Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Note 1. We must distinguish a fourfold kind of measure. 1. There is the measure of perfection, according to that saying of Aristotle, Metaphysics 1, chapter 3: In every genus there is one thing which is the measure of the others under the same genus. 2. There is the measure of causation; thus in Metaphysics 9 the knowable is called the measure of knowledge because it causes knowledge. 3. There is the measure of knowledge or of making known; thus a cubit makes known the quantity of a cloth, and in this way a measure is nothing other than a quantity more known which makes known another: insofar as being measured involves a threefold respect, one to the intellect, another to the thing measured, and another to the measure. 4. There is the measure of duration; thus Time is called the measure of motion, aevum the measure of the angels, eternity the measure of God.

Note 2. This is the difference between eternity, aevum, and time: that Eternity (as we said when treating of the eternity of God) is the possession of life interminable, whole at once, and perfect, which namely expresses a threefold negation, of ending, of beginning, and of succession and dependence. Time, however, as we said in the Physics, is the measure of motion according to before and after. Aevum, however, is a measure and duration permanent, incorruptible from within, yet defectible through a superior external power. In this aevum is distinguished in two ways both from eternity and from time; first it differs from Eternity, because eternity is always actually present and in no way in potency: time, however, according to the present instant is in act, but according to the future is in potency, without any permanence at all of past and future. Aevum, however, is a certain indivisible measure, and is not wholly present, but partly actually present, partly in potency: for just as the being of an angel is indivisible and immaterial, and is now actually present, yet is somehow in potency, because it is in potency so as to be preserved in the future by the maintenance of God, which if it ceased entirely the angel would be annihilated: for the same reason it must be said of aevum that it is indivisible and actually present, yet somehow in potency with respect to the future. Moreover it differs from time, because it is not so potential as time is, for it does not have preceding parts and following parts. Second, aevum differs from eternity and time on the side of its measure, because Eternity is the measure of a thing neither failing nor able to fail: Time, however, is the measure of a thing actually failing and able to fail: Aevum, however, is an intermediate measure, namely the measure of a substance not failing and immutable, yet able somehow to fail and to be changed according to its operations. It is declared by an example; for just as a solar ray produced from the Sun in a diaphanous medium, while the latter remains the same, is one and the same ray produced in an indivisible instant, is in act; yet it is somehow in potency, because when the Sun withdraws, it immediately ceases to be: so it must be said of the angel and of its measure. The other example is an image in a mirror, which is produced from a visible corporeal object in an instant, and is produced indivisibly, yet when the object withdraws that image ceases to be. Time itself, however, is compared to a river whose parts flow forth from the same source, so that one part succeeds another, and accordingly the parts of time are the measure of a thing with renewal and aging of the same: aevum, however, is the measure of a thing without renewal and aging as to its substance.

Note 3. From the Doctor, Book II, dist. 2, question 2, n. 10: That to measure is to certify an unknown quantity by a more known quantity:

certification, however, can sometimes be made by a quantity existing in a thing or in imagination, just as an experienced craftsman, by some quantity which he has in his imagination, measures any quantity that presents itself to him. Sometimes, however, it can be made by some quantity existing in a thing, and this in three ways: either one exceeding: and then the intellect is certified about the lesser quantity by its approach to the greater quantity, or its withdrawal from it; and in this way a measure is placed in the quiddities of things, and the measure is more perfect than the very thing measured, which is said to be naturally more known than the thing measured itself: just as whiteness is placed as the first measure in the genus of colors, and God is said to be the first measure of all things that are in whatever genus. In another way a thing is measured by an exceeded quantity, because the known quantity is the lesser, and a part of the greater quantity, which is more unknown, and then that lesser quantity, by its repetition, measures the whole greater quantum, and in this way a lesser motion can be the measure of a greater motion ex natura rei. In the third way an unknown quantity is measured by another quantity known, distinct, and equal to it, and this is done by application, or superposition. And because that which is a measure ex natura rei ought to be naturally more known than the thing measured itself; therefore in this way, namely the third, one of equals is not the measure of the others, unless that equality has been known ex natura rei; in this way time, if it is another quantity than motion, and more known than it, can be the measure of motion ex natura rei. To some intellect, however, that can be a measure which ex natura rei is not a measure, for instance if the quantity of a cubit is known to someone, and the quantity of the cloth unknown; then the quantity of the cubit can be the measure of the quantity of the cloth, although ex natura rei neither quantity has greater certitude than the other.

These things having been set forth in preamble, three things especially are to be resolved here: First, that the angels have no other measure of their duration than aevum. Second, that this measure is not successive. Third, that it is really indistinct from the substance of the angel.

First conclusion. — The existence of the angels is measured by aevum. This is common among the Theologians.

Proof, first. The existence of an angel is measurable by some measure: but it is not measured by eternity, for this is the proper measure of God, nor by time, because corruptible things are measured by that, although the very existence of the angel, on account of the intensive perfection, power, and magnitude of its duration, could coexist with the whole of time, no variety having been made in its duration: as in the example of a stake fixed in a river, around which water flowed continually, the stake itself remaining stable: therefore the very existence of the angel is measured by aevum alone, since there is between it and that existence of the angel the proportion which is required between measure and measured. Then, if there were no time, an angel could know its own duration: therefore it has some other measure distinct from time, by which it can know it: that, however, cannot be eternity, since it is of a higher order; therefore it is aevum, because nothing else can be assigned which would have the character of a measure of angelic existence. Finally, aevum, according to the Doctor, is the measure of a created being permanent, and uniformly disposed while it subsists, or which has a uniform mode of existing: or, according to St. Thomas, it is the measure of a being immutable according to its substance; but mutable and variable according to its operations: but the substance of the angels is immutable in itself, and is uniformly disposed while it subsists: therefore the angel is truly measured by aevum. The things that could be objected against this Conclusion will be more easily resolved in the following Conclusion.

Second conclusion. — Aevum is not a successive duration. This is the position of the Doctor in Book 2, dist. 2, question 1, where, although he said the opinion of St. Bonaventure about the succession of angelic duration was probable, and had solved all the arguments that had been proposed by others against the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor; nevertheless he himself attacks that same opinion in this way, n. 18:

That angelic duration, which according to St. Bonaventure is said to be a quantity having its divisibility not permanent but successive, so that to one of its nows of rapidly flowing time another succeeds; that duration, I say, or quantity, either is identified with the existence of the angel, or it is not identified with it.

