Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

That angels occupy a place was not the unanimous teaching of the holy Fathers: for some asserted not only that they are in a place, but also that they are circumscribed by it, in the manner of bodies; of this assertion were all those who thought the angels to be endowed with bodies, among whom St. Basil, book De Spiritu Sancto, c. 16. Their substance, he says, is aerial, or if you will, a fire without matter, as it is written: who maketh his angels spirits, etc. Therefore, they are both in a place, and become visible, and appear to those who are worthy, in the form of their own bodies. Very many seem to have entirely denied that the angels are in a place; thus St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the first book against Eunomius, says: No one is of so childish an understanding as to think that difference of place is found in an intelligent and incorporeal nature; for position in place belongs properly to bodies: but that which by nature is intelligent and lacks matter is far removed from every notion of place, as all confess. — There have not been lacking

Scholastics who asserted that the angels are either everywhere or nowhere. For Durandus, in 1. dist. 27. quaest. 1., judges that the angels are in place neither by action nor by substance, but by a certain, as he says, presence of order, by which an angel is present to any body whatsoever which he can move, and to one no more than another: just as the heavenly body, because it diffuses its power into all lower things, is said to be present to all; not indeed proximately, but through the intervention of those nearer, it is present to those more remote. But an angel is intimately and proximately present to those bodies which he can move: whence, since he holds that all bodies can be moved by an angel, he teaches that he is everywhere.

This opinion, long since eliminated from the schools and rightly despised by all, today obtains no defender. It is worth while, therefore, here to determine first whether, and by what, angels are fixed in place. Second, how they occupy place: third, whether several can occupy the same place, or one many places.

Note 1. With the Seraphic Doctor, in the first dist. 2., question 2., that place has a threefold relation to the thing placed. For it is compared first, under the aspect of containing; second, under the aspect of measuring; third, under the aspect of conserving. For it contains as a vessel; it measures as a quantity; it conserves as a nature.

For indeed according to this threefold habitude, finite, corporeal, and corruptible substances are in place: for because they are finite and limited, they are in place as in a container: but because they are corporeal, they are in place as in a measurer: finally, insofar as they are corruptible, they are in place as in a conserver. According to the first two relations, which are to contain and to measure, substances which are finite and corporeal are in place, but incorruptible, namely the lower heavens: but according to the first, which is to contain, finite substances that are spiritual and incorruptible are in place, such as angels. And I say this of bodily place: for an angel has a spiritual conserving place, namely the power of God; a measuring or circumscribing place of its own substance, namely a limitation or enclosure of power: but it has a containing place, not only spiritual, but also bodily.

Note 2. The bodily place in which an angel is said to exist can be distinguished generically into two kinds: one connatural to it, the other violent, or beyond the inclination of its nature. The place connatural to an angel is called that one in which it presents itself as present according to the wish of its free will; the violent, however, is that in which it does not freely situate itself, but is shut up and detained therein by external force, such as, for example, the eternal fire and hell with respect to demons. We inquire here about both kinds of place: what is the proximate account by which angels are said formally to occupy place. For the resolution of this difficulty, a threefold opinion of authors is distinguished: The first is that of the Angelic Doctor and his disciples, who assert that the formal account immediately founding the location of an angel in a connatural place is an operation virtually passing outward: but in a violent place, it is a passion by which it is detained against its will in some place. The second assigns as the foundation of such location and presence some mode of union produced through the free will of the angel, by which before every passing operation it is united to a bodily place; thus Vasquez, disp. 188. Finally, the third opinion teaches that the formal account by which an angel is immediately in a place is the very substance of the angel, by which it becomes really and substantially present in the place it occupies. Thus the Subtle Doctor in the second dist. 2., question 6.

Note 3. From the Doctor just cited above, number 6., six conditions are required in creatures for the true determination of place and of the thing placed: First, he says, to be in place; Second, to be in actual place: Third, to be in determinate and equal place: Fourth, to be in place commensuratively: Fifth, to be in place determinately, here rather than there: Sixth, to be in place naturally or violently. The four first conditions, he says, belong to body insofar as body is body; the fifth belongs to it from an agent; the sixth belongs to it insofar as it is a natural body.

Moreover, from these six conditions only three seem to be required per se and intrinsically for constituting the account of place and of the thing placed formally, which conditions can belong not only to bodily things but also to spiritual substances: The first condition is that there be real and actual presence of the thing placed to the place, without which neither bodily things nor spiritual things can truly be said to exist somewhere. The second condition is that the thing placed, as regards its substance and entity, be terminated and bounded by the space and extent of the place itself. Finally, the third is that this determination to place come about through the formal account of being located. But the formal account, as the same Doctor observes in dist. 4., question 10. q. 3., ad 2., is taken two ways: First, properly for the proximate formal account by which a thing is called such formally; thus whiteness is the formal account by which a wall is called white. Second, it is taken fundamentally for the remote account by which a thing is denominated in such a way; thus the whiteness of one wall is the fundamental formal account of the likeness which one white wall has to another. These two formal accounts are also found in being-located: for the formal account of existing in place, properly so called and proximate, is the respect of the thing placed toward the place; but the fundamental and remote one is that in which such respect is founded: thus in bodies, the formal account of existing circumscriptively in place is quantity; but in angels or souls, it is substance, as we shall prove below.

First conclusion. — Angels are neither nowhere nor everywhere: but in some certain and definite space. This is common as regards all three parts among all theologians. The first part is openly gathered from sacred Scripture, which makes mention in many places of the place of angels, as will appear in the proof of the second part. Hence among the articles condemned by Stephen of Paris, this third is written in chapter 1., That an angel or separate soul is nowhere. It is proved also by reason: If angels were nowhere, especially on account of their spirituality, by which they would be said to be altogether separable from, and independent of, true or imaginary space: yet this reason does not prevent them from truly being said to be in place; since God himself, although supremely spiritual, is truly everywhere, not only by presence, knowing all things; and by power, operating all things in all; but also by essence, inasmuch as he fills all things with his substance and entity necessarily diffused everywhere unto immensity. Then, from the instant of their creation, angels either remained immobile, or had local motion: if the first, therefore they are by substance where they were created, namely in some lower empyrean heaven: if the second, therefore, changing place, they obtained other space and a place true or imaginary, and accordingly they are always supposed to be in place. Finally, angels cannot fail to be intimately present to God, upon the hypothesis that they exist: but if they were not in some part of true or imaginary space, they would not be intimately present to God. Lastly, it is no less improbable that something truly exists and exists nowhere, than that something truly exists and yet never exists: therefore just as whatever is at some time is, so too it must also be somewhere. Hence St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 1. Contra Eunomium: "It cannot be," he says, "that things brought forth by creation, or coming to be, should not have existence wholly in place or in time. Only that nature which needs nothing, is eternal, and embraces all things, is neither in place nor in time."

The second part is proved. Namely, that angels are not everywhere: First indeed from Scripture, which teaches that angels are in one place so as not to be in another. Thus Apocalypse 12.: Their place was no longer found in Heaven: where the words concern wicked angels driven out of Heaven because of sin. Scripture teaches likewise that angels are moved locally, and thus are present to one part of the Universe so that if they wish to be present to another, they must needs abandon this place and come to that one by local motion: thus Zechariah 2.: Behold the angel who spoke with me went forth to meet him, and said to him: Run, speak to this young man: thus Job 1., Satan says: I have gone round about the earth, and walked through it: Tobit 5., the angel Raphael said: I have often walked through all his ways, etc. All these are to be taken in their proper and literal sense; especially since no reason urges recourse to tropes; and moreover the holy Fathers themselves explain them literally.

For St. Basil, book De Spiritu Sancto, chapter 16., openly says:

Moreover, the several Powers are believed to be circumscribed within a definite place: for that angel who stood by Cornelius was not at the same time with Philip: nor did he who spoke to Zachary from the altar at the same time discharge his proper station in heaven. Yet the same spirit is believed to have worked both once in Habakkuk and in Daniel at Babylon.

Theodoret subscribes, question 3. on Genesis, where he pronounces God alone to be uncircumscribed: "But those things which began at some time to be are circumscribed; wherefore although we confess that the nature of angels is without bodies, we nevertheless assert that their substance is circumscribed."

St. Damascene agrees, book 2. De Fide, chapter 3., where concerning angels he says: "They are circumscribed, because when they are in heaven they are not on earth; and when they are sent to earth by God, they do not remain in heaven."

St. Gregory the Great openly teaches the same, book 2. Moralia: "In this," he says, "the angelic nature is now distinguished from the condition of our nature, in that we are both circumscribed by place and confined by the ignorance of blindness; but the spirits of angels are indeed circumscribed by place: yet their substances are far extended above us beyond comparison."

The third part follows from what has gone before, and the Seraphic Doctor confirms it in the place cited by a twofold reason: he repeats the first from the reason of a created and limited spirit. For since, he says, the uncreated Spirit, who is God, has in himself simplicity, by which he is within all things, and immensity, by which he contains all things and is outside all things, he communicates those conditions to a creature insofar as it is apt to receive them:

But because spirit could not receive the power of containment, since its simplicity is finite, therefore it is in place; and because it has not part and part, therefore it is whole in itself simultaneously here and now: whence it cannot have a capacity for containing: but since body is composite and has many parts, it could not participate divine simplicity, but on account of the extension of parts it could participate and receive a capacity for containing: therefore God made one most noble body which could embrace all things, outside which absolutely nothing existed, namely the empyrean, in which he placed the angel.

