Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Note 1. With our Alensi, from St. Bernard, book On Free Choice, there is a threefold liberty: The first is liberty from coercion, or from necessity; the second is liberty from sin, of which Scripture says: Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; if the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed; the third is liberty from misery, of which the creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. We say therefore that the second and third liberties are not equally in man and in angel, but greatest in the good angel, lesser in the good man, least in the evil man, nonexistent in the demon. But the first liberty, which is from coercion, is equally in man and in angel, whether good or evil; whence Bernard: Liberty from necessity is neither lost by sin nor by misery, nor increased by their opposites, nor is it fuller in man than in angel. And he adds: With this prerogative the Creator marked out rational creatures, that just as He was His own and of His own will, not of coercion, in being good, so also they should be their own masters, so as to do only what they willed, whether good or evil.

Note 2. With the Subtle Doctor, quodlibetal question 16, again a threefold liberty is distinguished: the first is called liberty of contrariety, or of specification, by which the will can tend at will toward some object, or toward its opposite, and by which it can elicit an act of love or of hate. The second is called liberty of contradiction, or with respect to exercise, whereby to be sure the will can elicit an act or not elicit it, tend toward an object or not tend. The third finally is essential liberty, by which the will, since from its intrinsic nature it is indifferent and undetermined, is judged always to elicit its act freely from itself and to tend toward the object, even though it be moved and determined from without. Now this essential liberty the Doctor gathers from St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 105., where he says:

It was fitting that man first be so made by God that he could will well and ill; but afterwards, that is, in beatitude, he will be so made that he cannot will ill; for he will not lack free choice; for far freer indeed will be that choice which can in no way serve sin; nor is a will to be blamed, or it is not a will, by which we wish to be blessed in such wise that not only do we not wish to be miserable, but we can in no way at all will it;

in which words St. Augustine affirms that the necessity of not sinning in the Blessed is compatible with their liberty; not indeed with the liberty of contrariety or of contradiction, by which the will can desire or not desire something against the will of God, and consequently can sin; but with the essential, or radical, and entitative liberty of the will itself, which is a faculty ever remaining free of itself, entitatively, intrinsically, and radically, even if sometimes it be so necessitated and efficaciously drawn by something extrinsic toward the love of it that it can neither cease loving it nor elicit the act opposite to love, namely hate, concerning that object.

Note 3. That although all Theologians agree that angels are endowed with free will, by which they can tend toward good or evil, and into contraries, mutable by their own condition; nevertheless their opinions differ in explaining the use of this same free will: for St. Thomas, first part, question 64, article 2, and his whole School, holds that the will of the angel before election is free toward either alternative; after election, however, it adheres immovably to what it has embraced: and he holds this to be the reason why the demons harden their minds in the wickedness they have taken up and are not converted to better things, which he thinks follows from that knowledge of thought, or, as he calls it, apprehension:

For (he says) the apprehension of an angel differs from the apprehension of a man in this, that the angel apprehends immovably through intellect, just as we immovably apprehend first principles, which belong to intellect: but man apprehends movably through reason, discoursing from one thing to another, having a way of proceeding toward either of two opposites. Hence too the will of man adheres to something movably, as being able even to depart from it and adhere to the contrary: but the will of the angel adheres fixedly and immovably, and therefore if it be considered before adhesion, it can freely adhere both to this and to its opposite, namely in those things which it does not will naturally: but after it has already adhered, it adheres immovably. And therefore it has been customary to say that man's free will is flexible toward the opposite both before and after election: but the free will of the angel is flexible toward either opposite before election, but not after; thus therefore also the good angels, ever adhering to justice, are confirmed in it, but the evil, sinning, are obstinate in sin.

Such are the words of St. Thomas, which indeed the Subtle Doctor rejects, and with him the Theologians commonly teaching that the angelic will is not immutable of itself, but that it can refrain from putting an act once elected, or recall it once put, as will appear in the Second Conclusion.

First conclusion. — Angels are truly endowed with free will. This is of faith, since Sacred Scripture in many places affirms that angels are capable of precept and of sin, on account of which they merit punishment: and likewise receptive of holiness and justice, and of merit before God; all of which free will supposes and denotes, as appears both from what has been said in moral Philosophy and from what will be said in the treatise on Grace.

