Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Three things above all must be discussed in this Question: First, whether angels are able to occupy any place, however great or small: Second, whether several can exist in the same place at once; Third, whether one can be in several places.

Note 1. The place of the angels can be distinguished as twofold; namely adequate or total, and inadequate or partial. The adequate and total place is that which corresponds to the angel according to the ultimate measure of his power and virtue, in which whole he can substantially be, and outside of which he cannot at the same time naturally be: but the inadequate and partial place, which is less than the whole adequate place, is that in which an angel existing can also by his own power be outside it; namely as in a partial continuous place; such is some part of the aforesaid adequate place and space. We ask, therefore, whether an angel by natural or supernatural power can exist in several adequate and inadequate places at once.

Note 2. It is beyond controversy that one angel can exist at once in several inadequate places that are continuous and do not stand apart from each other; for since the presence of his substance to a place depends on the free application of the same, it is plainly evident that if a hall were the adequate place of an angel, and four parts and corners of that hall his inadequate place, he could at will remove his presence from one corner and another, so as to make himself present in only two other parts and corners, especially since this does not exceed his natural power: for his indivisible substance is not naturally extended to a place of a certain and determinate magnitude, in the way bodies are extended, which according to their greater or lesser quantity naturally and necessarily require a greater or lesser place. Hence the only difficulty is whether an angel can be, by his will and natural power, in inadequate places that are discontinuous and distant from each other, yet contained within the place naturally adequate to him; e.g., whether an angel existing in a hall can make himself present in two corners of that hall without existing in the middle.

Note 3. The precise reason why two bodies cannot naturally occupy the same place at the same time must be sought chiefly from this, that each of those bodies fills every place to which it is present: but a place filled by one body can receive no other: just as a vessel full of some liquid cannot by natural power receive the infusion of another liquid poured upon it. But whether the same reason holds, or whether some other similar reason must be brought forward why two spiritual substances cannot occupy the same place at the same time, Authors do not agree among themselves; for very many, with St. Thomas and his disciples, affirm that angels cannot be simultaneously present to one and the same adequate place: while the rest, with the Subtle Doctor, dispute the problem on both sides, inclining nevertheless more to the affirmative than to the negative side. These points premised, let there be

First conclusion. — Although the angelic substance is indivisible, it can nevertheless occupy a divisible place, and also a minimum indivisible one. This Conclusion, as to both parts, is the Doctor's in 2. dist. 2. quaest. 6. num. 13.; for although on this point he may seem problematic, he nonetheless leans more to the affirmative than to the negative side.

The first part is proved, namely that an indivisible soul can occupy a divisible place: for if anything were detrimental to this occupation and presence, it would be above all the indivisibility of the angelic substance: but that does not prevent him from being able to make himself present in a divisible place: for although the substance of the rational soul is likewise indivisible, it nevertheless occupies divisible space, being whole in the whole body which it informs, and whole in each part of it: similarly, although the divine substance and essence is truly supremely indivisible, nevertheless because it is infinite in entity, it is really and substantially diffused through the whole universe, as was proved when treating of the Divine Immensity: therefore, by parity of reason, although the angelic substance is indivisible, it can nevertheless occupy a divisible place. Add that since the presence of the angels comes about either through the voluntary application of their substance to a place, as we taught above with

the Subtle Doctor, or through the application and diffusion of their power, as the Thomists contend, both schools must necessarily hold this part of the Conclusion as certain and undoubted: for it is certain that an angel can naturally will that his substance make itself present throughout a determinate place; for what could oppose this volition? Especially since an indivisible substance can occupy a divisible place. It is equally certain that an angel can apply his power to some extended and divisible space: for although his operative power and operation are formally indivisible in their entity, they are nevertheless virtually divisible and extended, because they produce and immediately cause a divisible and extended effect in the subject about which they operate.

