Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Note 1. Local motion is customarily distinguished as fourfold, namely Continuous, Discrete, Successive, and Instantaneous. That motion is called continuous in which the mobile leaves the term from which by parts and acquires the term to which. Discrete, on the contrary, is that motion in which the mobile leaves the whole of the term from which all at once, and immediately acquires the whole of the term to which all at once; yet so that it seems, as it were, to rest in its last being in the term from which before it immediately exists in the term to which through the first of its being in it. Successive is entirely the same as continuous, except perhaps they differ from each other in this, that continuous motion is called that whereby the mobile reaches its adequate place intended and proposed by the mover at the inception of the motion: while successive is that whereby the mobile sometimes does not reach the adequate place proposed, but subsists midway; whence it happens that every continuous motion is also successive, but not every successive motion should for this reason be called continuous. Finally, that motion is called instantaneous whereby the mobile leaves the term from which and acquires the term to which in the same moment; so that this rejection of one term and acquisition of the other coexists with only a single instant of our time. Hence it appears that continuous motion is directly opposed to discrete, and successive to instantaneous. We ask, therefore, whether angels are moved by this twofold, or rather fourfold, local motion.

Note 2. The divisibility of motion is to be drawn chiefly from three heads. First indeed on the part of the mobile, namely when it is extended and divisible, and has extended parts, such that one cannot be moved except after another, as is the motion of an animal. Second, on the part of the extended space having various parts, one of which cannot be traversed except after another, for example the air midway between heaven and earth. Third, on the part of temporal duration; for since time is the measure of motion according to prior and posterior, and therefore according to succession, what is measured must be divisible when the measure is divisible. Hence motion is to be called divisible as often as the mobile has distinct parts, or the space is so extended and disposed that one part ought not to be traversed before another is traversed; or while the motion lasts through some succession of time: but it is not necessary that these three concur together to constitute motion truly divisible, but it suffices that either one intervene in the motion itself. It is certain, however, that angelic motion cannot be said to be divisible on the part of the angel himself, since his substance is wholly indivisible: whether he obtains divisibility from the space that is traversed, or from the time during which it lasts, must be resolved here.

Note 3. Motion can be considered in two ways: first in general, and insofar as it embraces every passage from a term from which to a term to which; whether that passage supposes something mediating between the two terms or not. Second in particular, as it truly signifies not only every such passage, but also the medium between the two terms, which the mobile must pass through in order to pass from the term from which to the term to which. The former is called mutation rather than motion, and it embraces all those instantaneous mutations of generation and corruption, illumination and darkness, etc., which philosophers are accustomed to call motion, though using the word motion loosely and less properly. The latter, however, signifies only that tending of the mobile from the term from which to the term to which through the space mediating between both. There will be discussion here of both. For three things must be determined here: First, whether an angel can be moved per se with local motion that is continuous: Second, whether he can be moved with discrete motion: Third, whether he can pass in an instant from one place to another by true motion, or only by true mutation.

First conclusion. — An angel can be moved per se from place to place with continuous and successive motion. So the Doctor in Book II, dist. 2, q. 9, n. 8, where, after saying that an angel can move himself because he is not immense and unlimited as regards every where: therefore he can be changed from one where to another, he adds: and that continuously is evident: because between two wheres there are infinite intermediate wheres, which is proved from the continuous motion of a body through all those wheres: but through all those the angel can pass, such that he is in none of them except indivisibly, and consequently he cannot pass through all of them unless he be moved continuously.

By which words the Doctor affirms not only that an angel can be moved, but even that he can be moved continuously without any interruption for some time, say for a quarter of an hour, or an hour, or a day: which he certainly proves, because between two places, from one of which to the other an angel can be moved, so that he must necessarily leave the prior place before acquiring the later, there are either infinitely many places acquirable successively, on the hypothesis that infinite parts are given in the continuum, whether in act or in potency, as is commonly conceded; or at least very many intermediate places successively and continuously acquirable, otherwise a body could not be moved successively and continuously from one place to another: therefore the angel, moving himself from one place to another, can move himself successively and continuously through those intermediate places.

