Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

No theologian doubts that the angels possess a will, since Sacred Scripture frequently attributes operations of the will to them; for example, when they are called ministers of God, who do His will, Psal. 102. This certainly cannot be said except of those who have a will and serve willingly. Hence in Apoc. 7. one angel cried out to the others as endowed with free will: Do not harm the earth, nor the sea etc. S. Peter confirms the same thing in Epist. 1. cap. 1., teaching that there is in them desire, which is an act of the will: Into whom, he says, the angels desire to look: but where there are acts, it is necessary that the power likewise be present.

Add to this that, since the angels are of an intellectual nature, there is no doubt that they are endowed with a volitional power; for in every thing there naturally inheres its own inclination, or appetite, toward the good proportioned to it — in animals, indeed, the sensitive appetite: and consequently the rational being must likewise have its own rational appetite, which we call the will. And indeed it would be highly unfitting, and far removed from the ordered constitution of divine providence, that an intellectual nature could perceive the good and the beauty suited to the intellect, and yet not be able to love it and rest in it, or to take delight in it and rejoice, or that it could know and endure evil, and yet not be able to flee from it by aversion. It is therefore certain, and entirely indubitable, that the angels have an appetitive faculty by which they can pursue the good and shun evil, just as they have an intellective faculty by which they can discern the true from the false. Since, however, we shall have occasion to speak of the works of the will and its supernatural endowments in the following Disputation, namely of the merits and demerits of the angels, here we only undertake to examine what and of what kind are the native characteristics of the angelic will.

Note 1. With our Alensi, from St. Bernard, book On Free Choice, there is a threefold liberty: The first is liberty from coercion, or from necessity; the second is liberty from sin, of which Scripture says: Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; if the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed; the third is liberty from misery, of which the creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. We say therefore that the second and third liberties are not equally in man and in angel, but greatest in the good angel, lesser in the good man, least in the evil man, nonexistent in the demon. But the first liberty, which is from coercion, is equally in man and in angel, whether good or evil; whence Bernard: Liberty from necessity is neither lost by sin nor by misery, nor increased by their opposites, nor is it fuller in man than in angel. And he adds: With this prerogative the Creator marked out rational creatures, that just as He was His own and of His own will, not of coercion, in being good, so also they should be their own masters, so as to do only what they willed, whether good or evil.

Note 2. With the Subtle Doctor, quodlibetal question 16, again a threefold liberty is distinguished: the first is called liberty of contrariety, or of specification, by which the will can tend at will toward some object, or toward its opposite, and by which it can elicit an act of love or of hate. The second is called liberty of contradiction, or with respect to exercise, whereby to be sure the will can elicit an act or not elicit it, tend toward an object or not tend. The third finally is essential liberty, by which the will, since from its intrinsic nature it is indifferent and undetermined, is judged always to elicit its act freely from itself and to tend toward the object, even though it be moved and determined from without. Now this essential liberty the Doctor gathers from St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 105., where he says:

It was fitting that man first be so made by God that he could will well and ill; but afterwards, that is, in beatitude, he will be so made that he cannot will ill; for he will not lack free choice; for far freer indeed will be that choice which can in no way serve sin; nor is a will to be blamed, or it is not a will, by which we wish to be blessed in such wise that not only do we not wish to be miserable, but we can in no way at all will it;

in which words St. Augustine affirms that the necessity of not sinning in the Blessed is compatible with their liberty; not indeed with the liberty of contrariety or of contradiction, by which the will can desire or not desire something against the will of God, and consequently can sin; but with the essential, or radical, and entitative liberty of the will itself, which is a faculty ever remaining free of itself, entitatively, intrinsically, and radically, even if sometimes it be so necessitated and efficaciously drawn by something extrinsic toward the love of it that it can neither cease loving it nor elicit the act opposite to love, namely hate, concerning that object.

Note 3. That although all Theologians agree that angels are endowed with free will, by which they can tend toward good or evil, and into contraries, mutable by their own condition; nevertheless their opinions differ in explaining the use of this same free will: for St. Thomas, first part, question 64, article 2, and his whole School, holds that the will of the angel before election is free toward either alternative; after election, however, it adheres immovably to what it has embraced: and he holds this to be the reason why the demons harden their minds in the wickedness they have taken up and are not converted to better things, which he thinks follows from that knowledge of thought, or, as he calls it, apprehension:

For (he says) the apprehension of an angel differs from the apprehension of a man in this, that the angel apprehends immovably through intellect, just as we immovably apprehend first principles, which belong to intellect: but man apprehends movably through reason, discoursing from one thing to another, having a way of proceeding toward either of two opposites. Hence too the will of man adheres to something movably, as being able even to depart from it and adhere to the contrary: but the will of the angel adheres fixedly and immovably, and therefore if it be considered before adhesion, it can freely adhere both to this and to its opposite, namely in those things which it does not will naturally: but after it has already adhered, it adheres immovably. And therefore it has been customary to say that man's free will is flexible toward the opposite both before and after election: but the free will of the angel is flexible toward either opposite before election, but not after; thus therefore also the good angels, ever adhering to justice, are confirmed in it, but the evil, sinning, are obstinate in sin.

Such are the words of St. Thomas, which indeed the Subtle Doctor rejects, and with him the Theologians commonly teaching that the angelic will is not immutable of itself, but that it can refrain from putting an act once elected, or recall it once put, as will appear in the Second Conclusion.

First conclusion. — Angels are truly endowed with free will. This is of faith, since Sacred Scripture in many places affirms that angels are capable of precept and of sin, on account of which they merit punishment: and likewise receptive of holiness and justice, and of merit before God; all of which free will supposes and denotes, as appears both from what has been said in moral Philosophy and from what will be said in the treatise on Grace.

This same thing the holy Fathers clearly teach, who prove that angels are mutable 1. from their power of sinning: thus St. Basil, book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 16., where speaking of the Holy Angels he says: Having free choice in electing, they never fall away from communion with Him who is truly good: and of the evil ones he says: Whose defection confirms what we say, that the invisible powers are of their own choice: as if to say, that concerning the merit and demerit of angels their free will is legitimately concluded.

— Another argument no less efficacious is used by St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On the Lord's Prayer, where he shows that from the power of consulting in the intellect there follows the power of choosing in the will, and therefore that liberty is common to angel and man, precisely because they agree in intellect or reason.