— Yet it is not permissible to infer from this that an angel could become present to an infinite quantity, if such were granted, seeing that his native power is limited and determinate, and therefore cannot extend itself infinitely: for he could not become present to an infinite quantity as infinite unless he became present to all its parts. But it implies a contradiction that a finite and limited substance could be proportioned and commensurated to infinite parts: therefore, etc. Whence the Doctor rightly concludes in the same place num. 11:

It is commonly conceded that an angel cannot be in a place, however great, because this is proper to God. — But whether an angel has a place so determinate that he cannot be in a greater or lesser one. This, he says at number 14., is doubtful, because neither part seems easily provable: which would indeed be an inconvenience, if his virtual quantity, by which he can be present to some place, were the natural reason of being in so great a place in its own manner, just as the quantity of a body is the natural reason of being in so great a place in its own manner: so that although it be within my power to be in this place or in that place, it is not however within my power to be in so great a place or in so great: because this effect naturally follows from quantity, which is not subject to my power: and as not in itself, so neither as regards this effect, namely to be in so great a place or so great. Nothing inconvenient therefore seems to follow if this were posited in angels, or if it were posited that their quantity has some adequate place, greater than which it could not have according to the conditions of its power and essence; although it is nevertheless subject to the will of the angel, so that he can, not always have that place, but a greater or a lesser one; no inconvenience follows.

By which words of the Doctor, Poncius says in his Commentary on the same passage, he means that no convincing reason can be assigned whereby it could be proved that an angel is able to occupy at will a smaller place, or that he is not able to. For if it were said that by his nature every angel tends to be connaturally in the whole place, as a body four palms long tends to be in the corresponding place, so that he could not naturally be posited in a smaller one, certainly the angel could not place himself in a smaller place, but although he could place himself in another place, every place in which he could place himself ought always to be of such a size: nor is there any convincing reason why it should not be said to be thus in fact. Again, if it were posited that he does not require by his nature so great a place, but is of himself indifferent to any place whatsoever below that maximum which he could have, down to the minimum place, then doubtless he could be posited in a smaller and smaller place, nor would he necessarily have to have always a place of the same magnitude: but neither is there even here any convincing reason by which it is shown that it is not thus in fact. Thus far Poncius.

The second part is also proved: namely that an angel can exist in a minimum place: for although the Doctor in the place cited above num. 11. seems to assert that an angel cannot exist in a place however small, nevertheless he maintains this only problematically, seeing that he immediately raises the question whether he can be in a point, and determines neither side, for he says at number 18:

Whether, however, he can be in a point or not, there seems to be no necessary reason, neither for one side nor for the other: because although the angel is indivisible, he has not an indivisibility limited like a point: and therefore he need not be in a point as in a place. Nor perhaps does it repugn for him to be in a point as in a place: because no inconvenience seems to be inferred from this; for if from being in a point as in a place it were inferred that he could not move locally unless space were composed of points, it does not follow; for he could carry himself immediately from the place of the little point into the continuum, whose continuum the point terminates.

Since, therefore, the Doctor holds that an angel can exist in a point, there is no doubt that he likewise asserts problematically that the same can exist in an indivisible place.

This is further urged: to the very place an Angelic substance can inexist, to which it can truly become present definitively: but an angel can definitively be present to a minimum and indivisible place; since by definitive presence a thing is whole in the whole, and whole in each part of the whole, so the substance of an angel, since it is indivisible, can inexist in an indivisible thing: therefore, etc. Add that no inconvenience follows from this; for, says our Herrera Disp. 6. quaest. 7., if any inconvenience could be assigned, it would be above all that the angel could not move himself locally from one place to another, because a point is not a place, since it is indivisible, nor are there two immediate points. But this does not stand in the way, because when the angel is in a place definitively, it will have the character of a definitive place, which can found the relation of the presence of the angel to it, and consequently since this fundamental character can be had in a point, because it can be predicated of the angel, that is, that he is thus here and not elsewhere, therefore in a point the true character of where, or of place, can be found. But there is no inconvenience concerning local motion, as the Doctor himself answers, because an angel existing in a point could bear himself immediately into a continuous place, that is, into the surface proximate to the point, whose point (namely of the surface) is the terminus.

Finally, when an angel is in the place adequate to him, he is also in whatever part of it: but a place smaller than any determinate divisible place is a part of that great place: therefore he is in fact in that smaller place when he is in the greatest place: but his existence in that place has no dependence on his simultaneous existence in the other parts of the greater place: nor indeed can it be shown in what genus of cause, or of necessary condition, such a dependence could be had: therefore he can be in that one place alone without being in the remaining parts.