He draws the other reason from the fact that the distinction according to here and there belongs to body alone;

for since, he says, the other creatures hold order in the world, having distinction and position according to degrees of perfection: and thus one is here, another there, one above, another below: and because in body alone there is potential distinction according to here and there, therefore among creatures the universal power of locating, with respect to visible and invisible things, ought to be given to body alone, so that the Universe might be one, ordered in all its parts. And thus is clear the twofold reason why the power of locating spirit was given to body, and why spirit is contained by body. For this the order of the Universe required, both on account of the limitation of created spirit, and because distinction according to here and there is found in body alone.

You will object 1. Many of the holy Fathers deny that angels are defined by place; for besides Gregory of Nyssa praised in the prelude of the present Section, Didymus teaches the same in book 1. De Spiritu Sancto, where he denies that spiritual creatures are circumscribed by place and bounds, and in book 2. he says: "We separate places and changes of places from incorporal things:" St. Basil teaches the same, homily 30. De Paradiso, where he says: "Place belongs chiefly to body; the soul, however, is in place consequently, and as it were by accession, on account of its relation to body, since by the property of its own nature it is not at all circumscribed by place:" therefore much less ought angels to be circumscribed by place, since they profess no order to body. For that which is of magnitude of bulk and parts, namely body (says Nemesius, book De natura hominis, chapter 3., where he teaches that the soul is not at all circumscribed, because it is spirit), cannot be circumscribed by any part of place: for place exists by means of bulk, since place is the term of the ambient body, embracing the thing contained. Whence Boethius de Hebdomadibus says: "A common conception of mind, which appears to all, is that an incorporal thing is not in a place." Therefore since an angel is altogether incorporeal, it is by no means to be said to be in place.

— The Doctor answers, in the number 17. cited above: that the aforementioned opinions of the holy Fathers, and others like them, are to be understood as wishing that spiritual substances be not in place circumscriptively and commensuratively, in the manner of bodies, each of whose parts corresponds to a part of place, as St. Damascene explains in the place cited above: "And since angels are intelligences," he says, "they are in places also in an intelligible manner, not circumscribed after the manner of bodies. For they are not figured as bodies are by their nature, nor do they consist of three dimensions, but they are in place by this very thing, that they are present intelligibly etc." Therefore those holy Fathers deny that angels are circumscribed by place because they lack the parts which place measures, and which embraces the situated thing so that part may answer to part. Which Augustine declares in Epistle 28. to Jerome thus:

Further, if a body is only that which through the extent of place is set or moved with some length and breadth, so that with its greater part it occupies a greater place, and with its lesser a lesser, and is less in a part than in the whole, then the soul is not a body: for throughout the whole body which it animates it is extended not by local diffusion, but by a kind of vital intentness. For through all its particles it is whole and simultaneously present: nor lesser in lesser things, and greater in greater; but in some places more intense, in others more remiss; and whole in all, and whole in each.

You will object 2. Place, according to the Philosopher, is the ultimate surface of the first immobile containing body: but no body contains an angel, because the container ought to be more actual than the content: but body is not more actual than an angel: therefore an angel is not in body as in a place.

— The Doctor answers there, denying the minor, and distinguishes its proof: that the container, after the mode of cause, ought to be more actual than the content, he concedes: that the container, after the mode of place, such that the thing placed be found totally within the place, he denies. If, however, it be asked how an indivisible angel can be contained within some surface of a body: it is answered, not in any other sense except insofar as it is present to that surface; not that it is the ultimate surface of it, because an angel cannot be in place with extension of parts, but in such a way that it penetratively be within a part of that body to which it is present. — From these things the Doctor rightly infers that an angel is not necessarily in place: for if even body does not exist necessarily in place — seeing that it could be produced outside the world and set in a vacuum — much less will an angel depend on bodily place: for it can be produced independently of the production of any creaturely body whatsoever, and then there would be nothing in which it would be said to be located, and accordingly it does not have from its own nature the necessity of inhering in some place. It has, however, a power to be in place at least definitively, whether meanwhile that power is founded in it insofar as it is substance, or insofar as it is actually a limited nature, or by reason of something extrinsic; and therefore, says the Doctor, one need not seek some intrinsic account of being in place, because there is none there, but there is in it only passive potency, by which it can be in place, because it does not repugn to itself.

Second conclusion. — The fundamental formal account by which an angel is constituted in place is not to be sought from its operation, but from its substance.

This is the Doctor's teaching in dist. 2. qu. 6. n. 1. *where, having proposed the opinion of St. Thomas, who says in dist. 37. question 3. art. 1., and part 1. question 52. art. 1., that an angel is formally constituted in place by operation and application of power producing some effect in a place, he says: This seems to be condemned as* a certain article condemned by the Bishop of Paris (namely Stephen), and excommunicated. And if it be said that excommunication does not cross the sea, or a diocese: still, if it was an article condemned as heretical, it is everywhere condemned as heretical; not by the authority of a diocesan alone, but also by the authority of the Pope, Extra. de Haeres. c. Ad abolendam; or at least the opinion is suspect, when it is solemnly condemned in some University. — *Now the first of those articles which Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned, was that separate substances are somewhere by their operation alone, and that they cannot be moved from one extrinsic place to another. And since this is a proposition copulated from two, it leaves doubt whether the condemnation falls upon the copulate of both, or upon each taken singly and separately. And therefore perhaps Scotus used the word "seems," because the censure could be carried over both joined together, and not over one or the other torn away. — That this article was condemned is testified also by Richard of Mediavilla in dist. 2. art. 2. question 1.; and Gabriel in dist. 2. question 2. art. 2.; and Henry, who was one of those condemning, reports that censure. Whence it appears that some Thomists wrongly rebuke the Subtle Doctor, as if he had gratuitously invented that condemnation, or hurled it against adversaries like a glassy shield, using it as if the strongest argument of all for establishing and confirming his own opinion: how ridiculously contrived that reproach is, must be shown by the arguments of the Doctor proving the Conclusion.

First, indeed, the conclusion is to be supported *by all those texts of sacred Scripture in which angels are said to have approached places before they did anything there; thus Luke 2.: The angel Gabriel was sent to Mary, and entering in he said etc. Therefore he enters and becomes present before he speaks. Matthew 4.: Angels came and ministered to him, namely Christ the Lord after the assaulting demon had been overcome: therefore they were present to Christ before they did anything toward him; and hence their presence is precisely not to be gathered from operation.

The Thomists reply. That angels are indeed present before they operate, but with inadequate and inchoative presence, which an angel has when it begins to order itself toward some place, that it may operate there: which presence Cajetan calls the presence of order, teaching that three conditions are required for it, namely practical judgment about the operation to be done now, or at such time, by the angel; second, election of such operation, and dispatch of the executive power; these suppositions granted, he teaches that the angel becomes present to the place inchoatively and incompletely before it operates there; completely, however, and adequately through operation.

— On the contrary. For the true and adequate account of the angelic presence it is only required that the angel be truly whole here and not elsewhere; for what else does the presence of a thing mean? But by that very fact whereby an angel is somewhere, it is true to say that he is truly there, not elsewhere, even though he should work nothing there: therefore his presence there is adequate. Next, in that instant in which the angel orders himself to his operation, he can be removed from it, either by divine command, whereby he will be summoned elsewhere, or he will be forbidden to exercise the operation, just as those angels were forbidden to whom it was said in the Apocalypse: Hurt not the earth, nor the sea, etc. Or through the denial of divine concurrence; but in that case the angels would truly have been present in the place, and yet not operating there: therefore etc. Finally, if an angel were adequately in a place only through operation, it would follow that he could never be said to operate in a place; for to operate in a place presupposes a place, and a thing constituted in the place: but the angel, as operating, does not presuppose himself as constituted in a place, since by his very operation he would have to be constituted in a place: therefore he would never be said to operate in a place: which consequence no one admits, and therefore neither ought that whence it is inferred be admitted.

The Doctor proves the conclusion 1. To be is prior to operating: therefore to be in a place is prior to operating in a place: but what is later is not the cause of what is prior: therefore operating in a place is not the cause why the angel is in a place. It is confirmed: as being simply stands to operating simply, so being here stands to operating here. Therefore just as operating simply presupposes being simply, so operating here necessarily presupposes being here: and hence the angel must first be here before he operates here.

But the Thomists deny the antecedent: since, they say, nothing prevents something from being prior simply which is not prior according to something, as the subject is prior to surface simply, but not qua colored: for there are, says Cajetan, three things in the located thing. In a body, e.g., there is the substance which is located, the quantity which is the reason of location, and the relation of presence, which follows upon those two as upon its proper foundation. In an angel likewise there is the substance which is present as that which, the contact of power, which is present as that whereby, and the relation of itself arising from those two. These three can be diversely considered, and according to diverse considerations can have the character of prior and posterior: for if they are considered as certain entities existing in the nature of things, thus in the angel substance is prior to operation, and operation to relation; just as also in a body substance is prior to quantity and relation: but if they are considered not absolutely, as they are entities, but as reasons of being in a place, thus just as in bodily things substance is prior to quantity, and then the relation follows, so in spiritual things the very operation is prior to the substance of the angel, upon which, as upon subject and founding reasons, the relation of presence results.

