Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Note 1. For the present a twofold love can be distinguished: namely Natural, and Supernatural. The former is so called because to elicit it the natural faculty itself suffices, with the sole prior light of the intellect illuminating it and determining it toward the lovable object, opening to it and manifesting all those perfections which shine forth in such an object, and which are so many stimuli and incentives of love: the latter is that love which the will cannot elicit without the benefit and aid of supernatural grace: of the former we speak here; of the latter we shall treat in the following Disputation.

Note 2. From our Alensis, q. 30., natural love can be taken in several ways;

for, he says, natural love is said to be whatever of itself helps nature to be, or helps it to remain; and for this reason God alone is loved with natural love by an angel: for nothing else is necessary to the being of an angel besides that which belongs to its esse; for one angel does not need another in order to be, or to remain in being. In the second way natural love can regard everything congenial to nature, whether similar, or conformed in nature; and in this way there is natural love not only of the Creator, or Governor, but also of another angel, who is alike in angelic nature, or even of man, who is similar in created intellectual nature. In the third way natural love can be said with respect to that good which is ordained to participating the complete lovable object, which is glory; and according to this mode, charity, or grace is a perfection of nature; thus according to this mode it is lovable by an angel not only the soul of man, but also the human body, which can participate in the dower gifts; whence the soul will be perfected in the second stole, and the angel on this account obtains a certain love. In the fourth way, natural love is said with respect to every good, inasmuch as it is good; and thus it extends itself to every creature, and to the Creator.

Note 3. From the Seraphic Doctor in 2. d. 3. a. 3. q. 2.,

that the greater love of someone can come about in three ways: by reason of the good desired, or by reason of intense affection, or by reason of the effect bestowed. By reason of the good desired someone is said to love someone more when he wishes him a greater good, and thus he is said to love more, because unto the greater. In this way, with natural love proceeding from the judgment of right reason, the angel loved the superior angel more; for he willed him to excel, and to have more good, just as God the creator willed so to ordain. By reason of intense affection one is said to love another more when his affection draws him more toward the other, and consoles him more in his companionship; and thus someone is said to love more him with whom he more willingly dwells: and thus the angel by nature loved more the angel of the same order, since just as by natural affection one loves his fellow citizens more, especially when they are conformed to him in morals; and just as a man loves more him who is of the same profession and office, where envy does not interpose its part: so the angel must be understood to embrace with natural love more the other angel of the same order, when he saw himself joined to him by the Creator in equality of office and similarity of nature; nor would there then be diversity of morals, nor the malice of envy. By reason of the effect, or of the benefit bestowed, someone is said to love more him upon whom he bestows more goods, and about whom he is more solicitous, just as a Master cherishes more his tender son, and is more solicitous about him than about the grown man, and more about the sick than about the healthy; and this he does out of consideration of the greater need; and in this way it can be said that the angel of the higher order loves more the angel of the lower, since an angel of an equal or higher order does not > need, either his instruction, or his purification, as does an angel of the lower order.

These things therefore premised, it must be determined, 1. Whether there be any natural love in the angels. 2. Whether with this love, while they were wayfarers, they could have loved God above all things. 3. In what manner they love both themselves and the other angels.

First conclusion. — Truly there is in the angels natural love, insofar as natural love is opposed to supernatural: but not insofar as it is opposed to free.

This Conclusion has two parts, of which the first is common among Theologians, and it is proved: That which is attributed to interior things without any imperfection must not be denied to the angels: but natural love and dilection is attributed formally to men without any imperfection: therefore it seems it ought not to be denied also to the angels. Next, each thing naturally loves itself, and appetites its own perfection, and is naturally inclined to it: for no being is so imperfect that it does not naturally appetite its own perfection: therefore much more do the angels naturally appetite their beatitude, unto which they are ordered as unto their ultimate perfection: but this appetite is called natural love: therefore etc. Finally, demons have a natural love of themselves: therefore also the angels. The antecedent is evident, for demons naturally flee their misery: therefore they naturally love themselves. The inference is evident: for I therefore hate someone because I love myself, or another; therefore if demons naturally flee the misery which they have, they also naturally love themselves.