The study, he says, of the good and the honorable was implanted and attributed at once as essential to both natures alike. And likewise full and supreme power over themselves, and a will free from all necessity, He who presides over all things made equal in both, that whatever has been honored alike with reason and mind might be governed by a certain free choice and purpose of soul.

St. Augustine subscribes, book 22. De Civitate chapter 1., where, having said that God created nothing better in the world than spiritual nature, to which He gave understanding, he adds: Who bestowed upon that intellectual nature such free will that if it should wish to abandon God, misery would straightway follow.

— The same thing the other Fathers likewise prove, who with one accord affirm that angels are endowed with liberty, and gather their free will from their very spiritual nature.

Hence deservedly St. Damascene, book two chapter 3., defines the angel, saying: An Angel is by its nature intelligent, endowed with liberty of choice, immutable as to its judgment by reason etc. And he subjoins the reason. Because, he says, everything that uses reason is also endowed with liberty. Which reason is indeed valid: for liberty of choice follows intelligence or reason: but angels have perfect reason or intelligence: therefore also liberty. The minor is clear from what has been said: the major however is proved by induction; for the supreme intellectual nature, namely the Divine, precisely because it is intellectual, is free; the lowest rational nature also, namely human, is endowed with liberty from the fact that it excels in intelligence and reason: therefore the same must be said of the middle intellectual nature, which is the angelic: both because this has the same root of liberty, namely intellectual nature; and because it is capable of pursuing good and averting evil, as well as of merit and demerit; and finally because liberty pertains to the perfection of intellectual nature, otherwise it would not be in God: therefore an intellectual nature nearer and more closely related to God, such as the angelic, ought above all to be endowed with it.

You will say. If this argument pressed anything, it would follow that God could not create any intellectual creature which would not be free, and indifferent to good or evil: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The truth of the major appears from what will soon be said: the minor however is proved: for just as God created the will so determined to loving the good in general that it cannot hate it, so He could create some will determined to the good in particular, so that it would be necessarily determined to its love and could not cease from it: therefore etc.

— I deny the minor. and to its proof I say that it is repugnant that a will be so determined to the good as to will it always, necessarily, in particular, and from within; all of which seem required lest some faculty be called free. I confess indeed that a will, without prejudice to its liberty, can be necessarily determined to some primary and common object, yet free and indifferent concerning secondary and particular objects; in which way the divine will is determined by its essence, which it loves unchangeably and necessarily; while it is borne indifferently toward secondary objects, namely toward creatures, to be pursued freely in hate or love, according as their perfections or defects deserve divine love or hatred.

It can also be determined concerning some object in general, at least as to the specification of the act, in which way created will is determined in general to loving the good; so that it cannot hate it under the aspect of good. Finally it can even be determined from without toward some particular object to be so loved that it cannot be recalled from the love of it; in which way the will of the Blessed is drawn and determined to loving God: but this determination is altogether extrinsic; and consequently it does not impede the liberty of the will, which notwithstanding that extrinsic determination no less freely inclines toward that object. Therefore it is repugnant that any will could be so created as to be intrinsically determined concerning some particular object to be necessarily loved, since the will of itself is an indifferent faculty, or one of indifference of contrariety or contradiction, as the Second Conclusion will declare more fully.

Second conclusion. — The angelic will is not immutable, nor naturally of itself so determined to one thing that it cannot retract and recall what has once been elected. This is the Doctor's teaching in 2. dist. 6. q. 2. n. 17., where he says:

I say that when the Angel sinned with the second sin, he was still in the way; and consequently when he sinned with the second sin he could have repented of the first sin; and so the first sin was not of itself irremediable, because had he repented, he would have found pardon and mercy etc.

The same he teaches dist. 7. quaest. 2. and in 4. dist. 46. q. 4. n. 6. against the Thomists: and it is Proved 1. By the authority of the holy Fathers, especially St. Jerome, Epistle 146. to Damasus: God alone, he says, is He into whom sin does not fall; the rest, since they are of free will, just as man was made to the image and likeness of God, can bend their will toward either part. St. Gregory of Nyssa subscribes, Oration 5. on the Lord's Prayer, where, speaking of both natures, human and angelic, he attributes an equal liberty of choice to both, as was said above. There agrees also the aforesaid St. Damascene, who, having said that angels are mutable in purpose and judgment, and this of themselves and by their own spontaneity, brings forward this reason:

Forsooth, he says, every created thing is mutable: but that alone which is Uncreated cannot be changed or converted. Moreover everything rational is free in potency: wherefore in that very thing in which it is rational and intelligent, it is of free choice: but as a mutable creature, it has the power of remaining and proceeding in good, > and of lapsing into worse.

Then immediately he adds: In no way capable is it of penance, because devoid of body: for man on account of the weakness of his body has attained to penance. In which words he plainly teaches that angels are by no means capable of penance, not because they cannot depart from what they have once chosen, as St. Thomas holds, but because they are destitute of divine grace, which is nowhere to be granted them, for the reason that since they lacked a body, they cannot plead the excuse of weakness, as men can, for the pardon of sin, and on that account they sinned far more gravely and intolerably than men. Hence of the good angels he subjoins: Hardly movable into evil, but not immovable: Now however they are immovable not by nature, but by grace, and by adherence to Him who alone is good.

— The same firmness and stability of election in goods the other holy Fathers attribute not to native obfirmation, but to the benefit of God. Thus St. Augustine, book 22. De Civitate Dei chapter 1. The fall of the Angels, he says, voluntary, most just punishment bound fast to everlasting unhappiness: and to those abiding in it supremely, so that they were certain of their endless perseverance, He gave it as the reward of their perseverance. Therefore St. Augustine judges that the holy Angels do not have that firmness in good from their nature. The same thinks St. Prosper, in book one De Vita Contemplativa chapter 3. It was of the will, he says, of the holy Angels that, while the evil fell spontaneously, they themselves remained in their dignity: And by divine and just judgment it came about that the will which was of persevering with God their own should become a voluntary and happy necessity of persevering. Whence Gennadius chapter 62. De Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus: The Angelic Virtues, he says, which persevered fixed in divine love, when the proud Angels fell, received this gift of retribution, that they should no longer be harmed by any rust of stealing guilt. Therefore the holy Fathers do not judge the blessed Angels immovable by their nature, but only by the divine benefit. For as St. Isidore says, If they were immutable by nature, the Devil certainly would not have fallen. — This truth above all others St. Fulgentius teaches most openly in the book De Fide ad Petrum chapter 3. who, comparing human liberty with the angelic, says:

If it were possible that human nature, after it had lost goodness of will by turning from God, could again have it of itself, much more possibly would the angelic nature have this: which, inasmuch as it is less burdened by the weight of an earthly body, so much the more would it be endowed with this faculty. But God showed whence good will is given to men, which the Angels, while they had it, so lost that thereafter they could not have it.