You will object 1. If an angel could exist in a minimum place, he could also exist in Heaven and on earth. Proof: whatever can be in one of equals can be in any other equal to it, if some configuration which would be in one of the equals does not repugn to it: but no configuration of any place can repugn to an angel, since he is indivisible: therefore if he can be in one place, he can be in any place equal to it, if he be not determined to some small place. But this is an inconvenience; because it would follow that an angel could naturally be at once in Heaven and on earth: for if he can occupy a square place, that is, of four equal sides, and be not determined to some determinate small place, in which smaller he cannot be, since from that square place there can be made a quadrangular place (that is, of four sides, two of which are longer than the other two, and equal among themselves), of such length that it could be stretched out to Heaven, because its sides can be compressed more and more to infinity, and the more the sides are compressed, the more that body is extended toward length, it follows that he could exist at once in Heaven and on earth.

— Poncius answers in his Summa of Theology, denying the first assumption and the consequence of the proof; because from a square of four feet there cannot naturally be made any quadrangle that could be stretched from earth to Heaven: for although by compressing the sides it can be extended into greater and greater length to infinity: yet this can only be done with respect to indeterminate parts, syncategorematically and to infinity: but not with respect to determinate parts, categorematically and to infinity: from this, however, it does not follow that it can naturally be extended at once up to Heaven: just as it does not follow, although there are as many parts syncategorematically in a palm-sized quantity as in a hundred-palm one, that it could occupy at once so much place as the hundred-palm one.

— * The Doctor confirms and presses this same argument from a certain principle of Euclid the mathematician, propos. 30. lib. 2. where he teaches that whatever can be in one of equals, and in the rest, if no configuration repugns to it. Whence the Doctor argues thus in the place cited above num. 12 — and in the commentary on this passage of the Doctor:

Whatever can be in one equal can be in the other: if no configuration repugns to it, by which one is distinguished from the other: but no configuration of the place in which it is repugns to an angel: therefore if it can be in one equal, it can be in the other. And consequently if it can be in a square however small or narrow, which must be posited by saying that it does not repugn to him to be in any place whatsoever, it follows that it does not repugn to him to be in a place however long, because the quadrangle is equal to that small square in which it can be. Which is indeed a most certain argumentation. But it excepts: unless the configuration repugns, which pertains to bodies. For water, or wine, or another liquid, since it requires a certain capacious figure, will not be able to be in a quadrangle formed from a square: since if the quadrangle be too much contracted, and stretched out into an enormous length, it will not hold those liquids. But the angel is without body, and lacks figure; if he can be in a square, he can be in a quadrangle, though never stretched out here to infinity.

— To the Doctor I say that he truly presses and confirms this argument against St. Thomas who, lib. 1. q. 52. a. 2., having denied in the body of the article that an angel can be in a body however great, and having reduced him to a certain and determinate place therein, afterwards did not hesitate to say that within his sphere he could be in a greater and lesser place even down to the indivisible. An angel, he says, is indivisible, existing outside the genus of quantity and situation; hence it is not necessary that one indivisible place according to situation be determined to him: but either divisible or indivisible, greater or lesser, according as he voluntarily applies his power to a greater or lesser body. And so the whole body, to which his power is applied, corresponds to him as one place. And he had said above that the angel is not to be bound necessarily to an indivisible point, although he himself is indivisible; and so he leaves only his sphere free to him, so that within it, whether in a greater place or a lesser, he can be. And thus Cajetan understands it there, and commonly the authors, both domestic and extern.

This argument, I say, the Doctor twists against St. Thomas to show that his assertion is not firm and constant, nor resting on sure foundations. But he himself did not descend to the opposite opinion, but only proposed it as probable, whatever our Francis Macedo may pronounce to the contrary, sect. 6. collat. 1. De loco Angelorum. For thus teach the faithful more recent interpreters of the Doctor, namely Cavellus in his scholion on this passage of the Doctor; Vulpius disp. 18. art. 1; Mastrius; Tataretus on the same text of the Doctor, whom Lichetus had preceded in his Commentary, and Poncius in the same place, where he both copiously and subtly dissolves the aforesaid argument and turns it back in this way: by what reasoning would it follow that the angel could be in any quadrangle equal to some minimum assignable square, and consequently in a place however great; and hence he would be at once in heaven and on earth; and by parity of reason the same angel could be in any smaller square whatever which would be the minimum place that the angel can occupy. For if the angel can be, e.g., in a square of which any side is ten or twenty palms, but cannot be in a square so small that each of its sides is only one palm. Since thus that large square can be extended into a quadrangle as long as that small square can, by compressing its sides, even before it reaches the narrowness of that small square, because it has in breadth many more determinate parts, and as many indeterminate parts above the breadth of the small square, it can be extended toward length by compression of the sides as much as the small square can be extended, and consequently if the small square can be extended from earth into heaven, and into any length whatsoever to infinity, the large square can also be thus extended, even without reducing it to so narrow a breadth as the small square has, and consequently, if the angel can be in any quadrangle equal to that square, he could be at once in heaven and on earth, and in a quadrangle however long. Therefore that very inconvenience which follows according to the adversaries, because the angel can be in so small a square, follows from the fact that he would be in a square as great as they themselves concede. Thus Poncius.*

