Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Note 1. Concerning the determination of the present Question there is a threefold opinion among Authors: The first was that of Durandus on the first dist. 37. second part of it qu. 1. num. 26. asserting that an angel is simultaneously wherever it can operate, whether simultaneously or successively; hence he holds both that an angel is simultaneously in all the bodies of the Universe, and that if more or greater things were made, it would at once exist in them without any mutation of itself, because it can always operate successively in all things, although it cannot move all things at once; because, he says, it suffices to have power at once to operate in whatever place disjunctively, and in all places successively, so as to be present to all at once, in the manner in which it can be. Thence in the second question he infers that an angel cannot properly be moved locally, so as to be transferred from place to place, because it is not in a place circumscriptively nor definitively; but is at once in every place in which it can be. Hence he thinks an angel is not properly moved locally, such that its substance abandons one place and begins to be in another: but only because it appears successively in different places through the various effects which it produces in them.

The second opinion is that of St. Thomas, first part, qu. 53. art. 3., and likewise of Cajetan there on the same article one, where he says: it must be diligently observed that local motion does not properly speaking belong to spiritual substances; but just as it is said abusively and equivocally that spiritual substances are in a place, so too are they said to be moved locally. Hence to be moved is not for them to be the subject of motion, just as neither is to be located to be the subject of ubi: but virtually to touch, in the genus of efficient cause, diverse places.

* Thus Cajetan on the celebrated passage of the Angelic Doctor. Yet the Angelic Doctor himself opens his mind more clearly, and excludes continuous motion from angels in 1. dist. 17. quaest. 1. art. 1., where thus ad 3.:

The local motion of an angel is not posited to be continuous, therefore it is not necessary that a part of that motion be motion, and therefore it is neither moved in A nor moved in B, although A and B are parts of it, but the succession of these, which is to be in A and to be in B: its motion is so called, plainly as if its motion were considered either according to intellect or according to affection, because the very succession of affections is called its motion, as in the body toward the end. An angel is said to be in a place inasmuch as it is applied to a place by operation, and because it is not at once in divers places it is said to be moved: whence just as the conceptions of intellect fittingly follow upon one another without continuity, so also do its operations. Hence its local motion is not continuous, but its very operations following consecutively upon divers places, according to which it is said to be in them, are said to be its local motion.

Thus St. Thomas. *

Third and finally, the opinion of the Doctor Subtilis on the second book dist. 2. qu. 9. and following, where just as he establishes the angel truly and properly in a place through its substance, so also he affirms that it is truly and properly moved.

Note 2. With our Herrera disp. 7. qu. 1., real space in each single place stands differently toward bodies than toward spirits; for with respect to bodies it stands in the manner of a container, since the body truly contains, and in the manner of filled space: seeing that with body it is so filled that it cannot admit another; thus while water is in a vessel, the vessel is said to be the place of the water, inasmuch as it contains the water, and it is called space inasmuch as it is filled with water: it can also be called the ubi of the water itself, inasmuch as it grounds or terminates the relation of presence, because the water is here in such a way that it is not elsewhere. But with respect to spirits, that real space can indeed have the character of place, and also of ubi, with respect to a spiritual substance located in it, provided that substance of an angel or rational soul is really there in such a way that it is not elsewhere: yet it cannot have the character of filled space, seeing that real space is not filled through the presence of a spiritual substance; indeed even if all angels were present in some real space, that space could receive any body no less than if no spirits were present.

Note 3. From the Doctor, lib. 2. on the Metaphysics num. 93., something is moved, and moves, in three ways: 1. per accidens; 2. according to some part; 3. according to itself whole. That is said to be moved per accidens which is moved by the motion of another with which it has a natural connection, whether this connection is made in the manner of a substantial or accidental form — thus the soul is moved by the motion of the body, and any accident by the motion of its subject: or after the manner of an integral part, thus the parts are moved by the motion of the whole: or as what is contained in a container naturally, thus liquid is moved by the motion of the vessel, and a sailor is carried about by the motion of the ship: or what is joined to something by some natural necessity, as a heavy thing to that on which it rests.

In the second way something is said to be moved, or moving, on account of motion produced by, or received in, some part of it: thus Peter is said to be healed, on account of his eye being healed, and to have thrown a stone, because he threw the stone with his hand.

In the third way something is said to be moved, and moving, according to itself whole: thus an animal is moved according to all its parts, and water cools, and fire heats according to all its parts.