The first cannot be said, because it is impossible for there to be succession in duration without succession in existence; but in the existence of the angel there is no succession, any more than in the essence with which the existence is identified: therefore, etc. The second likewise cannot be affirmed, because just as the absolute existence of the angel itself can be put in being by various productions, or by the same production continued, so the absolute duration which it has from the first production can be put in being by a second production, or by the same continued: therefore when the angel is preserved for a second instant, it is not necessary that there be given to it a new duration distinct from that which it had in the first instant, and consequently its duration will not be a successive quantity consisting of various parts. If you said that the same absolute duration can be put again in being, but for different nows: On the contrary, if it can be put in different nows; therefore it can be preserved in them: whence I argue thus: either it can be preserved in them by another duration distinct, and thus there will be a process to infinity, because the same question is asked about the other duration: or it can be preserved in them without another duration, and thus just as the same existence is in different nows, the same duration also will be in them, which is the intended point.

The Doctor imputes, second, to that same opinion, inasmuch as it would assert that duration to be something successive, because, he says, a new respect does not seem to be posited without a new foundation, or term, and without some newness on the side of the extremes: therefore if the existence of the angel is the same, and God is disposed in the same way in the second instant as in the first, a new respect does not seem to be admissible.

The conclusion is proved further by the authority of the holy Fathers, first indeed by St. Augustine, book 83 questions, question 72, where he says, that this alone stands between aevum and time, that aevum is stable, but time mutable. Likewise St. Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, chapter 10, says, It is the property of aevum to measure the whole at once, according to the whole: not therefore according to part and part, and successively. And in chapter 5 he says aevum is a quiet life, whole at once. Likewise Gregory, in the Moralia, says of the joy of the Blessed, Nothing has passed away, nothing has arrived, and nothing will be future: therefore it is whole at once.

It is proved again by the fundamental reason: otherwise aevum would be successive, because it would plainly consist of many nows, or instants succeeding one another: but that does not seem to be true: therefore, etc. The major is that of St. Bonaventure. The minor is proved: that first now, or instant of aevum, either is the same as the existence of the angel, or other: if the same, therefore just as the existence of the angel remains always the same, according to St. Bonaventure, so also the same now remains permanent. But if you say it is other; On the contrary: just as the very existence, according to St. Bonaventure, can be put in being infinitely many times, so also that now, other than the essence and existence of the angel, can frequently be put in being, and thus the same now of aevum can be preserved, just as the same existence: therefore a plurality of those nows is not necessary: but one suffices. But if you say, that if it is frequently put in being, it will be put in different nows: I answer, that either a process to infinity will have to be granted, or it must be said that the same now can be preserved without a new now. It is proved, because that first now either can be preserved without another, or not. If the first, I have my point; if the second, I ask about that other now whether it can be preserved without another; and thus either one must arrive at some now which can be preserved without another, or a process to infinity will be granted. Moreover, even if this last were granted, still it will not be necessary that there be succession in the now itself; for just as the essence of the angel is posited as the same and unvarying, even if it is posited in one now and another, so the same now can remain unvarying in itself, even if it is posited in being in one now and another.

It is confirmed. because the conservation of the angel is taken either actively or passively. If the first, it is whole at once, having no succession, for it is a divine action, to which permanence considered in itself is not repugnant, any more than to its term, namely the angel. Hence God will be able by such an action to conserve the angel, especially since such a mode of conservation is more connatural, and consequently more due, to things themselves indivisible. Furthermore, because the conserving action of an incorruptible thing is incorruptible by its nature, since it has no intrinsic principle of its ending: therefore, etc. If the second, it is the very angelic being itself, unvarying: therefore it has no succession, and consequently the opposite opinion does not rightly assert that aevum, on the side of the conservation of the angel, includes succession.

You will object 1. The Doctor objects several authorities of the holy Fathers, which seem to support the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor: first of all St. Augustine 11. Confessionum, c. 4. If the now of time always stood, and did not flow, it would not be time, but eternity: therefore if the now of aevum did not flow, it also ought to be reckoned eternity: but the consequent is absurd: therefore also that from which it follows. Likewise book 4, on Genesis, chapter 14, expounding those words, My Father works even until now; he adds: even until now signifies the consummation of the work, for otherwise it could be understood if it were said, now he works, where it would not be necessary that we take the consummation of the work, but he compels it to be understood otherwise when he says, even until now, from that time at which he wrought all things. By which St. Augustine signifies that there is some continuation in the actions of God ad extra, by which he conserves the creatures produced by himself, and in consequence a continuation in the duration of creatures: but continuation implies succession: therefore the duration of any creature whatever, and therefore of the angels conserved, is successive. Boethius subscribes, book 1, De Trinitate, chapter 9: Although, he says, according to the Philosophers it can be said of celestial bodies and spirits that they are always, yet there is a great difference in being always, for in God alone the present is, not running; but the now flowing makes sempiternity, that is, aevum: therefore aevum is a flowing duration. St. Damascene also favors it, book 1, De Fide, chapter 25: Aeon, he says, is said to be that which is always extended together with the eternal things, as it were a space: but the angels endure through aeons; therefore their duration is extended as it were a space, and consequently includes parts succeeding one another. St. Anselm also agrees, in the Proslogion, c. 24: In this way also you transcend all things, even eternal ones, he says, speaking to God, because your eternity and theirs is wholly present to you, since that eternity does not yet have of its eternity what is to come, just as it no longer has what is past: therefore he holds that the duration of the angels does not exist as to that part which has passed, nor as to that which is future, and accordingly he thinks the duration of the angels includes parts succeeding one another. Finally St. Jerome, in the Epistle to Marcella, says: God alone is such that he does not know having been, or going to be: therefore a creature in its being has past and future, and consequently succession.

The Doctor answers, n. 21. that by all these authorities it is only persuaded that no creature is independent from the first Cause, but always dependent; not, however, by a continuous dependence now one, now another, but by the same, on account of which any creature whatever can have being with one part of time, and not with another, and thus can as it were fall under time, that is, coexist with one part of time, and not with another; for which reason it is said to have been, but not to be going to be, and thus not to have eternal being.