The Doctor confirms this argument from the fact that if an angel could not move himself continuously just as bodies do, especially since his substance is spiritual and indivisible: but this objection does not stand; for the rational soul is likewise a wholly indivisible substance, yet separated from the body it can be locally moved, and that with continuous motion. Whence he says: the most blessed soul of Christ is locally moved, because it descended into hell, as the article of faith says. It is also evident from Scripture that angels were sometimes sent with an assumed body, and if then they were moved with the body, it seems that there was then some passive motion on their part, or formally in the passive motion of the body itself, because they were not formally something of the body. Similarly, it is credible that they were often sent without a body, as was the one sent to Joseph doubting about the conception of blessed Mary.

Proof. An angel can successively leave some place and acquire another in the same manner without any interruption: therefore he can be moved from place to place continuously. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: when an angel is in a lesser place than the one that is adequate to him, he can little by little and successively leave a part of it, so that he remains in a lesser one, and acquire a greater within the breadth of the adequate place: therefore he can also leave successively and by parts the whole place in which he is, transferring himself in the same manner to another total place. This consequence is clear, for no reason appears why the angel could not leave and acquire a total place in this manner just as a partial one. The antecedent is proved: the angel freely applies himself to a greater or lesser place within the breadth of the place adequate to him: therefore also, after he is in some lesser adequate place, he can either leave a part of it, not all at once but by parts, or extend himself to a greater place; for it cannot otherwise be understood how it is free for the angel, once he is in a place, either to contract himself to a lesser place or to extend himself to a greater within the breadth of his adequate place. Then, if it were repugnant for an angel to be moved with continuous and successive motion, especially because his substance is indivisible: yet the rational soul, although indivisible, can successively leave some part of that matter which it informs, namely when some part of the body successively corrupts and wastes away: similarly it can extend itself to informing a new part of the substance which is regenerated through continuous nutrition: therefore by equal reason the angel will be able, notwithstanding his indivisibility, either to leave a part of that adequate place in which he is, or to extend himself to other parts of the same place to be acquired successively.

It is confirmed. It is no more repugnant to the indivisibility of an angel to acquire an extended place successively than to be in an extended and indivisible place: but the latter is possible: therefore also the former.

Finally, an angel can pass from one place to another by passing through all the intermediate places, leaving none untraversed and resting in none of them: therefore he can be moved with continuous and successive motion. The consequence is clear, because he cannot be moved through all those intermediate wheres with no intervening rest except with continuous and successive motion. But the antecedent is proved, because a body can pass through all those media: therefore also an angel. The consequence is clear, because in this the minor shows less repugnance. Likewise, for the continuity and succession of motion the divisibility of space suffices: therefore it is not repugnant for the angel, even though he be indivisible, to be moved continuously. The consequence is obvious, especially since an angel can exist in a divisible place. But the antecedent is clear from the second Note.

You will say 1. The angel is indivisible according to substance: therefore he cannot be moved with continuous motion. The inference is proved, for continuous motion requires that the thing moved be partly in the term from which and partly in the term to which: because what is moved is not being moved when it is in the term from which, for then it rests, nor when it is in the term to which, because it has already been changed: therefore what is moved continuously must be partly in the term from which and partly in the term to which: but the angel is impartible: therefore he cannot be locally moved continuously.

It is confirmed. Because an indivisible place ought to correspond to an indivisible mobile: therefore if the angel passes continuously through some space, it will be necessary that by his transit he number the infinite indivisibles that are in the space, touching one after another, which nevertheless is impossible; since a multitude that can be passed through by counting has a terminus, and consequently is not infinite.

The Doctor answers in the place cited above, n. 36: When it is said that an angel cannot be moved, because he is indivisible, although it could easily be answered that the angel occupies a divisible place, and therefore is related to place as if he were divisible; or that he occupies a punctual place, and thus existing non-punctually he cannot be moved continuously so as always to have punctual being; nevertheless, because no reason seems to appear why an indivisible should be denied motion, even if it were an indivisible of quantity existing per se: therefore it can be conceded that an angel having a punctual where can be moved continuously, as ever existing in a point. From there he proves that an indivisible can be locally moved, even continuously, as is evident from the motion of a sphere and a cube over a perfectly plane surface: since, he says, the divisibility and succession of motion arises from the divisibility of the mobile or of the space, either of which suffices for the divisibility and succession of motion.