These things having been set forth in advance, three things must be determined in the present Question: First, whether an angel is truly moved locally, not only metaphorically, but also really and properly. Second, whether it is moved by a motion both per se and per accidens. Third, whether it can not only be moved by another, but also move itself.

First conclusion. — The angel is truly moved locally; and that by motion properly so called. This is common, as to the first part, among theologians against Durandus.

Proof 1. By the authority of Sacred Scripture, which attributes local motion to angels not only when existing in a body but also outside a body; thus Isaiah 13. says of the prince of demons: How have you fallen from heaven, Lucifer? By which words is recalled the fall of the prince of the demons and all their followers, not only according to the affection of a depraved will, but also according to the distance of place, and their casting down from Heaven unto the lower parts of the earth. Which indeed Christ the Lord confirms, Luke 10., saying: I saw Satan falling like lightning from heaven: hence in Apocalypse 2. is narrated the great battle fought by the Prince of the army of the Lord, namely Michael, against the rebellious angels, and how they were so cast down from Heaven that no longer was their place found in Heaven.

The same is confirmed by all those texts praised by us in the first Conclusion of the preceding section, by which it is not only openly signified that angels truly occupy a place, but also that they are carried from place to place by local motion.

It is confirmed. From the fact that the same must be asserted of angels as of the separated soul; but the rational soul, once severed from the body, is truly moved locally: therefore also the angels. The major stands both from that passage of Matthew 22. where Christ the Lord teaches that the lot of souls existing in Heaven will be like that of the angels, they will be, he says, as the angels of God: and from the fact that separated souls are altogether spiritual substances, having no actual commerce with a body, just like the angels; and therefore if, notwithstanding their spirituality and indivisibility, they can occupy a place and be moved locally, the same judgment will have to be passed on the angels. The minor is proved, both from the article of faith by which we believe that the most blessed soul of Christ descended to the lower regions during the three days of death: for the Lateran Council under Innocent III., cap. Firmiter, expounding that article of faith, He descended into hell, rose again from the dead, and ascended into heaven, says, But he descended in soul, rose again in flesh, ascended in both: therefore the soul of Christ the Lord truly descended to the lower regions by local motion, abandoning its body and entering the lower parts of the earth. And because the souls of the just, immediately released from their bodies, are said to be carried by holy angels to the place of rest. Thus Luke 16.: the soul of Lazarus is said to have been carried into the bosom of Abraham: therefore it is certain that they are moved from place to place.

Durandus replies that for the truth of the foregoing texts it is not necessary that angels change place substantially, but that it is enough that, through some effect, they begin to appear and signify themselves present where they did not previously appear; just as Matthew 3. says of the Holy Spirit that it descended like a dove upon Christ: and John 5. of the Son that he descended from heaven. Whence just as that descent of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit, signifies no local mutation in them, but only that the Holy Spirit through the dove, and the Son through the assumed humanity, newly produced some effect which he did not before produce: so in like manner there is no need for angels to change place according to their substance, but it suffices that they exercise certain works somewhere, that they may be said to be moved to that place.

On the contrary. The words of Sacred Scripture must be taken literally as often as they involve no repugnance in themselves, or anything implied and unseemly: but such are those texts affirming local motion in angels. For nothing absurd follows from this, as will appear in the solution of the arguments to be objected, whereas a great absurdity would follow if the Son, or the Holy Spirit, were said to change place substantially; for this appears impossible from Sacred Scripture itself, which expressly declares God present everywhere, and therefore incapable of changing place substantially, which cannot be said of the angels.

Add that the above passages were interpreted in this manner by the holy Fathers: especially St. Augustine, lib. 1. Retractationum cap. 24., where he sets out the difference between the descent of an angel and the descent of the Son of God, because the Son of God did not descend, nor come, where he previously was not, but appeared in human flesh according to which he previously was not: but the angel truly abandoned Heaven according to substance, and began to be where it previously was not.

Likewise St. Ambrose, in the book De Spiritu sancto cap. 10., comparing the Holy Spirit with an angel, says: That Spirit, since it is everywhere, cannot depart from a place, nor acquire a place: but the angel, since it is defined by place, can acquire and abandon a place.

Which Diadochus admirably explains, cited in Damascenus, in the Eclogae, title 47.

It belongs, he says, to the divine Word alone, who took on man (to be everywhere), which was seen truly on this earth and not in appearance only, and yet did not leave Heaven, but ever comprehends all things, always on account of the uncircumscribed immensity of the divine nature — which the angels cannot do: For at whatever time they are sent into the world, it is impossible for them to be in the same place, and above Heaven.

