Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

The supreme providence of God, the Maker of all things, fashioned and distinguished three things above all in every creature whatsoever, namely, Nature, End, and Inclination: the Nature by which they subsist; the End toward which they tend, so that in its attainment they may rest; and finally the Inclination through which they incline toward the end, and are, as it were, borne along by a native weight. That these three belong to things, however, is shown not only by the natural, but also by the praeternatural order. A stone, for example, has a corporeal nature compacted out of the elements, chiefly earth and water; for its end, the center of the earth, in which it rests peacefully as in a mother's bosom; and a weight of gravity innate to it, by which, as by an inclination or propensity, it is borne to the earth with as swift a motion as it can. The same things may be discerned in the supernatural order: for the divine and blessed vision and fruition of God is the end toward which we tend; sanctifying grace, by constituting us adopted sons of God, establishes us in a certain praeternatural entity and state; charity, moreover, and the other theological virtues are the very propensions, and, as it were, heavenly wings, by which we tend toward God as toward the center of our perpetual rest. Since these three things are found alike in the angels, each of them must therefore be discussed in this Article in the following Questions: of which the First will set forth in what beatitude the angels were created; the Second, what grace, and in what manner, they obtained for attaining it; the Third, with what merits and virtues they were adorned, so that they could obtain that beatitude.

Note 1. A twofold beatitude can be distinguished in the angels: one Natural, which is the ultimate perfection that the angelic nature can attain for itself by its innate powers through its most excellent operations, namely the cognition and love of God as the Author of nature; the other Supernatural, which is the ultimate perfection of the angelic nature, exceeding all its natural capacity, and which it can attain only by the benefit of divine aid elevating it supernaturally. This latter, moreover, is again twofold: one of the way, the other of the homeland; the former inchoate, the latter consummated; the former which comes about through the knowledge of faith, by which we know God obscurely and in an enigma, and through the infused habit of charity we love him; the latter which consists in the clear vision of God and his perfect fruition, which the blessed souls in heaven enjoy.

Note 2. For the perfect and consummated supernatural beatitude three things are especially required. The first is the clear vision of God, most excellent love, and perfect fruition; for beatitude consists in the attainment and enjoyment of the highest good, which takes place through knowledge and love. The second is the inability to sin; since sin is the greatest misery, it cannot coexist with true and perfect beatitude. Add that it is impossible to behold God intuitively and to love him supremely and not prefer him to all other things that could allure the will and turn it away from God. For that supreme majesty of God is of such excellence that, clearly seen, it seizes the created will into its own most excellent love, and that with every effort and with such necessity that from love of him the will can neither be diverted nor recalled, and consequently one so affected cannot sin. The third is the perpetuity and immutability of the beatific state; otherwise there will be either fear and sadness, if the blessed understand that they will fall from such a state; or error, if they believe they will remain forever; or anxiety and disquiet, if they are in doubt and do not know what the lot of that state will be. All these things, as is evident, are repugnant to true and perfect beatitude, and therefore that state must be perpetual.

Note 3. In resolving this Question, there are chiefly two opposing opinions of Authors. For some hold that the angels were gifted from the very beginning of their creation with the perfect vision of the divine essence, not abiding but transitory, so that at least for some instants of time all the angels, both good and reprobate, enjoyed the delightful fruition of God, which takes place through knowledge and love; and they strive to establish this by very many statements of St. Augustine, to be brought forward in the objections. But the second opinion, entirely opposed to this, is held by nearly all Theologians, who assert that no angels were de facto created in the state of supernatural beatitude, although some, with the Subtle Doctor, judge that they could have been so created.

Three things therefore are chiefly to be resolved here: First, that all the angels were created in natural beatitude. Second, that none of them was gifted with supernatural beatitude in the first instant of their formation. Third, that nevertheless they could have obtained that supernatural beatitude from the very beginning of their creation, had God so willed.

First conclusion. — All the angels were created in the state of natural beatitude. So hold all the Scholastic Doctors with the Subtle Doctor in dist. 3. q. 9. n. 8., where he proves that there was granted to the angels the species representative of the divine essence, by which they knew God distinctly.

Indeed, he says, it is possible to have distinct cognition even though abstractive; for abstractive cognition is divided into confused and distinct, according to one or another manner of knowing: and it does not seem unfitting to posit that such a species representing the divine essence was given to the angelic intellect from the beginning: so that although it is not natural to the intellect in such a way that this intellect could acquire it from its natural powers, nor yet that it could have it from the action of any object acting naturally, because it cannot have it from the presence of any finite object moving it, except the divine essence alone, which causes nothing else of itself by natural causation naturally; nevertheless, just as the perfections given to the angel in his first creation, although they do not necessarily follow his nature, would be called natural, distinguishing them against those merely supernatural, namely of grace and glory: so that perfection given to the angelic intellect, by which the divine essence would be present to him distinctly though abstractively, can be called natural, and belong to the natu> ral cognition of the angel, so that whatever the angel knows of God by the power of this species, he knows in some way naturally, and in some way not naturally, inasmuch as it is not the principle of an act either of grace or of glory; not naturally, however, inasmuch as he could not attain it from natural powers, nor by any natural action.

By these words the Doctor openly teaches that there was given to the angel a species representing God abstractively, not only confusedly but also distinctly, and which was at once natural and supernatural: natural, I say, insofar as everything that is not of the order of grace or glory is called natural; but supernatural, because it would be infused by God alone, nor could the angelic intellect acquire it. — But that it is probable that that species was granted to the angels from the beginning of their creation he proves first because a distinct knowledge of God of some sort seems to have been granted to man before the Fall, which he could not have had without such a species: therefore, since the cognition and natural beatitude of the angels is more excellent than man's, that species seems much more to have been granted to the angels. He proves secondly from the fact that St. Augustine grants that there was in the angels the cognition of creatures in the Word, or morning knowledge, before evening knowledge was granted them, which is the cognition of things in their proper genus; for he says in book 4. Super Genesim cap. 30:

Then night pertains to day, not day to night: when the lofty and holy angels refer to the honor and love of the Creator what they knew of creature in the Creator himself, in whom they contemplate the eternal reasons by which it was created, which by their most harmonious contemplation are one day, which the Lord made: to which the Church, delivered from this pilgrimage, is joined, that we too may exult and rejoice in him;

from which words the Doctor infers that this cognition in the Word naturally preceded the cognition of creatures in their proper genus. But, he says, then the angels were in the state of innocence, and not blessed, because there was some little delay of time between their creation and their fall: there was therefore some morning cognition of the angels, namely of creatures existing in the Word, in natural matters, or at least of angels not yet blessed. But this distinct cognition could not be had without an impressed species: therefore it is likely that that species was granted to the angels, by which they might know God distinctly.

It is further proved. The angels, both good and bad, received from the beginning of their creation whatever pertains to the integrity of their own nature, and also to their natural perfection: therefore they were created in natural felicity. The antecedent is evident, since, as the works of God are perfect, and he has brought to completion all things that he made from himself with all their numbers, he does not seem to have denied anything to the angelic nature, most excellent of all, that would conduce to its perfect and natural beatitude. — Moreover, the angels had from the beginning cognition and perfect love of God as the Author of nature: since they were gifted with the perfect power of understanding and loving, they were able to know and love the object intelligible and lovable above all, which is God: but beatitude consists in that twofold operation of intellect and will; for that is the ultimate perfection which the angelic nature can attain by its innate powers: therefore the angels were created by God in natural beatitude.

You will say. If the angels had been created in natural beatitude, they would certainly have remained in it, for inamissibility belongs to the nature of beatitude: but the apostate angels do not have natural beatitude, for they are affected with the greatest sadness and punishment: therefore they were not created in natural beatitude. It is confirmed. Natural beatitude consists especially in the love of God as the Author of nature: but that love does not abide in the demons, for they pursue God with the utmost hatred: therefore they were not blessed.

I answer. by denying the major: for although natural beatitude is inamissible with respect to an angel constituted in pure naturals; nevertheless an angel raised to the supernatural order can lose it per accidens and indirectly, by sinning directly against the supernatural precepts. Nor does it matter that St. Dionysius said that natural things remained intact in the demons: for he must be understood of natural things considered in their physical being, such as substance, powers, intelligible species, and the like; but not of natural things that have something of morality mixed in, of which kind are practical cognition and the rectitude of the will toward the ultimate end; for these, at least in some respect, were destroyed in the angels by sin. In a similar way the answer must be given to the confirmation: for although the demons did not persevere in that love of God as the Author of nature, they are no less to be said to have had it from the beginning of their formation, while they were still wayfarers.

Second conclusion. — The angels were not de facto created in supernatural beatitude. This is the Doctor's teaching in dist. 5. qu. 2. n. 3., where, inquiring whether the good angels were de facto blessed in the first instant, and the damned ones condemned, or miserable, he answers first concerning the wicked, that they were not blessed in the first instant, and proves it: Because then, he says, they would not have been certain about their beatitude; for thus afterwards they would not have fallen: but if they were not certain about beatitude, they were not blessed. Similarly, as St. Augustine says in book 4. super Genesim, God did not distinguish the good from the wicked before they were separated from one another: therefore those who are now wicked were not blessed in the first instant, because they were created uniform, both good and wicked; in the same way, he adds, it is evident concerning the good. St. Thomas and all his disciples concur.

The Conclusion is therefore proved. first indeed concerning the wicked angels: If the demons had been so blessed, and had seen God clearly in the first instant of their creation, or somewhat after their formation, then either they would have been deprived of this vision on account of supervening sin, or from the mere good pleasure of God, who offered himself to be seen clearly by them for a little while, and afterward hid himself by his own will: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first: because, as we said in the second note, the clear vision of God excludes all sin: nor yet the second, for the gifts of God are without repentance, says the Apostle, Rom. 11.; and therefore he does not withdraw his benefits from creatures unless moved to do so by their ingratitude. Moreover, even if that clear vision of God had been granted to the angels in the first instant of their creation, the demons would not on that account have been called blessed because of the lack of impeccability and permanence in that happy state: for security and innocence, at least consequently, are required for the state of beatitude. — The same is evident concerning the good angels, that namely they did not see God in the first instant of their creation: both because the reason is the same concerning the good as concerning the wicked, nor was there any distinction between them in creation itself; but only while they were on the way, since, as the Doctor praised above says in n. 14., all the angels were uniform in their creation, but the good were distinguished from the wicked on the way: whence he concludes that on the way there were three delays: the first, in which they were uniform in grace, (if we wish to say that the wicked had grace) or at least uniform in nature; the second delay, in which, still existing on the way, they were unlike, namely so that these merited ultimately, and those demerited ultimately. The third delay was the final necessary distinction of one from the other.