You will say 2. Continuous succession in motion arises from the resistance of the mobile to the mover, or of the medium through which the motion occurs to the mobile that is moved through it, or of the medium to the mover that moves through it: but succession in the motion of an angel can arise from none of these heads: therefore his motion cannot be successively continuous. The minor is proved, because not from the first head, inasmuch as the mobile here would be the angel, and the same angel is the mover when he moves himself: but the angel does not resist himself. Nor from the second or third head, because the medium through which angelic motion occurs does not resist the angel either as mover or as mobile, since the angel could move himself through the medium by penetrating it without any motion of the medium. It is confirmed. Because a body would not be moved successively through a vacuum, since such a medium does not resist it: but a plenum resists an angel no more than a vacuum would resist a body: therefore the angel cannot be moved successively through any medium, whether corporeal or empty.

— The Doctor denies the minor in the place cited, n. 10, where he distinguishes two successions in motion, one which belongs to it by reason of space, the other which is attributed to it from the resistance of the medium, which cannot easily be traversed, say on account of its thickness, whereby it does not easily yield to the mobile. The first is essential; the second accidental. The essential one belongs to motion by reason of space, whose parts, since they are not together, also cannot be traversed and gone through together; wherefore it is necessary that any mobile whatsoever pass through them successively, running through one after another: thus the angel descending from Heaven to earth must necessarily traverse the air, the medium, successively. But the accidental succession, which arises either from the resistance of the medium, or from a greater or lesser impediment on the part of the mobile itself in overcoming it, cannot have place in an angel; since neither can the medium resist him, nor can there be in it any impediment by reason of which he would acquire the term more quickly or more slowly. From there the Doctor concludes in n. 13 that successive motion can occur in a vacuum, speaking of essential succession, since that motion would correspond to the parts of the filled place; it would not, however, be accidentally successive, since it would have neither greater nor lesser velocity. For altogether, says the Doctor, the mobile in a vacuum would have no superadded velocity or slowness, such as it would have in a plenum; evidently by reason of the space yielding more easily or more difficultly to the mobile.

You will say 3. If the angel were moved continuously, it would follow that the inferior angel would be moved with equal velocity to the superior angel, even though each would exert all his locomotive power: but the consequent seems absurd: therefore also that from which it follows. The minor is plain, for the greater power an agent has, other things equal, the more excellent an effect it ought to produce: since, therefore, the superior angel excels in a more excellent nature, and therefore a more vigorous locomotive faculty, than the inferior, it is evident that if each exerts all his locomotive power of moving, the superior ought to run through the space with quicker and more prompt motion and obtain the term to which. Therefore the inference of the major is proved: if the superior angel moves himself with continuous and successive motion, he must spend some span of time in perfecting that motion; but however brief that span of time might be, in an equal span the inferior angel could descend from Heaven to earth with the same velocity. Since indeed he undergoes no resistance on the part of the space by which he could be somewhat retarded in his motion: therefore, etc.

— I answer 1. by denying the major: since, as was said just now, the succession of the angel's motion is to be sought not only from the resistant space, but also from that space inasmuch as it is divisible, and has parts not posited together but extended, one of which ought to be traversed after another.

I answer 2. The minor can be denied; for although one angel exceeds another in locomotive power, it still need not be inferred that he must be moved more quickly than the other; for the motive power of the superior angel could exceed the power of the inferior in many other respects, say that he could move a greater body, or agitate one equal to a greater with greater velocity, nay, could hold the inferior angel himself in place against his will and resisting, and impede him from being moved: just as, e.g., it does not follow that, although some luminous body exceeds another in illuminative power, it can illuminate more quickly or faster; nay, this seems impossible, since each illuminates in an instant. It suffices, therefore, for that diversity that the more excellent luminous body diffuse a greater light, and to a greater distance.

Second conclusion. — An angel cannot be naturally moved with discrete motion. This is the Doctor's teaching in Book II, dist. 2, q. 11, against St. Thomas and several of his followers.

Proof. To be moved with discrete motion is to leave the whole of the term from which through one's ultimate being, and immediately afterward to acquire the term to which without any succession: but the angel cannot do this by the powers of nature: therefore he cannot be moved with discrete motion. The major is admitted by the adversaries. But the minor is proved: two immediate indivisible instants cannot be given, otherwise it would follow that something composed of indivisibles is given: but in discrete motion it would be necessary that two immediate instants exist; for there would have to be given an ultimate instant in which the angel is in the term from which, and a first instant in which he becomes present to the term to which: but the ultimate instant in which the angel is in the term from which, and the first instant in which he exists in the term to which, must necessarily be two distinct instants: therefore it must be confessed that in that discrete motion two immediate instants must necessarily be admitted. The minor is clear, for those instants are intrinsically conformed to the opposite terms, namely the term from which and to which: therefore equally they ought to be opposite and distinct.