Add. that demons naturally appetite their felicity, and beatitude in common: therefore they naturally appetite and love themselves. The antecedent is evident, for beatitude in common cannot be hated. This angelic natural love, moreover, is to be understood even as regards the elicited act; for in the angels there is a love following reason, and the apprehended form; therefore in the angels there is an elicited act of love. The antecedent is proved: An angel has natural knowledge of himself: therefore also natural love of himself.

You will say 1. If there were some natural love in the angels, it would have to be either right, and perfect; or disordered, and imperfect: but neither can be said. Not the first: for every right and perfect love is charity, and hence something supernatural; not even the second, since an imperfect and disordered love is sin: but an angel, as in the state of pure nature, does not sin.

I answer to the major. that since natural love is nothing else than an inclination implanted by the Author of nature, it must necessarily be said to be right; otherwise the greatest injury would be done to the Creator if anyone asserted that he implanted a depraved inclination. Nevertheless, since there is a twofold rectitude, namely the rectitude of natural inclination, and of supernatural virtue; and the latter is perfective of the former; hence it can be said that the rectitude of nature is not perfectly perfect in every way while it stands within its own limits, since it becomes more perfect when joined to charity: yet it is right, and perfect within the order of nature, inasmuch as it is conformable to the principles of nature, by which each thing appetites what is convenient to itself.

I answer to the minor. that this love is truly natural, both insofar as natural sounds as an inclination and propensity toward something perfective of oneself, and insofar as it is opposed to a supernatural thing: since by this love the angel not only obtains the perfection of his will, for powers are perfected by acts; but is also borne toward it by his own native inclination, by which each thing tends toward that which is convenient to it. Nor does it matter that he had this propensity implanted in him by the Author of nature, for no less by means of it is he said to be moved from within, namely by the internal appetite of the will. Similarly this tendency is said to be free, for the angel can suspend his love both toward himself and toward other objects, as will be proved in the third Conclusion.

You will say 2. If there were any natural love in the angels, it would be midway between gratuitous love, which is charity, and sinful love, which Alensis calls libidinous: but this cannot be said. For the mean between good and evil must be indifferent: but natural love is not indifferent to good and evil, but truly is to be placed in the genus of good: therefore etc.

Alensis himself answers. that although that natural love is midway between the gratuitous and the vicious, it is nevertheless not midway between good and evil simply, but only between the good which is called supernatural, and evil opposed to supernatural good: for although it partly agrees with each extreme — with gratuitous love indeed, because it loves the highest good; with the vicious, however, because it loves it for its own sake, but not for Him Himself; nevertheless it agrees more with gratuitous love than with the vicious, because it is borne toward the highest good, namely toward God, although it is so borne on account of the good of the lover himself.

The second part is proved. namely that angelic love is not natural insofar as natural is opposed to free: for that which is natural, opposed to free, is of itself necessarily determined to one thing: but the angelic will cannot be said to be so determined to love: therefore neither can it have a natural love opposed to liberty. The major stands from the common opinion of the Philosophers, who in this distinguish the natural from the free, that the former is determined by its intrinsic principles to one thing, as fire to burning, the heavy to motion downward, and the light upward. The minor is proved: if the angelic will were of itself determined necessarily to loving some object, especially either God, or the angel himself: but it loves neither so necessarily; for although perhaps it is necessarily borne to loving itself as regards perfection, so that it cannot hate itself, nevertheless it is not so determined as regards exercise: since, as will be proved in the third Conclusion, it can cease from every act of love toward itself.

The same can be said of love toward God. Indeed it is much less determined to the love of God than to the love of itself, for it cannot hate itself, but it can hate God, for of the demons the Royal Psalmist says: The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually. Add that one angel can be occupied in the love of another with the love of friendship which he has for him, and likewise of concupiscence toward the goods which he desires for the beloved angel. But by that act of love, the loving angel loves neither himself nor God, since he desires the good of neither for its own sake: therefore he does not necessarily always love himself and God. This truth will be shown more evidently in the third Conclusion.