Rupert subscribes, book 5. on chapter 5. of John;

For the Angelic nature also, he says, could do evil, and did, and does: and human nature could do evil, and did. And indeed the holy Angels were confirmed, because, while another wrought evil, that is, was doing evil, they preferred to adhere to God their prince, and in this they received recompense, that thereafter they cannot do evil, because when they could do it, they would not.

But this is not by the power of their own nature, but by the remunerating grace of the divine will.

The truth of the Conclusion can also be urged from that battle of the good angels among themselves, and conflict which is gathered from the sacred Books, as we read in Daniel chapter 10. where, according to the exposition of the Pelusiotan, Epistle 85., the Angel of the Persians taking it ill that the Jews continued to merit the wrath of God and perpetual slavery by their most wicked deeds, was unwilling that they be liberated from captivity: but another Angel opposed him, who preferred the goodness of God's justice, and God favored each according to his desire, passing sentence: to which sentence each Angel gave assent. Therefore the angel does not adhere immovably to what he has once seized upon by intelligence and will.

Proof moreover. by theological reason: while the Angel elects something he is truly free, and acts freely; since he can elect the thing or not elect it: but after the election has been made nothing necessitates him so that he cannot revoke the election made and change his judgment: therefore even after election he is truly mutable.

The major is clear from the preceding Conclusion: the minor Suarez proves in book 8, chapter 10, and from him Martinonus: if an angel could not change his purpose, that immutability would have to be sought either on the part of God, who determines the angel necessarily to one act; or from the angel's own nature, which on account of its dignity and perfection could be imagined immutable in its election, just as God on account of the excellence of his nature is altogether invariable; or from the act of the will itself, which would demand this invariability from its own nature; or from a habit or other disposition added to the will and left behind by the act; or finally on the part of the intellect and the mode of understanding, by which the will would be so directed toward one object that it could not be determined to another: but from neither heading can this immutability be sought.

Not indeed first on the part of God: both because it would not befit God to necessitate the will in an evil act; and also because we are speaking here of an angel considered naturally, as he stands under God, as it were under a first cause operating naturally according to the exigency of second causes; and consequently not necessitating, unless there be something demanding this on the part of the second cause.

Nor does that immutability proceed from the very nature of the will: both because no greater mutability should be imagined in the angelic will than in judgment: yet the judgment of angels can be varied and corrected just as they can be deceived; and also because although in a will that cannot fall away from good, immutability in purpose and election is a great perfection; yet not so in a will that can fall away: indeed it would be a great imperfection not to be able to correct oneself and to desist from evil; just as for an intellect capable of error it would be a great imperfection not to be able to be untaught an error and cast it away: but the will of an angel can sin, just as the intellect can err: therefore it would be the highest imperfection for it if it could not recall its own act; and finally because the holy Fathers did not acknowledge such a nature and perfection in the angels.

Nor indeed on the part of the act of the will: inasmuch as this neither binds nor constrains the power, since nature precedes it, and by it the power is not constituted in first act, in respect of which alone it is powerful or powerless, whether to produce a first act or to conserve one produced.

But what some say, that the necessity of immutability arises from the impulse with which the angelic will bursts forth into its acts, is vain: for they gratuitously suppose that angels always operate with supreme effort. Next, although the will operates with its whole effort, it is entirely free, and can fail to elicit an act, or elicit the opposite: it can likewise lay aside an act after it has elicited it: why then could it not change to the opposite, and indeed with its whole effort, if there be need? Truly, from this opinion of the Adversaries it would follow that an angel could naturally make himself impeccable for the future: for he can love

God with his whole effort above every natural act, and likewise detest with his whole effort every sin; for both knowledge and will are available for this: therefore if he could not change such an election from elsewhere, he would constitute himself impeccable.

Nor indeed on the part of the habit, and of the disposition left behind by the act: both because a habit and disposition preceding the act of election does not necessitate to the election, but in this is subject to the will — for we suppose that the angel freely elects, notwithstanding any habit or prior disposition whatever: therefore neither can it necessitate to persevering in an election once made. Then because such a habit or disposition cannot influence the conservation of the act more efficaciously than its first production. And also because such a habit or disposition can never deprive the will of its natural and intimate power of suspending its influx, or of persevering freely in the act which it freely elicited: therefore, notwithstanding such a habit or disposition, it can freely cease from that act, and again elect freely; why then, if it wills, could it not pass to the contrary election? Add that it does not seem credible that in the first instant there could be generated from any act whatever so intense a habit in the will of an angel that it could not overcome it, since men even overcome and tear out inveterate habits. Further, habits only incline the power so that it can easily produce similar acts, not so that it can produce opposite ones.

Finally not on the part of the intellect, and of the mode of understanding: both because angels can change their judgment, and now judge unworthy of love what before they thought lovable, and in fact loved. Moreover, angels can naturally be deceived, especially when they judge from conjectures and signs uncertain and obscure; and demons are not rarely deceived about the outcomes of temptations and about future events that are free, and about the mysteries and dispensations of grace: therefore on the part of judgment or of the mode of understanding there is no reason for necessarily persisting in an election previously made, but rather a reason for prudently changing it to the contrary. Then because, even if the very same judgment always stood which the angel had when he freely elected, it would not follow from this that the will could not change its act: for just as that judgment did not physically predetermine the will, but, that judgment being posited and standing, the will freely elected what it embraced, and could have not elected even in the composed sense, that is, could compose not-election with such a judgment: so neither does it predetermine to continuing the act, but the will remains entirely of itself free to continue the election or lay it aside. Finally, angels in fact did change their will, namely the evil ones, who for some time were good with the others, and loved God. Nay, every day both good and bad angels change their wills: the latter while they desist from tempting, seeing that temptations rather profit than harm; the former while they finally abandon those whom they strove in vain to call away from vices.