The Thomists reply that although in our time two instants cannot succeed each other immediately, yet they well can in discrete and angelic time, whereby discrete motion and the free operations of the angel are measured; for, they say, that time is nothing else than a number of indivisible durations, or instants.

— On the contrary. To each of those instants of discrete time corresponds something of our time; for whatever duration each of them has is determined also with respect and order to our time, since God knows determinately and distinctly how great would be the duration of that discrete motion: but in our time only divisible parts are found, or indivisible instants continuing the divisible parts of time; but whatever instant of angelic motion can be compared either with a past or with a future part of our time: therefore it is necessary that to each of those two instants of discrete time there correspond in our time either a single instant, or that to the first instant of discrete time there correspond the prior part of our time together with the terminating instant thereof, and that to the second there correspond the subsequent part of time together with its initiating instant; for the same instant in our time terminates the prior part and initiates the posterior; or at least it follows that to one there corresponds only an instant of our time, and to the other a part of the same time: but both are absurd. The first, indeed, for it would follow that those two instants of our time are immediate to each other; for if some time intervened between them, it could not be verified that the second instant of discrete motion is the first non-being of the angel in the term from which, since in that intermediate time it would previously have been truer to say: The angel is not in the term from which. Add that it would follow that the angel does not immediately pass from one term to the other, as the adversaries wish: for it would be necessary that in that intermediate time, before he reached the term to which, he be in some middle place between the two terms, and consequently, leaving the term from which through his ultimate non-being, he would not acquire the term to which through the first of his being in it. Nor can the second be said, otherwise it would follow that there is not given either a first being of the angel in the term to which, or an ultimate being of the same in the term from which, because neither a first nor a last part of time is given.

They reply 2. It does not seem unfitting that the inception or cessation of something indivisible occur in time, when it is not in it per se, and as by its proper measure, but only per accidens, and according to a certain coexistence: for the nature of the duration of anything is not to be judged by order to whatever other duration with which it coexists, but by order to that which has the character of measure with respect to it: and thus the existence of the angel in the term from which would be said to cease indivisibly and through his ultimate being, and in the term to which to begin through the first of his being, because what so ceases and begins by order to its proper measure, that is, to discrete time, although it begins or ceases by coexisting with a divisible part of our time, no less begins or ceases indivisibly. Just as the substantial being of the angel no less begins or ceases indivisibly than his existence in a place, and yet it is not repugnant that its first or ultimate being coexist with our time; otherwise one angel could not be created immediately after another with respect to our time; because if the creation of the first angel coexists with an instant of our time, it will be necessary that the creation of the second coexist with time, seeing that in our time two immediate instants are not given.

— On the contrary. It is repugnant that the acquisition of the term to which coexist with time having parts, and occur all at once and indivisibly; for either that acquisition in fieri coexists secundum se whole with the whole time, and according to its various parts with distinct parts of time, such that only one of its parts corresponds to one part of time and another to another: or the whole coexists at once with the whole time, and the whole with each single part: but neither can be said. Not the first, otherwise it would follow that that acquisition did not occur all at once, but successively and by parts, which the adversaries deny in discrete motion. Nor even the second; even if in each part of that time there is the whole acquisition, it follows that it occurs infinitely many times, because in any time there are infinitely many aliquot parts. Add that two halves of time cannot exist together; but upon the advent of the second the first recedes, and the same must be said of the other parts: therefore that acquisition of the term cannot coexist at once with any whole time.

The conclusion is proved secondly. Local motion is essentially an intermediate passage between two terms: but if the angel simultaneously abandons the term from which, and simultaneously also acquires the whole term to which, some passage cannot mediate between those two terms: therefore neither in that way can local motion occur from one to the other. The major stands: for every motion, especially local, is a way, or tending, from one term to another.

The Thomists reply. The very cessation of one term and acquisition of the other has the character of way and tending; for the succession, they say, and the relation of one term to the other has the character of some medium.

— On the contrary. The rejection of one term and the acquisition of the other are not outside the terms themselves: therefore neither can have the character of a medium, or passage. The antecedent is clear; for either that rejection and acquisition are both at once in the term to which, or one occurs in the term from which and the other in the term to which; because since that rejection and acquisition of the term is an operation of the angel, or presupposes an operation, it must be found in one or other extremity at once, or the rejection in one and the acquisition in the other. The consequence also is evident; for a passage is something mediating between terms; but the medium is distinguished equally from both extremes, since it does not hold to one side any more than to the other.

