Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Claude Frassen

Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Claude Frassen (1620–1711)


Monitum I: Monitum editoris

Praefatio I: In secundum librum Sententiarum praefatio

Tractatus I: De Angelorum natura, operationibus, et praecellentiis

Disputatio I: De Angelorum existentia, natura, et ordine

Articulus I: De Angelorum existentia

Quaestio I: An revera constet Angelos existere

Quaestio II: An, et quo tempore, et loco creati fuerint Angeli

Articulus II: De natura, et substantia Angelica

Quaestio I: An Angeli sint omnino incorporei, et prorsus immateriales

Quaestio II: An, et quomodo Angeli sint incorruptibiles, et immortales

Quaestio III: An, et quomodo Angeli ab anima rationali distinguantur

Articulus III: De numero, et ordine Angelorum

Quaestio I: An certo cognosci possit multiplex Angelorum numerus

Quaestio II: An inter Angelos plures sint specie, et solo numero distincti

Quaestio III: Quid, et quot sint Angelorum hierarchiae, et ordines

Disputatio II: De facultatibus, et operationibus Angelorum

Articulus I: De intellectu, et cognitione Angelorum

Quaestio I: Quis, et qualis sit intellectus Angelicus

Quaestio II: An, et qualiter Angeli res intelligant per earum species

Quaestio III: Quodnam sit obiectum cognitionis Angelicae

Quaestio IV: An, et quomodo Angeli sibi invicem loquantur

Quaestio V: An, et qualiter unus Angelus alterum illuminare possit

Articulus II: De voluntate Angelica

Quaestio I: An Angelica voluntas revera sit libera, et mutabilis

Quaestio II: An, et qualiter Angelus Deum, seipsum, et alia diligat

Articulus III: De potentia motrice, et executiva Angelorum

§ I: De loco Angelorum

Quaestio I: An, et per quid Angeli constituantur in loco

Quaestio II: Qualiter Angeli existant in loco

§ II: De motu Angelorum

Quaestio I: An, et per quid Angeli localiter moveri dicantur

Quaestio II: Qualis, et quotuplex distingui possit motus Angelicus

Quaestio III: An Angelus possit transire de uno loco ad alium, non transeundo per spatium intermedium

Quaestio IV: An, et quae sit Angelorum durationis mensura

§ III: De activitate Angelorum erga corpora

Quaestio I: An, et qualiter Angeli soleant in assumptis corporibus apparere

Quaestio II: An, et quas Angeli operationes vitae edere possint in corporibus assumptis

Disputatio III: De Angelorum gratia, merito, et demerito

Articulus I: De gratia Angelis concessa

Quaestio I: An, et in qua beatitudine creati fuerint Angeli

Quaestio II: An, et qualem gratiam habuerint Angeli

Note 1. By the name of grace we are here to understand not only that divine gift or benefit which is not owed by the force of creation alone or of the nature of a thing, but that quality of the supernatural order by which the rational creature is rectified, completed, and elevated so that it can produce some supernatural act pleasing to God, or be established in a supernatural state. For indeed, as the Seraphic Doctor says in 2. dist. 4. q. 2. ad tertium:

The name of grace is used in three ways: for in one way grace is spoken of commonly, insofar as it comprehends whatever is superadded to natural things; natural things, I say, which belong to the essential constitution of a thing; thus one is said to have by grace a good intellect, to read well, to sing well, and other things of this kind. In another way it is called what is superadded to free will, effecting and disposing rectitude; thus natural virtues, such as innocence, humility, and piety can be called grace. In the third way, what is superadded as rectifying, completing, and elevating, and this is called sanctifying grace, because it makes man acceptable to God, because it makes him conformable to Him.

But it is of grace in this latter acceptation that we are speaking at present.