I answer 2. for the sake of greater elucidation, to each of those authorities singly; and indeed to the first of St. Augustine, I say that he intends only that if temporal duration of itself subsisted always necessarily, and could in no way fail even from without, it would truly be eternity, which, as is apparent, is altogether impossible: but he does not will that if that duration subsisted without any flux, and with the ordinary conservation of God, it ought to be eternity; for from that it would not follow that it could not in any way fail, as eternity itself is altogether indefectible. Hence I distinguish the consequent: if aevum did not flow, that is, if it were altogether indefectible, it would be eternity, I concede; for we do not will it to be non-flowing in that way: if it did not flow, insofar as it would not have succeeding parts, it would be eternity, I deny the consequence. To the second saying from St. Augustine, I deny the subsumed inference drawn from it: for by the very fact that the same action by which the thing was produced is always continued, the thing itself conserved is also continued without any succession in itself, or in its duration. To the authority of Boethius I answer that he wills that the sempiternity of God be always present so necessarily that it be altogether indefectible, even with respect to whatever; but the sempiternity which an angel would have if it had been created from eternity would not have existed always present necessarily, since it could have failed, God willing: whence that saying is to be distinguished in the same way as the prior one of St. Augustine. To St. Damascene I say that the consequence drawn from his authority in the last place is to be denied: for extension through a space can be said not of that which has parts succeeding one another, but of that whereby the very existence itself, the same always, is conserved indivisible. To St. Anselm I say that he wills only that since the angels have not existed always necessarily, nor will exist, since they can fail, God willing: therefore on account of that possible defection they can truly be said not to have what is future, nor what is past: just as God has it necessarily, because in the highest degree necessarily, he always was, is, and will be. Hence the consequence is to be denied: for the whole of that duration of the angel for past and future time exists now, although it has not existed necessarily for the past, nor, speaking absolutely, will it so exist for the future. Finally, to St. Jerome I deny the consequence drawn from his authority: for the angel, even if it has a permanent duration, can know past and future, since it knows that it has not existed necessarily, nor will exist, inasmuch as it can be annihilated, God so ordaining.

You will object 2. Another authority of St. Augustine, from book 8, De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 19, where he says: As the air with respect to the Sun is not made lucid, but becomes lucid, otherwise, the Sun absent, the air would remain lucid: so the creature stands with respect to God. From which the Doctor Subtilis argues thus for the opinion of St. Bonaventure, on the cited question 1, n. 4:

The creature is continually produced by God conserving, and is conserved by God producing, and it does not only depend on God inasmuch as the productive action of it goes forth from God for the first instant in which it has being, but also inasmuch as for any instant whatever in which it is conserved in being, that divine action by which it is conserved continually goes forth from God; but it is not that very same action by which it was being produced by God for the first instant, which goes forth from God for the other instants in which it is conserved: but another action altogether distinct, succeeding the prior: therefore the duration of the angel is not whole at once, but successive.

The consequence is evident, because that conserving action is of the essence of the duration of the angel, either as the formal reason, or an intrinsic part; or as a condition sine qua non: therefore if that conservation is successive, the very duration of the angel will also be successive, or at least will depend on something successive. The Doctor proves the minor: the conserving action is a true positive action: but it is not the same by which God produced the angel in the first instant: therefore it is another, succeeding that prior one. The major is evident, because, the Doctor says, to conserve is not only not to destroy, but is some positive action of God, otherwise he would be said to conserve the light who does not close the window, which is openly false, for the light could be conserved in the hall even with it absent. Furthermore, if conservation were not a positive action, it would follow that annihilation, opposed to it, would be a positive action, because there is no negation of a negation: but it is false that annihilation is a positive action, because to annihilate is not to act; therefore to conserve is to act. Finally, no creature is independent in its being, because it is not pure act: therefore it depends continually on a cause, not only by reason of its primary production, whereby it received being from that cause, as if it did not continually receive that being from it, because it would follow that to conserve would be nothing other than to have acted previously, and now not to destroy: therefore it is necessary that the conserving action be positive. The minor is therefore proved, namely that that positively conserving action, distinct from the first productive action; because by that productive action whereby the thing received being in the first instant, it cannot be said to be formally and ultimately conserved in that being for the other following instants, without any superadded thing; for that first productive action could be without the thing being conserved for another following instant; since in that following instant it could be annihilated: therefore, that it may exist for another following instant, there must be another action of its conservation distinct from the prior.

If you said that indeed from that action alone the thing produced by it does not have that it exist for another posterior instant, but it is further required that there be that posterior instant, which being posited, and without any new action, or anything superadded in any way, that thing coexists with that posterior instant; the Doctor urges against this: if the angel, produced in the first instant, had of itself, and without anything superadded, the power to coexist with the following time, there being posited only the existence of the future time, it would follow that its duration would not differ from eternity; for eternity cannot coexist with future time unless future time exists; but where it will no longer exist, neither will eternity coexist with it. Add that notwithstanding the production of the angel for the first instant, it could not have coexistence with the future instant, even with the future time itself existing; because it could not be conserved for that instant: therefore from the action whereby it receives being for the first instant it does not have being for the future instant, even with such a future instant existing.

Therefore the Doctor answers, n. 20. by denying the minor, and conceding the consequence of each proof, from which it does not follow that conservation is an action distinct from the first production as to the positive element of each; although the first production, inasmuch as it signifies a respect to the non-being immediately preceding the production of the thing, is distinct from the conserving action, inasmuch as the latter does not signify such a respect, but rather a respect to the being immediately preceding: for the productive action presupposes the non-being of the thing which is produced, but the conserving action supposes that the thing which is conserved previously had being through the first production of itself.

But that this objection with its proofs may be more easily solved, I answer: on the hypothesis that duration were a mode distinct from the very thing enduring, it indeed follows that that mode through which the thing would coexist with the first instant could not suffice for it to exist in the second instant; nor could it consequently make the angel existent for the second instant, unless it itself existed for the second instant: therefore that the thing might exist for the second instant, there would have to be another mode distinct, through which it would thus exist. On the supposition, however, that the duration of the angel, and the action whereby it is produced, superadds nothing above the entity and existence of the angel itself, beyond the volition of God, whereby he wills to produce it for so long a time, or for such, the argument concludes nothing; because it is false that that action of God, whereby it is produced for the first instant, can in fact be conserved without the angel being conserved, namely in the composite sense, and on the hypothesis that the conserving action of the angel would always subsist. Hence although there could be granted some productive action which of itself, and without anything else superadded, would not suffice for the conservation of the thing, for instance if God willed to produce an angel with the intention that through a single instant alone that angel should subsist: nevertheless, since the action whereby he in fact creates the angel is that volition whereby he wills to produce it for eternity a parte post, and since that volition cannot be without the angel necessarily existing thus for eternity, hence the aforesaid argument introduces no difficulty.