This same thing the holy Fathers clearly teach, who prove that angels are mutable 1. from their power of sinning: thus St. Basil, book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 16., where speaking of the Holy Angels he says: Having free choice in electing, they never fall away from communion with Him who is truly good: and of the evil ones he says: Whose defection confirms what we say, that the invisible powers are of their own choice: as if to say, that concerning the merit and demerit of angels their free will is legitimately concluded.

— Another argument no less efficacious is used by St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On the Lord's Prayer, where he shows that from the power of consulting in the intellect there follows the power of choosing in the will, and therefore that liberty is common to angel and man, precisely because they agree in intellect or reason.

The study, he says, of the good and the honorable was implanted and attributed at once as essential to both natures alike. And likewise full and supreme power over themselves, and a will free from all necessity, He who presides over all things made equal in both, that whatever has been honored alike with reason and mind might be governed by a certain free choice and purpose of soul.

St. Augustine subscribes, book 22. De Civitate chapter 1., where, having said that God created nothing better in the world than spiritual nature, to which He gave understanding, he adds: Who bestowed upon that intellectual nature such free will that if it should wish to abandon God, misery would straightway follow.

— The same thing the other Fathers likewise prove, who with one accord affirm that angels are endowed with liberty, and gather their free will from their very spiritual nature.

Hence deservedly St. Damascene, book two chapter 3., defines the angel, saying: An Angel is by its nature intelligent, endowed with liberty of choice, immutable as to its judgment by reason etc. And he subjoins the reason. Because, he says, everything that uses reason is also endowed with liberty. Which reason is indeed valid: for liberty of choice follows intelligence or reason: but angels have perfect reason or intelligence: therefore also liberty. The minor is clear from what has been said: the major however is proved by induction; for the supreme intellectual nature, namely the Divine, precisely because it is intellectual, is free; the lowest rational nature also, namely human, is endowed with liberty from the fact that it excels in intelligence and reason: therefore the same must be said of the middle intellectual nature, which is the angelic: both because this has the same root of liberty, namely intellectual nature; and because it is capable of pursuing good and averting evil, as well as of merit and demerit; and finally because liberty pertains to the perfection of intellectual nature, otherwise it would not be in God: therefore an intellectual nature nearer and more closely related to God, such as the angelic, ought above all to be endowed with it.

You will say. If this argument pressed anything, it would follow that God could not create any intellectual creature which would not be free, and indifferent to good or evil: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The truth of the major appears from what will soon be said: the minor however is proved: for just as God created the will so determined to loving the good in general that it cannot hate it, so He could create some will determined to the good in particular, so that it would be necessarily determined to its love and could not cease from it: therefore etc.

— I deny the minor. and to its proof I say that it is repugnant that a will be so determined to the good as to will it always, necessarily, in particular, and from within; all of which seem required lest some faculty be called free. I confess indeed that a will, without prejudice to its liberty, can be necessarily determined to some primary and common object, yet free and indifferent concerning secondary and particular objects; in which way the divine will is determined by its essence, which it loves unchangeably and necessarily; while it is borne indifferently toward secondary objects, namely toward creatures, to be pursued freely in hate or love, according as their perfections or defects deserve divine love or hatred.

It can also be determined concerning some object in general, at least as to the specification of the act, in which way created will is determined in general to loving the good; so that it cannot hate it under the aspect of good. Finally it can even be determined from without toward some particular object to be so loved that it cannot be recalled from the love of it; in which way the will of the Blessed is drawn and determined to loving God: but this determination is altogether extrinsic; and consequently it does not impede the liberty of the will, which notwithstanding that extrinsic determination no less freely inclines toward that object. Therefore it is repugnant that any will could be so created as to be intrinsically determined concerning some particular object to be necessarily loved, since the will of itself is an indifferent faculty, or one of indifference of contrariety or contradiction, as the Second Conclusion will declare more fully.

Second conclusion. — The angelic will is not immutable, nor naturally of itself so determined to one thing that it cannot retract and recall what has once been elected. This is the Doctor's teaching in 2. dist. 6. q. 2. n. 17., where he says:

I say that when the Angel sinned with the second sin, he was still in the way; and consequently when he sinned with the second sin he could have repented of the first sin; and so the first sin was not of itself irremediable, because had he repented, he would have found pardon and mercy etc.