— Contra 1. The example about the subject is not to the purpose; for it is evident that the reason of the extended colored thing constitutes that subject under the character of surface, since surface is the extension of a body according to length and breadth: but it is not likewise evident that operation is the constitutive reason of the angel in a place; nay rather the contrary is shown; for, as we have already said, the agent must first be located before acting, which is most evident in corporeal agents, for they are located before they act. Second, they falsely suppose that quantity is the reason of locating bodies, for the quantity of bread and wine in the Sacrament of the Eucharist remains the same after consecration, and yet it is not the reason why the bread is said to exist in a place; since it no longer exists: therefore quantity precisely is not the reason why a body is in a place, since it can subsist after that body is destroyed. Moreover, the adorable Body of Christ the Lord in the Eucharist has no quantity whereby its parts would be extended toward the place and circumscribed by it, and yet it is none the less truly in a definitive place; therefore quantity per se is not the reason why bodies are in a place, but only insofar as it affects bodies and inheres in them. Thirdly finally, they do not rightly reply that the application or contact of power to a place is the reason why the angel is in a place; for that application is either the first act of the angel, or the second. If the first, since the first act of the angel is his very substance, or a substantial faculty; the consequence is that the angel is present to the place by reason of his substance. If the second, either that act is transitive or immanent. Not immanent, as even the Adversaries confess, since an immanent act has no reference ad extra, and consequently cannot be the reason why angels are said to be present in a place. Not even transitive; for if transitive operation were the formal constitutive reason of the angel in a place, what sort of thing is that transitive operation? Therefore, since that extrinsic operation of the angel is in a place circumscriptively and measuratively (since it is commensurated with the body about which it acts, and in which it is received; while the body is circumscribed by the place) that operation must likewise be circumscribed by the place: for this is why the operation of a man, e.g., inasmuch as it imports the thing operated, is circumscribed by the place, because it is received in a subject which is circumscribed by the place: but the presence of the angel is not circumscriptively in a place, as will appear in the following Question: therefore, etc. Add that if the substantial power itself of the angel is not for him the reason of existing in a place, neither is the application of that same power; for if the quantity of a body were not the reason of existing circumscriptively in a place, neither would its application effect such a presence. Moreover, just as the application of a heating power to wood so as to heat it is not the reason of heating, but only a condition sine qua non; so similarly the application of angelic power to a place is not the reason of existing in a place, but a condition sine qua non whereby we would know the angel to be present to this place rather than to another; for angelic presence becomes known to us only through operation, although it is presupposed in the place before he operates there.

The Doctor proves it 2.: if the angel were precisely in a place through operation, it would follow that he would often be nowhere; *since it often happens that they operate nothing in places where they can be thought to exist. First indeed they perform no work in the empyrean heaven: but among the other celestial orbs only some Intelligences are occupied in governing and moving them, while the rest do not exercise their power in them. In the sphere of fire they attempt nothing at all, for fire in its center has need neither of fuel, nor of tinder, nor of an inciting air. In the air indeed demons sometimes excite and hurl hailstorms, thunderings, and lightnings as lictors and ministers of God the avenger; but good angels are exempt from these and rest. Nor do these expend any labor on the surge and motion of the sea, nor are good angels reckoned the authors of tempests, although demons sometimes stir them up. On earth finally no work can be thought of in trees, flowers, or living things worthy to be ascribed to the power of the angels; for without their operations rivers run headlong with their own clearness and nature, meadows sprout, trees are adorned with flowers and fruits, animals live and direct their movements according to instinct and impulse, and universal nature tends toward its ends according to the laws prescribed by its divine Maker without any special governance of the angels. Indeed demons are occupied in hell in tormenting and cruciating the reprobate; but they are demons, and not the most holy angels of whom principally we speak. Therefore for these no other ministry seems to be assigned with regard to creatures than the guardianship of men and the liberation and solace of souls groaning in Purgatory. But few out of so immense a multitude of them are detained in those ministries. From all these things, therefore, it may be gathered that if the existence of angels in a place were to be gathered from their operation around the place, few of them would be reckoned to abide in a place.

* Gonet answers, from Cajetan. First, indeed, that the angels have some operation regarding the empyrean heaven, although such an operation does not become known to us. — But this solution is offered quite gratuitously and is by no means to be admitted; both because if such an angelic operation does not become known to us, it is asserted without foundation and fictitiously imagined: and because in this way it would be easy to dissolve any arguments whatever: for who could not evade any difficulty whatsoever by answering that the matter is indeed as asserted, but that its reason and cause lie hidden from us?

He answers 2.: that the angels produce some light whereby the innate splendor of the empyrean heaven is more perfected: for although, he says, an angel cannot immediately produce alterative qualities, e.g., heat and cold, but only by applying active things to passive ones; yet he can well produce light, for light is supreme among all corporeal qualities; and the lower nature is touched in its supreme degree by the higher nature, because, as S. Dionysius says, De divinis nominibus: divine wisdom joins the ends of the first to the beginnings of the second. By this light moreover that celestial body is chiefly beautified and adorned. For thus it is said of the Blessed, Apoc. 21: They shall bring their glory and honor into it, namely into the heavenly City; much more will the angels, with their special light, make that city most glorious. — Against this: it is gratuitously and without any reason feigned that the angels adorn the empyrean heaven with new light; for that light would either emanate from the angels themselves, as it shall emanate from the glorified bodies, as is asserted by the cited text of the Apocalypse, or it would be produced by them: but neither can be said. Not the first indeed, since angels are purely spiritual substances, they cannot pour forth from themselves the corporeal light wherewith the heaven would be illuminated. Not even the second: for they would produce that light either through creation, or through generation. Not through creation, since creation is proper to God alone, as we proved with the Subtle Doctor in the Physics. Add that if the angels could produce light through creation, on the ground that what is supreme of the lowest order can be produced by something of a higher order; if, I say, on this account an angel could create light, much more could he create a rational soul; for although this is more interior to them, yet it is most akin to them: but no one admits the consequence; therefore neither ought the antecedent be admitted. Nor can the angels produce light through generation; for generation comes about through the corruption of a form previously existing in matter, whereas in the empyrean heaven there is nothing that can be corrupted, and therefore nothing whence generation could take place. Finally, a most perfect substance, such as the empyrean heaven is, ought to proceed from its Creator at the beginning of its formation with the whole perfection due to it, and consequently it obtained the light fitting to it by force of its creation. Nor does it avail to reply that a most perfect substance subordinated to another can be completed by that other, just as the lower angels, although perfect, nevertheless stand in need of illumination from the Superior ones. This reply, I say, is not to the purpose; for there is a far different distinction between the empyrean heaven and the angels; since the angels are operative intellectually, they can receive daily new perfection and illumination, which certainly can in no way be said of the empyrean heaven, wholly immobile and unalterable; since it can exercise no action, neither can it acquire any perfection, and therefore it must have had every perfection due to it by force of its perfection.

The Doctor proves it 3.: If the angel had necessarily to operate where he is, it would follow that the angel moving the heavens would be immediately in the whole heaven; for the whole heaven is proportioned to the power of the angel; but the consequence is false; for the angel would have his presence supremely diffused and extended through the whole heaven, which the Adversaries do not admit. — Nor say that the angel is only in that part of heaven in which he operates immediately, and which he moves, and mediately in the others. For, the Doctor says, the angel of himself has no greater power to move one part immediately than the others except insofar as he is more applied to one part than to the rest; but if he be first applied to one part, which he moves immediately, the consequence is that he is first in a place with that part before he operates in that part, and thus he will not have precisely from operation that he is in a place. He has other similar proofs, all of which, like the preceding ones, I touch upon briefly for this reason:

It is proved 4.: An angel can be in a corporeal place without any operation, or application of his power, whether properly or improperly called an operation, and without undergoing anything in the place, or adorning it; therefore he does not have from operation, as from the fundamental reason, that he is in a place. The antecedent is proved: a body can be in a place without any application of power, or operation proper or improper: therefore much more an angel. The Adversaries admit the antecedent; the consequence is proved: a body can be placed in a place without any operation either because it can have in itself an intrinsic ubi whereby it is formally said to be in a place, namely the relation of the located thing to the place; or because through the action of an extrinsic cause, motive of the place, it would be put in a place; but the angel is equally capable of an ubi, and of an intrinsic form whereby he would be placed formally in a place without any operation, and he is equally capable of being placed in a place through the action of a cause motive of the place as a body is: therefore just as a body can be placed in a place without any proper or improper operation, so too the angel. The minor is proved: first, no reason can be brought forward, or assigned why the substance of the angel by its quantity of power should not be capable of a definitive place without operations, any less than the material substance of a body by benefit of its quantity of bulk is capable of a circumscriptive place: therefore, etc. Second, God depends no more upon anyone to constitute some angel in a place independently of operation, than to transport and establish some body therein: but he can do this: therefore also that. Third, when an angel is located somewhere and operates, God can suspend his operation, either by forbidding him to do anything further in that place, or by denying him his concurrence: but by that suspension of action the angel no less remains present in that place, and another angel there would see him equally as he saw him while he was operating: therefore independently of operation he is truly as capable of occupying a place as a body.