Note 2. Grace seems necessary for the angels in many ways, but especially in four ways: First indeed they had need of the grace of predestination, since supernatural beatitude is naturally unde both to angels and to men, it was a benefit of grace, and a gift not owed to nature, that God out of His good pleasure ordered the angels to a supernatural end; nor did He abandon them in the state of pure nature. Hence the Council of Vienne, in the Clementine Ad nostrum, De haereticis, rightly defined that intellectual nature (that is, angels as well as men) is not naturally blessed: and in the censure of Pius V. and Gregory XIII. against Michael Baius, it is established that man even in his state of integrity, and the angels, ought to have been elevated through supernatural gifts, that they might merit eternal life. — Second, they had need of preventing and concomitant grace, since God predestined the angels to attain beatitude through fitting means, that is, through their own free and moral acts: but fitting means must be proportioned to the end: wherefore since beatitude is of the supernatural order, in order that the angels might dispose themselves toward it, there was need for them of preventing grace, or the special help of illumination and pious motion, by which God precedes the intellect and will for the exercise of such free acts of actual conversion to God: and also concomitant grace, physically cooperating in the very exercise of the free act of supernatural consent to the vocation, as St. Augustine teaches lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 9. affirming that exciting and cooperating grace was necessary to the holy angels that they might adhere to God with chaste love. — Third, in order that they might be holy and just, they had need of sanctifying, or habitual grace, which implies the special indwelling of the Holy Spirit: for Sanctification, says St. Basil lib. De Spiritu sancto cap. 16., is not without the Spirit: nor are the virtues of the heavens holy of their own nature; and St. Augustine, praised above, teaches that what Paul says ad Romanos 5., The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us, is to be understood of angels equally with men. — Fourthly finally, in order that the good angels, while the evil ones were falling, might stand fast in grace, and resist those soliciting them to rebellion, they had need of the grace of perseverance, as St. Fulgentius teaches book De Fide cap. 3.; and in lib. 2. ad Thrasimundum cap. 3. he says that the same grace operates in man that he may rise again, which operated in the angel lest he fall, which Bede also teaches on Psalm 32., expounding the words: By the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, etc., where he says that the heavenly armies, the Cherubim and Seraphim, when the Devil transgressed, persevered, not from themselves, but from the Lord the Father and His Word they had it: and not a part of their strength, but all their strength is of the spirit of His mouth. Here, however, the discussion concerns only habitual and sanctifying grace, namely whether the angels had it in the first instant of creation.

Note 3. Concerning the resolution of the present difficulty there are chiefly two Sentences of the authors.

For there were some, says the Seraphic Doctor in the place praised above, saying that all the angels were created in gratuitous sanctifying gifts, and the reason that moved them was this: on the part of God indeed perfect liberality, and on the part of the creature fitness: for since from the instant of creation they were clean vessels and receptacles, and God is prompt to impart His grace unless He meet an obstacle on the part of the receiver, God did not leave those vessels empty for a moment; but as soon as He created them He illumined them with grace, and such receptacles ought to go forth from the hand of God as would be immediately prompt unto good use. Whence as some probably conjecture that God made trees full of fruits, and other things in the noblest and most perfect state: so also He adorned the nature of the angel with grace from its creation, which grace was to be perpetuated in the first good use without victory, and to be lost forever upon the first disorder.

This is one position, and it seems sufficiently consonant with the authorities of the Holy Fathers. This sentence, however, St. Thomas teaches quaest. 2. art. 3.

— There were also others, who said that the angels did not have sanctifying grace from the instant of creation, but afterwards: and the reason that moved them is the disposition of the angelic nature, which is borne toward what it desires without retardation. Wherefore just as by their conversion to evil they were converted so profoundly that they could not return; so, indeed much more, by their conversion to good, or by their hability, had they had grace, they would have adhered to the good so totally that they would never have fallen. Whence it does not seem probable in any way that Lucifer had grace, and if he himself did not have it, though he was exalted among the others, it is argued a fortiori that the others did not have it from their origin. The Master seems to accept this position, and the Doctors commonly hold it, and thus they agree with this one as more probable and more common.

So the Seraphic Doctor; so also teach Hugh of St. Victor lib. 1. De Sacramentis par. 5. c. 29., Henry of Ghent 1. quaest. 10. — From these it is clear that he in this matter is entirely being probabilist, nor does he openly teach either sentence. Such also was the Subtle Doctor, who judges both sentences probable, dist. 5. q. 1., where he asserts only that all the angels were at some time in grace: but whether they were created in sanctifying grace, or in pure naturals, so that sanctifying grace was afterwards bestowed upon them, he does not determine: but he says num. 7. only, that to posit the angels as created in pure naturals, one must then posit four delays, so that all in the first delay were in pure naturals; in the second all were in grace, and the good merited, and the evil demerited: in the third the good persevered in good, and the evil in evil; in the fourth both these and those were in their term; and this last way of four delays saves more states in them, and more affirmative authorities. But if this plurality of delays does not please, because it has no evident necessity, it is probable to posit at least three delays, in the first of which, he says num. 6., all were created in grace, and were uniform; in the second they were non-uniform, namely the good merited, and the evil demerited; in the third all were in their term, namely the good in beatitude, and the evil in punishment. So the Doctor. These things premised, four things here above all are to be resolved: first, that all the angels, whether good or evil, at some time had sanctifying grace: second, that it is more probable that they were created in sanctifying grace: third, that those who were of superior nature received more abundant grace.