Second conclusion. — An angel can naturally love God more than himself, and above all things. So the Doctor in 3. dist. 27. num. 13.

And he proves this Conclusion First: Natural reason shows that there is something supremely lovable for intellectual nature, because in all acts, and objects essentially subordinated, there is something supreme, and thus some supreme love, and thus a supreme object thus lovable: but natural reason must dictate that that supremely lovable thing is the highest Good, namely God, otherwise it would follow that charity inclines to loving supremely that which natural reason dictates is not to be loved supremely, and thus charity would not be a virtue, since it would not be conformable to right reason: therefore natural reason dictates that God is to be loved supremely. But the will can naturally love every object which is proposed by natural reason as supremely lovable, for the intellect cannot rightly dictate anything unto which the will cannot naturally tend according to the dictum; otherwise the will would be naturally evil; or at least would not be free to tend toward anything according to that reason of good according to which it is shown to it by the intellect. Which the Doctor says is argued especially of the angels, because in the state of innocence they were not not-right, since then they could not have had a not-right act: but they could have had some elicited act; and it is to be supposed that they had it, and that that act was right: but that act could not have been right if in that very act the angels had loved themselves above all things, but not God: therefore etc.

Next, Natural love of God above all things is possible, for the production of it is not repugnant, either from its terms, namely that it be love of God above all things, and that it be natural, or from some reason a priori, or a posteriori: but the angel can elicit every love possible naturally, unless some impediment be present on the part of the will, which certainly there is none: for if there were some impediment by which the will could not elicit such a love, especially either the inclination, and propensity of the latter to loving other objects, or the actual love of other objects, for no other impediment on the part of the will can be imagined: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first; for to that extent would that inclination impede the love of God, inasmuch as it would determine necessarily to the actual love of other objects: but it is not so, for no propensity of the will is reckoned to determine it necessarily, since notwithstanding any inclination whatsoever it always remains free. Not even the second: because the actual love of other objects is not necessarily conserved, and consequently can be changed, and recalled, and the love of God succeed it: therefore the will has nothing of itself by which it could be withheld from forming the love of God naturally possible.

Finally, says the Doctor, according to the philosophers the brave man, insofar as he is a member of the Republic, following the dictate of right reason ought to expose himself to death for the sake of defending the Republic itself, and consequently he would have to love the Republic more than himself: but the same reason dictates far more that one ought to love God more than oneself, and expose oneself for the love of God himself; for the brave man owes more to God than to the Republic; since he is bound to the Republic only because he is its part and member; but he owes himself wholly to God as regards his production and conservation: therefore if he ought to love the Republic more than himself, much more God.

It is confirmed 1. The more something belongs to another than to itself, by so much the more ought it to love that other than itself: but any creature whatsoever, especially an angel, belongs more to God, since from him it has being, operation, and well-being, while of itself without God it obtains none of these: therefore it is bound to love God more than itself.

It is confirmed 2. Every creature includes in itself an intrinsic order and dependence upon God, as upon the efficient and conserving cause not only of itself, but of the whole Universe: therefore by natural appetite it is borne toward God as the conservator of the Universe rather than toward itself. The inference is proved: any creature stands in order to God as the conservator of the Universe, as a part of that same Universe: but every part by natural appetite rather desires the being of the whole of which it is a part than its own proper being: therefore every creature rather desires the subsistence and essence of God than its own: and accordingly that which is capable of love naturally loves God more than itself. The minor is evident from experience, whereby it is established that men expose a hand or another limb for the preservation of the whole body: yet that exposure is a natural motion, and not a violent one: therefore it befits them in accordance with their natural inclination: and thus do creatures stand with respect to God who conserves the whole Universe; whence if per impossibile God could be exposed to the danger of non-being, creatures would expose themselves to such danger of non-being in order that God might be preserved, because they are parts of the whole Universe, which cannot subsist unless God subsists and conserves the Universe: therefore from this it follows that each creature is borne toward God more than toward itself.