The same he teaches dist. 7. quaest. 2. and in 4. dist. 46. q. 4. n. 6. against the Thomists: and it is Proved 1. By the authority of the holy Fathers, especially St. Jerome, Epistle 146. to Damasus: God alone, he says, is He into whom sin does not fall; the rest, since they are of free will, just as man was made to the image and likeness of God, can bend their will toward either part. St. Gregory of Nyssa subscribes, Oration 5. on the Lord's Prayer, where, speaking of both natures, human and angelic, he attributes an equal liberty of choice to both, as was said above. There agrees also the aforesaid St. Damascene, who, having said that angels are mutable in purpose and judgment, and this of themselves and by their own spontaneity, brings forward this reason:

Forsooth, he says, every created thing is mutable: but that alone which is Uncreated cannot be changed or converted. Moreover everything rational is free in potency: wherefore in that very thing in which it is rational and intelligent, it is of free choice: but as a mutable creature, it has the power of remaining and proceeding in good, > and of lapsing into worse.

Then immediately he adds: In no way capable is it of penance, because devoid of body: for man on account of the weakness of his body has attained to penance. In which words he plainly teaches that angels are by no means capable of penance, not because they cannot depart from what they have once chosen, as St. Thomas holds, but because they are destitute of divine grace, which is nowhere to be granted them, for the reason that since they lacked a body, they cannot plead the excuse of weakness, as men can, for the pardon of sin, and on that account they sinned far more gravely and intolerably than men. Hence of the good angels he subjoins: Hardly movable into evil, but not immovable: Now however they are immovable not by nature, but by grace, and by adherence to Him who alone is good.

— The same firmness and stability of election in goods the other holy Fathers attribute not to native obfirmation, but to the benefit of God. Thus St. Augustine, book 22. De Civitate Dei chapter 1. The fall of the Angels, he says, voluntary, most just punishment bound fast to everlasting unhappiness: and to those abiding in it supremely, so that they were certain of their endless perseverance, He gave it as the reward of their perseverance. Therefore St. Augustine judges that the holy Angels do not have that firmness in good from their nature. The same thinks St. Prosper, in book one De Vita Contemplativa chapter 3. It was of the will, he says, of the holy Angels that, while the evil fell spontaneously, they themselves remained in their dignity: And by divine and just judgment it came about that the will which was of persevering with God their own should become a voluntary and happy necessity of persevering. Whence Gennadius chapter 62. De Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus: The Angelic Virtues, he says, which persevered fixed in divine love, when the proud Angels fell, received this gift of retribution, that they should no longer be harmed by any rust of stealing guilt. Therefore the holy Fathers do not judge the blessed Angels immovable by their nature, but only by the divine benefit. For as St. Isidore says, If they were immutable by nature, the Devil certainly would not have fallen. — This truth above all others St. Fulgentius teaches most openly in the book De Fide ad Petrum chapter 3. who, comparing human liberty with the angelic, says:

If it were possible that human nature, after it had lost goodness of will by turning from God, could again have it of itself, much more possibly would the angelic nature have this: which, inasmuch as it is less burdened by the weight of an earthly body, so much the more would it be endowed with this faculty. But God showed whence good will is given to men, which the Angels, while they had it, so lost that thereafter they could not have it.

Rupert subscribes, book 5. on chapter 5. of John;

For the Angelic nature also, he says, could do evil, and did, and does: and human nature could do evil, and did. And indeed the holy Angels were confirmed, because, while another wrought evil, that is, was doing evil, they preferred to adhere to God their prince, and in this they received recompense, that thereafter they cannot do evil, because when they could do it, they would not.

But this is not by the power of their own nature, but by the remunerating grace of the divine will.

The truth of the Conclusion can also be urged from that battle of the good angels among themselves, and conflict which is gathered from the sacred Books, as we read in Daniel chapter 10. where, according to the exposition of the Pelusiotan, Epistle 85., the Angel of the Persians taking it ill that the Jews continued to merit the wrath of God and perpetual slavery by their most wicked deeds, was unwilling that they be liberated from captivity: but another Angel opposed him, who preferred the goodness of God's justice, and God favored each according to his desire, passing sentence: to which sentence each Angel gave assent. Therefore the angel does not adhere immovably to what he has once seized upon by intelligence and will.