The Thomists reply 2, that existence in the term from which can be taken in two ways, namely either secundum se and absolutely, or as bearing the order of a certain potentiality to existence in the term to which immediately succeeding it. If it is taken in the first way, it is true that the angel, while he is in the term from which, is not moved: but if it is taken in the second way, it is false; because according to this account he is the terminus of discrete succession, in which discrete motion consists; and this suffices for existence so taken to be called inchoative succession and motion. Similarly, existence in the term to which can be taken in two ways, namely absolutely, or as bearing the order of actualizing and terminating the potentiality which existence in the term from which imports: taken in the first way it is not called motion; yet taken in the second way it is called motion terminatively. But the reason why each of these existences, as bearing order to the other, can be called discrete motion, is taken from the proper nature of this motion; for discrete motion is nothing else than a number of diverse operations, by reason of which the angel is successively in diverse places: whence as number is composed of units, considered indeed not absolutely, but one in relation to another; so also discrete motion is composed of diverse operations, not taken absolutely, but as one bears order to another.

— On the contrary. Whether the existence of the angel in the term from which is taken absolutely and secundum se, or respectively and by order to the term to which, it is always true that the angel really is in the term from which, and not in the term to which, nor in the middle: therefore equally it is true that he is really not moved; for real motion is a tending from the term from which to the term to which, such that the one is abandoned and the other acquired: but as long as the angel really is in the term from which, he does not abandon it unless he cast off some part of it, and consequently he cannot be said to be moved. Then, that relation and ordainability of the angel to the term to which can by no means be called motion formally: therefore neither by reason of that can the angel be said formally to be moved. The antecedent is proved: that cannot be called motion formally which can subsist with rest: yet the angel, even resting in the term from which for an hour, not only in the last instant of that hour but in every moment of it, can have that relation and ordainability to the term to which; for he has that ordainability from the moment when he voluntarily determined and ordered himself to that place to be acquired: but in the first instant of that hour in which he exists in the term from which he can determine and ordain the acquisition of the term to which; and therefore be ordained to it; and consequently that ordainability can subsist with the rest of the angel, and forthwith cannot be called true motion. Finally, all Thomists confess that every motion, whether discrete or continuous, can occur in a true and real instant; but that discrete motion would have to occur in an instant, since between the rejection of the term from which and the acquisition of the term to which no true time is supposed, nor an intervening instant: therefore their reply is invalid and a pure evasion.

It is proved thirdly. It belongs to the character of local motion that it be one: but the motion in which the angel is so disposed that through his ultimate being he simultaneously abandons the whole term from which, and immediately through his first being acquires the whole term to which all at once, is not one, but an aggregate of many instantaneous mutations: therefore, etc.

The minor is proved. Motion interrupted by rest is not one: but this motion would be interrupted by some rest: therefore it would not be one.

The minor is proved. An angel cannot be in one term by a single instant alone without being in another for a time, since time necessarily follows upon an instant, given that, as we said, two instants of time cannot be immediately successive to one another: therefore an angel moving himself must of necessity remain for some time in the term from which, or to which, and then presently come to rest in one or the other.

Finally, the Conclusion is proved by the Doctor's argument whereby he solves the principal foundation of the adversaries, namely: that he who is at rest throughout some whole time cannot be otherwise disposed in the last instant of that time, but must also necessarily be at rest in it. This foundation, I say, the Doctor attacks thus: if that were true, it would follow that the bread which was under the Eucharistic species in a state of rest throughout the whole time of the pronouncing of the words of consecration would be under them in the last instant of the pronouncing of the words, which is false, inasmuch as in that instant transubstantiation takes place, and the Body of Christ is under those species, while bread no longer exists in the nature of things. Next it would follow that the air, which was in a state of rest under darkness throughout the whole time before the instant in which it is illuminated, would also be under darkness in that instant, and thus either darkness and illumination would be simultaneous, which implies a contradiction, or certainly illumination would not take place in an instant. Nor does it matter that the Sun is applied by local motion to the darkened air which it illuminates, and that illumination takes place in the instant terminating that local motion: both because, if the Sun were created in an instant, and the air preexisted under darkness up to that instant, certainly illumination would still take place in that instant. Add that although illumination does not in fact take place except in the instant terminating the motion, from this it does not follow that it does not take place in that instant: therefore either darkness is not in that instant, or darkness and illumination exist simultaneously. —