The Thomists object 1.: A corporeal substance cannot, by its formal reason, proximately and immediately grant to bodies to be in a place: therefore neither can a spiritual substance be the formal reason proximately founding ubication in corporeal and immaterial things. The consequence is evident: for if a corporeal substance cannot of itself, and prescinding from quantity, be the formal reason proximately founding ubication for bodies, but holds this only by reason of quantity, much less will a spiritual substance hold of itself that it is for the angel himself the formal reason of being in a place. But the antecedent is proved: only that is in a body the formal reason immediately granting it to be in a place which is for it the proximate and immediate formal reason of touching the place: yet a corporeal substance cannot of itself be the proximate and immediate formal reason of touching the place; for a corporeal substance touches the place not immediately by reason of itself, but only by reason of the quantity mediating between it and the place: therefore, etc. The major is proved from a likeness, for one clothed, although he has a garment, is in no way said to be clothed unless he touches the garment: therefore neither could a substance be in a place unless it touched the place, either by physical contact through quantity, as corporeal substances; or metaphorically through power, as all spirits.

— I answer 1. by denying the consequence: for although real and physical contact would be necessary for bodies to be said to be formally in a place, it does not thence follow that the contact of power ought equally to be required, that a spiritual substance be said to be formally present to a place: for physical contact is said to be required in bodies because they are in a place divisively and through commensuration; so that their parts correspond to and are commensurated with the parts of the place, unto which, as appears, contact and application of the parts of the body to the parts of the place is necessarily required: otherwise it is with a spiritual substance, which since it is in a place definitively and in a manner wholly invisible, it is not necessary that it have any contact, or at least none other than the real presence of its substance: for as a body is said to touch the place through quantity, and by this reason becomes present to it; so the angel through his substance becomes really present to the place, which suffices for him to be said to touch it.

I answer 2.: the antecedent can be denied, as well as the major of its proof: Both because, as we have already said, the adorable Body of Christ the Lord in the Eucharist, stripped of its quantity at least external, and whereby it could really touch a place, is truly present on the altar, and under the eucharistic species, with definitive presence: therefore that quantity, whereby the place is touched, is not the formal reason why bodies are precisely in a place. And because the eucharistic species of bread and wine remain the same after and before consecration: but once consecration is accomplished, their quantity is not the formal reason why the substance of bread and wine is said to be in a place, since that substance has ceased to be, and subsists no longer: therefore quantity is not the formal reason founding the ubication of bodies in a place, since bodies, at least divinely, can be formally in a place without quantity, and quantity itself can remain in the same place without thereby constituting bodies formally in the place.

They object 2.: What is the proximate reason of founding angelic ubication imports determination, or limitation with respect to the place, since by it one is so here as not to be elsewhere: but the substance of the angel per se, and operation removed, does not import such a determination; for the order to place is not essential but accidental to the angel: therefore, all operation removed, the substance of the angel is not the formal reason immediately founding the ubication of the angel.

— I deny the minor. for that determination, or limitation with respect to the place is either understood causally, and denotes an extrinsic or intrinsic cause whereby the angel is determined to occupy this place rather than another; or fundamentally, or formally, insofar namely as existing here it has the reason of founding a relation to this place rather than to another: but it can hold this independently of any extrinsic operation; since it can be determined, either by the divine, or by its own will, to undergo this or that place: to which ubi when it is present, its substance is the sufficient reason of founding the relation of presence and ubication to the place; for nothing else is required for this than that the angel can be said to be truly present here, and not elsewhere, and hence to have a relation of presence to this, and not to another place, all of which can come about with any operation excluded: therefore whichever way the Thomists use that determination, it comes about independently of operation.

They insist: the substance of the angel per se is indifferent to every single place in particular: therefore that it be in a certain, or determinate place, it necessarily requires something whereby it be determined to undergo this place rather than another: but that cannot be anything other than its transitive operation: therefore by this it is substituted formally in a place.

— I deny the minor. for, as was said, that determination is understood either causally or fundamentally. If the first, the angel has it not from his operation transiting to the place, but either from his own motive power, whereby he freely transferred himself to that place, or from an extrinsic power, namely from God, whereby he was produced in that place, or detained therein, or translated to it. But if that determination be taken fundamentally, he has it from his substance, which although of itself it is indifferent to existing here or elsewhere, yet when it is stationed present here, whether by its own, or by another's will, it is no longer indifferent to founding a respect to this or another place, but necessarily founds a relation of presence to that place in which it is substantially present.

They urge again: with operation excluded, the angels have nothing whereby they could found a real relation of presence to a place; therefore this is necessarily required, that they be said to have a determinate place. The antecedent is proved: if there be anything besides operation in the angel whereby he could found this relation immediately, it is above all his substance: but the substance of the angel cannot be the immediate foundation of such a relation: Both because a substance per se and precisely founds no other relation than that of identity. And because if it founded a relation, it would be above all either qua it is substance, and insofar as it has the common concept of substance, or qua it is angelic substance: but neither can be affirmed: not the first indeed, otherwise every substance would found a like relation: not even the second, because the formal reason of angelic substance formally denotes nothing else than a total and adequate spiritual substance, denoting no order to a body: therefore the substance of the angel per se precisely cannot found a relation to space, or place.

— I deny the antecedent; and to the minor of its proof I say, that angelic substance founds a respect to the place, not precisely qua it is substance, nor qua angelic substance, but qua it is substance here, and not elsewhere; just as, e.g., a wall founds a relation of similarity to another, not precisely qua it is a corporeal substance, nor qua it is extended, but qua it is white, or black. But to what is said, namely that a substance founds no other relation than that of identity; I answer that this is true while it is compared with another substance, but not while compared with something else; for as substance qua created, when compared to God, bears to God a relation of dependence; so when compared to a place, it can bear to it a relation of presence entirely distinct from that respect of identity which it has to another substance. Thence it appears that the Thomists seem not to philosophize sufficiently congruously, while, as if indubitable, they put forward as the foundation of their opinion that substance per se can found no relation, since it has to God a relation of dependence, and to another substance a relation of identity.

They object 3.: If the substance of the angel per se, and anterior to the virtually transiting operation, were the proximate reason of founding ubication, or immediately granting to the angel that he be in a place, the angel would always claim for himself a certain place, and could not exist in a greater or lesser one at his pleasure: but this cannot be said: therefore neither that. The minor will appear below. The major is proved: for the substance of the angel within its own line is something invariable, for it always holds the same substantial perfection, and never varies in its substantial being: therefore if that per se, and anterior to operation, be the proximate reason of founding angelic ubication, or immediately granting to the angel that he be in a place, he will always claim a certain place for himself, nor can he at his pleasure exist in a greater or lesser place within the sphere of his activity.

— It is confirmed, from this, that since the quantity of bulk is in us the formal reason of being in a place, a body, e.g., cannot occupy or fill now a greater, now a lesser place unless some intrinsic change be made in its quantity, namely through condensation or complication, or rarefaction: therefore similarly, if the substance of the angel according to what it holds within its own line be the proximate formal reason of being in a place, the angel will not be able sometimes to exist in a greater, sometimes in a lesser place, unless his very substance be intrinsically varied, and within its own line, which however is impossible.

— I deny the minor, and to its proof I say, that although the substance of the angel is of itself invariable according to its entity, it can nevertheless be varied by respect to the place to which it is applied, insofar namely as it is subject to the determination of the divine or its own will, whereby it is applied to such or such a place. For although the substance of the angel per se is determinate to the place adequate to it, in this sense, that it cannot be in a greater, still it is not determined to exist in the whole of that place, nor in any certain part of it, but indifferently it can be either in the place, or within its breadth in a greater or lesser place: and consequently it is necessary that in this respect it be determined in some way, so that the very substance be a determined thing. Yet this determination is not to be understood as made in such wise that the very substance of the angel, before (at least in the order of nature) it be united to the place, lose the termination it has from its nature, and acquire another, as it were through a certain constitution or dilatation, by reason of which it demands so much or so much place within the breadth of that place, which according to its natural termination it demanded; just as bodies by reason of their own quantity demand a place of a certain extension, and that they be in a lesser one it is necessary that their quantity be first, at least in the order of nature, constrained, or in some other way acquire a new termination: but it must be said that the aforesaid termination is made in the angel by this alone, that his substance is applied to so much or so much place, according to the measure of his own will.

To the confirmation, I deny parity; for there is disparity between corporeal and angelic substance, in that the former while it is divisively in a place, is in it through commensuration of every kind of the whole quantity with the whole place, and of the parts of that same quantity with the parts of the place: but the latter is whole in the whole, and whole in any part, as the rational soul in the body, and the Body of Christ in the Eucharist; whence just as the rational soul, without intrinsic variation of itself, can inform now a greater, now a lesser matter, and the Body of Christ can sometimes exist under greater, sometimes under lesser dimensions or species, according to the will of the consecrator; so too the angel, without intrinsic variation of his substance, will be able sometimes to exist in a greater, sometimes in a lesser place, according to the good pleasure of his will, by reason of which angelic substance can be united either to the whole place adequate to it, or only to some one of the parts of the place.