Proof moreover. by theological reason: while the Angel elects something he is truly free, and acts freely; since he can elect the thing or not elect it: but after the election has been made nothing necessitates him so that he cannot revoke the election made and change his judgment: therefore even after election he is truly mutable.

The major is clear from the preceding Conclusion: the minor Suarez proves in book 8, chapter 10, and from him Martinonus: if an angel could not change his purpose, that immutability would have to be sought either on the part of God, who determines the angel necessarily to one act; or from the angel's own nature, which on account of its dignity and perfection could be imagined immutable in its election, just as God on account of the excellence of his nature is altogether invariable; or from the act of the will itself, which would demand this invariability from its own nature; or from a habit or other disposition added to the will and left behind by the act; or finally on the part of the intellect and the mode of understanding, by which the will would be so directed toward one object that it could not be determined to another: but from neither heading can this immutability be sought.

Not indeed first on the part of God: both because it would not befit God to necessitate the will in an evil act; and also because we are speaking here of an angel considered naturally, as he stands under God, as it were under a first cause operating naturally according to the exigency of second causes; and consequently not necessitating, unless there be something demanding this on the part of the second cause.

Nor does that immutability proceed from the very nature of the will: both because no greater mutability should be imagined in the angelic will than in judgment: yet the judgment of angels can be varied and corrected just as they can be deceived; and also because although in a will that cannot fall away from good, immutability in purpose and election is a great perfection; yet not so in a will that can fall away: indeed it would be a great imperfection not to be able to correct oneself and to desist from evil; just as for an intellect capable of error it would be a great imperfection not to be able to be untaught an error and cast it away: but the will of an angel can sin, just as the intellect can err: therefore it would be the highest imperfection for it if it could not recall its own act; and finally because the holy Fathers did not acknowledge such a nature and perfection in the angels.

Nor indeed on the part of the act of the will: inasmuch as this neither binds nor constrains the power, since nature precedes it, and by it the power is not constituted in first act, in respect of which alone it is powerful or powerless, whether to produce a first act or to conserve one produced.

But what some say, that the necessity of immutability arises from the impulse with which the angelic will bursts forth into its acts, is vain: for they gratuitously suppose that angels always operate with supreme effort. Next, although the will operates with its whole effort, it is entirely free, and can fail to elicit an act, or elicit the opposite: it can likewise lay aside an act after it has elicited it: why then could it not change to the opposite, and indeed with its whole effort, if there be need? Truly, from this opinion of the Adversaries it would follow that an angel could naturally make himself impeccable for the future: for he can love

God with his whole effort above every natural act, and likewise detest with his whole effort every sin; for both knowledge and will are available for this: therefore if he could not change such an election from elsewhere, he would constitute himself impeccable.

Nor indeed on the part of the habit, and of the disposition left behind by the act: both because a habit and disposition preceding the act of election does not necessitate to the election, but in this is subject to the will — for we suppose that the angel freely elects, notwithstanding any habit or prior disposition whatever: therefore neither can it necessitate to persevering in an election once made. Then because such a habit or disposition cannot influence the conservation of the act more efficaciously than its first production. And also because such a habit or disposition can never deprive the will of its natural and intimate power of suspending its influx, or of persevering freely in the act which it freely elicited: therefore, notwithstanding such a habit or disposition, it can freely cease from that act, and again elect freely; why then, if it wills, could it not pass to the contrary election? Add that it does not seem credible that in the first instant there could be generated from any act whatever so intense a habit in the will of an angel that it could not overcome it, since men even overcome and tear out inveterate habits. Further, habits only incline the power so that it can easily produce similar acts, not so that it can produce opposite ones.