You will object 3. If the duration of the angel, whereby it ought to exist, e.g., for a year, is not something successive, but indivisible, simple, and immutable: it follows, that after half a year God could not bring it about that that angel should not subsist for the other following half of the year; just as he cannot bring it about that it has not existed for the preceding half of the same year. But the consequent is absurd; for it is false that God, for any time whatever, cannot destroy a creature produced by himself: therefore, etc.

The Doctor proves the sequel of the major, n. 6. in that which has the whole of being at once, to have been, to be, and to be going to be are the same: but that which was, it is impossible that it not have been: therefore if in the aeviternal to have been and to be going to be are the same, it is also impossible that it not be future. But this is proper to God alone, whose eternity to have been, to be, and to be going to be it embraces necessarily and indivisibly. Then, God cannot from eternity will contradictories, as contradictories: but he can will to create the angel, and annihilate it, and consequently he could will it to be, and not will it to be: therefore the being of the angel, and its non-being, do not seem to be contradictories: but truly they would be contradictories, unless diverse nows, or diverse instants of duration, were assigned, in one of which he would will to create the angel and that it exist, and in the other he would will to annihilate it, or would not will to create it and that it be: but those diverse nows ought not to be instants of time, because God could will to create and annihilate an angel even if no time were given: therefore they ought to be diverse instants of aevum, or of the duration of the angel, succeeding one another, and consequently the duration of the angel will be successive.

I answer 1. I distinguish the minor: it is absurd that God could not annihilate the angel for any instant whatever in the divided sense, and on the hypothesis that he has not decreed to conserve it for that instant, I concede: in the composite sense, and on the hypothesis that he has decreed to conserve it for that instant, I deny.

I answer 2. By distinguishing the sequel of the major: if the duration of the angel is something indivisible holding on the side of the angel itself, it must necessarily make the angel enduring for the whole year, I concede: if that indivisible does not hold on the side of the angel itself, but of God, I deny. But it is false that that duration is something indivisible holding on the side of the angel precisely, for it is the very volition of God whereby he wills it to exist for a year, or for eternity, which volition is one and indivisible; hence it is in no way inconvenient that if God wills to produce the angel and conserve it for a year, or eternity, the angel also ought to be conserved for so long a time in the composite sense, and that God cannot not give to it future being, just as he cannot not have given to it past being. To the first proof of the sequel I distinguish the minor: it is repugnant to created duration that it have being, having been, and going to be at once, inasmuch as the duration is of a created thing, holding on the side of the creature itself, I concede the minor: holding on the side of God conserving the creature through his indivisible and simple volition, I deny. To the second proof I deny the minor; for by the same reason that it would not be contradictory that God willed to create and annihilate the angel if its duration were successive, so neither would it be contradictory if its duration be something permanent and indivisible: for to save that contradiction nothing helps that that duration be divisible rather than indivisible. But how those two opposite volitions with respect to conserving and annihilating the angel could not be contradictories is gathered from this, that God can will the angel to be in such a way that, if such or such a time were existing, by the force of that volition the angel could not endure except for so long, or so long a finite time; and thence he would have a volition whereby he would will to conserve it further, by reason of which volition it would come about that, although further time would be admitted, nevertheless the angel would not exist in it. Hence I distinguish the subsumed: that those two opposite volitions would be contradictories, unless diverse nows, whether of aevum or of time, actually existing, were assigned, I deny: if those diverse nows were assigned as possible, in one of which creation could be, and in the other the negation of creation, I concede. Therefore those diverse nows ought not to be nows of time, or of aevum, which exist in act; but they can be diverse possible nows of time.

You will object 4. The angel is going to endure for eternity: therefore it will have duration to infinity, and accordingly if its duration is not successive, but whole at once, the consequence is that its duration is actually infinite; and consequently, that something created is actually infinite: but it is absurd that something created be actually infinite: therefore, etc.

The Angelic Doctor denies the consequence, num. 23. For in order that something be infinite by reason of the coexistence it could have with infinite time, it would have to coexist with all the parts of that infinite time: for just as that time would not be infinite unless it included infinite parts, so what coexists with it would not be infinite unless it equally coexisted with all its parts; but since the parts of infinite time can nowhere be simultaneously in act, neither could the coexistence with those parts be simultaneously in act. And therefore, although the duration of the angels is indivisible in itself, nevertheless since it is divisible with respect to coexistence with infinite time, if such were granted, it does not follow that they must be actually infinite in itself and permanently, although it could have a successive coexistence with the parts of infinite time, if such were granted.

Finally he objects: An angel could have been created not a sinner, and afterwards could have sinned, even if there had been no time: therefore in its duration there can be a prior moment, namely that in which it would not be a sinner, and a later one, in which it would exist as a sinner; and so its duration is successive. It is confirmed: an angel could be created, and afterwards annihilated, and another angel created after it: but in that case it would not be true that those two angels existed simultaneously for the same now: therefore they would have to exist for different nows: but another angel could coexist with those two angels, namely with the annihilated one and the one newly produced; therefore in the duration of the third angel there would be a prior and a later: prior indeed, by reason of which it would be said to have coexisted with the annihilated angel: and later, by which it would coexist with the newly produced angel.

The Doctor denies the consequence, both of the argument and of the confirmation, num. 24. For although one angel follows upon another, and from not sinning becomes sinning, it does not follow from this that there is a succession in its duration, but there would only be a succession between its duration and its annihilation, and likewise between its innocence and its injustice: so that although its duration coexists with an innocence and an injustice succeeding one another, it does not follow from this that there is any succession in its duration; for the indivisible duration with which it previously coexisted with innocence can coexist with its injustice. In the same way a third angel could coexist with an angel previously produced and with an angel subsequently produced without any succession in its intrinsic duration; just as eternity itself, which is indivisible and without any formal succession, coexists, according to all, with yesterday and today.