Gonet urges: even if some substance be whole in the whole of some place, and whole in any part of that place, it does not thence follow that it can constitute itself now in a greater, now in truth in a lesser place, as it pleases it; for God is whole in the whole corporeal place, and whole in any part of it, and yet he cannot fail to fill every created place. Likewise the rational soul is whole in the whole body, and whole in any part of it, and yet it cannot at its pleasure inform sometimes the whole body, sometimes only one part of it. Whence that it can inform now a lesser matter, namely while it first actualizes the body of a child, now a greater, when indeed the same child grows, does not arise from this, that it is whole in the whole body, and whole in any part of it, but because from its nature it is determined to this, that it first actualize a lesser matter, then a greater converted into the proper substance of man. Similarly, that the Body of Christ can sometimes exist under lesser, sometimes under greater dimensions of the bread, according to the good pleasure of the consecrator signing the matter to be converted into it, arises from the nature or institution of the Sacrament of the Eucharist determining it to this. But the substance of the angel is not per se, and intrinsically, or from its nature determined to this, that for diverse times it be now in a lesser place, afterwards in a greater; nay rather, since it is wholly invariable from within, it must consequently be determined to exist always in an equal place, if it be the proximate formal reason of existing in a place.

— I deny the minor: for since angelic substance, as regards motion and its union to such or such a place, hangs altogether upon its free will, although per se it be invariable; yet it is not determined from within to exist always in an equal place; whence much more easily than the rational soul can it occupy a greater or lesser place; for the soul is so bound that a greater or lesser diffusion of it to the body hangs upon the greater or lesser constitution of the body itself; but the angel does not thus depend upon the place; but according to the inclination of his will he can pour forth the presence of his substance to a wider or stricter place.

— But the reason why peculiarly the substance of the angel, for the occupation of a place, hangs upon his free will, whereas the corporeal quantity of man is not so subjected to the empire of his liberty as to occupy a greater or lesser place according to his inclination, and neither is the substance of the rational soul free to inform the whole body, or only some parts of it, nor can God, by reason of his immensity and eternity, effect that his substance be only in some part of a place, and not everywhere; nor that his duration coexist with only some part of time: the reason, I say, of this distinction is, says our Rada, that the quantity of perfection in the angel, with regard to that union, holds two things by reason of which it befits it to be so subjected to the liberty of the angel himself: The first is, that from its own entity, and from the mode wherein it is united, it does not repugn to it indifferently to be united to the whole place, and to a part of it: The second is, that that union be the term of the free operation of the angel himself, namely local motion: for by means of local motion the angel applies and unites himself efficiently to some place. But to corporeal quantity the first is lacking by reason of its extension, as was expounded; and to the rational soul the second is lacking, for its union with the body which it informs is not the term of any free action of the soul itself, but is wrought by an extrinsic agent; and similarly the power of God toward every place, and coexistence with the whole time, if considered on the part of God, do not terminate any free action of God himself: but supposing that there be place and time, God necessarily coexists with them, otherwise God would be mutable as regards place and time.

Three things above all must be discussed in this Question: First, whether angels are able to occupy any place, however great or small: Second, whether several can exist in the same place at once; Third, whether one can be in several places.

Note 1. The place of the angels can be distinguished as twofold; namely adequate or total, and inadequate or partial. The adequate and total place is that which corresponds to the angel according to the ultimate measure of his power and virtue, in which whole he can substantially be, and outside of which he cannot at the same time naturally be: but the inadequate and partial place, which is less than the whole adequate place, is that in which an angel existing can also by his own power be outside it; namely as in a partial continuous place; such is some part of the aforesaid adequate place and space. We ask, therefore, whether an angel by natural or supernatural power can exist in several adequate and inadequate places at once.

Note 2. It is beyond controversy that one angel can exist at once in several inadequate places that are continuous and do not stand apart from each other; for since the presence of his substance to a place depends on the free application of the same, it is plainly evident that if a hall were the adequate place of an angel, and four parts and corners of that hall his inadequate place, he could at will remove his presence from one corner and another, so as to make himself present in only two other parts and corners, especially since this does not exceed his natural power: for his indivisible substance is not naturally extended to a place of a certain and determinate magnitude, in the way bodies are extended, which according to their greater or lesser quantity naturally and necessarily require a greater or lesser place. Hence the only difficulty is whether an angel can be, by his will and natural power, in inadequate places that are discontinuous and distant from each other, yet contained within the place naturally adequate to him; e.g., whether an angel existing in a hall can make himself present in two corners of that hall without existing in the middle.

Note 3. The precise reason why two bodies cannot naturally occupy the same place at the same time must be sought chiefly from this, that each of those bodies fills every place to which it is present: but a place filled by one body can receive no other: just as a vessel full of some liquid cannot by natural power receive the infusion of another liquid poured upon it. But whether the same reason holds, or whether some other similar reason must be brought forward why two spiritual substances cannot occupy the same place at the same time, Authors do not agree among themselves; for very many, with St. Thomas and his disciples, affirm that angels cannot be simultaneously present to one and the same adequate place: while the rest, with the Subtle Doctor, dispute the problem on both sides, inclining nevertheless more to the affirmative than to the negative side. These points premised, let there be

First conclusion. — Although the angelic substance is indivisible, it can nevertheless occupy a divisible place, and also a minimum indivisible one. This Conclusion, as to both parts, is the Doctor's in 2. dist. 2. quaest. 6. num. 13.; for although on this point he may seem problematic, he nonetheless leans more to the affirmative than to the negative side.

The first part is proved, namely that an indivisible soul can occupy a divisible place: for if anything were detrimental to this occupation and presence, it would be above all the indivisibility of the angelic substance: but that does not prevent him from being able to make himself present in a divisible place: for although the substance of the rational soul is likewise indivisible, it nevertheless occupies divisible space, being whole in the whole body which it informs, and whole in each part of it: similarly, although the divine substance and essence is truly supremely indivisible, nevertheless because it is infinite in entity, it is really and substantially diffused through the whole universe, as was proved when treating of the Divine Immensity: therefore, by parity of reason, although the angelic substance is indivisible, it can nevertheless occupy a divisible place. Add that since the presence of the angels comes about either through the voluntary application of their substance to a place, as we taught above with

the Subtle Doctor, or through the application and diffusion of their power, as the Thomists contend, both schools must necessarily hold this part of the Conclusion as certain and undoubted: for it is certain that an angel can naturally will that his substance make itself present throughout a determinate place; for what could oppose this volition? Especially since an indivisible substance can occupy a divisible place. It is equally certain that an angel can apply his power to some extended and divisible space: for although his operative power and operation are formally indivisible in their entity, they are nevertheless virtually divisible and extended, because they produce and immediately cause a divisible and extended effect in the subject about which they operate.

— Yet it is not permissible to infer from this that an angel could become present to an infinite quantity, if such were granted, seeing that his native power is limited and determinate, and therefore cannot extend itself infinitely: for he could not become present to an infinite quantity as infinite unless he became present to all its parts. But it implies a contradiction that a finite and limited substance could be proportioned and commensurated to infinite parts: therefore, etc. Whence the Doctor rightly concludes in the same place num. 11:

It is commonly conceded that an angel cannot be in a place, however great, because this is proper to God. — But whether an angel has a place so determinate that he cannot be in a greater or lesser one. This, he says at number 14., is doubtful, because neither part seems easily provable: which would indeed be an inconvenience, if his virtual quantity, by which he can be present to some place, were the natural reason of being in so great a place in its own manner, just as the quantity of a body is the natural reason of being in so great a place in its own manner: so that although it be within my power to be in this place or in that place, it is not however within my power to be in so great a place or in so great: because this effect naturally follows from quantity, which is not subject to my power: and as not in itself, so neither as regards this effect, namely to be in so great a place or so great. Nothing inconvenient therefore seems to follow if this were posited in angels, or if it were posited that their quantity has some adequate place, greater than which it could not have according to the conditions of its power and essence; although it is nevertheless subject to the will of the angel, so that he can, not always have that place, but a greater or a lesser one; no inconvenience follows.

By which words of the Doctor, Poncius says in his Commentary on the same passage, he means that no convincing reason can be assigned whereby it could be proved that an angel is able to occupy at will a smaller place, or that he is not able to. For if it were said that by his nature every angel tends to be connaturally in the whole place, as a body four palms long tends to be in the corresponding place, so that he could not naturally be posited in a smaller one, certainly the angel could not place himself in a smaller place, but although he could place himself in another place, every place in which he could place himself ought always to be of such a size: nor is there any convincing reason why it should not be said to be thus in fact. Again, if it were posited that he does not require by his nature so great a place, but is of himself indifferent to any place whatsoever below that maximum which he could have, down to the minimum place, then doubtless he could be posited in a smaller and smaller place, nor would he necessarily have to have always a place of the same magnitude: but neither is there even here any convincing reason by which it is shown that it is not thus in fact. Thus far Poncius.

The second part is also proved: namely that an angel can exist in a minimum place: for although the Doctor in the place cited above num. 11. seems to assert that an angel cannot exist in a place however small, nevertheless he maintains this only problematically, seeing that he immediately raises the question whether he can be in a point, and determines neither side, for he says at number 18:

Whether, however, he can be in a point or not, there seems to be no necessary reason, neither for one side nor for the other: because although the angel is indivisible, he has not an indivisibility limited like a point: and therefore he need not be in a point as in a place. Nor perhaps does it repugn for him to be in a point as in a place: because no inconvenience seems to be inferred from this; for if from being in a point as in a place it were inferred that he could not move locally unless space were composed of points, it does not follow; for he could carry himself immediately from the place of the little point into the continuum, whose continuum the point terminates.

