follows in them on that account, since all of it is excluded by essential beatitude.

You will say 2. A greater reward supposes greater merit; but the angels have a greater reward and ampler beatitude than very many elected men: therefore they must likewise have greater merit: but they could not have had greater merit before receiving their beatitude than very many holy men who, living through a long time, amassed many merits: therefore it is necessary that the angels merit glory through subsequent works, and consequently their merit subsists together with beatitude.

— The Doctor distinguishes the major: a greater reward requires greater merit intensively — he concedes it; extensively — he denies it; that is, it requires a meritorious work which is more excellent and more perfect by reason, namely, either of a more excellent principle or of a more intense act of charity and love, but it does not require more meritorious works as to number. And likewise, with the minor distinguished, the consequence must be denied: for the merit of the angels, though accomplished in a brief time, could nevertheless far exceed intensively the merits of men multiplied over many years.

You will insist. Merit carries with it difficulty: but there was no difficulty in the angels in pursuing good: therefore either no merit at all belongs to them, or at least less perfect than in men, who suffer the greatest difficulty in the pursuit of good.

— The Doctor distinguishes the minor: there was not in the angels difficulty in pursuing good from a sensible inclination to the opposite — he concedes it; from the proportion of the object toward which they had to tend — he denies it; for it must be known, he says, that difficulty sometimes arises in some work from an inclination of the will to the opposite: sometimes difficulty arises in a work because of that about which one works, which exceeds the nature of the worker. And in this way the attainment of beatitude was difficult and praiseworthy in the angels, but not in the first way, because they were not inclined to the opposite. But it is altogether likely that the angels suffered great difficulty in adhering to God with love and service: for this denotes the great struggle begun between the utterly hostile angels and the faithful ones; it also signifies the fall of so many angels, who probably would not have fallen so, nor strayed from God, unless they had suffered some difficulty in adherence to Him. Finally, if the argument proved anything, it would have to be said that even the angels could in no wise merit by works effecting the attainment of beatitude, since that state removes all difficulty, especially concerning the love of God, whom, beholding face to face, they acknowledge as supremely lovable.

Third conclusion. — The angels merited their beatitude chiefly through acts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity.

Proof of the Conclusion. First indeed from faith, for from Habakkuk 2. The just lives by faith, and as the Apostle adds to the Hebrews 11. without faith it is impossible to please God. But the angels, in order to merit, had to be just and pleasing to God: therefore also to have faith: no less was it necessary for the angels to be justified through faith and to arrive at vision than for men; but men cannot be justified without faith, nor arrive at vision apart from faith; since, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews chapter 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. Whence he concludes in the same place: he who approaches God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to those who seek Him: therefore, etc. Finally, vision answers to faith by a special reason, as the reward specially proportioned to it. Hence that saying of the Psalmist can be accommodated to the blessed, as we have heard through faith on the way, so we see through manifest revelation, in the city of the Lord of hosts. To these add, that the angels had charity, for charity is either identical with grace or inseparable from it: but charity necessarily presupposes faith, and hence it was necessary that the angels possessed infused faith.

— Hence I judge it truer to say that it was revealed to the angels, and that they knew through faith, first, God as the Author of grace and the ultimate end and the object of supernatural beatitude, for as we said above from the Apostle, he who approaches God, etc. That these words must be understood equally of angels as of men, St. Thomas teaches 2. 2. qu. 5. art. 1. Second, they explicitly knew the mystery of the Trinity. For, as Thalassius says, t. 5. Biblioth. Patrum sentence 59., the sanctification and deification both of angels and of men is the holy consubstantial knowledge of the Trinity. It can also be urged, because the knowledge of the way of the angels ought to correspond to the knowledge of the homeland: for faith is the disposition most suited by which rational creatures are gradually advanced to beatific knowledge: but supernatural beatitude consists chiefly in the knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity: therefore, etc. Third, I also hold it more probable that the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed equally to them: both because such revelation and knowledge pertained not only to the perfection of the angels themselves; but also was highly fitting to the honor and majesty of Christ, and this St. Paul indicates, Hebrews 1., saying: And when again He brings the First-begotten into the world, He says: and let all the angels of God adore Him: which precept befitted to be given also to the angels as wayfarers, not only toward the Son as God, but also as God made man; for since the mystery of the Incarnation is known by the blessed angels as one of the chief mysteries, and since the knowledge of the way of the angels ought to correspond to the knowledge of the homeland, it was fitting that they know that mystery on the way.