First conclusion. — It is certain that all the angels were at some time devoid of all guilt, and stood in the state of sanctifying grace. This is now common among the Theologians, and is proved first: if some of the angels at some time did not have sanctifying grace, especially Lucifer with his rebellious followers: but it is not so: therefore, etc. The major stands, for since the good angels were not created in the state of supernatural beatitude, as was proved above, but obtained it by their own merits, as will appear below, there is no doubt that they stood for some time in habitual and sanctifying grace, in which state they could merit that beatitude.

Proof of the minor. From Sacred Scripture: First indeed from Isaiah 14.: How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning? etc. where although literally the speech is about Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon, yet in the mystical sense the Fathers understand Lucifer, the prince of the rebellious angels, not only Origen lib. periarchon cap. 2. and Tertullian lib. 5. adversus Marcionem cap. 17., but also Athanasius lib. De Passione Christi: Jerome on cap. 14. of Isaiah, Ambrose on Psalm 118., and likewise Augustine lib. 3. De Doctrina Christiana cap. 37. And although these words intimate the fall of Lucifer from heaven, in which heaven he was created together with the other angels, nevertheless so grave an interrogation and admiration seems to signify a fall not only from the material heaven, but from a certain eminent dignity and excellence, not indeed natural, which he did not lose, but supernatural, and of grace, by which through sin he was stripped.

Secondly the same minor is proved. From Ezekiel 28.: Thou sealest up the likeness of wisdom, and perfect in beauty, thou wast in the delights of the paradise of God; every precious stone was thy covering... thou walkedst in the midst of the stones of fire, perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation, until iniquity was found in thee. Which words although they were said literally of the King of Tyre, yet they are understood everywhere by the holy Fathers of the demon, the prince of the rebellious angels, Ambrose lib. De Paradiso cap. 2., Jerome on this passage of Ezekiel, Augustine lib. 11. De Genesi ad litteram cap. 20., Cyril lib. 3. in Ioannem cap. 29., and the more recent Interpreters, who commonly weigh first those words, thou sealest up the likeness of God, namely with singular excellence. Whence Gregory lib. 32. Moralia cap. 18.: What gift had he not, if he was the seal of the likeness of God? Secondly by those words, in the midst of the stones of fire, they understand the holy angels blazing and aflame with charity, as St. Augustine lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 15. And accordingly that Lucifer placed in their midst like a King attended by courtiers, when he walks among them, blazed with the same fire. Thirdly those words, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty, and perfect in thy ways, until iniquity was found in thee, probably signify a supernatural perfection and justice, from which the demon fell; for natural gifts are not usually so greatly exaggerated in Scripture.

Thirdly the same minor is proved. From Jude cap. 6.: The angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation, he hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains unto the judgment of the great day. For although some more recent Interpreters explain this text of the princes ruling in the land of promise, whom they say were reserved unto eternal judgment because they kept not the principality entrusted to them, the royal dignity granted by God; nevertheless the more common and truer interpretation is of the demons, who are known to have been deprived of principality, not indeed natural, nor of the sciences and similar natural gifts, according to which there is a natural subordination among the evil angels. Nor were they excluded from Heaven and deprived of the right of inhabitants of the celestial dwelling except on account of sin, and the loss of supernatural grace, to which glory is owed by hereditary right.

This same truth is proved from the holy Fathers, very many of whom affirm that the angels once had grace, which the demons lost through sin. So St. Cyprian lib. De zelo, et livore at the beginning, where he affirms that the demon was once acceptable and dear to God: and Basil Epistola 141., in which disputing about the Holy Spirit, he shows thus that he was not of the same nature and condition as the angels:

But neither wilt thou ever dare to say that his substance is mutable, if thou lookest to the nature of the contrary Virtue, which fell from Heaven like lightning, and dropped away from true life, for the reason that it had adventitious virtue, and following an evil life underwent mutation. Therefore when it had departed from unity, and cast away angelic dignity, it was named devil from its manners: after that former and blessed habit was extinguished, and the opposing force kindled against him.