• Caïetan tries to refute this argument of the Doctor. First, to the example of Eucharistic transubstantiation he answers in two ways: in one way, that it is miraculous, and from divine power: in the other, that there is no opposed state of rest there. But, says our Macedo, whether that rest be proper or not, certainly an instantaneous change succeeds to it, just as an instantaneous change of an angel succeeds to a preceding state of rest, whatever it may be. To the second, concerning illumination, he answers that when it is made anew it is not per se first the terminus of local motion, but per se second according to the course of nature. Which solution does not contain the point: for what is per se first or second? It is enough that illumination take place after the rest of the darkness of the air, and that it take place in an instant, so as to convict the change of an angel, which takes place in the instant of its preceding local rest.

He attacks the Doctor secondly: * If the foundation of St. Thomas were true, it would follow that an angel would never be moved locally, neither in continuous nor in discrete time: but the consequence the Adversaries do not admit: therefore they ought not admit that from which it follows. The sequel of the major is proved: on the hypothesis, e.g., that an angel has been at rest for an hour of our time in one place, according to the adversaries he should also necessarily have been at rest in the last terminating instant of that hour in the same place. This supposed, I ask, when the adversaries say that he can move himself in an instant of discrete time to another place, does that instant of discrete time coexist with an instant of our time, or with some part of it? If with a part: then that angelic motion takes place in our continuous time, and has no instant in which it could begin. If in an instant: then either that instant will be immediate to the terminating instant of the rest, and thus two instants would follow immediately upon one another, which is here also supposed by the adversaries to be false, because otherwise our time would be composed of indivisibles, and consequently would not be continuous but discrete. If mediated: then between that mediated instant and the terminating instant of the rest there intervenes a time in which the angel is still at rest; but if he is at rest in that time, he must be at rest in the terminating instant of that time according to the adversaries: but that terminating instant is that same mediated instant in which he is said to be moved: therefore he could not be moved in that instant, because otherwise he would be moved and at rest in the same instant.

The adversaries object: To be moved with discrete motion is to abandon by one ultimate act of being some whole place, and immediately after to acquire another whole place simultaneously, and not part by part: but an angel can do this: therefore he can also be moved with discrete motion. The major stands, for by this indeed discrete motion differs from continuous, that in continuous motion the mobile abandons the term from which part by part, and acquires the term to which part by part: in discrete motion, on the contrary. The minor is proved: An angel is indivisible, and consequently is not commensurated with the place in which he exists; therefore he can by one ultimate act of being abandon some whole place, and immediately after acquire another whole place simultaneously. The consequence is proved: first, because by this very fact that an angel is not commensurated with a place, he need not be in it according to its exigency, and consequently need not be moved continuously in that place, even though it be continuous. Secondly, because from the extension alone of the mobile it comes about that it cannot acquire the whole term to which simultaneously: but an angel, by this very fact that he is indivisible, lacks extension. Thirdly, because the rational soul, by the very fact that it is indivisible, actualizes in a moment the whole divisible body, and in an instant abandons the whole simultaneously: why then could not an angel abandon some whole place simultaneously and at once, and immediately after acquire another similarly whole simultaneously? So Gonetius.

— I deny the minor. And to its proof I distinguish the consequent: That an angel can thus abandon some whole place, and immediately after acquire another whole simultaneously by an abandonment and acquisition which is true local motion, I deny: that which is only a change, I concede: for, as will appear in the following Conclusion, an angel can in an instant, at least by divine power, pass from the term from which to the term to which, not by true local motion, but by simple change. But our discourse here concerns true local motion.

To the first proof of that consequent I say, that it is not necessary that an angel be commensurated with a place in order to be said to be moved continuously in it, but that it suffices that he can present himself to one part of that place, then to another, and again to another.

To the second proof, I deny that therefore the mobile cannot acquire the whole term to which simultaneously because it is extended; for, as we observed in the second Notable, the divisibility of motion must be drawn not only from the extension of the mobile, but also from the side of time, or space.

To the third proof, I deny the parity. For the soul informs the whole body not by motion, but by a kind of instantaneous infall, and therefore that example of the instantaneous informing, or abandonment, of the body is beside the point, since here the discourse concerns not every change whatever, but the change of local motion.