You will say. St. Paul to the Ephesians 3. and 1. to Timothy 3., signifying that the mystery of the Incarnation was hidden from eternity in God, and that through the Church the Gospel was made known to the Principalities and Powers in heavenly places; whence those questions of the angels, Who is this King of glory? Psal. 23. Who is this that comes from Edom, with dyed garments from Bosra? Isai. 63. therefore, etc.

— Poncius answers, from the same Apostle to the Hebrews 1., that it is established that the angels before every peace and the preaching of the Church recognized the mystery of the Incarnation from its beginning, and adored Christ the Lord at the very point of His Conception or Nativity. Therefore the other passages of his are to be understood of the knowledge of the Incarnation, not simply, but secundum quid, namely either according to the intuitive knowledge of the same already put into execution, or according to its extension to all nations opened to the angels experimentally at least by the preaching of Paul and of the Church, or according to the abrogation of the legal rites and other circumstances of the thing presented and exhibited. Those questions, moreover, are either those of the Prophets, or rather of the angels, not ignorant, but wondering. For neither is it true, as some affirm, that certain ones indeed knew beforehand, but others were ignorant, namely those who asked at the Ascension of Christ; for Paul to the Hebrews 1. affirms that all the angels adored Christ the first-begotten of God when He was brought into the world. It is confirmed by this, that St. Dionysius, chapter 1. of the Celestial

Hierarchy, affirms that all the angels were instructed in all the mysteries which they announced to men, but especially those which concerned Christ. Whence he adds: I see that the divine mystery of the humanity of Jesus was first made known to the angels, then through them the benefit of knowledge came to us. To him accords St. Augustine, book 1. De Civit. cap. 32., while he says: From the beginning of the human race the mystery of the Incarnation was announced and prefigured through the ministry of the angels; he supposes, therefore, that it was foreknown by the angels: and hence the aforesaid words of St. Paul cannot be taken with such rigor as to exclude all prior knowledge held by the angels of the mystery of the incarnate Word of Christ to be adored; especially as regards the angels of the higher order: for the Doctor Subtilis, dist. 19. num. 2., does not wish the knowledge of that mystery to have been made known to the angels of the lower orders, as will appear in qu. 1. of the following Article.

You will say 2. Angelic knowledge was evident: but knowledge held through faith is not evident: therefore that knowledge was not through faith. The major is proved: the angels evidently knew that God was revealing to them those mysteries whose knowledge they received; whence rightly St. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 28. art. 2. quaest. 3. teaches that the angels, from their first condition, had some knowledge of the articles pertaining to the Trinity, which nevertheless does not deserve to be called faith; nay rather, knowledge of contemplation on account of the absence of enigma.

— I distinguish the major: that knowledge was evident on the side of the attesting and revealing party, because the angels evidently knew that the revelation, or manifestation, of the mysteries was being made by God — I concede it; on the side of the thing revealed — I deny it. And likewise, with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence: for evidence on the side of the attesting party does not absolutely repugn to faith. For we recognize men speaking to us, and yet we believe their words. Similarly it happened in the angels, who indeed knew God speaking to them, but what He related and manifested they did not know evidently.