The same St. Jerome teaches on Hosea 3.: And they love the grape-gleanings of grapes, where he adds: Which wines they have not, and have lost pristine grace, like the demons, who having fallen from their proper dignity, possessing things of ancient grace, are dry. But best of all St. Augustine, who although he seems doubtful in several places, elsewhere affirms it, as lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 9. about the middle, where he says that God created the angels, at once founding their nature in them and bestowing grace. Whence, he says:

Without a good will, that is, the love of God, the holy angels must never be believed to have been; but those who although created good yet became evil, became so by their own evil will, which a good nature did not cause, unless when it voluntarily fell away from good; and the cause of the evil is not the good, but the defect from the good: either they received a lesser grace of divine love than those who persevered in the same: or if both were created good equally, when these fell by evil will, those, further helped, arrived at that fullness of beatitude whence they were made most certain that they would never fall.

Also favorable is the First Council of Braga Canon 7., whose words are these: If anyone says that the devil was not previously a good angel made by God, let him be anathema.

You will say. He who nowhere had charity must be said not to have had grace. For everyone, says St. John epistola prima cap. 3., who loveth not, abideth in death: but the demons nowhere had charity. — It is proved first, from Pope John in the epistle to Isaac of Syracuse, where concerning the demon he says: He grieves enough, and blushes, that the charity which he could not have in heaven he cannot hold men constant of muddy nature in the earth: but men hold in earth the charity by which they are justified before God: therefore the demons could not have it in the heavens. — Then St. Gregory lib. 32. Moralia cap. 23., weighing that text of Ezekiel c. 28., Gold the work of thy beauty, and thy holes were prepared in the day thou wast created; by gold he understands the wisdom of the demon: by holes truly the capacity of charity, by which, he says, if he had wished to be filled, standing firm with the angels like stones set in the ornament of a King, he could have adhered. Whence he concludes: He had therefore holes, but through the vice of pride they were not filled with the gold of charity. Which sentiment Rupert certainly follows lib. 1. De operibus Trinitatis c. 28., where concerning the demon he says:

It is hard here to assert that he was not perfect, but harder to affirm that he ever had in himself the love of the Creator without which there is no perfection of the ways. For even if the aforesaid Prophet said: gold the work of thy beauty, and thy holes were prepared in the day thou wast created, still he neither said this, nor signifies it in any way, that he received in his holes the chain of gold; namely because since he is a rational creature, he certainly had wit, intellect, and memory, by which quasi-holes, the spirit of the love of God, which is the best gold, he proudly refused to receive when he ought to have received it.

From these it stands that the devil never had the love of the Creator, and consequently not grace either, which either is charity or is indivisibly joined to charity.

I deny the minor. and to its first proof I say with the canonical Gloss that those words of Pope John are to be understood of final perseverance in charity, which the devil could not have: not that he truly could not have received it, but because he was unwilling to retain it once received, and therefore he grieves most that men obtain it and keep it steadfastly. Or I say that the particle nequivit signifies the impotence of having after the fall, that is, of recovering charity, either on account of his obfirmation in the evil purpose, or on account of the defect of vocation to supernatural penance, without which it cannot be recovered. Whence also in certain exemplars, in place of the past-tense verb nequivit, the present nequit is read. Or finally I say that the demon grieves that he could not, not absolutely or antecedently, but consequently on account of the inconstancy and vice of his own will, have persevering charity, which he sees many men, constant although of muddy nature, and far frailer, firmly hold. — To St. Gregory I say that he must be understood of charity not simply, but increased through merits, as the word filled also indicates; or even of charity consummated through beatitude and glory, and then he speaks of the proximate capacity for that consummated charity, which capacity is not through nature alone, but through the charity of the wayfarer. That however it should be thus understood is clear from this, because otherwise he would contradict himself, for c. 18. of the same book, weighing these words of Ezekiel: Perfect thou walkedst in the midst of the stones of fire, he interprets those words of Lucifer, whom he testifies was founded in charity: Because, he says, among the choirs of angels, kindled with the fire of charity, he shone bright with the glory of his condition. Similarly Rupert could be expounded: or it must be said that he followed the contrary opinion, which is now disapproved by the Theologians.