* Corollary. — From these things it becomes clear that even if the Subtle Doctor solved all the arguments of Henry and of St. Thomas against the opinion of St. Bonaventure, and demonstrated that they do not prove nor are correctly deduced, nevertheless Cajetan falsely charges him, when he says that he held with St. Bonaventure that the angel is measured by successive duration, or that the duration of the angels includes formal succession; nor does Rada rightly hold, controv. 1. art. 1., Delogad. in that treatise De Angelis, cap. 9., nor others who think that the Doctor proposed that opinion as probable and confirmed it with his arguments. For whoever has read the arguments of the Doctor for the indivisible aevum of the angels and of spiritual things, and indeed of ingenerable material substances, will easily persuade himself that he could not have proposed that opinion of a successive aevum as probable. For how would those things cohere with what he has in 2. dist. 2. quaest. 2. num. 3., where he clearly proves that the aevum of an angel is really indistinct from its existence, which we shall also demonstrate in the following Conclusion? But there the Doctor teaches, in what follows, that the duration of the existence of an angel is indivisible. How then could the probability of the other opinion, which posits formal succession in angelic duration, stand with this doctrine?

Third conclusion. — Angelic duration is not really distinct from the angel.

Thus the Subtle Doctor, in the second book, dist. 2. quaest. 2. n. 3., where he proves this conclusion as follows: By this very fact that a thing is produced and preserved, or that it terminates the productive and conserving action, it endures either in an instant or in time: therefore nothing else is required in order that it endure: both because if duration were something distinct from the thing enduring and from its productive and conserving action, it would be something absolute or relative: but neither can be said: therefore it is not something distinct from them. The minor is clear: for it is not relative, because a real relation must have a real term: but a thing can endure without there being something real to which it would have a relation, for instance if God were to produce a single angel: nor is it absolute, because it would be posterior to the thing enduring, and consequently the thing enduring could be produced without it; which is absurd, because then it would endure and not endure: it would endure indeed, because it would be produced: but it would not endure, because it would not have the duration, which would be another absolute thing posterior and not produced.

Proof 2. Whenever things are really distinguished, and one of them is prior in nature to the other, one of them can also exist without the other: therefore if aeviternal duration is really distinguished from the substance of the angel, since the substance itself is posterior, it follows that the angel can be and remain without its aeviternal duration, and thus it will endure without its duration, which is contradictory. Moreover, if aevum is really distinct from the being of the angel, either the angel endures by itself, or by another distinct from itself. If by itself, then by equal reason existence itself could endure formally by itself, because that other will not be more perfect than its actual existence itself, since it is as it were a passion of it: but if it endures in being by another absolute thing distinct from itself, there will be a process to infinity in measured things and measures. Further, plurality is not to be posited without necessity, from the first book of the Physics: but there is no necessity that aevum, taken as the duration of the aeviternal, be something other than the aeviternal: therefore it is not other. Finally, if aevum is really and essentially distinguished from the angel, or from the aeviternal whose duration it is, it follows that it is some accident of it: but it seems impossible that the substance itself endure per accidens; for the accident rather seems to endure through the substance than the converse: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. Time is really distinguished from the motion which it measures: therefore by equal reason something really distinct from the essence of the angel must necessarily be admitted, which would be its measure.

The Doctor denies the consequence, because, he says, num. 8. of the same question,

although time differs from motion, and consequently the instant from mutation, the same does not seem to be said of the duration of the angel: for, he says, if time differs from motion, this is because the parts of the same proportion are not necessarily equal in number and quantity to the parts of the same proportion of time; but no quantity is the same as another quantity unless the parts of the same proportion and quantity in it are equal to the parts of the same proportion and quantity in the other, and this equ> al both in number and in magnitude: but speaking of the quantity which is in motion, which it has on the part of the magnitude, or of the form according to which there is motion, some parts of motion, for instance ten parts completing the whole motion, can be with ten parts of time: but they are not the same as those, because with the same parts of time there can be more parts of motion equal to the prior parts of motion, or as many unequal ones, because a double power moves the same mobile, and consequently twice as fast; there will be no part in the slower motion which is not in the faster motion, speaking of the parts which it has in magnitude, or of the parts which it has according to the form by which it is: because the mover moving the mobile with a faster motion does not make it pass through some parts of magnitude simultaneously, but precisely one after another: therefore there are as many parts in the faster motion, and of such a kind, speaking of that quantity, as there are in the slower motion; but the same time cannot have the same parts with this motion and with that motion: therefore those parts of time will not be the same, neither with the parts of this motion nor of that, because they do not stand in the same proportion to the whole, nor are they equal to those parts of the whole.

Thus the Doctor. But the same reason does not hold of aeviternal duration and the angel, since both the substance of the angel and its duration are altogether indivisible: and therefore one cannot exceed the other.

You will say 2. Permanent quantity is an accident distinct from the subject: therefore successive quantity too, because both are of the same genus, or predicament: and consequently both must be distinct from the subject, especially if the subject is a substance: but what measures the existence of the angel is successive quantity: therefore the measure of the angel is really distinguished from it.

The Doctor answers, num. 11. that there is nothing in the actual existence of the angel which is properly a quantity, nor anything indivisible of the genus of quantity; because existence seems to be able to be known without any other addition. Hence the supposition of the subsumption is denied, namely that there is in the angel something which measures its existence: and even if such a thing were granted, certainly it would not be a quantity, whereby it would not be something really distinct from it.

You will say 3. If a thing could endure of itself without any other addition, it could also be in a place of itself without a new where superadded, against our opinion.

I answer. by denying the parity; because a thing does not necessarily have being in a place from the fact that it is produced; for it could have it independently; but it endures by this very fact that it is produced and preserved. Hence in order to be in a place, something must concur besides conservation: but in order to endure, nothing other than conservation must accrue.

You will insist. An angel is as indifferent to being in this or that time as to being in this or that place: therefore just as besides that indifference a distinct where is posited, which is determined to this place rather than to another, so in order that it be in this time rather than in another, something added must be posited: but that is nothing other than duration: therefore, etc.

I answer. by denying the subsumption; because duration is not that from which a thing has being in this or that time, but that by which it can exist for such or such a time, comprehending under the name of time either its divisible part or the indivisible instant.