This very point all the other holy Fathers confirm: thus St. Chrysostom, homily three on the Epistle to the Hebrews, treating those words, sent to minister, says of the angels: they are sent into many places for us, and they minister to our salvation... They hasten about us, this is their ministry, to be sent by us to all quarters: which he confirms with various testimonies of Scripture, and finally, explaining the difference between the missions of the divine Son and of the angels, says: The Son was not sent as an angel is sent, for he did not pass from place to place, but took flesh; the angels however change places, and leaving those in which they are, come to others in which they were not.

St. Gregory Nazianzen concurs, oration 34., where among the properties of angels he lists, that they pass through all places, are present everywhere and everywhere untiringly: partly on account of the readiness of their ministry, partly on account of the lightness of their nature. Here the phrase, "are present everywhere," must be noted, together with its explanation, whereby he sufficiently declares that they are not everywhere at once, but able to aid us everywhere, and to do this untiringly through readiness of will and swiftness of nature.

As Tertullian also speaks in the Apologeticus cap. 22., saying: Every spirit is winged, that is, angels and demons; therefore in a moment they are everywhere, the whole world is one place to them; what is done anywhere they know as easily as they report it; the swiftness is believed divine, because the substance is unknown. Where by the word "winged" he alludes to the opinion of Dionysius in the last chapter of De Caelesti Hierarchia, who says the angels are depicted with wings, that their swiftness may be signified: and on account of that same swiftness Tertullian said the angels are everywhere in a moment; certainly by most swift passage: in which way also St. Jerome is to be understood, Epistola 50., where treating that text of Apocalypse 14., They follow the Lamb wherever he goes, he says: If the Lamb is everywhere: then the Martyrs, who are with the Lamb, must be believed to be everywhere; whence he adds: since the demons wander through the whole globe, and by their excessive swiftness are present everywhere, much more the Martyrs, etc. All which things signify true and real motion: and therefore the angels are not only truly moved, but also by a real and proper motion.

The Doctor Subtilis proves this truth equally by reason, qu. 9. num. 8.: Every recipient of forms of a certain genus, which is not determined of itself to some one of them, nor unlimited to having all of them, can be moved from one of those forms to another, as is evident of surface, which, being receptive of several colors, and determined to none of them, can now receive this one, now another: but an angel is receptive of several ubi, in which it can truly exist definitively, as was proven above; and it is no more determined to one place than to another, nor can it be present to all at once, but sometimes in one, sometimes in another, because it is neither infinite nor immense: therefore it can be changed from one ubi and place to another.

Next, the angel has a definite place, to which by its nature it is not necessarily present: therefore it also has mutability from place to place. The consequence is evident, because local immutability can arise only from necessary presence in all places at once, or from necessary adherence to one place. * But the angel neither exists in all places, nor is bound to any place, as is manifest and will be proved at once. * The antecedent indeed stands as to the first part, namely that the angel has a determinate place, since it is truly in a place, as was proved above. It is also evident as to the second part: for real place is something corporeal; but the angel adheres naturally by necessity to no body, since it is neither its substantial form, nor is it constrained to it by its nature; and therefore its motion cannot be hindered by it, as the motion of the rational soul can be hindered while it is detained in the body.

Finally, since angels excel in intellect and will, they can know and desire a place: but in them that desire would be vain, if they could not transfer themselves to that place: therefore etc. * The Doctor confirms it from the fact that if it be repugnant for the angel to be moved continuously, chiefly because they are spiritual substances: yet this does not stand in the way. For indeed the rational soul, once severed from the body, is a spiritual substance operating independently of the body: but it is truly moved locally, as is evident from the example of the soul of Christ, who during the three days of death descended to the lower regions; therefore the angels also can be moved locally. *

The second part also remains proven from what has been said: for not only does Scripture and the context of the holy Fathers affirm motion in the angels, but they also signify it to be true and real; which is moreover proved: The angel truly and properly exists in a corporeal place, although not commensuratively, but only definitively: therefore it can truly and properly be moved locally. The consequence is clear, since finite and limited things are moved in the manner in which it belongs to them to be in a place. Next, whoever truly and properly changes place, abandoning one and acquiring another, is also truly and properly moved locally; for local motion comes about through the true abandonment of one terminus a quo and acquisition of the terminus ad quem: but the angel, when it descends e.g. from Heaven to the earth, truly abandons heaven and reaches the earth, since, as was said above from the holy Fathers, they cannot by the forces of nature be at once in Heaven and on the earth: therefore, etc. Finally, whatsoever passes of itself from place to place through the application of its substance to divers places is said to be moved of itself, and substantially, and not merely metaphorically and equivocally: but the angel, when it appears somewhere, truly applies its substance there, and removes it from the place in which it previously was: therefore it is moved substantially and properly.