You will say 2. Whoever sinned from the beginning of his formation, and did not repent, did not have sanctifying grace: but such is the case of the demon, as is proved first from John 3.: Whoever committeth sin is of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning. And cap. 8. Christ addressing the Jews opposing Himself said: You are of your father the devil, and the desires of your father you wish to do: he was a murderer from the beginning, and stood not in the truth; that is, he did not exist, for the word stand is more frequently used in Scripture for to be, or to exist; thus 2. ad Corinth. 3.: By the mouth of two or three every word shall stand, that is, shall be: therefore it follows that the devil nowhere had sanctifying grace.

I deny the minor. and to the first context I say that its sense is, either that the devil sinned from the beginning of the world taken morally, and not mathematically, that is, a little after his formation: or that thereafter he sinned pertinaciously and continuously, from the moment he once began to sin. To the latter text truly I say that indeed the devil, morally speaking, is guilty of homicide from the beginning of the world, inasmuch as he not only impelled Cain to the fratricide of Abel, but also through his envy death entered into the world on account of the sin committed through temptation of the first Parent; wherefore Christ rightly said to the Jews attempting to put Him to death that they were of their father the devil, because they imitated the cruelty of the devil. Therefore it is not thence gathered that the demons nowhere had sanctifying grace, nay rather the contrary is drawn from the latter words; since the devil is said not to have stood in the truth, for although the word sto sometimes signifies the same as existo in Scripture, it more frequently designates stability and permanence in something begun, or in some good begun, especially in this place. Which is certainly confirmed by Job 4.: Behold they that serve him are not stable, and in his angels he found pravity: for the demons are said not to have been stable, because they did not persevere in the grace which they received: which Christ surely signifies by saying that the devil stood not in the truth; here however truth signifies innocence and sanctity, just as also in 4. Regum cap. 20., where Ezechias said, Remember that I have walked before thee in truth.

Second conclusion. — It is more probable that all the angels received sanctifying grace in the first instant of their creation. This likewise is now the more common opinion among the Theologians, and is proved First from Ezekiel 28.: Perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation, until iniquity was found in thee. This truth St. August. expressly teaches lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 9. where, after he had said, as we related in the preceding Conclusion, that God created the angels, at once founding their nature in them and bestowing grace: concerning the good angels he subjoins: Whence without a good will, that is, the love of God, the holy angels must never be believed to have been. But concerning the evil ones:

Those who, though created good, became evil either received a lesser grace of divine love than those who persevered in the same; or if both were created equally good, when the latter fell by an evil will, the former were further helped and attained that fullness of beatitude from which they were made most certain they would never fall.

— Secondly Basil on Psalm 32.:

Nothing is holy without the presence of the Holy Spirit; for the Word, maker of all things, created the angels out of nothing so that they might be, but the Holy Spirit at the same time bestowed sanctification upon them: for they were not created in an infantile stature and then gradually exercised and perfected so as to be held worthy of the reception of the spirit; but in their very constitution, and as it were by a certain sprinkling of their substance, they had holiness infused together.

Which he likewise teaches afterwards of the evil angels. — Thirdly Gregory, book 27. Moralia, chapter 23. The Angelic virtues, which remained fixed in the love of God, received in this gift of retribution that they remain in the contemplation of the Creator without end of felicity, and in that wherein they were created they subsist with eternal stability. It is proved by reason: for the angels were not created in a lesser perfection than the first man: but all Theologians confess that our first Parent was created in original justice. First because this seems to be intimated by Trent, session 5., where it says: Adam lost through sin the justice and sanctity in which he had been constituted. — Secondly because it openly teaches Anacletus Pope, epistle 1., saying: Man is said to have been created to the image of God because in his creation he had grace and the other virtues. Thirdly because Scripture testifies to it not obscurely, while Ecclesiastes 7. says God made man upright, for uprightness in Scripture signifies grace and sanctity. — Finally, because the children who would have been born of Adam, had he persevered in the state of innocence, would have had grace as it were congenital: therefore Adam himself also, who was their head and exemplar, had it from the beginning of his condition. — Then, God is more prone to pity than to condemn: but he created the angels in such a state that they could immediately demerit, and consequently be condemned: therefore he ought also to have brought them forth in a state in which they could merit, and forthwith in the state of sanctifying grace, which is the principle of merit. — Finally, God from the beginning created all the angels for a supernatural end, and with the most fitting providence for attaining it: but fitting providence demands that to each thing there be granted the necessary means for reaching the end due to it: therefore since sanctifying grace is most necessary for meriting beatitude, it was congruous that God should grant it to all the angels immediately from the beginning. Congruous, I say, for I confess that for persuading this truth no demonstrative reason can be supplied, since the matter depends upon the free will of God...