But the Conclusion is proved. at once concerning the good and the wicked: If the angels had seen God clearly in the first instant of their creation, then neither would any have freely stood firm after the wicked fell; nor would they have had the faculty of meriting or demeriting: but this is absurd: therefore also that from which it follows. The major is evident; for the clear vision of God renders the seer impeccable, at least extrinsically, and it is of such efficacy on account of the supreme goodness and beauty of the object that it necessarily attracts the seer to the knowledge and love of itself, and therefore if the angels had seen God clearly from the first instant of their creation, they would not thereafter have been free to merit or demerit. — The minor is therefore proved. from the Holy Fathers affirming that all the angels had the liberty of cleaving to God, or of turning themselves away from him, and that the holy ones freely stood firm in the love of God, while the wicked fell away from him. Thus teaches above all St. Augustine, book De Correptione, et gratia cap. 10., saying: God so ordered the life of angels and men that in it he might first show what free will could do, then what the benefit of God could do. By which words St. Augustine makes all the angels equal, not only among themselves, but also with the first man; and consequently, as man and the angels who fell were created without the vision of God, so it must be said of the other holy angels. Whence he subjoins concerning those holy angels: By free will (helped surely by grace) they stood in truth, and they merited to know it most certainly, that their fall would never come. — St. Damascene subscribes, book 2. cap. 3., and also St. Gregor. homil. 7. in Ezechiel., where he says:

when the angelic nature was created, it received the free choice whether it wished to persist in humility and remain in the sight of almighty God; or whether it would slide into pride and fall from beatitude: but because, while others fell, the holy angels persevered in their beatitude, they received this as a gift, that now they could not fall at all.

Nor does it matter that he inserts the word persevered in beatitude; for he does not wish the holy angels previously to have had consummated beatitude, but only inchoate, or not in fact, but in hope. Or because, persevering in the beatitude and natural love of God, they obtained the supernatural, whereas the demons had lost both. — Now this truth St. Prosper explains best of all, book 1. De Vita Contemplativa cap. 3.

It was, he says, by the will of the holy angels that, while the wicked fell of their own accord, they themselves remained in their dignity: and by divine and just judgment it was brought about that the will they had of remaining with their God became a voluntary permanence and a happy necessity. And therefore, because they never sinned nor can now sin, having been made once partakers of that contemplative life, they behold inexpressibly the Author of their beatitude: and made happy for eternity by the merit of their stability, they are secure about their remaining.

You will say 1. The holy Fathers constantly affirm that all the angels were beatified from the beginning: therefore this must truly be so judged. The antecedent is proved from St. Augustine in many places, especially book 4. De Genesi ad litteram cap. 24. where he asserts that all the angels were created with morning knowledge: but this is beatific:

• ergo they did not have this fullness of beatitude; but because they did not know their future misery, they enjoyed a lesser yet still a beatitude without any defect; for if they had known their future fall and eternal punishment, they certainly could not have been blest, whom the fear of so great an evil would already then have compelled to be miserable.

And immediately he adds:

So also He made man with free will; and although ignorant of his future fall, yet on that account blest, because he felt that not to die and not to become miserable was within his own power. In which upright state and without defect, if he had willed to remain in it by free will, without doubt he would have received, without any experience of death and unhappiness, on the merit of that permanence, the fullness of the beatitude of perseverance, by which the holy angels are blest... But because he did not will to remain, certainly his is the fault, whose would have been the merit if he had willed to remain, as the holy angels did, who while others fell through free will, stood themselves through the same free will, and merited to receive the due reward of that permanence, namely so great a fullness of beatitude that it is most certain to them that they shall always remain in it.

Where you see him attributing to the angels at their creation no other beatitude than that granted to man at the beginning of his formation, namely the state of sanctifying grace with liberty to persevere in it, and that without any commotion and disturbance, but with the highest internal and external concord and tranquillity of the movements of soul and body. Lest anyone should think, however, that St. Augustine placed the faculty of persevering in that happy state solely in the use of free will, he straightway adds:

But if this aid had been wanting to the angel, or to man as soon as they were made — since such a nature was not made that it could remain, if it willed, without divine aid — they would assuredly not have fallen by their own fault, since the aid was wanting without which they could not remain.

• In the same place he says they were blest with that beatitude which we hope for: but this is supernatural: which indeed he confirms in lib. 12. Confess. cap. 9. where, expounding those words, In principio Deus creavit caelum, he interprets it of the intellectual heaven, that is, the angelic nature, which he says was made a partaker of eternity, and cleaving to God from the moment it was made, and raised above all mutability and the shifting vicissitude of times by the sweetness of its most happy contemplation. — Moreover he plainly teaches in lib. De Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus cap. 9. that the holy angels persevere in that beatitude in which they were created. — Thirdly, finally lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 9. he says the good angels were never pilgrims from the Lord. A great part is theirs, he says, and the more blessed in that they never went on pilgrimage. But to be a pilgrim from the Lord is the same as to walk by faith, according to that saying of St. Paul 2. Ad Corinth. 2. While we are in the body we are pilgrims from the Lord. To this subscribes St. Bernard serm. 13. and 17. super Cantica, where he says the devil before his fall saw the Word, and things in the Word; for he asserts in sermon 17: But it could have happened, if it be not thought incredible, that one full of wisdom and perfect in beauty could have foreknown men even as future, and as about to enter into an equal glory: but if he foreknew, doubtless he saw it in the Word of God, and envied them with his spite. — I deny the antecedent. and to the first authority I answer that St. Augustine sometimes understands by morning knowledge the beatific vision, sometimes the supernatural knowledge and of faith, which compared with natural knowledge can be called morning knowledge, though obscure. Or I say that he sometimes uses morning knowledge for that abstractive knowledge of God which the angels had through the species divinely impressed upon them, and that immediately from the beginning of their creation, as we taught above with the Doctor dist. 3. q. 9. n. 9. There he says the angel had from the beginning an intelligible species distinctly representing the divine essence through abstractive knowledge of God himself, which knowledge was morning knowledge,

because according to St. Augustine 4. super Genes. c. 23. those six days were not in the succession of time, but in the angelic knowledge of creatures having a natural order: so that the angel naturally first knew the creature in the Word, secondly in its proper genus, and not standing there returned to the Word praising Him for His work: and in that same Word again he naturally saw the reason of the following creature. So that when God said let there be light, the angel saw himself in the eternal Word: when light was made, and when evening was made, he saw himself in his proper genus: and when evening was made and morning, day one, he rose from himself into the praise of God, in whom he saw the second creature: so that that vision was the terminus of the preceding day, inasmuch as from the knowledge of the first creature in the Word he rose to the knowledge of the Word, nay rather the rest of all creatures in the first Artificer and Workman. Thus does St. Augustine distinguish each day up to the seventh day, whose morning was the last creature in the Word, and which was not followed by evening, and which was the beginning of the following day inasmuch as he saw that creature in its proper genus. — Nor does it matter, says the Doctor there, that St. Aug. c. 22. of the same book called that knowledge of things in the Word beatific; for it can be proved from his words that this knowledge, which is very commonly called morning knowledge, is natural, and not precisely beatific: because according to St. Augustine, this order existed in the angelic knowledge of creature after creature, that the angelic knowledge of creatures in the Word naturally preceded their knowledge in the proper genus: but when the creatures were made in the proper genus, the angel could at once have knowledge of them in the proper genus: therefore all these knowledges in the Word naturally preceded the knowledge of the creatures in the proper genus: therefore all of them, according to him, were produced simultaneously: therefore that knowledge in the Word naturally preceded their production in the proper genus. But then the angels were in the state of innocence, and not blest, because some little interval occurred between their creation and their fall: therefore there was some morning knowledge of the angels, namely of creatures existing in the Word in natural things, or at least not beatific: and thus it seems that one must posit a distinct knowledge of the standing angel in natural knowledge, or in grace, because otherwise, with only the cause precisely known, he could not know creatures and their ordered effects before knowing them in the proper genus. For the reason of knowing a thing confusedly is not the reason of knowing it distinctly, and its ordered effects.

This is the Doctor's teaching. — To the testimonies of the same St. Augustine adduced in the second place, I answer that he is not speaking of that most perfect and consummated beatitude which the angels now enjoy, but only of the general and inchoate beatitude which consists in the knowledge and love of charity of God, especially when joined with innocence, and the power and facility of being without every evil if one wills: after which manner St. Augustine explains himself lib. De Correptione et gratia c. 10. where, after saying that the saints are secure concerning their state, he speaks thus:

But the devil and his angels, although they were blest before they fell, although they knew not that they would fall into misery; there was nevertheless still something to be added to their beatitude, if they had stood in the truth by free will, until they received that fullness of supreme beatitude as the reward of that permanence: that is, that by the great abundance of the charity of God through the Holy Spirit they could in no wise fall any further, and would know this of themselves most certainly.

— To the third head of authority, however, I say that St. Augustine must be understood, not of the pilgrimage of the way simply, which takes place through faith, but of the pilgrimage of sin, of which St. Peter speaks Epistola 1. c. 4. Be not pilgrims in fervor, which is unto temptation for you. Or I say that he wishes the angels not to have been pilgrims, either because in a most brief time after their creation they obtained their beatitude: and thus for a brief time they walked by faith, but a little is reckoned as nothing: or because they were always in the empyrean heaven, from which we are removed afar: or because through sin they never departed from God: or finally because they had no misery as men have. — To St. Bernard, however, I answer that he spoke not assertively but doubtingly, for he says if it be not thought incredible, which words denote that in this matter he remained in doubt.

You will say 2. Sacred Scripture clearly signifies that at least the supreme angel was endowed with heavenly beatitude; for Ezechiel 28. addresses the first angel, the transgressor, in the person of the King of Tyre thus: Thou the seal of likeness, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty, thou wast in the delights of paradise: but the delights of paradise are beatific love, and joy in the divine vision: therefore the first angel while yet a wayfarer possessed heavenly beatitude. — I deny the major. for by the delights of paradise, which Lucifer is said at one time to have enjoyed, is not understood the clear and intuitive vision of the divine essence itself, but love of God through charity, and knowledge through faith, as well as all the charismatic graces with which Lucifer had been illumined together with the other angels at the beginning of his creation, and which he lost through sin: or certain lower delights are understood, namely the dwelling in the empyrean heaven, which is a most pleasant place, and a paradise full of delights, in which Lucifer was placed with the other angels, and from which he was cast down through sin.

You will say 3. If all the angels were not endowed with heavenly beatitude from the beginning of their creation, chiefly because they ought first to have been free in order to be able to merit it: but this reason does not stand in the way, seeing that Christ the Lord, although blest in the first instant of His conception according to His soul, was none the less able to merit, therefore the state of beatitude does not impede merit. — I distinguish the minor. merit can coexist with the state of beatitude when it has no danger of sinning annexed to it, I concede: when it has, I deny: but Christ did not merit with the danger of sinning and the liberty unto sin, which supremely repugns the beatific vision, and which was not in Him from the beginning of the creation of His soul: but Christ merited only, either with the liberty unto the multiplication of acts, none of which determinately was necessary for fulfilling the command prescribed to Him, which nevertheless He fulfilled by each single act: or with the liberty of obtaining from the Father a dispensation from the command if He had willed; or finally with the liberty as to various circumstances and diverse motives, which were not commanded together with the acts prescribed to Him. Add that the angels are not to be compared in this respect with Christ the Lord, but rather with men: so that just as men were first wayfarers before comprehensors, and ordained adults first, so that through their own free cooperation they might be able to merit beatitude, namely the clear vision of God through acts of faith, comprehension through acts of hope, and through the charity of the way tend toward the charity of the homeland: so also were the angels ordered; and therefore beatitude does not seem to have been granted them from the beginning: for the fitting order required that they should at least for some instant previously be under grace, and in capacity of meriting, before having merited and received the reward.