You will object 2. If an angel had not a determinate place as to smallness, but could make himself present in smaller and smaller places to infinity, he would be of infinite perfection: but this is false: therefore, etc. The consequence is proved; because it is of greater perfection in him that he can become present in a smaller and smaller place: for if, says the Doctor, n. 12., he could be in greater and greater places to infinity, the infinity of his power would be concluded; so therefore the infinity of his power would be concluded, if he could be in smaller and smaller places to infinity.

— I deny the consequence, and likewise the consequentia of its proof; for the reason of the disparity is that the occupation of greater and greater places to infinity, which would argue infinite perfection, is that which takes place through determinate parts, from which, if all were posited a parte rei, there would arise a categorematic infinite: whence it is no wonder that the power by which that occupation could take place would be infinite, and consequently repugnant to an angel; but the occupation of smaller and smaller places to infinity takes place with respect to indeterminate parts, from which, even if all were posited in act, it does not follow that a categorematic infinite is given.

* Because those parts are not distinct nor actually divided, but only in potency to be distinguished and divisible to infinity. — There is added, says Poncius in the same place, that the aforesaid argument can also be turned back upon the adversaries. For, he says, they themselves confess that between the maximum adequate place of the angel and his minimum place he could place himself in smaller and smaller places down to that minimum place, and that this also is of greater perfection in him. Whence I argue thus: between that maximum place and the minimum place there are given smaller and smaller places to infinity, because the excess of the maximum place over the minimum is divisible to infinity: but the angel can place himself in any place of those: therefore he can place himself in smaller and smaller places to infinity, even according to those authors. Either, then, this argues perfection; and then either such perfection must be conceded to the angel, or it must not be conceded to him that he can do this; or it does not argue it, and then the first consequence is bad together with the consequence of its proof. Thence Poncius concludes that the angel can truly reduce his presence to a smaller place than the adequate one, to which many more recent Scotists assent, as Branchatius disp. 5. q. 6; Mastrius 12 Metaphysicae disp. 11. q. 5. art. 2; and very many others, asserting that in this matter the Doctor does not oppose it, but only holds it as probable, seeing that he himself supposes as probable that an angel can be in a point, as is evident from his words cited above, whose reason is manifest enough. For if an angel can be in an indivisible place, such as the world, much more can he be in a less divisible place, because that minimum divisible place is more proportioned to the divisible adequate place of the angel than a wholly indivisible place. Further, whoever can be in extreme places can also be in intermediate ones: but an angel can be in a most divisible place adequate to him, and also in a point: therefore he can also subsist in a less divisible place, which is midway between the more divisible and the point *.

Second conclusion. — An angel cannot naturally be in two adequate places: nor even in inadequate discontinuous places: in both, however, he can exist supernaturally.

This embraces three parts, all of which the Doctor unfolds q. 7. n. 2.

The first part is proved. An adequate place is called that which neither exceeds the located thing nor is exceeded by it: therefore it implies that the angel is present simultaneously and once to several places, each of which is adequate. The consequence is plain; for if he were in several, he would exceed each of them in particular; since he would not be in one without equally existing in another, and thus each of those places would be adequate, as supposed, and at the same time would not be, since the located thing existing also in another would exceed the former place. Further, if an angel could be simultaneously and once in several adequate places, he would not need to pass from place to place in order to operate: but the consequent is false, and against Sacred Scripture, which teaches that angels approach bodies or spirits, that they may do something about such things, as was said in the preceding Question: therefore etc.

The second part the Doctor leaves as doubtful for others to discuss. For when he had said that one angel cannot be in two adequate places: Because, he says, then that place would not seem adequate to him according to his natural power, he adds: But whether he could be in two discontinuous places, of which neither one nor the other would be adequate to him, is doubtful: nor does a necessary reason seem to exist for or against.