They object 2. Therefore a body cannot be moved with discrete motion, but with continuous alone, because since it is extended, and consequently has parts corresponding to the parts of the place, it cannot abandon some whole place simultaneously; but it is necessary that its last part depart first from the last part of the place in which it is, and enter into another place before the first part: but an angel lacks extension: therefore he can be moved with discrete motion.

— I deny the major. For not by this reason alone can a body not be moved with discrete motion, but also because it must traverse the divisible space mediating between the term from which and the term to which: since, as we said just now, the divisibility of motion must be sought from a threefold source, namely from the side of the extended mobile, of the intervening medium, and of the divisible terms from which and to which. Hence although angelic motion may not have the primary reason of divisibility and succession, it suffices that it can be called divisible by reason of the divisibility of space and terms.

From these the Doctor gathers, that recourse need not be had to another time for measuring the local motion of an angel, whether that by which he moves himself locally continuously and successively, or that by which he moves himself instantaneously and not successively; but that an angel can altogether move himself successively according to our time no less than a body, and can also move himself instantaneously according to an instant of our time.

He proves the first part; because nothing can be saved by discrete time that cannot be saved by continuous time: for by discrete time nothing else can be saved than that an angel can be moved from place to place either indivisibly and without succession, or divisibly and with succession: but he can do both of these in our time, comprehending under time the instants themselves, which I suppose to be included in it: therefore, etc.

The major is proved as to the first part, because if he is moved indivisibly without succession, that motion can take place in an instant, as is evident.

He proves the same major as to the second part concerning divisible motion; because if he is moved divisibly and successively, either those parts of the motion are all divisible and not continuous, but discrete succeeding one another, and then they can all be successive and discrete according to the instants of our time, and those which are divisible can be according to divisible parts of our time; or all are divisible, but discrete, and then also they can be according to diverse parts of our time discrete from one another, namely so that one be taken for a quadrant, and then cessation be made, and another for another quadrant after cessation: therefore although the very existence of an angel be measured by aevum, nevertheless where he and his motion ought not necessarily to be so measured by it, they can be measured by our time, just as what is corporeal and its motion can be.

He proves the second part; because if he is moved through several wheres continuously without any intermission, as a body is moved, since upon the arrival of the later where the earlier ceases, certainly he will be moved in time just as well as a body; and if he is moved to one place without succession, so that he is not present to one part before another, he will certainly be moved in an instant of our time to that place.

Third conclusion. — An angel cannot in an instant be moved from one place to another with motion properly so called: nevertheless he can in an instant pass from one place to another by a simple change of place. This is common to the Subtle and Angelic Doctor and their followers, for the Doctor says in the cited place number 6.

I say that change can be understood in two ways, and a twofold change can be spoken of, one including the whole reality of motion, another including precisely the reality of the terminus of motion. An example of this is that this thing is changed from a where, up to B where. "Where" can be understood in two ways: either that it has simultaneously all the intermediate wheres, as it would have if it were precisely moved successively, or that by that change it would precisely have the last where, as it would have if that change were the last terminus of motion. In the first way, objecting against the second opinion, I do not see how an angel can be changed or moved in an instant by natural power, because it does not seem that by his natural power he can have several equal wheres. In the second way, it does not seem inconvenient that he could be changed in an instant, because that the terminus of motion is not induced at once is from the imperfection of the power of the mover itself, which imperfection is not to be attributed to an angel unless some necessity appears, because nature is to be dignified as much as appearance permits.

• But St. Thomas, 1st part q. 53. a. 3.; and on 1. dist. 57. q. 4. a. 1., expressly proves that the motion of an angel must take place in time, either continuous or discrete.

It remains that the motion of an angel be in time: in continuous time indeed if his motion be continuous: but in non-continuous, if his motion be non-continuous. For in either way it happens that the motion of an angel exists, as was said. For the continuity of time is from the continuation of motion, as is said in 4. Physics. But this time, whether > it be continuous time or not, is not the same time that measures the motion of the heaven, and by which all corporal things are measured, which have mutability from the motion of the heaven, for the motion of an angel does not depend on the motion of the heaven.