Third conclusion. — The angels could have been created in the state of beatitude, if God had so ordered. This is the doctrine of the Doctor, dist. 5. q. n. 5., where he says:

I say, that the Good could have been blest in the first instant. The reason of this is that beatitude cannot be present in any creature capable of beatitude except from God: therefore for whatever instant beatitude is possible to be given by God, and to be present in a creature capable of it, for that instant it is simply possible: but for whatever instant God could give it, as well in the first as in the second or third instant: and the good angel was capable for whatever instant, because by nature he is the image of God, by which he is capable of God, and he had that nature full and perfect in natural things; wherefore, etc.

By which words the Doctor openly affirms that the angels could truly have been blest in the first instant of their formation; and that, either without their cooperation, as was the most holy soul of Christ the Lord, which independently of its cooperation and of any act of free will, but from the sole good pleasure of God, as soon as it was formed obtained beatitude and the clear and intuitive vision of God; or so that they received that beatitude offered to them by God with the free acceptance of their will, only the order of nature being observed between that act and beatitude; after the manner observed between contrition and grace, infused by virtue of the latter as of a last disposition: whether, however, they could also merit it in the first instant, will be said below. Nor, as regards what has been said, does any difficulty seem to require discussion. — The Doctor subjoins that the angels could also have been miserable in the first instant of their creation with the misery of punishment, which does not presuppose guilt; Because, he says, no contradiction appears in that in the first instant some punishment had been infused into the angelic nature; and forthwith it could also have been given immediately by God for that first instant just as beatitude: no contradiction, I say, or repugnance, can be assigned in this respect; for if there were any, it would be chiefly either physical or moral. But not physical, because every physical opposition which would exist in the first instant between the angel and punishment ought equally to exist in the subsequent instants: but no such opposition existed in the subsequent instants, inasmuch as many angels were condemned to eternal punishments. Not moral either, because if there were any, it would be chiefly because it would displease God to punish so gravely without guilt, namely with the punishment which the damned in fact suffer, since this seems supremely to repugn the divine goodness; but from this head it would not repugn, because since God is the Lord of the life and death of the creature, He can at His pleasure change its state. This the Doctor confirms by the authority of St. Augustine 3. De lib. arb. who says: If God had from the beginning made man in punishment, God would not on this account be to be blamed nor unjust: therefore neither would it displease Him to ordain the same of an angel. Wherefore no repugnance appears why God could not condemn some creature to punishments without guilt, as we shall more fully demonstrate when treating of the state of pure nature, in which God could create man and condemn him to punishments, where likewise will be solved whatever may be objected against this truth.

Note 1. By the name of grace we are here to understand not only that divine gift or benefit which is not owed by the force of creation alone or of the nature of a thing, but that quality of the supernatural order by which the rational creature is rectified, completed, and elevated so that it can produce some supernatural act pleasing to God, or be established in a supernatural state. For indeed, as the Seraphic Doctor says in 2. dist. 4. q. 2. ad tertium:

The name of grace is used in three ways: for in one way grace is spoken of commonly, insofar as it comprehends whatever is superadded to natural things; natural things, I say, which belong to the essential constitution of a thing; thus one is said to have by grace a good intellect, to read well, to sing well, and other things of this kind. In another way it is called what is superadded to free will, effecting and disposing rectitude; thus natural virtues, such as innocence, humility, and piety can be called grace. In the third way, what is superadded as rectifying, completing, and elevating, and this is called sanctifying grace, because it makes man acceptable to God, because it makes him conformable to Him.

But it is of grace in this latter acceptation that we are speaking at present.

Note 2. Grace seems necessary for the angels in many ways, but especially in four ways: First indeed they had need of the grace of predestination, since supernatural beatitude is naturally unde both to angels and to men, it was a benefit of grace, and a gift not owed to nature, that God out of His good pleasure ordered the angels to a supernatural end; nor did He abandon them in the state of pure nature. Hence the Council of Vienne, in the Clementine Ad nostrum, De haereticis, rightly defined that intellectual nature (that is, angels as well as men) is not naturally blessed: and in the censure of Pius V. and Gregory XIII.¹ against Michael Baius, it is established that man even in his state of integrity, and the angels, ought to have been elevated through supernatural gifts, that they might merit eternal life. — Second, they had need of preventing and concomitant grace, since God predestined the angels to attain beatitude through fitting means, that is, through their own free and moral acts: but fitting means must be proportioned to the end: wherefore since beatitude is of the supernatural order, in order that the angels might dispose themselves toward it, there was need for them of preventing grace, or the special help of illumination and pious motion, by which God precedes the intellect and will for the exercise of such free acts of actual conversion to God: and also concomitant grace, physically cooperating in the very exercise of the free act of supernatural consent to the vocation, as St. Augustine teaches lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 9. affirming that exciting and cooperating grace was necessary to the holy angels that they might adhere to God with chaste love. — Third, in order that they might be holy and just, they had need of sanctifying, or habitual grace, which implies the special indwelling of the Holy Spirit: for Sanctification, says St. Basil lib. De Spiritu sancto cap. 16., is not without the Spirit: nor are the virtues of the heavens holy of their own nature; and St. Augustine, praised above, teaches that what Paul says ad Romanos 5., The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us, is to be understood of angels equally with men. — Fourthly finally, in order that the good angels, while the evil ones were falling, might stand fast in grace, and resist those soliciting them to rebellion, they had need of the grace of perseverance, as St. Fulgentius teaches book De Fide cap. 3.; and in lib. 2. ad Thrasimundum cap. 3. he says that the same grace operates in man that he may rise again, which operated in the angel lest he fall, which Bede also teaches on Psalm 32., expounding the words: By the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, etc., where he says that the heavenly armies, the Cherubim and Seraphim, when the Devil transgressed, persevered, not from themselves, but from the Lord the Father and His Word they had it: and not a part of their strength, but all their strength is of the spirit of His mouth. Here, however, the discussion concerns only habitual and sanctifying grace, namely whether the angels had it in the first instant of creation.

Note 3. Concerning the resolution of the present difficulty there are chiefly two Sentences of the authors.

For there were some, says the Seraphic Doctor in the place praised above, saying that all the angels were created in gratuitous sanctifying gifts, and the reason that moved them was this: on the part of God indeed perfect liberality, and on the part of the creature fitness: for since from the instant of creation they were clean vessels and receptacles, and God is prompt to impart His grace unless He meet an obstacle on the part of the receiver, God did not leave those vessels empty for a moment; but as soon as He created them He illumined them with grace, and such receptacles ought to go forth from the hand of God as would be immediately prompt unto good use. Whence as some probably conjecture that God made trees full of fruits, and other things in the noblest and most perfect state: so also He adorned the nature of the angel with grace from its creation, which grace was to be perpetuated in the first good use without victory, and to be lost forever upon the first disorder.

This is one position, and it seems sufficiently consonant with the authorities of the Holy Fathers. This sentence, however, St. Thomas teaches quaest. 2. art. 3.

— There were also others, who said that the angels did not have sanctifying grace from the instant of creation, but afterwards: and the reason that moved them is the disposition of the angelic nature, which is borne toward what it desires without retardation. Wherefore just as by their conversion to evil they were converted so profoundly that they could not return; so, indeed much more, by their conversion to good, or by their hability, had they had grace, they would have adhered to the good so totally that they would never have fallen. Whence it does not seem probable in any way that Lucifer had grace, and if he himself did not have it, though he was exalted among the others, it is argued a fortiori that the others did not have it from their origin. The Master seems to accept this position, and the Doctors commonly hold it, and thus they agree with this one as more probable and more common.

So the Seraphic Doctor; so also teach Hugh of St. Victor lib. 1. De Sacramentis par. 5. c. 29., Henry of Ghent 1. quaest. 10. — From these it is clear that he in this matter is entirely being probabilist, nor does he openly teach either sentence. Such also was the Subtle Doctor, who judges both sentences probable, dist. 5. q. 1., where he asserts only that all the angels were at some time in grace: but whether they were created in sanctifying grace, or in pure naturals, so that sanctifying grace was afterwards bestowed upon them, he does not determine: but he says num. 7. only, that to posit the angels as created in pure naturals, one must then posit four delays, so that all in the first delay were in pure naturals; in the second all were in grace, and the good merited, and the evil demerited: in the third the good persevered in good, and the evil in evil; in the fourth both these and those were in their term; and this last way of four delays saves more states in them, and more affirmative authorities. But if this plurality of delays does not please, because it has no evident necessity, it is probable to posit at least three delays, in the first of which, he says num. 6., all were created in grace, and were uniform; in the second they were non-uniform, namely the good merited, and the evil demerited; in the third all were in their term, namely the good in beatitude, and the evil in punishment. So the Doctor. These things premised, four things here above all are to be resolved: first, that all the angels, whether good or evil, at some time had sanctifying grace: second, that it is more probable that they were created in sanctifying grace: third, that those who were of superior nature received more abundant grace.

First conclusion. — It is certain that all the angels were at some time devoid of all guilt, and stood in the state of sanctifying grace. This is now common among the Theologians, and is proved first: if some of the angels at some time did not have sanctifying grace, especially Lucifer with his rebellious followers: but it is not so: therefore, etc. The major stands, for since the good angels were not created in the state of supernatural beatitude, as was proved above, but obtained it by their own merits, as will appear below, there is no doubt that they stood for some time in habitual and sanctifying grace, in which state they could merit that beatitude.

Proof of the minor. From Sacred Scripture: First indeed from Isaiah 14.: How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning? etc. where although literally the speech is about Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon, yet in the mystical sense the Fathers understand Lucifer, the prince of the rebellious angels, not only Origen lib. periarchon cap. 2. and Tertullian lib. 5. adversus Marcionem cap. 17., but also Athanasius lib. De Passione Christi: Jerome on cap. 14. of Isaiah, Ambrose on Psalm 118., and likewise Augustine lib. 3. De Doctrina Christiana cap. 37. And although these words intimate the fall of Lucifer from heaven, in which heaven he was created together with the other angels, nevertheless so grave an interrogation and admiration seems to signify a fall not only from the material heaven, but from a certain eminent dignity and excellence, not indeed natural, which he did not lose, but supernatural, and of grace, by which through sin he was stripped.