Nevertheless the denying opinion appears truer than the affirming: First because, if an angel could make himself present in several inadequate discontinuous places, he would be at once in several places, as several: for those partial and inadequate places would be neither one in entity, as is evident; nor in continuity, since they are supposed to be discontinuous; nor in order, because the presence of the angel in one is not derived from his presence in the other, and therefore the angel would be in them as several: but he cannot be in several places as several; otherwise he could also be in several adequate places, the contrary of which has just been proved. Second because, if the angel could naturally be in several inadequate discontinuous places, he could at once become present to several places removed by any distance whatsoever; for if the distance which is between two inadequate places discontinuous with each other does not prevent the angel from inexisting in them without existing in the intermediates, neither will a greater distance stand in the way of that angelic presence: but that consequent is absurd: for it would follow thence that the angel could become naturally present at once to Heaven and to earth; which no Theologian admits.

— Nor does it avail to reply that this would indeed be true if that distance and discontinuation took place outside the sphere of the angel's activity and of his adequate place, which since it is not so, thence it does not follow, neither that the angel is in several places as several, nor that he can exist in places removed by any distance whatsoever: this, I say, response does not weaken the force of the preceding reasons. First, for whether those places are outside the sphere of the angel's activity or not, they are truly remote from each other and distinct from each other; and therefore they are truly many, and accordingly the angel existing in them exists not as in one, but as in many.

Add that since the angel is present to a place by reason of his substance, and through the application of his free will, if he could make himself present in four corners of a hall discontinuous with each other, why could he not likewise make himself present also in a place nearer to the hall, yet not contiguous? For if the distance of one cubit does not prevent him from being present to discontinuous places, by what reasoning could the distance of two or three cubits prevent it?

This reason is confirmed together with the preceding ones; First indeed, because no reason appears why such a power should rather be attributed to an angel than to other entities, which are limited and determined naturally to one place, so that as soon as we see a thing in one place we judge that it is distinguished from another placed in another place. Second, the angel is determined to a place just as the soul to informing a body: but the same soul cannot inform distant parts at once without informing the intermediates: therefore the angel cannot exist in several discrete parts of a place unless he exist in the intermediate parts. Third, the multiplication of the presence of the Body of Christ in divers places remote from each other is said to be miraculous: therefore it would be a miracle if a spiritual thing existed in divers discontinuous places, and consequently the angel cannot make himself present by his own power in divers remote places.

You will say 1. The whole reason why no body can be in two places, even partial ones, discontinuous and distant, is because a body is something continuous and dependent on place, and accordingly cannot be in discrete places unless its quantity be divided: but this reason has no place in angels, since they lack quantity and are independent of place: therefore, etc.

— I deny the major. For not for this reason is some body unable to be in several places, that it would be divided, but also because according to its limited entity it is so determined to one place that it cannot occupy several at once; which reason holds in angels. Whence as a body is shut up in one circumscriptive place, nor can occupy several at once, as several and discontinued; so by parity of reason the angel is shut up in a definitive place, so that by his own proper power he cannot extend himself to several.

You will say 2. An angel, as we have said, is in a place by the free application of his substance to it, in such a way that, whenever he wills, he can apply his substance to the whole place commensurate with him, or only to some one of its parts; therefore nothing prevents him from being able to apply it to two extremities, but not to the middle.

— I deny the consequence. For that an angel occupy the whole place commensurate with him or only a single part of it involves no apparent repugnance; since from this it does not follow that he is multilocated, and beyond the sphere of his natural power: but this does follow if he were present in two places that are non-commensurate and discontinuous, and so there is no parity.

The third part is proved, namely that, as the Doctor says in n. 2, an angel can be in several places, both commensurate and non-commensurate, by divine power: for if anything stood in the way, it would above all be because one and the same thing could not be in several places definitively; but the consequent is absurd, for the Body of Christ the Lord is really present under the discontinuous and distant Eucharistic species; therefore much more will an angel be able to be present multilocated. The consequence is evident, for it is easier to work a single miracle than many: but for the Body of Christ to become present under the consecrated species, two miracles must especially intervene, one by which it is stripped of its native quantity and exists in a kind of spiritual mode; the other by which it becomes present multilocated: but for an angel to be in several places only a single miracle is required, namely one by which his presence is multiplied; therefore he will be able to be constituted multilocated much more easily than bodies.