You will object 1. That passage of chapter 4. of Job, for where we read that God found wickedness in the angels, the Hebrew has, he set not praise or light in his angels: but grace and justice are called light and splendor in the sacred letters, according to that of 1 Peter 2. He called them into his admirable light: and St Paul often calls the just children of light, saying: You were sometimes darkness, but now light in the Lord. — It is confirmed from this, that St Augustine, book 1. De Genesi ad litt., chapter 9. says: The angelic creature was first made formless and called heaven; then formed and called light: therefore the angel did not obtain sanctifying grace from the beginning.

I answer. that even if the aforesaid text of Job be interpreted concerning praise or light, it does not thereby prejudice the truth of the Conclusion, since it signified that the angels did not have praise or light consummated and perfect, such as the blessed angels have, wherefore by the same chapter 38. they are called the morning stars praising God. — But to Saint Augustine I say that indeed he appears more hesitant and doubtful in deciding this truth; nevertheless, since, as we said above, elsewhere he teaches the same truth steadfastly, he must be benignly interpreted, lest he appear self-contradictory. I say therefore that when he affirms the angels to have been first formless before formed, he understands either a priority of nature alone, not of time; or — which I judge more probable — he speaks of formlessness through the absence of the beatific vision and of the light of glory, which preceded beatitude in duration.

You will say 2. If all the angels had been created in sanctifying grace, none of them could have fallen: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The minor is evident, for the demons fell. Moreover the inference of the major is proved: if they had been created in sanctifying grace, they would also have been supernaturally converted to God, for God does not usually bestow sanctifying grace upon persons using their own will unless consenting and willing to have it, and consequently converted to God: but if the angels had once been converted to God, they could never have turned away from him; both because the will of the angels either cannot at all be changed from what it has once chosen, or is changed only with the greatest difficulty, and therefore demands to be confirmed at once in its election; and because if in the first instant they had been converted to God through grace, they would have merited beatitude: therefore in the second instant they would have received it as the reward of their merit, and thus could not have fallen.

I deny the major. and to its proof I say that although the angels are not moved so easily as men from what they have once chosen, yet of themselves they are not utterly immobile in their election: therefore even if an angel in his first operation had been converted to God through sanctifying grace, still he could withdraw from that conversion, since indeed he was free and still in the state of the way; and moreover, because a new occasion of sinning presented itself to him, as Saint Gregory Nazianzen teaches in oration 38., where, after saying concerning the fall of the angels: I would wish to say of them that they are immobile toward evil, having only agitation toward good, as encompassing God and drawing from him the first illuminations: he adds: Yet that I may judge and call them not wholly immobile but hard to move, I am persuaded by that Lucifer who from brightness was made darkness on account of pride and so named, and the rebellious Powers subjected to him, which by flight from the good wrought vice and contracted it upon us.

You will say 3. Grace is a medium between nature and glory: therefore the angels ought to have been first created in the state of pure nature, afterwards gifted with grace, and then to have merited beatitude.

I deny the consequence. for if it proved anything it would also establish that the first man was not created in grace. Add that the reason laid down in the antecedent is of little moment, for it is far better for a rational creature always to have stood in the grace of God, although in the instant immediately following its reception it would not receive beatitude, than to have been for some time in the state of pure nature; for the state of pure nature does not denote perfection as the state of grace does. Then greater power and liberality of God appears in granting grace together with nature at once than if he first conferred nature and afterward grace; nor does any reason appear why God should have deferred conferring grace upon the angels, especially since, as Saint Basil taught above, the angels were not created infants, that is, they had no need of the course of time to receive sanctification and illumination.

You will say 4. It was more congruous to confer grace after nature, since by conferring both at once grace would seem connatural: therefore it is more probable that God did not confer both at once.

I deny the antecedent. for although grace was conferred upon the angels together with nature, there was no danger thenceforth of confusing the two, especially since the angels could know, at least through faith, that the help granted them depended on the mere liberality of God and utterly exceeded their natural powers: for this knowledge contributed most to proving their constancy and humility.

Finally you will say. God works nothing in vain: but grace conferred upon the angels in the first instant would have been conferred in vain, seeing that as yet they could not deliberate, nor consequently operate by means of grace. Then grace would have been futile in the demons, since they derived no fruit of good work or merit from it. Finally the angel would have known himself created in grace, and thereupon to be a Son of God, and consequently he would not so easily have willed to lose so great a dignity: therefore it seems more probable that sanctifying grace was not granted to them.