Finally not on the part of the intellect, and of the mode of understanding: both because angels can change their judgment, and now judge unworthy of love what before they thought lovable, and in fact loved. Moreover, angels can naturally be deceived, especially when they judge from conjectures and signs uncertain and obscure; and demons are not rarely deceived about the outcomes of temptations and about future events that are free, and about the mysteries and dispensations of grace: therefore on the part of judgment or of the mode of understanding there is no reason for necessarily persisting in an election previously made, but rather a reason for prudently changing it to the contrary. Then because, even if the very same judgment always stood which the angel had when he freely elected, it would not follow from this that the will could not change its act: for just as that judgment did not physically predetermine the will, but, that judgment being posited and standing, the will freely elected what it embraced, and could have not elected even in the composed sense, that is, could compose not-election with such a judgment: so neither does it predetermine to continuing the act, but the will remains entirely of itself free to continue the election or lay it aside. Finally, angels in fact did change their will, namely the evil ones, who for some time were good with the others, and loved God. Nay, every day both good and bad angels change their wills: the latter while they desist from tempting, seeing that temptations rather profit than harm; the former while they finally abandon those whom they strove in vain to call away from vices.

You will object 1. The intellect of an angel adheres immovably to those things which it understands and judges: therefore the will has a similar immutability in its elections. The antecedent is clear, for an angel apprehends conclusions in principles, whence he judges about things known just as man does about first principles: therefore just as man adheres immovably to first principles, so also the angel adheres to all that he apprehends and judges. The consequence also is evident, for the will follows the intellect, and imitates the mode of its operation.

I answer 1. by denying the antecedent; for it is false that the angel adheres invariabily to those things which he knows. It is equally false that he knows conclusions in principles, since he has the virtue of discursus, and in truth his knowledge is discursive.

I answer 2. by denying the consequence: for just as, notwithstanding that determination of the intellect, the will in its first election was free, so also, that election having been made, it still remains free to abandon it or elicit another; inasmuch as the intellect in both cases finds a sufficient reason by which it can be appetized. Add that the will is the mistress of the intellect, and by far the freer; and therefore notwithstanding the judgment of the intellect it can elect what pleases it.

You will object 2. Adhesion to the last end, or the intention of attaining it, is the principle of all elections: but an angel adheres immovably to the last end which he destined for himself: therefore he also adheres immovably to all other things inasmuch as they are ordered to that end.

— I distinguish the minor. that he adheres immovably to the last end by an extrinsic determination, namely while the last end so efficaciously moves the will by its clear and evident proposition, in whatever way God, seen intuitively, determines blessed minds to his vision and love, I concede: by an intrinsic determination,¹ insofar as it would proceed from an immovable election of the will apprehending the last end true or apparent, I deny. For although the Blessed adhere immovably to God, and the demons are hardened in that will by which they proposed to themselves the divine equality as their last end, nevertheless this determination does not proceed precisely from the intrinsic, but from the extrinsic — in the Blessed indeed from the object clearly apprehended, but in the damned from the grace being denied by which they might recall their sentence and do penance.

You will say 3. The more perfect the will is, and the more freely it elects, the more vehemently and with greater affection it adheres to the thing elected: but the will of an angel is most perfect, and elects most freely, because it is not led by passion, but determines itself from itself alone: therefore in electing it is so affected toward the thing elected that it cannot be removed from it.

— I deny the major. for it is not necessary that a freer will be carried with greater affection toward its object: indeed the freer it is, the more it will be able to moderate and temper its affection. Add that even if it be carried with supreme affection toward its object, it does not follow from this that it must subsist invariable in that affection; for with the same liberty it can cease from it, and command the intellect to consider other things by which it may be drawn away from the love of that object and tend toward another.

You will say 4. If angels were changeable and mutable, they would likewise be capable of penance: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The major stands, for he is capable of penance who can cast away and recall an evil will: the minor also is clear, for if they were capable of penance, there is no doubt that at some time they would have done penance, or at least some one of them would have repented.

— I deny the major. for the defect of penance in the angels does not proceed from the immutability of their will, but from the supernatural divine aid being denied them, absolutely necessary for doing true penance, and from the fact that they are in the term; for if, in the state of the way, and before the sentence of their eternal damnation had been pronounced, God had granted them the grace of penance, they truly could have repented and obtained pardon: but because they are in the term, nor are they given any divine aid for penitence, therefore they cannot repent.

You will say 5. An angel is most subtle in nature, and also most vehement in operating, and therefore his will totally immerses itself in the object which it elects and to which it adheres, and cannot be recalled from it: therefore after the first act it is immutable.

— I deny the consequence. for however much the angelic will, existing in the way, might pursue the object, and with whatever effort tend toward it, nevertheless it could cast it aside at its pleasure, as we said above.