You will object 1. The intellect of an angel adheres immovably to those things which it understands and judges: therefore the will has a similar immutability in its elections. The antecedent is clear, for an angel apprehends conclusions in principles, whence he judges about things known just as man does about first principles: therefore just as man adheres immovably to first principles, so also the angel adheres to all that he apprehends and judges. The consequence also is evident, for the will follows the intellect, and imitates the mode of its operation.

I answer 1. by denying the antecedent; for it is false that the angel adheres invariabily to those things which he knows. It is equally false that he knows conclusions in principles, since he has the virtue of discursus, and in truth his knowledge is discursive.

I answer 2. by denying the consequence: for just as, notwithstanding that determination of the intellect, the will in its first election was free, so also, that election having been made, it still remains free to abandon it or elicit another; inasmuch as the intellect in both cases finds a sufficient reason by which it can be appetized. Add that the will is the mistress of the intellect, and by far the freer; and therefore notwithstanding the judgment of the intellect it can elect what pleases it.

You will object 2. Adhesion to the last end, or the intention of attaining it, is the principle of all elections: but an angel adheres immovably to the last end which he destined for himself: therefore he also adheres immovably to all other things inasmuch as they are ordered to that end.

— I distinguish the minor. that he adheres immovably to the last end by an extrinsic determination, namely while the last end so efficaciously moves the will by its clear and evident proposition, in whatever way God, seen intuitively, determines blessed minds to his vision and love, I concede: by an intrinsic determination,¹ insofar as it would proceed from an immovable election of the will apprehending the last end true or apparent, I deny. For although the Blessed adhere immovably to God, and the demons are hardened in that will by which they proposed to themselves the divine equality as their last end, nevertheless this determination does not proceed precisely from the intrinsic, but from the extrinsic — in the Blessed indeed from the object clearly apprehended, but in the damned from the grace being denied by which they might recall their sentence and do penance.

You will say 3. The more perfect the will is, and the more freely it elects, the more vehemently and with greater affection it adheres to the thing elected: but the will of an angel is most perfect, and elects most freely, because it is not led by passion, but determines itself from itself alone: therefore in electing it is so affected toward the thing elected that it cannot be removed from it.

— I deny the major. for it is not necessary that a freer will be carried with greater affection toward its object: indeed the freer it is, the more it will be able to moderate and temper its affection. Add that even if it be carried with supreme affection toward its object, it does not follow from this that it must subsist invariable in that affection; for with the same liberty it can cease from it, and command the intellect to consider other things by which it may be drawn away from the love of that object and tend toward another.

You will say 4. If angels were changeable and mutable, they would likewise be capable of penance: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The major stands, for he is capable of penance who can cast away and recall an evil will: the minor also is clear, for if they were capable of penance, there is no doubt that at some time they would have done penance, or at least some one of them would have repented.

— I deny the major. for the defect of penance in the angels does not proceed from the immutability of their will, but from the supernatural divine aid being denied them, absolutely necessary for doing true penance, and from the fact that they are in the term; for if, in the state of the way, and before the sentence of their eternal damnation had been pronounced, God had granted them the grace of penance, they truly could have repented and obtained pardon: but because they are in the term, nor are they given any divine aid for penitence, therefore they cannot repent.

You will say 5. An angel is most subtle in nature, and also most vehement in operating, and therefore his will totally immerses itself in the object which it elects and to which it adheres, and cannot be recalled from it: therefore after the first act it is immutable.

— I deny the consequence. for however much the angelic will, existing in the way, might pursue the object, and with whatever effort tend toward it, nevertheless it could cast it aside at its pleasure, as we said above.

You will say 6. A change of election proceeds either from the electing one being disposed otherwise, or because after the election he apprehends the thing otherwise than before: but neither has place in the angels. Not the first, because they have no passions, nor do they receive their internal disposition from without: nor even the second, because an angel has a most perfect light; and therefore he first apprehends everything that is knowable, especially concerning the intention and election of the last end; for since this matter is of the highest weight and moment, it is likely that the angel spends all his intellectual power in forming this knowledge.

— I deny the minor. for although the angel be illuminated most perfectly, nevertheless he can err, as in fact he erred in apprehending that equality with God was possible for him, and in appetizing it: for the election of evil always presupposes an error, or at least an inconsideration on the part of the intellect, especially when one does not sin from certain and determinate malice; and therefore where there is error or inconsideration, the apprehension on the part of the intellect can be incomplete. And so it can be said that the evil angels had these two judgments at once: the first, that it would be good to be subject to God and obey him: the second, that their own excellence would be an appetible good: whence it came about that, even with the prior judgment standing, nevertheless they were moved to follow the later one, namely to elect their own excellence: and thus, notwithstanding the knowledge of the means and of the due end, they could appetize for themselves another end, namely their own excellence.

You will insist. the more excellent the light of the intellect, the more tenaciously the will adheres to the object: but the light of the angelic intellect was most excellent: therefore their will adhered so firmly to the elected object that in no way could it be removed from it. The minor stands: the major is proved by experience, whereby it is clear that those who have a less perfect intellect, namely children and women, are also easily moved from their own opinion.

— I answer to the major that although the adhesion of the will follows the illumination of the intellect, and the will adheres the more firmly to the elected object, the greater good it finds in it; nevertheless it does not follow from this that it cannot cast it aside in its liberty. But to the minor I say that from it indeed follows that the angels cannot change their purpose and election with as much facility as men can: nevertheless it does not follow that they absolutely cannot recall both, on account of the reasons expressed by us.

Third conclusion. — The angelic will is also free with the liberty of contradiction, and even with respect to exercise. This likewise is the doctrine of the Doctor, and

It is proved: Nothing can be assigned by which the angelic will would be necessarily determined to persisting always under act: therefore in truth it can cease from act. The antecedent is clear from the preceding Conclusion, for if it could be necessitated by anything to persisting under its act, especially on the part of God, or from its native dignity, or from its act, or on the part of the intellect determining it necessarily always to act, or from some other principle: but none of these can be affirmed, as was proved above: therefore, etc.