You will say 1. If an angel existed multilocated, he would be distant from himself; but this is absurd; therefore etc. The inference of the major is proved; because those places, as is supposed, are distant from one another; therefore also the angel existing in them. The consequence is proved; because things that are together with one third are together with one another; therefore things that are not together with one third are not together with one another, and consequently are distant from one another.

— The Doctor answers in the number praised above, denying both the inference and the consequent of each proof: for just as it does not follow that God is distant from himself even if the bodies in which he is present are distant; and just as it does not follow that the soul of a man is distant from itself even if it informs the right hand and the left, which are distant from one another; so it does not follow that an angel existing in several places is distant from himself, even if the places in which he exists are distant from one another; whether he exists in those places supernaturally or naturally: rather it is known only that he exists in them. This I add, because if it were known that one angel existed in one place naturally, and that an angel existed also in another place naturally, it should be judged that it was not one angel who existed in both places. For confirmation the Doctor distinguishes the consequent: when that which is together in them is limited to one only, he concedes; when it is not, he denies: as is clear concerning the soul, he says, placed in the right hand and the left, which soul is not distant from itself, and yet hand is distant from hand; similarly God is not distant from himself, yet those things that are with him, here or in Rome, are distant from one another.

You will say 2. An angel is of one limited nature; therefore he must be limited according to everything that can belong to him, and consequently cannot have several places at once.

— The Doctor answers by distinguishing the consequent. According to absolutely anything whatsoever of whatever kind, the consequence is denied: because otherwise he could not have several intellections at once, nor even several continuous presences; according to anything whatsoever that can belong to him by the mode of a natural property and inseparable accident, let the first consequence pass, and the second is denied.

* You will say 3. If an angel could exist in two places at once, it would follow that he could likewise at once rest in one place and be moved from the other place to another; but this fights contradictorily, for from it there would follow that he would rest and not rest at once; therefore it is also repugnant for him to exist in two places.

— The Doctor answers, in the third number, conceding the inference of the major and denying the minor along with its proof. It would indeed be true on that hypothesis that the angel would rest according to one where and not rest according to another where; but it would not be true that he would rest and not rest simpliciter: for to rest simpliciter signifies that the thing is moved in no way whatsoever with respect to any place whatever, and hence excludes all motion entirely from the thing located. But to rest with respect to one place and not rest with respect to another can be verified of the same thing, because they do not fight contradictorily, since it is not affirmed at once of the same thing according to the same place and state, but according to diverse ones; whence the Doctor concludes that on that hypothesis, if anyone were to infer from the fact that the angel rests in one place and is moved from another into another, that he would at once rest and not rest simpliciter, he would commit the fallacy from what is said secundum quid to what is said simpliciter, and would stray in his reasoning through ignorance of the elenchus, because he would infer that some things that are not contradictory — since they are not affirmed or denied of the same thing according to the same respect — are nevertheless contradictory.

You will say 4. Two "wheres" are formally incompossible as being contraries, since between them local motion can occur, which is always between two extreme contraries mutually opposed; for all "wheres" that are distant are of distinct species, and hence imply a certain contrariety; therefore those two "wheres" cannot be posited in one and the same angel, for contraries cannot be at once in the same subject.

— I distinguish the antecedent. Two "wheres" are incompossible and contrary in themselves and with respect to themselves, because they are of diverse species — I concede; with respect to something else and by reason of the subject, I subdistinguish: if they are taken non-commensurately, I deny, for an angel existing in a place commensurate with him has as many non-commensurate "wheres" as there are parts of that place, and hence is at once in several non-commensurate places. If those two "wheres" are taken commensurately, they cannot belong to one and the same subject — I subdistinguish: by the power of some natural agent, I concede; of a supernatural one, I deny: for although two "wheres" are naturally reckoned contrary and incompossible, because one cannot be acquired by the forces of nature without the other being lost; nevertheless, since it is certain from faith that one body can be in two places at once by divine power, nothing prevents the same being affirmed of an angel, since he is of a nobler entity and more vigorous power, and accordingly fitter to occupy diverse places at once by the ordination of God. Nor does the specific distinction of those "wheres" hinder this occupation in any way, since two things of distinct species can be found even naturally in the same subject, as whiteness and sweetness in milk, the sensitive and vegetative power in the same animal. *

Third conclusion. — It is more probable that several angels can be at once in the same place by natural power, not only materially but even definitively.