Corollary I. — From these things the Doctor gathers, num. 11., that there is not in the angel any form intrinsic to it, really distinct from its existence, by which it would be measured. He proves this; because entities are not to be multiplied without necessity: but there is no necessity of positing such a measure in the angel: therefore, etc. The minor is proved; because if there were a necessity of positing a distinct measure, there would be a necessity of positing a distinct duration: but this is not necessary, as is clear from the proof of the first conclusion. It is confirmed; because those very arguments by which it was proved that no distinct duration is given in it prove that no distinct measure is given in it. It is confirmed secondly; because if a measure were posited in the angel, neither an exceeding nor an exceeded measure would be posited in it, since it cannot be understood for what reason it would be exceeding or exceeded; therefore an equal measure ought to be posited: but neither can this be said, because nothing posited in the angel can be better known for the purpose of measuring, neither ex natura rei nor per accidens, than the very existence of the angel: therefore nothing is posited in it which could be the measure of that existence: and although some total quantity, distinct and known, could be its measure with respect to certain of its parts, nevertheless not even thus can the reason of a measure be posited in the angel, because it has no parts which could be measured by it. The Doctor adds to this that not only is it not necessary to posit something absolute as a measure, but not even any relation, because it is not necessary here to posit any other relation than that by which it is related to the efficient or conserving cause, and that is not something other than its foundation.

Corollary II. — He gathers secondly, in the third question, that some external measure is to be admitted in the duration of the angels, and that it is either outside the genus or in the genus. The former is God himself by reason of his infinite duration, in accordance with which created things can be said to coexist with him more or less. The latter is the existence of the first angel, whose aeviternal duration can be called the measure of the others: for this measure of the first angel with respect to all aeviternal things is the simplest, and more uniform, regular, and simpliciter better known in the genus of aeviternal things; accordingly it is the measure of all the existences of the other angels: just as the motion of the first mobile, because it is the simplest of all, best known, and more uniform and longer-lasting, is posited as the measure of all motions, and time of all temporal things. Therefore just as the existence of any angel is measured by its particular aevum, as its extrinsic measure, and in that way is distinguished from another, so that there are as many aeva as there are aeviternal things: so, generally speaking, there is one aevum of all aeviternal things, namely the existence of the first angel, distinct from the existence of any aeviternal thing, and therefore it is called an extrinsic measure also in the reason of duration.

It is proved from the fact that, as we said above from Aristotle, in every genus of things there is some first thing which is the cause and measure of the rest: therefore in the durations of spiritual things one must have recourse to the first duration, more perfect and uniform, in order to measure the durations of the others; but that duration is in that first angel, whose nature is simpler, more perfect, and more uniform and regular in its duration; and consequently its existence is the measure, at least extrinsic, of other incorruptible things, since each aeviternal thing has its own proper intrinsic measure, as was said. Hence just as the measure, whether of wheat or of wine and other such things, in some commonwealth is wont to be sealed with the public seal, so that it may be made known to all that it is faithful and certain, in order that the other measures be weighed against it: so, since art imitates nature, it must be said that the substance of the first and supreme angel, proportion being preserved, is the uniform and perfect measure of all other spirits, which measure indeed is really the same as the existence of that supreme angel in which it inheres, but is really distinguished from the existences of the others which it measures, just as that supreme angel is really distinguished from all the other angels.

You will say 1. If the aevum of the first angel is the measure of all aeviternal things: therefore, the first angel in which it is being destroyed, such an aevum would also be destroyed, and consequently all the other aeviternal things measured by it would be changed: but this is inconvenient: therefore, etc.

I answer. that this being granted, they would not be measured by the aevum of the first angel, nor consequently would they be changed according to their absolute entity, because the relation of the measure to the measured is not real but of reason, which imports no mutation; for the first angel is related to the other aeviternal things as an exceeding measure, but not as a measure from which the measured depends.

You will say 2. The measure must be better known than the thing measured: but the aevum of the first angel is not better known to the other angels, for rather the proper aevum is better known to each angel than the aevum of the first angel: therefore, etc.

I answer. that it suffices that the measure be better known in itself, even if it is not better known to the one who uses it; for as regards us, the motions of these lower things are better known than the motion of the first mobile, which is the measure of all, because in itself it is better known; so it is with the aeviternal duration of the first angel.

You will say 3. All the angels were created simultaneously, and the duration of all is equally uniform: therefore there is no greater reason why the aevum of the first angel should be the measure of aeviternal things, than why the aeva of these should be the measure of the first angel.

I answer. that the aevum of the first angel is simpler, more uniform, and more invariable, and thus it is the measure with respect to aeviternal things: just as although the other heavens are uniform in their motions, nevertheless they are not called the measure of the first mobile, but rather are measured by it, because it is higher.

These things notwithstanding, I would not hesitate to assert that in truth no angel can be called the measure of another's duration by reason of greater simplicity; for it does not appear how one angel, as regards essence, could be called simpler than another angel, since all are indivisible as regards integral and physical parts, and none of them is without metaphysical composition, nor composition of essence and existence, nor composition of nature and personality. Unless perhaps simpler were said because it could perceive more things simultaneously through fewer acts; and in this sense, although a more perfect angel could be called simpler, nevertheless from such simplicity it does not follow that it could measure the existence of another as regards its duration, of which measurement we are speaking.

You will ask. By what measure are the angelic operations measured?

The Doctor answers in question four. That the immanent operations of an angel, namely its intellection and volition, are measured by aevum, just as its substance is, he proves thus: because things that exist in the same manner as long as they exist have a measure of the same kind, even though one of them exists longer than another; but the angel and its operation have the same mode of existing while they exist, without any difference, except that the angel is to last longer than any operation of its own: therefore the angel and its operation have a measure of the same kind; but the angel has aevum for its measure: therefore also its operation. The major is proved, because by the very fact that they have a similar mode of existing, whatever can measure the one can also measure the other; and if it could not, it would certainly follow from this very thing that they did not have a similar mode of existing. It is confirmed, because from this it follows that all the angels, although some are more perfect than others, nevertheless have a measure of the same kind, namely because they all have a uniform mode of existing. It is confirmed secondly, because the fact that one thing exists longer than another does not prevent both from being measured by aevum; otherwise, keeping the proportion, it would follow that because sound does not last as long as the motion of the heavens, it ought not to be measured by time, as the motion of the heavens is measured, but by some other measure of a different kind, which is absurd.

You will reply. that there is a disparity; for the existence of the angels will be everlasting, whereas their knowledge and other immanent operations can cease.

On the contrary. because it is per accidens with respect to the duration of a measure that one thing lasts longer than another; for if an angel were to last only for an hour, it would still be measured by aevum; for perpetuity, or destruction or annihilation do not formally vary the measure: therefore likewise its knowledge and other immanent operations, together with their nature, while they remain, having their whole being at once and uniformly permanent, suffice for them to have the same measure which the very existence of the angel has. This argument is confirmed, because for no other reason are successive things measured by time than because they have a permanent mode of lasting; for, as was said above, a measure must be proportioned to what is measured, and the diversity of measure is considered according to the diverse mode of lasting of what is measured: but such interior and immanent operations of the angels are not successive, but unfailing and permanent, like the very existence of the angels: therefore they must be measured by the same measure.