Since, therefore, the Doctor holds that an angel can exist in a point, there is no doubt that he likewise asserts problematically that the same can exist in an indivisible place.

This is further urged: to the very place an Angelic substance can inexist, to which it can truly become present definitively: but an angel can definitively be present to a minimum and indivisible place; since by definitive presence a thing is whole in the whole, and whole in each part of the whole, so the substance of an angel, since it is indivisible, can inexist in an indivisible thing: therefore, etc. Add that no inconvenience follows from this; for, says our Herrera Disp. 6. quaest. 7., if any inconvenience could be assigned, it would be above all that the angel could not move himself locally from one place to another, because a point is not a place, since it is indivisible, nor are there two immediate points. But this does not stand in the way, because when the angel is in a place definitively, it will have the character of a definitive place, which can found the relation of the presence of the angel to it, and consequently since this fundamental character can be had in a point, because it can be predicated of the angel, that is, that he is thus here and not elsewhere, therefore in a point the true character of where, or of place, can be found. But there is no inconvenience concerning local motion, as the Doctor himself answers, because an angel existing in a point could bear himself immediately into a continuous place, that is, into the surface proximate to the point, whose point (namely of the surface) is the terminus.

Finally, when an angel is in the place adequate to him, he is also in whatever part of it: but a place smaller than any determinate divisible place is a part of that great place: therefore he is in fact in that smaller place when he is in the greatest place: but his existence in that place has no dependence on his simultaneous existence in the other parts of the greater place: nor indeed can it be shown in what genus of cause, or of necessary condition, such a dependence could be had: therefore he can be in that one place alone without being in the remaining parts.

You will object 1. If an angel could exist in a minimum place, he could also exist in Heaven and on earth. Proof: whatever can be in one of equals can be in any other equal to it, if some configuration which would be in one of the equals does not repugn to it: but no configuration of any place can repugn to an angel, since he is indivisible: therefore if he can be in one place, he can be in any place equal to it, if he be not determined to some small place. But this is an inconvenience; because it would follow that an angel could naturally be at once in Heaven and on earth: for if he can occupy a square place, that is, of four equal sides, and be not determined to some determinate small place, in which smaller he cannot be, since from that square place there can be made a quadrangular place (that is, of four sides, two of which are longer than the other two, and equal among themselves), of such length that it could be stretched out to Heaven, because its sides can be compressed more and more to infinity, and the more the sides are compressed, the more that body is extended toward length, it follows that he could exist at once in Heaven and on earth.

— Poncius answers in his Summa of Theology, denying the first assumption and the consequence of the proof; because from a square of four feet there cannot naturally be made any quadrangle that could be stretched from earth to Heaven: for although by compressing the sides it can be extended into greater and greater length to infinity: yet this can only be done with respect to indeterminate parts, syncategorematically and to infinity: but not with respect to determinate parts, categorematically and to infinity: from this, however, it does not follow that it can naturally be extended at once up to Heaven: just as it does not follow, although there are as many parts syncategorematically in a palm-sized quantity as in a hundred-palm one, that it could occupy at once so much place as the hundred-palm one.

— * The Doctor confirms and presses this same argument from a certain principle of Euclid the mathematician, propos. 30. lib. 2. where he teaches that whatever can be in one of equals, and in the rest, if no configuration repugns to it. Whence the Doctor argues thus in the place cited above num. 12 — and in the commentary on this passage of the Doctor:

Whatever can be in one equal can be in the other: if no configuration repugns to it, by which one is distinguished from the other: but no configuration of the place in which it is repugns to an angel: therefore if it can be in one equal, it can be in the other. And consequently if it can be in a square however small or narrow, which must be posited by saying that it does not repugn to him to be in any place whatsoever, it follows that it does not repugn to him to be in a place however long, because the quadrangle is equal to that small square in which it can be. Which is indeed a most certain argumentation. But it excepts: unless the configuration repugns, which pertains to bodies. For water, or wine, or another liquid, since it requires a certain capacious figure, will not be able to be in a quadrangle formed from a square: since if the quadrangle be too much contracted, and stretched out into an enormous length, it will not hold those liquids. But the angel is without body, and lacks figure; if he can be in a square, he can be in a quadrangle, though never stretched out here to infinity.

— To the Doctor I say that he truly presses and confirms this argument against St. Thomas who, lib. 1. q. 52. a. 2., having denied in the body of the article that an angel can be in a body however great, and having reduced him to a certain and determinate place therein, afterwards did not hesitate to say that within his sphere he could be in a greater and lesser place even down to the indivisible. An angel, he says, is indivisible, existing outside the genus of quantity and situation; hence it is not necessary that one indivisible place according to situation be determined to him: but either divisible or indivisible, greater or lesser, according as he voluntarily applies his power to a greater or lesser body. And so the whole body, to which his power is applied, corresponds to him as one place. And he had said above that the angel is not to be bound necessarily to an indivisible point, although he himself is indivisible; and so he leaves only his sphere free to him, so that within it, whether in a greater place or a lesser, he can be. And thus Cajetan understands it there, and commonly the authors, both domestic and extern.

This argument, I say, the Doctor twists against St. Thomas to show that his assertion is not firm and constant, nor resting on sure foundations. But he himself did not descend to the opposite opinion, but only proposed it as probable, whatever our Francis Macedo may pronounce to the contrary, sect. 6. collat. 1. De loco Angelorum. For thus teach the faithful more recent interpreters of the Doctor, namely Cavellus in his scholion on this passage of the Doctor; Vulpius disp. 18. art. 1; Mastrius; Tataretus on the same text of the Doctor, whom Lichetus had preceded in his Commentary, and Poncius in the same place, where he both copiously and subtly dissolves the aforesaid argument and turns it back in this way: by what reasoning would it follow that the angel could be in any quadrangle equal to some minimum assignable square, and consequently in a place however great; and hence he would be at once in heaven and on earth; and by parity of reason the same angel could be in any smaller square whatever which would be the minimum place that the angel can occupy. For if the angel can be, e.g., in a square of which any side is ten or twenty palms, but cannot be in a square so small that each of its sides is only one palm. Since thus that large square can be extended into a quadrangle as long as that small square can, by compressing its sides, even before it reaches the narrowness of that small square, because it has in breadth many more determinate parts, and as many indeterminate parts above the breadth of the small square, it can be extended toward length by compression of the sides as much as the small square can be extended, and consequently if the small square can be extended from earth into heaven, and into any length whatsoever to infinity, the large square can also be thus extended, even without reducing it to so narrow a breadth as the small square has, and consequently, if the angel can be in any quadrangle equal to that square, he could be at once in heaven and on earth, and in a quadrangle however long. Therefore that very inconvenience which follows according to the adversaries, because the angel can be in so small a square, follows from the fact that he would be in a square as great as they themselves concede. Thus Poncius.*

You will object 2. If an angel had not a determinate place as to smallness, but could make himself present in smaller and smaller places to infinity, he would be of infinite perfection: but this is false: therefore, etc. The consequence is proved; because it is of greater perfection in him that he can become present in a smaller and smaller place: for if, says the Doctor, n. 12., he could be in greater and greater places to infinity, the infinity of his power would be concluded; so therefore the infinity of his power would be concluded, if he could be in smaller and smaller places to infinity.

— I deny the consequence, and likewise the consequentia of its proof; for the reason of the disparity is that the occupation of greater and greater places to infinity, which would argue infinite perfection, is that which takes place through determinate parts, from which, if all were posited a parte rei, there would arise a categorematic infinite: whence it is no wonder that the power by which that occupation could take place would be infinite, and consequently repugnant to an angel; but the occupation of smaller and smaller places to infinity takes place with respect to indeterminate parts, from which, even if all were posited in act, it does not follow that a categorematic infinite is given.

* Because those parts are not distinct nor actually divided, but only in potency to be distinguished and divisible to infinity. — There is added, says Poncius in the same place, that the aforesaid argument can also be turned back upon the adversaries. For, he says, they themselves confess that between the maximum adequate place of the angel and his minimum place he could place himself in smaller and smaller places down to that minimum place, and that this also is of greater perfection in him. Whence I argue thus: between that maximum place and the minimum place there are given smaller and smaller places to infinity, because the excess of the maximum place over the minimum is divisible to infinity: but the angel can place himself in any place of those: therefore he can place himself in smaller and smaller places to infinity, even according to those authors. Either, then, this argues perfection; and then either such perfection must be conceded to the angel, or it must not be conceded to him that he can do this; or it does not argue it, and then the first consequence is bad together with the consequence of its proof. Thence Poncius concludes that the angel can truly reduce his presence to a smaller place than the adequate one, to which many more recent Scotists assent, as Branchatius disp. 5. q. 6; Mastrius 12 Metaphysicae disp. 11. q. 5. art. 2; and very many others, asserting that in this matter the Doctor does not oppose it, but only holds it as probable, seeing that he himself supposes as probable that an angel can be in a point, as is evident from his words cited above, whose reason is manifest enough. For if an angel can be in an indivisible place, such as the world, much more can he be in a less divisible place, because that minimum divisible place is more proportioned to the divisible adequate place of the angel than a wholly indivisible place. Further, whoever can be in extreme places can also be in intermediate ones: but an angel can be in a most divisible place adequate to him, and also in a point: therefore he can also subsist in a less divisible place, which is midway between the more divisible and the point *.