You will say 1. From Aristotle, 3. Physicorum, text 6., motion is the act of a being in potency according as it is in potency: therefore it is the acquisition of some perfection which the movable thing cannot have except through motion: but neither ubi nor place can be a perfection of the angel: therefore it cannot be moved to them. The minor is proved; every perfection is more excellent than the perfectible: but neither ubi nor place are more excellent than the angel: therefore neither are they its perfections.

The Doctor answers, num. 9., denying the minor together with the proof of that major: For, he says, the angel has intellection, which is a perfection of the intellectual power: yet intellection is simply more ignoble, or more imperfect, than the angelic nature. And so it can be conceded concerning ubi, or bodily presence with the angel, that it is some perfection of the angel, as any act is said to be a perfection: but far more ignoble than that nature in which it inheres. Add that not every motion must terminate in a perfection of the mobile thing; for many perfections are acquired through neutral and violent motion.

* It accedes that even if motion must terminate in some perfection, it is not necessary that that perfection redound to the good of the mobile thing itself; but it suffices that there be some utility and perfection for another. Thus the angels are moved for the perfection and salvation of men. *

You will insist from the Philosopher, 1. Physicorum: the indivisible cannot be moved: but the angel is indivisible: therefore it cannot be moved.

I answer. The Philosopher speaks of the quantitative indivisible, such as the point, which is not moved by motion properly so called, whereby namely it acquires place, and circumscriptive ubi; but he does not speak of the substantial indivisible, such as is the angel.

* Indeed, the Doctor adds, the mathematical indivisible existing per se of quantity, namely the point, can be moved locally and continuously. For a sphere moved over a plane describes a line on that plane, as was said in the Physics; yet the sphere itself, if it be perfect, touches the plane only at a point. Therefore the indivisible, even the mathematical one, can be moved locally and continuously, and accordingly this is much more to be attributed to the angel. *

You will urge. Motion is a divisible accident: but an indivisible substance, such as the angel, cannot be the subject of a divisible accident: therefore the angel cannot be the subject of motion, nor properly moved locally.

I distinguish the minor. The indivisible cannot be the subject of a divisible permanent accident, that is, one having all its parts at once, such as whiteness and blackness — I concede: successive, which has being in becoming, such as motion — I deny. Or otherwise I distinguish the minor: it cannot be the subject of divisible motion through the reception of that divisibility and extension — I concede; through commensuration and a certain proportion to it — I deny: for thus the rational soul, though indivisible according to substance, is in a divisible body which it informs, and the angel in a divisible place, to which it is present.

* You will say 2. Continuous succession in motion arises either from the resistance of the mobile to the mover, or from the divisibility of the space traversed, or from the medium retarding the action of the mover. But from none of these heads can there be succession in the motion of the angel. Not indeed from the first head, since the mobile is the same as the mover, namely the angel which moves itself. Nor even from the second or third head, because the medium and the space through which angelic motion occurs does not resist the angel either as mover or as mobile, since the angel could move itself through the medium by penetrating it without any motion of the mobile. Therefore in angelic motion there can be no succession.

The Doctor denies the major. For succession in angelic motion arises precisely from the divisibility of the space traversed; for, says the Doctor num. 41., between heaven and earth there are many intermediate places which the angel must traverse while passing from heaven to earth; nor can he by his motive power make those intermediate places exist all at once: therefore he must traverse them successively. *

You will say 3. St. Augustine, book 8. De Genesi ad litteram c. 20., teaches that every body is moved through time and place: but that a spiritual creature is not moved through place, but only through time; and that God is in no way moved: therefore St. Augustine holds that an angel cannot be moved locally.

I answer. St. Augustine there treats of circumscriptive motion, which belongs only to bodies: but not of definitive motion, which takes place without local circumscription, as Hugh of St. Victor explains in chapter 16; and therefore his opinion does not support the view of Durandus.

You will say finally. St. Bernard, Sermon 5. on the Canticles, openly teaches that the angels need bodies for motion, because, he says, To run about, nor to pass from place to place, is possible only to what is corporeal, which the angels are seen to do, as an authority proves, as indubitable as it is well known. Therefore in truth the angels are not of themselves capable of motion.