Finally it is confirmed. charity and grace perfect nature according to the mode of nature: but charity and grace incline to loving God above all things: therefore they suppose in man and the angels a natural inclination to loving God more than themselves. Moreover, the precepts of natural law are founded on natural inclination: for by nature itself and the dictate of reason we are inclined to observing such precepts, for instance the precept of guarding our own life, which is founded on the appetite for self-preservation: but the precept of loving God above all things is of natural law: therefore it is founded on a natural propensity and inclination, and accordingly man and angel are naturally inclined to loving God.

You will say 1. If the angels had a natural propensity to loving God more than themselves, we too should have the same by parity of reason: but the consequent is shown false by experience itself, whereby we suffer the greatest difficulty in undergoing death for the glory of God: therefore it is a sign that nature inclines us more to the love of ourselves than to the love of God.

I deny the minor. and to its proof I say that a twofold inclination can be distinguished in man and angel, one indeed common and general inasmuch as they are creatures, the other special and particular inasmuch as they are such and such creatures considered in themselves and absolutely; for instance, man considered inasmuch as he is a rational animal precisely and formally says nothing of an order to God, but only a natural inclination and tendency to his own proper perfection. In the former mode he is more inclined to loving God than to loving himself, since indeed every creature belongs more to God than to itself, seeing that it has its whole being from God and through God; hence also as such it is inclined more toward God than toward itself, and on this account man would be more inclined to undergoing death for God than to preserving his life. But since the angel and man considered in themselves desire their natural inclination and perfection, hence they are inclined to preserving themselves more than to their own destruction. Hence man feels difficulty in undergoing death for God's sake, which difficulty does not arise from a greater love of himself than of God, but from the fact that he naturally loves his own life, which since he could not preserve together with the love of God, thence he suffers difficulty at its loss. Just as, for example, he who for saving his life throws his merchandise into the sea when a storm presses in, suffers difficulty in this throwing overboard; nevertheless he values his own life more, and loves it more than the lost merchandise. The same must be said of him who, for the sake of the soundness of the whole body, suffers some putrid limb to be cut off; for although he bears this amputation with distress, he is nevertheless judged to love the whole body more than that part. So it happens in our case; for while someone in undergoing Martyrdom suffers a natural repugnance, this repugnance is not an indication of greater love toward himself than toward God; nay rather the opposite is inferred, because namely despite this repugnance, he willingly casts himself into death.

You will say 2. If we naturally loved God above all things, it would follow that there is in us a native inclination to good: but the consequent is against Genesis 8. The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth: therefore etc.

I deny the major. and to the text of Scripture I answer that it is understood of the appetite of nature vitiated by sin, not indeed of the appetite of unimpaired nature; for since that appetite was implanted by God the author of nature, it necessarily had to be upright and prone to good.

You will object. Man is naturally inclined to his own good: therefore not to the good of God himself, especially when the good of God is opposed to his own good. The inference is evident, for it implies that the natural inclination is borne toward two opposites, and consequently if one is inclined to his own being naturally, he will be averse to his non-being, and presently to everything that follows upon his non-being.

I distinguish the inference. that he is more inclined to his own good than to the good of God himself absolutely and simply, I deny; in a certain respect, I concede. That is, inasmuch as the creature is a being having existence received on loan from God himself, it is borne in love and inclination more toward God, to whom it owes itself entirely, than toward itself; but it is borne more toward itself according to that propensity which every thing has for its own conservation, so that in truth it would wish to preserve its life if there were no occasion of undergoing death for God; yet since that occasion is present, it is borne more toward undergoing that death, even according to the inclination of nature, than toward preserving its life. Lest however hallucination arise here, note that the Doctor, and we with him, are here treating only of physical power and the natural inclination of nature instituted, or defiled and weakened by no vice, such as was the angelic nature in the state of the way, as the Doctor himself speaks in n. 15., writing thus:

I concede the conclusion, that ex puris naturalibus any will whatever can, at least in the state of instituted nature, love God above all things, namely, > as regards the inclination and physical power of unimpaired nature. For with respect to this state of nature vitiated and weakened by original sin, we willingly grant that we cannot elicit the perfect act of the love of God above all things without the special help of grace. For if supernatural help were required for other acts of the moral virtues, much more is it required for loving the love of God above all things, especially since love of this kind is incompossible with the affect of sinning, and includes an efficacious will even of undergoing martyrdom for the defense of God's glory and the fulfilling of his will, as will appear more fully in the treatise De Gratia.

Third conclusion. — Angels necessarily love themselves with a love necessitating as regards specification: but not as regards exercise.

This Conclusion has two parts, of which the first is proved: Angels cannot hate themselves: therefore they necessarily love themselves as regards specification. The antecedent is proved: everyone naturally desires his own being and wishes his own preservation: therefore the angels hold the same in their wishes, and accordingly naturally love themselves; for that appetite is nothing other than the very natural propensity by which every being wishes its own conservation, wherefore among spiritual beings it is called love. Then, if the angels could have some hatred toward themselves, especially since they could change the judgment by which practically they judge their own conservation to be something desirable and lovable, they would judge their own annihilation to be desirable: but this cannot happen, since the nothing of the angel or of a being is nothing, nor does it involve anything of goodness, neither does it embrace in itself anything of lovability. Finally, if certain angels desired and with elicited love loved their non-being, most especially the demons: but it is not so; for even if out of natural self-love and an appetite for beatitude in common the demons desire not to be in such a state of misery in which they are pressed down, nevertheless it is more likely that they simply do not desire their non-being; since that appetite of non-being, if they have any, arises only from the pressing misery in which they are held, and accordingly it must be referred more to a state of misery than to non-being.

The second part is proved. against certain modern Thomists: Liberty as regards exercise persists intact in our will in any state of nature with respect to any object whatever: therefore much more does that liberty stand intact in the angels. The antecedent S. Thomas admits, De Virtute quaest. 22. art. 6. The consequence is evident per se; since angelic liberty is far more excellent than ours, with better right are they said to be free as regards exercise with respect to any natural object set before them. Then, if the angelic will were necessarily determined to the act of self-love, it could by no means sin in the love of self: but the consequent is false: therefore also that from which it follows. The inference is evident, because sin is sin insofar as it is voluntary: but if the angels were necessarily and naturally determined to the act of self-love, nor could they elicit another, that act would not be free, and therefore not sinful. The minor is proved: that act is not free which does not proceed from an indifferent will, nor has order to it as it is free: but if the will is naturally determined to the love of self, that act does not say order to the will as it is a free power: for if it said any order, especially since after eliciting it the will could fail to conserve it: but in the opinion of the Thomists this cannot be said, inasmuch as, they say, the will could never cease from that love: therefore etc. Finally, therefore the angel is not free as regards specification, because no reason of good can be found in the object contrary to the love of him, namely in the nothing of himself: but in the object contrary to this love, namely in the actual non-loving, the angel can find some reason of good: therefore he can cease from the actual love of himself. The major is evident from the prior part. The minor is proved: the angel can judge it better to exercise the liberty he has in his acts than always to have an act of love toward himself; for in this no reason of evil appears: therefore although the angel apprehends by speculative cognition that it is good that he love himself, nevertheless by practical judgment he can judge it good that in that same instant he not elicit an act of love toward himself, namely either so as to transfer himself wholly to loving God, or so as to pursue another angel with a love of friendship or of concupiscence: therefore he does not love himself necessarily with natural love as regards exercise. It is confirmed: the will is not necessitated as regards exercise to that act in which there can be detected the reason of a lesser good: but the angel can apprehend some reason of a lesser good in the love of self; for he can apprehend that love not only as impeding the exercise of his liberty regarding the suspension of his acts, but also as hindering him from bearing himself with his whole endeavor toward God as his last end, or from loving another angel with the most excellent charity: therefore in the love of self he can detect the reason of a lesser good; and thus he will be able to suspend such an act, and be borne toward a more excellent one.