— Next, for liberty with respect to exercise there suffices the power of suspending the act by a pure privation, or negation, of influx; so that it is not necessary to will not to elicit an act, but it is enough not to will to elicit, or not to elicit from certain knowledge, and power, and dominion over one's own act, or influx: but the will is absolutely mistress of its own influx: therefore it is not necessitated with respect to exercise even with respect to the whole collection of acts possible to it.

— Finally, just as no act of the angelic will in particular is absolutely necessary, but the will freely determined itself to the eliciting of each one; so likewise it can cease from eliciting any one in particular, and therefore also cease from every act; because the same is the reason of liberty in the whole collection of acts which is found in the individual acts: therefore just as no particular act is necessary to the angel for his good, so also neither one or another, and so of the others taken disjunctively.

You will say. If there were some act of willing in particular in which no reason of evil would be found, nor could a reason of good be apprehended in its absence, the will could not cease from such an act, but it would be in particular necessary with respect to exercise; for by this reason the love of God in the homeland is necessary with respect to exercise: but in the absence of every act of the will no reason of good can be thought, nor in the actual exercise of any act of willing taken indefinitely can any reason of evil be found, because in the whole breadth of acts there cannot but be many fitting ones; but truly it is better to operate in act than to cease from operation; indeed that is of itself good and perfect; not to operate however is simply imperfect: therefore the will cannot formally, or virtually, will such a cessation, and consequently to will something, at least indefinitely, it is necessitated.

— I deny the minor. for in that voluntary absence of every act there is found the highest liberty of the will, which at its pleasure can act or not act, and thus becomes the supreme mistress of its own acts, which it can put in being or not put in being at a nod, which indeed argues the greatest perfection, and connotes the highest good, as will be shown more fully in the third Conclusion of the following Question.

Note 1. For the present a twofold love can be distinguished: namely Natural, and Supernatural. The former is so called because to elicit it the natural faculty itself suffices, with the sole prior light of the intellect illuminating it and determining it toward the lovable object, opening to it and manifesting all those perfections which shine forth in such an object, and which are so many stimuli and incentives of love: the latter is that love which the will cannot elicit without the benefit and aid of supernatural grace: of the former we speak here; of the latter we shall treat in the following Disputation.

Note 2. From our Alensis, q. 30., natural love can be taken in several ways;

for, he says, natural love is said to be whatever of itself helps nature to be, or helps it to remain; and for this reason God alone is loved with natural love by an angel: for nothing else is necessary to the being of an angel besides that which belongs to its esse; for one angel does not need another in order to be, or to remain in being. In the second way natural love can regard everything congenial to nature, whether similar, or conformed in nature; and in this way there is natural love not only of the Creator, or Governor, but also of another angel, who is alike in angelic nature, or even of man, who is similar in created intellectual nature. In the third way natural love can be said with respect to that good which is ordained to participating the complete lovable object, which is glory; and according to this mode, charity, or grace is a perfection of nature; thus according to this mode it is lovable by an angel not only the soul of man, but also the human body, which can participate in the dower gifts; whence the soul will be perfected in the second stole, and the angel on this account obtains a certain love. In the fourth way, natural love is said with respect to every good, inasmuch as it is good; and thus it extends itself to every creature, and to the Creator.

Note 3. From the Seraphic Doctor in 2. d. 3. a. 3. q. 2.,

that the greater love of someone can come about in three ways: by reason of the good desired, or by reason of intense affection, or by reason of the effect bestowed. By reason of the good desired someone is said to love someone more when he wishes him a greater good, and thus he is said to love more, because unto the greater. In this way, with natural love proceeding from the judgment of right reason, the angel loved the superior angel more; for he willed him to excel, and to have more good, just as God the creator willed so to ordain. By reason of intense affection one is said to love another more when his affection draws him more toward the other, and consoles him more in his companionship; and thus someone is said to love more him with whom he more willingly dwells: and thus the angel by nature loved more the angel of the same order, since just as by natural affection one loves his fellow citizens more, especially when they are conformed to him in morals; and just as a man loves more him who is of the same profession and office, where envy does not interpose its part: so the angel must be understood to embrace with natural love more the other angel of the same order, when he saw himself joined to him by the Creator in equality of office and similarity of nature; nor would there then be diversity of morals, nor the malice of envy. By reason of the effect, or of the benefit bestowed, someone is said to love more him upon whom he bestows more goods, and about whom he is more solicitous, just as a Master cherishes more his tender son, and is more solicitous about him than about the grown man, and more about the sick than about the healthy; and this he does out of consideration of the greater need; and in this way it can be said that the angel of the higher order loves more the angel of the lower, since an angel of an equal or higher order does not > need, either his instruction, or his purification, as does an angel of the lower order.

These things therefore premised, it must be determined, 1. Whether there be any natural love in the angels. 2. Whether with this love, while they were wayfarers, they could have loved God above all things. 3. In what manner they love both themselves and the other angels.

First conclusion. — Truly there is in the angels natural love, insofar as natural love is opposed to supernatural: but not insofar as it is opposed to free.

This Conclusion has two parts, of which the first is common among Theologians, and it is proved: That which is attributed to interior things without any imperfection must not be denied to the angels: but natural love and dilection is attributed formally to men without any imperfection: therefore it seems it ought not to be denied also to the angels. Next, each thing naturally loves itself, and appetites its own perfection, and is naturally inclined to it: for no being is so imperfect that it does not naturally appetite its own perfection: therefore much more do the angels naturally appetite their beatitude, unto which they are ordered as unto their ultimate perfection: but this appetite is called natural love: therefore etc. Finally, demons have a natural love of themselves: therefore also the angels. The antecedent is evident, for demons naturally flee their misery: therefore they naturally love themselves. The inference is evident: for I therefore hate someone because I love myself, or another; therefore if demons naturally flee the misery which they have, they also naturally love themselves.

Add. that demons naturally appetite their felicity, and beatitude in common: therefore they naturally appetite and love themselves. The antecedent is evident, for beatitude in common cannot be hated. This angelic natural love, moreover, is to be understood even as regards the elicited act; for in the angels there is a love following reason, and the apprehended form; therefore in the angels there is an elicited act of love. The antecedent is proved: An angel has natural knowledge of himself: therefore also natural love of himself.

You will say 1. If there were some natural love in the angels, it would have to be either right, and perfect; or disordered, and imperfect: but neither can be said. Not the first: for every right and perfect love is charity, and hence something supernatural; not even the second, since an imperfect and disordered love is sin: but an angel, as in the state of pure nature, does not sin.