I deny the consequence. For St. Bernard does not speak of the angels considered in themselves, but only with respect to the ministries they carry out among us: for when at the beginning of the chapter he had said: Four kinds of spirits are known to you: of beasts, of ours, the angelic, and that which is like these. For not to all, to whom a body, or the likeness of a body, is necessary, whether on account of themselves, or on account of another, or on account of both, is it given — except only to him to whom every creature, both corporeal and spiritual, rightly confesses and says: You are my God, for you have no need of my goods. Then, speaking of the holy angels, he says: Now that the supercelestial Spirits have need of bodies for their work, that voice and divine saying above all makes us certain: Are they not all, he says, ministering Spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation? How then do they fulfill their ministry without a body, especially since they are occupied with a body? Whence he immediately adds: Finally, to run about, nor to pass from place to place, is possible only to what is corporeal, which the angels frequently do, as an authority proves, as indubitable as it is well known: Hence it is that they were seen by the Fathers, and entered to them, and ate, and washed their feet, etc. From these words it is plainly clear that he is speaking of the angels with respect to the ministries they exercise toward men, and not insofar as they are considered according to their own nature. For, says Alexander of Hales, question 33., member 3., where he explains the aforementioned authority in like manner:

As far as their nature is concerned, it befits the angels to be moved from place to place without a body, or without the assumption of a body, which indeed is evident from the example of separated souls: for separated souls, he says, can be moved without assuming a body: since they would assume either another's body or their own; another's body does not seem to befit them: concerning their own we see that they do not assume it, since they lie in their tombs; wherefore much more can angelic spirits be moved without the assumption of a body, since they are of themselves, and by their nature, separated; nor do they seem in any way to depend upon a body, or to have any relation to it.

Second conclusion. — The angel is not moved per accidens, and with the motion of the bodies in which he exists: but per se. This is the Doctor's teaching in the fourth book, dist. 10. qu. 6., where he says:

If an angel should make himself present to a stone voluntarily, when I move the stone, the angel is not moved on that account, because he is neither movable per se by my power, nor per accidens in this case, because he is neither the form, nor a part, of anything movable per se by me. If, then, an angel were present to a stone moved by me at the term of the motion, this would not be by my act, but by his own action, whereby he makes himself present there.

But that he is not moved per accidens is proved: whatever is moved per accidens must have a natural union and conjunction with the body in which it exists: but the angel does not have such union and conjunction with the body in which he is: therefore, etc. The major is clear from the third Notable; for in order that something be said to be moved per accidens, it is necessary that it be moved by the motion of another, every other effective causality being set aside, whether on its own part, or on the part of the other moving cause directly ordered to it. But the minor is evident per se, since, in whatever body the angel exists, in that body he is neither after the manner of a substantial form, as the soul in the body, nor accidental, as whiteness on a wall, nor of the contained in the containing, as liquid in a vessel and a sailor in a ship; nor of a heavy body at rest, as a stone in the earth; nor can any other natural conjunction be devised which should intervene between the angel himself and the corporeal place in which he is: therefore he does not seem to have with it any natural conjunction, and consequently he cannot be moved by its motion, except insofar as he himself moves himself together with the moved body, or is efficaciously moved by a higher cause, namely by God.

Next, if the angel were moved by the motion of a body, he could at once rest and be moved, and indeed be agitated by two contrary motions, namely upward and downward: but this appears absurd: therefore also that from which it follows. The inference of the major is clear: for if the angel had two stones as his adequate place, and one of them were moved while the other remained unmoved, or if one were cast upward and the other downward, it would be necessary that the angel rest with the unmoved stone and be moved with the projected stone, and likewise that he be held with one stone upward and with the other downward; which things certainly being repugnant, that also from which they follow is absurd.

Finally, if the angel could be moved per accidens, it would follow that he could be moved against his will by a man; for on the hypothesis that one angel had been destined by God to be stationed near the sacred Relics of some saint placed upon an altar, and some man should steal them away with a thieving and sacrilegious hand: if the angel ought to be moved by the motion of the body in which he exists, it would be necessary that he be moved, against his will, to the carrying away of those sacred Relics by a man; but the consequent appears not only absurd, but even contrary to experience, whereby it is established that nothing of prevailing power can be moved by the weak power of one weaker, while it resists in mind: therefore, since the angel is far superior to and stronger than man, it must not be said that he is moved against his will by a man, and consequently he cannot be moved per accidens.