So holds the Doctor who, although he may seem doubtful about how this question should be resolved, nevertheless proves the affirmative part and dissolves the arguments of the denier.

It is urged 1. from the holy Fathers, some of whom, although they attribute bodies to angels just as they do to the souls of men, nevertheless affirm that several of either can subsist in the same place. Thus Tertullian, in book 2 De Anima, chapter 25, rebukes Plato's contrary opinion:

But if anyone, as Plato, thinks, he says, that two souls do not come together in one, just as neither do bodies, I would show him not only two souls crowded together in one, as also bodies in embryos; but truly many other things conjoined with a soul, namely demons, and not of one spirit, as in Socrates himself, but a septenary of spirits, as in Mary Magdalene, and legionary numbers, as in the Gerasene; whereby a soul is the more easily joined with a soul through the fellowship of substance than a wicked spirit through the diversity of nature.

Gregory Nazianzen indeed, in the first Epistle to Cledonius, refuting Apollinaris, who denied that Christ was a perfect man on the ground that two perfect things cannot exist at once, answers thus:

Not at all, provided you weigh the matter in a corporeal manner: for a vessel holding one measure will by no means contain two measures, nor can the place of one body hold two or more bodies. But if you consider these things as intelligible and incorporeal, observe that the very same contains both the soul, and reason, and mind, and the Holy Spirit:

he adds: for such is the nature of intelligibles, that in an incorporeal and indivisible manner they are mingled both with one another and with bodies. Which mingling occurs not according to their substantial union, but according to the occupation and presence of the same place.

The Doctor proves 1. indeed by the authority of Richard of Saint Victor, who gathers that demons do not have bodies, from the fact that a whole legion of demons occupied a single body of a man.

For the legion could not have been in someone if the demons had had bodies; therefore, the Doctor says, he seems to argue that if they had had bodies, their bodies would have been at once in the same place.

Therefore, in the way that they now do not have bodies, it seems it must be said that they were at once without bodies.

Moreover, if one angel moving the heavens is at midday, and another good angel sent from heaven to earth must pass through that place, there seems no necessity that he not pass through a straight line, or that the other give way to him. Finally, he says, if all angels had been created before bodily creation, as seems true according to Damasc., book 7, c. 21, it does not seem easy to assign how they were then not at once: and if it was then not inconvenient for them to be at once, neither now: however it turns out de facto, and de possibili — I speak of their natural power; yet de possibili with respect to divine power, it does not seem impossible but that by it they could be at once.

Moreover the conclusion is proved. Two angels can apply their operative natural powers, and their substances, totally at once to the same body or place, and make themselves present; therefore they can be at once in the same commensurate place according to their powers and essences. The consequence is evident: the antecedent is proved most manifestly, because an angel can inhabit the same body at once with a rational soul, as is clear in those who are vexed by unclean spirits; therefore by equal reason he will be able to be at once with another angel, since the rational soul is of the same kind as the angels as regards the mode of existing in a place. Then, because if the powers and essences of two angels applied at once to the same place could not coexist — above all because the power and essence of one would not be compatible with the power and essence of the other, but would exclude it, just as one bodily quantity naturally expels another from its place — but this cannot be said, since those powers and essences are spiritual; otherwise neither would the power and essence of the soul suffer with itself in the same place and body the angelic power and essence; therefore etc. Finally, the powers and essences of angels are of a far more immaterial and sublime nature than this light that we see: but it is established that two different lights caused by two luminous sources exist at once in the same commensurate place; therefore a fortiori two powers and essences of angels will be able to be applied at once and be in the same place; and hence also two or more angels, because the one does not obstruct the other.

* To this is added that several angels can even have diverse total operations in the same place; indeed that de facto they have them, for a good angel intimately present to a man suggests to him right and good thoughts, while a wicked angel, equally present to him, instills evil and depraved sentiments and motions. Therefore those two angels, intimately present in the same place, have operations altogether diverse though fully adequate; and thus the reasoning of the Thomists collapses. *

You will say 1. There cannot be two total causes with respect to the same effect: but the angel himself is the total cause of the operation by which the angel is constituted in a place; therefore another angel cannot have an operation in that place, and consequently cannot be in that place.