I answer to the major. that since natural love is nothing else than an inclination implanted by the Author of nature, it must necessarily be said to be right; otherwise the greatest injury would be done to the Creator if anyone asserted that he implanted a depraved inclination. Nevertheless, since there is a twofold rectitude, namely the rectitude of natural inclination, and of supernatural virtue; and the latter is perfective of the former; hence it can be said that the rectitude of nature is not perfectly perfect in every way while it stands within its own limits, since it becomes more perfect when joined to charity: yet it is right, and perfect within the order of nature, inasmuch as it is conformable to the principles of nature, by which each thing appetites what is convenient to itself.

I answer to the minor. that this love is truly natural, both insofar as natural sounds as an inclination and propensity toward something perfective of oneself, and insofar as it is opposed to a supernatural thing: since by this love the angel not only obtains the perfection of his will, for powers are perfected by acts; but is also borne toward it by his own native inclination, by which each thing tends toward that which is convenient to it. Nor does it matter that he had this propensity implanted in him by the Author of nature, for no less by means of it is he said to be moved from within, namely by the internal appetite of the will. Similarly this tendency is said to be free, for the angel can suspend his love both toward himself and toward other objects, as will be proved in the third Conclusion.

You will say 2. If there were any natural love in the angels, it would be midway between gratuitous love, which is charity, and sinful love, which Alensis calls libidinous: but this cannot be said. For the mean between good and evil must be indifferent: but natural love is not indifferent to good and evil, but truly is to be placed in the genus of good: therefore etc.

Alensis himself answers. that although that natural love is midway between the gratuitous and the vicious, it is nevertheless not midway between good and evil simply, but only between the good which is called supernatural, and evil opposed to supernatural good: for although it partly agrees with each extreme — with gratuitous love indeed, because it loves the highest good; with the vicious, however, because it loves it for its own sake, but not for Him Himself; nevertheless it agrees more with gratuitous love than with the vicious, because it is borne toward the highest good, namely toward God, although it is so borne on account of the good of the lover himself.

The second part is proved. namely that angelic love is not natural insofar as natural is opposed to free: for that which is natural, opposed to free, is of itself necessarily determined to one thing: but the angelic will cannot be said to be so determined to love: therefore neither can it have a natural love opposed to liberty. The major stands from the common opinion of the Philosophers, who in this distinguish the natural from the free, that the former is determined by its intrinsic principles to one thing, as fire to burning, the heavy to motion downward, and the light upward. The minor is proved: if the angelic will were of itself determined necessarily to loving some object, especially either God, or the angel himself: but it loves neither so necessarily; for although perhaps it is necessarily borne to loving itself as regards perfection, so that it cannot hate itself, nevertheless it is not so determined as regards exercise: since, as will be proved in the third Conclusion, it can cease from every act of love toward itself.

The same can be said of love toward God. Indeed it is much less determined to the love of God than to the love of itself, for it cannot hate itself, but it can hate God, for of the demons the Royal Psalmist says: The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually. Add that one angel can be occupied in the love of another with the love of friendship which he has for him, and likewise of concupiscence toward the goods which he desires for the beloved angel. But by that act of love, the loving angel loves neither himself nor God, since he desires the good of neither for its own sake: therefore he does not necessarily always love himself and God. This truth will be shown more evidently in the third Conclusion.

Second conclusion. — An angel can naturally love God more than himself, and above all things. So the Doctor in 3. dist. 27. num. 13.

And he proves this Conclusion First: Natural reason shows that there is something supremely lovable for intellectual nature, because in all acts, and objects essentially subordinated, there is something supreme, and thus some supreme love, and thus a supreme object thus lovable: but natural reason must dictate that that supremely lovable thing is the highest Good, namely God, otherwise it would follow that charity inclines to loving supremely that which natural reason dictates is not to be loved supremely, and thus charity would not be a virtue, since it would not be conformable to right reason: therefore natural reason dictates that God is to be loved supremely. But the will can naturally love every object which is proposed by natural reason as supremely lovable, for the intellect cannot rightly dictate anything unto which the will cannot naturally tend according to the dictum; otherwise the will would be naturally evil; or at least would not be free to tend toward anything according to that reason of good according to which it is shown to it by the intellect. Which the Doctor says is argued especially of the angels, because in the state of innocence they were not not-right, since then they could not have had a not-right act: but they could have had some elicited act; and it is to be supposed that they had it, and that that act was right: but that act could not have been right if in that very act the angels had loved themselves above all things, but not God: therefore etc.

Next, Natural love of God above all things is possible, for the production of it is not repugnant, either from its terms, namely that it be love of God above all things, and that it be natural, or from some reason a priori, or a posteriori: but the angel can elicit every love possible naturally, unless some impediment be present on the part of the will, which certainly there is none: for if there were some impediment by which the will could not elicit such a love, especially either the inclination, and propensity of the latter to loving other objects, or the actual love of other objects, for no other impediment on the part of the will can be imagined: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first; for to that extent would that inclination impede the love of God, inasmuch as it would determine necessarily to the actual love of other objects: but it is not so, for no propensity of the will is reckoned to determine it necessarily, since notwithstanding any inclination whatsoever it always remains free. Not even the second: because the actual love of other objects is not necessarily conserved, and consequently can be changed, and recalled, and the love of God succeed it: therefore the will has nothing of itself by which it could be withheld from forming the love of God naturally possible.

Finally, says the Doctor, according to the philosophers the brave man, insofar as he is a member of the Republic, following the dictate of right reason ought to expose himself to death for the sake of defending the Republic itself, and consequently he would have to love the Republic more than himself: but the same reason dictates far more that one ought to love God more than oneself, and expose oneself for the love of God himself; for the brave man owes more to God than to the Republic; since he is bound to the Republic only because he is its part and member; but he owes himself wholly to God as regards his production and conservation: therefore if he ought to love the Republic more than himself, much more God.

It is confirmed 1. The more something belongs to another than to itself, by so much the more ought it to love that other than itself: but any creature whatsoever, especially an angel, belongs more to God, since from him it has being, operation, and well-being, while of itself without God it obtains none of these: therefore it is bound to love God more than itself.