Second conclusion. — An angel cannot naturally be in two adequate places: nor even in inadequate discontinuous places: in both, however, he can exist supernaturally.

This embraces three parts, all of which the Doctor unfolds q. 7. n. 2.

The first part is proved. An adequate place is called that which neither exceeds the located thing nor is exceeded by it: therefore it implies that the angel is present simultaneously and once to several places, each of which is adequate. The consequence is plain; for if he were in several, he would exceed each of them in particular; since he would not be in one without equally existing in another, and thus each of those places would be adequate, as supposed, and at the same time would not be, since the located thing existing also in another would exceed the former place. Further, if an angel could be simultaneously and once in several adequate places, he would not need to pass from place to place in order to operate: but the consequent is false, and against Sacred Scripture, which teaches that angels approach bodies or spirits, that they may do something about such things, as was said in the preceding Question: therefore etc.

The second part the Doctor leaves as doubtful for others to discuss. For when he had said that one angel cannot be in two adequate places: Because, he says, then that place would not seem adequate to him according to his natural power, he adds: But whether he could be in two discontinuous places, of which neither one nor the other would be adequate to him, is doubtful: nor does a necessary reason seem to exist for or against.

Nevertheless the denying opinion appears truer than the affirming: First because, if an angel could make himself present in several inadequate discontinuous places, he would be at once in several places, as several: for those partial and inadequate places would be neither one in entity, as is evident; nor in continuity, since they are supposed to be discontinuous; nor in order, because the presence of the angel in one is not derived from his presence in the other, and therefore the angel would be in them as several: but he cannot be in several places as several; otherwise he could also be in several adequate places, the contrary of which has just been proved. Second because, if the angel could naturally be in several inadequate discontinuous places, he could at once become present to several places removed by any distance whatsoever; for if the distance which is between two inadequate places discontinuous with each other does not prevent the angel from inexisting in them without existing in the intermediates, neither will a greater distance stand in the way of that angelic presence: but that consequent is absurd: for it would follow thence that the angel could become naturally present at once to Heaven and to earth; which no Theologian admits.

— Nor does it avail to reply that this would indeed be true if that distance and discontinuation took place outside the sphere of the angel's activity and of his adequate place, which since it is not so, thence it does not follow, neither that the angel is in several places as several, nor that he can exist in places removed by any distance whatsoever: this, I say, response does not weaken the force of the preceding reasons. First, for whether those places are outside the sphere of the angel's activity or not, they are truly remote from each other and distinct from each other; and therefore they are truly many, and accordingly the angel existing in them exists not as in one, but as in many.

Add that since the angel is present to a place by reason of his substance, and through the application of his free will, if he could make himself present in four corners of a hall discontinuous with each other, why could he not likewise make himself present also in a place nearer to the hall, yet not contiguous? For if the distance of one cubit does not prevent him from being present to discontinuous places, by what reasoning could the distance of two or three cubits prevent it?

This reason is confirmed together with the preceding ones; First indeed, because no reason appears why such a power should rather be attributed to an angel than to other entities, which are limited and determined naturally to one place, so that as soon as we see a thing in one place we judge that it is distinguished from another placed in another place. Second, the angel is determined to a place just as the soul to informing a body: but the same soul cannot inform distant parts at once without informing the intermediates: therefore the angel cannot exist in several discrete parts of a place unless he exist in the intermediate parts. Third, the multiplication of the presence of the Body of Christ in divers places remote from each other is said to be miraculous: therefore it would be a miracle if a spiritual thing existed in divers discontinuous places, and consequently the angel cannot make himself present by his own power in divers remote places.

You will say 1. The whole reason why no body can be in two places, even partial ones, discontinuous and distant, is because a body is something continuous and dependent on place, and accordingly cannot be in discrete places unless its quantity be divided: but this reason has no place in angels, since they lack quantity and are independent of place: therefore, etc.

— I deny the major. For not for this reason is some body unable to be in several places, that it would be divided, but also because according to its limited entity it is so determined to one place that it cannot occupy several at once; which reason holds in angels. Whence as a body is shut up in one circumscriptive place, nor can occupy several at once, as several and discontinued; so by parity of reason the angel is shut up in a definitive place, so that by his own proper power he cannot extend himself to several.

You will say 2. An angel, as we have said, is in a place by the free application of his substance to it, in such a way that, whenever he wills, he can apply his substance to the whole place commensurate with him, or only to some one of its parts; therefore nothing prevents him from being able to apply it to two extremities, but not to the middle.

— I deny the consequence. For that an angel occupy the whole place commensurate with him or only a single part of it involves no apparent repugnance; since from this it does not follow that he is multilocated, and beyond the sphere of his natural power: but this does follow if he were present in two places that are non-commensurate and discontinuous, and so there is no parity.

The third part is proved, namely that, as the Doctor says in n. 2, an angel can be in several places, both commensurate and non-commensurate, by divine power: for if anything stood in the way, it would above all be because one and the same thing could not be in several places definitively; but the consequent is absurd, for the Body of Christ the Lord is really present under the discontinuous and distant Eucharistic species; therefore much more will an angel be able to be present multilocated. The consequence is evident, for it is easier to work a single miracle than many: but for the Body of Christ to become present under the consecrated species, two miracles must especially intervene, one by which it is stripped of its native quantity and exists in a kind of spiritual mode; the other by which it becomes present multilocated: but for an angel to be in several places only a single miracle is required, namely one by which his presence is multiplied; therefore he will be able to be constituted multilocated much more easily than bodies.

You will say 1. If an angel existed multilocated, he would be distant from himself; but this is absurd; therefore etc. The inference of the major is proved; because those places, as is supposed, are distant from one another; therefore also the angel existing in them. The consequence is proved; because things that are together with one third are together with one another; therefore things that are not together with one third are not together with one another, and consequently are distant from one another.

— The Doctor answers in the number praised above, denying both the inference and the consequent of each proof: for just as it does not follow that God is distant from himself even if the bodies in which he is present are distant; and just as it does not follow that the soul of a man is distant from itself even if it informs the right hand and the left, which are distant from one another; so it does not follow that an angel existing in several places is distant from himself, even if the places in which he exists are distant from one another; whether he exists in those places supernaturally or naturally: rather it is known only that he exists in them. This I add, because if it were known that one angel existed in one place naturally, and that an angel existed also in another place naturally, it should be judged that it was not one angel who existed in both places. For confirmation the Doctor distinguishes the consequent: when that which is together in them is limited to one only, he concedes; when it is not, he denies: as is clear concerning the soul, he says, placed in the right hand and the left, which soul is not distant from itself, and yet hand is distant from hand; similarly God is not distant from himself, yet those things that are with him, here or in Rome, are distant from one another.

You will say 2. An angel is of one limited nature; therefore he must be limited according to everything that can belong to him, and consequently cannot have several places at once.

— The Doctor answers by distinguishing the consequent. According to absolutely anything whatsoever of whatever kind, the consequence is denied: because otherwise he could not have several intellections at once, nor even several continuous presences; according to anything whatsoever that can belong to him by the mode of a natural property and inseparable accident, let the first consequence pass, and the second is denied.

* You will say 3. If an angel could exist in two places at once, it would follow that he could likewise at once rest in one place and be moved from the other place to another; but this fights contradictorily, for from it there would follow that he would rest and not rest at once; therefore it is also repugnant for him to exist in two places.

— The Doctor answers, in the third number, conceding the inference of the major and denying the minor along with its proof. It would indeed be true on that hypothesis that the angel would rest according to one where and not rest according to another where; but it would not be true that he would rest and not rest simpliciter: for to rest simpliciter signifies that the thing is moved in no way whatsoever with respect to any place whatever, and hence excludes all motion entirely from the thing located. But to rest with respect to one place and not rest with respect to another can be verified of the same thing, because they do not fight contradictorily, since it is not affirmed at once of the same thing according to the same place and state, but according to diverse ones; whence the Doctor concludes that on that hypothesis, if anyone were to infer from the fact that the angel rests in one place and is moved from another into another, that he would at once rest and not rest simpliciter, he would commit the fallacy from what is said secundum quid to what is said simpliciter, and would stray in his reasoning through ignorance of the elenchus, because he would infer that some things that are not contradictory — since they are not affirmed or denied of the same thing according to the same respect — are nevertheless contradictory.

You will say 4. Two "wheres" are formally incompossible as being contraries, since between them local motion can occur, which is always between two extreme contraries mutually opposed; for all "wheres" that are distant are of distinct species, and hence imply a certain contrariety; therefore those two "wheres" cannot be posited in one and the same angel, for contraries cannot be at once in the same subject.