The second part is also proved by the Doctor, in the second book, d. 2. q. 9. and 10.; for although he does not expound the question in its proper terms, nevertheless in his whole discussion he manifestly supposes it, admitting in the angel a receptive potency of motion, and teaching that he acts upon himself when he moves himself. Add that, as we said just now, he openly teaches that the angel is not moved per accidens: therefore it is necessary that he hold him to be moved per se.

The truth of this assertion is proved: that is said to be moved per se which is truly of itself the subject of motion: but the angel is truly the subject of his own motion: therefore he is moved per se. The major is clear; for a thing moved is so called from motion: therefore that which receives motion in itself and immediately is said to be moved per se. But the minor is proved, both because the angel ought to be said to be moved locally in the same manner as he is in place: but, as was proved above, he is in place fundamentally by his substance, in which nothing is more intrinsic to him, and formally by the respect of presence to the place received in the angel himself: therefore he is also moved locally by the motion residing in himself. The minor is clear from what has been said. The major, however, is admitted by all the Philosophers; since local motion is the tending of a mobile from one place to another, it is necessary that its motion correspond to that location, at least as regards the respect of presence: Then because the subject of the term of motion in facto esse and in fieri is the same: but the subject of the term in local motion in facto esse is the very substance of the angel present to this place which he acquired by motion: therefore the same is also the subject of that term in fieri, and consequently of local motion: since local motion is nothing else than the very term in fieri, that is, to be acquired: Then finally because the angel's motion is the very successive acquisition of ubi, that is, of the existence of the angel present in one and then another part of space: but an existence and presence of this kind is truly in the angel: therefore motion is likewise in him.

You will say. If the angel's motion were a real thing received in him, it would follow that the angel is really changed as many times as he is moved; but the consequent seems absurd: for he would be liable to infinite real changes, which seems unbecoming to the most excellent created nature, and one very close to God, who is altogether immutable: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. That he would be liable to changes through real absolute forms, which would change him physically and entitatively, I deny: through respective forms, or through relations, which produce no physical and entitative change, but only an extrinsic denomination, I deny: for the angel's motion, beyond his substance, signifies no absolute entity, but only the action by which the angel formally and immediately acquires successively the existence of his own substance, that is, the respect of presence of that substance to this or that space through which he passes, and toward a determinate place he tends: but that respect imports no real and entitative change; otherwise a man would be really changed a thousand times in every little moment of time, since he takes on innumerable relations and correlations anew.

Third conclusion. — The angel can move himself locally. So the Doctor in the second book, d. 2. q. 10., and it is common among the Theologians.

And it is proved 1. From sacred Scripture, which speaks of the motion of the angels in the same manner as of the motion of men, or of other animals that move themselves: for it uses the same words signifying motion proceeding from an intrinsic principle of the thing moving itself. Thus the demon Job 1. said: I have gone round about the earth, and walked through it, and of him St. Peter, first Epistle chapter 5. says: He goeth about seeking whom he may devour: whence Luke 8., Matthew 4., and John 13. attribute to demons the words of coming, approaching, entering, and going out; thus Christ commanded the unclean spirit to go out from the man: thus the demons besought Christ that he would permit them to enter into the swine: from which it is clear that the demons, as having the power of moving themselves, only asked that they be permitted to enter the swine, that is, that they not be forbidden.

The same is plainly established from those words of Christ, Matthew 12.:

When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest, and findeth none: Then he saith: I will return into my house from whence I came out, and coming he findeth it, etc. Then he goeth, and taketh with him seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and entering in they dwell there:

in which, as Suarez cleverly observes, book 4. cap. 23., there are six or seven words that signify local motion, and motion from an intrinsic principle, namely the words of entering, going out, walking, seeking, returning, coming, going, and taking. For these things cannot be said of a thing which cannot move itself, but can only be moved by another.

From these words also, says Suarez, is taken the best reason, which Gregory touched upon: because all the motions and journeys of the demons are ordered to an evil end, namely the ruin of men, according to that saying I have gone round about the earth, and walked through it: therefore it cannot be said that those motions are specially made by God alone at the will of the demon himself; for it would be impious so to think of God: therefore it is necessary to confess that they are made by the demons themselves moving themselves.

The consequence is proved. Because if the angel does not move himself; much less will one angel be able to move another: therefore he could be moved by God alone, and in order that such motion not be violent or necessary for the angel, God would then have to move the angel only when he himself wishes to be moved, and consequently to lead the demons only when they themselves wish to tempt us; which is repugnant to the aforesaid texts of Scripture.