You will say 6. A change of election proceeds either from the electing one being disposed otherwise, or because after the election he apprehends the thing otherwise than before: but neither has place in the angels. Not the first, because they have no passions, nor do they receive their internal disposition from without: nor even the second, because an angel has a most perfect light; and therefore he first apprehends everything that is knowable, especially concerning the intention and election of the last end; for since this matter is of the highest weight and moment, it is likely that the angel spends all his intellectual power in forming this knowledge.

— I deny the minor. for although the angel be illuminated most perfectly, nevertheless he can err, as in fact he erred in apprehending that equality with God was possible for him, and in appetizing it: for the election of evil always presupposes an error, or at least an inconsideration on the part of the intellect, especially when one does not sin from certain and determinate malice; and therefore where there is error or inconsideration, the apprehension on the part of the intellect can be incomplete. And so it can be said that the evil angels had these two judgments at once: the first, that it would be good to be subject to God and obey him: the second, that their own excellence would be an appetible good: whence it came about that, even with the prior judgment standing, nevertheless they were moved to follow the later one, namely to elect their own excellence: and thus, notwithstanding the knowledge of the means and of the due end, they could appetize for themselves another end, namely their own excellence.

You will insist. the more excellent the light of the intellect, the more tenaciously the will adheres to the object: but the light of the angelic intellect was most excellent: therefore their will adhered so firmly to the elected object that in no way could it be removed from it. The minor stands: the major is proved by experience, whereby it is clear that those who have a less perfect intellect, namely children and women, are also easily moved from their own opinion.

— I answer to the major that although the adhesion of the will follows the illumination of the intellect, and the will adheres the more firmly to the elected object, the greater good it finds in it; nevertheless it does not follow from this that it cannot cast it aside in its liberty. But to the minor I say that from it indeed follows that the angels cannot change their purpose and election with as much facility as men can: nevertheless it does not follow that they absolutely cannot recall both, on account of the reasons expressed by us.

Third conclusion. — The angelic will is also free with the liberty of contradiction, and even with respect to exercise. This likewise is the doctrine of the Doctor, and

It is proved: Nothing can be assigned by which the angelic will would be necessarily determined to persisting always under act: therefore in truth it can cease from act. The antecedent is clear from the preceding Conclusion, for if it could be necessitated by anything to persisting under its act, especially on the part of God, or from its native dignity, or from its act, or on the part of the intellect determining it necessarily always to act, or from some other principle: but none of these can be affirmed, as was proved above: therefore, etc.

— Next, for liberty with respect to exercise there suffices the power of suspending the act by a pure privation, or negation, of influx; so that it is not necessary to will not to elicit an act, but it is enough not to will to elicit, or not to elicit from certain knowledge, and power, and dominion over one's own act, or influx: but the will is absolutely mistress of its own influx: therefore it is not necessitated with respect to exercise even with respect to the whole collection of acts possible to it.

— Finally, just as no act of the angelic will in particular is absolutely necessary, but the will freely determined itself to the eliciting of each one; so likewise it can cease from eliciting any one in particular, and therefore also cease from every act; because the same is the reason of liberty in the whole collection of acts which is found in the individual acts: therefore just as no particular act is necessary to the angel for his good, so also neither one or another, and so of the others taken disjunctively.

You will say. If there were some act of willing in particular in which no reason of evil would be found, nor could a reason of good be apprehended in its absence, the will could not cease from such an act, but it would be in particular necessary with respect to exercise; for by this reason the love of God in the homeland is necessary with respect to exercise: but in the absence of every act of the will no reason of good can be thought, nor in the actual exercise of any act of willing taken indefinitely can any reason of evil be found, because in the whole breadth of acts there cannot but be many fitting ones; but truly it is better to operate in act than to cease from operation; indeed that is of itself good and perfect; not to operate however is simply imperfect: therefore the will cannot formally, or virtually, will such a cessation, and consequently to will something, at least indefinitely, it is necessitated.

— I deny the minor. for in that voluntary absence of every act there is found the highest liberty of the will, which at its pleasure can act or not act, and thus becomes the supreme mistress of its own acts, which it can put in being or not put in being at a nod, which indeed argues the greatest perfection, and connotes the highest good, as will be shown more fully in the third Conclusion of the following Question.