What we have said of faith must be said with stronger reason of angelic hope and charity: for it is established that the good angels, at the time of that struggle which they waged against the hostile ones in Heaven, both loved God and reposed their hope in Him; indeed, for the sake of defending His glory they fought, which certainly could not have been done unless they burned with the greatest love of Him, and had awaited opportune help from Him against that immense troop of rebellious angels.

You will ask. What was the duration of the way of the angels?

The Doctor answers, dist. 5. qu. 1. num. 5. and following: that various opinions of Doctors were to be determined in this matter: for first St. Thomas, 1. par. qu. 65. art. 5., teaches that there were only two delays of the angels, one in which they were created in grace and merited, another in which the good received the essential reward of beatitude, but the evil eternal punishment. Indeed the Master of the Sentences holds that three delays of duration are to be posited, which he explains thus, wishing that in the first the angels, created blessed, were in pure natural things, in the second delay the evil sinned, the just merited; in the third all were at the term, the good indeed in beatitude, but the evil in torments. Likewise there are other opinions of ancient theologians. But almost all more recent theologians now agree with the Subtle Doctor that only three little delays of the angelic way are to be admitted, which they call instants, even though they are not necessary indivisibles, as are the instants of our time:

The first instant was that of their creation, in which all received both nature and sanctifying grace co-created with themselves, and adhered to their Creator through chaste love, and hence by love merited in that same instant; but not all stood in merit.

The second instant was that in which the distinction was made between the good and the evil: the good persevering in merit, the evil slipping into hostility and sin.

The third instant was that in which that distinction was completed, the good having been beatified, but the evil damned.

Or, as the Doctor speaks, qu. 2. num. 15.: The first delay, in which they were uniform in grace, if we wish to say that the evil had grace, or at least uniform in nature. The second delay, in which, still existing on the way, they were unformed, in that these merited ultimately, and those demerited ultimately. The third delay was the necessary formal distinction of one from the other.

It is probable also that in the second delay, in which they were unformed on the way, there were many little delays, because the evil sinned in many species of sin, namely pride, hatred, and envy: and those acts were elicited in ordered fashion, and not in the same instant.

— I said, however, that those instants were not wholly indivisible, especially the first and second. For as regards the first, it must have been virtually divisible corresponding to some duration of our time: for it would be gratuitously feigned that the perverse angels fell immediately after the first instant, wholly indivisible: nor does it seem likely that that chaste love, in which all were co-created, persevered in only one indivisible instant and was immediately extinguished; indeed the contrary seems suggested by Ezekiel graphically delineating Lucifer under the person of the King of Tyre, saying: In the midst of the fiery stones you walked, perfect in your ways: which indicates that he stood for some time in chaste love, and as it were made progress in it through the continuation of that love and the plurality of good works. Whence much less true appears what very many Thomists teach, that after the first indivisible instant all the good were beatified, but the evil damned, because as many instants would have to be posited for the way of the demons as there were operations really distinct among themselves and succeeding one another, by which their way was finally terminated: for the Thomists suppose that the instants of discrete time, in which the way of the angels lasted, are multiplied according to the number of operations succeeding one another: but the demons exercised three kinds of operations: for in the first instant of creation they elicited a meritorious act, afterward mortally sinful, which was followed by damnation: which three operations are utterly incompossible: for the first was actual conversion to God as the ultimate end: the second was actual aversion from the same; the third, however, necessarily ought to be distinguished together from the second; for supreme delight and supreme sorrow are incompossible with respect to the same subject: but the angel, in that instant in which he sinned, had supreme delight and complacency in his natural perfection: therefore in the same instant he could not have supreme sorrow, and hence that third instant must be distinguished from the second.

Likewise the second instant of the way had some continuation of time, in which the good were occupied with increasing merits, and with combat or resistance against the sinning ones and their sins. For in the angels, most prompt to act through grace and nature, although a long delay through some duration of time was not necessary; nevertheless it was fitting that they be able to extend their duration by their merits, and thus merit an ampler beatitude if they wished: just as theologians teach that if man had remained innocent, neither he nor his posterity would have been carried straightway into Heaven, but would have dwelt on earth for a long time, that by multiplying the fruit of good works they might obtain in Heaven a more abundant glory and beatitude.