Secondly the same minor is proved. From Ezekiel 28.: Thou sealest up the likeness of wisdom, and perfect in beauty, thou wast in the delights of the paradise of God; every precious stone was thy covering... thou walkedst in the midst of the stones of fire, perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation, until iniquity was found in thee. Which words although they were said literally of the King of Tyre, yet they are understood everywhere by the holy Fathers of the demon, the prince of the rebellious angels, Ambrose lib. De Paradiso cap. 2., Jerome on this passage of Ezekiel, Augustine lib. 11. De Genesi ad litteram cap. 20., Cyril lib. 3. in Ioannem cap. 29., and the more recent Interpreters, who commonly weigh first those words, thou sealest up the likeness of God, namely with singular excellence. Whence Gregory lib. 32. Moralia cap. 18.: What gift had he not, if he was the seal of the likeness of God? Secondly by those words, in the midst of the stones of fire, they understand the holy angels blazing and aflame with charity, as St. Augustine lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 15. And accordingly that Lucifer placed in their midst like a King attended by courtiers, when he walks among them, blazed with the same fire. Thirdly those words, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty, and perfect in thy ways, until iniquity was found in thee, probably signify a supernatural perfection and justice, from which the demon fell; for natural gifts are not usually so greatly exaggerated in Scripture.

Thirdly the same minor is proved. From Jude cap. 6.: The angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation, he hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains unto the judgment of the great day. For although some more recent Interpreters explain this text of the princes ruling in the land of promise, whom they say were reserved unto eternal judgment because they kept not the principality entrusted to them, the royal dignity granted by God; nevertheless the more common and truer interpretation is of the demons, who are known to have been deprived of principality, not indeed natural, nor of the sciences and similar natural gifts, according to which there is a natural subordination among the evil angels. Nor were they excluded from Heaven and deprived of the right of inhabitants of the celestial dwelling except on account of sin, and the loss of supernatural grace, to which glory is owed by hereditary right.

This same truth is proved from the holy Fathers, very many of whom affirm that the angels once had grace, which the demons lost through sin. So St. Cyprian lib. De zelo, et livore at the beginning, where he affirms that the demon was once acceptable and dear to God: and Basil Epistola 141., in which disputing about the Holy Spirit, he shows thus that he was not of the same nature and condition as the angels:

But neither wilt thou ever dare to say that his substance is mutable, if thou lookest to the nature of the contrary Virtue, which fell from Heaven like lightning, and dropped away from true life, for the reason that it had adventitious virtue, and following an evil life underwent mutation. Therefore when it had departed from unity, and cast away angelic dignity, it was named devil from its manners: after that former and blessed habit was extinguished, and the opposing force kindled against him.

The same St. Jerome teaches on Hosea 3.: And they love the grape-gleanings of grapes, where he adds: Which wines they have not, and have lost pristine grace, like the demons, who having fallen from their proper dignity, possessing things of ancient grace, are dry. But best of all St. Augustine, who although he seems doubtful in several places, elsewhere affirms it, as lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 9. about the middle, where he says that God created the angels, at once founding their nature in them and bestowing grace. Whence, he says:

Without a good will, that is, the love of God, the holy angels must never be believed to have been; but those who although created good yet became evil, became so by their own evil will, which a good nature did not cause, unless when it voluntarily fell away from good; and the cause of the evil is not the good, but the defect from the good: either they received a lesser grace of divine love than those who persevered in the same: or if both were created good equally, when these fell by evil will, those, further helped, arrived at that fullness of beatitude whence they were made most certain that they would never fall.

Also favorable is the First Council of Braga Canon 7., whose words are these: If anyone says that the devil was not previously a good angel made by God, let him be anathema.

You will say. He who nowhere had charity must be said not to have had grace. For everyone, says St. John epistola prima cap. 3., who loveth not, abideth in death: but the demons nowhere had charity. — It is proved first, from Pope John in the epistle to Isaac of Syracuse, where concerning the demon he says: He grieves enough, and blushes, that the charity which he could not have in heaven he cannot hold men constant of muddy nature in the earth: but men hold in earth the charity by which they are justified before God: therefore the demons could not have it in the heavens. — Then St. Gregory lib. 32. Moralia cap. 23., weighing that text of Ezekiel c. 28., Gold the work of thy beauty, and thy holes were prepared in the day thou wast created; by gold he understands the wisdom of the demon: by holes truly the capacity of charity, by which, he says, if he had wished to be filled, standing firm with the angels like stones set in the ornament of a King, he could have adhered. Whence he concludes: He had therefore holes, but through the vice of pride they were not filled with the gold of charity. Which sentiment Rupert certainly follows lib. 1. De operibus Trinitatis c. 28., where concerning the demon he says:

It is hard here to assert that he was not perfect, but harder to affirm that he ever had in himself the love of the Creator without which there is no perfection of the ways. For even if the aforesaid Prophet said: gold the work of thy beauty, and thy holes were prepared in the day thou wast created, still he neither said this, nor signifies it in any way, that he received in his holes the chain of gold; namely because since he is a rational creature, he certainly had wit, intellect, and memory, by which quasi-holes, the spirit of the love of God, which is the best gold, he proudly refused to receive when he ought to have received it.

From these it stands that the devil never had the love of the Creator, and consequently not grace either, which either is charity or is indivisibly joined to charity.

I deny the minor. and to its first proof I say with the canonical Gloss that those words of Pope John are to be understood of final perseverance in charity, which the devil could not have: not that he truly could not have received it, but because he was unwilling to retain it once received, and therefore he grieves most that men obtain it and keep it steadfastly. Or I say that the particle nequivit signifies the impotence of having after the fall, that is, of recovering charity, either on account of his obfirmation in the evil purpose, or on account of the defect of vocation to supernatural penance, without which it cannot be recovered. Whence also in certain exemplars, in place of the past-tense verb nequivit, the present nequit is read. Or finally I say that the demon grieves that he could not, not absolutely or antecedently, but consequently on account of the inconstancy and vice of his own will, have persevering charity, which he sees many men, constant although of muddy nature, and far frailer, firmly hold. — To St. Gregory I say that he must be understood of charity not simply, but increased through merits, as the word filled also indicates; or even of charity consummated through beatitude and glory, and then he speaks of the proximate capacity for that consummated charity, which capacity is not through nature alone, but through the charity of the wayfarer. That however it should be thus understood is clear from this, because otherwise he would contradict himself, for c. 18. of the same book, weighing these words of Ezekiel: Perfect thou walkedst in the midst of the stones of fire, he interprets those words of Lucifer, whom he testifies was founded in charity: Because, he says, among the choirs of angels, kindled with the fire of charity, he shone bright with the glory of his condition. Similarly Rupert could be expounded: or it must be said that he followed the contrary opinion, which is now disapproved by the Theologians.

You will say 2. Whoever sinned from the beginning of his formation, and did not repent, did not have sanctifying grace: but such is the case of the demon, as is proved first from John 3.: Whoever committeth sin is of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning. And cap. 8. Christ addressing the Jews opposing Himself said: You are of your father the devil, and the desires of your father you wish to do: he was a murderer from the beginning, and stood not in the truth; that is, he did not exist, for the word stand is more frequently used in Scripture for to be, or to exist; thus 2. ad Corinth. 3.: By the mouth of two or three every word shall stand, that is, shall be: therefore it follows that the devil nowhere had sanctifying grace.

I deny the minor. and to the first context I say that its sense is, either that the devil sinned from the beginning of the world taken morally, and not mathematically, that is, a little after his formation: or that thereafter he sinned pertinaciously and continuously, from the moment he once began to sin. To the latter text truly I say that indeed the devil, morally speaking, is guilty of homicide from the beginning of the world, inasmuch as he not only impelled Cain to the fratricide of Abel, but also through his envy death entered into the world on account of the sin committed through temptation of the first Parent; wherefore Christ rightly said to the Jews attempting to put Him to death that they were of their father the devil, because they imitated the cruelty of the devil. Therefore it is not thence gathered that the demons nowhere had sanctifying grace, nay rather the contrary is drawn from the latter words; since the devil is said not to have stood in the truth, for although the word sto sometimes signifies the same as existo in Scripture, it more frequently designates stability and permanence in something begun, or in some good begun, especially in this place. Which is certainly confirmed by Job 4.: Behold they that serve him are not stable, and in his angels he found pravity: for the demons are said not to have been stable, because they did not persevere in the grace which they received: which Christ surely signifies by saying that the devil stood not in the truth; here however truth signifies innocence and sanctity, just as also in 4. Regum cap. 20., where Ezechias said, Remember that I have walked before thee in truth.

Second conclusion. — It is more probable that all the angels received sanctifying grace in the first instant of their creation. This likewise is now the more common opinion among the Theologians, and is proved First from Ezekiel 28.: Perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation, until iniquity was found in thee. This truth St. August. expressly teaches lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 9. where, after he had said, as we related in the preceding Conclusion, that God created the angels, at once founding their nature in them and bestowing grace: concerning the good angels he subjoins: Whence without a good will, that is, the love of God, the holy angels must never be believed to have been. But concerning the evil ones:

Those who, though created good, became evil either received a lesser grace of divine love than those who persevered in the same; or if both were created equally good, when the latter fell by an evil will, the former were further helped and attained that fullness of beatitude from which they were made most certain they would never fall.

— Secondly Basil on Psalm 32.:

Nothing is holy without the presence of the Holy Spirit; for the Word, maker of all things, created the angels out of nothing so that they might be, but the Holy Spirit at the same time bestowed sanctification upon them: for they were not created in an infantile stature and then gradually exercised and perfected so as to be held worthy of the reception of the spirit; but in their very constitution, and as it were by a certain sprinkling of their substance, they had holiness infused together.

Which he likewise teaches afterwards of the evil angels. — Thirdly Gregory, book 27. Moralia, chapter 23. The Angelic virtues, which remained fixed in the love of God, received in this gift of retribution that they remain in the contemplation of the Creator without end of felicity, and in that wherein they were created they subsist with eternal stability. It is proved by reason: for the angels were not created in a lesser perfection than the first man: but all Theologians confess that our first Parent was created in original justice. First because this seems to be intimated by Trent, session 5., where it says: Adam lost through sin the justice and sanctity in which he had been constituted. — Secondly because it openly teaches Anacletus Pope, epistle 1., saying: Man is said to have been created to the image of God because in his creation he had grace and the other virtues. Thirdly because Scripture testifies to it not obscurely, while Ecclesiastes 7. says God made man upright, for uprightness in Scripture signifies grace and sanctity. — Finally, because the children who would have been born of Adam, had he persevered in the state of innocence, would have had grace as it were congenital: therefore Adam himself also, who was their head and exemplar, had it from the beginning of his condition. — Then, God is more prone to pity than to condemn: but he created the angels in such a state that they could immediately demerit, and consequently be condemned: therefore he ought also to have brought them forth in a state in which they could merit, and forthwith in the state of sanctifying grace, which is the principle of merit. — Finally, God from the beginning created all the angels for a supernatural end, and with the most fitting providence for attaining it: but fitting providence demands that to each thing there be granted the necessary means for reaching the end due to it: therefore since sanctifying grace is most necessary for meriting beatitude, it was congruous that God should grant it to all the angels immediately from the beginning. Congruous, I say, for I confess that for persuading this truth no demonstrative reason can be supplied, since the matter depends upon the free will of God...