The Doctor proves it secondly. The beatific vision is measured by aevum; therefore also the immanent operation of an angel. He proves the consequence, because the beatific vision proceeds from the intellect as from a partial cause: therefore the intellect has a production terminated to it; but that production must be measured by such a measure as the vision itself is measured; for the vision cannot be in aevum, and its continuous production, on which it necessarily and per se depends, of another measure: therefore that production is in aevum, that is, measured by aevum; but if that production is measured by aevum, then every other operation of the angel produced and conserved indivisibly must likewise be measured by aevum.

The Thomists reply. that those operations are indeed not measured by the eternity which is the measure of God, but by participated eternity, which they say is inferior to divine eternity and differs from it as the more perfect from the less perfect; for divine eternity is the measure of divine being, while participated eternity is the measure of the being of the divine and supernatural order, such as habitual grace, the virtues infused by God, and the beatific vision.

On the contrary. whatever is properly measured by eternity is unfailing by its nature, as God is: therefore what is measured by participated eternity is unfailing by participation; but no being is so unfailing, because every created being, absolutely speaking, is fallible: therefore nothing is measured by participated eternity.

If you were to say that glory is in this way unfailing, I would reply with stronger reason that since the angel is a living substance, and consequently under this consideration nobler in its very entity than the glory which is an accident, it too ought to be so measured; for whether it is a natural or supernatural being matters little to the present difficulty. Yet no one admits this.

You will say 1. By this the duration and measure of God are distinguished from the duration and measure of the angel, in that the duration of God is independent and unfailing by its nature, whereas the duration of the angel is fallible and dependent by its nature, so that it could in no way be, and after it is, could cease; but the angelic operation has some fallibility by its nature which the angel does not have, because the angel, once produced, naturally tends never to cease, which is not required of its operation, which can naturally cease: therefore the operation of the angel has a measure specifically distinct from the measure of the angel. The consequence is evident; for there is no stronger reason why the fallibility of the angel and the infallibility of God should require distinct measures than the fallibility of such an angelic operation and the infallibility of the angelic substance itself, at least intrinsically and of itself; nor does there seem to be a stronger reason why that diverse mode of existing which God and the angel have — inasmuch as the angel exists fallibly and God infallibly — should require a diverse measure, than that diverse mode of existing which the angel and its operation have, inasmuch as the latter is naturally fallible and the former not so; therefore they do not have the same mode of existing, nor consequently the same measure.

I answer. that even if the substance of the angels and its operation had a different duration and measure, they could nevertheless agree with each other in the character of aevum as such, namely insofar as aevum is distinguished from eternity and from time; for aevum thus taken is nothing else than the duration of a thing fallible of itself or through another, and having its whole being at once without any succession of parts; and the angelic substance and its operation have such a duration, and therefore would agree in the character of aevum, although they would differ from each other in the specific character of this or that aevum.

You will say 2. If the substance and operation of the angels were measured by aevum, it would follow that all permanent beings would likewise be measured by aevum; but this seems absurd: therefore, etc. The major stands; for there is nothing permanent whose existence does not remain the same while it lasts, and this without succession properly so called, which is the acquisition or loss of part after part. The minor is proved first, because according to the Philosopher, book 4 of the Physics, text 118, rest is measured by time; therefore those things around which motion is naturally apt to be, when they are no longer in motion, are measured by time, just as if they were in motion. Secondly, because the generations and corruptions of all generable and corruptible things are measured in an instant of time; but of that whose first being is measured by a now of time, the habitual being is measured by time: therefore the habitual being of all these things after generation is measured by time.

The Doctor grants the major in the same question, number 9. Namely, that it be measured by aevum: Whatever actual existence is invariable, that is to say, to which it is repugnant that according to it there be variation, whether flux or acquisition of part after part; for neither the perpetuity of some things, nor their corruption, or annihilation, formally varies the measure, provided the existence is of the same kind while it lasts.

But to answer the minor, he notes that several things can be considered regarding permanence. First, there can be considered the flux of a divisible permanent form, which is acquired successively, which flux is the very successive acquisition of the form, or the succession of the parts of the form. Secondly, there can be considered the very form for which that flux is apt, or which is acquired successively in act, as for example the form of heat or cold produced successively. Thirdly, the form remaining, around which motion can be, although de facto it is not, as heat, for example, after it has been produced. Fourthly, the permanent form around which flux is not apt to be, or which is not apt to be produced successively, as substantial forms producible in an instant, for example the form of the soul, which form nevertheless has another consequent form around which flux is apt to be, for example the form of heat or of some other quality consequent upon that permanent substantial form. Fifthly and finally, that which is so permanent that neither can flux be given with respect to it, nor with respect to some form antecedent or consequent to it, as are the heavenly bodies.

From these, this last, namely the fifth, is in no way measured by time, neither per se nor per accidens, as by its proper intrinsic measure. But the first is measured by time. The fourth, of itself, is not apt to be measured by time by reason of the consequent form around which motion and rest can be. The third and the fourth are in reality the same form, which nevertheless has one character insofar as motion is toward it, and another character insofar as it is under rest without motion. And this manner of speaking the Doctor again distinguishes into two. The first is that it is always measured by time, even when it rests and remains according to all its parts, because it is a form variable of itself, or acquirable and destructible successively; and if this is held, then the major ought not to be understood of all permanent things, but of those which must be produced and conserved indivisibly, nor does the first objection press even if everything proposed in it is granted. The second manner of speaking is that that form, as long as it is under rest, is measured by aevum, because then it has all its parts existing indivisibly. He says, however, that this second manner of speaking is less probable than the first, because a form produced in time for the last instant of that time seems to have that instant for its measure, and not a now of aevum; but according to this second manner of speaking this would be false. Whence he concludes that although the rest of forms of this kind is measured by time, yet the forms themselves are not necessarily so measured; or if, according to the prior manner of speaking, it is said that they are measured by time, nevertheless it must be said that all generable and corruptible substances, indivisibly or successively, are of themselves measured by aevum, although per accidens, by reason of the consequent motion, they may be said to be measured by time. So the Doctor.