It is confirmed 2. Every creature includes in itself an intrinsic order and dependence upon God, as upon the efficient and conserving cause not only of itself, but of the whole Universe: therefore by natural appetite it is borne toward God as the conservator of the Universe rather than toward itself. The inference is proved: any creature stands in order to God as the conservator of the Universe, as a part of that same Universe: but every part by natural appetite rather desires the being of the whole of which it is a part than its own proper being: therefore every creature rather desires the subsistence and essence of God than its own: and accordingly that which is capable of love naturally loves God more than itself. The minor is evident from experience, whereby it is established that men expose a hand or another limb for the preservation of the whole body: yet that exposure is a natural motion, and not a violent one: therefore it befits them in accordance with their natural inclination: and thus do creatures stand with respect to God who conserves the whole Universe; whence if per impossibile God could be exposed to the danger of non-being, creatures would expose themselves to such danger of non-being in order that God might be preserved, because they are parts of the whole Universe, which cannot subsist unless God subsists and conserves the Universe: therefore from this it follows that each creature is borne toward God more than toward itself.

Finally it is confirmed. charity and grace perfect nature according to the mode of nature: but charity and grace incline to loving God above all things: therefore they suppose in man and the angels a natural inclination to loving God more than themselves. Moreover, the precepts of natural law are founded on natural inclination: for by nature itself and the dictate of reason we are inclined to observing such precepts, for instance the precept of guarding our own life, which is founded on the appetite for self-preservation: but the precept of loving God above all things is of natural law: therefore it is founded on a natural propensity and inclination, and accordingly man and angel are naturally inclined to loving God.

You will say 1. If the angels had a natural propensity to loving God more than themselves, we too should have the same by parity of reason: but the consequent is shown false by experience itself, whereby we suffer the greatest difficulty in undergoing death for the glory of God: therefore it is a sign that nature inclines us more to the love of ourselves than to the love of God.

I deny the minor. and to its proof I say that a twofold inclination can be distinguished in man and angel, one indeed common and general inasmuch as they are creatures, the other special and particular inasmuch as they are such and such creatures considered in themselves and absolutely; for instance, man considered inasmuch as he is a rational animal precisely and formally says nothing of an order to God, but only a natural inclination and tendency to his own proper perfection. In the former mode he is more inclined to loving God than to loving himself, since indeed every creature belongs more to God than to itself, seeing that it has its whole being from God and through God; hence also as such it is inclined more toward God than toward itself, and on this account man would be more inclined to undergoing death for God than to preserving his life. But since the angel and man considered in themselves desire their natural inclination and perfection, hence they are inclined to preserving themselves more than to their own destruction. Hence man feels difficulty in undergoing death for God's sake, which difficulty does not arise from a greater love of himself than of God, but from the fact that he naturally loves his own life, which since he could not preserve together with the love of God, thence he suffers difficulty at its loss. Just as, for example, he who for saving his life throws his merchandise into the sea when a storm presses in, suffers difficulty in this throwing overboard; nevertheless he values his own life more, and loves it more than the lost merchandise. The same must be said of him who, for the sake of the soundness of the whole body, suffers some putrid limb to be cut off; for although he bears this amputation with distress, he is nevertheless judged to love the whole body more than that part. So it happens in our case; for while someone in undergoing Martyrdom suffers a natural repugnance, this repugnance is not an indication of greater love toward himself than toward God; nay rather the opposite is inferred, because namely despite this repugnance, he willingly casts himself into death.

You will say 2. If we naturally loved God above all things, it would follow that there is in us a native inclination to good: but the consequent is against Genesis 8. The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth: therefore etc.

I deny the major. and to the text of Scripture I answer that it is understood of the appetite of nature vitiated by sin, not indeed of the appetite of unimpaired nature; for since that appetite was implanted by God the author of nature, it necessarily had to be upright and prone to good.

You will object. Man is naturally inclined to his own good: therefore not to the good of God himself, especially when the good of God is opposed to his own good. The inference is evident, for it implies that the natural inclination is borne toward two opposites, and consequently if one is inclined to his own being naturally, he will be averse to his non-being, and presently to everything that follows upon his non-being.

I distinguish the inference. that he is more inclined to his own good than to the good of God himself absolutely and simply, I deny; in a certain respect, I concede. That is, inasmuch as the creature is a being having existence received on loan from God himself, it is borne in love and inclination more toward God, to whom it owes itself entirely, than toward itself; but it is borne more toward itself according to that propensity which every thing has for its own conservation, so that in truth it would wish to preserve its life if there were no occasion of undergoing death for God; yet since that occasion is present, it is borne more toward undergoing that death, even according to the inclination of nature, than toward preserving its life. Lest however hallucination arise here, note that the Doctor, and we with him, are here treating only of physical power and the natural inclination of nature instituted, or defiled and weakened by no vice, such as was the angelic nature in the state of the way, as the Doctor himself speaks in n. 15., writing thus:

I concede the conclusion, that ex puris naturalibus any will whatever can, at least in the state of instituted nature, love God above all things, namely, > as regards the inclination and physical power of unimpaired nature. For with respect to this state of nature vitiated and weakened by original sin, we willingly grant that we cannot elicit the perfect act of the love of God above all things without the special help of grace. For if supernatural help were required for other acts of the moral virtues, much more is it required for loving the love of God above all things, especially since love of this kind is incompossible with the affect of sinning, and includes an efficacious will even of undergoing martyrdom for the defense of God's glory and the fulfilling of his will, as will appear more fully in the treatise De Gratia.

Third conclusion. — Angels necessarily love themselves with a love necessitating as regards specification: but not as regards exercise.

This Conclusion has two parts, of which the first is proved: Angels cannot hate themselves: therefore they necessarily love themselves as regards specification. The antecedent is proved: everyone naturally desires his own being and wishes his own preservation: therefore the angels hold the same in their wishes, and accordingly naturally love themselves; for that appetite is nothing other than the very natural propensity by which every being wishes its own conservation, wherefore among spiritual beings it is called love. Then, if the angels could have some hatred toward themselves, especially since they could change the judgment by which practically they judge their own conservation to be something desirable and lovable, they would judge their own annihilation to be desirable: but this cannot happen, since the nothing of the angel or of a being is nothing, nor does it involve anything of goodness, neither does it embrace in itself anything of lovability. Finally, if certain angels desired and with elicited love loved their non-being, most especially the demons: but it is not so; for even if out of natural self-love and an appetite for beatitude in common the demons desire not to be in such a state of misery in which they are pressed down, nevertheless it is more likely that they simply do not desire their non-being; since that appetite of non-being, if they have any, arises only from the pressing misery in which they are held, and accordingly it must be referred more to a state of misery than to non-being.