The Doctor proves the conclusion in the place cited for this reason: whenever something has a potency for acquiring something through motion, it is a perfection in it that it have also an active potency, by which it can acquire that thing: but the angel has a passive potency for local motion, as we said just now, since the angel is the subject of his own motion: therefore the active is not to be denied to him: since, as Aristotle says, nature must be honored as far as appearances permit.

The consequence is clear, because the angel is not of lesser condition than corporeal things and inferior creatures; indeed he is far nobler than they: yet in those things, together with the receptive potency of some perfection, there is found at the same time an active power, as is clear in living things, in which there is also a passive and an active potency for growth, and for the operations of the senses, and for moving themselves: it is clear also in inanimate things, for from the fact that heavy things have a passive potency to be in the center, they have also an active potency by which they can acquire it: therefore much more, if there be in the angel a passive potency, he also possesses an active one; and why should he not move himself, if he has an active power for moving?

It is confirmed. Because to move oneself is a degree of life which the angels enjoy: therefore they move themselves. Moreover, the angels are most perfect living things, and are not naturally everywhere, and therefore are capable of local change: therefore they can effect it in themselves. The consequence is proved, because, given the imperfection of their own limitation, to the perfection of life belongs the intrinsic faculty of moving oneself; the argument for this is, because lower living things, if they participate in knowledge not only intellectual but even sensitive, have the perfect power of moving themselves locally: who then will doubt that the angels can much more perfectly move themselves, especially since there is in this no difficulty, or apparent repugnance?

You will object. Nothing can be the same according to the same in potency and in act at once: but the mover qua mover is in potency to motion, and what is moved as such is in act of motion, that is, has motion in act: therefore nothing, the same indivisible thing, can be at once moving and moved, that is, can at once move and be moved, and consequently the angel cannot move himself. It is confirmed, because certain differentiae contracting and dividing being as such are incompossible in the same subject, as is clear from the differentiae by which being is contracted to substance and accident: therefore by parity of reasoning, the differentiae of act and potency, by which being as such is contracted, cannot be found in the same subject.

The Doctor denies the major. But he distinguishes it: nothing can be in potency, insofar as potency signifies the privation of act, and in act at once, I concede the major: nothing can be in virtual potency for producing, or receiving, an act, and at the same time in formal act, that is, at once have the formal act, I deny the major. Likewise I distinguish the minor: but what is moved is in potency to that to which it is moved, insofar as potency signifies such privation for that instant, or time, at which it is moved, and what moves is in act; that is, has the act opposed to that privation, I deny the minor: it is in potency, insofar as potency does not signify such privation, and in act at once, I concede the minor, and deny the consequence.

To the confirmation the Doctor says, that wholly opposite things dividing being, which are truly opposed, cannot be found really in the same subject: and consequently, that to be in act and in potency, insofar as they are differentiae of being so opposed, cannot be found in the same; but I deny that such things are found in the same. Therefore, when being as such is divided into being in act and being in potency, being in potency is not there taken for a being productive or receptive of something, and being in act for a being having such an act; otherwise prime matter could not at once have with form a receptive potency of it, and because otherwise it would be badly so divided, and without foundation, and against the truth: but being in potency is there taken for a possible being not actually existing, and being in act for a being actually existing; and it is evident that every being is either in act or in potency in this way, and that no being is at once in act and in potency in this way.

You will say 2. In that which moves itself, the part moving itself must be distinguished from the part moved per se: but in the angel no moving part and moved part can be assigned: therefore he does not move himself. The major is proved both by the authority of Aristotle, in the book Physics; and also by reason, because if one part moved another, it would follow that the whole would at once be at rest on account of the rest of one part, and not at rest on account of the motion of the other.

I answer. The major is true of corporeal substance moving itself with organic motion; for in it these things concur to motion, namely cognition, which first moves that part of the body which is first impelled, because the motive power concurring to such motion is organic, and consequently is not only really distinct from the soul, which is the first mover, but also perhaps the organic power itself resides in some part of the body, and must first move some other part. But from this it does not follow that whatever else is moved by itself with another, non-organic motion must have two really distinct parts, as is clear in heavy and light things, in which every part moves and is moved, because every part has an intrinsic active and passive principle of its motion. Whence it is no wonder if in the angels, whose substance is indivisible, one part moving and another moved is not so required for their motion. Add that in them also, at least metaphorically, a moving and a moved part can be assigned; for their substance is moved by the will.