You will object 1. That passage of chapter 4. of Job, for where we read that God found wickedness in the angels, the Hebrew has, he set not praise or light in his angels: but grace and justice are called light and splendor in the sacred letters, according to that of 1 Peter 2. He called them into his admirable light: and St Paul often calls the just children of light, saying: You were sometimes darkness, but now light in the Lord. — It is confirmed from this, that St Augustine, book 1. De Genesi ad litt., chapter 9. says: The angelic creature was first made formless and called heaven; then formed and called light: therefore the angel did not obtain sanctifying grace from the beginning.

I answer. that even if the aforesaid text of Job be interpreted concerning praise or light, it does not thereby prejudice the truth of the Conclusion, since it signified that the angels did not have praise or light consummated and perfect, such as the blessed angels have, wherefore by the same chapter 38. they are called the morning stars praising God. — But to Saint Augustine I say that indeed he appears more hesitant and doubtful in deciding this truth; nevertheless, since, as we said above, elsewhere he teaches the same truth steadfastly, he must be benignly interpreted, lest he appear self-contradictory. I say therefore that when he affirms the angels to have been first formless before formed, he understands either a priority of nature alone, not of time; or — which I judge more probable — he speaks of formlessness through the absence of the beatific vision and of the light of glory, which preceded beatitude in duration.

You will say 2. If all the angels had been created in sanctifying grace, none of them could have fallen: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The minor is evident, for the demons fell. Moreover the inference of the major is proved: if they had been created in sanctifying grace, they would also have been supernaturally converted to God, for God does not usually bestow sanctifying grace upon persons using their own will unless consenting and willing to have it, and consequently converted to God: but if the angels had once been converted to God, they could never have turned away from him; both because the will of the angels either cannot at all be changed from what it has once chosen, or is changed only with the greatest difficulty, and therefore demands to be confirmed at once in its election; and because if in the first instant they had been converted to God through grace, they would have merited beatitude: therefore in the second instant they would have received it as the reward of their merit, and thus could not have fallen.

I deny the major. and to its proof I say that although the angels are not moved so easily as men from what they have once chosen, yet of themselves they are not utterly immobile in their election: therefore even if an angel in his first operation had been converted to God through sanctifying grace, still he could withdraw from that conversion, since indeed he was free and still in the state of the way; and moreover, because a new occasion of sinning presented itself to him, as Saint Gregory Nazianzen teaches in oration 38., where, after saying concerning the fall of the angels: I would wish to say of them that they are immobile toward evil, having only agitation toward good, as encompassing God and drawing from him the first illuminations: he adds: Yet that I may judge and call them not wholly immobile but hard to move, I am persuaded by that Lucifer who from brightness was made darkness on account of pride and so named, and the rebellious Powers subjected to him, which by flight from the good wrought vice and contracted it upon us.

You will say 3. Grace is a medium between nature and glory: therefore the angels ought to have been first created in the state of pure nature, afterwards gifted with grace, and then to have merited beatitude.

I deny the consequence. for if it proved anything it would also establish that the first man was not created in grace. Add that the reason laid down in the antecedent is of little moment, for it is far better for a rational creature always to have stood in the grace of God, although in the instant immediately following its reception it would not receive beatitude, than to have been for some time in the state of pure nature; for the state of pure nature does not denote perfection as the state of grace does. Then greater power and liberality of God appears in granting grace together with nature at once than if he first conferred nature and afterward grace; nor does any reason appear why God should have deferred conferring grace upon the angels, especially since, as Saint Basil taught above, the angels were not created infants, that is, they had no need of the course of time to receive sanctification and illumination.

You will say 4. It was more congruous to confer grace after nature, since by conferring both at once grace would seem connatural: therefore it is more probable that God did not confer both at once.

I deny the antecedent. for although grace was conferred upon the angels together with nature, there was no danger thenceforth of confusing the two, especially since the angels could know, at least through faith, that the help granted them depended on the mere liberality of God and utterly exceeded their natural powers: for this knowledge contributed most to proving their constancy and humility.

Finally you will say. God works nothing in vain: but grace conferred upon the angels in the first instant would have been conferred in vain, seeing that as yet they could not deliberate, nor consequently operate by means of grace. Then grace would have been futile in the demons, since they derived no fruit of good work or merit from it. Finally the angel would have known himself created in grace, and thereupon to be a Son of God, and consequently he would not so easily have willed to lose so great a dignity: therefore it seems more probable that sanctifying grace was not granted to them.

I deny the consequence. and to the first argument I say that grace was not futile in the first instant, since it contributed most to the perfection of the angels, and moreover with it they could deliberate sufficiently and operate, as we shall prove in the last Conclusion. To the second I say that although the demons received no fruit of grace, yet it was not granted them in vain; since it was a medium for attaining the end due, and contributed to demonstrating that sweet and right providence of God who wills all men to be saved and supplies every means necessary to salvation. To the third I say that although the angel knew himself a Son of God and constituted in grace, yet by his liberty he could lose that dignity, acting namely against the inclination and institution of grace; since grace does not compel the will, but according to its free condition assists and advances it toward supernatural acts.

Third conclusion. — God bestowed an unequal grace upon the angels according to the greater or lesser natural perfection of each. This is common among Theologians, and is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers: for above all St Ambrose, book 1. De Spiritu sancto, c. 7. teaches that a more abundant grace was conferred upon the angels than upon men on account of the greater and more excellent dignity of their condition:

If they think, he says, that there is no spiritual holiness in the angels, but some other grace proper to their nature, these will certainly judge the angels inferior to men. For although they themselves confess that they dare not attribute to the angels the Holy Spirit, nor can they deny that the Holy Spirit is infused into men — for sanctification is the gift and boon of the Spirit — there will be found men certainly who have a better sanctification, and are to be preferred to the angels: but when the angels descend to the aid of men, it must be understood that the creature superior is that of the angels, which receives more spiritual grace, yet that the gift of the Author is the same both toward us and toward them.

In which words St Ambrose confesses that for this reason a more abundant grace was conferred upon the angels than upon men, because they are of a more excellent nature; but since the angels also differ among themselves in excellence of nature, by the same reasoning it follows that a more abundant grace was conferred upon them according to the perfection of each one's nature. — This very thing Saint Basil teaches, book De Spiritu sancto, chapter 16., saying: The powers of the heavens are not holy of their own nature, but according to the proportion in which they surpass one another they have from the Spirit the measure of sanctification. Nearly the same opinion Damascenus holds, book 2., c. 3.; for he says: Through the Word all the angels were created, and through the sanctification of the Holy Spirit all received the measures of perfection; yet so that each according to his dignity and rank is a partaker of light and grace. And they seem to have taken their opinion from St Dionysius in the book De Coelesti Hierarchia, where he says that the angels more perfect in nature are nearer to God, both in office and in the splendors of glory and grace: which he professes to have learned from his teacher Paul, chapter 6.; and accordingly there he says: The first Hierarchy, as it is more perfect than the rest, is joined with greater nearness to the foremost splendors of God. And c. 7.: Deservedly that first heavenly function is performed by the most exalted Spirits, since it is the order higher and more sacred than all; and in this manner he philosophizes about the others in the following chapters. — And although these Fathers do not speak expressly of the first instant of creation, yet, says Suarez, book 5., chapter 10., without doubt they hold the same proportionally concerning it: both on the part of God, because it seems consonant with his wisdom that those whom he created better in nature he placed in higher seats of glory, and consequently also anticipated with greater graces; and on the part of the angels themselves, because the more perfect they are in nature, the more vehemently and with greater effort do they operate through grace and dispose themselves to it. But this assertion is not without difficulty, that it may appear,

You will say 1. If God had conferred grace upon the angels according to the perfection of nature, it would follow that Lucifer in the first instant of creation was more holy than the other angels; but this seems absurd: therefore, etc. The inference of the major is evident, for Lucifer was the most perfect of all the angels in natural things. The minor also stands, for it is hardly credible that God preferred that angel in holiness to the others whom he knew would not be placed in glory with them. It is confirmed: the inferior cannot be the measure of the superior: but nature is inferior to grace: therefore it cannot be the measure of its conferral.

I deny the minor. for it is not inconvenient that, if Lucifer was more perfect than all the angels in nature, he also stood holier than they and had more abundant grace than the other inferior angels, since God does not confer grace according to the foreknowledge of the future event, but according to the present disposition: nor does greater grace always infer greater conformity to it, as is found by the example of Judas, for he received more graces than most saints; yet he perished, while these are saved unto eternity.

To the confirmation. I distinguish the major: the inferior cannot be the principal or formal rule of the superior, I concede; occasional or instrumental, I deny. To the minor I say that the angelic nature is the measure of grace and of its distribution among the angels, not indeed as the principal and formal rule: for the primary rule of the distribution of grace, both among the angels and among men, is the divine will itself dividing to each as it wills, as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 12. Nevertheless the angelic nature itself can be an occasional rule, insofar namely as God, about to distribute grace to the angels out of pure liberality, wisely willed to distribute it according to the proportion of natural perfections, so that those who were more excellent in the natural order might excel also in the supernatural.

You will say 2. God does not observe that proportion in distributing graces according to the dignity and excellence of nature with respect to men: therefore neither ought he to observe it with respect to the angels. The antecedent is evident: for we see many men more outstanding than others in intellect and the other faculties of the soul whom God nevertheless neither gifts with more abundant grace nor elects or calls to discharge divine offices; nay rather, says the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 1.: Not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, but God has chosen the foolish things of the world, etc. The consequence also stands by parity of reason, since no reason appears why God ought to behave otherwise toward the angels in distributing graces than toward men, especially since that benefit is utterly undebted to both natures.

I deny the consequence. for although no reason appears to us why God should so behave toward the angels rather than toward men, the matter itself ought not on that account be less certain to us, especially since the reason of all God's counsels does not shine forth to us. Just as it is no less certain that God did not apprehend the angels but the seed of Abraham to be hypostatically united with himself, although no other reason for that preference was supplied than the divine will itself, which adopted the nature it willed at its pleasure: so also it pleased him to elect men to various degrees of grace according to his own will; but it pleased him to distribute grace to the angels keeping proportion to their innate excellence, namely on account of the reasons of congruity premised in the Conclusion; and above all this stands because of the authority of the holy Fathers asserting the same. Therefore it is not lawful to argue from men to angels, or conversely: and perhaps God willed to grant grace to men and angels in this twofold diverse mode, that he might show himself the liberal donor of grace, since he distributes it to whomsoever he wills and in whatever manner.