Add that the common opinion concerning the sin of Lucifer inducing the others by his instigation to the fellowship of hostility urges the same prolonged delay of duration: for it was not likely that all the rebel angels adhered to him in the same indivisible moment; indeed it appears more credible that some at times resisted, and at length, pressed by his solicitation, declined to his side.

But the third instant, of the completed distinction of the good angels from the evil through the glorification of the former and the damnation of the latter, was indeed indivisible, by that reason that it closed and terminated the way; yet it is to last forever.

* For long ago that insane comment of Origen was proscribed, by which he supposed that the angels were not yet endowed with perpetual and unloseable innocence and felicity: but that they still fluctuated between sin and holiness, misery and beatitude, just as we do; whence in the homily on Numbers 20., On the angels deputed to the guardianship of men, he writes: For, he says, the angels will come to judgment with us, and will stand for us before the throne of justice, lest perhaps any one of them should have been the cause that we offended, lest perhaps they expended less work and labor toward us, that they might recall us from the stain of sins. He confirms and repeats the same with proofs in homily 13. on Luke, and thus concludes: Moreover it frequently happens that while we labor they do not fulfill their own office, and are at fault. But the homily on the same Gospel 3. says not the angels of all men see the face of the Father who is in heaven, but only of those who have given their name to the Church, and afterward says: For how, if salvation is procured for men through their care and industry, do they attend the face of the Father always: but if through their negligence man has perished, they are not ignorant of the peril of their loss. And shortly after: It is ignominy for an angel if a man believed just shall have sinned: that, on the contrary, it is glory for an angel if even the least believed in the Church shall have been saved. For they shall sometime see the face of the Father who is in heaven, when others shall not see: for according to their merit the angels are, either always, or never, or little, or more, contemplating the face of God, O angels. — But that doctrine of Origen has long since been proscribed by the holy Fathers of the Church and by the whole assembly of theologians, judged among the errors of Origen. *

You will ask 2. How long did the way of the angels last?

I answer. the matter to be quite uncertain; for certain ones think the angels had the terminus of their way on the very first day of the world, when God divided the light from the darkness, as if in that mystical distinction there was outlined and designated the distinction of the good angels from the evil. There are those who think this happened on the second day, when God, creating the firmament, divided the waters which are above the firmament from those which are below it, as if by this division was foreshadowed the separation of the holy angels from the demons.

The others think that no angels had yet fallen by the sixth day of the world, since God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good, and hence no creatures deformed and infected by sin seemed then to exist.

— But all these opinions are led by lighter and uncertain arguments: since Moses outlines in those days of the world the formation of corporeal things; and thus the most holy Prophet relates the division of the light and of the waters as corporeal, as nature itself demonstrates, and not perchance anything then concerning that distinction of the good angels from the evil; so likewise it teaches that God approved all things that He had made for the integrity and adornment of the whole Universe: but whether in those words He also comprehended the formation of spiritual creatures is quite uncertain.

— Nevertheless all theologians agree that the way of the angels was not drawn out so long, but was very brief: both on account of the perfection of the angelic powers, which most easily fulfill their works, especially since those Spirits, most expeditious for understanding and willing, have no opposing impediments nor corporeal organs: then on account of the immense aids divinely conferred upon them, by which their intellect was irradiated and their will stimulated to operation; add that the magnitude of acquiring the reward requires neither long duration of time nor multitude and plurality of good works: for, as the Doctor speaks, dist. 5. qu. 1. num. 4., for a great reward there is not required a multitude of merits, but much more is required one intense merit than a hundred thousand remitted ones. But in the angels there was a very intense movement of merit during that little delay in which they merited, so much so perhaps that no man according to the common law could have so intense an act of merit as they had.