I deny the consequence. and to the first argument I say that grace was not futile in the first instant, since it contributed most to the perfection of the angels, and moreover with it they could deliberate sufficiently and operate, as we shall prove in the last Conclusion. To the second I say that although the demons received no fruit of grace, yet it was not granted them in vain; since it was a medium for attaining the end due, and contributed to demonstrating that sweet and right providence of God who wills all men to be saved and supplies every means necessary to salvation. To the third I say that although the angel knew himself a Son of God and constituted in grace, yet by his liberty he could lose that dignity, acting namely against the inclination and institution of grace; since grace does not compel the will, but according to its free condition assists and advances it toward supernatural acts.

Third conclusion. — God bestowed an unequal grace upon the angels according to the greater or lesser natural perfection of each. This is common among Theologians, and is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers: for above all St Ambrose, book 1. De Spiritu sancto, c. 7. teaches that a more abundant grace was conferred upon the angels than upon men on account of the greater and more excellent dignity of their condition:

If they think, he says, that there is no spiritual holiness in the angels, but some other grace proper to their nature, these will certainly judge the angels inferior to men. For although they themselves confess that they dare not attribute to the angels the Holy Spirit, nor can they deny that the Holy Spirit is infused into men — for sanctification is the gift and boon of the Spirit — there will be found men certainly who have a better sanctification, and are to be preferred to the angels: but when the angels descend to the aid of men, it must be understood that the creature superior is that of the angels, which receives more spiritual grace, yet that the gift of the Author is the same both toward us and toward them.

In which words St Ambrose confesses that for this reason a more abundant grace was conferred upon the angels than upon men, because they are of a more excellent nature; but since the angels also differ among themselves in excellence of nature, by the same reasoning it follows that a more abundant grace was conferred upon them according to the perfection of each one's nature. — This very thing Saint Basil teaches, book De Spiritu sancto, chapter 16., saying: The powers of the heavens are not holy of their own nature, but according to the proportion in which they surpass one another they have from the Spirit the measure of sanctification. Nearly the same opinion Damascenus holds, book 2., c. 3.; for he says: Through the Word all the angels were created, and through the sanctification of the Holy Spirit all received the measures of perfection; yet so that each according to his dignity and rank is a partaker of light and grace. And they seem to have taken their opinion from St Dionysius in the book De Coelesti Hierarchia, where he says that the angels more perfect in nature are nearer to God, both in office and in the splendors of glory and grace: which he professes to have learned from his teacher Paul, chapter 6.; and accordingly there he says: The first Hierarchy, as it is more perfect than the rest, is joined with greater nearness to the foremost splendors of God. And c. 7.: Deservedly that first heavenly function is performed by the most exalted Spirits, since it is the order higher and more sacred than all; and in this manner he philosophizes about the others in the following chapters. — And although these Fathers do not speak expressly of the first instant of creation, yet, says Suarez, book 5., chapter 10., without doubt they hold the same proportionally concerning it: both on the part of God, because it seems consonant with his wisdom that those whom he created better in nature he placed in higher seats of glory, and consequently also anticipated with greater graces; and on the part of the angels themselves, because the more perfect they are in nature, the more vehemently and with greater effort do they operate through grace and dispose themselves to it. But this assertion is not without difficulty, that it may appear,

You will say 1. If God had conferred grace upon the angels according to the perfection of nature, it would follow that Lucifer in the first instant of creation was more holy than the other angels; but this seems absurd: therefore, etc. The inference of the major is evident, for Lucifer was the most perfect of all the angels in natural things. The minor also stands, for it is hardly credible that God preferred that angel in holiness to the others whom he knew would not be placed in glory with them. It is confirmed: the inferior cannot be the measure of the superior: but nature is inferior to grace: therefore it cannot be the measure of its conferral.

I deny the minor. for it is not inconvenient that, if Lucifer was more perfect than all the angels in nature, he also stood holier than they and had more abundant grace than the other inferior angels, since God does not confer grace according to the foreknowledge of the future event, but according to the present disposition: nor does greater grace always infer greater conformity to it, as is found by the example of Judas, for he received more graces than most saints; yet he perished, while these are saved unto eternity.