You will say 3. If the innate excellences of the angels were the reasons why more ample grace was infused into them, it would follow that, with equal grace, one angel would merit more than another: but the consequent is false: therefore the antecedent. The inference of the major is proved; for this reason one angel obtained more ample grace, namely because he had a more excellent nature and more vigorous faculties, and therefore disposed himself more nobly and efficaciously to receive that grace: therefore by parity, if one angel with equal grace applies greater effort in fulfilling the divine mandate prescribed to him than another, he will also have more excellent merit: not on account of grace, which is supposed equal: therefore on account of the greater effort, and hence that exuberance of merit must be refunded to the purely natural powers.

— The Theologians commonly deny the inference of the major; for, they say, the reason of more ample merit must be drawn from the side of grace, and consequently, with equal grace, if two powers were performing some work, one of which acted more vigorously than the other, it would not on that account have more abundant, but altogether equal merit with the other.

— But since the Scotists reject this answer, contending that even with equal light of glory God is seen more clearly by a keener and more vigorous intellect, therefore I deny the minor, and to its proof I say that that amplitude of merit greater in one than in another is not to be refunded to the powers of nature alone, but to the faculty elevated by grace, just as we similarly said in treating of the principle of the inequality of the light of glory.

Note 1. From the Seraphic Doctor, book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 11:

Merit is the efficacy of a good work for obtaining what is not had, or for having more justly what is had: hence through merit something not owed becomes owed, and the very debt becomes more deeply owed. Just as a King gives a horse which the soldier has not merited; but by his use of the horse he merits that same horse already given. Now merit in general is distinguished threefold, namely, of congruity, of dignity, and of condignity. The merit of congruity is that by which the subject is disposed so as to be able to receive grace according to the standard of divine Justice; this is called the disposition of the matter, namely when someone does what is in him. The merit of dignity denotes the fitness of the agent for attaining what he merits. The merit of condignity denotes an equality of merit to the reward: I say equality, however, not arithmetical, but geometrical, that is, not of quantity, but of proportion; and this is evident, because God always remunerates above merit, just as he punishes short of what sin deserves. Hence there is not between merit and reward an equal quantity, but a proportion, because with God there is no commutative justice, justice of the marketplace, whereby one loaf of bread is given for one denarius, or a cubit of cloth for a solidus; distributive justice, however, is the principle by which gifts are distributed according to proportion to merits, and that is what obtains with God. Hence the Apostle, first to the Corinthians 3: Every one shall receive his own reward according to his own labor. Whence the Seraphic Doctor infers that no one merits for himself first grace by the merit of dignity or by the merit of condignity, but only by the merit of congruity. Similarly, one existing in charity cannot merit for another first grace by the merit of condignity, but by the merit of dignity and by the merit of congruity. But one existing in grace can merit for himself an increase of grace from condignity, and consequently by the merit of dignity, and by the merit of congruity.

Note 2. From the same author, there, chapter 13:

that meritorious works are wholly from grace, and wholly from free will, though principally from grace, because grace is compared to free will as the rider to the horse: for just as the rider directs the horse, so grace directs free will in the exercise of the virtues: for we can do evil by ourselves, but not good. Moreover, toward the efficacy of meriting, three things avail. First is the difficulty of the work, which appears in martyrdom. Second, the promptness of the will; for, says the Apostle, second to the Corinthians 5: God loves a cheerful giver. Third is the magnitude of charity, for charity itself is the weight of the sanctuary, according to which all things that were in the temple were weighed: as we read in Leviticus 27. — Again, for any work to be meritorious, three things are required. First, that the work itself be done in charity, because works done outside charity are dead, like an extinguished coal. Second, that it be done from charity: for many things are done in charity which nevertheless are not meritorious, from the fact that they are not done from charity, that is, because they are not referred to their due end. Third, that the work itself be referable to a good: for evil deeds cannot be done with a good intention, otherwise there would follow the absurdity that the same work would be meritorious and demeritorious.

— Finally, three things are attended to in merit on the part of man, namely the subject, that is, the soul; the principle, that is, free will; and the intention of the end: to which three things correspond on the part of God, namely grace, virtue, and charity: grace indeed makes the subject pleasing to God: virtue enables free will: but charity directs the intention to the due end.

Note 3. From the same author, there, chapter 15:

that good works are meritorious of three things, namely eternal life, increase of grace, remission of punishment. The first corresponds to the root of the work, namely charity, and this is the substantial reward of eternal life; the accidental reward, however, corresponds to the genus of the work, as does also increase of grace, because for works that are excellent and supererogatory we merit a greater increase of grace than for other works; remission of punishment, however, corresponds to the painfulness of the work, because the more painful works are, the more they are meritorious of remission of punishment.

So the Seraphic Doctor.

But it must be known, that I am not here instituting a discussion about the merit of remission of punishment, since indeed God did not spare the Angels who sinned, nor granted them time for repenting and the grace of pardon; therefore only the following remains here to be examined. First, whether the Angels disposed themselves by their own works, with actual grace, to receiving sanctifying grace. Second, whether the holy Angels truly merited their beatitude by their good works. Third, by which virtues above all they attained it.

First conclusion. — It is more probable that all the Angels received sanctifying grace through the cooperation, and as it were disposition, of their own will. This is the more common view among Theologians, and S. Thomas plainly teaches it in the first part, question 62, article 2, as do all his disciples. And although the Subtle Doctor determines nothing expressly about that truth, he nevertheless sufficiently indicates it, dist. 5, question 1, number 5, where, referring various modes of speaking about the duration and state of the way of the Angels, he says: That four periods can be assigned: in the first all the Angels were in natural things: in the second all in grace: in the third the good stood firm, and merited in grace, while the wicked fell away, in the fourth both these and those were in the term. Although he does not judge that assertion the more probable, as he explains below, judging truer that the Angels were all created in sanctifying grace: nevertheless he does not disapprove it, but esteems it probable.

The conclusion is urged, first: sanctified angels were sanctified in a nobler manner, such as befitted a rational creature: but sanctification which takes place through one's own disposition is far nobler and more excellent than that which takes place through the pure mercy and liberality of God: because, other things being equal, it is always of its kind more perfect to have something from oneself than from another alone, and to be at least in part the cause of one's own perfection, than to be utterly dependent on another for it: but whoever prepares himself for habitual grace by his own act is at least in part the cause of his own sanctification, since he concurs with the actual aid toward receiving that habitual and sanctifying grace. Hence Theologians commonly distinguish a twofold sanctification; one of adults, who are sanctified according to their own act: the other of infants, who are not sanctified by their own act of faith, but according to the faith of parents, or of the Church: and they confess the first sanctification to be more perfect than the second, for the reason that act is more perfect than habit: for habit is ordered to act; and therefore it was more perfect in the Angels to be sanctified through their own disposition than through the simple concession of God.

Add, that whoever disposes himself to habitual, or sanctifying, grace obtains it from God, and merits it at least de congruo, and somewhat stirs up and allures God to confer that grace upon him, and thereby is in some manner the cause of his own sanctifying grace, for he concurs with the actual supernatural aid toward thus earning it.

Second, adult men do not receive sanctifying grace except through their own disposition mediating, because they have the use of liberty, which infants lack, in whom that preceding disposition is not required: but the Angels were created with the perfect use of free will: For, says S. Basil on Psalm 32, they were not created in an infantile stature and then gradually exercised; but from the beginning of their production they were endowed with perfect knowledge and liberty: therefore it is more likely that they did not receive sanctifying grace otherwise than through their own disposition and consent. — It is confirmed, because free causes can no less act as soon as they have everything required for acting than natural or necessary causes can: but a natural cause which in the first instant of its formation has everything required for acting acts in that same instant, as is clear of the Sun, and of any other luminous body, which illuminates immediately upon existing: therefore by equal reason a free cause can act in the first instant in which it is, if in that instant it has everything required for acting freely. Yet the Angels could have had everything necessary for acting in the first instant of their formation, both on the part of God and on their own part. On the part of God, namely the actual supernatural aid, by which their will would be moved toward God and would tend toward him with an affection of piety: on their own part, namely full knowledge and the complete power of the will, by which they could concur with the divine aid offered to them either to elicit a supernatural act or not to elicit it: therefore from the beginning they had everything necessary by which they could freely dispose themselves to receiving sanctifying grace.

Third, finally, through the reception of sanctifying grace friendship is entered into between God and the creature, indeed even a certain spiritual marriage is contracted: but friendship is founded on the consent of those who love, and for contracting marriage the consent of each party is required: therefore sanctifying grace is not communicated to an intellectual creature possessing the use of liberty unless its consent be present.

Add, that it is fitting that God should not advance to that supernatural state those whom he adopts as sons, once they are adults and free, except as free, that is, willingly and freely consenting, and this is more consonant with rational and free nature, and with the entering of friendship, which it is fitting be entered into by mutual consent of the parties: in which manner too God conducts himself with men already adult and free, according to that saying, Turn to me, and I will turn to you: which law with respect to us is certain and universal, according to the Tridentine Council, session 6, chapter 5.

You will say 1. Christ the Lord, according to his humanity, was made a little lower than the angels: but to him was given the habit of grace from the instant of his conception, without his own disposition, and from that habit came forth the first act elicited by him: therefore the same judgment must be made about the Angels.

I deny the parity, for the first habitual grace of Christ was as it were resulting from the grace of union, and thus he had it in a nobler manner than through his own disposition. Moreover, the Grace of Christ was consummated from the beginning, and its first acts were vision and beatific enjoyment, which could not be dispositions to grace, but rather its fruits.

You will say 2. God created other things perfect together with their fruits, e.g., trees, and without any disposition on the part of those things: therefore much more did he create the Angels together with their fruits, that is, with habitual grace and inherent justice, without their preceding disposition.

I answer. other things are not able, through dispositions of their own, to receive higher perfections, as Angels and adult men can.

You will say 3. A more perfect mode of acting ought to have been granted to the Angels from the beginning, for it is consonant with the divine operation and with angelic dignity: but it is nobler and more perfect to act from a supernatural habit than without its concurrence: therefore it was nobler for the Angels first to act from the habit of sanctifying grace than through actual aid, and therefore they could not dispose themselves to the reception of that habitual grace.

I distinguish the major. to act from a habit, other things being equal, is better and more connatural than to act without the concurrence of that habit, I concede: when other things are not equal, I deny: for it can happen that it is more fitting to act without a habit than with its concurrence: and so it is in the case at hand; for it was nobler for the Angels to dispose themselves to their own sanctification, and to be in some degree the cause of their own justice, and through their own consent to accept the friendship and espousal of God, than to receive this otherwise: therefore it must be judged that it was so done.

You will say 4. The Angels had sanctifying grace concreated with themselves: therefore they could not dispose themselves to it. The antecedent is clear from what was said in the previous Question: the consequence is proved: disposition precedes form, since it prepares the subject to receive it: but something concreated cannot presuppose anything prior in the subject that would be dispositional to its reception: therefore since sanctifying grace was concreated with the Angels, they could not dispose themselves to it.