— I distinguish the antecedent. Two "wheres" are incompossible and contrary in themselves and with respect to themselves, because they are of diverse species — I concede; with respect to something else and by reason of the subject, I subdistinguish: if they are taken non-commensurately, I deny, for an angel existing in a place commensurate with him has as many non-commensurate "wheres" as there are parts of that place, and hence is at once in several non-commensurate places. If those two "wheres" are taken commensurately, they cannot belong to one and the same subject — I subdistinguish: by the power of some natural agent, I concede; of a supernatural one, I deny: for although two "wheres" are naturally reckoned contrary and incompossible, because one cannot be acquired by the forces of nature without the other being lost; nevertheless, since it is certain from faith that one body can be in two places at once by divine power, nothing prevents the same being affirmed of an angel, since he is of a nobler entity and more vigorous power, and accordingly fitter to occupy diverse places at once by the ordination of God. Nor does the specific distinction of those "wheres" hinder this occupation in any way, since two things of distinct species can be found even naturally in the same subject, as whiteness and sweetness in milk, the sensitive and vegetative power in the same animal. *

Third conclusion. — It is more probable that several angels can be at once in the same place by natural power, not only materially but even definitively.

So holds the Doctor who, although he may seem doubtful about how this question should be resolved, nevertheless proves the affirmative part and dissolves the arguments of the denier.

It is urged 1. from the holy Fathers, some of whom, although they attribute bodies to angels just as they do to the souls of men, nevertheless affirm that several of either can subsist in the same place. Thus Tertullian, in book 2 De Anima, chapter 25, rebukes Plato's contrary opinion:

But if anyone, as Plato, thinks, he says, that two souls do not come together in one, just as neither do bodies, I would show him not only two souls crowded together in one, as also bodies in embryos; but truly many other things conjoined with a soul, namely demons, and not of one spirit, as in Socrates himself, but a septenary of spirits, as in Mary Magdalene, and legionary numbers, as in the Gerasene; whereby a soul is the more easily joined with a soul through the fellowship of substance than a wicked spirit through the diversity of nature.

Gregory Nazianzen indeed, in the first Epistle to Cledonius, refuting Apollinaris, who denied that Christ was a perfect man on the ground that two perfect things cannot exist at once, answers thus:

Not at all, provided you weigh the matter in a corporeal manner: for a vessel holding one measure will by no means contain two measures, nor can the place of one body hold two or more bodies. But if you consider these things as intelligible and incorporeal, observe that the very same contains both the soul, and reason, and mind, and the Holy Spirit:

he adds: for such is the nature of intelligibles, that in an incorporeal and indivisible manner they are mingled both with one another and with bodies. Which mingling occurs not according to their substantial union, but according to the occupation and presence of the same place.

The Doctor proves 1. indeed by the authority of Richard of Saint Victor, who gathers that demons do not have bodies, from the fact that a whole legion of demons occupied a single body of a man.

For the legion could not have been in someone if the demons had had bodies; therefore, the Doctor says, he seems to argue that if they had had bodies, their bodies would have been at once in the same place.

Therefore, in the way that they now do not have bodies, it seems it must be said that they were at once without bodies.

Moreover, if one angel moving the heavens is at midday, and another good angel sent from heaven to earth must pass through that place, there seems no necessity that he not pass through a straight line, or that the other give way to him. Finally, he says, if all angels had been created before bodily creation, as seems true according to Damasc., book 7, c. 21, it does not seem easy to assign how they were then not at once: and if it was then not inconvenient for them to be at once, neither now: however it turns out de facto, and de possibili — I speak of their natural power; yet de possibili with respect to divine power, it does not seem impossible but that by it they could be at once.

Moreover the conclusion is proved. Two angels can apply their operative natural powers, and their substances, totally at once to the same body or place, and make themselves present; therefore they can be at once in the same commensurate place according to their powers and essences. The consequence is evident: the antecedent is proved most manifestly, because an angel can inhabit the same body at once with a rational soul, as is clear in those who are vexed by unclean spirits; therefore by equal reason he will be able to be at once with another angel, since the rational soul is of the same kind as the angels as regards the mode of existing in a place. Then, because if the powers and essences of two angels applied at once to the same place could not coexist — above all because the power and essence of one would not be compatible with the power and essence of the other, but would exclude it, just as one bodily quantity naturally expels another from its place — but this cannot be said, since those powers and essences are spiritual; otherwise neither would the power and essence of the soul suffer with itself in the same place and body the angelic power and essence; therefore etc. Finally, the powers and essences of angels are of a far more immaterial and sublime nature than this light that we see: but it is established that two different lights caused by two luminous sources exist at once in the same commensurate place; therefore a fortiori two powers and essences of angels will be able to be applied at once and be in the same place; and hence also two or more angels, because the one does not obstruct the other.

* To this is added that several angels can even have diverse total operations in the same place; indeed that de facto they have them, for a good angel intimately present to a man suggests to him right and good thoughts, while a wicked angel, equally present to him, instills evil and depraved sentiments and motions. Therefore those two angels, intimately present in the same place, have operations altogether diverse though fully adequate; and thus the reasoning of the Thomists collapses. *

You will say 1. There cannot be two total causes with respect to the same effect: but the angel himself is the total cause of the operation by which the angel is constituted in a place; therefore another angel cannot have an operation in that place, and consequently cannot be in that place.

— The Doctor answers first that it is falsely supposed in this argument, namely that

an angel is constituted formally in a place by an operation. He answers secondly that although it were conceded, both that one operation proceeds from several angels, and consequently that from one operation they would not have existence in the same place; nevertheless it would not follow from this that when one angel has one operation, another could not have another. And if it be said that in a body an angel cannot have any operation except a motive-to-place operation, which moves him locally, and that when he is moved locally by an angel by one motion he cannot be moved by another by another motion; he answers thirdly that even with this granted gratis, two angels can still concur to the same operation, in such a way that neither is the total cause of it but partial, and then, although they would have existence in the place from the same operation, it would not follow that the same effect was produced by two total causes. That an angel can be the partial cause of such a motion and admit the concurrence of another is clear, because he is the free cause of it no less than a man, and can consequently employ his whole effort, or a part; and if one angel employs a part, the other can freely employ another part; and thus the whole motion will be from both as from two partial causes integrating one total cause.

* To these add that an angel can naturally subsist in the same place with any body whatever; therefore much more can he subsist in it with another spirit. The adversaries concede the antecedent; but the consequence is manifest per se: for two complete spiritual substances have less repugnance to subsisting together than have a corporeal and a spiritual substance, which are opposed and specifically distinguished. *

You will say 2. Things having the same mode of existing cannot be at once; but angels have the same mode of existing in a place; therefore they cannot be at once. The major is proved: because glorious bodies for this reason cannot naturally be at once, although a glorious body can be at once with a non-glorious body; and therefore even if there were two Gods, they would not be at once with creatures.

The same Doctor answers by denying the major, which he rightly judges to be irrational or improbable, because to be in a place imports no essential respect or dependence of the located thing upon the place; but to be from another as from an essentially operating cause, as an effect is from a cause, signifies the essential dependence of the effect upon the cause; therefore if there can be several effects from one cause, it will not be inconvenient that several things can be in the same place as regards existence precisely. Then, all temporal things signify the same respect to time, or the same mode of existing in time, just as spiritual things signify the same mode of existing in place: but notwithstanding this, several temporal things can be at once in the same time; therefore also several spiritual things in the same place as regards this respect. Finally, all bodily accidents have the same mode of existing in place, and yet notwithstanding this several of them are in the same place, as whiteness and sweetness of milk. To the proof of the major, moreover, he answers: if it is true that two glorious bodies cannot be at once, or two Gods, this arises not from their having the same mode of existing in place, but from some other reason. In truth, however, it should rather be judged that two glorious bodies can be at once, and even two Gods, if they were possible.

You will say 3. Very many of the holy Fathers are of the opinion that no created thing, however lacking a body, can be mingled with and infused into another spiritual thing, since this is proper to God, to whom (as Paschasius says in book 2 De Spiritu sancto c. 1.) this privilege alone is owed, that he can enter into the secret conscience: but soul cannot be infused into soul, or angel into angel. Hence he affirms that demons, the assailants of men, can enter only the hiding-places of the body; but cannot reach the interior parts of the soul: which he proves by this argument, that they cannot know consciences. The same Didymus teaches in book 1 De Spiritu sancto c. 15; but Cassian more clearly in collation 7, c. 13, where he says:

That nothing is incorporeal except God alone, and for that reason all spiritual and intellectual substances are penetrable to him alone, because he alone is whole, and everywhere, and in all things; so that he inspects and surveys the thoughts of men and their inward motions without veils and completely; therefore truly two angels cannot be at once, just as neither can they be with a rational soul.

I deny the consequence. For the aforementioned Fathers, and whoever else brings forward similar things, are to be understood not so much of that penetration and infusion which comes about through the conjunction of place, as of the efficiency and impulse by which God moves our soul by himself, with no intervening thing, which angels cannot perform. Thus Saint Bernard seems to interpret the matter, sermon 5 on the Canticles:

Know this, he says, that no created spirit applies itself to our minds per se; namely that it be mingled with and infused into us with no mediation of our own or of its bodily instrument, whereby taught or better taught by participation of it, we might become good or better. No angel, no soul, is in this way capable of me, and therefore capable of none. Nor do the angels take one another in this way. Let this prerogative therefore be reserved to the supreme and uncircumscribed Spirit, who alone, when he teaches knowledge to angel or man, seeks no instrument of our bodily ear, any more than of his own mouth. He is infused per se; he makes himself known per se; the pure is received by the pure.