To the confirmation. I distinguish the major: the inferior cannot be the principal or formal rule of the superior, I concede; occasional or instrumental, I deny. To the minor I say that the angelic nature is the measure of grace and of its distribution among the angels, not indeed as the principal and formal rule: for the primary rule of the distribution of grace, both among the angels and among men, is the divine will itself dividing to each as it wills, as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 12. Nevertheless the angelic nature itself can be an occasional rule, insofar namely as God, about to distribute grace to the angels out of pure liberality, wisely willed to distribute it according to the proportion of natural perfections, so that those who were more excellent in the natural order might excel also in the supernatural.

You will say 2. God does not observe that proportion in distributing graces according to the dignity and excellence of nature with respect to men: therefore neither ought he to observe it with respect to the angels. The antecedent is evident: for we see many men more outstanding than others in intellect and the other faculties of the soul whom God nevertheless neither gifts with more abundant grace nor elects or calls to discharge divine offices; nay rather, says the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 1.: Not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, but God has chosen the foolish things of the world, etc. The consequence also stands by parity of reason, since no reason appears why God ought to behave otherwise toward the angels in distributing graces than toward men, especially since that benefit is utterly undebted to both natures.

I deny the consequence. for although no reason appears to us why God should so behave toward the angels rather than toward men, the matter itself ought not on that account be less certain to us, especially since the reason of all God's counsels does not shine forth to us. Just as it is no less certain that God did not apprehend the angels but the seed of Abraham to be hypostatically united with himself, although no other reason for that preference was supplied than the divine will itself, which adopted the nature it willed at its pleasure: so also it pleased him to elect men to various degrees of grace according to his own will; but it pleased him to distribute grace to the angels keeping proportion to their innate excellence, namely on account of the reasons of congruity premised in the Conclusion; and above all this stands because of the authority of the holy Fathers asserting the same. Therefore it is not lawful to argue from men to angels, or conversely: and perhaps God willed to grant grace to men and angels in this twofold diverse mode, that he might show himself the liberal donor of grace, since he distributes it to whomsoever he wills and in whatever manner.

You will say 3. If the innate excellences of the angels were the reasons why more ample grace was infused into them, it would follow that, with equal grace, one angel would merit more than another: but the consequent is false: therefore the antecedent. The inference of the major is proved; for this reason one angel obtained more ample grace, namely because he had a more excellent nature and more vigorous faculties, and therefore disposed himself more nobly and efficaciously to receive that grace: therefore by parity, if one angel with equal grace applies greater effort in fulfilling the divine mandate prescribed to him than another, he will also have more excellent merit: not on account of grace, which is supposed equal: therefore on account of the greater effort, and hence that exuberance of merit must be refunded to the purely natural powers.

— The Theologians commonly deny the inference of the major; for, they say, the reason of more ample merit must be drawn from the side of grace, and consequently, with equal grace, if two powers were performing some work, one of which acted more vigorously than the other, it would not on that account have more abundant, but altogether equal merit with the other.

— But since the Scotists reject this answer, contending that even with equal light of glory God is seen more clearly by a keener and more vigorous intellect, therefore I deny the minor, and to its proof I say that that amplitude of merit greater in one than in another is not to be refunded to the powers of nature alone, but to the faculty elevated by grace, just as we similarly said in treating of the principle of the inequality of the light of glory.

Quaestio III: An, et quomodo Angeli gratiam sanctificantem, et suam beatitudinem ex propria operatione, et merito fuerint assecuti

Articulus II: De officiis sanctorum Angelorum erga homines, et obsequiis hominum erga Angelos

Quaestio I: An omnes omnino Angeli ad hominum obsequia interdum deputentur

Quaestio II: An, et qualiter Angeli sancti ad hominum custodiam deputentur

Quaestio III: Quaenam beneficia per suam custodiam nobis impendant Angeli, quaeve ob eam eis rependat Deus, nosque eis rependere debeamus

Articulus III: De Angelorum peccatis, et poenis

Quaestio I: An, et qualiter Angeli peccare potuerint

Quaestio II: Quodnam, et quale fuerit primarium, et capitale diaboli peccatum

Quaestio III: An voluntas daemonum ita sit in malo obfirmata, ut nec possit aliquatenus resipiscere, nec bonum aliquod operari

Quaestio IV: An, et quali poena daemones crucientur

Appendix I: Appendix. De infestatione, et cruenta daemonum in humanum genus saevitia

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