I deny the consequence, and I distinguish the major of that proof: disposition precedes form, in the order of nature, I concede: of time, I deny: since, as is clear even in physical things, the last being of disposition is the first being of substantial form; and the act of contrition, which is a disposition to sanctifying grace, is simultaneous with the sanctifying grace itself, although in nature it precedes it: therefore by similarity the Angels, with the supernatural aid granted to them from the beginning, in the same instant in which they were created, could turn themselves to God by an act of love, by which they accepted, as it were by a certain disposition, all those things which were then shown to them by that magnificent Artificer of all things, both in natural and in supernatural matters: and they gave thanks to him for the immense benefits bestowed on them.

You will insist. If the Angels elicited some act, by the actual aid granted to them, by which they disposed themselves to habitual grace, it follows that simultaneously in time they had two acts, one indeed elicited by the will with the concurrence of that actual grace, the other truly with the concurrence of habitual grace: but one and the same faculty cannot elicit two acts simultaneously: therefore neither did the Angels have those two acts simultaneously. The sequela of the major is proved: First we assert that they elicited an act with the actual supernatural aid, by which they would dispose themselves to habitual grace; but they also ought to have elicited another act from that habitual grace concreated with them, otherwise that habit would have been idle in the Angels for some time, which appears absurd: therefore, etc.

I answer. granting the major, I distinguish the minor: one and the same faculty cannot elicit simultaneously two total acts, and non-subordinated ones, I concede: partial, and mutually subordinated ones, I deny: for just as the Sun, e.g., by the same illumination makes level both the Moon and, through her mediation, bathes the air with light at night: so the same will can tend simultaneously toward God by two acts, precisely when one stands in the manner of a disposition to the other.

Second conclusion. — The Angels in fact merited beatitude, and that earlier in time than they attained it. Thus

the Doctor, dist. 5, question 1, n. 3, where he reports and impugns the opinion of the Master, who says the Angels did not merit that beatitude before they received it, but after they received it: just as a soldier is said to merit a horse by works not yet done but to be done. Which opinion, says the Doctor, is absurd; for if anyone were said to merit because of foreseen works, it would follow that grace is not grace; for from the fact, he says, that someone is foreseen to use well a thing once received, he does not merit to receive it. For then man could merit first grace, because he is foreseen by God giving it to make good use of it, and then grace would not be grace, because it would be from merits, though not posited in effect, yet foreseen: therefore the Angel did not merit beatitude, if he had it only because of the foreseen good use of his in serving concerning the elect. Then he adds: Therefore he holds that the Angels merited their beatitude before they received it.

Now the Doctor proves the first part of the Conclusion thus: Every nature attains its perfection through its proper operation: but the perfection and end of every rational creature is beatitude, which is natural to God alone: therefore the Angel ought to attain it by his proper action. But an end to be attained through operation is either to be made through it, or to be earned through it, or, as the Doctor speaks, every operation leading into an end is either factive of the end, when namely the end does not exceed the power of the agent acting for the end, as medication with respect to health: or meritorious of the end, when namely the end exceeds the power of the agent acting for the end, and then the end is awaited from the gift of another: but beatitude exceeds every created nature: therefore both the Angel and man cannot attain it by an effective operation, but only by a meritorious one.

Proof 2. The angelic nature is as capable of meriting its beatitude as man: therefore by the reason that men do not attain beatitude except through their own merit, the Angels likewise ought to earn it. The consequence is clear: both because, other things being equal, the Angels are more apt for meriting with God than men; and because if glory is not given to men, whose nature is weaker and more infirm, without merit, by equal reason it does not seem it should be conceded to the Angels without merit; finally because Apoc. 21: The measure of a man, which is an angel: that is, as certain interpreters explain, it bears the same ratio toward men as it bore toward the Angels in their ordination to beatitude, because certainly in attaining beatitude men and angels are measured by the same measure or rule: therefore since in men the measure of attaining beatitude is merit, by equal reason it must be said that the Angels attained beatitude by their proper merit.

It is confirmed. This truth by the authority of the holy Fathers, especially S. Augustine, book On Correction and Grace chapter 11, where, speaking of the state of the first man, to whom God had granted an aid by which he could, if he willed, hold fast perseveringly to the good, he says:

but because he did not will to remain, it is certainly his fault, whereas it would have been his merit, had he willed to remain: as the holy angels did, who, while others fell through free will, through free will stood fast themselves, and merited to receive the reward of that abode, namely so great a fullness of beatitude that it is most certain to them that they will always remain in it.

Therefore S. Augustine confesses that the holy Angels truly earned their beatitude.

The Doctor also proves the second part, namely that the Angels merited glory earlier in time than they attained it: a will cannot be simultaneously and at once in that state in which it wills an object mutably and contingently, and also immutably and necessarily: but if the Angels received beatitude at the same time at which they merited it, it would follow that they willed the same object mutably and immutably, contingently and necessarily; therefore they cannot merit and obtain beatitude in the same instant of time. The major is clear: for two acts entirely opposed cannot proceed simultaneously from the same faculty. The minor is proved: in order to merit, one must be in such a state as not to be so determined to an act as to lack liberty not only essential, but of contradiction, of having such an act or not having it, or rather one must be indifferent to eliciting the act or not eliciting it: but when the will is in the beatific state it no longer has such indifference, since through the beatific vision it is so determined and drawn to loving God that it cannot cease from eliciting that act; therefore if in the same instant in which it merited it had beatitude, it would follow that it could simultaneously mutably and immutably, contingently and necessarily tend toward God by an act of love; which since it is absurd, it is likewise absurd that they should simultaneously merit beatitude and receive it.

Then, the state of beatitude excludes all merit, otherwise men could in fact merit in Heaven; nor would the state of the wayfarer necessarily be desired for meriting: but the consequent is against the common opinion of Theologians, who require the state of the way, not of the homeland, for merit: therefore merit cannot exist simultaneously with beatitude, and accordingly it must precede it in time.

Finally, the disposition to a form and the way to a term must be prior to the form and the term when, by their own special rationale they have a certain incompatibility on account of which they cannot subsist together: but the merit of the angels is a way and disposition to beatitude, which cannot subsist together with it; because the merit of the angels presupposes faith, and knowledge, and the state of the way: both of which beatitude excludes; therefore they cannot subsist together: and consequently merit must precede beatitude in time.

You will say 1. The angels merit something on account of the services rendered to men: but that merit exists together with its reward, otherwise they would await it; yet such expectation would disturb their happy state: for from Prov. 13. Hope that is deferred afflicts the soul: now what they merit can be nothing other than beatitude, and hence merit and beatitude can subsist together, and consequently the angels could at once merit beatitude and possess it.

The Doctor distinguishes the major. By those services the angels merit essential beatitude — he denies it; accidental beatitude — he concedes it; and although they did not previously have this accidental beatitude, and can desire and long for it, yet no distress follows in them on that account, since all of it is excluded by essential beatitude.

You will say 2. A greater reward supposes greater merit; but the angels have a greater reward and ampler beatitude than very many elected men: therefore they must likewise have greater merit: but they could not have had greater merit before receiving their beatitude than very many holy men who, living through a long time, amassed many merits: therefore it is necessary that the angels merit glory through subsequent works, and consequently their merit subsists together with beatitude.

— The Doctor distinguishes the major: a greater reward requires greater merit intensively — he concedes it; extensively — he denies it; that is, it requires a meritorious work which is more excellent and more perfect by reason, namely, either of a more excellent principle or of a more intense act of charity and love, but it does not require more meritorious works as to number. And likewise, with the minor distinguished, the consequence must be denied: for the merit of the angels, though accomplished in a brief time, could nevertheless far exceed intensively the merits of men multiplied over many years.

You will insist. Merit carries with it difficulty: but there was no difficulty in the angels in pursuing good: therefore either no merit at all belongs to them, or at least less perfect than in men, who suffer the greatest difficulty in the pursuit of good.

— The Doctor distinguishes the minor: there was not in the angels difficulty in pursuing good from a sensible inclination to the opposite — he concedes it; from the proportion of the object toward which they had to tend — he denies it; for it must be known, he says, that difficulty sometimes arises in some work from an inclination of the will to the opposite: sometimes difficulty arises in a work because of that about which one works, which exceeds the nature of the worker. And in this way the attainment of beatitude was difficult and praiseworthy in the angels, but not in the first way, because they were not inclined to the opposite. But it is altogether likely that the angels suffered great difficulty in adhering to God with love and service: for this denotes the great struggle begun between the utterly hostile angels and the faithful ones; it also signifies the fall of so many angels, who probably would not have fallen so, nor strayed from God, unless they had suffered some difficulty in adherence to Him. Finally, if the argument proved anything, it would have to be said that even the angels could in no wise merit by works effecting the attainment of beatitude, since that state removes all difficulty, especially concerning the love of God, whom, beholding face to face, they acknowledge as supremely lovable.

Third conclusion. — The angels merited their beatitude chiefly through acts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity.

Proof of the Conclusion. First indeed from faith, for from Habakkuk 2. The just lives by faith, and as the Apostle adds to the Hebrews 11. without faith it is impossible to please God. But the angels, in order to merit, had to be just and pleasing to God: therefore also to have faith: no less was it necessary for the angels to be justified through faith and to arrive at vision than for men; but men cannot be justified without faith, nor arrive at vision apart from faith; since, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews chapter 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. Whence he concludes in the same place: he who approaches God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to those who seek Him: therefore, etc. Finally, vision answers to faith by a special reason, as the reward specially proportioned to it. Hence that saying of the Psalmist can be accommodated to the blessed, as we have heard through faith on the way, so we see through manifest revelation, in the city of the Lord of hosts. To these add, that the angels had charity, for charity is either identical with grace or inseparable from it: but charity necessarily presupposes faith, and hence it was necessary that the angels possessed infused faith.

— Hence I judge it truer to say that it was revealed to the angels, and that they knew through faith, first, God as the Author of grace and the ultimate end and the object of supernatural beatitude, for as we said above from the Apostle, he who approaches God, etc. That these words must be understood equally of angels as of men, St. Thomas teaches 2. 2. qu. 5. art. 1. Second, they explicitly knew the mystery of the Trinity. For, as Thalassius says, t. 5. Biblioth. Patrum sentence 59., the sanctification and deification both of angels and of men is the holy consubstantial knowledge of the Trinity. It can also be urged, because the knowledge of the way of the angels ought to correspond to the knowledge of the homeland: for faith is the disposition most suited by which rational creatures are gradually advanced to beatific knowledge: but supernatural beatitude consists chiefly in the knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity: therefore, etc. Third, I also hold it more probable that the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed equally to them: both because such revelation and knowledge pertained not only to the perfection of the angels themselves; but also was highly fitting to the honor and majesty of Christ, and this St. Paul indicates, Hebrews 1., saying: And when again He brings the First-begotten into the world, He says: and let all the angels of God adore Him: which precept befitted to be given also to the angels as wayfarers, not only toward the Son as God, but also as God made man; for since the mystery of the Incarnation is known by the blessed angels as one of the chief mysteries, and since the knowledge of the way of the angels ought to correspond to the knowledge of the homeland, it was fitting that they know that mystery on the way.