The second part is proved. against certain modern Thomists: Liberty as regards exercise persists intact in our will in any state of nature with respect to any object whatever: therefore much more does that liberty stand intact in the angels. The antecedent S. Thomas admits, De Virtute quaest. 22. art. 6. The consequence is evident per se; since angelic liberty is far more excellent than ours, with better right are they said to be free as regards exercise with respect to any natural object set before them. Then, if the angelic will were necessarily determined to the act of self-love, it could by no means sin in the love of self: but the consequent is false: therefore also that from which it follows. The inference is evident, because sin is sin insofar as it is voluntary: but if the angels were necessarily and naturally determined to the act of self-love, nor could they elicit another, that act would not be free, and therefore not sinful. The minor is proved: that act is not free which does not proceed from an indifferent will, nor has order to it as it is free: but if the will is naturally determined to the love of self, that act does not say order to the will as it is a free power: for if it said any order, especially since after eliciting it the will could fail to conserve it: but in the opinion of the Thomists this cannot be said, inasmuch as, they say, the will could never cease from that love: therefore etc. Finally, therefore the angel is not free as regards specification, because no reason of good can be found in the object contrary to the love of him, namely in the nothing of himself: but in the object contrary to this love, namely in the actual non-loving, the angel can find some reason of good: therefore he can cease from the actual love of himself. The major is evident from the prior part. The minor is proved: the angel can judge it better to exercise the liberty he has in his acts than always to have an act of love toward himself; for in this no reason of evil appears: therefore although the angel apprehends by speculative cognition that it is good that he love himself, nevertheless by practical judgment he can judge it good that in that same instant he not elicit an act of love toward himself, namely either so as to transfer himself wholly to loving God, or so as to pursue another angel with a love of friendship or of concupiscence: therefore he does not love himself necessarily with natural love as regards exercise. It is confirmed: the will is not necessitated as regards exercise to that act in which there can be detected the reason of a lesser good: but the angel can apprehend some reason of a lesser good in the love of self; for he can apprehend that love not only as impeding the exercise of his liberty regarding the suspension of his acts, but also as hindering him from bearing himself with his whole endeavor toward God as his last end, or from loving another angel with the most excellent charity: therefore in the love of self he can detect the reason of a lesser good; and thus he will be able to suspend such an act, and be borne toward a more excellent one.

Gonet objects 1.: The angel knows and contemplates himself necessarily even as regards exercise: therefore with the same necessity he loves himself. The consequence is proved; both because the operation of the will is proportioned to the operation of the intellect, by which it is directed and regulated; and also because if the angel necessarily always understands himself, he necessarily wills to understand himself always: but this is to love himself, because this is to will for himself the greatest good; and finally, because from the natural cognition by which the angel comprehends himself and all his natural perfections there results necessarily a practical judgment altogether immutable, by which he judges that himself and all those perfections must needs be loved: therefore he knows himself necessarily by practical cognition causing love, and not only by merely speculative cognition, which does not give birth to love. The consequence is evident: the antecedent is proved: because the judgment about some object is then immutable, when there can be no reason for forming the opposite judgment: but there can be no reason why the angel should form a judgment contrary to the judgment about loving himself: therefore the angel, apprehending himself and all his natural perfections, forms a practical judgment altogether immutable about loving himself. The major is evident. The minor is proved: proper love generates in the angel not disgust but delight; nor does it impede but aids, as a medium leading to other operations, especially to the love of God: therefore there is no reason why the angel could form a judgment contrary to the judgment about loving himself; since the reason why a judgment can be had concerning the suspension of the love of any object is because that love either generates weariness, or is an impediment to a greater good.

I answer 1. by denying the antecedent: for it is false that the angelic intellect understands itself necessarily as regards exercise: since both on account of the externally moving object, and by the command of his own will, he can turn away from the vision of himself and divert his cognition to another object, as was said in the prior Article.

I answer 2. by denying the consequence, and to its first proof I say that, although the angel would understand himself necessarily, still it does not follow from this that he loves himself necessarily; for although the will follows the operation of the intellect, because namely it is not borne toward the unknown, nevertheless it does not follow it so necessarily that it must be occupied by an elicited act of love about any object whatever proposed to it by the intellect; otherwise the will could nowhere suspend its act, nor could it in any way be called free as regards exercise. To the second of its proofs, I deny the antecedent: for although the angel, from the natural cognition by which he comprehends himself and all his natural perfections, judges himself worthy of love, still it does not follow from this that he forms a practical judgment altogether immutable about the love of self; for although he cannot form a judgment opposed to this love, namely that he himself the angel would have to be hated, nevertheless he can form a judgment suspensive of the act, not on account of the weariness that a continuous act of self-love would generate, but on account of the reason of a lesser good and an impediment to a greater: for the angel could judge that that assiduous love of himself would be an impediment to the love of God, with all his powers and his whole effort of loving. For it is certain that God would be less loved by the angel who at the same time loved himself, than by one who, neglecting the love of himself, burned with the entire fire of divine love.

You will object 2. The will of the angel always wills, just as its intellect always understands: therefore just as every cognition of the angel is reduced to the cognition of self, as to the first operation determined by and proceeding from nature itself, so too all his volition is founded in the love and affection of self. Whence it is commonly said: the amiable things that are toward another arise from the amiable things toward oneself; and consequently the natural love by which the angel loves himself must necessarily be continuous and never interrupted, and accordingly necessary as regards exercise.

I distinguish the antecedent. that the will of the angel always wills the same object to which it is determined necessarily and naturally, I deny; that it wills diverse objects, or if the same one, that it wills it only by election and free determination, by which alone and so long it is occupied therewith, as much as and as long as it pleases it, I concede: and I deny the consequence. Add moreover that the proof of the consequence seems likewise false: for the natural love of any object whatever need not necessarily be reduced to the love of self; since, as we said above, the angel can naturally love God more than himself and above all things; but that love by which the angel loves God more than himself cannot be reduced to the love of self, nor take its origin from it: therefore the argument by which the consequence is supported is not universally true.