You will say 1. Between the thing whose substance and action are measured by time, as fire for example, and the thing whose substance and action are measured by eternity, as God, there is given a middle thing whose substance is measured by aevum and whose action by time; but such a thing is the angel rather than any other thing: therefore the operation of the angel is not measured by aevum. The major is that of Proclus, who is the author of the book De causis among the works of Aristotle.

The Doctor denies the major in n. 13. and rejects the authority of Proclus; because, he says, the doctrine concerning causes was handed down according to the erroneous doctrine of Avicenna, as if that author understood the intelligences to be certain gods, and their operations to be measured by a now of time — not indeed the intrinsic operation, for this would posit neither potentiality nor succession, but the extrinsic one around a body to be in a moment of time; and therefore that authority is not to be had as an authority, because it was handed down through an erroneous root.

You will say 2. Nothing is produced so as to cease immediately: therefore whatever is produced ought to last for some time; and consequently the angelic operation ought to last for some time; but if it were measured by aevum, it ought not to last for any instant; for whatever is measured by aevum and is not eternal must exist for some instant only, whereas the angelic operation is not eternal: therefore if it is measured by aevum, it must exist for some instant.

The Doctor denies the minor. For although nature does not intend the production of a thing so that it cease, and therefore according to the intention of nature the thing produced ought to last for some time, nevertheless it can cease from elsewhere, as is evident in all instantaneous mutations, which, the Doctor says, have being only fleetingly, and immediately are not, that is, immediately cease to be.

You will say 3. Such is the measure of the angelic operation as of the beatific vision; but the beatific vision is not measured by aevum: therefore neither ought the angelic operations to be measured by aevum. The major stands from the second proof deduced above. The minor is proved: both from that passage of John 17, This is eternal life, that they may know thee; and from S. Augustine, book 83 Questions, question 25, where he calls our beatitude participated eternity.

I deny the minor. and to its proof I say, first, that the context of Scripture is taken not for eternity formally taken, but for sempiternal aevum, just as the soul is said to be eternal because it is to endure forever; for, as we observed in the Article on eternity, the name of eternity is used in Scripture in various ways, but especially in five. To S. Augustine I say that he is not speaking of the beatific Vision, but of our soul, which he teaches to be eternal by participation of eternity, seeing that it is to be conserved forever by God, who is eternal.

* You will say 4. The operations of the angel, namely intellection and volition, can be intensified and remitted; but intensification and remission in the doctrine of Scotus take place by the addition of degree to degree, which addition entails succession and hence temporal duration. Therefore the Doctor admits successive duration and the measure of time in the angelic operations.

I answer first. that the argument does not proceed concerning the beatific operations of the angels, which are altogether invariable and incapable of remission or intensification; and forthwith the doctrine of the Doctor concerning those operations is altogether unshaken.

But as regards the other operations which they elicited while they were wayfarers, it does not appear how those could have admitted more and less, seeing that in that state the angels had uniform knowledge and volition arising from the species infused into them, which represented the object equally and without any variation; and hence in that state the angels had a certain and invariable knowledge, to which corresponded operations of the will likewise uniform. Therefore concerning these operations also the argument does not press. But as regards the other operations which the angels acquire for themselves by discourse, I answer that even if perhaps some remission and intensification intervenes in them, it still does not follow from this that these take place with time and successive duration; for those degrees are altogether indivisible, and those which are added do not properly compose with the preceding ones, but with one new degree coming upon the scene there is also made a new cognition, which, since it is indivisible, is not measured by successive time, and henceforth must be measured by the same duration by which the other angelic operations are measured.

You will ask. By what measure and duration are the transient operations of the angels measured?

I answer. These operations, such as local motion, the carrying about and agitation of bodies etc., I say are to be measured by our time. For by this reason they share a certain condition common to bodies, namely local motion, and ubi, inasmuch as the angels participate in it: therefore they ought also to participate in the measure of corporeal things, which is continuous time. It is confirmed; for inasmuch as they are moved locally, they participate in ubi, which is a condition and passion belonging to body, somehow of the same kind in them and in body: therefore they can also be measured by the measure of the first moved body. Indeed I add that although the foregoing concerning the immanent operations, according to the doctrine of the Doctor, appear more certain, nevertheless I would not hesitate to assert that the duration of the angel himself, as well as of his operations, and indeed of whatsoever permanent thing, can truly also be measured by our time; so that by their coexistence with our time it can be distinctly known how long they have lasted, namely either by a year, or by a day, or by an hour; and accordingly the duration of those things can be called temporal just as much as anything else whatsoever.

And this can indeed be confirmed by reason; for angelic duration must have some measure, whence it can easily be conjectured that the angel has lasted or will last so long; but this cannot be distinctly known through the very existence of the angel; for even if someone were to know intuitively the nature of the angel and its real existence, still from that he could not know with certainty how long it has lasted or will last; and therefore it must have another measure from which is known what sort and how great its duration is, and to measure it at least as regards the past. Now time can easily serve for this; since, on the hypothesis that (as was proved above) the angels were created together with the Universe, anyone will easily be able to judge that they have already lasted through so many thousands and hundreds of years, namely from the creation of the world until now; and if time were perpetual, from it anyone could know of the angels that they themselves and others have lasted so many and no more years, days, and hours: therefore if we consider the coexistence of the angels with time, it will be permissible to assert that it can be called an external measure of angelic duration, as of any other permanent things whatsoever.

Yet thence I would not subscribe to the Thomists, who assert that the immanent operations of the angels are measured by discrete time; for this assertion seems improbable: both because, as we proved above in question 1, conclusion 2, that discrete time is altogether fictitious and gratuitously invented; and because any instant of discrete time necessarily coexists with some part of our time, or with an instant: if with an instant, then our time is likewise discrete, and has instants succeeding each other immediately; and henceforth it is not a continuous quantity, as the Philosophers hold; if it corresponds to some part of time, then it follows that the angel cannot form an intellection in an indivisible instant of our time, because it could not form it except in an instant of its discrete time, which instant would necessarily correspond not to an instant but to a divisible part of our time; but this consequent is far from the truth; for if man can form an intellection in an instant of our time, much more the angel; finally, moreover, because the Thomists admit that our intellections and volitions are not measured by discrete time: therefore by parity of reason the same must be said of the angelic ones. The consequence is evident, for our intellections are whole at once, just as the angelic ones: therefore they have a proportionate measure; and hence if those are not measured by discrete time, these likewise cannot be said to be so measured by such a time.