Gonet objects 1.: The angel knows and contemplates himself necessarily even as regards exercise: therefore with the same necessity he loves himself. The consequence is proved; both because the operation of the will is proportioned to the operation of the intellect, by which it is directed and regulated; and also because if the angel necessarily always understands himself, he necessarily wills to understand himself always: but this is to love himself, because this is to will for himself the greatest good; and finally, because from the natural cognition by which the angel comprehends himself and all his natural perfections there results necessarily a practical judgment altogether immutable, by which he judges that himself and all those perfections must needs be loved: therefore he knows himself necessarily by practical cognition causing love, and not only by merely speculative cognition, which does not give birth to love. The consequence is evident: the antecedent is proved: because the judgment about some object is then immutable, when there can be no reason for forming the opposite judgment: but there can be no reason why the angel should form a judgment contrary to the judgment about loving himself: therefore the angel, apprehending himself and all his natural perfections, forms a practical judgment altogether immutable about loving himself. The major is evident. The minor is proved: proper love generates in the angel not disgust but delight; nor does it impede but aids, as a medium leading to other operations, especially to the love of God: therefore there is no reason why the angel could form a judgment contrary to the judgment about loving himself; since the reason why a judgment can be had concerning the suspension of the love of any object is because that love either generates weariness, or is an impediment to a greater good.

I answer 1. by denying the antecedent: for it is false that the angelic intellect understands itself necessarily as regards exercise: since both on account of the externally moving object, and by the command of his own will, he can turn away from the vision of himself and divert his cognition to another object, as was said in the prior Article.

I answer 2. by denying the consequence, and to its first proof I say that, although the angel would understand himself necessarily, still it does not follow from this that he loves himself necessarily; for although the will follows the operation of the intellect, because namely it is not borne toward the unknown, nevertheless it does not follow it so necessarily that it must be occupied by an elicited act of love about any object whatever proposed to it by the intellect; otherwise the will could nowhere suspend its act, nor could it in any way be called free as regards exercise. To the second of its proofs, I deny the antecedent: for although the angel, from the natural cognition by which he comprehends himself and all his natural perfections, judges himself worthy of love, still it does not follow from this that he forms a practical judgment altogether immutable about the love of self; for although he cannot form a judgment opposed to this love, namely that he himself the angel would have to be hated, nevertheless he can form a judgment suspensive of the act, not on account of the weariness that a continuous act of self-love would generate, but on account of the reason of a lesser good and an impediment to a greater: for the angel could judge that that assiduous love of himself would be an impediment to the love of God, with all his powers and his whole effort of loving. For it is certain that God would be less loved by the angel who at the same time loved himself, than by one who, neglecting the love of himself, burned with the entire fire of divine love.

You will object 2. The will of the angel always wills, just as its intellect always understands: therefore just as every cognition of the angel is reduced to the cognition of self, as to the first operation determined by and proceeding from nature itself, so too all his volition is founded in the love and affection of self. Whence it is commonly said: the amiable things that are toward another arise from the amiable things toward oneself; and consequently the natural love by which the angel loves himself must necessarily be continuous and never interrupted, and accordingly necessary as regards exercise.

I distinguish the antecedent. that the will of the angel always wills the same object to which it is determined necessarily and naturally, I deny; that it wills diverse objects, or if the same one, that it wills it only by election and free determination, by which alone and so long it is occupied therewith, as much as and as long as it pleases it, I concede: and I deny the consequence. Add moreover that the proof of the consequence seems likewise false: for the natural love of any object whatever need not necessarily be reduced to the love of self; since, as we said above, the angel can naturally love God more than himself and above all things; but that love by which the angel loves God more than himself cannot be reduced to the love of self, nor take its origin from it: therefore the argument by which the consequence is supported is not universally true.