You will say. St. Paul to the Ephesians 3. and 1. to Timothy 3., signifying that the mystery of the Incarnation was hidden from eternity in God, and that through the Church the Gospel was made known to the Principalities and Powers in heavenly places; whence those questions of the angels, Who is this King of glory? Psal. 23. Who is this that comes from Edom, with dyed garments from Bosra? Isai. 63. therefore, etc.

— Poncius answers, from the same Apostle to the Hebrews 1., that it is established that the angels before every peace and the preaching of the Church recognized the mystery of the Incarnation from its beginning, and adored Christ the Lord at the very point of His Conception or Nativity. Therefore the other passages of his are to be understood of the knowledge of the Incarnation, not simply, but secundum quid, namely either according to the intuitive knowledge of the same already put into execution, or according to its extension to all nations opened to the angels experimentally at least by the preaching of Paul and of the Church, or according to the abrogation of the legal rites and other circumstances of the thing presented and exhibited. Those questions, moreover, are either those of the Prophets, or rather of the angels, not ignorant, but wondering. For neither is it true, as some affirm, that certain ones indeed knew beforehand, but others were ignorant, namely those who asked at the Ascension of Christ; for Paul to the Hebrews 1. affirms that all the angels adored Christ the first-begotten of God when He was brought into the world. It is confirmed by this, that St. Dionysius, chapter 1. of the Celestial

Hierarchy, affirms that all the angels were instructed in all the mysteries which they announced to men, but especially those which concerned Christ. Whence he adds: I see that the divine mystery of the humanity of Jesus was first made known to the angels, then through them the benefit of knowledge came to us. To him accords St. Augustine, book 1. De Civit. cap. 32., while he says: From the beginning of the human race the mystery of the Incarnation was announced and prefigured through the ministry of the angels; he supposes, therefore, that it was foreknown by the angels: and hence the aforesaid words of St. Paul cannot be taken with such rigor as to exclude all prior knowledge held by the angels of the mystery of the incarnate Word of Christ to be adored; especially as regards the angels of the higher order: for the Doctor Subtilis, dist. 19. num. 2., does not wish the knowledge of that mystery to have been made known to the angels of the lower orders, as will appear in qu. 1. of the following Article.

You will say 2. Angelic knowledge was evident: but knowledge held through faith is not evident: therefore that knowledge was not through faith. The major is proved: the angels evidently knew that God was revealing to them those mysteries whose knowledge they received; whence rightly St. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 28. art. 2. quaest. 3. teaches that the angels, from their first condition, had some knowledge of the articles pertaining to the Trinity, which nevertheless does not deserve to be called faith; nay rather, knowledge of contemplation on account of the absence of enigma.

— I distinguish the major: that knowledge was evident on the side of the attesting and revealing party, because the angels evidently knew that the revelation, or manifestation, of the mysteries was being made by God — I concede it; on the side of the thing revealed — I deny it. And likewise, with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence: for evidence on the side of the attesting party does not absolutely repugn to faith. For we recognize men speaking to us, and yet we believe their words. Similarly it happened in the angels, who indeed knew God speaking to them, but what He related and manifested they did not know evidently.

What we have said of faith must be said with stronger reason of angelic hope and charity: for it is established that the good angels, at the time of that struggle which they waged against the hostile ones in Heaven, both loved God and reposed their hope in Him; indeed, for the sake of defending His glory they fought, which certainly could not have been done unless they burned with the greatest love of Him, and had awaited opportune help from Him against that immense troop of rebellious angels.

You will ask. What was the duration of the way of the angels?

The Doctor answers, dist. 5. qu. 1. num. 5. and following: that various opinions of Doctors were to be determined in this matter: for first St. Thomas, 1. par. qu. 65. art. 5., teaches that there were only two delays of the angels, one in which they were created in grace and merited, another in which the good received the essential reward of beatitude, but the evil eternal punishment. Indeed the Master of the Sentences holds that three delays of duration are to be posited, which he explains thus, wishing that in the first the angels, created blessed, were in pure natural things, in the second delay the evil sinned, the just merited; in the third all were at the term, the good indeed in beatitude, but the evil in torments. Likewise there are other opinions of ancient theologians. But almost all more recent theologians now agree with the Subtle Doctor that only three little delays of the angelic way are to be admitted, which they call instants, even though they are not necessary indivisibles, as are the instants of our time:

The first instant was that of their creation, in which all received both nature and sanctifying grace co-created with themselves, and adhered to their Creator through chaste love, and hence by love merited in that same instant; but not all stood in merit.

The second instant was that in which the distinction was made between the good and the evil: the good persevering in merit, the evil slipping into hostility and sin.

The third instant was that in which that distinction was completed, the good having been beatified, but the evil damned.

Or, as the Doctor speaks, qu. 2. num. 15.: The first delay, in which they were uniform in grace, if we wish to say that the evil had grace, or at least uniform in nature. The second delay, in which, still existing on the way, they were unformed, in that these merited ultimately, and those demerited ultimately. The third delay was the necessary formal distinction of one from the other.

It is probable also that in the second delay, in which they were unformed on the way, there were many little delays, because the evil sinned in many species of sin, namely pride, hatred, and envy: and those acts were elicited in ordered fashion, and not in the same instant.

— I said, however, that those instants were not wholly indivisible, especially the first and second. For as regards the first, it must have been virtually divisible corresponding to some duration of our time: for it would be gratuitously feigned that the perverse angels fell immediately after the first instant, wholly indivisible: nor does it seem likely that that chaste love, in which all were co-created, persevered in only one indivisible instant and was immediately extinguished; indeed the contrary seems suggested by Ezekiel graphically delineating Lucifer under the person of the King of Tyre, saying: In the midst of the fiery stones you walked, perfect in your ways: which indicates that he stood for some time in chaste love, and as it were made progress in it through the continuation of that love and the plurality of good works. Whence much less true appears what very many Thomists teach, that after the first indivisible instant all the good were beatified, but the evil damned, because as many instants would have to be posited for the way of the demons as there were operations really distinct among themselves and succeeding one another, by which their way was finally terminated: for the Thomists suppose that the instants of discrete time, in which the way of the angels lasted, are multiplied according to the number of operations succeeding one another: but the demons exercised three kinds of operations: for in the first instant of creation they elicited a meritorious act, afterward mortally sinful, which was followed by damnation: which three operations are utterly incompossible: for the first was actual conversion to God as the ultimate end: the second was actual aversion from the same; the third, however, necessarily ought to be distinguished together from the second; for supreme delight and supreme sorrow are incompossible with respect to the same subject: but the angel, in that instant in which he sinned, had supreme delight and complacency in his natural perfection: therefore in the same instant he could not have supreme sorrow, and hence that third instant must be distinguished from the second.

Likewise the second instant of the way had some continuation of time, in which the good were occupied with increasing merits, and with combat or resistance against the sinning ones and their sins. For in the angels, most prompt to act through grace and nature, although a long delay through some duration of time was not necessary; nevertheless it was fitting that they be able to extend their duration by their merits, and thus merit an ampler beatitude if they wished: just as theologians teach that if man had remained innocent, neither he nor his posterity would have been carried straightway into Heaven, but would have dwelt on earth for a long time, that by multiplying the fruit of good works they might obtain in Heaven a more abundant glory and beatitude.

Add that the common opinion concerning the sin of Lucifer inducing the others by his instigation to the fellowship of hostility urges the same prolonged delay of duration: for it was not likely that all the rebel angels adhered to him in the same indivisible moment; indeed it appears more credible that some at times resisted, and at length, pressed by his solicitation, declined to his side.

But the third instant, of the completed distinction of the good angels from the evil through the glorification of the former and the damnation of the latter, was indeed indivisible, by that reason that it closed and terminated the way; yet it is to last forever.

* For long ago that insane comment of Origen was proscribed, by which he supposed that the angels were not yet endowed with perpetual and unloseable innocence and felicity: but that they still fluctuated between sin and holiness, misery and beatitude, just as we do; whence in the homily on Numbers 20., On the angels deputed to the guardianship of men, he writes: For, he says, the angels will come to judgment with us, and will stand for us before the throne of justice, lest perhaps any one of them should have been the cause that we offended, lest perhaps they expended less work and labor toward us, that they might recall us from the stain of sins. He confirms and repeats the same with proofs in homily 13. on Luke, and thus concludes: Moreover it frequently happens that while we labor they do not fulfill their own office, and are at fault. But the homily on the same Gospel 3. says not the angels of all men see the face of the Father who is in heaven, but only of those who have given their name to the Church, and afterward says: For how, if salvation is procured for men through their care and industry, do they attend the face of the Father always: but if through their negligence man has perished, they are not ignorant of the peril of their loss. And shortly after: It is ignominy for an angel if a man believed just shall have sinned: that, on the contrary, it is glory for an angel if even the least believed in the Church shall have been saved. For they shall sometime see the face of the Father who is in heaven, when others shall not see: for according to their merit the angels are, either always, or never, or little, or more, contemplating the face of God, O angels. — But that doctrine of Origen has long since been proscribed by the holy Fathers of the Church and by the whole assembly of theologians, judged among the errors of Origen. *

You will ask 2. How long did the way of the angels last?

I answer. the matter to be quite uncertain; for certain ones think the angels had the terminus of their way on the very first day of the world, when God divided the light from the darkness, as if in that mystical distinction there was outlined and designated the distinction of the good angels from the evil. There are those who think this happened on the second day, when God, creating the firmament, divided the waters which are above the firmament from those which are below it, as if by this division was foreshadowed the separation of the holy angels from the demons.

The others think that no angels had yet fallen by the sixth day of the world, since God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good, and hence no creatures deformed and infected by sin seemed then to exist.

— But all these opinions are led by lighter and uncertain arguments: since Moses outlines in those days of the world the formation of corporeal things; and thus the most holy Prophet relates the division of the light and of the waters as corporeal, as nature itself demonstrates, and not perchance anything then concerning that distinction of the good angels from the evil; so likewise it teaches that God approved all things that He had made for the integrity and adornment of the whole Universe: but whether in those words He also comprehended the formation of spiritual creatures is quite uncertain.

— Nevertheless all theologians agree that the way of the angels was not drawn out so long, but was very brief: both on account of the perfection of the angelic powers, which most easily fulfill their works, especially since those Spirits, most expeditious for understanding and willing, have no opposing impediments nor corporeal organs: then on account of the immense aids divinely conferred upon them, by which their intellect was irradiated and their will stimulated to operation; add that the magnitude of acquiring the reward requires neither long duration of time nor multitude and plurality of good works: for, as the Doctor speaks, dist. 5. qu. 1. num. 4., for a great reward there is not required a multitude of merits, but much more is required one intense merit than a hundred thousand remitted ones. But in the angels there was a very intense movement of merit during that little delay in which they merited, so much so perhaps that no man according to the common law could have so intense an act of merit as they had.