But that an angel cannot be moved in an instant with motion properly so called is proved: if he were so moved, it would be necessary that in an instant he have several adequate wheres: but this cannot come to pass by the powers of nature: therefore neither to be moved in an instant. The sequel of the major is proved: if an angel were moved successively for an hour from this hall, which would be his adequate place, to the adjoining hall, in every instant of that hour he would have a place adequate to himself. For in the prior instant he would be as in an adequate place in part of this hall and in part of the other hall; but in the posterior instant he would be in another part of this, and in another also of the other hall, and thus little by little and successively he would change his adequate place, leaving part after part of the prior adequate place, and acquiring part after part of the posterior adequate place, until finally he arrived at occupying the whole second hall, occupying no longer any part of this hall: therefore, etc. — Further, that which by its essence is successive cannot be in an instant: but motion by its intrinsic and essential reason is successive: therefore it implies being in an instant: the consequence is evident together with the minor proved above. But the major is proved, because everything successive has part after part succeeding one another and incompossible with one another, and therefore cannot be in an instant, because then they would be simultaneous. Finally, where there is intrinsically a prior and posterior, there is intrinsic succession: but in the motion of an angel there is intrinsically a prior and posterior: therefore also intrinsic succession. The minor is proved: motion is the tending of a mobile from the term from which to the term to which through the space mediating between both: but in this tending there is a prior and posterior, since in abandoning the term from which the mobile must first be in the medium than in the term to which: therefore, etc.

The second part is also evident, namely that an angel can change his adequate place in an instant: first, because from this it does not follow that he be simultaneously and at once in two adequate places, since that sudden change would take place by the angel's first not being in the term from which, and first being in the term to which, which, as is evident, does not import being in two places, but only being in one and not being in the other. Further, if anything hindered this instantaneous change, especially because the term to which, which is at a distance from the term from which, has divisible parts: yet this does not stand in the way, since in an instant the rational soul informs the whole body, and light is spread through the whole air by sudden diffusion. Finally, if an angel were created outside the world, doubtless he could in an instant occupy the whole adequate place in the world: therefore the same can come to pass while he already occupies a place.

You will say 1. Against the first part; the motion by which an angel is moved from place to place through intervening spaces can altogether and beyond all proportion exceed the motion by which a body traverses that space; but this excess could not be unless the angel were moved in an instant: therefore, etc.

— I deny the minor. For in order that angelic motion exceed in swiftness the motion of any body whatsoever, it is not necessary that it be moved in an instant; but it suffices that it can take place in a smaller and smaller divisible duration than the motion of any body whatsoever can be: and since time is divisible to infinity, the consequence is that an angel will always be able to be moved with greater and greater velocity than any bodies whatsoever.

You will say 2. An angel, since he is altogether spiritual, is far more subtle and swift than corporeal light: but corporeal light in an instant pervades every space of the air: therefore much more easily will an angel be able to pervade it.

— I distinguish the minor. That corporeal light pervades the whole air in an instant by true motion, I deny: that by simple diffusion, and by a change which is the terminus of motion, I concede. But an angel passing from one place to another, since he is truly moved, not in an instant but successively, can pervade the air.

You will say 3. The local motion of an angel is nothing other than the acquisition of a place: but, as we proved in the second part of this Conclusion, an angel can acquire a place in an instant: therefore he will also be able to be moved locally in an instant.

— I deny the major. For, as we said, that simple acquisition of place is only a change, not truly local motion, which in order to be properly so called must be a passage from the term from which to the term to which; for if an angel were produced outside the world, he could acquire a place in the world, yet for all that he would not be said to be thus moved locally.

• Moreover, that sacred Scripture may declare the swiftness of angelic motion, when it attributes bodies to those spirits in which they appeared, it also feigns wings for them. Thus Daniel, Ezekiel, and Isaias saw them flying toward them. Wherefore Moses willed the Cherubim over the ark to be represented with expanded wings, not only to signify the loftiness of their nature, and the sublimity of the place which they inhabit, as St. Chrysostom thought in the homily De incomprehensibili natura, but especially, as St. Jerome adds on chapter 6 of Isaias, to designate their swiftness. Wings, he says, they are said to have, on account of their speed and their swift course into all things: or because they always dwell in higher things. Namely just as wings are attributed to winds to denote their swiftness, whence God too is said in Psalm 17. and 103. to fly and walk upon the wings of the winds. By the poets likewise winged beings are feigned, as appears from Ovid, Silius, Juvenal; also Calais and Zethus, sons of Boreas, winged according to Apollodorus. Wherefore I do not doubt that the angels being described as winged pertains chiefly to indicating swiftness: and because neither have the evil angels lost it, these too are said to be winged. Whence the Talmudists on Anoth cap. 36: Three things demons have in common with angels; that they are winged, that they foreknow future things, and that from one extremity of the world to the other they transfer themselves most swiftly.