You will object 3. The natural power of the angel ought to be ordered to some natural end according to the natural order of the Universe: but the motive power with respect to place, with respect to the angel himself, can serve no natural end: therefore it is not in him. The minor is proved: the angel is never moved on account of his own need, nor even on account of the natural need of other things, since the whole of inferior things are sufficiently aided by the motions of the heavenly bodies; indeed even man, as regards his body and all his animal powers, is sufficiently aided in his operations by the celestial motions; but as regards his mind, he is immediately subject to God himself, who alone can immediately touch intellect and will: therefore such natural motive power with respect to place is superfluous with respect to the angel himself.

I deny the minor. For that active power is not in the angel in vain, both because he himself needs it in order that the species of singular things may be able to be received from things remote from him through his approach to them: and also in order that he may be able to exercise certain operations pertaining to the governance of the Universe, which he could not otherwise exercise: and finally, because that motion above all expresses angelic liberty, by which he can transfer himself from place to place.

You will object finally. Opposite relations cannot belong to the same real extreme: but the relations of mover and moved are opposite: therefore they cannot both belong to the same angel.

I answer with the Doctor, in 2. dist. 25., that relations are of three kinds: For some are such that they are repugnant to one another, not because they cannot be in the same foundation, but because some of them include an essential dependence; such as the relations of cause and caused: and because the same cannot depend essentially upon itself, therefore these relations cannot belong to the same. Others are relations which include an essential order of origin, such as the relations of the producer to the product, and this implies that the same be producer and product. But other relations are (such as those of mover and moved) which include neither an essential dependence nor origin, and therefore can be founded in the same nature and in the same supposit, and they argue only an accidental dependence. Nor does it follow from this that that relation is of the same to himself, although the same will and the same angel be mover and moved: for if the angel be considered as causing motion in himself, he founds the relation of mover; but if the angel be considered precisely insofar as he receives motion in himself, then he founds the relation of moved; and thus it is only required that that form by reason of which the angel is moved, namely passive motion, be really distinct from the angel himself moving and moved. Such is the Doctor's teaching.

From these gather first, that the locomotive power of the angel is not really distinct from his substance: for that distinction would be altogether superfluous, since the same thing is not to be inferred concerning the locomotive power of the angel as of man; indeed, since the locomotive power of man is organic, and depends upon an external and corporeal faculty, there is no doubt that it is really distinct from the rational soul: but it is otherwise with the angels, who, being destitute of body and of corporeal faculty, there appears no reason why their locomotive power should be really distinguished, both from the angel's substance and from his will; therefore it seems to me more probable that it is altogether one and the same with the will; since faculties are not to be multiplied without necessity; but no necessity appears for admitting a locomotive faculty distinct from the angelic will; since the angelic will has its entity, and its own substance subordinated to it with respect to place and motion; and consequently it alone can suffice for effecting the motion, and for moving and placing its own substance somewhere.

Gather secondly, that any angel whatever can be moved extrinsically by God, in such a way that he himself concurs only passively in such motion: both because that does not repugn on the part of the angel himself, since he is not everywhere, and can be moved, nor does he resist the mover; and even if he did resist, his resistance, since it is finite, could be overcome by an agent of greater power. Nor does it repugn on the part of local motion absolutely and in common, because the angel's motion is not vital, and consequently does not require that it be necessarily made by an intrinsic principle of the mobile itself. Nor finally does it repugn on the part of the agent, because neither a superior angel, nor at least God, lacks the power for such an effect, nor is there involved in it any imperfection unbecoming to God: therefore God can move the angel per se. A superior angel could also move an inferior, even one resisting, on account of the greater power in him, just as a stronger animal moves a weaker one, even against its will. Thus the Magi, who have more powerful demons, overturn the machinations of others, namely by one superior demon coercing an inferior one: thus also the demons undoubtedly seize damned souls against their will and carry them off to hell. But how this is done, it is not so easy to determine; nevertheless it appears likely that the stronger angel unites himself, and in a certain manner binds himself, to the inferior one, upon which being posited, the rest or motion of the latter follows, according as the binding angel rests or moves himself: for just as a superior angel can determine and bind himself to a certain place, so it does not appear why he cannot likewise bind himself to another spirit, so as to carry him and hold him wherever and as long as he pleases. But if the spirit binding the other is not, or remains, present to the one bound, that binding is more easily explained by saying that it is made only by God, and morally by the spirit, as certain Saints are reported to have detained demons by their command: in which way also the angel Raphael is said to have bound the demon Asmodeus in the desert.