— The Doctor answers first that it is falsely supposed in this argument, namely that

an angel is constituted formally in a place by an operation. He answers secondly that although it were conceded, both that one operation proceeds from several angels, and consequently that from one operation they would not have existence in the same place; nevertheless it would not follow from this that when one angel has one operation, another could not have another. And if it be said that in a body an angel cannot have any operation except a motive-to-place operation, which moves him locally, and that when he is moved locally by an angel by one motion he cannot be moved by another by another motion; he answers thirdly that even with this granted gratis, two angels can still concur to the same operation, in such a way that neither is the total cause of it but partial, and then, although they would have existence in the place from the same operation, it would not follow that the same effect was produced by two total causes. That an angel can be the partial cause of such a motion and admit the concurrence of another is clear, because he is the free cause of it no less than a man, and can consequently employ his whole effort, or a part; and if one angel employs a part, the other can freely employ another part; and thus the whole motion will be from both as from two partial causes integrating one total cause.

* To these add that an angel can naturally subsist in the same place with any body whatever; therefore much more can he subsist in it with another spirit. The adversaries concede the antecedent; but the consequence is manifest per se: for two complete spiritual substances have less repugnance to subsisting together than have a corporeal and a spiritual substance, which are opposed and specifically distinguished. *

You will say 2. Things having the same mode of existing cannot be at once; but angels have the same mode of existing in a place; therefore they cannot be at once. The major is proved: because glorious bodies for this reason cannot naturally be at once, although a glorious body can be at once with a non-glorious body; and therefore even if there were two Gods, they would not be at once with creatures.

The same Doctor answers by denying the major, which he rightly judges to be irrational or improbable, because to be in a place imports no essential respect or dependence of the located thing upon the place; but to be from another as from an essentially operating cause, as an effect is from a cause, signifies the essential dependence of the effect upon the cause; therefore if there can be several effects from one cause, it will not be inconvenient that several things can be in the same place as regards existence precisely. Then, all temporal things signify the same respect to time, or the same mode of existing in time, just as spiritual things signify the same mode of existing in place: but notwithstanding this, several temporal things can be at once in the same time; therefore also several spiritual things in the same place as regards this respect. Finally, all bodily accidents have the same mode of existing in place, and yet notwithstanding this several of them are in the same place, as whiteness and sweetness of milk. To the proof of the major, moreover, he answers: if it is true that two glorious bodies cannot be at once, or two Gods, this arises not from their having the same mode of existing in place, but from some other reason. In truth, however, it should rather be judged that two glorious bodies can be at once, and even two Gods, if they were possible.

You will say 3. Very many of the holy Fathers are of the opinion that no created thing, however lacking a body, can be mingled with and infused into another spiritual thing, since this is proper to God, to whom (as Paschasius says in book 2 De Spiritu sancto c. 1.) this privilege alone is owed, that he can enter into the secret conscience: but soul cannot be infused into soul, or angel into angel. Hence he affirms that demons, the assailants of men, can enter only the hiding-places of the body; but cannot reach the interior parts of the soul: which he proves by this argument, that they cannot know consciences. The same Didymus teaches in book 1 De Spiritu sancto c. 15; but Cassian more clearly in collation 7, c. 13, where he says:

That nothing is incorporeal except God alone, and for that reason all spiritual and intellectual substances are penetrable to him alone, because he alone is whole, and everywhere, and in all things; so that he inspects and surveys the thoughts of men and their inward motions without veils and completely; therefore truly two angels cannot be at once, just as neither can they be with a rational soul.

I deny the consequence. For the aforementioned Fathers, and whoever else brings forward similar things, are to be understood not so much of that penetration and infusion which comes about through the conjunction of place, as of the efficiency and impulse by which God moves our soul by himself, with no intervening thing, which angels cannot perform. Thus Saint Bernard seems to interpret the matter, sermon 5 on the Canticles:

Know this, he says, that no created spirit applies itself to our minds per se; namely that it be mingled with and infused into us with no mediation of our own or of its bodily instrument, whereby taught or better taught by participation of it, we might become good or better. No angel, no soul, is in this way capable of me, and therefore capable of none. Nor do the angels take one another in this way. Let this prerogative therefore be reserved to the supreme and uncircumscribed Spirit, who alone, when he teaches knowledge to angel or man, seeks no instrument of our bodily ear, any more than of his own mouth. He is infused per se; he makes himself known per se; the pure is received by the pure.